Table of Contents i
List of Figures iii
List of Tables iii
Acronyms iv
INTRODUCTION ES-1
TRITIUM SUPPLY AND RECYCLING PROPOSAL ES-1
AGENCY PREFERRED ALTERNATIVE ES-5
PURPOSE OF AND NEED FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S ACTION ES-5
CHANGES FROM THE DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT ES-8
TRITIUM SUPPLY AND RECYCLING ES-10
Technologies ES-11
Heavy Water Reactor ES-11
Modular High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor ES-12
Advanced Light Water Reactor ES-15
Accelerator Production of Tritium ES-17
Commercial Light Water Reactor ES-19
Tritium Recycling ES-19
New Recycling Facilities ES-20
Upgrade of Recycling Facilities at Savannah River Site ES-20
SITES ES-20
Commercial Light Water Reactor ES-20
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory ES-23
Nevada Test Site ES-23
Oak Ridge Reservation ES-23
Pantex Plant ES-24
Savannah River Site ES-24
ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED BUT ELIMINATED FROM DETAILED STUDY ES-24
Purchase of Tritium from Foreign Sources ES-24
Redesign of Weapons to Require Less or No Tritium ES-24
Use of Existing Department of Energy Reactors or Accelerators ES-25
Alternative Sites ES-26
REDUCED TRITIUM REQUIREMENTS ES-26
ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCE IMPACT METHODS ES-26
Land Resources ES-26
Land Use ES-26
Visual Resources ES-26
Site Infrastructure ES-26
Air Quality and Acoustics ES-27
Water Resources ES-27
Surface Water ES-27
Groundwater ES-27
Geology and Soils ES-27
Biotic Resources ES-27
Terrestrial Resources ES-27
Wetlands ES-27
Aquatic Resources ES-27
Threatened and Endangered Species ES-27
Cultural and Paleontological Resources ES-28
Prehistoric and Historic Resources ES-28
Native American Resources ES-28
Paleontological Resources ES-28
Socioeconomics ES-28
Radiation and Hazardous Chemical Environment ES-28
Waste Management ES-28
Intersite Transportation ES-29
Environmental Justice ES-29
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS ES-29
Visual Resources ES-30
Air Quality and Acoustics ES-30
Floodplains ES-30
Geology and Soils ES-30
Terrestrial Resources ES-30
Cultural and Paleontological Resources ES-30
Other Socioeconomic Issues ES-30
MULTIPURPOSE ("TRIPLE PLAY") REACTOR ES-30
Advanced Light Water Reactor ES-31
Modular High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor ES-31
Commercial Light Water Reactor ES-31
Core Changes ES-32
Personnel Requirements ES-32
Effluent ES-32
Waste ES-32
Spent Nuclear Fuel ES-33
Worker Radiation Exposure ES-33
Radiological Impacts ES-33
Normal Operations ES-33
Transportation/Handling ES-33
QUALITATIVE COMPARISON ES-33
Site Infrastructure ES-34
Human Health ES-34
Generated Wastes ES-34
Spent Fuel Generation ES-34
Low-Level Waste ES-35
List of Figures
Figure ES-1 Current and Former Nuclear Weapons Complex Sites ES-2
Figure ES-2 Tritium Supply and Recycling Alternatives ES-4
Figure ES-3 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan Process ES-7
Figure ES-4 Estimated Tritium Inventory and Reserve Requirements ES-8
Figure ES-5 Heavy Water Reactor Facility (Typical) ES-13
Figure ES-6 Modular High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor Facility (Typical) ES-14
Figure ES-7 Advanced Light Water Reactor Facility (Typical) ES-16
Figure ES-8 Accelerator Production of Tritium Facility Site Layout (Typical) ES-18
Figure ES-9 New Tritium Recycling Facility (Typical) ES-21
Figure ES-10 Tritium Recycling Facilities Upgrades at Savannah River Site (Generalized) ES-22
List of Tables
Table ES-1 Summary Comparison of Environmental Impacts of Tritium Supply
Technologies and Recycling ES-36
Table ES-2 Summary Comparison of Environmental Impacts of Commercial Light
Water Reactor Alternative ES-68
Acronyms
APT Accelerator Production of Tritium
ALWR Advanced Light Water Reactor
CEQ Council on Environmental Quality
DOE Department of Enegy
DP DOE Office of the Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs
ES&H environment, safety and health
HLW high-level waste
HWR Heavy Water Reactor
INEL Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
IP implementation plan
LLW low-level waste
MHTGR Modular High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor
NEPA National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NRHP National Register of Historic Places
NTS Nevada Test Site
ORR Oak Ridge Reservation
PEIS programmatic environmental impact statement
ROD Record of Decision
SRS Savannah River Site
TRU transuranic
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION
In January 1991, the Secretary of Energy announced that the Department of Energy (DOE)
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs (DP) would prepare a programmatic
environmental impact statement (PEIS) examining alternatives for the reconfiguration of
the Nation's Nuclear Weapons Complex (Complex) (figure ES-1). The framework for the
Reconfiguration PEIS was described in the January 1991 Nuclear Weapons Complex Reconfigu-
ration Study, a detailed examination of alternatives for the future Complex. Because of
the significant changes in the world since January 1991, especially with regard to
projected future requirements for the United States nuclear weapons stockpile, the
framework described in the Nuclear Weapons Reconfiguration Study does not exist today.
Therefore, the Department separated the Reconfiguration PEIS into two PEISs: a PEIS for
Tritium Supply and Recycling; and a Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS. The Tritium
Supply and Recycling Proposal is analyzed in this PEIS. The Stockpile Stewardship and
Management Proposal is currently being analyzed in a separate PEIS being prepared by DP.
Another issue, which was once part of reconfiguration, was the storage of all
weapons-usable fissile materials, primarily highly enriched uranium and plutonium. In
early 1994 the Secretary established a Department-wide program for developing recom-
mendations and for directing implementation of decisions concerning disposition of excess
nuclear materials. This program was recognized in the FY 1995 Defense Authorization Bill
which directed that an office be established for this purpose.
A determination was made that a PEIS was needed to support the decision-making for
disposition of surplus weapons-usable fissile materials. Since long-term storage is so
closely related (connected) to disposition, the long-term storage analysis that had been
part of the Reconfiguration PEIS was moved into the program for Long-Term Storage and
Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials. As a result, a third PEIS, the Long Term
Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials PEIS, is being prepared to
analyze alternatives for the long-term storage of all weapons-usable fissile materials,
primarily highly-enriched uranium and plutonium. That PEIS will also address the
disposition of plutonium declared surplus to national defense needs by the President. An
EIS for the disposition of surplus highly enriched uranium is also being prepared.
Tritium Supply and Recycling Proposal
DOE proposes to provide tritium supply and recycling facilities for the Complex. Tritium,
a man-made radioactive isotope of hydrogen, is an essential component of every warhead in
the current and projected U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. These warheads depend on tritium
to perform as designed. Tritium decays at a rate of 5.5 percent per year and must be
replaced periodically as long as the Nation relies on a nuclear deterrent. Currently, the
Complex does not have the capability to produce the required amounts of tritium, yet
projections require that new tritium be available by approximately 2011. The Tritium
Supply and Recycling Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement evaluates the siting,
construction, and operation of tritium supply technology alternatives and recycling
facilities at each of five candidate sites: the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
(INEL), the Nevada Test Site (NTS), the Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR), the Pantex Plant, and
the Savannah River Site (SRS). The PEIS assesses the environmental impacts of all
reasonable alternatives discussed in the following section, including NoAction.
Tritium supply deals with the production of new tritium in either a reactor or an
accelerator (by irradiating target materials with neutrons) and the subsequent
extraction of the tritium in pure form for its use in nuclear weapons. Tritium recycling
consists of recovering residual tritium from weapons components, purifying it, and
refilling weapons components with both recovered and new tritium when it becomesavailable.
Figure (Page ES-2)
Figure ES-1. - Current and Former Nuclear Weapons Complex Sites
Under the No Action alternative, DOE would not establish a new tritium supply capability.
The current inventory of tritium would decay and DOE would not meet stockpile requirements
of tritium. This would be contrary to DOE's mission as specified by the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954, as amended. Alternatives for new tritium supply and recycling facilities
consist of four different tritium supply technologies and five locations as shown in
figure ES-2. The four technologies proposed to provide a new supply of tritium are Heavy
Water Reactor (HWR), Modular High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor (MHTGR), Advanced Light
Water Reactor (ALWR), and Accelerator Production of Tritium (APT). Both Large (1,300
MWe) and Small (600 MWe) options for the ALWR are evaluated as well as a phased approach
for the APT. The use of an existing commercial light water reactor that would be used for
irradiation services or purchased and converted for tritium production is also included
as an alternative for longterm tritium supply.
Tritium Supply and Recycling Proposal:
. Provide the long-term, assured supply of
Tritium.
. Safely and reliably fulfill all future
national defense requirements for
tritium.
. Protect the health of workers, the
general public, and the environment.
Additionally, the PEIS for Tritium Supply and Recycling includes an assessment of the
environmental impacts associated with using one or more commercial light water
reactors for tritium production as a contingency in the event of a national emergency.
Specific commercial reactors are not identified in thePEIS.
This PEIS also addresses the environmental impacts of an ALWR or modular gas-cooled
reactor used as a multipurpose reactor. A commercial reactor could also be used as a
multipurpose reactor. Throughout the PEIS, references to and discussion of impacts for the
multipurpose ALWR are also applicable to a multipurpose commercial reactor. A
multipurpose ("triple play") reactor is defined as one capable of producing tritium,
"burning" plutonium, and generating revenues through the sale of electric power. The
multipurpose ALWR would operate the same as the uranium-fueled tritium production ALWR.
Therefore, the environmental impacts from operation of a multipurpose ALWR would be
expected to be similar to those from the tritium production ALWR. However, a plutonium Pit
Disassembly/Conversion/Mixed-Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility would be needed to provide
the mixed-oxide fuel rods for the ALWR multipurpose reactor and would be the major
contributor to potential environmental impacts greater than those for a uranium-fueled
tritium production ALWR for this scenario. For a modular gas-cooled multipurpose reactor,
twice as many reactor modules would be needed both to meet tritium requirements and to
burn plutonium. A plutonium Pit Disassembly/Conversion/Fuel Fabrication Facility also
would be needed. Thus, the potential environmental impacts for a multipurpose gas-cooled
reactor are expected to be substantially greater than a uranium-fueled tritium production
gas-cooled reactor.
The PEIS evaluates alternative tritium supply technologies against a baseline tritium
requirement (i.e., a specific quantity of tritium, the exact amount of which is
classified). Understanding the concept of the baseline tritium requirement is crucial to
understanding the alternatives and the analysis in the PEIS. The baseline tritium
requirement is the amount necessary to support the 1994 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan,
which is based on a START II stockpile level of approximately 3,500 accountable weapons.
In the PEIS, the baseline tritium requirement is approximately 3/8ths the tritium
requirement that was analyzed in the New Production Reactor Draft EIS published in April
1991. This is the tritium requirement "baseline" which the tritium supply technologies
must support, and against which they are assessed.
