[107 Senate Committee Prints]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:83873.wais]
S. Prt. 107-84
EXECUTIVE SESSIONS OF THE SENATE
PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON
INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE
ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
=======================================================================
VOLUME 5
__________
EIGHTY-THIRD CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
1954
MADE PUBLIC JANUARY 2003
Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs
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83-873 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 2003
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
107th Congress, Second Session
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TED STEVENS, Alaska
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
MAX CLELAND, Georgia THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota JIM BUNNING, Kentucky
PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois
Joyce A. Rechtschaffen, Staff Director and Counsel
Richard A. Hertling, Minority Staff Director
Darla D. Cassell, Chief Clerk
------
PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii, SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois TED STEVENS, Alaska
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
MAX CLELAND, Georgia THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota JIM BUNNING, Kentucky
PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois
Elise J. Bean, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Kim Corthell, Minority Staff Director
Mary D. Robertson, Chief Clerk
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
83rd Congress, Second Session
JOSEPH R. McCARTHY, Wisconsin, Chairman
KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas
MARGARET CHASE SMITH, Maine HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, Minnesota
HENRY C. DWORSHAK, Idaho HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington
EVERETT McKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois JOHN F. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri
CHARLES E. POTTER, Michigan ALTON A. LENNON, North Carolina
Francis D. Flanagan, Chief Counsel
Walter L. Reynolds, Chief Clerk
------
PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
JOSEPH R. McCARTHY, Wisconsin, Chairman
KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas \1\
EVERETT McKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington \1\
CHARLES E. POTTER, Michigan STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri \1\
Roy M. Cohn, Chief Counsel
Robert F. Kennedy, Minority Counsel
Francis P. Carr, Executive Director
Ruth Young Watt, Chief Clerk
ASSISTANT COUNSELS
Thomas W. La Venia Donald A. Surine
Donald F. O'Donnell Jerome S. Adlerman
Daniel G. Buckley C. George Anastos
INVESTIGATORS
Robert J. McElroy
Herbert S. Hawkins James N. Juliana
Karl H.W. Baarslag, Director of Research
Carmine S. Bellino, Consulting Accountant
La Vern J. Duffy, Staff Assistant
----------
\1\ The Democratic members were absent from the subcommittee from
July 10, 1953 to January 25, 1954.
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Volume 5
PREFACE.......................................................... IX
INTRODUCTION..................................................... XI
Waste and Corruption--Development of Alaska, January 13.......... 1
Testimony of Carmine Bellino.
Voice of America, January 13..................................... 29
Testimony of Dr. Newbern Smith.
Army Signal Corps--Subversion and Espionage, January 19.......... 31
Statement of John Adams.
Army Signal Corps--Subversion and Espionage, February 18......... 33
Testimony of Peter A. Gragis; Leo Kantrowitz; Max Finestone;
Frank M. McGee; Lt. Col. Chester T. Brown; Capt. W. J.
Woodward; and Brig. Gen. Ralph W. Zwicker.
Army Signal Corps--Subversion and Espionage, February 23......... 63
Testimony of Charlotte Oram; Sallie Fannie Peek; Genevieve
Brown; William S. Johnson; and Lamuel Belton.
Army Signal Corps--Subversion and Espionage, March 1............. 73
Testimony of Pvt. David LaPorte Linfield; and Sidney
Rubinstein.
Army Signal Corps--Subversion and Espionage, March 10............ 75
Testimony of Harriman H. Dash.
American Citizens Behind the Iron Curtain, March 3............... 93
Statements of Ben H. Brown, Jr.; W. Barbour; Alyn Donaldson;
Everett F. Drumright; Frederick Ayer, Jr.; Lt. Col. R. W.
Springfield; James H. Smith, Jr.; Capt. W. R. Smedburg; Lt.
Com. T. J. Martz; Lt. Col. Nihart; and Warrant Officer Jack
Goodall.
American Citizens Behind the Iron Curtain, March 9............... 139
Statements of L. E. Berry; Col. Vernon M. Smith; Lt. Col.
Homer B. Chandler, Jr.; and Lt. Col. Charles M. Trammell,
Jr.
Alleged Threats Against the Chairman, March 4.................... 165
Testimony of William J. Morgan.
Communist Infiltration in the Army, March 4...................... 177
Testimony of Dr. Marvin Sanford Belsky.
Communist Infiltration in the Army, March 5...................... 187
Statement of Lt. Oscar Roy Weiner.
Communist Infiltration in the Army, March 10..................... 189
Testimony of Lt. Oscar Roy Weiner.
Special Senate Investigation on Charges and Countercharges
Involving Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens, John G.
Adams, H. Struve Hensel, and Senator Joe McCarthy, Roy M. Cohn,
and Francis P. Carr, March 16.................................. 195
Special Senate Investigation on Charges and Countercharges
Involving Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens, John G.
Adams, H. Struve Hensel, and Senator Joe McCarthy, Roy M. Cohn,
and Francis P. Carr, April 19.................................. 197
Testimony of J. Myer Schine; Florence D. Torrey; and Roy M.
Cohn.
Special Senate Investigation on Charges and Countercharges
Involving Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens, John G.
Adams, H. Struve Hensel, and Senator Joe McCarthy, Roy M. Cohn,
and Francis P. Carr, April 20.................................. 209
Special Senate Investigation on Charges and Countercharges
Involving Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens, John G.
Adams, H. Struve Hensel, and Senator Joe McCarthy, Roy M. Cohn,
and Francis P. Carr, April 23.................................. 213
Testimony of George E. Sokolsky.
Special Senate Investigation on Charges and Countercharges
Involving Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens, John G.
Adams, H. Struve Hensel, and Senator Joe McCarthy, Roy M. Cohn,
and Francis P. Carr, April 24.................................. 223
Testimony of Iris Flores.
Special Senate Investigation on Charges and Countercharges
Involving Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens, John G.
Adams, H. Struve Hensel, and Senator Joe McCarthy, Roy M. Cohn,
and Francis P. Carr, May 5..................................... 241
Testimony of James B. Reston.
Special Senate Investigation on Charges and Countercharges
Involving Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens, John G.
Adams, H. Struve Hensel, and Senator Joe McCarthy, Roy M. Cohn,
and Francis P. Carr, May 6..................................... 245
Testimony of Fred A. Seaton.
Special Senate Investigation on Charges and Countercharges
Involving Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens, John G.
Adams, H. Struve Hensel, and Senator Joe McCarthy, Roy M. Cohn,
and Francis P. Carr, May 27.................................... 253
Testimony of John E. Pernice.
Special Senate Investigation on Charges and Countercharges
Involving Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens, John G.
Adams, H. Struve Hensel, and Senator Joe McCarthy, Roy M. Cohn,
and Francis P. Carr, June 3.................................... 259
Special Senate Investigation on Charges and Countercharges
Involving Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens, John G.
Adams, H. Struve Hensel, and Senator Joe McCarthy, Roy M. Cohn,
and Francis P. Carr, June 8.................................... 273
Special Senate Investigation on Charges and Countercharges
Involving Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens, John G.
Adams, H. Struve Hensel, and Senator Joe McCarthy, Roy M. Cohn,
and Francis P. Carr, June 10................................... 291
Special Senate Investigation on Charges and Countercharges
Involving Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens, John G.
Adams, H. Struve Hensel, and Senator Joe McCarthy, Roy M. Cohn,
and Francis P. Carr, July 15................................... 293
Confirmation of Subcommittee Personnel, July 15.................. 295
Matters of Staff Organization and Committee Funds, July 20....... 317
Subversion and Espionage in Defense Establishments and Industry,
January 15..................................................... 329
Testimony of Leon J. Kamin; Theodore Pappas; Alexander
Gregory; Victor S. Boyls; Karl T. Nabeshka; Simon Pallet;
Lewis B. Thomas; Benjamin Alfred; Edwin Allen Cassano;
Renaldo Cavalieri; Rodney Avram Brooks; George Frederick
Moore; and Wendell H. Furry.
Subversion and Espionage in Defense Establishments and Industry,
February 19.................................................... 359
Testimony of Dante DeCesare; Helen Quirini; Lillian Garcia
Krummel; Louis Passikoff; William Vincent Delos; Robert H.
LaFortune; Cyril Sille; Allan E. Townsend; Michael Riggi;
and Charles Rivers.
Subversion and Espionage in Defense Establishments and Industry,
July 19........................................................ 387
Statements of Lawrence W. Parrish; and Charles Wojchowski.
Subversion and Espionage in Defense Establishments and Industry,
July 20........................................................ 395
Testimony of Edwin Garfield; and Yates C. Holmes.
Subversion and Espionage in Defense Establishments and Industry,
August 6....................................................... 411
Testimony of Diantha Hoag; and Lawrence W. Parrish.
Subversion and Espionage in Defense Establishments and Industry,
August 11...................................................... 423
Testimony of Joseph O. Mattson; Waino E. Suokko; Waino S.
Nisula; Louis Passikoff; Joseph Mazzei; and Mary Mazzei.
Subversion and Espionage in Defense Establishments and Industry,
December 6..................................................... 471
Testimony of Herman E. Thomas; Joseph A. Picucci; John Szabo;
Markus Kalasz; John Wallach; Philip Valli; John Babirak;
and Benito Seara Quintana.
Subversion and Espionage in Defense Establishments and Industry,
December 7..................................................... 521
Testimony of Markus Kalasz; Philip Valli; Paul Ault; John
Babirak; Alvin Heller; Harold C. Allen; Maurice Slater; and
Andrew Nicko.
Subversion and Espionage in Defense Establishments and Industry,
December 8..................................................... 557
Testimony of Thomas B. Russiano.
Subversion and Espionage in Defense Establishments and Industry,
January 3, 1955................................................ 569
Testimony of Frank Nestler; Mary Stella Beynon; Joseph
Slater; Peter T. Lydon; Theodore Wright; and Harold K.
Briney.
PREFACE
----------
The power to investigate ranks among the U.S. Senate's
highest responsibilities. As James Madison reasoned in The
Federalist Papers: ``If men were angels, no government would be
necessary. If angels governed men, neither external nor
internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing
a government which is to be administered by men over men, the
great difficulty lies in this: You must first enable the
government to control the governed; and in the next place,
oblige it to control itself.'' It is precisely for the purposes
of government controlling itself that Congress investigates.
A century after Madison, another thoughtful authority on
Congress, Woodrow Wilson, judged the ``vigilant oversight of
administration'' to be as important as legislation. Wilson
argued that because self-governing people needed to be fully
informed in order to cast their votes wisely, the information
resulting from a Congressional investigation might be ``even
more important than legislation.'' Congress, he said, was the
``eyes and the voice'' of the nation.
In 1948, the Senate established the Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations to continue the work of a special committee,
first chaired by Missouri Senator Harry Truman, to investigate
the national defense program during World War II. Over the next
half century, the Subcommittee under our predecessor Chairmen,
Senators John McClellan, Henry Jackson, Sam Nunn, William Roth,
and John Glenn, conducted a broad array of hard-hitting
investigations into allegations of corruption and malfeasance,
leading repeatedly to the exposure of wrongdoing and to the
reform of government programs.
The phase of the Subcommittee's history from 1953 to 1954,
when it was chaired by Joseph McCarthy, however, is remembered
differently. Senator McCarthy's zeal to uncover subversion and
espionage led to disturbing excesses. His browbeating tactics
destroyed careers of people who were not involved in the
infiltration of our government. His freewheeling style caused
both the Senate and the Subcommittee to revise the rules
governing future investigations, and prompted the courts to act
to protect the Constitutional rights of witnesses at
Congressional hearings. Senator McCarthy's excesses culminated
in the televised Army-McCarthy hearings of 1954, following
which the Senate voted overwhelmingly for his censure.
Under Senate provisions regulating investigative records,
the records of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations are
deposited in the National Archives and sealed for fifty years,
in part to protect the privacy of the many witnesses who
testified in closed executive sessions. With the half century
mark here relative to the executive session materials of the
McCarthy subcommittee, we requested that the Senate Historical
Office prepare the transcripts for publication, to make them
equally accessible to students and the general public across
the nation. They were edited by Dr. Donald A. Ritchie, with the
assistance of Beth Bolling and Diane Boyle, and with the
cooperation of the staff of the Center for Legislative Archives
at the National Archives and Records Administration.
These hearings are a part of our national past that we can
neither afford to forget nor permit to reoccur.
Carl Levin,
Chairman.
Susan M. Collins,
Ranking Member.
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.
INTRODUCTION
----------
In 1954, the investigators found themselves the subject of
investigation. Senator Joseph R. McCarthy stepped aside
temporarily as chair of the Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations after the United States Army accused him and
chief counsel Roy Cohn of having demanded special treatment for
the subcommittee's former consultant, G. David Schine, then an
army private. Senator McCarthy rebutted that the army had held
Schine hostage in order to silence the subcommittee's
investigations.
A special subcommittee, chaired by Senator Karl Mundt, then
attempted to unravel these charges. Senator McCarthy, Cohn and
executive director Francis Carr served as the principals in the
investigation, along with Secretary of the Army Robert T.
Stevens, Army Counsel John G. Adams, and Assistant Secretary of
Defense H. Struve Hensel. The Army-McCarthy hearings were
televised nationally and captured public attention. They
resulted in an erosion of the senator's public standing, and
contributed to his censure by the United States Senate that
December.
Revising the Subcommittee's Rules
In the months leading up to the Army-McCarthy hearings,
Senator McCarthy faced several challenges to his chairmanship
of the permanent subcommittee. Eight senators died in office
during the Eighty-third Congress, including Majority Leader
Robert Taft, which from time to time gave Senate Democrats a
numerical advantage, even though Republicans officially
retained their majority status and held the committee
chairmanships. Complicating matters for the permanent
subcommittee in July 1953 were the resignations of all three of
its Democratic members--Senators John McClellan, Henry Jackson,
and Stuart Symington--over the subcommittee's hiring practices.
During their absence, Senator McCarthy was often the only
subcommittee member to attend its closed hearings, many of
which he held out of town with little advance notice.
Republican senators on the subcommittee had other Senate
business to attend to in Washington. Senator Everett Dirksen
and Senator Charles Potter occasionally sent staff to represent
them at the hearings, and Senator McCarthy allowed them to
interrogate witnesses. Unaware of this development, Senator
Potter eventually dismissed his staff delegate, Robert Jones,
for misrepresenting his position. On a few occasions, even
Senator McCarthy was not present and staff interrogatories
replaced hearings. David Schine sometimes presided, with Roy
Cohn conducting the interrogation and addressing Schine as
``Mr. Chairman.'' \1\
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\1\ Charles E. Potter, Days of Shame (New York: Coward-McCann,
1965), 152-159; Staff interrogatory, October 30, 1953.
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The Democrats' continued boycott jeopardized the
subcommittee's appropriation at the opening of the second
session in January 1954. Arizona Senator Carl Hayden, the
ranking Democrat on the Appropriations Committee, threatened to
cut off the subcommittee's funds for lack of a ``majority
vote.'' At the same time, Iowa Senator Guy Gillette called on
the Senate to restrict the subcommittee's freewheeling scope
and prohibit it from overlapping other committees'
jurisdictions. Senator McCarthy described these efforts as ``a
vote against the exposure of spies and saboteurs,'' and
asserted that it was ``a natural thing for left-wing Democrats
to try to stop the exposure of treason.'' \2\
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\2\ New York Times, January 15, 1954; Chicago Tribune, January 3,
7, 15, 1954.
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Senator Karl Mundt, a South Dakota Republican who served on
the Government Operations Committee, sought to mediate between
the chairman and Democrats. At a closed meeting on January 14,
1954, Senator McCarthy agreed to the Democrats' demand that
they be permitted to hire a minority counsel. The subcommittee
formally adopted these rules:
1. Future staff members as well as all present members
shall be confirmed by a majority of the subcommittee.
2. The minority shall select for appointment to the
subcommittee staff a chief counsel for the minority who shall,
upon being confirmed, work under their supervision and
direction; who shall be kept fully informed as to
investigations and hearings, have access to all material in the
files of the subcommittee, and, when not otherwise engaged,
shall do other subcommittee work.
3. The minority counsel shall be hired at a salary not to
exceed the maximum allowed Senate employees.
An increase of $16,000 on Senate Resolution 19 will be
requested to cover the salary and travel, per diem, allowance,
and incidental expenses.
4. A clerk already on the staff, acceptable to it, shall be
assigned to the minority and it is understood that when she is
not busy she will do any work assigned to her on the
subcommittee.
5. It is understood that before a voucher is submitted to
the chairman for a new employee, that an FBI investigation be
conducted--a full field investigation requested.
6. No public hearing shall be announced or held if the
minority members unanimously object, unless the Committee on
Government Operations by majority vote approves of a public
hearing.\3\
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\3\ Congressional Record, 83rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1101.
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When Democrats returned to the subcommittee they selected
as their counsel a former subcommittee staff member, Robert F.
Kennedy, the younger brother of Massachusetts Senator John F.
Kennedy. The full committee then voted unanimously to approve
the subcommittee's appropriation. In the Senate chamber,
Senator J. William Fulbright of Arkansas cast the sole vote
against the appropriation.\4\
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\4\ Congressional Record, 83rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1085-1103.
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With criticism of investigative tactics mounting, the
Republican Policy Committee in February 1954 proposed new rules
under which a vote of the full committee would be necessary to
authorize any subcommittees; hearings would be prohibited
unless a quorum was present; and committees were restricted
from delegating subpoena power, initiating an investigation,
holding a hearing outside of the District of Columbia, or
taking confidential testimony unless authorized by a majority
of committee members. Witnesses subpoenaed would have the right
to counsel. Only senators and authorized staff personnel could
interrogate witnesses. The policy committee unanimously
approved these rules and forwarded them to the Senate Rules
Committee. The Rules Committee chose to let individual
committees set their own investigative standards and
procedures. The next year, the Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations adopted rules similar to those that the policy
committee had recommended:\5\
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\5\ Donald A. Ritchie, A History of the United States Senate
Republican Policy Committee, 1947-1997, S. Doc. 105-5 (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1997), 43-44.
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1. An investigating subcommittee of any committee may be
authorized only by the action of a majority of the committee.
2. No investigating committee or subcommittee is authorized
to hold a hearing to hear a subpoenaed witness or take sworn
testimony unless a majority of the members of the committee or
subcommittee are present: Provided, however, That the committee
may authorize the presence of a majority and a minority member
to constitute a quorum.
3. An investigating committee or subcommittee may not
delegate its authority to issue subpoena except by a vote of
the committee or subcommittee.
4. No hearing shall be initiated unless the investigating
committee or subcommittee has specifically authorized such
hearing.
5. No hearing of an investigating committee or subcommittee
shall be scheduled outside of the District of Columbia except
by the majority vote of the committee or subcommittee.
6. No confidential testimony taken or confidential material
presented in an executive hearing or an investigating committee
or subcommittee or any report of the proceedings of such an
executive hearing shall be made public, either in whole or in
part or by way of summary, unless authorized by a majority of
the committee or subcommittee.