This baseline tritium requirement is made up of two specific components: (1) a
steady-state tritium requirement to make up for tritium lost through natural decay; and
(2) a surge tritium requirement to replace any tritium which might be used in the event
the Nation ever dipped into, or lost, its tritium reserve. The sizing of the surge
capacity is based on the requirement set forth in the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan to
reconstitute the entire reserve in a 5-year period. The steady-state component accounts
for approximately 50 percent of the baseline tritium requirement, while the surge accounts
for the remaining 50 percent. Tritium supply technologies being evaluated must be able to
support the steadystate tritium requirement (a specific quantity of tritium every year),
and make up for any lost tritium reserves.
Figure (Page ES-4)
Figure ES-2.- Tritium Supply and Recycling Alternatives
Time Frame of Proposed Action:
. 1999 to 2009 - Construction
. 2010 - Initial Operation
. 2010 to 2050 - Full Operation
The Tritium Supply and Recycling Proposal will proceed in three phases. The first phase
involves preparing information to support programmatic decisions on siting and technology.
This includes preparing this PEIS and the associated Record of Decision (ROD). The ROD may
include the following programmatic decisions:
. Whether to build new tritium supply
andnew or upgraded tritium recycling
facilities;
. Where to locate new tritium supply and
recycling facilities; and
. Which technologies to employ for tritium
supply.
During the second phase, DOE would develop detailed designs and meet project-specific
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) requirements which would focus on where
the facility would be placed and construction and operation impacts. The third phase would
involve constructing, testing, and certifying the selected tritium supply and recycling
facilities, leading to full operation. Present planning requires the tritium facilities to
be fully operational by the year 2010 with new tritium available for use approximately 1
year later. The PEIS also includes analyses of providing tritium at an earlier date
(approximately 2005) to support a higher stockpile level.
Following the PEIS, DOE will develop a schedule for implementing the ROD decision. The
schedule will be subject to change and include reassessments required by congressional
authorizations and appropriations. Although the individual schedules of any activities
or projects may overlap, the current uncertainty associated with any given activity or
project requires that assumptions be made regarding the time periods used in the PEIS
analyses.
Because of the uncertainties associated with the scheduling of the second and third
phases, the PEIS assumes an environmental baseline period for construction between 1999
and 2009, and an operational period, beginning in approximately 2010, of 40years. Although
the design life of the tritium supply and recycling facilities has not yet been deter-
mined by engineering studies, the assumption of an operational period of approximately 40
years is consistent with the operating periods used in prior DOE NEPA documents for
similar new facilities. Projectlevel tiered NEPA documents would identify in detail the
specific construction and operational periods for each project implemented.
AGENCY PREFERRED ALTERNATIVE
The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) Regulations require an agency to identify its
preferred alternative(s) in the Final Environmental Impact Statement (40 CFR 1502.14(e)).
The preferred alternative is the alternative which the agency believes would fulfill its
statutory mission, giving consideration to environmental, economic, technical, and other
factors. Consequently, to identify a preferred alternative, the Department has developed
information on potential environmental impacts, costs, technical risks, and schedule
risks for the alternatives under consideration.
This PEIS provides information on the environmental impacts. Cost, schedule, and
technical analyses have also been prepared, and are summarized in the Tritium Supply and
Recycling Technical Reference Report which is available in the appropriate DOE Reading
Rooms for public review.
Based upon the analysis presented in the documents identified above, the Department's
preferred alternative is a acquisition strategy that assures tritium production for
the nuclear weapons stockpile rapidly, cost effectively, and safely. The preferred
strategy is to begin work on the two most promising production alternatives: (1) purchase
an existing commercial light water reactor or irradiation services with an option to
purchase the reactor for conversion to a defense facility; (2) design, build, and test
critical components of an accelerator system for tritium production. Within a three year
period, the Department would select one of the alternatives to serve as the primary source
of tritium. The other alternative, if feasible, would be developed as a back-up
tritiumsource.
Savannah River Site has been designated as the preferred site for an accelerator, should
one be built. The preferred alternative for tritium recycling and extraction activities is
to remain at the Savannah River Site with appropriate consolidation and upgrading of
current facilities, and construction of a new extraction facility.
Purpose of and Need For the department of energy's action
Since nuclear weapons came into existence in 1945, a nuclear deterrent has been a
cornerstone of the Nation's defense policy and national security. The President reiterated
this principle in his July 3, 1993, radio address to the Nation. Tritium was used in the
design process to enhance the yield of nuclear weapons and allow for the production of
smaller or more powerful warheads to satisfy the needs of modern delivery systems. As a
result, the United States' strategic nuclear systems are based on designs that use
tritium. Therefore, the Nation requires a reliable tritium supply source. Tritium has a
relatively short radioactive half-life of 12.3 years. Because of this relatively rapid
radioactive decay, tritium must be replenished periodically in nuclear weapons to ensure
that they will function as designed. Over the past 40 years, DOE has built and operated 14
reactors to produce tritium and other nuclear materials for weapons purposes. Today, none
of these reactors is operational, and no tritium has been produced since 1988.
Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, DOE is responsible for developing
and maintaining the capability to produce nuclear materials such as tritium, which are
required for the defense of the United States. The primary use of tritium is for
maintaining the Nation's stockpile of nuclear weapons as directed by the President in the
Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan. Figure ES-3 depicts the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan
process.
Tritium, with a 12.3-year half-life, decays at the rate of approximately 5 percent per
year and is necessary for all nuclear weapons that remain in the stockpile
The Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan is normally forwarded annually from the Secretaries of
the Departments of Energy and Defense via the National Security Council to the President
for approval. The Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan reflects the size and composition of the
stockpile needed to defend the United States and provides an assessment of DOE's ability
to support the proposed stockpile. Many factors are considered in the development of the
Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan, including the status of the currently approved stockpile,
arms control negotiations and treaties, Congressional constraints, and the status of the
nuclear material production and fabrication facilities. Revisions of the Nuclear Weapons
Stockpile Plan could be issued when any of the factors indicate the need to change
requirements established in the annual document. The most current Nuclear Weapons
Stockpile Plan, which was approved by President Clinton on March 7, 1994, authorizes
weapons production and retirement through fiscal year 1999. The analysis in this PEIS is
based on the requirements of the 1994 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan which is based on
START II stockpile levels (approximately 3,500 accountable weapons). The 1994 Nuclear
Weapons Stockpile Plan represents the latest official guidance for tritium requirements. A
Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan for 1995 has not yet been issued. Appendix CA, which is
classified, contains quantitative projections for tritium requirements based on the 1994
Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan, and details of the transportation analysis.
Even with a reduced nuclear weapons stockpile and no identified requirements for new
nuclear weapons production in the foreseeable future, an assured long-term tritium supply
and recycling capability will be required. Presently, no source of new tritium is avail-
able. The effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear deterrent capability depends not only on the
Nation's current stockpile of nuclear weapons or those it can produce, but also on its
ability to reliably and safely provide the tritium needed to support these weapons.
Until a new tritium supply source is operational, DOE will continue to support tritium
requirements by recycling tritium from weapons retired from the Nation's nuclear weapons
stockpile. However, because tritium decays relatively quickly, recycling can only meet the
tritium demands for a limited time. Current projections, derived from classified
projections of future stockpile scenarios, indicate that recycled tritium will adequately
support the Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile until approximately 2011 (figure ES-4).
After that time, without a new tritium supply source, it would be necessary to utilize the
strategic reserve of tritium in order to maintain the readiness of the nuclear weapons
stockpile. The strategic reserve of tritium contains a quantity of tritium maintained for
emergencies and contingencies. In such a scenario, if the strategic tritium reserve is
depleted, the nuclear deterrent capability would degrade because the weapons in the
stockpile would not be capable of functioning as designed. Eventually, the nuclear
deterrent would be lost. The proposed tritium supply and recycling facilities would
provide the capability to produce tritium safely and reliably in order to meet the
Nation's defense requirements well into the 21st century while also complying with
environment, safety, and health (ES&H) standards.
DOE has analyzed the activities that must take place in order to bring a new tritium
supply source into operation. The analysis indicates that it could take approximately 15
years to research, develop, design, construct, and test a new tritium supply source before
new tritium production can begin. Thus, in order to have reasonable confidence that the
Nation will be able to maintain an effective nuclear deterrent, prudent management
dictates that DOE proceed with the proposed action now. In addition, DOE was required to
meet a statutory deadline of March 1, 1995, to issue a PEIS addressing tritium supply
alternatives (Public Law 103-160, section 3145). That deadline was met by the issuance
of a Draft PEIS for Tritium Supply and Recycling in February 1995. Following public
hearings, comments received have been considered in preparing this Final PEIS which will
be submitted to Congress to close out DOE's obligation with respect to the intent of
Public Law 103-160, Section 3145.
Changes from the Draft Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement
The 60-day public comment period for the Draft PEIS began on March 17, 1995, and ended on
May 15, 1995. However, comments were accepted as late as June 23, 1995. During the comment
period, public hearings were held in Las Vegas,NV; Washington,DC; Pocatello, ID; Oak
Ridge,TN; NorthAugusta, SC; and Amarillo,TX. Two hearings were held at each location. In
addition, the public was encouraged to provide comments via mail, fax, electronic
bulletin board (Internet), and telephone (tollfree 800-number). During public review of
the Draft PEIS a majority of the comments regarded concerns that alternatives and/or
candidate sites were not given the correct amount of consideration on factors including
cost and technical feasibility. Although these concerns made up the majority of the
comments, many others involved the resources analyzed, NEPA and regulatory issues, and DOE
and Federal policies as they related to the PEIS. The major issues identified by
commentors included the following:
The electrical requirements of the various alternatives, particularly the APT, and the
potential for the MHTGR and ALWR to produce electricity;
The impacts of the alternatives on groundwater, including the potential for aquifer
depletion and contamination and the consideration of the use of treated wastewater for
cooling;
The socioeconomic impacts, both positive and negative, of locating or failing to locate a
facility at one of the candidate sites;
Figure (Page ES-8)
Figure ES-3. - Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan Process
Figure (Page ES-9)
Figure ES-4. - Estimated Tritium Inventory and Reserve Requirements.
The generation, storage, and disposal of radioactive and hazardous wastes (including
spent nuclear fuel) and the associated risks;
The impacts of the alternatives on human health (both from radiation and hazardous
chemicals) and how these risks were determined and evaluated;
The relationship of this PEIS to other DOE documents and programs, particularly the
Waste Management PEIS and the Fissile Materials Disposition Program, and the need to make
decisions based on all associated programs and activities concurrently;
The need for decisions to be based on many different factors, including environmental,
cost, and safety concerns;
The failure of DOE to consider a no tritium or zero stockpile alternative, and the
negative national and international implications of building a new tritium supply
facility; and
The need for DOE to consider a commercial reactor alternative in greater detail.
Additionally, as a result of public comments, DOE published on August 25, 1995 a Notice in
the Federal Register (60 FR 44327) to include the purchase of irradiation services from a
commercial reactor as a reasonable alternative. The Draft PEIS considered this an
unreasonable alternative because of the long-standing policy of the United States that
civilian nuclear facilities should not be utilized for military purpose and
nonproliferation concerns. Nonetheless, the Draft PEIS included an evaluation of the
environmental impacts of irradiation services using an existing commercial reactor to
make tritium. Because of public comments on the Notice, public review of the Draft PEIS,
and further consideration of nonproliferation issues, purchase of irradiation services is
evaluated in the PEIS as a reasonable alternative. During the extended comment period,
there were two major issues of concern raised:
License and regulatory implication; and
Non-proliferation concerns.
Revisions in the Final PEIS include additional discussion and analysis in the following
areas: severe accidents and design-basis accidents for all tritium supply technologies;
site-specific environmental impacts of a dedicated power plant for the Accelerator
Production of Tritium (APT); revisions to water resources sections; site-specific analysis
of the multi-purpose reactor that could produce tritium, burn plutonium as fuel, and
produce electricity; and the commercial reactor alternative, specifically the purchase of
an existing reactor and the purchase of irradiation services for DOE target rods to
produce tritium. Each of these areas will be discussed in more detail below.
Analyses of an ALWR design-basis accident were reevaluated as a result of public comments
questioning the apparent severity and frequency of the accident consequences shown in
the Draft PEIS. Additional analyses were performed to accurately estimate the impacts from
a more reasonable design-basis accident and these results have been included in the Final
PEIS.
The analyses of impacts of severe reactor accidents were also revised. The Draft PEIS
presented the impacts of a single severe accident for each of the reactor technologies.
Since accident consequences vary greatly depending on the selected accident frequency
value, a spectrum of severe accidents with a range of frequencies was used to perform a
more representative analysis for each technology. The new analyses presented reflect the
probable effects of a set of accidents for each reactor rather than the single accident
scenario.
Public comments also suggested that a disparity existed between the reactor and APT
accident analyses, thereby creating a bias in favor of the APT. The Final PEIS now
includes an APT severe accident with loss of confinement. The new accident analysis has a
more severe initiating event, a lower frequency, and a higher consequence than the
analysis presented in the Draft PEIS.
The Final PEIS has been modified to include a qualitative discussion of impacts to
involved workers (workers assigned to the facility and located in close proximity to the
facility as a result of the proposed action) and quantitative impacts to noninvolved
workers (workers collocated at the site independent of the proposed action). For involved
workers, impacts were addressed qualitatively, explaining the significant risk for
exposure and fatality and that mitigative features would be provided in the design and
operation to minimize worker impacts from accidents.
For the noninvolved worker, the impacts were represented by the exposure of a
hypothetical worker at several prescribed distances from the accident (but within the site
boundary). These impacts were described in terms of dose (rems), increases in the
likelihood of cancer fatalities, and risk of cancer for the maximally exposed noninvolved
worker.
Another significant change in the document is a more detailed description of potential
impacts of a dedicated power plant for the APT. The section has been revised to include
site-specific impacts for the gas-fired power plant.
Based on public comments received at the hearings, two revisions were incorporated in the
water resources sections for NTS and Pantex. For NTS, the Final PEIS incorporates more
accurate recharge rates and information regarding the potential project use of the NTS
aquifer to present a more accurate impact on groundwater resources.
For Pantex, the Final PEIS includes the use of reclaimed sanitary wastewater sources, the
Hollywood Road Wastewater Treatment Plant and the Pantex Plant Wastewater Treatment Plant
for tritium supply cooling water.
A more detailed analysis of the multi-purpose reactor has been included in the Final PEIS.
Since the multi-purpose reactor would use plutonium fuel, an analysis of the construction
impacts of a Pit Disassembly/Conversion/Mixed-Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility to support a
multi-purpose ALWR has been incorporated in the site-specific analysis for each of the five
candidate sites. Impacts of just the pit disassembly/conversion part of the facility are
included for the multi-purpose MHTGR since this technology already includes a fuel
fabrication component. For the operation of a multi-purpose reactor, additional detail
regarding the impacts on atmospheric emissions, liquid emissions, water requirements,
socioeconomics, human health (for both normal operations and accidents), waste management,
and intersite transportation has been included in the site-specific analysis.
Analysis and a discussion of potential impacts have been expanded and included in this
PEIS on the alternative of DOE purchasing an existing operating commercial reactor or
an incomplete reactor and converting it to production of tritium for defense purposes.
Also included in the Final PEIS is an analysis of the alternative of DOE purchasing
irradiation services from one or more commercial light water reactors for the production
of tritium using DOE targets.
TRITIUM SUPPLY AND RECYCLING
The tritium supply technologies and site alternatives are described below. For each
alternative except those being considered for SRS, a new tritium recycling facility could
either be collocated with the new supply facilities or DOE could use the existing tritium
recycling facilities at SRS after upgrade. For the alternatives at SRS, DOE would utilize
existing recycling facilities at SRS, which would be upgraded to support the tritium
mission.
Technologies
Of the tritium supply technologies considered by DOE for the production of tritium in this
PEIS, only the HWR has tritium production operating experience. The MHTGR and light
water reactor (upon which the ALWR is based) technologies have been used in electrical
power production but lack tritium production experience and development of tritium target
technology. The APT technology, which has an operating history in research and development
programs, also has no tritium production experience and only recent development of tritium
targets.
Since both the MHTGR and the ALWR were originally developed to produce electricity and
as such have steam turbines as an integral part of their designs, the PEIS evaluates the
environmental effects of both of these technologies with turbines included. The actual
sale of steam or generation of electricity by DOE would be covered in the site-specific
tiered NEPA documents if either of these technologies is chosen. The general impacts of
the transmission lines necessary to carry this generated electricity are discussed. In
addition, the general impacts of constructing and operating a dedicated power plant
(either coal or natural gas burning) to provide the required power for the APT are also
presented. As both the MHTGR and the ALWR technologies could also be used for the ultimate
disposition of plutonium, the general impacts of operating these two technologies with
plutonium-uranium fuel is presented in the PEIS.
Heavy Water Reactor. The HWR would be a low pressure, low temperature reactor whose sole
purpose would be to produce tritium. The HWR would use heavy water as the reactor coolant
and moderator. Because of the low temperature of the exit coolant, a power conversion
system designed to produce electrical power as an option would not be feasible. In
addition to the reactor, the HWR complex would consist of several support buildings and
other facilities required for the supply and extraction of tritium.
The HWR complex would cover approximately 260acres and the entire area would be surrounded
by a security fence. The main reactor would be about 10stories high and other associated
buildings would range from one story to three stories in height. The cooling towers would
vary in height, depending on the type of cooling towers utilized. The cooling tower basin,
which serves as a holding pond for the cooling towers, would cover approximately 2 acres.
In this PEIS, dry sites such as INEL, NTS, and Pantex which lack plentiful surface water
sources would use mechanical draft dry cooling towers while wet sites such as ORR and SRS
with abundant surface water resources would use natural draft wet cooling towers.
Range of Selected Construction Requirements for Tritium Supply Technologies:
. Electrical Energy Demand:
40,000 to 120,000 MWh per year
. Land Use:
173 to 360 acres
. Total Number of COnstruction Workers:
2,200 to 3,500
. Water Consumption:
41,700,000 to 200,000,000 gallons
. Steel Consumption
45,000 to 68,000 tons
The conceptual design of the HWR complex includes a fuel and target fabrication facility
to assemble fuel and target rods that are used in the reactor core; a tritium target
processing facility to extract and collect tritium from irradiated targets; an interim
spent fuel storage building to store used target and fuel rods; a general services
building for administrative purposes; and a security infrastructure to control access to
the complex. Figure ES-5 shows a representative drawing of an HWR complex with mechan-
ical draft cooling towers for illustrative purposes only. The number and arrangement of
buildings and support areas are descriptive only and can change significantly as design
progresses. The fuel and target fabrication facility would be a steel or concrete
structure designed to control the spread of contamination within the building and
prevent the uncontrolled release of radioactive material. The target processing facility
would consist of two attached structures: a process building and a support building. The
process building would include the laboratory and other activities associated with
handling tritium. The support building contains offices, maintenance areas, and
nonradioactive ventilation systems.
The design of the HWR would incorporate numerous safety features including: an emergency
power facility to house diesel generators or gas turbines for short-term emergency power
to support safety related loads in the event of temporary failure of the offsite power
supply; a reactor containment building to limit any operational or accidental release of
radioactivity; an emergency core cooling system to makeup coolant for heat removal in the
event of a loss of coolant or a loss of pumping; an emergency shutdown system with safety
rods independent of the reactor control rods; a neutron poison system to inject neutron-
absorbing material into the moderator tank; and a backup system to remove heat from the
reactor if the primary coolant fails to circulate.
Construction of the HWR would take somewhat less than 8 years and require approximately
2,320workers during the peak construction period. Once constructed, approximately 1 to 2
years would be needed for system checkout of the reactor prior to actual tritium
production. Operation of the HWR would require approximately 930 workers.
Modular High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor. The MHTGR would be a high temperature,
moderate pressure reactor whose primary purpose would be to produce tritium. The MHTGR
would use helium gas as a core coolant and graphite as a moderator. Because of the high
temperature of the exit coolant, a power conversion facility designed to produce elec-
tricity is an integral part of the design and is included in the analysis. In addition to
the reactor building and the power conversion building, the MHTGR complex would consist of
several buildings and other facilities required for the supply and extraction of tritium.
The MHTGR complex would cover approximately 360 acres and the entire area would be
surrounded by a security fence. The MHTGR would consist of three 350 MWt reactor vessels
housed in adjacent, below-ground, reinforced-concrete silos. The silos would extend
approximately 160 feet below-grade and each reactor vessel would be about 22 feet in
diameter and 75 feet high. Each reactor vessel would contain a reactor core, reflectors,
and associated supports. A shutdown cooling heat exchanger and a shutdown cooling
circulator would be located at the bottom of the vessels. Support buildings and other
associated facilities within the MHTGR complex would range in height from one to three
stories. Two cooling towers would be needed and their height would vary, depending on the
type of cooling towers that are utilized. In this PEIS dry sites (INEL, NTS, and Pantex)
would use mechanical draft dry cooling towers and wet sites (ORR and SRS) would use
natural draft wet cooling towers.
Figure (Page ES-13)
Figure ES-5. - Heavy Water Reactor Facility (Typical).
The design of the MHTGR complex would include a fuel and target fabrication facility, a
tritium target processing building, helium storage buildings, waste treatment facilities,
spent fuel storage facility, a general services building, a security infrastructure, and a
power conversion facility consisting of three turbine-generators and associated electrical
control equipment. Figure ES-6 shows a representative drawing of a MHTGR complex with
mechanical draft cooling towers shown for illustrative purposes only. The number and
arrangement of buildings and support areas are descriptive only and can change sig-
nificantly as design progresses. The design of the MHTGR would incorporate numerous safety
features that include: an emergency power facility to house diesel generators or gas
turbines for short-term emergency power to support safety related loads in the event of
temporary failure of the offsite power supply; a below-grade design, which serves as a
barrier to external hazards (aircraft, turbine blades, and tornado-generated debris),
reduces seismicinduced stress on the reactors, and provides radiological shielding; a
below-grade containment structure made of reinforced concrete; an emergency core cooling
system; and an emergency shutdown system with safety rods independent of the reactor
control rods.