7. Any witness summoned to a public or executive hearing
may be accompanied by counsel of his own choosing, who shall be
permitted while the witness is testifying to advise him of his
legal rights.\6\
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\6\ Congressional Record, 83rd Cong., 2nd sess., 2970.
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McCarthy and the Army
The subcommittee's investigation of Communist infiltration
of the army eventually focused on two principal subjects:
Irving Peress, an army dentist, and Annie Lee Moss, a Pentagon
file clerk. Both appeared only fleetingly before the
subcommittee, but with considerable consequence.
During the autumn of 1953, the subcommittee had looked into
charges of subversion and espionage at the Army Signal Corps
laboratories at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. Security officers
abruptly suspended forty-two employees as security risks, and
Senator McCarthy began calling them as witnesses. Many had
graduated from the engineering program at the City College of
New York (CCNY) where they had sat in classes with Julius
Rosenberg. Since Rosenberg had worked at Fort Monmouth during
the Second World War, suspicions arose that he had operated a
spy ring within the laboratories. Army officials at first
cooperated with the investigation, with Secretary of the Army
Robert T. Stevens and the army's counsel John G. Adams
attending executive sessions. Relations grew strained, however,
when President Dwight D. Eisenhower refused to allow army
security board members to be identified and questioned by the
subcommittee. The president withheld other requested materials
on the grounds of executive privilege.
Discovering that an army dentist suspected of being a
member of the Communist party had been promoted to major, and
then honorably discharged, Senator McCarthy raised the
question: ``Who promoted Peress?'' He further demanded the
names of those who had cleared Peress' discharge. Peress'
commanding officer, Brigadier General Ralph Zwicker, cited an
executive order that forbade him from divulging such
information. ``Then, General, you should be removed from any
command,'' the chairman stormed. ``Any man who has been given
the honor of being promoted to general and who says, `I will
protect another general who protected Communists,' is not fit
to wear that uniform, General.'' General Zwicker's executive
session testimony was made public on February 22, 1954, and
caused some alarm even among the senator's strongest
supporters. An editorial in the Chicago Tribune suggested that
McCarthy learn to ``distinguish the role of investigator from
the role of avenging angel.'' Since McCarthy's clash with
Zwicker has already been published, it is not included in this
edition of executive sessions, but the volume does contain an
exchange between the senator and Lt. Colonel Chester T. Brown
that immediately preceded General Zwicker's testimony, when the
senator used equally abusive language: ``I think, may I say
this, that any man in the uniform of his country, who refuses
to give information to a committee of the Senate which
represents the American people, that that man is not fit to
wear the uniform of his country.''
Army counsel John G. Adams noted that Senator McCarthy's
supporters on the Government Operations Committee initially
tried to strike from the record his verbal assault on General
Zwicker, but they had ``underestimated the efficiency of the
stenographic company.'' The army had already received copies of
the transcript. Learning this, the committee voted to release
the controversial exchange.\7\
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\7\ John G. Adams, Without Precedent: The Story of the Death of
McCarthyism (New York: W. W. Norton, 1983), 79, 129.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The subcommittee had gotten the name of Annie Lee Moss from
an FBI informant, Mary Stalcup Markward, who told them that she
had seen ``a woman by the name of Annie Lee Moss on the list of
card-carrying, dues-paying members.'' However, Markward could
not recall having met Moss personally. Moss, an African
American, had worked in a government cafeteria before getting a
job as an Army Signal Corps communications clerk at the
Pentagon in 1950. She had been cleared by loyalty boards of the
General Accounting Office in October 1949 and by the army in
January 1951. In September 1951, the FBI raised questions about
Moss, and offered Markward's testimony as evidence, but the
army did not reopen the case. Senator McCarthy described Moss
herself as ``not of any great importance,'' but he demanded to
know: ``Who in the military, knowing that this lady was a
Communist, promoted her from a waitress to a code clerk?'' Due
to ill health, Moss did not attend an executive session and
made her first appearance before the subcommittee at a
televised public hearing on March 11, 1954.\8\
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\8\ Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Army Signal Corps--
Subverision and Espionage, part 8 (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1954), 314-29.
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The army described Annie Lee Moss' position as a relay
machine operator who received and transmitted ``unintelligible
code messages.'' When the charges against her became public,
the army first transferred her to a supply room and then
suspended her entirely. At the public hearing, Moss denied
having been a member of the Communist party, having paid any
dues, or having attended any party meetings. She testified that
her late husband had received copies of the Daily Worker,
although she was uncertain whether they had been addressed to
him or to her. Moss had paid dues to a cafeteria-workers' union
in 1943, but could not say whether the union had any Communist
party connections. Appearing frail and perplexed at the
hearing, she seemed an unlikely espionage agent even to Senator
McCarthy, who left midway through her testimony. The hearing
was replayed on Edward R. Murrow's popular See It Now
television program and proved a public relations blow to the
chairman. The army eventually reinstated Annie Lee Moss,
placing her in its finance and accounts office. In 1958 the
Subversive Activities Control Board confirmed Markward's
assertion that Moss' name had appeared on the Communist party
rolls in the mid-1940s. But the board conducted no further
investigation of Moss, and the following year it concluded that
``Markward's testimony should be assayed with caution.'' \9\
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\9\ Thomas C. Reeves, The Life and Times of Joe McCarthy (New York:
Stein and Day, 1982), 548-50, 667-69, 766-67; David M. Oshinsky, A
Conspiracy So Immense: The World of Joe McCarthy (New York: Free Press,
1983), 381-85, 401-3; Arthur Herman, Joseph McCarthy: Reexamining the
Life and Legacy of America's Most Hated Senator (New York: Free Press,
2000), 333-37.
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Reporter Ethel Payne, who covered the case for the Chicago
Defender, an African-American newspaper, described Annie Lee
Moss as a humble person of limited education. ``The three
things in her life were her son, her grandson, and her church,
beside her job. And other than that, she knew little about the
world outside. She was a widow. In those days, when the
Communist Party was really campaigning in black areas to
recruit blacks to join the Communist Party, they were very
active. I know in Chicago, when people were evicted, Communists
would come and move their furniture and everything else back
into these houses, and they would bring baskets of food. They
launched a serious campaign in the black community. Well, Mrs.
Moss' husband was one of those who had been contacted by the
Communists. He was just a simple working man, but they were
sending him free subscriptions to the Daily Worker, the organ
of the Communist Party. And I don't know what he did with them,
but when he died, they kept coming, these papers, and they
piled up on her back porch, some with the wrappings still on
them. She never paid any attention to it; the Bible was her
thing.'' \10\
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\10\ Ethel Payne oral history, 1987 Washington Press Club
Foundation, 39-40.
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The Peress and Moss cases further eroded Senator McCarthy's
relations with the army. Then the controversy escalated when
the army charged that McCarthy and Cohn had demanded special
privileges for the subcommittee's former chief counsel, David
Schine. Ruth Watt, chief clerk of the subcommittee since 1947,
had observed that Cohn and Schine operated outside the normal
rules for Senate staff. Rather than work out of the
subcommittee's limited quarters, they had rented office space
in a nearby office building. Schine, as a consultant, was not
on the subcommittee's payroll and could not be reimbursed for
his expenses. Watt noted his ten-
dency to place long-distance calls to notify friends whenever
he expected live television coverage of the subcommittee's
hearings. ``Then when the bill came, it was personal, I wasn't
going to pay it,'' she explained. ``So Roy Cohn ended up paying
his telephone bills.'' Schine once signed Senator McCarthy's
name to a letter to the Senate Rules Committee asking
permission for Cohn and Schine to have access to the
``Senators' Baths,'' a pool and steam room reserved exclusively
for senators. When the chairman of the Rules Committee informed
Senator McCarthy that the request could not be granted,
McCarthy, who had known nothing about it, simply nodded and
said he knew that and would inform his staff.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Ruth Watt oral history, 107-8; Nicholas von Hoffman, Citizen
Cohn (New York: Doubleday, 1988), 177-78.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
That pattern of seeking special privilege continued after
Schine was drafted into the army as a private. Schine made
numerous requests for passes and release from basic training,
which Cohn demanded of army officials. Senator McCarthy, by
contrast, seemed indifferent to special treatment for Schine.
During a monitored telephone conversation in November 1953,
Senator McCarthy had told Army Secretary Stevens: ``For God's
sake, don't put Dave in service and assign him back to my
committee. If he could get off weekends--Roy--it is one of the
few things I have seen him completely unreasonable about. He
thinks Dave should be a general and work from the penthouse of
the Waldorf.'' Secretary Stevens had expected Senator McCarthy
to turn the Fort Monmouth investigation over to the army after
the initial inquiry, but began to suspect that Roy Cohn was
pursuing the investigation more aggressively as leverage to win
favors for Private Schine.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the Government
Operations Committee, Special Senate Investigation in Charges and
Countercharges Involving: Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens, John
G. Adams, H. Struve Hensel and Senator Joe McCarthy, Roy M. Cohn, and
Francis P. Carr, 83rd Cong., 2nd sess., Part 10 (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1954), 377-78.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The resulting Army-McCarthy hearings were played out before
televised audiences. Only a few closed-door executive sessions
were held. Rather than leading the questioning, both Senator
McCarthy and Roy Cohn were called upon to testify. Reviewing
his own testimony, Cohn saw things that had managed to elude
him during his previous year as subcommittee counsel. ``I was
rambling, garrulous, repetitive,'' he admitted. ``I was brash,
smug, and smart-alecky. I was pompous and petulant.'' Cohn had
a similarly negative assessment of Senator McCarthy's
performance at the hearings: ``He complained bitterly of being
interrupted . . . and yet he came charging in on everyone
else's testimony time and again with his `point of order, Mr.
Chairman, point of order.' He used the words so often they were
taken up by countless comedians and had a vogue as a national
catch-phrase. His language toward his opponents was often less
than parliamentarian. He was verbally brutal where he should
have been dexterous and light; he was stubbornly unwilling to
yield points where a little yielding might have gained him
advantage; he frequently spoke before thinking of the effect of
his words; he was repetitious to the point of boredom.'' Cohn
recognized that McCarthy was addicted ``to dramatic techniques
in presenting information,'' and was ``impatient, overly
aggressive, overly dramatic. He acted on impulse. He tended to
sensationalize the evidence he had.'' The Senator ``would
neglect to do important homework and consequently would, on
occasion, make challengeable statements.'' These were the
qualities that McCarthy revealed to television audiences, and
that the army's counsel Joseph Welch employed so effectively
against him.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Roy Cohn, McCarthy (New York: New American Library, 1968),
181, 208, 223, 275, 277.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Investigating Communists in the Defense Industry
The Army-McCarthy hearings consumed the better part of the
session and delayed other subcommittee business, but Senator
McCarthy was anxious to develop a new investigation of
Communist involvement in the defense industry. Both before and
after the Army-McCarthy hearings, the subcommittee looked into
the activities of the United Electrical, Radio, and Machine
Workers (UE), which had organized workers at General Electric
and Westinghouse plants. UE had once been the third largest
union in the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). In
1941, UE president James B. Carey had been defeated for
reelection largely after refusing to follow the Communist
party's line on foreign policy. The union had supported the war
effort throughout World War II, but in 1946 it conducted a
massive strike against GE for increased wages. During the
Eightieth Congress (1947-1948) enactment of the Taft-Hartley
Act required union leaders to sign non-Communist affidavits,
and several top UE officials had refused to comply. In 1948 the
House Un-American Activities Committee had investigated the UE
and heard testimony that the union's secretary-treasurer Julius
Emspak and director of organization James J. Matles were
members of the Communist party. Both Emspak and Matles cited
the Fifth Amendment in refusing to answer the committee's
questions. Senator McCarthy entered in the debate in 1950 when
he denounced the United Electrical union as ``one of America's
worst security risks,'' and accused the UE of representing the
``interests of the Kremlin'' rather than of GE workers and
management.
Prior to the subcommittee's investigation, the Senate Labor
Committee had also looked into the role of Communists in the
UE. By then the CIO had expelled the UE for being Communist
dominated. A rival International Union of Electrical, Radio,
and Machine Workers (IUE), headed by the UE's former president
Carey, won elections in most General Electric plants, although
the UE remained the bargaining agent at GE plants in Lynn,
Massachusetts; Erie, Pennsylvania; and Schenectady, New York.
In 1952 and 1953, articles in the Saturday Evening Post and
Reader's Digest had linked the UE with ``spies in our defense
plants.'' In 1954, the IUE defeated the UE for the right to
represent GE workers in Schenectady. As a result of this
turmoil, General Electric concluded that its labor problems
stemmed in large part from poor communications with its
employees and the community. In September 1954, GE hired the
actor Ronald Reagan (who at that time was known as a liberal
anti-Communist) to promote better public relations through
speaking engagements and by hosting its weekly television
program, General Electric Theater.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., A7002; Herbert R.
Northrup, Boulwarism: The Labor Relations Policies of the General
Electric Company, Their Implications for Public Policy and Management
Action (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Bureau of Industrial
Relations, 1964), 7-49; Ronald L. Filippelli and Mark McColloch, Cold
War in the Working Class: The Rise and Decline of the United Electrical
Workers (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 141-66; and
Ronald W. Schatz, The Electrical Workers: A History of Labor at General
Electric and Westinghouse, 1923-60 (Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 1983).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aftermath
Although Senator McCarthy had planned to resume holding
executive and public sessions in Boston after the Army-McCarthy
hearings had ended, Senate Republican Leader William F.
Knowland denied permission for committee hearings to be held
outside of Washington for the remainder of the session. At that
juncture, the subcommittee also underwent major changes in its
staff.
Under pressure, Roy Cohn resigned as chief counsel in
August 1954. Cohn never again held a government post. As a
private attorney he was frequently reprimanded for unethical
conduct, and was tried and acquitted in 1964, 1969, and 1971 on
charges of conspiracy, bribery and fraud. He was eventually
disbarred in 1986, just prior to his death. In his books and
later interviews, Cohn conceded that Senator McCarthy's
``penchant for the dramatic'' and exaggerated claims and
accusations had invited much of the critical storm that
engulfed them, but he always insisted that McCarthy had
performed ``a substantial service to the country by alerting
the country to the menace of communism when most people in this
country were not tuned in to how deadly it was.'' Cohn
discounted charges that their investigations had ruined people
and cost them their livelihood. ``Name one,'' he challenged.
Looking back, Cohn concluded: ``I can live to be 300 years old
and do all sorts of things. . . . and when I die, when I'm
referred to, it's going to be as Joe McCarthy's counsel.'' \15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Cohn, McCarthy, 94-95; New York Times, August 3, 1986;
Washington Post, December 22, 1985.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
G. David Schine, whose army service caused so much
commotion, disengaged from the political sphere and spent the
rest of his life in Hollywood as a motion picture producer,
winning an Academy Award for The French Connection. He also
made a guest appearance as himself on a television episode of
Batman. In 1996 Schine and his wife died in the crash of a
small plane piloted by one of their sons.
As Cohn and Schine departed from the subcommittee, Robert
F. Kennedy, who had resigned from the staff in 1953, returned
as minority counsel. Kennedy wrote the final report on the
Army-McCarthy hearings and then became chief counsel when
Democrats took the majority in the next Congress. He rose to
national prominence as counsel during the labor racketeering
investigations, managed his brother's presidential campaign,
served as attorney general, and was elected senator from New
York in 1964. As a senator he served on the Government
Operations Committee but not on the Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations. In 1968, Robert Kennedy ran for the Democratic
nomination for president of the United States. On the night
that he won the California primary, he was assassinated in Los
Angeles' Ambassador Hotel, by coincidence one of the Schine
family's chain of hotels.
In July 1954, Vermont Republican Senator Ralph Flanders
introduced a resolution calling for the censure of Senator
Joseph R. McCarthy for conduct unbecoming a senator. The
resolution was referred to a select committee chaired by Utah
Republican Senator Arthur Watkins. In September, after the
Senate had recessed, the Watkins committee issued a report
recommending the senator's censure. Following the November
congressional elections, when Democrats won narrow majorities
in both the Senate and House, the Senate returned in a lame
duck session to debate the Watkins report and vote on censure.
Friends from both parties appealed to Senator McCarthy to avoid
censure by apologizing for his conduct, but he would hear none
of it. On December 2, 1954, the Senate voted 67 to 22 to
condemn McCarthy's conduct for having been ``contrary to
senatorial tradition.'' With his party losing the majority,
McCarthy also lost the chairmanship of the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations. Reporters ignored his speeches
and press releases and his name disappeared from the front
pages. His health and spirit declined rapidly and he died in
1957 at the age of forty-eight.
Senator McCarthy's most lasting legacy came in the form of
judicial review of the rights of witnesses before congressional
investigations. The chairman's single-minded focus on possible
sedition and espionage had made him impatient over governmental
efforts to treat the accused with due process. When informed
that rules of the Civil Service Commission forbade the release
of details of any loyalty hearing, Senator McCarthy said: ``I
do not care what is in any loyalty review board memorandum.
This man is ordered to produce certain information. He will
produce it or his case will go to the grand jury.'' The loyalty
boards, he insisted, ``are not running this committee. The
senators on the committee are running it.''
Along those lines, the senator defined the constitutional
right against self-incrimination as incriminating in itself. He
instructed witnesses that they could claim the Fifth Amendment
only if they honestly felt that answering would incriminate
them. Then he took the position that anyone who claimed self-
protection had admitted guilt, and demanded that they be
dismissed from any government-related employment.
At the time that Senator McCarthy made these assertions,
the weight of judicial precedent was on his side. Dating back
to the Teapot Dome investigations, the Supreme Court had ruled
in McGrain v. Daughtery (1927) that a congressional committee
could subpoena anyone, even those who were not government
officials or employees, to testify. In Sinclair v. U.S. (1929),
the Supreme Court recognized the right of Congress to
investigate anything remotely related to its legislative and
oversight functions. In 1940, Congress passed the Alien
Registration Act (or Smith Act) that had made it illegal to
advocate overthrowing the government by force or violence. In
1948 the Justice Department indicted twelve Communist leaders
for having conspired to organize ``as a society, group and
assembly of persons who teach and advocate the overthrow and
destruction of the Government of the United States by force and
violence.'' In Dennis v. U.S. (1951), the Supreme Court upheld
those convictions on the grounds that the government's power to
prevent an armed rebellion enabled it to subordinate free
speech. During the next six years, the government indicted 126
individuals for being members of the Communist party. Congress
had also passed the Mundt-Nixon Act in 1950, which barred
Communist party members from employment in defense facilities,
denied them passports, and required them to register with the
Subversive Activities Control Board. In Rogers v. U.S. (1951)
the Supreme Court ruled that a witness who admitted having been
treasurer of a local Communist party could not claim privilege
under the Fifth Amendment when asked to whom she had given her
records. Her initial admission had waived her privilege and she
was guilty of contempt for failing to answer.