Construction of the MHTGR would take about 9years and require approximately 2,210 workers
during the peak construction period. One to 2 years would be needed after construction for
system checkout of the reactor prior to actual tritium production. Operation of the
MHTGR would require approximately 910 workers.
A modular gas-cooled reactor like the MHTGR would also be capable of performing the
"triple play" missions of producing tritium, burning plutonium, and generating
electricity. To burn plutonium in a gas-cooled reactor, a plutonium Pit Disassem-
bly/Conversion/Plutonium-Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility would be needed. Additionally,
because tritium production decreases significantly in a plutonium-fueled gas-cooled
reactor, twice as many reactor modules would be necessary in order to produce the
steady-state tritium requirements. This doubling of reactor modules would be the major
contributor to potential environmental impacts for this scenario. The PEIS contains an
assessment of these potential environmental impacts.
Advanced Light Water Reactor. The ALWR would be a high temperature, high pressure reactor
whose primary purpose would be to produce tritium. There are two options for the proposed
ALWR technology: a Large ALWR (1,300 MWe) and a Small ALWR (600MWe). The large and small
options would be chosen from the following four candidates: a large or small pressurized
water reactor; or a large or small boiling water reactor. All ALWR options would use light
(regular) water as the reactor coolant and moderator. Like the MHTGR, a power conversion
facility (steam turbine) is an integral part of the design for the ALWR because of the
high temperature of the exit coolant and is included in the analysis. In addition to the
reactor building, the ALWR complex would consist of several support buildings and other
facilities for the supply and extraction of tritium.
The ALWR complex would cover approximately 350acres and the entire area would be
surrounded by a security fence. The main reactor building would be approximately 10
stories high. The other associated buildings would range from one to three stories in
height. The differences between the large and small options are primarily in the power
output of the reactors. Both of the small reactors are rated at 600MWe, while the large
options are rated at 1,300MWe. The physical sizes of the large and small options for each
of the technologies are generally the same.
In addition to the reactor, the ALWR complex would include an interim spent fuel storage
building, a waste treatment facility, a tritium target processing facility, warehouses,
and a power conversion facility. Unlike the other technologies, the ALWR would not have a
fuel fabrication facility since fuel rods would be obtained from offsite sources. Figure
ES-7 shows a representative drawing of an ALWR complex with a natural draft cooling tower
shown for illustrative purposes only. The number and arrangements of buildings and support
areas are descriptive only and can change significantly as design progresses. The tritium
target processing facility would consist of the following two attached structures: a
processing building and a support building. The process building would include the tritium
extraction processes, laboratory, and other activities associated with handling tritium.
The support building would contain offices, maintenance areas, and nonradioactive
ventilation systems. The type of cooling tower used depends upon where the ALWR were
located. In this PEIS, dry sites (INEL, NTS, and Pantex) would use mechanical draft dry
cooling towers and wet sites (ORR and SRS) would use natural draft wet cooling towers.
Figure (Page ES-15)
Figure ES-6. - Modular High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor Facility (Typical).
Figure (Page ES-16)
Figure ES-7. - Advanced Light Water Reactor Facility (Typical).
The design of the ALWR would incorporate numerous safety features such as: an emergency
power facility to house diesel generators or gas turbines for short-term emergency power
to support safety-related loads in the event of temporary failure of the offsite power
supply; a reactor containment building to limit any release of radioactivity; an emergency
core cooling system to makeup coolant in the event of a loss of coolant or a loss of
pumping; an emergency shutdown system; and a neutron poison system to inject
neutron-absorbing material into the reactor vessel.
Construction of the ALWR would take about 6 years and require approximately 3,500 workers
for the Large ALWR and 2,200 workers for the Small ALWR during the peak construction
period. Once constructed, 1 to 2 years would be needed for system checkout of the
reactor prior to actual tritium production. Operation of the Large and Small ALWR would
require approximately 830 and 500 workers,respectively.
An ALWR would also be capable of performing the "triple play" missions of producing
tritium, burning plutonium, and generating electricity. The multi-purpose ALWR would
operate essentially the same as a uranium-fueled tritium production ALWR. Therefore, the
environmental impacts from operation of a multi-purpose ALWR would be expected to be
unchanged from the tritium production ALWR. To burn plutonium in an ALWR, a plutonium Pit
Disassembly/Conversion/Mixed-Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility would be needed to provide
the mixed-oxide fuel rods for the ALWR, and would be the major contributor to potential
environmental impacts for this scenario. The PEIS contains an assessment of these
potential environmental impacts.
Range of Selected Operation Requirements for Tritium Supply Technologies:
. Electrical Energy Demand:
260,000 to 740,000 MWh per year
. Land Use:
173 to 360 acres
. Total Number of Operation Workers:
500 to 930
. Water Consumption:
0.03 to 16 billion gallons per year
. Spent Nuclear Fuel Generation:
0 to 80 cubic yards per year
Accelerator Production of Tritium. The APT would be a linear accelerator whose primary
purpose would be to produce tritium. The APT accelerates a proton beam in a long tunnel to
one of two target/blanket assemblies located in separate target stations. There are two
target/blanket concepts being considered in the conceptual design of the Full APT: the
helium-3 target and the spallation-induced lithium conversion target.
The APT complex would cover approximately 173acres and the entire area would be surrounded
by a security fence. The accelerator, 3,940 feet in length, would be housed in a concrete
tunnel buried 40 to 50 feet underground for radiation shielding. The design of the APT
radio frequency power system and its distribution network is similar to that of existing
accelerators. The tunnel would be sealed and evacuated during operation but would vent to
the atmosphere during shutdown period. The full size facility would consist of 10 cooling
towers and 13substations located above ground along the full length of the underground
accelerator. The APT facility would require a peak electrical load of approximately 550
MWe to produce the 3/8 goal tritium quantity and 355 MWe to produce the steady-state
tritium requirement. Additionally, there would be two cooling towers for the
target/blanket beam stop located next to the target building. The cooling towers and the
substations would be approximately one to two stories in height.
The preconceptual design of the APT complex includes: a target building that would house
either the helium-3 or the spallation-induced lithium conversion target chambers located
in a subterranean structure at the same level as the accelerator; a tritium processing
facility to extract tritium from the targets; a klystron remanufacturing and maintenance
facility; waste treatment buildings to treat all generated wastes; and various
administration, operation, and maintenance facilities. Figure ES-8 shows a repre-
sentative drawing of an APT complex. The number and arrangement of buildings and support
areas are illustrative and can change significantly as designprogresses.
The design of the APT would incorporate numerous safety features to include: an emergency
power facility to house diesel generators or gas turbines for short-term emergency power
to support safety related loads in the event of temporary failure of the offsite power
supply; multiple sensors and diagnostics which would determine if the accelerator beam
is out of acceptable limits in terms of position, energy, size, etc.; redundant cooling
systems for all heat-removal systems; and an automatic beam shutoff in the event of a
loss of cooling, a misaligned beam, or abnormal radiation levels.
Construction of the APT would take about 5 years and require approximately 2,760 workers
during the peak construction period. Additional construction area for equipment and
materials would not be required since there would be sufficient unencumbered space
within the APT boundaries. Once constructed, 1 to 2 years would be needed for system
checkout of the accelerator prior to actual tritium production. Operation of the APT
would require approximately 624 workers.
If desired, a phased construction of the APT could also occur. Under this scenario,
initial construction of the APT would result in a facility that could produce the
steady-state requirement of tritium (approximately 50 percent of baseline case). Expansion
of the facility could be possible at a later date in order to increase tritium production
to the baseline requirements if necessary. The helium-3 target is the primary target in
the Phased APT option.
Commercial Light Water Reactor. The purchase by DOE of an existing operating or partially
completed commercial power reactor is an alternative to meet the stockpile tritium
requirement. Production of tritium using irradiation services contracted from commercial
power reactor(s) (with the option to purchase the reactor) is also an alternative. Commer-
cial light water reactors use both pressurized water and boiling water technologies. Of
the two types, pressurized water reactors are more readily adaptable to the requirements
of tritium production by DOE tritium target rod irradiation because they utilize burnable
poison rods which could be replaced by tritium target rods.
Commercial pressurized water reactors are high-temperature, high-pressure reactors that
use ordinary light water as the coolant and moderator and are capable of generating large
amounts of electricity through a steam turbine generator. The range of electrical
production for these plants is approximately 390 million kWh per year to 6,900 million kWh
per year using an assumed annual capacity factor of 62percent. A typical commercial light
water reactor facility includes the reactor building, spent fuel storage facilities,
cooling towers, a switchyard for the transmission of generated electricity, maintenance
buildings, administrative buildings, and security facilities. Acreage for existing
operating commercial light water reactor facilities varies in size from a low of 84 acres
to a high of 30,000 acres.
The designs of typical commercial reactors incorporate numerous safety features
including: a reactor containment building to limit any release of radioactivity; an
emergency core cooling system for heat removal in the event of a loss of coolant or a loss
of pumping; an emergency shutdown system with safety rods independent of the reactor
control rods; and a backup system to remove heat from the reactor if the primary coolant
fails to circulate.
The representative drawing for the ALWR complex (figure ES-7) would be similar to a
commercial light water reactor complex except that tritium target fabrication and
processing facilities would not be typical facilities. If a partially completed reactor
were purchased, these facilities could potentially be constructed along with the final
construction of thereactor.
Figure (Page ES-19)
Figure ES-8. - Accelerator Production of Tritium Facility Site Layout (Typical).
A commercial reactor would also be capable of performing the triple play" missions of
producing tritium, burning plutonium, and generating electricity. The multi-purpose
commercial reactor would operate essentially the same as a uranium-fueled tritium
production commercial reactor. Therefore, the environmental impacts from operation of a
multi-purpose commercial reactor would be expected to be unchanged from the tritium
production commercial reactor. To burn plutonium in a commercial reactor, a plutonium Pit
Disassembly/Conversion/Mixed-Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility would be needed to provide
the mixed-oxide fuel rods for the commercial reactor, and would be the major contributor
to potential environmental impacts for this scenario. The PEIS contains a generic
assessment of these potential environmental impacts.
Tritium Recycling
The primary mission of the tritium recycling facility is to process and recycle tritium
for use in nuclear weapons. This mission includes the steps necessary to empty reservoirs
(small pressure vessels containing tritium installed in nuclear weapons), recover the
tritium, provide new gas mixtures according to specifications, and reclaim usable
reservoirs. Additionally, the tritium recycling facility would perform a full range of
analytical, physical, and environmental tests to ensure that the quality and integrity of
all reservoirs are maintained throughout their operational life. It would also provide
for appropriate waste management, including storage, treatment, and disposal of
tritiated wastes.
The tritium recycling facility would receive tritium in reservoirs returned from DOD and
other activities, or as new tritium from the extraction facility that is associated with
the tritium supply facility. The reservoirs would be unpacked from their shipping
containers in the auxiliary building and taken to the tritium processing building for
temporary storage. They would then be emptied and the contained gases would be processed
to separate the hydrogen isotopes from other gases, primarily helium-3 (a stable isotope
resulting from the radioactive decay of tritium). Prior to being placed into reservoirs,
the tritium would undergo a purification process. The empty reservoir bottles would be
sent to the tritium auxiliary building to be reclaimed. If reclamation is not possible,
the bottles would be disposed of as LLW. Otherwise, they would be refurbished and sent to
the tritium processing building to be filled.
Reservoirs that have been filled with tritium and sealed would be transferred to the
auxiliary building for finishing, where they would be decontaminated, leak tested,
inspected, marked, measured for tritium content, and, if required, combined with various
parts necessary for final assembly. The reservoirs would then be placed in storage until
needed for limited life component exchange, or sent to the assembly and disassembly
facility for use in new weapons.
Some reservoirs would be placed in the weapon surveillance program. The tritium
recycling facility would include testing capability for production, surveillance, and
research and development reservoirs. In general, tests on reservoirs filled with tritium
would be performed in the tritium processing building, while tests on other bottles or
parts of bottles would be performed in the auxiliary building.
Tritium recycling could be collocated with tritium supply, or be done in existing
facilities at SRS. At SRS, an upgrade of the existing recycling facilities would be
implemented rather than construction of a new facility. Discussed below are the options
for new or upgraded recycling facilities.
New Recycling Facilities. If the tritium supply and recycling facilities are located at
any site other than SRS, new recycling facilities would have to be constructed (figure
ES-9). The tritium recycling facility would be housed in two major buildings and in
several support facilities. The first building, the tritium processing building, would
be a hardened facility designed with systems to contain tritium releases should they
occur. The second building, the auxiliary building, would house nontritium and extremely
small amounts of working tritium. These buildings would be located within a 202-acre plant
area.
Figure (Page ES-21)
Figure ES-9.- New Tritium Recycling Facility (Typical)
Upgrade of Recycling Facilities at Savannah River Site. If the tritium supply facilities
are located at SRS or at one of the other sites without a collocated recycling facility,
the existing tritium recycling facilities would be upgraded. The upgrade, presented
here, called the unconsolidated upgrade, would result in no buildings being closed and no
consolidation of tritium handling activities. Buildings 232-H, 232-1H, 234-H, 238-H, and
249-H (figure ES-10), would be upgraded to meet DOE Order 5480.28, Natural Phenomena
Hazards Mitigation. These upgrades would involve adding wall and cross bracings to
existing beams, strengthening some exterior walls, and reinforcing existing building
frames. Additionally, Building 232-H would require an anchor for the service area roof
slab as well as an upgrade to the Radiation Control and Monitoring System. Building 234-H
would require upgrades to its reservoir storage encased safes which are used to protect
filled reservoirs during high winds and earthquakes. No additional acreage would be
required for these upgrades, and no upgrade modifications would be required for buildings
233-H (Replacement Tritium Facility), 235-H, 236-H, or 720-H.
As a potential mitigation measure, a consolidation of tritium activities into fewer
buildings to minimize tritium emissions and waste is also possible. In this upgrade,
called the consolidated upgrade, Building 232-H would be closed and its functions
transferred to buildings 233-H and 234-H. As discussed above, upgrades would then be made
to buildings 232-1H, 234-H, 238-H, and 249-H. Additionally, Building 233-H would require
modifications in order to accept activities transferred from Building 232-H.
SITES
Commercial Light Water Reactor
The commercial light water reactor alternative does not include a specific site for
analysis in the PEIS. Therefore, any one of the existing operating commercial nuclear
reactors or partially completed reactors is a potential candidate site for the tritium
supply mission. Currently, 109 commercial nuclear power plants are located at 71 sites in
32 of the contiguous states. Of these, 53 sites are located east of the Mississippi
River. No commercial nuclear power plants are located in Alaska or Hawaii. Approximately
one-half of these 71 sites contain two or three nuclear units per site.
Typically, commercial nuclear power plant sites and the surrounding area are
flat-to-rolling countryside in wooded or agricultural areas. More than 50 percent of the
sites have 50-mile population densities of less than 200 persons per square mile and over
80 percent have 50-mile densities of less than 500 persons per square mile.
Site areas range from 84 acres to 30,000 acres. Twenty-eight site areas range from 500 to
1,000 acres and an additional 12 sites are in the 1,000 to 2,000acre range. Thus, almost
60 percent of the plant sites encompass 500 to 2,000 acres. The larger land-use areas are
associated with plant cooling systems that include reservoirs, artificial lakes, and
buffer areas.
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
In 1949, INEL was established in the southeastern Idaho desert 50 miles west of Idaho
Falls. Situated on approximately 570,000 acres in four counties, the site is used to test,
build, and operate nuclear facilities. INEL is one of DOE's primary centers for research
and development activities on reactor performance, materials testing, environmental
monitoring, waste processing, and breeder reactor development and serves as a naval
reactor training site. The collection of reactors at INEL is the world's largest, varying
from research and testing to power and ship propulsion reactors. Over the years, 52
research and test reactors at INEL have been used to test fuel and target design, reactor
systems, and overall safety. Currently, there are four reactors in use, three of which
are in continuous operation.
In addition to nuclear reactor research, other INEL facilities support reactor operations;
processing and storage of high-level waste (HLW) and low-level waste (LLW); and storage of
LLW and transuranic (TRU) waste generated by defense program activities. Until 1992,
spent reactor fuels were reprocessed at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant but this was
terminated by DOE. Therefore, INEL has no current defense program missions.
Figure (Page ES-23)
Figure ES-10. - Tritium Recycling Facilities Upgrades
at Savannah River Site (Generalized).
Nevada Test Site
In 1950, NTS was established in southern Nevada 65miles northwest of Las Vegas, on
approximately 864,000 acres of land. NTS is operated by several management and operating
contractors under the direction of the Nevada Operations Office. The site is a remote,
secure facility for conducting underground testing of nuclear weapons and evaluating the
effects of nuclear weapons on military communications, electronics, satellites, sensors,
and other materials. Approximately one-third of the land is used for nuclear weapons
testing, one-third is reserved for future missions, and one-third is used for research and
development and other facility requirements. In October 1992, the underground nuclear
testing was halted, yet the site maintains the capability and infrastructure necessary
to resume testing if authorized by the President. The infrastructure to continue research,
development, and testing is being maintained (albeit at lower levels).
Facilities at NTS include nuclear device assembly, diagnostic canister assembly, hazardous
liquid spill, and the Radioactive Waste Management Site. In addition, DOE is evaluating
Yucca Mountain, an area on the border of the site, as a potential repository for spent
nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste.
Oak Ridge Reservation
ORR was established in 1942 as part of the World War II Manhattan Project. The site,
located 20 miles west of Knoxville on approximately 35,000 acres, includes three major
facilities: Oak Ridge National Laboratory; Y-12 Plant (Y-12); and the K-25 site (the
former Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant). Oak Ridge National Laboratory missions include
basic and applied scientific research and technology development. Y-12 engages in
national security activities and manufacturing outreach to U.S. industry. The K-25 site
serves as an operations center for environmental restoration and waste management
programs.
Y-12 is the primary location for defense program missions. Activities at Y-12 include the
dismantling of nuclear weapons components returned from the Nation's stockpile,
maintaining nuclear production capability (primarily uranium and lithium) and stockpile
support, storing special nuclear materials, and providing special manufacturing support to
DOE programs. Operational space at Y-12 is being downsized in response to the reduced
workloads.
Pantex Plant
Pantex is located 17 miles northeast of Amarillo, TX, on approximately 10,000 acres. The
site served as a conventional bomb plant during World War II. After the war, the site was
sold to Texas Technological College (Texas Tech) but was repurchased by the Army in 1951
at the request of the Atomic Energy Commission. Pantex served as a nuclear weapons
production facility and over the years absorbed the weapons modification functions of the
Clarksville, TN (1965) and Medina, TX (1966) plants. In 1975, Pantex absorbed the
functions of the decommissioned Burlington Plant in Iowa.
Today, Pantex functions include the fabrication of chemical explosives; nuclear weapons
assembly, disassembly, testing, quality assurance, repair, and disposal of nonnuclear
components; and development work in support of design laboratories. Due to recent
reductions in the Nation's stockpile, Pantex has developed the interim capability for
sealed pit storage of nuclear materials. Pantex is the only DOE facility that can execute
the final assembly of a nuclear weapon for the DOD stockpile. At present, weapons
disassembly and component storage dominate activity at the plant.
Savannah River Site
In 1950, SRS was established 12 miles south of Aiken, SC, on approximately 198,000 acres.
The major nuclear facilities at SRS have included fuel and target fabrication facilities;
nuclear material production reactors; chemical separation plants used for recovery of
plutonium and plutonium isotopes; a uranium fuel reprocessing area; and the Savannah River
Technology Center, which provides processsupport.
SRS is the Nation's primary facility for tritium recycling operations, which provide
tritium for weapons in the nuclear stockpile. Recycled tritium is delivered to Pantex for
weapons assembly and directly to DOD to replace expired tritium reserves. In the past, SRS
produced tritium but only tritium recycling operations continue at the Replacement Tritium
Facility. Other activities at SRS include interim storage of plutonium, waste management,
and environmental monitoring and restoration.
Alternatives Considered But Eliminated From Detailed Study
By law, DOE is required to support the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan. To do this, DOE
must maintain a nuclear weapons production, maintenance, and surveillance capacity
consistent with the President's Stockpile Plan. For the proposed action, the following
alternatives were considered but eliminated from detailed study for the reasons stated.
Purchase of Tritium From Foreign Sources
DOE has considered the purchase of tritium from other sources, including foreign nations.
Conceptually, the purchase of tritium from foreign governments could provide a
fraction of the tritium requirement. However, while there is no national policy against
purchase of defense materials from foreign sources, DOE has determined that the uncer-
tainties associated with obtaining tritium from foreign sources render this alternative
unreasonable for an assured long-term supply.
Redesign of Weapons to Require Less or No Tritium
The nuclear warheads in the enduring stockpile were designed and built in an era when the
tritium supply was assured, when underground nuclear testing was being conducted, and when
military needs required that the warheads be optimized in terms of weight and volume.
Replacing these warheads with new ones that would use little or no tritium for the sole
reason of reducing overall tritium demand would be infeasible and unreasonable. Without
underground nuclear testing to verify their safety and reliability, new warhead designs
cannot deviate very far from current designs that require the use of tritium. Even with
underground testing to facilitate new designs and a fully operational production complex,
it would still take many years to build enough warheads to replace the enduring stockpile.
Therefore, replacing the enduring stockpile of warheads with new designs would most likely
take longer and could cost more than constructing and operating a new tritium supply
facility. Because neither the President nor the Congress has approved that the government
embark on a costly and expansive design, testing, and construction program solely to
eliminate tritium requirements, weapons redesign to use less or no tritium is not a
reasonable short or long-term alternative.
Use of Existing Department of Energy Reactors or Accelerators
DOE (and its predecessor agencies) has designed, constructed, and operated many nuclear
reactors over the past 50 years. The majority of these reactors were designed to assist in
the development of nuclear research and safety standards development. DOE has also
constructed nuclear reactors to produce the materials required to support the production
and maintenance of nuclear weapons and has constructed nuclear reactors in support of the
Naval PropulsionProgram.