These rulings supported Senator McCarthy's operating
assumption that those who belonged to the Communist party were
committed to overthrowing the government by force and violence,
and that those who claimed the Fifth Amendment must be guilty
of the accusations made against them. He believed that the
subcommittee gave him license to interrogate anyone regarding
any possible links to communism, and that nothing could be too
private or personal in nature to escape notice. The need to
uncover disloyalty, in his mind, justified all means available,
including the verbal abuse and intimidation of witnesses, and
the firing of suspected subversives without due process.
In 1957, the Supreme Court acted to restrict the
government's ability to prosecute under the Smith Act and
broaden the rights of congressional witnesses. On June 17,
1957, a majority led by Chief Justice Earl Warren handed down a
series of sweeping decisions. In Yates v. U.S. (1957) it
reversed the convictions of fourteen Communist party members
under the Smith Act, finding that joining the Communist party
was not tantamount to advocating the overthrow of the
government by force and violence. Thereafter, the Justice
Department ceased all further indictments under the Smith Act.
In Watkins v. U.S. (1957), the Supreme Court bolstered the
rights of witnesses by insisting that an investigating
committee had to demonstrate a legislative purpose in order to
justify probing affairs, that public ``education'' was
insufficient reason to force witnesses to answer questions
under the penalty of being held in contempt, and that the Bill
of Rights applied to anyone subpoenaed by a congressional
committee. Despite Senator McCarthy's repeated threats that
witnesses would be imprisoned for perjury or contempt, not a
single witness went to jail for testimony given to the
subcommittee during his chairmanship. Several were tried for
contempt, but their convictions were all overturned on appeal.
It was a noticeably subdued and cooperative Joseph McCarthy
who attended the organizational meeting of the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations on January 24, 1955, as ranking
minority member rather than chairman. In that executive session
(not included in these volumes since it occurred outside of the
Eighty-third Congress), the new chairman, Senator John
McClellan, announced his intention to address unfinished
business left pending from the previous Congress. As Senator
McClellan turned to Senator McCarthy and to James Juliana, the
new minority counsel, they engaged in these valedictory
remarks:
Senator McClellan. Let me say to you now that you two are
certainly familiar with these files, and I mean the things that
are unfinished and need attention. We want your wholehearted
cooperation, Joe and Jim, in calling to our attention what in
your judgment needs further work of this committee. I am not
familiar with them.
I want your wholehearted cooperation in these matters
because there is no desire on my part to evade any
responsibility that we have here. We are going through with it,
whatever comes before us. I am not interested in any Democrat
who has in the present administration or in the past
administration as such, in no action that smacks of corruption
or waste or inefficiency or anything else. I am prepared to
defend or shield and I do not--there are a lot of things I
don't know, and of course the work of the committee will find
some other things as we go along. I am sure that every member
of this committee will go into anything that needs our
attention and any duty with which we are charged. I invite your
wholehearted cooperation in this field.
Beyond that now, I have nothing further.
Senator McCarthy. I have already instructed Jim here to
give you all the available information. He cannot do that just
on the spur of the moment, but I think the chair knows that I
have not tried to protect either the Eisenhower administration
or the Truman administration. As far as I am concerned, I agree
with the chair that politics plays no part in this. If we find
a wrongdoing, I certainly will call it to your attention.
Donald A. Ritchie,
U.S. Senate Historical Office.
SUBCOMMITTEE STAFF IN JANUARY 1953
Francis D. Flanagan, chief counsel (July 1, 1945 to June 30,
1953)
Gladys E. Montier, assistant clerk (July 1, 1945 to November
15, 1953)
Ruth Young Watt, chief clerk (February 10, 1947 to May 31,
1979)
Jerome S. Adlerman, assistant counsel (July 1, 1947 to August
3, 1953)
James E. Sheridan, investigator (July 1, 1947 to December 3,
1953)
Robert J. McElroy, investigator (April 1, 1948 to April 24,
1955)
James H. Thomas, assistant counsel (January 19, 1949 to
February 15, 1953)
Howell J. Hatcher, chief assistant counsel (March 15, 1949 to
April 15, 1953)
Edith H. Anderson, assistant clerk (January 26, 1951 to
February 9, 1957)
Willliam A. Leece, assistant counsel (March 14, 1951 to March
16, 1953)
Martha Rose Myers, assistant clerk (April 5, 1951 to July 31,
1953)
Nina W. Sutton, assistant clerk (April 1, 1952 to January 31,
1955)
SUBCOMMITTEE STAFF HIRED IN 1953-1954
Roy M. Cohn, chief counsel (January 15, 1953 to August 13,
1954)
Robert F. Kennedy, assistant counsel (January 15, 1953 to
August 31, 1953) chief counsel to the minority
(February 23, 1954 to January 3, 1955)
Donald A. Surine, assistant counsel (January 22, 1953 to July
19, 1954)
Marbeth A. Miller, research clerk (February 1, 1953 to July 31,
1954)
Herbert Hawkins, investigator (February 1, 1953 to November 15,
1954)
Daniel G. Buckley, assistant counsel (February 1, 1953 to
February 28, 1955)
Aileen Lawrence, assistant clerk (February 1, 1953 to September
15, 1953)
Thomas W. LaVenia, assistant counsel (February 16, 1953 to
February 28, 1955)
Pauline S. Lattimore, assistant clerk (March 16, 1953 to
September 30, 1954)
Christian E. Rogers, Jr., assistant counsel (March 16, 1953 to
August 21, 1953)
Howard Rushmore, research director (April 1, 1953 to July 12,
1953)
Christine Winslow, assistant clerk (April 2, 1953 to May 15,
1953)
Rosemary Engle, assistant clerk (May 25, 1953 to March 15,
1955)
Joseph B. Matthews, executive director (June 22, 1953 to July
18, 1953)
Mary E. Morrill, assistant clerk (June 24, 1953 to November 15,
1954)
Ann M. Grickis, assistant chief clerk (July 1, 1953 to January
31, 1954)
Francis P. Carr, Jr., executive director (July 16, 1953 to
October 31, 1954)
Karl H. Baarslag, research director (July 16, 1953 to September
30, 1954) (November 2, 1954 to November 17, 1954)
Frances P. Mims, assistant clerk (July 16, 1953 to December 31,
1954)
James M. Juliana, investigator (September 8, 1953 to October
12, 1958)
C. George Anastos, assistant counsel (September 21, 1953 to
February 28, 1955)
Maxine B. Buffalohide, assistant clerk (November 19, 1953 to
October 15, 1954)
Thomas J. Hurley, Jr., investigator (November 19, 1953 to
December 15, 1953)
Margaret W. Duckett, assistant clerk (November 23, 1953 to
October 15, 1954)
Charles A. Tracy, investigator (March 1, 1954 to February 28,
1955)
LaVern J. Duffy, investigator (March 19, 1954 to February 28,
1955)
Ray H. Jenkins, special counsel (April 14, 1954 to July 31,
1954)
Solis Horwitz, assistant counsel (April 14, 1954 to June 30,
1954)
Thomas R. Prewitt, assistant counsel (April 14, 1954 to June
30, 1954)
Charles A. Maner, secretary (April 14, 1954 to July 31, 1954)
Robert A. Collier, investigator (April 14, 1954 to May 31,
1954)
Regina R. Roman, research assistant (July 15, 1954 to February
28, 1955)
WITNESSES WHO TESTIFIED IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, 1954
Adam, John
Alfred, Benjamin
Allen, Harold C.
Ault, Paul
Ayer, Frederick, Jr.
Babirak, John
Barbour, W.
Bellino, Carmine
Belsky, Dr. Marvin Sanford
Belton, Lamuel
Berry, L.E.
Beynon, Mary Stella
Bolys, Victor S.
Briney, Harold K.
Brooks, Rodney Avram
Brown Ben H.
Brown, Lt. Col. Chester T.
Brown, Genevieve
Cassano, Edwin Allen
Cavalieri, Renaldo
Chandler, Lt. Col. Homer B., Jr.
Cohn, Roy M.
Dash, Harriman H.
DeCesare, Dante
Delos, William Vincent
Donaldson, Alyn
Drumright, Everett F.
Finestone, Max
Flores, Iris
Furry, Wendell H.
Garfield, Edwin
Goodall, Jack
Gragis, Peter A.
Gregory, Alexander
Heller, Alvin
Hoag, Diantha
Holmes, Yates
Johnson, William S.
Kalasz, Markus
Kamin, Leo J.
Kantrowitz, Leo
Krummel, Lillian Garcia
LaFortune, Robert H.
Linfield, Pvt. David LaPorte
Lydon, Peter T.
Maglin, Gen. W.H.
Martz, Lt. Com. T.J.
Mattson, Joseph O.
Mazzei, Joseph
Mazzei, Mary
McGee, Frank M.
Moore, George Frederick
Morgan, William J.
Nabeshka, Karl T.
Nestler, Frank
Nicko, Andrew
Nihart, Lt. Col.
Nisula, Waino S.
Oram, Charlotte
Pallet, Simon
Pappas, Theodore
Parris, Lawrence W.
Passikoff, Louis
Peek, Sallie Fannie
Pernice, John E.
Picucci, Joseph A.
Quintana, Benito Sera
Quirini, Helen
Reston, James B.
Riggi, Michael
Rivers, Charles
Rubinstein, Sidney
Russiano, Thomas B.
Schine, J. Meyer
Seaton, Fred A.
Sille, Cyril
Slater, Joseph
Slater, Maurice
Smedburg, Capt. W.R.
Smith, James H., Jr.
Smith, Dr. Newbern
Smith, Col. Vernon M.
Sokolsky, George E.
Springfield, Lt. Col. R.W.
Suokko, Waino E.
Szabo, John
Thomas, Herman E.
Thomas, Lewis B.
Torrey, Florence D.
Townsend, Allan E.
Trammell, Lt. Col. Charles M.
Valli, Philip
Wallach, John
Weiner, Dr. Oscar Roy
Wojchowski, Charles
Woodward, Capt. W.J.
Wright, Theodore
Zwicker, Brig. Gen. Ralph W.
PUBLIC HEARINGS OF SENATE PERMANENT
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS,
PUBLISHED IN 1954
Army Signal Corps--Subversion and Espionage: February 23-24,
1954
Army Signal Corps--Subversion and Espionage: March 1, 5, 1954
Army Signal Corps--Subversion and Espionage: March 10-11, 1954
Army Signal Corps--Subversion and Espionage: November 4, 1954
Subversion and Espionage in Defense Establishments and
Industry,
Part 1: November 19, 1953, January 15 and 16, 1954
Part 2: February 19 and 20, 1954
Part 3: July 19 and August 12, 1954
Part 4: December 7, 1954
Part 5: December 8, 1954
Part 6: July 20 and August 6, 1954
Part 7: January 3, 1955
Part 8: January 3, 1955
Part 9: January 15, 1954
Special Senate Investigation on Charges and Countercharges
Involving: Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens, John G.
Adams, H. Struve Hensel, Senator Joe McCarthy, Roy M. Cohn and
Francis P. Carr (Army-McCarthy Investigation), supplement:
April 22, 1954; part 1: March 16, April 22, 1954; part 2: April
22, 1954; part 3: April 23, 1954; part 4: April 23, 1954; part
5: April 26, 1954; part 6: April 26, 1954; part 7: April 27,
1954; part 8: April 27, 1954; part 9: April 28, 1954; part 10:
April 28, 1954; part 11: April 29, 1954; part 12: April 29,
1954; part 13: April 30, 1954; part 14: April 30, 1954; part
15: May 3, 1954; part 16: May 3, 1954; part 17: May 4, 1954;
part 18: May 4, 1954; part 19: May 5, 1954; part 20: May 5,
1954; part 21: May 6, 1954; part 22: May 6, 1954; part 23: May
7, 1954; part 24: May 10, 1954; part 25: May 10, 1954; part 26:
May 11, 1954; part 27: May 11, 1954; part 28: May 12, 1954;
part 29: May 12, 1954; part 30: May 13, 1954; part 31: May 13,
1954; part 32: May 14, 1954; part 33: May 14, 1954; part 34:
May 17, 1954; part 35: May 17, 1954; part 36: May 24, 1954;
part 37: May 24, 1954; part 38: May 25, 1954; part 38: May 25,
1954; part 39: May 25, 1954; part 40: May 26, 1954; part 41:
May 26, 1954; part 42: May 27, 1954; part 43: May 27, 1954;
part 44: May 28, 1954; part 45: May 28, 1954; part 46: June 1,
1954; part 47: June 1, 1954; part 48: June 2, 1954; part 49:
June 2, 1954; part 50: June 3, 1954; part 51: June 3, 1954;
part 52: June 4, 1954; part 53: June 4, 1954; part 54: June 7,
1954; part 55: June 7, 1954; part 56: June 8, 1954; part 57:
June 8, 1954; part 58: June 9, 1954; part 59: June 9, 1954;
part 60: June 10, 1954; part 61: June 10, 1954; part 62: June
11, 1954; part 63: June 11, 1954; part 64: June 14, 1954; part
65: June 14, 1954; part 66: June 15, 1954; part 67: June 15,
1954; part 68: June 16, 1954; part 69: June 16, 1954; part 70:
June 17, 1954; part 71: June 17, 1954; Composite Index: January
3, 1956.
WITNESSES WHO TESTIFIED IN PUBLIC SESSION, 1954
Alfred, Benjamin
Allen, Harold C.
Arsenault, Jean, Jr.
Ault, Paul
Babirak, John
Belgrave, Gordon
Belsky, Dr. Marvin Sanford
Beynon, Mary Stella
Bolys, Victor
Brandshear, Dewey F.
Briney, Harold K.
Dash, Harriman
DeCesare, Dante
Eagle, Ruth
Fernandez, Emanuel
Friedlander, Sidney
Furry, Wendell H.
Garfield, Edwin
Gebhardt, Joseph Arthur
Glatis, James W.
Gragis, Peter A.
Gregory, Alexander
Heiston, William L., Jr.
Heller, Alvin J.
Hoag, Diantha
Inslerman, Felix A.
Kalasz, Marcus
Kamin, Leon J.
Kantrowitz, Leo
LaFortune, Robert
Linfield, David LaPorte
Lydon, Peter Tom
Markward, Mary Stalecup
Mattson, Joseph
Mazzei, Joseph D.
McGee, Frank Mason
Middleton, Rufus E.
Moss, Annie Lee
Nestler, Frank
Nisula, Waino S.
Northrop, Robert Pierson
Oram, Charlotte
Owens, Arthur Lee
Pallet, Simon
WASTE AND CORRUPTION--DEVELOPMENT OF ALASKA
[Editor's note.--In an effort to end the investigation of
Fort Monmouth, Vice President Richard Nixon met with Senator
McCarthy on December 30, 1953, and urged a widening of the
subcommittee's probes beyond the issue of communism in
government. Senator McCarthy then told reporters that he
planned to pursue fraud and mismanagement in government
operations in the territory of Alaska, and that he was
considering going to Alaska once the weather had improved.
Scheduled for March 1954, the public hearings were never held
due to the subcommittee's preoccupation with matters related to
Fort Monmouth. The subcommittee then referred the Alaska
investigation to the Senate Banking and Currency Committee,
which conducted its own hearings.
A certified public accountant, Carmine Bellino (1905-1990)
had served as a special agent in the Federal Bureau of
Investigations from 1934 to 1945, becoming an administrative
agent to FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover. From 1945 to 1947 he was
assistant director of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation
and the War Assets Administration. He established a private
accounting practice in 1947 but soon afterwards was called back
to government service by the Truman committee and continued to
assist its successor, the Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations. He was later an investigator during the
Senate's labor racketeering investigation in the 1950s, special
counsel to Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, 1961-
1964, chief investigator for the Senate Watergate Committee,
1973-1974, and chief investigator for the Senate Judiciary
Committee, 1978-1981.]
----------
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 13, 1954
U.S. Senate,
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
of the Committee on Government Operations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met (pursuant to Senate Resolution 40,
agreed to January 30, 1953) at 10:00 a.m., in room 357, Senate
Office Building, Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, presiding.
Present: Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican, Wisconsin;
Senator Everett McKinley Dirksen, Republican, Illinois.
Present also: Francis P. Carr, executive director; Roy M.
Cohn, chief counsel; Karl Baarslag, research director; Herbert
S. Hawkins, investigator; Ruth Young Watt, chief clerk.
TESTIMONY OF CARMINE BELLINO
Mr. Cohn. Mr. Bellino, you are consulting accountant for
the committee? Is that right?
Mr. Bellino. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Have you and Mr. Hawkins, an investigator for the
committee, been in Alaska in the last few months?
Senator Dirksen. Roy, would you mind--I wonder if it
wouldn't be well, for the purpose of the record, to qualify the
accountant with respect to background.
Mr. Cohn. Could you tell us briefly something about your
accounting experience. I believe you were with the FBI, and
some other valuable experience.
Mr. Bellino. I am a certified public accountant in the
State of New Jersey and the District of Columbia. I had seven
years of public accounting with a public accounting firm in New
York City; seven years in my own business; eleven years with
the FBI; five and a half as administrative assistant to Mr.
Hoover; assistant director of the investigation division of the
RFC and WAA; and I have been on the Hill since 1947 on various
major investigations.
Mr. Cohn. Now, you and Mr. Hawkins were up in Alaska. When
did you arrive there?
Mr. Bellino. I arrived in Juneau about November 2, 1953.
Mr. Cohn. And from that time, did you conduct an
investigation of various expenditures of money and situations
involving the expenditure of government funds in connection
with the development of Alaska?
Mr. Bellino. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cohn. And from that investigation, as a result of that
investigation in which Mr. Hawkins participated, did you
uncover evidence of waste and corruption?
Mr. Bellino. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Now, I wonder if you could tell us the name of
the principal person involved in the transaction which you
addressed yourself to?
Mr. Bellino. I might explain this way, Senator. I was sent
to Alaska at the initiation of the Department of Interior on
the basis of suspicions of their man, Don R. Wilson, who is
head of the Alaska Public Works Administration, which has under
the law an authorization of $70 million. They have spent up to
the present time approximately $45 million and have about $7
million more authorized and appropriated.
[Off-record discussion.]
Mr. Bellino. In looking into Wilson, we found that Mr.
Kenneth Kadow----
Mr. Cohn. He is the man involved in this?
Mr. Bellino. I will explain just how we got into him. Mr.
Kadow was interested in certain housing developments in
Fairbanks and Anchorage, Alaska, and he was able to get from
Mr. Wilson the installation of utilities, street paving,
sidewalks, water mains, etc., and we couldn't understand how a
private venture could get government funds and pay only 50
percent of the actual cost. It was learned that Mr. Kadow had
been chairman of a field committee----
The Chairman. I missed something. You said government funds
and pay only 50 percent of the cost----
Mr. Bellino. Under the Alaska Public Works Act, the
communities and public bodies that participate in public works
may be charged at the discretion of Alaska Public Works
Administration anywheres from 25 to 75 percent of the cost.
They have established a policy of only 50 percent because the
law said on an overall basis it should not be any more than 50
percent. What they have been doing is putting in utilities and
have the public body pay 50 percent to the government by giving
them notes at interest of about 2 percent.