Among the first experimental reactors were the Water Boiler at Los Alamos National
Laboratory and CP-3 at Argonne National Laboratory, which were completed in 1944. Since
then, numerous experimental and research reactors were constructed for a variety of
purposes, including material tests, new reactor concepts, and safety experiments. Only
four DOE research reactors are currently operational: the High Flux Isotope Reactor at
ORR; the High Flux Beam Reactor at Brookhaven National Laboratory; and the Experimental
Breeder Reactor-II and the Advanced Test Reactor at INEL. In addition, there are some low
power/critical facilities supporting medical research (at Brookhaven) and supporting
reactor core configuration research (at Argonne National Laboratory-West at INEL). None of
these facilities is large enough to produce the amount of tritium required to support the
projected stockpile requirements. All are fully or partially committed to existing
programs, and were constructed in the early 1960s, rendering their design life reliability
unsuitable for the timeframe required for a new, assured, long-term tritium supply
facility.
Of the existing DOE reactors that are currently not being operated, only one has the
potential for producing any significant quantities of tritium: the Fast Flux Test Facility
at the Hanford Site. This facility was designed and constructed to perform materials
research for the national liquid-metal breeder reactor program. This small (440-megawatt
thermal (MWt)) experimental reactor, based on liquid-metal reactor technology, could,
after substantial core and cooling system modifications, as well as target technology
development, have the potential to supply a significant percentage of the steady state
tritium requirement. The Fast Flux Test Facility, however, was designed in the late 1970s
and began operation in 1980. The Fast Flux Test Facility is currently defueled. A
technical study to extend the life of the Fast Flux Test Facility to 10 years past its
design 20-year lifetime has been completed. While technically possible to expand the
lifetime, in the year 2010 the facility would be at the end of even the extended life.
Relying on the ability to further modify and operate the Fast Flux Test Facility well into
the middle of the next century is not a reasonablealternative.
DOE also constructed and operated more than a dozen nuclear reactors for production of
nuclear materials at SRS and the Hanford Site, starting with the early part of the
Manhattan Project during World War II. None of these reactors is currently operational.
Of those reactors specifically designed to produce nuclear materials for the nuclear
weapons program, the K-Reactor at SRS is the only remaining reactor which could be capable
of returning to operation. It is currently in a "cold stand-by state" and has not been
operated since 1988. The reactor was shut down for major environmental, safety, and health
upgrades, to comply with today's stringent standards. DOE discontinued the K-Reactor
Restart Program when the reduced need for tritium to support a smaller stockpile delayed
the need for tritium. In this context-reliance upon the ability to upgrade and operate
well into the middle of the next century-a first generation reactor designed in the 1940s
is not a reasonable alternative for new, long-term, assured tritium supply.
DOE has been a world leader in the design and construction of particle accelerators and
currently operates six national facilities. Of the existing research accelerators, none is
capable of producing significant quantities of tritium. The existing DOE research
accelerators are all of the pulsed design and are only capable of producing low power
accelerator beams in the 800 kilowatt (kW) range. A production accelerator facility,
utilizing continuous wave operation, would be required to deliver a high power proton
beam of 100 megawatts (MW) for tritium production. None of the existing research accelera-
tors could be reasonably upgraded to meet the long-term, assured tritium requirements.
Alternative Sites
The process of determining these reasonable tritium supply alternative sites has been
evolutionary, starting with the engineering studies and criteria developed by the New
Production Reactor program, then utilizing additional criteria and considerations from the
Reconfiguration Program, information related to changing missions at DOE sites, and input
from public scoping.
During the preparation of the PEIS, the Department has continued to assess other
alternative sites. In fact, once the APT was added as a potential tritium supply
technology, an assessment was conducted to determine if the Los Alamos National
Laboratory, which operates a linear accelerator and is the home of significant accelerator
expertise, would be a reasonable site for a tritium producing accelerator.
The APT conceptual designs for tritium supply have established that evaporative cooling
towers would be used to dissipate the heat generated in the tritium target assemblies and
in the accelerator facility. These APT cooling water requirements are significantly
greater than the current regulated allotment of water for Los Alamos National Laboratory
and increasing the allotment to support the APT water requirement would be impractical and
infeasible, and in any event beyond DOE's control.
It may be possible that an APT could use nonevaporative cooling towers, which would
greatly reduce the water requirements. However, there is sufficient technical uncertainty
regarding the feasibility and practicality of using non-evaporative cooling towers for a
continuous wave APT to render this option unacceptable as a source for the Nation's only
supply of tritium. The other five sites being analyzed in this PEIS could reasonably
support the water requirements of the APT using evaporative cooling towers and, thus,
would not incur the technical uncertainty and risk of Los Alamos National Laboratory.
Thus, DOE has concluded that Los Alamos National Laboratory is not a reasonable site for
an accelerator to produce tritium.
REDUCED TRITIUM REQUIREMENTS
The need for new tritium supply is based on the 1994 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan, which
projects a need for new tritium by approximately 2011 based on a START II level stockile
size of approximately 3,500 accountable weapons. A smaller than STARTII stockpile size
would extend the need date for new tritium beyond approximately 2011. If the need for new
tritium were significantly later than 2011, the Department would not have a proposal for
new tritium supply, and would not be preparing a PEIS for Tritium Supply and Recycling.
ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCE IMPACT METHODS
The following is a brief description of the impact assessment approach used in the PEIS
for addressing potential impacts of the tritium supply and recyclingaction.
Land Resources
Land Use. Land use impacts are assessed based on the extent and type of land that would be
affected, and potential direct impacts resulting from the conversion or the
incompatibility of land use changes with special status and protected lands.
Visual Resources. Visual impacts are assessed based on whether changes in existing
facilities or construction of new facilities would appear uncharacteristic in each
site's visual setting and, if so, how noticeable the changes would be.
Site Infrastructure
Changes to site infrastructure are assessed by overlying the support requirements of the
respective tritium supply technologies and recycling facilities upon the projected site
infrastructure capacities. These assessments focus upon power requirements, road networks,
rail interfaces, and fuel requirements. The basis for the PEIS assessment is the supply
and demand projections of the U.S. electric utilities published annually by the North
American Electric Reliability Council.
Air Quality and Acoustics
The assessment of potential impacts to air quality is based upon comparison of proposed
project effects with applicable state, local, or national ambient air quality standards,
or the potential exceedance of Prevention of Significant Deterioration increments. The
more stringent of the standards serve as the comparison criteria. The comparison of
project toxic pollutants includes guidelines or standards adopted or proposed by each
state.
Acoustic impacts are assessed qualitatively on the basis of the potential degree of change
in noise levels at sensitive receptors with respect to ambientconditions.
Water Resources
Surface Water. The surface water impacts are assessed based on water consumption and
wastewater discharge for both construction and operation phases. Changes in the annual low
flows of surface water resulting from proposed withdrawals and discharges are determined.
The existing water supply is evaluated to determine if sufficient quantities are available
to support an increased demand by comparing projected increases with the capacity of the
supplier and existing water rights, agreements, or allocations. The assessment of water
quality impacts from wastewater (sanitary and process) and stormwater runoff qualitatively
addresses potential impacts to the receiving waters.
Floodplains impacts are assessed based on whether any of the proposed tritium supply
technologies and recycling facilities are located within a floodplain. Where possible, the
proposed location is compared with the 500-year floodplain.
Groundwater. Groundwater resource impacts are assessed based on the effects on aquifers,
groundwater usage, and groundwater quality within the regions. Total groundwater use at
the facility and projections of future usage are added to project water requirements to
determine the short and long-term impacts associated with construction and operation and
dewatering withdrawals. Impacts of groundwater withdrawals on existing contaminant
plumes because of construction and facility operation are assessed.
Geology and Soils
Impacts to the geological environment are assessed based on the destruction of or damage
to unique geological features and subsidence caused by groundwater withdrawal,
landslide, or shifting. Potential seismic impacts are assessed based on the locations of
capable faults and the history of the seismicity of the site areas. Soil types at the
proposed project sites are described and the capability of supporting construction of
the proposed structures assessed.
Biotic Resources
Potential impacts are assessed based on the degree to which various habitats or species
could be affected by the project. Where possible, impacts are evaluated with respect to
Federal and state protection regulations and standards.
Terrestrial Resources. Impacts to wildlife are based on plant community loss, which is
associated with animal habitat. Also evaluated is the disturbance, displacement, or loss
of wildlife. Based on expected releases and the results of past studies, impacts of
radionuclides on site biota were not evaluated.
Wetlands. Impacts are assessed based on the nearness of wetlands to project areas and with
the knowledge that standard construction erosion and sedimentation control measures would
be implemented. Impacts from increased flows are assessed based on a comparison of
expected discharge rates with present stream flow rates.
Aquatic Resources. Impacts as a result of sedimentation, increased flows, and effluent
discharges are assessed in the same manner as wetlands. Impacts as a result of impingement
and entrainment are assessed based on comparison of stream flow and intake volumes.
Threatened and Endangered Species. A list of species potentially present at each site
using information obtained from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, National Marine
Fisheries Service, and appropriate state agencies, along with site environmental and
engineering data, is used to assess whether the various technologies would impact any
plant or animal.
Cultural and Paleontological Resources
Prehistoric and Historic Resources. Impacts are assessed by considering whether the
proposed action could substantially add to existing disturbance of resources in the areas,
adversely affect National Register of Historic Places (NRHP) eligible resources, or cause
loss of or destruction to important prehistoric resources.
Native American Resources. Impacts are assessed by considering whether the proposed action
has the potential to affect sites important for their position in the Native American
physical universe or belief system, or the possibility of reducing access to traditional
use areas or sacred sites.
Paleontological Resources. Impact assessments for paleontological resources are based on
the numbers and kinds of resources that could be affected as well as the quality of fossil
preservation in a given deposit.
Socioeconomics
The assessment of impacts on local and regional socioeconomic conditions and factors
include population, employment, economy, housing, public finance, and transportation.
The impact assessment is based on the degree to which changes in employment and
population affect the local economy, housing market, public finance, and transportation.
The changes to these factors are projected to the year 2030 because it is assumed that
after 2030 the impacts associated with the alternatives are negligibly different from
the 2030 conditions.
Radiation and Hazardous Chemical Environment
The health effects are determined for each technology by identifying the types and
quantities of material to which one is exposed, estimating doses, and then calculating the
resultant health effects. The impacts on human health for workers and the public during
normal operation and postulated accidents from various alternatives are assessed. Models
such as GENII and MACCS for airborne and liquid radioactive releases; CHEM-PLUS for fire
and explosions; and SLAB for hazardous chemical releases were used to project impacts.
Atmospheric dispersion modeling performed for the air quality section is also utilized in
the evaluation of impacts to workers from radiological and hazardous chemicals.
Experience from past and current operations that are similar to future operation is used
to estimate the radiological health impacts to workers. Models are used to estimate the
worker chemical exposure dose since no individual exposure data are available. Public
health impacts could result from exposure to radioactive or hazardous chemical materials
released during operation. Modeling is used to estimate the type and amount of material
released and the associated radiological and chemical doses. These doses are converted
to health effects using appropriate health risk estimators.
The relative consequences of postulated accidents in the evaluation of each alternative
are assessed. The accident analysis involves less detail than a formal Probabilistic Risk
Assessment and only addresses bounding accidents (high consequence, low probability) and
a representative spectrum of possible operational accidents (low consequence but high
probability of occurrence). The technical approach for the selection of accidents is
consistent with the DOE Office of NEPA Oversight Recommendations for the Preparation of
Environmental Assessments and Environmental Impact Statements Guidance (May 1993), which
recommends consideration of two major categories of accidents: within design basis
accidents and beyond design basis accidents.
Risk is defined as the mathematical product of the probability and consequence of an
accident. Both probabilities and consequences are presented in the PEIS. The
risk-contributing scenarios consider both design-basis and severe accidents. The specific
accidents consider the types of facilities.
Waste Management
The analysis addresses the waste types and waste volumes projected to be generated from
the various supply technologies and recycling facilities at each site. Impacts are
assessed in the context of site practices for treatment, storage, and disposal plus the
applicable regulatory settings.
Pantex is the only site under consideration that does not have existing onsite low-level
waste disposal; the number of additional shipments required to transport low-level waste
from Pantex to a DOE low-level waste disposal facility is estimated. The risk associated
with additional shipments is also addressed.
Intersite Transportation
The intersite transportation assessment was based on the transport mode, weight of
material, curies, proximity dose rates (transport index), type of package, number of
shipments, and/or distance. Health impacts from the transportation of tritium,
highly-enriched uranium, plutonium, heavy water, and LLW are presented. Radiological
health risks attributed to transport of tritium target rods from commercial reactors, the
transport of highly-enriched uranium to potential HWR and MHTGR tritium supply sites, the
transport of plutonium pits to support the multipurpose MHTGR and ALWR, and the transport
of low-level waste from Pantex to NTS are also addressed.
Environmental Justice
The environmental justice analysis addressed selected demographic characteristics of the
region-of-influence (50-miles) for each of the five candidate sites. The analysis
identified census tracts where people of color comprise 50 percent (simple majority) of
the total population in the census tract, or where people of color comprise less than
50percent but greater than 25 percent of the total population in the census tract. The
analysis also identified low-income communities where 25 percent or more of the
population is characterized as living in poverty (yearly income of less than $8,076 for a
family of two). Impacts are assessed based on the analysis presented for each resource and
issue area for each tritium supply technology at each site. No disproportionately high
and adverse human health or environmental effects on minority and low-income populations
were identified.
Environmental IMPACTS
In accordance with Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations, the environmental
consequences discussions provide the analytical detail for comparisons of environmental
impacts associated with the various tritium supply technologies and recycling facilities.
TablesES-1 and ES-2, at the end of this summary, present a summary comparison of
environmental impacts of the tritium supply and recycling alternatives. Impacts
associated with collocation of a tritium supply and recycling alternative in table ES-1
are evaluated for every site except SRS. At SRS, impacts are evaluated for a tritium
supply with upgraded recycling and a tritium upgrade. In addition, impacts associated with
tritium supply alone alternatives are evaluated for all the candidate sites except SRS. A
supply alone alternative does not exist for SRS because of existing recycling facilities.
The tritium upgrade is part of the supply alone alternatives at the other four candidate
sites (INEL, NTS, ORR, and Pantex) and the commercial reactor alternative. For the supply
alone alternatives and the commercial reactor alternative, there would be minor impacts
associated with upgrading the facilities at SRS.
For comparison purposes, environmental concentrations of emissions and other potential
environmental effects are presented with appropriate regulatory standards or guidelines.
However, the compliance with regulatory standards is not an assessment of the significance
or severity of the environmental impact for NEPA purposes. The purpose of the analysis of
environmental consequences is to identify the potential for environmental impacts. The
PEIS for Tritium Supply and Recycling (Volume I) discusses in detail the environmental
assessment methods used and the factors considered in assessing environmental impacts.
To satisfy the requirements of the NEPA, No Action is presented for comparison with the
action alternatives. Under No Action (2010), DOE would not establish a new tritium supply
capability, the current inventory of tritium would decay, and DOE would not meet current
projections of stockpile requirements of tritium. Sites would continue waste management
programs to meet the legal requirements and commitments in formal agreements and would
proceed with cleanup activities. Production facilities and support roles at specific
sites, however, would be downsized or eliminated in accordance with the reduced workload
projected for the year 2010 and beyond.
To minimize repetition and be as concise as possible, the comparison of alternatives in
tablesES-1 and ES-2 concentrate on the areas in which the public has expressed
considerable interest and on programmatic factors important to DOE decisionmaking. Accord-
ingly, the following resources are compared in tableES-1:
Land resources;
Site infrastructure;
Water resources (surface water and Groundwater);
Biotic resources (wetlands, aquatic resources, and threatened and endangered species
and/or species of concern);
Socioeconomics (employment during construction and operation and unemployment during
operation);
Radiological and hazardous chemical impacts during normal operations;
Radiological impacts-accidents;
Waste management; and
Intersite transportation.
For the other resource areas summarized below, the environmental impacts do not vary
significantly from site to site or technology to technology.
Visual Resources. Visual impacts may occur at NTS, ORR, or SRS. There would be no impacts
to visual resources at INEL or Pantex. The use of a wet cooling system at ORR or SRS would
produce some visible cooling tower plumes during certain weatherconditions.
Air Quality and Acoustics. Construction activities would result in exceedance of 24-hour
PM10 and TSP standards. At all sites, air pollutant concentrations would increase during
operation but would be within standards, and noise levels would increase during both
construction and operation.
Floodplains. No construction would take place in areas designated as 100-year flood plains
at any site, or in areas designated as 500-year flood plains at INEL. NTS, ORR, Pantex,
and SRS would require 500-year floodplain assessments.
Geology and Soils. There would be no impacts associated with geological conditions and
no impacts to soils except for the disturbed areas.
Terrestrial Resources. The impacts to terrestrial resources would vary by the acreage
disturbed during construction, and some salt drift impacts are possible with wet cooling
systems.
Cultural and Paleontological Resources. Some NRHP-eligible resources may occur within the
proposed site; Native American resources may be affected by land disturbance and audio or
visual intrusions; and some paleontological resources may be affected by construction
excavations deeper than 50 feet.
Other Socioeconomic Issues. Unemployment would decrease slightly in the economic study
area at all sites during construction. Population and housing demand would increase
slightly in the economic study area during construction and operation, as would per capita
income. Revenues and expenditures for most region-of-influence counties, cities, and
school districts would increase during construction and operation. Traffic conditions
would worsen slightly during construction and operation on main access routes to the
sites.
MULTIPURPOSE ("TRIPLE PLAY") REACTOR
The Department's Office of Fissile Materials Disposition is preparing a PEIS addressing
the issue of how to dispose of plutonium that is excess to nuclear weapons requirements.
Among the alternatives to be analyzed in the Long-Term Storage and Disposition of
Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials PEIS is the use of plutonium as a fuel in existing,
modified, or new nuclear reactors.
The nuclear reactors evaluated for tritium production in the Tritium Supply and Recycling
PEIS utilize uranium as the fuel source, and the analysis in this PEIS is based on that
design. Nonetheless, it is technically feasible to also use plutonium or plutonium-
uranium oxide (mixed-oxide) fuel for a tritium production reactor. Congress and
commercial entities have expressed interest in developing a multipurpose ("triple play")
reactor that could produce tritium, "burn" plutonium, and generate revenues through the
sale of electric power. Only the commercial reactor, ALWR, and MHTGR would be capable of
performing the triple play missions; the potential environmental impacts from these
triple play reactors are summarized below. The discussion for the multipurpose ALWR also
applies to the multipurpose commercial reactor.
Advanced Light Water Reactor. If an ALWR were used to burn plutonium, the major
contributions to potential environmental impacts would be from a new plutonium Pit
Disassembly/Conversion/Mixed-Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility. Such a facility could
disturb up to 129 acres of land, and require a peak construction force of 550 during the
peak year of the 6-year construction period.
During operation, this facility would require approx imately 10 percent as much water as
a large ALWR at a dry site, and would employ as many workers as the ALWR. Radiological
exposures to workers during normal operation would be kept as low as reasonably
achievable, and would not be expected to exceed 50mrem per worker per year. If all 650
workers were exposed to such a dose, a highly conservative assumption, 0.52 latent
cancer fatalities (less than one) would be expected over the 40 year operation life of the
facility. The goal for the facility for public radiation exposure would be not to exceed
1.0 mrem effective dose equivalent per year.
Safety analysis reports have not been prepared for this facility. However, bounding
accident scenarios have been identified from safety analysis reports for similar plants.
Criticality accidents, explosions, and fires could occur in such a facility, and release
radiation to the environment. The use of plutonium in an ALWR would not significantly
affect the consequences of radioactivity releases from severe accidents, though there
would be some small changes in the source term release spectrum and frequency.
Using a mixed-oxide fuel in an ALWR would have no major effect on reactor operations, and
therefore, impacts would not be expected to change significantly from those associated
with utilizing a uranium fueled reactor. This is based on a study conducted by the NRC,
the Final Generic Environmental Statement on the Use of Recycled Plutonium in Mixed-Oxide
Fuel in Light Water Reactors (August, 1976).
Modular High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor. To burn plutonium in a modular gas-cooled
reactor, a plutonium Pit Disassembly/Conversion Facility would also be needed, and the
environmental impacts from such a facility are expected to be approximately the same as
those described for the similar facility to support a multipurpose ALWR. In a plutonium-
fueled gas-cooled reactor, however, tritium production decreases significantly. Thus,
twice as many reactor modules would be necessary in order to produce the steady-state
tritium requirements. This doubling of reactor modules would be the major contributor to
potential environmental impacts for this scenario.
Overall, building twice as many reactor modules could double most environmental impacts.
Some construction impacts (land distributed, construction duration, and peak construction
workforce) might be less than double because of economies of scale and shared support
infrastructure. Depending upon the particular site, some impacts could be significant.
During operation of twice as many reactor modules, water requirements could increase by 80
percent. Impacts to groundwater would not change significantly from those expected with
the three module MHTGR at those sites that would use groundwater resources. The expected
workforce increase would approximately double any socioeconomic impacts and radiation
doses to workers. Radiation exposure to the public from normal operation might also
double. The use of plutonium in a MHTGR would not significantly affect severe accident
consequences because fuel failures are not expected in any severe accident. Spent fuel
generation would also double with the addition of twice as many reactor modules.
COMMERCIAL LIGHT WATER REACTOR
The purchase by DOE of an existing operating or partially completed commercial power
reactor is a reasonable alternative being evaluated to meet the stockpile tritium
requirement mission. Production of tritium using irradiation services contracted from
commercial power reactors is also being evaluated as a reasonable alternative and as a
potential contingency measure to meet the projected tritium requirements for the
Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile in the event of a national emergency. The reactors
employed for domestic electric power generation in the United States are conventional
light water reactors that use ordinary water as moderator and coolant. The potential
environmental impacts of the commercial light water reactor alternative are summarized
below.
The option to purchase an operating commercial power reactor or finish construction of a
partially complete commercial reactor to support the stockpile tritium requirement would
have similar impacts. The reactor technologies and characteristics would be the same.