Kadow was sent to Alaska, according to his initial
statement--and I am emphasizing this, at the request of former
Secretary of the Interior, [Julius] ``Cap'' Krug. He has put
that in a letter that ``Cap'' Krug sent him up there. When I
started questioning him with a tape recorder he changed
immediately and said it was Mr. Warne, William A. Warne.
Mr. Cohn. He is now the head of the Stassen Mission in
Iran?
Mr. Bellino. Yes, sir.
Kadow's job in Alaska was to coordinate all the activities
of the Interior Department agencies. Now, there is a point that
is unusual and that is that the governor's function in Alaska
is to coordinate all activities, including the territorial
units and agencies of the Interior Department.
Senator Dirksen: Kadow, was he on the Interior payroll?
Mr. Bellino. Yes, sir.
Senator Dirksen. And he had the title of coordinator----
Mr. Bellino. Director of the field service. He was the only
one in the office besides D'Epiro, his assistant and a
secretary. Later on he had a public relations man that was on
the staff of the field service.
However, in addition to the governor, in the development of
Alaska, they also had a board of which George Sunbourg was
consultant. They had the existing function of developing
Alaska.
Kadow was sent up there especially to initiate various
projects, one of the first being housing and I found in going
through the various records and documents that we have here
that he was not only interested in getting people to become
interested in Alaska, but he would go so far as to take them by
the hand, get cost prices, write letters, analyze financial
set-ups and get financing for them. He did everything possible.
In fact, at one point George Megrath, public relations man
wrote a letter----
Senator Dirksen. He wrote a letter to whom?
Mr. Bellino. William Dougherty, who is head of the public
relations office, Interior, here in Washington.
Senator Dirksen. When was that letter written?
Mr. Bellino. We have a copy of that.
Senator Dirksen. Identify it for the record.
Mr. Bellino. This is a letter dated May 5, 1959, to William
J. Dougherty.
Senator Dirksen. 1959?
Mr. Bellino. It is typed 1959, but it should be 1949, in
which he states:
Particularly, did I warn Kadow against continued traffic
with a Mr. Cole with whom he had a joint housing proposition
and who is a shareholder in the Newcastle Engineering Company
of Newark, Delaware, a corporation having Kadow as president
and Mrs. Kadow as vice-president along with Cole who is another
vice-president. Incidentally, the man whom Kadow has been
attempting to locate in Alaska as the Department Counsel is
another officer and stockholder in the same corporation, a Mr.
Mackey.
As he pointed out----
Mr. Cohn. Let me see if I can ask you about a couple of
points which will interest them particularly and then you can
go on.
One project which you told us about, that is involving the
U.S. Tin Company--is that right?
Mr. Bellino. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Does the U.S. Tin Company operate a mine or
attempt to operate a mine up in Alaska?
Mr. Bellino. The U.S. Tin Corporation--I might say that tin
was discovered on the property in about 1903.
Senator Dirksen. Tin was discovered in 1903. Where?
Mr. Bellino. At Lost River, Alaska. That is ninety miles
northwest of Nome, possibly forty miles from Siberia.
Senator Dirksen. And how extensive was the discovery?
Mr. Bellino. The ore has been of a very poor grade.
However, in 1944 the Bureau of Mines, by drilling, discovered a
granite cupola where they believed that possibly there was a
higher grade of ore, but the exploration was discontinued until
1950 when the Defense Material Procurement Act was passed which
permitted acquiring critical material and the government
advancing funds in that connection. In other words, apparently
they were of the belief it was not necessary that a corporation
be financially sound, but merely that here is critical material
which we could use for our stockpile.
Mr. Cohn. They selected this one company, the U.S. Tin
Corporation, and the government has given to that a
considerable amount of money?
Mr. Bellino. Yes, sir.
Senator Dirksen. Who is the U.S. Tin Corporation?
Mr. Bellino. The U.S. Tin Corporation was organized in
1949. The principal officer is one Harry Fishnaller. The other
two principal officers at that time were Fred Furey and a
Robert A. F. McIntosh. They were the principal ones.
Mr. Cohn. Is Kadow in that company now?
Mr. Bellino. He is now president.
Mr. Cohn. When did he become president?
Mr. Bellino. He became president about October 2, 1951.
Mr. Cohn. How long after he left the government was that?
Mr. Bellino. Well, in connection with his employment, I
might point out first in connection with Kadow's employment.
Kadow left Interior March 15, 1951. He started to plan on
leaving Interior in July 1950. We have a letter which he wrote
to Cash Cole and in the letter he asked Cash Cole to talk to
the Mortensen Construction Company, who was one of those
interested in housing, to see whether they would be favorable
to Kadow's joining up with them.
The Chairman. Who is Cash Cole?
Mr. Bellino. Cash Cole is the Alaskan who owned the land
Kadow initially wanted to buy--either to buy from him and start
a housing development or get him started in a housing
development. Kadow is--actually the letters indicate he was
financial advisor to Cash Cole.
The Chairman. Was Kadow in a position to influence or aid
U.S. Tin in getting the federal monies to start this mining
project?
Mr. Bellino. Here is a letter dated January 27, 1951, from
Harry Fishnaller to the other officers of U.S. Tin, Bob and
Henry, in which he says:
Alaska representative of Secretary of Interior (Kenneth
Kadow) of great help to me. He says Lorain thoroughly sold on
our property and has convinced him (Kadow) of magnitude.
The Chairman. Do you know how much money Kadow has drawn
out of the corporation since he went in?
Mr. Bellino. He was supposed not to get a salary. However,
in October 1952, he arranged it so that he would get $1,500 a
month. I might say that under the contract no officer is
supposed to get anything until the mill and mine are in full
production, which was a period of thirty days.
The Chairman. Is he still getting $1,500 a month?
Mr. Bellino. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. And no tin is being produced?
Mr. Bellino. No tin at all. In fact, this one statement--
about June 5th, a telegram was sent from the mine
superintendent indicating the mill was operating on a test
basis. In other words, up to that point, 1952, they had not
been able to get the mill operating and suddenly they make it
operate on a test basis. It is not in production; it never has
been in production but Kadow told GSA that they were producing,
mining and milling, and on the basis of that mining and milling
they should begin to pay him $1,500 immediately.
From that point on they were supposed to be mining and
milling. Actually GSA went to Lost River and found they haven't
mined or milled one ton of ore whatsoever through the lode
operation.
The Chairman. Up to now, we have sunk about how much into
it?
Mr. Bellino. A little over $2 million.
The Chairman. And the U.S. engineer has long since
recommended that the project be dropped as a hopeless project;
that there was no tin there?
Mr. Bellino. There have been two recommendations to drop
the project on the part of GSA. However, as he wrote in one
letter that we have, he points out that ``I had a nice talk
today.'' This is a letter from Kadow.
The Chairman. The question is: Did the engineer recommend
that the project be closed up?
Mr. Bellino. This is after the project was to be closed up.
I want to mention who he said helped them.
Had a nice talk today with the guy that has been trying to
kill us off--he acts so friendly and nice that you'd never
guess he actually tried to cancel our contract two months ago--
Maull and Gumbel stopped it in its tracks with Nicoll's help.
Nic sure is our real friend.
The Chairman. Who is Nichols?
Mr. Bellino. J. S. Nichols, who is employed by the credit
and finance division, and who we have evidence of private
correspondence and who came to Kadow's office----
The Chairman. Was there a difference between our government
engineers as to whether or not the project should continue?
Mr. Bellino. There has been a difference to this extent.
One group felt that what they should do was explore the mine--
let's find out whether the granite dome has got valuable ore,
then consider putting money into it. Let's not put any
development into it. The other group wanted both. That was the
difference.
Senator Dirksen. Then to summarize one phase. While Kadow
was in government, he helped this corporation, the U.S. Tin
Corporation get money. After he had the money transferred over
to U.S. Tin, while there is a provision in the agreement of our
government that no officer can get money until thirty days
after tin is produced, he wrote untruthful letters to GSA,
which said he was now producing tin and on the basis of that
got $1,500 a month. Is that correct?
Mr. Bellino. Yes, sir.
Senator Dirksen. Does he have any other occupation?
Mr. Bellino. That is the important thing too. I might
mention when he submitted his resignation, about January 25,
1951, then he came to work--in fact, January 27, 1951, he
contacted Fishnaller as to definite employment. Fishnaller
agreed to take him on, while he was still in government
service.
He submitted his resignation as of January 27, 1951,
effective March 31, 1951.
The Chairman. Is he getting money besides the $1,500?
Mr. Bellino. Yes, sir. In fact he was getting money----
The Chairman. How much money is he getting and from whom?
Mr. Bellino. Mortensen Construction Company. Under
agreement of a partnership, he gets 25 percent interest in
anything done. Mortensen has interest in anything Kadow does.
The Chairman. Is Mortensen doing work for the government?
Mr. Bellino. Yes.
The Chairman. Was it doing work for the government when he
was a government official?
Mr. Bellino. Yes, sir, he helped them.
The Chairman. Did he have 25 percent interest at the time
he was a government official, who was negotiating with them?
Mr. Bellino. Senator, in that connection Mr. Kadow operated
on promises for the future so there is nothing definite to show
he definitely had an interest.
The Chairman. Then there was an agreement, was there? You
have letters to show it?
Mr. Bellino. Not that particular one. Another instance
gives inference that he must have had that agreement with
Mortensen.
The Chairman. Has he billed the government for liquor and
collected money for it?
Mr. Bellino. My recollection on some of the entertainment
for liquor and business dinners, as he called it--in fact,
Lorain, Bureau of Mines, I believe those were paid for but the
letters that I recall seeing from that time on, he was not
going to charge U.S. Tin anymore.
The Chairman. How much did he get from the government for
liquor and that sort of thing?
Mr. Bellino. Roughly, the bill on which that appeared
amounted to $1,600. However, the major portion of that was for
travel. I'd say roughly $200. I am not certain of that.
The Chairman. Did he also make claims for money with the
statement that he had water available when there was no water?
Mr. Bellino. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Would you give us the story on that?
Senator Dirksen. There is a break here somewhere that we
have to pick up.
Number one, let's summarize for a moment. Tin was
discovered in Alaska, low grade form, way back----
Mr. Bellino. Yes, sir.
Senator Dirksen [continuing]. And somebody made the
suggestion that perhaps it ought to be developed.
Mr. Bellino. They had developed----
Senator Dirksen. Did the Bureau of Mines or anybody in the
government make a suggestion this might be developed?
Mr. Bellino. Yes, sir, the Bureau of Mines and the U.S.
Geological Services both.
Senator Dirksen. Number two, in 1949 three men organized a
company called the U.S. Tin Corporation.
Mr. Bellino. Yes, sir.
Senator Dirksen. It had no corporate life before that time?
Mr. Bellino. No, sir.
Senator Dirksen. It was organized under the laws of what
state?
Mr. Bellino. The state of Washington.
Senator Dirksen. Before that it was the Lost River Tin
Company, which just folded up without going through
liquidation.
Mr. Bellino. They just didn't do anything more on that.
Senator Dirksen. Now, this corporation had to have money to
sink a shaft and develop tin?
Mr. Bellino. Yes, sir.
Senator Dirksen. Where did they get the money and how did
they get it?
Mr. Bellino. When they began to operate it was merely a
placer operation. They didn't need much money. There was water
available to run it down the creek and then put it through the
mill and get it in concentrated form and ship it out.
Senator Dirksen. So out of their own capital structure they
probably raised that money?
Mr. Bellino. Yes, sir.
Senator Dirksen. Did they come to the government for money?
Mr. Bellino. They came to the government for money in the
latter part of 1950.
Senator Dirksen. To what agencies?
Mr. Bellino. They had to get the approval of the Department
of Interior on the basis of it being a critical item but the
money was----
Senator Dirksen. Did the Department of Interior approve it?
Mr. Bellino. Yes, sir.
Senator Dirksen. I presume it was in the form of an
application under the old Exploration Act for funds with which
to go ahead with exploration. How much did they ask for?
Mr. Bellino. Initially over $300,000.
Senator Dirksen. U.S. Tin Corporation asked for $300,000.
To whom was that application directed?
Mr. Bellino. I might mention in connection with the
application, Senator, in one of his letters, Harry Fishnaller's
letter to Bob and Henry, he stated:
Am enclosing an application blank. Don't think we can
answer all requirements as to statements, etc. Consult with
Henry Schaefer and Fred Loomis as to how we might answer or
side-step where we need to.
Henry Schaefer was connected with the Seattle Trust and
Savings Bank at that time.
I want to get to the point where he said what should be
left out of the application to get their thinking.
Senator Dirksen. That can come later.
They filed an application to a federal agency for $300,000.
Mr. Bellino. Yes, sir.
Senator Dirksen. Do you know who signed the application?
Mr. Bellino. I believe it was Mr. Walsh from the Emergency
Procurement Service.
Senator Dirksen. No, it would have had to be somebody in
the Tin Corporation.
Mr. Bellino. From the U.S. Tin Corporation, Harry
Fishnaller.
Senator Dirksen. This went to the Department of Interior?
Mr. Bellino. It went to the GSA, which was Jess Larson's
outfit.
Senator Dirksen. You said the Department of Interior had to
first approve it.
Mr. Bellino. They had to approve it. The project itself was
one coming under the Defense Procurement Act, you see. It
involved no money as far as the Department of Interior was
concerned.
Senator Dirksen. They did approve it under the Exploration
Act; then the application had to go where?
Mr. Bellino. The application went to GSA, which is now GSA,
it was then the Emergency Procurement Service.
Senator Dirksen. When was the application filed?
Mr. Bellino. It was filed in the early part of February
1951.
Senator Dirksen. February 1951! Was Mr. Kadow still in the
government service?
Mr. Bellino. Yes. In fact, we have a telegram to Harry
Fishnaller at government expense asking him to send the
application blank to him here in Washington and second to
advise him whether he could be at a meeting of the Geological
Services in Washington.
Senator Dirksen. This was 1951 or before?
Mr. Bellino. 1951.
Senator Dirksen. Now, when the application got to GSA, what
happened to it?
Mr. Bellino. When it got to GSA, it was reviewed and
eventually recommended on the basis of a 25 ton mill per day
project.
In other words, there was a considerable difference of
opinion whether the government should put a lot of money in
this project so they agreed to permit them to go ahead on a
test basis. ``Let's see if it is feasible to operate up
there.'' The climatic weather conditions were terrific, the
shipping and everything else. They felt it would not be
feasible to put it in full production. They permitted them to
start on a 25 ton basis. However, Mr. Lorain of the Bureau of
Mines in Juneau was against the 25 ton mill. The money they
were permitted to have would only be sufficient to operate that
type of mill. He was against the 25 ton mill. Mr. Kadow got his
instructions, but he said, ``Let's disregard the 25 tons; we
are going to build up to 100 tons on the basis of what we have
got.'' We have a letter where Mr. Lorain doubted the
feasibility of that very much.
As a result of proceeding on a 100 ton basis, they got
money for 25 tons, and naturally they had to ask for more money
later on. That is what happened. When GSA finally approved the
application for 25 tons test--they approved it about March 23,
1951----
Senator Dirksen. When was the money disbursed?
Mr. Bellino. The first money was a guarantee by GSA to the
bank, Seattle Trust Company. The bank was willing to stand 10
percent of this loss while the government would stand 90
percent. The bank, however, was willing to do that provided the
company got in production and produced by a certain time. When
the time came and the company failed to go into operation, the
bank said, ``We will not give them any more money.''
At that time $157,000 out of $300,000 some odd guaranteed
had been spent, so they came back to Washington and they got
GSA----
Senator Dirksen. Wait. How long after this was approved,
namely in February or March 1951 was it before the bank
indicated they could get no more money under this guarantee?
Mr. Bellino. About August 1951.
Senator Dirksen. They had roughly six or seven months to
operate?
Mr. Bellino. Actually, their operation would not have begun
until July. If it was a mine which had been able to operate and
able to deliver what they said they could deliver, they should
have begun to operate by the first of July.
Senator Dirksen. By August there was no actual production?
Mr. Bellino. No, sir. Never has been. The Seattle Bank said
they would disburse no more money. GSA, however, got them to
agree to loan $10,000 more but this time GSA was responsible
for 95 percent so the bank's loss, on the outside, would be 5
percent. At 6 percent interest, the bank was doing pretty good.
Senator Dirksen. Was that money all spent--approximately
$250,000 or $300,000?
Mr. Bellino. $257,000, I think, was gotten and spent.
Senator Dirksen. With that additional money, how long did
they run?
Mr. Bellino. They have been trying to run ever since 1951.
They came back into Washington in the latter part of November
1951 for a $35,000 advance. In fact, on one of the letters he
says:
I had a new idea. Sell GSA on this.
Instead of having the bank give them money to pay interest,
the government was paying the interest, the corporation never
did pay interest, they said:
Let's have GSA advance the money to use monthly as we need
it and pay GSA interest unless they indicate we don't have to
pay interest.
It was finally agreed that they pay 4 percent interest.
They never did pay the interest.
Senator Dirksen. With this $35,000 was any tin produced?
Mr. Bellino. There was never any tin produced.
Senator Dirksen. Now, they came back for more money?
Mr. Bellino. Yes, sir.
Senator Dirksen. How much?
Mr. Bellino. I believe the next amount was two hundred and
some thousand.
Senator Dirksen. What happened to that application?
Mr. Bellino. That was the time about February 1952 when Mr.
Bourret recommended that they stop giving any more funds to the
development.
Senator Dirksen. Who is Mr. Bourret?
Mr. Bellino. He is with the GSA, one of the mining
engineers.
Senator Dirksen. Did they get the money or didn't they?
Mr. Bellino. They got the money.
Senator Dirksen. Notwithstanding his objection?
Mr. Bellino. Yes, sir.
Senator Dirksen. Was the money spent?
Mr. Bellino. Yes, sir.
Senator Dirksen. How long did they take to spend that
money?
Mr. Bellino. It didn't take them long because they were
back in July for about $900,000 more.
Senator Dirksen. Now, by fall 1952, they had spent $2
million?
Mr. Bellino. I wouldn't say--they were getting close to it.
Senator Dirksen. How much tin was produced between November
1951 to November 1952?
Mr. Bellino. Never tin--placer tin on placer ground
producing tin of a very poor grade.
Senator Dirksen. How much?
Mr. Bellino. They have gotten on an average about forty
tons.
Senator Dirksen. Altogether forty tons?
Mr. Bellino. A year--not out of this project however. In
that area.
U.S. Tin operated that also.
Senator Dirksen. Out of these funds?
Mr. Bellino. Yes, sir.
Senator Dirksen. They got forty tons of tin?
Mr. Bellino. Concentrate. They ran out of the next $200,000
and came back for $900,000.
Senator Dirksen. When did they come back?
Mr. Bellino. They came back for the $900,000 sometime in
the latter part of 1952.
Senator Dirksen. What happened to that application?
Mr. Bellino. That was also approved.
Senator Dirksen. So they got another $900,000. How long did
that run, if you know or roughly?
Mr. Bellino. Well, they were back in--well, that would be
for 1953.
Senator Dirksen. Up to the present time they have spent
around two million dollars altogether?
Mr. Bellino. That is including the money they are spending
at the present time.
Senator Dirksen. Now, what is the value of the ore
concentrate--you say they got forty tons?
Mr. Bellino. Approximately forty tons a year. I don't have
the actual value in dollars.
Senator Dirksen. Have you any notion as to what ore
concentrate is worth in tons?
Mr. Bellino. Of course, the concentrate has to be put into
tin and the tin price now is at least $1.05 a pound. There
never has been more than enough to do any more than pay off
part of the bank loan. That is the most they have ever been
able to do.
Senator Dirksen. Let's find out what the market is for ore
concentrate. We have the actual amount of the sales?
Mr. Bellino. Yes, sir.
Senator Dirksen. Now, I have got one other question. This
is with reference to Mr. Kadow. He filed his resignation in
January 1951, effective March 31, 1951. Did he actually go off
the rolls in March 1951?
Mr. Bellino. Subsequent to that resignation letter, he sent
a telegram about March 13th requesting that his resignation be
effective March 15th. Then he entered into an agreement with
Mortensen and U.S. Tin on March 16th.
Senator Dirksen. When did he become president of U.S. Tin?
Mr. Bellino. He was general manager on March 16, 1951. He
became president about the latter part of September or October
2, 1951.
Senator Dirksen. Now then, after he became general manager
on March 16th, 1951, the company actually then got the $200,000
you referred to in 1952?
Mr. Bellino. Yes, sir.
Senator Dirksen. So your recollection would indicate that
U.S. Tin got $1,100,000 within a short period of time after Mr.
Kadow's resignation from the government service became
effective.
Mr. Bellino. Senator, altogether he got $2,900,000.
Senator Dirksen. I am speaking about these two items?
Mr. Bellino. Yes, sir.
[Off-record discussion.]
Senator Dirksen. Did he have a written contract with U.S.
Tin when general manager?
Mr. Bellino. I think initially it was oral and eventually
he entered into a written contract.
What I want to explain in connection with U.S. Tin was that
what I did there is take everything I could. I did not look at
the records or audit the record. The GSA auditor was going to
do that and we haven't gotten his report as yet.
The Chairman. Do you know when he went with U.S. Tin on the
sixteenth of March if he had a contract either oral or written,
and if so, how much he was to get?
Mr. Bellino. How much stock he was to get?
The Chairman. What was he getting from U.S. Tin the day
after he left the government?
Mr. Bellino. The records indicate that the corporation gave
him gratis 8,500 shares of stock in this corporation.
The Chairman. How many shares were outstanding?
Mr. Bellino. Three hundred thousand authorization. There
was outstanding, I believe, somewheres around 180,000; balance
was all optioned.
The Chairman. So he got about 10 percent of the outstanding
stock?
Mr. Bellino. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. And do you know what that stock was worth, if
anything?
Mr. Bellino. The stock had book value of $1.00 a share. The
stock had a par value of $1.00 a share. The book value was
minus zero. However, they were selling the stock not less
than--from $3.00 a share to as much as $6.00 a share. The
market value was between $3.00 and $6.00 a share.
The Chairman. Were they actually selling stock at that time
at that figure?
Mr. Bellino. At that date I do not know. Subsequent to
getting the money from the government they began to sell stock
to other individuals from $3.00 to $6.00 a share.
Mr. Cohn. Did Kadow sell his?
Mr. Bellino. Kadow, according to tax returns, sold some of
his.
Mr. Cohn. How?
Mr. Bellino. Not less than $3.00 a share.
Mr. Cohn. And he paid zero?
Mr. Bellino. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cohn. What was his consideration?
Mr. Bellino. Actually, it had been his help to the
corporation.
Mr. Cohn. Mr. Bellino, Senator Dirksen very correctly
points out here, I think the pattern is very clear. Senator
Dirksen makes this point: What, very specifically, did Kadow
have to do with giving of any monies or any other benefits to
this company prior to his leaving this government?
Mr. Bellino. He definitely contacted officials in both
Interior and GSA and helped them get the loans.
The Chairman. You have told us that. Was that his job?
Mr. Bellino. No, sir. He says this. He says, ``I was up
there to develop Alaska.'' Everything he did was for the
purpose of----
The Chairman. I am trying to find out whether in his
official capacity he was supposed to contact people or not. It
makes a big difference. Was part of his job to advise that
money be given to deserving developing companies? If not, what
was his job? He was on the government payroll. He had a job. Do
you follow me on this, Carmine?
Mr. Bellino. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Let's say I went to Alaska, while Kadow was
holding his government job and if I had some vision of
developing a certain project and I needed federal funds, was
Kadow part of the chain of command through which I would go to
get those funds. Was he the man who would recommend for or
against it.
Mr. Bellino. Senator, Kadow injected himself into
everything that he desired. I might say on that, he would go to
extremes making sure they got the funds--whether it was
government, Stettinius or any fund.
The Chairman. What I want to know--if that was his job. If
not----
Mr. Bellino. His job isn't spelled out at all--just
development of Alaska. Anything he could do to develop Alaska
was his job.
The Chairman. Then if the government sent him up there to
develop Alaska, he is the man who would be depended upon,
relied upon for recommendations for loans.
Mr. Bellino. It would appear from the Alaska field service
that he was in an advisory capacity. However, he went much
further than that.
The Chairman. He advised the government to give loans to
worthy projects?
Mr. Bellino. No, I wouldn't say that.
The Chairman. Who would he advise?
Mr. Bellino. His staff was made up of heads of various
government agencies, Bureau of Mines, Geological Survey----
Mr. Cohn. The fact is that one of his jobs was to recommend
to his superiors what would be good and what bad; which ones
they should finance and which ones they shouldn't. Is that
correct?
Mr. Bellino. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Here is a man who was in Alaska when U.S. Tin
wanted money. One of his tasks was to advise his superiors
whether or not they should get the money. He did that, didn't
he?
Mr. Bellino. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. In fact, on February 27, 1951, he was down here
with Harry Fishnaller seeing Mr. Ellis in the Bureau of Mines
about money for the corporation.
Mr. Cohn. Do you have any statements that he advised his
superiors, made recommendations on contracts?
Mr. Bellino. No.
Mr. Cohn. You don't?
Mr. Bellino. No, unless--no, nothing.
That was not part of his official duty, Senator. He took
that all upon himself and his own interpretation.
The Chairman. How do you know?
Mr. Bellino. I will say that this way. When he started out,
started doing that, rumors came down about his activities, so
Warne wrote him a letter calling his attention to being like
Caesar's wife, vulnerable, above suspicion.
The Chairman. Above suspicion of what?
Mr. Bellino. In developing Alaska, of having any personal
interest in any way or seeking to have any personal interest.
The Chairman. I didn't ask about that. I didn't ask about
personal interest.
Listen to me a minute. I am not talking about personal
interest. I am trying to find out whether there is a conflict
here, taking over a company which he had promoted and fostered
while a government agent--whether or not he did that. In order
to find that out, I must find out from you or someone else
whether he did perform the function of advising his superiors,
advising GSA, advising Interior, the Bureau of Mines or anyone
else, when they should or should not give a company some aid.
It had nothing to do with personal interest.
Mr. Bellino. Senator, this is his job description. I could
read that.
The Chairman. I can read it.
Let's read it into the record. This is the job description
for Kadow dated July 8, 1948:
Under the general direction of the Secretary of the
Interior to serve as Director of the Alaska Field Staff,
Chairman of the Alaska Field Committee, and ex officio
Commissioner for Alaska for the Department. To be responsible
for integrating the activities in Alaska of the bureaus and
offices of the Department and for increasing the effectiveness
of the Alaskan program of the Department. Will report to the
Secretary through the Director of the Division of Territories
and Island Possessions.
To serve as the representative of the Department and of the
Secretary in Alaska in dealing with other Federal agencies, the
Territorial government, and other public or private groups or
persons on matters of common interest.
To make continuous study of the operations of the bureaus
and offices of the Department in Alaska and of questions of
common interest in such operations; to act as a point of
contact and a channel for the exchange of views and information
in regard to such questions; to initiate and endeavor to secure
common agreement on measures necessary to ensure, integration
and economical execution of departmental programs; and to
report promptly to the Secretary on any situations which may
require departmental action.
To resolve directly, wherever possible, differences in
matters crossing bureau lines or affecting more than one bureau
or office.
In conjunction with the Alaska Field Committee to prepare
and submit for the Secretary an annual report covering the
following:
1. The general aspects of the entire program of the
Department in Alaska and of the programs of each bureau or
office.
2. Obstacles encountered in the realization of an effective
program in Alaska and recommendations for overcoming such
obstacles.
3. Recommendations as to steps needed to accomplish an
adequate program for Alaska.
In conjunction with the Alaska Field Committee to prepare
and submit to the Secretary a comprehensive long-range
departmental program for Alaska on a 6-year basis; and,
subsequent to the adoption of such a program, suggest such
annual revisions as may be required to maintain a program on a
6-year basis.
To supervise and direct the activities of the employees of
the Alaska Field Staff and to perform related duties as
assigned.
[Off-record discussion.]
The Chairman. When did he have the agreement with U.S. Tin,
if you know, to get the stock or anything else?
Mr. Bellino. About the stock, that just appeared in the
minutes. I don't know when he made the agreement.
The Chairman. When did it appear in the minutes?
Mr. Bellino. I do not recall. However, about January 27,
1951, he has admitted speaking to Fishnaller about the job. He
says it wasn't until after he told Fishnaller he would work for
the company that he began to help the Tin Company.
The Chairman. How much salary was he supposed to get as
general manager?
Mr. Bellino. I haven't seen any salary, Senator.
The Chairman. Did you ask him?
Mr. Bellino. No, sir.
The Chairman. That is an important thing, isn't it.
Mr. Bellino. Certainly, yes, sir.
The Chairman. That should be in the record.
Mr. Bellino. From what I could see, he hasn't received any
salary. The agreement was that he would not receive a salary
while with the government.
The Chairman. What type of deferred salary did he receive?
If I go to work for your corporation, I don't go to work for
nothing, even under an agreement with the mortgagee. If I don't
get money as of today, certainly I am going to pile up salary.
Mr. Bellino. He said he wasn't interested in such, that he
was interested in capital gains and for that reason felt
eighty-five hundred shares of stock was his salary.
The Chairman. Did you ask him?
Mr. Bellino. I went there by what the records showed in
connection with his signing the contract--his agreement to sign
the contract gave him eighty-five hundred shares.
The Chairman. Do you have documents, letters or anything
else to show the date that he became interested in becoming
part of this company?
Mr. Bellino. The first document that I found of this
corporation, which was called to his attention, was about
October 2nd.
In October, I am not sure of the date, 1950, at which time
a copy of a letter written by Mr. Lorain was sent to Mr. Kadow.
The Chairman. Setting out what?
Mr. Bellino. It showed this corporation was anxious to get
money and begin doing business.
The Chairman. Have you identified Mr. Lorain?
Mr. Bellino. Mr. Lorain was director of Bureau of Mines in
Juneau.
I might explain to the senator, actually we jumped to the
tin mine and you can't follow Kadow's activities. If we were to
follow his prior activities we could understand his
thinking,when he was ready to leave the government and go to
work for Mortensen and U.S. Tin. For instance, in 1947, October
21, 1948, which was about three months after he arrived in
Alaska--he went there, got there about July 15, 1948, Mr. Warne
wrote a handwritten memo for the files pointing out:
Director James Boyd of the Bureau of Mines came to me this
morning, having returned this week from Juneau, Alaska, where
he was early in October, and other mines field stations. He
said that his man Germain at Juneau, some in Geological Survey,
and the governor, were worried because Ken Kadow had given the
impression that (1) he was in Alaska to make a personal
killing, (2) had endeavored to make a personal arrangement with
a firm of architects for a cut on future building, and (3) had
in mind trying to participate personally in mineral
developments that he is promoting as a part of a development
program. Mr. Boyd says all his information is hearsay, but he
thought such rumors and reports ought to be investigated. He
does not think they are widespread in Alaska.
As a result of that, the only action taken was a letter
from Mr. Warne to Mr. Kadow and he starts off:
It perhaps is natural that the representatives of the
Interior Department assigned to aid the development of Alaska
should be watched closely by Alaskans, but I do not want you,
through inadvertence or otherwise, to invite suspicious
attitudes nor to be made the butt of gossip. It would hurt both
you and our program for the development of Alaska.
Like Caesar's wife, as I have said before, anyone in your
position must be above suspicion.
Some nasty rumors have gained some currency and apparently
are being spread. They run something like this: that you have
said that you were in Alaska `to make a killing'; that you
sought a silent partnership and a 10 percent cut in a proposed
building project; and that part of your interest might be
personal in the proposed mineral developments. In the light of
the exchange of letters--yours of August 27, mine of September
21, and yours of September 24--I cannot credit such rumors,
which are based on hearsay so far as any who have repeated them
to me freely admit.
I imagine, however, that the suggestion you made at the
October 7 Field Committee meeting that the limestone deposit
might be protected through a dummy company to hold it for
appropriate later use by bona fide developers is being
distorted and may be repeated with garnishment to your
disadvantage. The voicing of such a suggestion, it seems to me,
is ill-advised since it puts Caesar's wife in a not-totally
invulnerable position, against thoughts, that is.
No government employee may use his official position,
directly or indirectly, for personal gain nor can he afford,
for example, to say that he would like to do so, even in jest,
nor to propose anything that has the color of preparation for a
situation in which would be created the opportunity for him or
others to profit personally because of the government's
business.
I have been very pleased with the way you have started the
field program. Perhaps we both underestimated the amount of
resistance that a field coordinator would meet in our
department, in other departments, and outside of government.
That may account for some of the pot-shotting. I thought,
however, that you should know and be forearmed. The government
service is exacting in its demands for personal self-sacrifice,
and is remunerative only in the satisfaction of having rendered
service. Forgive me for seeming to lecture. Especially do I
apologize since I believe there is no reason for me to be
saying such things to you.
Mr. Warne ended up apologizing.
Senator Dirksen. What was the date of that letter?
Mr. Bellino. October 21, 1948.
Senator Dirksen. Let's get the sequence of dates clear in
the record. Mr. Kadow went to work for the Department of
Interior what month?
Mr. Bellino. July 1948.
Senator Dirksen. And he went to Alaska when?
Mr. Bellino. He arrived in Alaska about that time.
Senator Dirksen. In July?
Mr. Bellino. Yes, sir.
Senator Dirksen. What was his prior experience?
Mr. Bellino. Prior thereto he was connected with Stettinius
and his work in Liberia; before that he was with Nelson A.
Rockefeller in South America.
Senator Dirksen. What you mean to say is: His earlier
government employment consisted of work with the State
Department in Liberia and later with the Rockefeller committee
in South America.
Mr. Bellino. From September 1947 to August 1948, he was
with the Stettinius Associates in Liberia, Inc., and the
Liberia Company, in charge of planning and development. It was
his responsibility to present practical operating plans for the
development of Liberia. ``These two corporations were organized
for the purpose of developing Liberia both economically and
socially.''
Prior to that time he was with the International Basic
Economy Corporation and American International Association. His
immediate supervisor was Mr. Nelson A. Rockefeller, president
of the above corporations. He was also with the Coordinator of
Inter-American Affairs, Food Supply Division in Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil. Before that all of his work was in connection with
agriculture, either at the University of Delaware or the
University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois. From September 1931
to December 1948, he was associate plant pathologist,
Department of Horticulture, University of Illinois. Before that
he was assistant to plant pathologist, Washington State
College, Pullman, Washington.
Senator Dirksen. All right then, he entered the Department
of Interior in July of 1948?
Mr. Bellino. Yes, sir.
Senator Dirksen. And was dispatched almost immediately to
Alaska?
Mr. Bellino. Within two weeks he was on his way to Alaska.
Senator Dirksen. He was in Alaska then roughly five months
when this rather lecturing letter was written by a Mr. Warne,
and Mr. Warne's full name is William E. Warne, and his title?
Mr. Bellino. Assistant Secretary of Interior.
Senator Dirksen. Which means within five months after Mr.
Kadow assumed employment with the Department of Interior,
rumors had come back from Alaska as far as Washington and
became the foundation for a letter by Mr. Warne.
Mr. Bellino. Yes, sir.
Senator Dirksen. All right. Now you can proceed.
Mr. Bellino. On October 28, 1948, there appears a letter in
the file from Mr. Warne, in which he says:
I talked with Governor Gruening by phone on October 22
relative to Dr. Boyd's conversation with me and mine with John
Reed of the Geological Survey about Mr. Kadow and the situation
at Juneau. The Governor said he had heard rumors and had
discussed the subject of the rumors with Mr. Kadow and that he,
the Governor, was satisfied. He said no investigation or other
action was warranted at this time, that Mr. Kadow had not had a
long background of government employment but was learning
rapidly.
In that connection, Governor Gruening on August 16, 1948,
wrote to Mr. Kadow and he said:
I am dropping a line on the subject of a communication
which George Sundborg mailed you. It has to do with a birch
products project, the principal of which is a man named
Franklin Lanum. The project is discussed in the enclosed
memorandum.
It seems to me that other than housing and the cement
plant, no other single project is so much in line with the
thoughts that we were developing.
Here is a man who has gone quite a distance in seeking to
develop and process an Alaska native product which hitherto has
been unutilized. He can develop it as a raw-material exporter;
that is, shipping out the logs; and is doing so. But this is
scarcely desirable. If he could get the financing--and the
amount would not seem to be large--$170,000--he can establish a
birch manufacturing and producing plant which will (1) supply
Alaska with finished products needed in the construction
industry; (2) obviate the high cost of transportation for
corresponding materials; (3) aid in the solution of the housing
problem; (4) establish another year-round industry, employing
local labor.
This shows the Governor asking Kadow to help this man with
his financing, which was what Kadow was doing up there--help in
financing--but as indicated in other memoranda, he was looking
also for his own personal interest whenever he did help with
financing.
Now, Kadow wrote a note to Governor Gruening on August 28,
1948, in which he said:
I received your letter and George's regarding Franklin V.
Lanum of Anchorage. I have read carefully his business
prospectus. I have discussed it with several of my friends and
believe that financing for this enterprise is definitely
possible. I can not, however, work it out until I have a
detailed breakdown of Mr. Lanum's financial statement.
Considering the time that I have left here, I would suggest
that you have Mr. Lanum meet me in Juneau sometime shortly
after my return, which is now scheduled for the 11th. He should
come prepared to discuss the whole thing in detail. It is my
opinion, from what I read of his business prospectus, that I
can propose a much more satisfactory capital structure for him
than the one he has already.
I have asked some of my partners in the New Castle
Engineering & Construction Company to help work out the
financing for this company. Whether they put their money in or
not is beside the point. I am reasonably sure that they will
come up with a satisfactory working formula.
The governor had knowledge of this activity of Kadow, but
nevertheless a few months later the question came up as to his
activities and whether an investigation should be made of it.