However, some additional land use impacts may occur to incorporate security infrastructure
and other requirements which would be needed for a DOE-owned and -operated tritium
production facility. The potential land use impacts would result from new buffer zone
requirements, new fencing, security buildings, and road access restrictions or
construction of new roads.
The environmental impacts of completing construction of an unfinished commercial nuclear
power plant would be relative to the extent that the potential power plant has been
completed by the utility. For construction impact analysis, a range of reactor com-
pletion (45 percent to 85 percent) was used. Environmental impacts from the upgrade of
existing site infrastructure to support renewed construction activities would be minor.
Completing construction of a nuclear reactor would result in impacts from air emissions,
increased worker numbers, and waste generation and management. Air emissions would be
temporary and would not be expected to significantly affect air quality in the projected
area. The increase in construction workers would have potential impact on the local
economy and area population, housing, and local services. Because a majority of the
nuclear power plant infrastructure and the power plant itself have already been completed
using a much larger overall workforce and peak workforce, socioeconomic impacts are
expected to be minor.
Construction activities are expected to generate construction debris and other hazardous
and nonhazardous wastes. Typical hazardous wastes generated during the completion of the
construction phase would include paints, solvents, acids, oils, and degreasers. Adverse
environmental impacts from management and disposal of these wastes would not be expected.
The commercial reactor alternatives for producing tritium would result in additional
environmental impacts from the changes in the reactor operational characteristics due to
the introduction of DOE target rods. Impacts would likely result from core changes,
personnel requirements, effluents, waste, spent fuel, radiation exposure, and
transportation/handling.
Core Changes. Production of tritium in a commercial light water reactor would require
physical changes to the reactor core, which could range from replacement of burnable
poison elements with DOE target elements to the replacement of fuel rods with DOE target
assemblies. Core changes could alter the accident basis and would modify the source term.
The estimated additional core tritium content in curies per reactor at the end of the
irradiation period would be 3.2x107 for a single reactor. Because of the reduced burn up
in the reactor core, the total fission products in each fuel rod would decrease.
Personnel Requirements. An estimated 72 additional personnel would be needed for a
typical commercial nuclear power facility. The additional personnel would represent an
increase of approximately 9 percent for a single reactor. The number of personnel would
be smaller for each commercial reactor site if multiple reactors were used.
Effluent. Because of the addition of DOE target rods, airborne and water-borne effluent
would be expected to change (particularly for tritium). Estimates for expected increases
of gaseous tritium effluent range from 5,740 Ci per year for a single reactor to 3,680 Ci
per year in the multiple reactor scenario. Estimated increases of liquid tritium effluent
ranges from 1,460 Ci per year for a single reactor to 935 Ci per year per reactor in the
multiple reactor scenario.
Waste. Additional activities associated with the handling, processing, and shipping of DOE
target assemblies would be expected to increase waste generation rates at the commercial
reactor site. An estimated 164yd3 per year of LLW per reactor would be expected. This
would be approximately a 50-percent increase for a typical plant. No increase in mixed
waste generation would be anticipated. Depending on the selected site, expansion of
existing or construction of new facilities may be required.
Spent Nuclear Fuel. More frequent refueling operations and the segmenting of fuel
assemblies could result in an increase in spent nuclear fuel volumes With the single
reactor case, 137 additional spent fuel assemblies (40yd3, assuming 8ft3/assembly) would
be generated each year. This amounts to approximately 58 metric tons of heavy metal. The
additional fuel assemblies represent more than a 3-fold increase over the average of 56
assemblies (24 metric tons of heavy metal) for a typical pressurized commercial light
water reactor. The change to 12-month refueling cycles with full core discharge would
accelerate the consumption of available spent nuclear fuel pool storage and would require
earlier use of additional storage alternatives such as dry storage at some commercial
reactor sites.
Worker Radiation Exposure. New DOE target assembly process activities and, in some cases,
more frequent refueling-type operations would be expected to increase radiation exposure
for some categories of workers. Estimates for expected increases of exposure for refueling
personnel range from 19 person-rem per reactor for maintenance workers to less than 1
person-rem for supervisory personnel. In the multiple reactor scenario, no additional
refueling personnel would be required; therefore, no additional worker exposure would be
expected. The increase in person-rem per reactor for all personnel ranges from 24 for
maintenance workers to 1 for supervisory personnel.
Radiological Impacts
Normal Operations. The impact from adding tritium targets to a commercial reactor would
vary depending on the reactor type, reactor site location, and the number of sites
involved in the tritium production mission. The maximum impacts at a given site would
occur if all of the tritium were produced at that site. The impacts would lessen at a
given site if multiple sites are used.
Considering that the arithmetic mean annual radiation dose to people who lived within a
50-mile radius of a commercial nuclear power plant in 1991 was about 1.2 person-rem (0.25
and 0.95 person-rem from airborne and liquid releases, respectively) and the median was
less than 0.2 person-rem (NUREG/CR-2850), impacts of normal operation from tritium
production are expected to be less than the NESHAPS 10 mrem limit for atmospheric releases
and less than the drinking water limit of 4mrem. It is estimated that the changes in
radioactive releases associated with the production of tritium in a single reactor would
result in an annual dose increase of 0.51 person-rem to the 50-mile population. This
would result in a calculated increase of 0.10 fatal cancer in this population as the
result of 40years of reactor operation. There would be a slightly larger increase in the
total number of fatal cancers in the several population groups for the multiple reactor
scenario compared with the single reactor, but the calculated risk to an individual member
of the public would be less because of the larger number of people exposed.
Detailed impact analysis would be performed after the reactor/site combination(s) have
selected. If the results of the impacts analysis indicates exceedances of either NESHAPS
and/or drinking water limits, the reactor's radioactive waste management system would be
revised to reduce the effluent to acceptablelimits.
Transportation/Handling. Assuming that an inventory of 500target rods would be accumulated
for shipment at one time in NRC-approved fuel assembly shipping casks, and one cask per
transport truck, approximately 12 shipments per year would occur. The curie content per
truck would be approximately 2.7x106. The upper bound radiological consequences of an
accident during transportation from a single site to SRS might incur an additional
240person-rem per year.
QUALITATIVE COMPARISON
To aid the reader in understanding the differences in environmental impacts among the PEIS
alternatives (particularly the tritium supply technology alternatives i.e., HWR, MHTGR,
ALWR, and commercial light water reactor), this section presents a brief, qualitative
summary comparison of the alternatives. Tables ES-1 and ES-2 which follow this section,
present quantitative comparisons of greater detail.
For some of the resource areas evaluated in the PEIS, the analyses indicate that there are
no major differences in the environmental impacts among the tritium supply technology and
site alternatives. Resource areas where no major differences exist, or where potential
environmental impacts are small, are: land resources, air quality, water resources,
geology and soils, biotic resources, and socioeconomics. For these resource areas, this
general conclusion is particularly true when comparing the operational impacts of the
tritium supply facilities. For construction, this general conclusion is also particularly
true when comparing among the various types of new tritium supply facilities (e.g., HWR,
MHTGR, ALWR, and APT).
However, when comparing the potential impacts of constructing a new tritium supply
facility against the alternative of using an existing commercial reactor (purchase of
irradiation services or purchase and conversion of an existing commercial reactor), the
environmental impacts of the latter are clearly less because the facility already
exists, and, thus, there are minimal construction-related environmental impacts. For
tritium recycling, this also applies when comparing the existing tritium recycling
facilities at SRS against constructing a new tritium recycling facility at another site.
For other resource areas evaluated in the PEIS, the analyses indicate that there are
notable environmental impact differences. Resource areas where notable differences exist
are: site infrastructure (electrical requirements), human health (from radiological
impacts due to accidents), and wastes generated. Each of these resource areas is discussed
in greater detail below.
Site Infrastructure. Infrastructure and electrical capacity exist at each of the
alternative sites to adequately support any of the tritium supply technology
alternatives. Nonetheless, because the ALWR and MHTGR technologies could generate
electricity while also producing tritium, these technologies could have a positive
environmental impact by delaying the need to build some electrical generating facility in
the future. The PEIS acknowledges, and qualitatively discusses, these potential "avoided"
environmental impacts. The APT, and to a significantly lesser degree the HWR, would be
energy consumers. The PEIS assesses the environmental impacts of providing power to the
energy consumers. Thus, in terms of environmental impacts, there could be approximately
1,800 MWe of difference (i.e., ALWR generating 1,300 MWe versus an APT consuming 500 MWe)
between the tritium supply technologies. For commercial reactors that already exist and
produce electrical power, there would be no change to the existing electrical
infrastructure.
Human Health. There are differences among the tritium supply technology and site
alternatives regarding the potential human health impacts from accidents. The potential
consequences are directly related to the amount of radioactivity released and the
population density near the facility. For each of the tritium supply technology
alternatives, the probability of severe accidents occurring is extremely small, on the
order of once every millions of years at most. Based upon the PEIS analyses of the reactor
technologies, the ALWR could cause the largest potential impacts to human health from
severe accidents, while the MHTGR would have the smallest potential impacts. Because the
APT does not utilize fissile materials, and there is no significant decay heat, there are
virtually no radiological consequences from any APT accidents.
Consequently, the APT would have the fewest potential impacts to human health from
accidents. The commercial reactor alternatives do not acquire any substantial risks by
assuming a tritium-production mission.
Regarding the site alternatives, in the event of an accident at sites with small
populations (INEL, NTS, and to a lesser extent Pantex), there would be fewer impacts to
human health. Because ORR and SRS have larger populations within 50 miles of the proposed
facilities, these two sites have greater potential human health impacts than the other
sites. Because there are virtually no radiological consequences from any APT accidents,
there are no grounds for discrimination among sites in the case of the APT. It is, in
essence, site neutral with respect to potential impacts to human health.
Generated Wastes
Spent Fuel Generation. All of the tritium supply reactor technologies would generate spent
fuel. While the MHTGR would generate the greatest volume of spent fuel (because of the
graphite moderator), the residual heavy metal content of spent fuel from the ALWR would
be the greatest. Reactors providing irradiation services would not generate additional
spent fuel over and above what they would otherwise generate during their planned
lifetime, assuming that multiple reactors are used and the operating scenarios do not
change fuel cycles. However, if only a single reactor were used (irradiation services or
purchased and converted), additional spent fuel would likely be generated because the
reactor's refueling cycle would be shortened. The APT is not a reactor and would not
generate spentfuel.
Low-level Waste. None of the alternatives would generate unacceptably large amounts of
low-level waste. However, of the alternatives, the HWR would create the most low-level
waste in 1 year (almost 5times as much as any other reactor alternative). The APT would
generate the least amount of low-level waste annually. In producing tritium, the
commercial reactor alternatives would generate additional low-level waste, but this
amount would be less than the new reactor alternatives. With regard to sites, except for
Pantex, all sites have the ability to handle and dispose of low-level nuclear waste at the
site. Low-level nuclear waste generated at Pantex would need to be shipped to another site
for disposal.
Table ES-1.-Summary Comparison of Environmental Impacts of Tritium Supply Technologies and
Recycling [Page 1 of 32]
INEL NTS ORR PANTEX SRS
Land Resources-No Action
Under No Action there Under No Action there Under No Action there Under No Action there Under No Action there
would be no impacts to land would be no 