The governor said he didn't think this should be done and it
stopped right there.
Senator Dirksen. Who was the New Castle Construction
Company to which he refers and in which he refers to partners?
Mr. Bellino. The New Castle Construction Company was
organized and incorporated in June of 1948, just before he
obtained his job with Interior. He organized it for the purpose
of using it in the development of housing in Alaska.
In that connection he claims that when he first--well, I
could read his confidential letter from Mr. Warne to Mr. Kadow.
Senator Dirksen. First, the letter is to whom?
Mr. Bellino. Mr. Warne.
Senator Dirksen. By whom?
Mr. Bellino. This letter is dated October 26, 1948 from Mr.
Kadow to Mr. William E. Warne, Assistant Secretary of the
Interior.
Thank you very much for yours of the 21st. I appreciate it
more than words can tell. You are absolutely correct in
assuming that my letter of the 24th was a statement of policy
on my part. It is true, however, that ``Caesar's wife was very
nearly seduced.'' This was a function of misunderstanding on
our parts. I had definitely expected to make investments in
Alaska when I came here. You knew this as did Secretary Krug.
As a matter of fact, I can tell you without reservation, I
would not have taken this job had I known that this policy
would have been reversed. I could not have afforded to do so.
However, that is all water over the dam. I am here as
Interior's representative. I will do everything in my power to
promote the best interest of the Interior Department and of
Alaska, and you have my word that as long as I am a government
employee, I will not personally take part in any of the many
opportunities that I see.
So much for the record. Now for what I consider to be
additional pertinent information. In the first place very few
people in the government seem to know how a business project is
born. They seem to think that if you publish some sort of a
report, that almost immediately business as a whole will take
it up. Personal conferences and actual solicitation of interest
on the part of a person who has the facts are a very integral
part of business development, as you well know. Of course, some
projects will be developed in the other manner, but by and
large, the road must be smoothed for the proper business
psychology. Trying to smooth this road in Alaska is one of the
toughest problems I have yet tackled primarily because of laws
and stands taken by the government which the people consider
inept. Most of the people in the government simply cannot
understand how important little things are to the businessman's
point of view. A typical example is the necessity for a man who
is going to make a sizable investment to own the piece of
ground on which he makes it.
Another point that has been somewhat disconcerting to me is
the endless chain of rumors and absolutely foundless remarks
that float around. For instance, it came to my attention
through Reed Salisbury the other day that two different people
in Agriculture are supposed to have made a statement to Rex Lee
that I told them if they did not cooperate 100 percent with us,
I would see that they were fired. I expect to hear all sorts of
crazy things, some good and some bad. This is always the case
when a fellow is really out getting something done. It
distressed me particularly, however, to hear that Agriculture
might be complaining because I have been bending over backward
to get what I regard as a healthy relationship with them. I
have made no such comment to anyone.
The greatest trouble I am having in Alaska to date is
avoiding the press, and when they finally corner me for a
speech or a statement, getting them to quote me correctly. I
enclose herewith two articles written as a result of a speech I
made in Ketchikan. If I do say so myself, the speech was fairly
good, which is not always the case, but the article in the
Ketchikan Daily News misquoted me badly. Frequently some of the
misquotes seem to be intentional and are definitely popular
with the people, but it irritates me, nevertheless, that they
see fit to garble one's remarks.
Your reference to our meeting at which time I proposed to
form a corporation with the authorization of the Field
committee just about floors me because I do not see how anyone
could possibly have misunderstood my motive. I stated very
clearly that all the stock of the company would be assigned to
the government and held by it until such a time as it saw fit
to develop the project to the greatest public good. It was
simply a suggestion of a mechanism whereby we could move at
once. Had we followed it, the lime deposits would have been
under our control. As it is, it is under somebody elses. In my
opinion, any person who misconstrued my intention with regard
to that recommendation is doing so deliberately. Had I wished
to be two-faced, or had I been concerned about personal
investment possibilities, I should certainly not have discussed
it as I did in the meeting.
In closing, I want you to know that I will appreciate every
bit of information you can send me that would indicate my
motives or methods are being misunderstood. You have my word of
honor, however, that I will not betray your faith in me nor
will I abuse my position in the government. As a matter of
fact, I will fight like a wildcat and raise particular hell
with anyone who does. You must appreciate, however, that in all
the appraisals that come to your attention, I speak as a
businessman. It must be remembered that a businessman's
psychology of view should be misunderstood by some bureaucrats
is not a great surprise to me. However, if it becomes
misunderstood by the average citizen, I will then definitely be
surprised and disappointed.
Your continued confidence and support are greatly
appreciated.
Now, I would like to read in connection with his stock,
what Mr. Kadow said to his lawyer. This is a letter dated
September 24, 1948, to Mr. Jim Mackey, Rockville Center, New
York.
The Chairman. How does that date compare with the letter
you just read?
Mr. Bellino. This is September 24, 1948; the other letter
was dated October 26, 1948.
As you will recall, I told you I had gotten permission from
Krug and Warne to have The Newcastle Engineering and
Construction Company do business in Alaska. As an afterthought,
it occurred to me that I had better have that permission in
writing, and accordingly I enclose a copy of a letter I
received from Bill Warne after consultation with the Solicitor.
The thing is so goddamn stupid, it makes me boil, but I shall
of necessity take steps to comply.
I shall be sending along in a few days or at least before
any actual business activity of The Newcastle Engineering and
Construction Company takes place, the transfer of stock and the
corporate books. At the same time I shall let you know the
additional officers so that the company can get on with its
business. At your first convenience I wish you would prepare a
rough draft of an agreement which is adequate to indicate that
you will hold the stock and that you will transfer it back to
me at my request. We cannot do this as you once proposed that
the corporation actually indicate on its books that the stock
was being held for me or Dal since this would obviously be
circumventing the provisions of the Solicitor's judgment. It
will be necessary for the stock to be yours and the agreement
should simply indicate that I have the right to purchase back
`x' number of shares when I choose. I would like to see your
draft of this as soon as it is convenient.
The Chairman. This New Castle Engineering Company, was it
doing business in Alaska?
Mr. Bellino. It was organized to do business--in September
he put $1,000 in the corporation.
Senator Dirksen. When was that?
Mr. Bellino. September 1948. He and his wife were the
principal officers. He intended to have Reed Salisbury an
officer of the corporation, but Salisbury eventually got out of
the corporation, some difference of opinion, and he did not
continue.
The corporation, as far as I can see, never did operate.
The Chairman. It had no government contract?
Mr. Bellino. Never as New Castle Engineering. Actually, the
Delaware Corporation was organized to do business in Alaska or
anywhere, but never did get up there and operate under that
name.
The Chairman. Do you know whether it operated under any
other name?
Mr. Bellino. There was another name, whether or not it
might be tied into it--NEDCO. It might be an abbreviation.
The Chairman. It sounds as though it might be.
Mr. Bellino. That was incorporated in Alaska. What they
did, I don't have that information.
The Chairman. You don't know if they had contracts with the
government?
Mr. Bellino. No.
At any rate, Senator, on September 2, 1949, Mr. Kadow
submitted a financial statement to J. E. Dougherty, vice
president of the Farmers Trust Company in Newark, Delaware. He
showed net assets of $264,000, among which were stocks of
$179,000.
This is what he said under stocks:
Including controlling stock in the new housing project, the
$179,000 figure represents the actual purchase value of the
stock. Since none of these stocks are listed on the market,
their true par value today can only be judged by their worth in
capital assets which materially exceed the $179,000 figure.
Some of the companies are fairly new and have not yet paid
dividends.
The Chairman. Does that statement or anything else show how
he got the controlling interest in the housing project?
Mr. Bellino. No, sir, his explanation of this, Senator, was
a very confusing one. He claimed this was the New Castle
Engineering and Development Company.
The Chairman. In other words, he claimed New Castle
Engineering and Development had gotten controlling interest in
the housing project.
Mr. Bellino. He claimed what he was referring to, not what
he said here they were new corporations and hadn't paid
dividends.
He said the new corporation was New Castle Engineering and
Construction Company.
The Chairman. I am talking about the $179,000 stock
interest in the housing development. Did he say that belonged
to New Castle Engineering and Development Company or him
personally?
Mr. Bellino. He said that New Castle was the company he was
referring to.
The Chairman. You say the company he was referring to. Did
you mean New Castle owned the controlling interest in the
housing project?
Mr. Bellino. He says the housing project is the New Castle
Company. In other words, New Castle obtained it.
The Chairman. Does he say how New Castle got it? Who did
they buy it from?
Mr. Bellino. There is no question in my mind that New
Castle had no part of it.
The Chairman. Did he say that?
Mr. Bellino. He couldn't give me any details whatsoever.
The Chairman. He didn't give you any explanation of how New
Castle acquired interest?
Mr. Bellino. He got the bank account of $1,000. He put in
$1,000 and nothing was paid out. I know it is not that. That
was his explanation.
Senator Dirksen. Did it have an actual physical value of
$179,000?
Mr. Bellino. I don't know what he had reference to. All he
would say was that it was New Castle. If he had admitted these
interests and given us the names of the companies, it might
have been Bay View, West Juneau, Gastineau and other companies
with which Cash Cole was identified involving housing projects
that he (Kadow) was pushing, contrary to what he said to his
superiors. He may have been getting an interest in these
companies. That is what this indicates. He would not admit
this.
The Chairman. In other words, in his statement to the bank,
he said he had $179,000 interest in the housing project. By
housing project, do you know what project that is?
Mr. Bellino. No, sir.
The Chairman. But he said he owned the controlling stock?
How many projects are there in the area?
Mr. Bellino. Well, I'd say there are at least twenty at the
minimum. At this time there might have been five or six.
The Chairman. When you asked him he said he didn't know--
New Castle owned it and he knew nothing more about it?
Mr. Bellino. He just said this was New Castle.
The Chairman. Would he identify the housing project?
Mr. Bellino. No, sir.
The Chairman. He said he didn't know the name of it?
Mr. Bellino. He just said this was New Castle Company he
was talking about; that was the new housing project and its
business, but he said it had to do business in Delaware.
The Chairman. Did he tell you what housing project New
Castle had?
Mr. Bellino. He said a housing project in Delaware, where
he owned about sixty lots.
[Off-record discussion.]
Senator Dirksen. Just in general, what, besides the tin
mine and the New Castle Engineering Company--what other
interests does it appear Mr. Kadow may have had in Alaska, if
any?
Mr. Bellino. He has interest in housing projects. At this
time he definitely has interest in the Island Home Project in
Fairbanks.
Senator Dirksen. Those are privately constructed and
operated, I take it.
Mr. Bellino. Privately constructed, private corporation.
However, practically all of the money came from the government.
Senator Dirksen. You mean the money came from the
government, FHA plan, under which money is loaned from private
sources and insured, depending on the time, up to 90 percent.
Mr. Bellino. The Alaska Housing Authority funds came out of
the government revolving fund, similar to Housing and Home
Finance.
Senator Dirksen. I suppose the Alaska Housing Authority
referred to is the same kind of authority that is set up in any
community, in the United States under the authority conferred
by state law, which is in conformity with the federal act. It
can then get funds out of the U.S. Housing Authority, that is a
loan, or it can be a contribution. They get the loan, get the
money from the Housing and Home Finance. The sponsor gets the
Alaska Housing--they are actually government funds or bank
funds?
Mr. Bellino. Actually Alaska Housing Authority funds.
However, at the present time the Alaska Housing Authority is
getting out of it by having Fannie Mae take over the mortgage.
Now, it is still government funds, but you see where a public
housing project is built they issue bonds and the Housing and
Home Finance----
Senator Dirksen. When it has been constructed bonds have
been marketed the paid off only federal funds might be
contributions in the form of economic rent. In other words, if
a house should normally rent for, let's say $100.00 a month,
but the man's pay check is such that he only earns an amount
that would justify rental of $80.00 a month, under the
consideration you dip into the contribution for $20.00 a month.
Those would actually be the only funds represented. I can't
tell exactly how this might be set up. The territories like
Puerto Rico and Alaska are authorized to set up housing
authority just as the states of the Union.
Mr. Bellino. Yes, sir. From the Island Home Project, what I
can see, is principally Alaska Housing Fund which came through
the Housing and Home Finance and in December of this year
Fannie Mae would take the responsibility. Getting mortgages
transferred to Fannie Mae, that has been his principal
activity.
There is one I might mention--how he started with Cash Cole
in the West Juneau Company in Juneau, Alaska on a few lots. He
got the Alaska Housing Authority to buy the land for some
$17,400. It was appraised at $4,200, the highest evaluation the
appraisers would give it. The Alaska Housing Authority paid for
this project $17,400. Part of that money, when it was paid,
went to the Gastineau Utility Company, which was the water
company organized by----
The Chairman. I missed the land deal.
Mr. Bellino. Cash Cole and an individual by the name of
Everett Nowell, two persons owned a large tract of land.
The Chairman. You don't know whether Kadow had an interest?
Mr. Bellino. No, sir. That was land Kadow wanted to buy or
help get developed and he induced the government to pay $17,400
when the appraisers said it was worth $4,200. Then when they
organized it they found it had no water. A Juneau gold mining
company had a stream getting water and they diverted the water
from the stream so it would get down to this housing
development.
Kadow was interested in Gastineau Utility Company, Inc.
Nowell put $10,000 up and Cash Cole was supposed to put up
$10,000. Kadow said he advanced the money to pay for a house.
The company eventually built two houses they were trying to
sell. Kadow bought one of them.
Out of this land money, $17,400, $8,800 went to the
Gastineau Utility Company. At this time, July of 1951, Kadow
was general manager of West Juneau Company, Inc. Everett Nowell
is president of the West Juneau Company, Inc.
The Chairman. Let me ask this. Would you say it is correct
that he appears to have an interlocking interest in both of the
companies up there which received federal assistance?
Mr. Bellino. I would say everyone he was urging, promoting
personally, he endeavored to get some sort of promise or
interest. That is what our documents revealed.
[Off-record discussion.]
The Chairman. I think what we should do is try to make
arrangements to bring Kadow down.
[Off-record discussion.]
[Whereupon the committee adjourned for lunch at 12:05.]
afternoon session
[The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 2 p.m.,
January 13, 1953.]
Mr. Bellino. Here is one point, a photostat dated March 4,
1952, from Kadow to Fishnaller.
Harry, please get Executive Committee backing of this
letter I have written to Wilder. I must take action now if I'm
to get the housing and other materials needed this summer. If
we get our exploration program, I have the money in the budget.
If we do not, I can get $20,000 by using individual natives or
by using a native cooperative. We will have to underwrite
repayment of the funds advanced by A.H.A. Once we have proven
the ore, this will be simple, either as an advance from G.S.A.
or by increasing monthly pay of natives to cover rent and
deducting it from their payroll. In either case we can own the
houses once the native notes are paid. If the native actually
pays the note from his own present earnings, the house would be
his. Even this procedure could be evolved to our satisfaction,
but I prefer us paying for the housing and owning it ourselves.
It would be easier for us to handle.
All A.H.A. and I want is a legal vehicle to accomplish our
goal of getting about one-half million dollars worth of
building materials to our property. It is estimated to cost us
about $200 per unit to land materials on our property, but
please do not stipulate in Executive Committee action any
particular amount. If the boys feel that a limit is necessary,
then see if they will approve $500 per unit which is the amount
A.H.A. will loan each employee. While I want Executive
Committee approval of my housing plans, I do not want this
action to become part of our corporate minutes. In other words,
I don't want our auditor to pick this up as a corporation
liability at this time. A little later on it will be O.K., but
not now.
Just get me authority to go ahead and lick our housing
problem through A.H.A. or any other manner possible. Scotty
will know what I need.
The Chairman. What is A.H.A.?
Mr. Bellino. Alaska Housing Authority. That, of course,
indicates his scheming to Fishnaller to get, as he says, one
half million dollars worth of building materials through A.H.A.
He eventually succeeded but he had a call under the service
assistance of Alaskan Native Service and he just helped himself
to considerable surplus property. I will read one of those
letters. This is a letter dated March 13, 1952 from Kadow to
the United States Tin Corporation.
I have been holding the check for $2,425 as a ``wind fall''
and as per our agreement. Looks like we need it now. I
certainly don't understand how we managed to get $6,000 in the
hole. There must be something wrong some place. When I arranged
the financing for this winter, I saw to it that we had an
actual surplus over all our recorded obligations plus
anticipated needs of about $5,000 per month. Paul must be
building up his Nome account. There certainly better be a good
answer to this one. If we can't budget better than it looks, we
had better take some drastic action.
In any event, do not show any such obligation over our
funds on hand on your February statement. If you do all hell
will break loose in D.C.
I want to know from Henry and Spence if this shortage is
due to orders from the mine or from old bills that were not
listed or cleaned up at the end of January.
When can Spence go to the mine? We must get this thing
straightened out before we get in too much deeper. If we can't
operate on $29,190 per month at this stage of the game, we
must, at once, start looking for and plugging all holes. I
don't understand it unless we undershot our winter supplies.
Have Spence give me his schedule for Lost River so I can plan
accordingly.
Enclosed please find copy of my letter to Lomens and Bureau
of Mines check for $2,425.
In other words, they paid him for transporting the stuff to
his own mines. The Bureau of Mines paid him to transport stuff
to his own mine. In other words, he watered the budget. We have
another letter later on where he says that, simply calls it
watering the budget.
The Chairman. What does he mean by ``Paul must be building
up his Nome account''?
Mr. Bellino. I will explain that. I have another
photostatic bank account up in Nome. He was granted lots of
leaveway and not too many could see what was going on.
The Chairman. That is a personal account, huh?
Mr. Bellino. Corporation accounts, but a lot of things he
wanted to change to mine operations without anyone knowing the
details.
This is a letter dated September 18, 1951 from Kadow to
Harry, Fred, et al. They are officers of the U.S. Tin
Corporation.
Just a short note to let you know that I have the beaches
on Spenser piled a `mile' high with things we need now or will
need in the future. I have lumber, iron pipe, wooden pipe,
electric cable, BX electric cable, telephone wire, houses and
Pacific huts, iron rods and strips, iron plate, nails, bolts,
electric fixtures, 80 octane gas for an outboard motor and many
other items too numerous to mention. When I come down I'll try
to have some idea of the replacement value to give you a better
idea of its value and also with the hope that it may help us
with our financing.
By the way, I don't remember if I asked Caidill to have you
and the other members of the Board O.K. Paul and me to write
checks against a new account at the Nome bank called U.S. Tin
Corporation--Special. This account is the one I'm using to
finance all the things I'm doing. I need lots of leeway and not
too many people in possession of all the details. When I get
through this fall, I'll have everything done I set out to do
and I hope a little money left over. So far I've been on the
point nine days and no barge has been here to haul away a
thing.
I sure agree with Paul this human service is awful but
we've had lots of wind and that may be the reason. I'm going to
the mine today and then to Nome. If I don't have news of the
barge. My whiskers are ever getting gray trying to keep this
end of our show running smoothly. The progress here is great,
but we sure aren't getting all the breaks so far as the mine is
concerned. I can't stay here much longer so maybe I'll get
someone to take my place here and be in Seattle fairly soon.
I'll wire my arrival date. Keep your chin up. I still say we
got a first class winner.
The main thing on that was the bank account I wanted to
bring out.
The Chairman. Sounds like he got a pretty good deal,
doesn't it?
Mr. Bellino. Now, just to give you another idea on possible
bribery, this is a statement of Clinton C. Staples, head of
Federal Housing Administration. It is very lengthy so I won't
go into the whole thing. I will point out what happened when
Staples went there in connection with Kadow.
I arrived in Fairbanks early Sunday morning by plane and
later that morning Mr. Kadow came to my room in the Nordale
Hotel and began to tell me exactly what he wished the Director
to do in the way of approving the Weeks Field area. At this
point I informed Mr. Kadow that my opinions were not going to
be molded by either him or any other official in the Territory,
that I would later proceed to Weeks Field and would then make a
decision. This I did in company with the then present Mayor and
several of the Councilmen of the City. Mr. Kenneth Kadow more
or less took over this meeting on the Field and I finally
stated that if the City would allow our land planning analyst
to land plan this section of land, which would consist of
providing sewers, water and utilities, together with the
removal of the present air field, that I would be favorably
inclined to having this section of land developed. This was all
agreed to and our land planning did proceed and in the meantime
I committed a 608 project now known as Fairview, but only
committed this project after a responsible builder entered the
picture. This office would have refused to have committed this
particular 608 project to the original sponsors as it did not
consider that they were, first, builders of experience, nor
possibly had the necessary finances that would be required to
make a commitment for $3,080,000.00; but, during this period
Mr. Kadow and Mr. Cash Cole made repeated visits to my office
here in Juneau, and while this proposal was pending presented a
second project in Juneau known as Silver Bow, which never
matured. The land in Weeks Field was to be given to the project
on a lease basis for a period of seventy-five years at a stated
annual rent, and I definitely stated to the City Council that
this lease was to be made to the Fairview Corporation; and
under date of December 10, 1949, under the signature of the
Mayor we have in our possession a letter addressed to the
Bayview Realty Inc., P.O. Box 331, Juneau, Alaska, stating that
the City will lease the twelve acres of land for a period of
seventy-five years at a base rental of $250.00 a year, also
stating that the City would make application to the General
Service Administration for the installation of utilities
including streets, sidewalks, curbs, sewers and water, with the
understanding that the City will purchase, maintain, and
operate these utilities with the normal service charge; that
the City Council will direct that light, power, and telephone
facilities be installed and will provide fire and police
protection, and signed by the City of Fairbanks, Maurice T.
Johnson, as Mayor.
On page 3 and 4:
Upon arriving at the site and inspecting it comments were
made by me but all of the advantages of this site were highly
played up by both Mr. Wilder of the Alaska Housing Authority,
and Mr. Kenneth Kadow. I did not know, upon the return to the
hotel in Anchorage, just what the decision of Mr. Cassidy or
Mr. Woods would be in reference to the selection of this Goose
Lake site, but when I brought up the subject I definitely told
them that I, as Director, would not approve this site at the
present time under any circumstances and for the reason that I
had been offered thirty thousand dollars for the building of
the so mentioned three hundred houses by Mr. Wilder and Mr.
Kadow, and that I was quite sure who the sponsor was and that
if they decided to recommend this site for the building of
these three hundred homes I would resign as Director of Federal
Housing. This conversation took place in one of the rooms at
the Westward Hotel in Anchorage and in the presence of Mr.
Cassidy, Mr. Woods, Mr. Beall, Mr. Sutton and Mr. Roy Sumpter,
President of the Washington Mortgage Company of Seattle.
Therefore, Goose Lake was not approved and I have now
learned that when Mr. Kadow found that I was not susceptible to
receiving bribes of any type that he reported this to Mr.
William Warne of the Department of Interior and to Mr. Thomas
J. Nally, Resident Agent of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. In my opinion, the only reason for his taking
this action at that time was to clear his own skirts of an
offer of bribe to me.
Now, what Kadow did after he offered the bribe, he went to
one of the FBI agents and claimed that Staples had tried to
bribe him. There was no motive for Staples trying to bribe him.
Kadow told me about that incident. He knew I would hear about
it sooner or later. I asked him what would be the motive for
Staples trying to bribe him. He said Staples figured he would
be getting out of government service some day and ``I could
help him.''
To show his guilt, there was an investigation going on by
Mr. Ramey of the Housing and Home Finance and when he ran into
Kadow's activities, he began to look into his activities a
little bit and he re-interviewed Kadow. You might want to read
the letter he wrote to Cash Cole after Ramey interviewed him.
A Mr. Ramey from D.C.--Housing and Home Finance, came over
to see me yesterday and is really digging into FHA--your
affairs and mine. I think he's trying to get something on you
or me more than Staples. I admitted that Staples had asked for
a `bribe' and that I appeared to be playing along with him,
then never went back after that until a few days ago. He is
trying to link me with you on Fairview, West Juneau and
Bayview. I told him I owned no stock in anything in Alaska
except the U.S. Tin Corporation but that I did represent both
you and Everett on occasion when neither of you were here to
represent yourself. I also said I hoped someday to buy an
interest in West Juneau or at least to buy some lots for a
building project. I admitted helping you and Everett on many
problems but at no time doing anything I did not do for others.
Lee Bettinger, Mayor of Kodiak, seems to have made some
remarks that at least suggest that you, Rushlight and I were
all working together and that we tried to `bribe him' on the
Kodiak project. I can see how he might think the first part but
where in the hell he got the notion of a bribe has got me beat.
He said we could get $1,500 for the land and would split it
with him. I remember writing him an official letter saying
F.H.A. would allow $1,500 for the land with all utilities in
but that is all I ever said to him. I don't remember even
discussing the value of the land with him when you, Dick and I
were in Anchorage. Do you? I told this Ramey that I had hoped
to go into business with Rushlight but Staples' attempt to
bribe me changed all of that. I said that I never had an
understanding with you or Rushlight or anyone else as to
details of how I would fit into any project. I had no
intentions working out such details until I was out of the
government. I said that my Department knew I was looking around
for a new connection and that I may go into housing.
I told him I reported the Staples incident to Warne and
local FBI. I told him also that I learned of Staples' action on
reporting it to Washington, D.C. about three weeks ago.
I give you all the above because I think he will be in to
see you very soon and that you'd want my views and remarks to
help.
I'm not positive but I'm quite sure that he is more after
you and me than Staples.
Senator, now to show the connection which subsequently
continued between Cash Cole and Staples and Kadow, this is a
letter dated September 6, 1950, which is about the time Staples
was going to leave the organization and Cash Cole tells Kadow
the results of his conversation. This letter shows how Cole is
now with Staples.
I had a big session with Staples last night, and got a
totally different picture than what he has been putting out.
First, he doesn't intend to let Rushlight have any jobs that
amount to anything, he said he offered him a small 207 at
Palmer, or one at Kodiak, about 20 or 25 units. There are just
three people going to do any building, Lewis, Anderson, and
Baldwin.
He will have nothing to do with the Railroad job if Sherman
shows in it any place. He will not approve anything in the
Goose Lake Area. He is off-setting this by putting more housing
closer in with one or all the three. Lewis is coming up with a
new one on Railroad land leased at a rental of $1,600 a year,
and a building some place close to Turnigan Arms, with a 134
units. He has been singing the blues about 207's in order to
let these fellows get a big head start. He has the same plans
for Fairbanks.
He told me Chris Berg was not going ahead with the Valdez
deal, which is the ARC Building. He says they are clearing the
tract and putting in the utilities. Check with Noyes on this.
That should be a good deal for Dick, and a steady income earner
for ownership.
He said he would write you the letter. I asked him if he
was going to announce his departure from the Territory before
the trip, and he said no, he knew that he was leaving it all
depended on Cassidy. If he said stay he would stay. I asked him
what prompted the change, and he either had a letter or phone
call from Harry Lewis telling him that he would go to the
President if necessary to help him hold his job. He was all
steamed up and cocky again, sick or no sick. It would look like
he is going whole hog or none, so I don't know if he should
have as much protection as we felt he should have. Maybe there
should be two meetings, one for each side. I feel you should
nail the Railroad deal down, or we will lose it, he is very
friendly to Allied Credit Bunch, and will use Sherman as an
excuse to throw it out. I started to phone you last night, but
got a little leary about telephoning this information. He is
death on any deal Wilder has, or anything to do with it.
Here is a letter dated May 13, 1950, when Kadow was still
in the government service, from Cash Cole to Kadow:
The plans we are sending you today were furnished us by
Rushlight, President of a plumbing and construction firm in
Portland, His establishment is over a million dollar concern,
and he is more our type doing business, free wheeling and
doesn't want it all himself. I think we can make a deal whereby
he would put up all the front money, give us five or ten
percent of the profit, and we would own all the houses, of
course it would be up to us to handle the land deal, by paying
for the lots as we sell the houses, or on a lease basis.
Ruth and I spent two days going over the housing situation
and getting some information on him and his firm, and it was
all of the best, while we were in Portland. I feel sure I laid
some successful plans for an immediate substitute for Cliff, if
he doesn't get something done on a lender. Rushlight said he
would very willingly put up a $125,000 front money if he could
get a contract like the Fairbanks deal.
As I told you on the phone for the first time we had a
meeting with all the Mortensen Firm, and the old man and
Henderson agreed with Everett and I that the lender should have
been had a long time ago, but in the finish Cliff seems to run
the thing. He signed a commitment which allows until the
eighteenth, but the whole thing hinged on our using plaster
instead of plasterboard. Frank Henderson agreed with us, but
that was as far as we were concerned a definite refusal, but
Cliff insisted that we wait until the 18th as his broker
thought he could change their opinion on that score. Everett
tells me this morning on the phone that his broker phoned that
he trying to place it with some banks of which there would have
to be three. That would take from a month to two months. We
have the same offer here. Definitely Cliff can't get better
than four percent money, and all this time has been wasted by
Cliff trying to chisel part of the Broker's commission.
I had a conference with some financial people in Portland,
who told me that Cliff's type are listed as chiselers amongst
the lenders, and they are posted as such and that he will wind
up with all the big fellows closing the door on him, and this
seems to be verified by the fact that Cliff came up Saturday
with three lenders instead of one, and when the word is passed
on to them they will drop him. We are going to have a meeting
again with them Monday morning, and have something definitely
understood and done immediately. They will have to make up
their mind that they are in the contracting business and not in
the three ball business.
Cliff is Cliff Mortensen. Cliff Mortensen is an officer of
the Mortensen Construction Company from Seattle.
This is a letter dated July 6, 1951, after Kadow left
government service, addressed to Cliff Mortensen, written as a
result of statement in a note from Cliff Mortensen to Kadow
where he said Bob Slater, who was associate in the construction
of Island Home Project, is writing you and said ``you are not
worth your salt. Send him a good letter.'' He didn't say what
he was writing about, but Kadow's mind went that way. He says:
I'm a little amazed at your comment from Bob Slater that he
can't see how I will earn my salt. I suppose this means he
wishes to renege on his promise of stock. When Bob and Howard
offered me ten percent of the stock obtained in Island Homes by
them, they did so according to the words of Bob and Howard
``out of appreciation for what you already did for us.'' As Bob
and Howard both know, it took a lot of fixing to get AHA,
Alaska Public Works, and the Mortensens to go on the Island
Homes Project with them.
The Chairman. Who are Bob and Howard?
Mr. Bellino. Bob Slater is one officer. Howard is Howard
Hollingsworth, another officer in Island Homes. What happened
in that, Senator, Slater wanted to start development but didn't
have the proper backing. It got into Kadow's hands and Kadow
maneuvered Mortensen in with this. He fixed the rest. That is
what he means it took a lot of fixing with the A.H.A., Alaska
Housing Authority, and Alaska Public Works and Mortensen to go
in on this deal.
The Chairman. On July 6th, was he still working for the
government?
Mr. Bellino. He was out of government service. On March
15th he was out and on March 16th he went in. He repeated that
in another letter to Slater right after that. I asked him what
he meant by fixing A.H.A. He said he probably used a wrong
word.
I just want to bring out one more thing on the mine. The
important thing in the mine was water. When they filed a
questionnaire back on February 14, 1951, with the Bureau of
Mines, their answer to Item No. 11 was: ``There is an
excellent, constant supply of water from the main winze, and
from a spring near by. The spring gives 120 gallons per minute
and never freezes. In addition, Cassiterite Greek and Lost
River water is available for about six months per year.''
At any rate, in the letter on ``tears,'' he says, ``The
only water in sight are the tears in my eyes and they are big
ones.''
This is what he said also on water on February 23, 1952, in
a letter to Sorensen:
Washington, D.C. was still stewing about our water supply.
I told them to quit worrying, that we had pumped the spring for
several hours at 300 gals p/m with no visible effect on the
supply. I know I told a little `white one', but you were so
sure we had plenty of water there that I just took a chance. If
asked, I would appreciate something that backs me up if your
conscience won't hurt too badly. I said we did so in December,
and if an actual test doesn't bear me out, we could say
conditions are always worse in March; hence, the difference in
results.
This is Kadow writing to Sorensen, the Superintendent of
Mines. They still don't have enough water. Two miles of pipes
to get water from the creek. After they got the water, the mill
still won't work.
The Chairman. Why won't the mill work?
Mr. Bellino. Breakdown of something or other. Right now the
main reason is the gears are jammed up. They put rock, stone,
tin in there and it goes so fast it makes the gears jam up.
They can't do anything.
The Chairman. I think, number one, you are going to have to
take all the stuff and read it over. What we should do is draw
out the letters that give a sequence, for example, attempted
bribery.
Mr. Bellino. That is what I am trying to do.
The Chairman. You have picked out some excellent ones
there. For example, where this fellow got eighty-five hundred
shares of stock worth over $3.00 a piece. This is $30,000
clearly a bribe. I think this looks like a clear cut criminal
case. I think we should be very careful in view of the fact
Interior Department originally sent you up there. I don't think
we should do anything without keeping them fully informed on
it. You work very closely with Don Wilson, don't you?
Mr. Bellino. William Strand.
The Chairman. Tell him what we are doing, Carmine. Tell
them we would like to call him down sometime and if they want
to be present here, they may have additional questions they
would like to ask and that sort of thing. If they have any
serious objections we won't guarantee to follow their
suggestions but we will lean over backwards in view of the
facts in this case.
Mr. Bellino. I think they have considerable confidence in
you, Senator.
The Chairman. I think you have done a tremendous job on
this, Carmine. I might say you do a hell of a good job on
everything except being short-winded.
[Off-record discussion.]
[Whereupon, the hearing adjourned at 2:45 p.m.]
VOICE OF AMERICA
[Editor's note.--In January 1954, Washington Senator Henry
M. Jackson questioned a claim in the subcommittee's annual
report that its investigation of the Voice of America had saved
the nation $18 million by causing the termination of
construction of two radio transmitters. Senator Jackson noted
that after the subcommittee held hearings on the issue in 1953,
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology had submitted a
report that contradicted the testimony of the subcommittee's
key witness, Lewis McKesson and had raised doubts about
McKesson's criticism of the planned locations of the
broadcasting transmitters. See Congressional Record, 83rd
Cong., 2nd sess., 1096-98.
Dr. Newbern Smith (1909-1987) had previously testified in
executive session on February 14, 1953, and at a public hearing
on February 16, 1953.]
----------
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 13, 1954
U.S. Senate,
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
of the Committee on Government Operations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met (pursuant to Senate Resolution 40,
agreed to January 30, 1953) at 3:00 p.m., room 357, Senate
Office Building, Senator Joseph R. McCarthy presiding.
Present: Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican, Wisconsin
Present also: Francis P. Carr, executive director; Roy M.
Cohn, chief counsel; Ruth Young Watt, chief clerk.
TESTIMONY OF DR. NEWBERN SMITH, BUREAU OF STANDARDS
Mr. Cohn. Dr. Smith, as reminded by the chairman, you are
still under oath.
Now, we have asked you to come in today because Senator
Jackson, a member of the full committee, and formerly a member
of the subcommittee, has supplied a correspondence file
concerning the Bureau of Standards and the Baker West project.
Senator Jackson has called our attention to your previous
testimony with particular reference to the fact you said the
Bureau of Standards had not been asked to make this detailed
analysis and recommendation as to the location of Baker West.
Now, is it a fact that the Bureau of Standards was not
asked to make the detailed analysis from the auroral zone
standpoint, and make recommendations as to the location of
Baker West?
Dr. Smith. As far as I know, there was never any request
made to make a complete study like that.
Mr. Cohn. You have glanced at this correspondence, have you
not?
Dr. Smith. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Isn't it a fact the correspondence does show a
Mr. Gautier of the Central Radio Propagation Laboratories was
in touch with somebody up at the Voice of America about Baker
West?
Dr. Smith. Yes, sir. That is right. After I had appeared
before this committee, I was shown by Mr. Gautier the
correspondence, which I believe is the same you have there, and
until that time I was not aware of it. That went out when I was
away, I believe, and he signed the letter.
Mr. Cohn. What did that correspondence, in brief, indicate?
Dr. Smith. The correspondence, as I remember it, indicated
some verbal request from somebody in the Voice of America to
make some maximum usable frequency and field strength
calculations across the Pacific.
Mr. Cohn. Did the bureau, in connection with that, make a
detailed study of that auroral zone problem as you did for the
committee.
Dr. Smith. It did not. As I recall, Mr. Gautier's analysis
included some auroral zone information taken from the National
Bureau of Standards circular on atmospheric propagation, which
came out in 1947 or 1948.
Mr. Cohn. That did not reflect current evaluations, is that
right?
Dr. Smith. That is correct.
Mr. Cohn. It did not embrace anywheres the job you did at
the request of the committee?
Dr. Smith. No. For the committee we did a detailed study
not done before.
Mr. Cohn. Now, then to sum up here, it is clear that when
you said that the Voice had never contacted the Bureau of
Standards when considering the location of Baker West, and I am
quoting from page 11, part 1 of the record, your testimony was
inaccurate to the extent that it later developed that at a
period when you were away one of your subordinates had been in
touch with the Voice about certain problems relating to Baker
West. Is that right?
Dr. Smith. That is right.
Mr. Cohn. However, you were correct in telling the
subcommittee that the Bureau of Standards had never been asked
and never did in fact conduct a detailed 1953 analysis of the
auroral zone question, on the question of mislocation.
Dr. Smith. I don't recall the exact figures, but the report
stands for itself.
Mr. Cohn. Right. Nothing has come up that would change your
opinion about that or change any of the facts in the report
submitted to the committee?
Dr. Smith. I have no subsequent information which would
change that.
Mr. Cohn. You stand on the report in all respects?
Dr. Smith. Yes.
[Whereupon, the hearing adjourned at 3:30 p.m.]
ARMY SIGNAL CORPS--SUBVERSION AND ESPIONAGE
[Editor's note.--Executive director Francis P. Carr
telephoned army counsel John Adams on the morning of January
19, 1954 to demand that five members of the army's loyalty-
security appeals board testify before the subcommittee that
afternoon. Adams pointed out that Secretary of the Army Robert
Stevens was out of the country at the time. Instead of
complying with the request in Stevens' absence, Adams himself
appeared before the chairman that afternoon. The following day,
Adams met with Senator John L. McClellan, ranking Democrat on
the Government Operations Committee to outline the army's
objections to the Fort Monmouth investigation and the special
privileges that the subcommittee's chief counsel, Roy Cohn, had
sought for former staff member G. David Schine, who had been
drafted into the army as a private.]
----------
TUESDAY, JANUARY 19, 1954
U.S. Senate,
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
of the Committee on Government Operations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 2:45 p.m., pursuant to call, in
room 357 of the Senate Office Building, Senator Joseph R.
McCarthy (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican, Wisconsin.
Present also: Roy M. Cohn, chief counsel; Francis P. Carr,
executive director; Ruth Young Watt, chief clerk.
The Chairman. The subcommittee will be in order.
STATEMENT OF JOHN ADAMS, COUNSELOR TO THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY (ACCOMPANIED BY LOUIS E.
BERRY, DEPUTY COUNSEL, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY)
The Chairman. At this point I would like to make clear that
we are calling the members of the loyalty board not only to
discuss with those why they have cleared people who are
obviously Communists, but we are also interested in matters of
graft, alleged graft and corruption and misconduct on the part
of the individual members of the board having nothing to do
with their official duties.
It is the same with General Reichelderfer.\1\ It does not
merely concern loyalty board procedures but it has to do with
many other things over which this committee not only has the
jurisdiction but a duty to investigate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ General Perry Reichelderfer, former commanding general at Fort
Monmouth.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Carr. So that Mr. Adams will know exactly what we want,
for Monday morning, then, we want General Reichelderfer and Mr.
Taft and Dr. Ritchie.
The Chairman. And then if John feels that the Department of
the Army cannot do the same as the other departments have done,
namely, to order their people up here, then Friday have your
subpoenas served.
Mr. Cohn. We can only call one group of people at a time,
and we might as well get the members of that particular panel.
Mr. Carr. That would be Malcolm R. Sewell, and----
Mr. Adams. You gave me nine names this morning.
Mr. Carr. Yes, I did; I gave you the nine names. All we
will take on Monday will be Malcolm Sewell and Lieutenant
Colonel Hodges.
The Chairman. That gives you how many people?
Mr. Carr. Five people. That gives you the entire board in
the one case.
The Chairman. Can we dispose of five people? I do not want
to have them sitting over here and waiting.
Mr. Carr. We can take the four, and have the general as the
fifth one.
The Chairman. I want to go into this thing thoroughly. We
could have two in the morning and two in the afternoon, and
have the general the following morning.
Mr. Carr. That would be Taft and Dr. Ritchie in the
morning, and Sewell and Hodges in the afternoon. That will be
ten o'clock in the morning.
Mr. Cohn. We have some other things to take care of.
The Chairman. When do you want the rest of the board?
Mr. Carr. We will take them Tuesday, then.
Mr. Cohn. How about General Partridge?
Mr. Adams. I think he may have left the country.
Mr. Cohn. Could you check that fast, and if he has not left
the country, make sure he does not leave?
Mr. Adams. I do not know when he is leaving.
The Chairman. I think he is in Europe.
Again, on General Partridge, let us make it clear we are
not going to ask General Partridge or any of these people to
violate any rules or regulations under which they are
operating. We are going to ask then questions which they can
answer and which they must answer, and they are questions which
involve no violation of any rules that are legally in effect. I
just want to make that clear.
[Whereupon, at 3 p.m., an adjournment was taken.]
ARMY SIGNAL CORPS--SUBVERSION AND ESPIONAGE
[Editor's note.--Irving Peress, an army dentist stationed
at Camp Kilmer, New Jersey, had been under military
surveillance as a suspected member of the Communist party. In
September 1953, when Captain Peress applied for a promotion
under the Doctor Draft Act, the First Army's G-2 (intelligence)
recommended against it. The processing officers, however,
judged Peress' case on his professional qualifications and the
promotion went through on October 23. Camp Kilmer's new
commanding officer, Gen. Ralph W. Zwicker, urged that the
dentist be relieved from active duty, and on January 18, 1954,
the army ordered Major Peress to be discharged within ninety
days.
The subcommittee staff contacted Gen. Zwicker, who
identified Major Peress as a Communist. Called to testify in
executive session on January 30, Peress cited the Fifth
Amendment in his refusal to answer questions (the subcommittee
made that testimony public on March 4). Although Peress'
discharge from the army was scheduled for March 31, he asked
for an immediate release and received an honorable discharge on
February 2. The day before the major's discharge, Senator
McCarthy had written to Army Secretary Robert Stevens
suggesting a court-martial for both Peress and whoever was
responsible for his promotion. Peress testified again in public
session on the morning of February 18. Following the testimony
of Lt. Col. Chester T. Brown (1908-1992) in executive session
that afternoon, Gen. Zwicker (1903-1991) testified. When Gen.
Zwicker cited the executive order that forbid him from
divulging the names of military personnel involved in Peress's
promotion and honorable discharge, Senator McCarthy replied:
``Then, General, you should be removed from any command. Any
man who has been given the honor of being promoted to general
and who says, `I will protect another general who protected
Communists,' is not fit to wear that uniform, General. I think
it is a tremendous disgrace to the army to have this sort of
thing given to the public. I intend to give it to them. I have
a duty to do that. I intend to repeat to the press exactly what
you said.'' The senator's treatment of Gen. Zwicker served as a
precipitating event in the Army-McCarthy hearings and a subject
of consideration during his later censure. Gen. Zwicker's
executive session testimony was made public on February 22,
1954.
Peter A. Gragis (1913-2001) testified in public on March 5
and March 10, 1954; Leo Kantrowitz (1917-1974) on March 10,
1954; and Frank M. McGee on March 5, 1954. Max Finestone, Lt.
Col. Chester T. Brown, and Capt. W. J. Woodward did not testify
publicly.]
----------
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 1954
U.S. Senate,
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
of the Committee on Government Operations,
New York, NY.
The subcommittee met at 3:00 p.m., pursuant to notice, in
room 111 United States Court House, Foley Square, New York,
N.Y., Senator Joseph R. McCarthy (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican, Wisconsin.
Present also: Roy M. Cohn, chief counsel; Daniel G.
Buckley, assistant counsel; James N. Juliana, investigator;
Harold Rainville, administrative assistant to Senator Dirksen;
Robert Jones, administrative assistant to Senator Potter.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Would you stand and be sworn? In this matter now in hearing
before the committee, do you solemnly promise to tell the
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you
God?
Mr. Gragis. Yes.
TESTIMONY OF PETER A. GRAGIS
The Chairman. Mr. Cohn will examine.
Mr. Cohn. Mr. Gragis, could we have your full name?
Mr. Gragis. Peter A. Gragis.
Mr. Cohn. G-r-a-g-i-s?
Mr. Gragis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cohn. Where do you reside?
Mr. Gragis. Twenty-five Collector Lane, Levittown, Long
Island, New York.
Mr. Cohn. Mr. Gragis, were you ever employed at the Federal
Telecommunications Laboratory?
Mr. Gragis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cohn. And did you work there from 1945 to 1950?
Mr. Gragis. Yes, roughly that.
Mr. Cohn. Did you work on any government work while you
were there?
Mr. Gragis. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Mr. Gragis, were you at that time a member of the
Communist party?
Mr. Gragis. Not for the full length of that time, but for a
good period of the time.
Mr. Cohn. You were a member of the Communist party?
Mr. Gragis. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. During what years were you a member of the
Communist party?
Mr. Gragis. Say from about 1946 to very early in 1950.
Mr. Cohn. You were a member of the party from 1946----
Mr. Gragis. To rather early in 1950.
Mr. Cohn. I see. Were any of the other people working at
the Federal Telecommunications Laboratory members of the
Communist party?
Mr. Gragis. Some.
Mr. Cohn. Can you furnish us with their names?
Mr. Gragis. Yes, I can. Harry Hyman, Al Shadowitz, Ruth
Levine, Jack Saunders.
The Chairman. I did not get the second name.
Mr. Gragis. Saunders.
The Chairman. The one after Harry Hyman.
Mr. Gragis. Shadowitz.
Mr. Cohn. Did you know Ernest Pataki?
Mr. Gragis. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Was he a party member?
Mr. Gragis. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. How about Frank McGee?
Mr. Gragis. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Leo Kantrowitz?
Mr. Gragis. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Andy Castros?
Mr. Gragis. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Did you ever attend any Communist meetings at
Harry Hyman's home?
Mr. Gragis. Quite a number of times.
Mr. Cohn. At Hyman's home?
Mr. Gragis. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. How about at Pataki's home?
Mr. Gragis. Quite a few times.
Mr. Cohn. Did you ever have any at your own house?
Mr. Gragis. Yes. But that was not at 25 Collector Lane.
That was when I lived in the city.
Mr. Cohn. And while attending these cell meetings with
people from the Federal Telecommunications Laboratory, were
there ever any discussions of revolution and specifically of
``State and Revolution'' by Lenin?
Mr. Gragis. Yes. Frank McGee was the leader of the
educational discussion.
Mr. Cohn. He was the leader?
Mr. Gragis. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. And had he been employed at the Federal
Telecommunications Laboratory?
Mr. Gragis. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Mr. Chairman, this Mr. Gragis obviously is a most
cooperative witness, and he is taking a very honorable approach
to this. I was wondering, rather than asking him anything more,
if Mr. Buckley could talk to him later in the afternoon or
tomorrow, and then possibly we would have Mr. Gragis later.
I think that is it. Mr. Buckley will work along with you,
Mr. Gragis, and we will keep in touch with you that way. We
certainly want to thank you for taking this attitude.
Mr. Gragis. If I might just say one word----
Mr. Cohn. Surely.
Mr. Gragis [continuing]. I wish to say this, that when I
was separated from the company, FTL, I spent a good number of
years thinking on just what I should do and before I read in
the papers about Fort Monmouth or anything about FTL, I had
come to the conclusion that I should voluntarily go to the FBI
and I did. I gave them a complete history of myself for about
twenty years back.
The Chairman. How long ago did you do that?
Mr. Gragis. That was around June of last year, I believe.
Now, I might be wrong, but I think it is around then, June or
maybe July.
The Chairman. I think the country owes a rather deep debt
to people who have made a mistake and who are willing to
rectify it as well as they can by going to the FBI or to the
committee and give then that information. I know your job is an
unpleasant one. It would be much easier for you to come in and
refuse to testify and that sort of thing. I would like to thank
you very, very much for the help not only that you have given
to the committee but for the help that we understand you have
also given to the FBI.
Mr. Gragis. May I say another thing?
The Chairman. Certainly.
Mr. Gragis. I have another fear now, too, and that is this:
Although I went to the FBI, I knew that my appearance before
them would be kept in the strictest confidence. Because I have
appeared here now I have a fear that should I be publicized or
anything, that some of these subversives might make my life
miserable at home with my wife or daughter.
Mr. Cohn. We will have Mr. Buckley work with you on that
angle, and we will do everything within our power to prevent
that. We will be mindful of the fact that that is a problem.
The Chairman. Would you stand and raise your right hand?
In this matter now in hearing before the committee, do you
swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth, so help you God?
Mr. Kantrowitz. I do.
TESTIMONY OF LEO KANTROWITZ (WITH HIS COUNSEL, VICTOR
RABINOWITZ)
Mr. Cohn. May we have your full name, please?
Mr. Kantrowitz. Leo Kantrowitz.
Mr. Cohn. K-a-n-t-r-o-w-i-t-z.
Mr. Kantrowitz. That is correct.
Mr. Cohn. Where do you live?
Mr. Kantrowitz. 69-B, Bruan Place, Clifton, New Jersey.
Mr. Cohn. What is your occupation now?
Mr. Kantrowitz. I am unemployed.
Mr. Cohn. What was your last job?
Mr. Kantrowitz. Draftsman.
Mr. Cohn. Where?
Mr. Kantrowitz. At Zenith Engineering Company, Newark.
Mr. Cohn. Do they have any government contracts?
Mr. Kantrowitz. I believe so.
Mr. Cohn. When were you working there?
Mr. Kantrowitz. Up until Monday.
Mr. Cohn. Up until Monday of this week, is that right?
Mr. Kantrowitz. That is right.
Mr. Cohn. What were the circumstances of your leaving?
Mr. Kantrowitz. I resigned.
Mr. Cohn. Is that in connection with being subpoenaed to
appear before the committee?
Mr. Kantrowitz. Yes, it was.
Mr. Cohn. Did you work on any of those government
contracts?
Mr. Kantrowitz. Well, I can't say that I know the answer to
that question.
Mr. Cohn. In other words, you did the type of work that
could or could not be used in connection with those contracts?
Mr. Kantrowitz. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. From what branch of the service does that company
have contracts, do you know?
Mr. Kantrowitz. They didn't have it directly from any
branch of the service.
Mr. Cohn. Well, for what branch were they subcontracting?
Mr. Kantrowitz. They were subcontracting from Bell
Telephone.
Mr. Cohn. Which was doing work for what branch of the
service, do you know?
Mr. Kantrowitz. Well, I know that they had army ordnance
and navy.
Mr. Cohn. Army ordnance and navy. Now, who at the Zenith
Company would be familiar with those contracts?
Mr. Kantrowitz. I should think the employers, the owners of
the company.
Mr. Cohn. Do you know the name?
Mr. Kantrowitz. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. That is all right. We can get that.
[The witness conferred with his counsel.]
Mr. Cohn. Mr. Kantrowitz, where did you work before you
were at Zenith?
Mr. Kantrowitz. At Federal Telecommunications Laboratories.
Mr. Cohn. And for how long a period of time were you
employed there?
Mr. Kantrowitz. About, approximately six years.
Mr. Cohn. Approximately six years. We just had a witness in
here who said that while you were working at the Federal
Telecommunications Laboratory, you were a member of the
Communist party. Were you?
Mr. Kantrowitz. I refuse to answer that question on the
grounds that under the Fifth Amendment a person may not be
compelled to bear witness against himself.
Mr. Cohn. Are you a member of the party today?
Mr. Kantrowitz. I refuse to answer that question on the
same ground.
Mr. Cohn. Were you a member of the party while working at
Zenith on Monday?
Mr. Kantrowitz. I refuse to answer that question on the
same grounds.
Mr. Cohn. While at the Federal Telecommunications
Laboratory, did you attend Communist cell meetings with other
persons who were employed there?
Mr. Kantrowitz. I refuse to answer that question on the
same grounds.
Mr. Cohn. Are there people still working at Federal
Telecommunications Laboratory and other places doing work for
the Army Signal Corps who, to your knowledge, are Communists?
You can consult with counsel, by the way, any time you want
to, if you feel the need to.
Mr. Kantrowitz. Would you mind repeating that question?
Mr. Cohn. Would you read the question, please?
[The reporter read from his notes as requested.]
Mr. Kantrowitz. I refuse to answer that question on the
same grounds.
Mr. Cohn. Did you discuss any of your work at the Federal
Telecommunications Laboratory with any members of the Communist
party?
Mr. Kantrowitz. I refuse to answer that question also, on
the same grounds.
Mr. Cohn. Did you discuss any of your work at Zenith with
any members of the Communist party?
Mr. Kantrowitz. I refuse to answer that question on the
same grounds.
Mr. Cohn. By the way, you have had an open Communist
record, have you not Mr. Kantrowitz? You have signed Communist
party nominating petitions over the years, have you not?
Mr. Kantrowitz. I refuse to answer that question.
Mr. Cohn. Are you the Leo Kantrowitz who resided at 2368
East 21st Street?
[The witness conferred with his counsel.]
Mr. Kantrowitz. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. And did you thereafter reside at 1168 St. Marks
Avenue?
Mr. Kantrowitz. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. I have nothing further, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Just one or two questions.
Before you worked at the Telecommunications, where did you
work?
Let me ask you this question first: You said you worked at
Telecommunications for six years, roughly. What year did you
start and what year did you quit?
Mr. Kantrowitz. I started in 1946, resigned March 1952, I
believe.
The Chairman. Did you resign as a result of any accusations
in regard to Communist party activities or membership?
Mr. Kantrowitz. I refuse to answer that question on the
grounds already stated.
The Chairman. I think I will have to order you to answer
that. I am not asking whether you are a Communist, I am not
asking whether or not the accusations are true. I am merely
asking you the facts surrounding your resignation, the reason
for the resignation. I can see nothing incriminating about
that. I think I will order you to answer that.
[The witness conferred with his counsel.]
Mr. Kantrowitz. I still refuse to answer on the same
ground.
The Chairman. You understand that you have been ordered to
answer?
Mr. Kantrowitz. Pardon?
The Chairman. You understand that you have been ordered to
answer?
[The witness conferred with his counsel.]
Mr. Kantrowitz. Yes, I understand that, sir.
The Chairman. Were you asked to resign?
Mr. Kantrowitz. I refuse to answer that question also on
the same grounds.
The Chairman. You will be ordered to answer it.
Mr. Kantrowitz. I still refuse to answer on the same
grounds.
The Chairman. What were the circumstances surrounding your
resignation from Telecommunications?
Mr. Kantrowitz. I refuse to answer that question on the
same grounds, sir.
The Chairman. Were you handling classified material at
Telecommunications?
[The witness conferred with his counsel.]
Mr. Kantrowitz. Yes, I was.
The Chairman. Could you tell us what classifications,
restricted, confidential, secret, top secret?
Mr. Kantrowitz. To the best of my knowledge, I would say
the highest classification I ever handled was classified and
restricted.
The Chairman. There is nothing called classified, is there?
It is restricted, confidential----
Mr. Kantrowitz. Confidential.
The Chairman. Restricted and confidential?
Mr. Kantrowitz. That is right.
The Chairman. Do you know whether you had secret and top
secret clearance?
Mr. Kantrowitz. I don't know, sir.
The Chairman. Did you have a loyalty hearing? In other
words, were you informed of any hearing that was being held
questioning your loyalty or your situation as a security risk?
[The witness conferred with his counsel.]
Mr. Kantrowitz. No, sir.
The Chairman. I don't believe you told me where you worked
before you went to telecommunications.
Mr. Kantrowitz. I worked for a company called Paragon
Design and Development Corporation.
The Chairman. How many years did you work there?
Mr. Kantrowitz. About a year.
The Chairman. And before that?
Mr. Kantrowitz. I worked for a company called Lloyd Rogers.
That is in New York City.
The Chairman. And before that?
Mr. Kantrowitz. I worked at Bell Telephone Laboratories, in
New York.
The Chairman. Were you handling classified material?
Mr. Kantrowitz. I can't recall.
The Chairman. You were working in electronics, were you?
Mr. Kantrowitz. Yes.
The Chairman. Are you a graduate engineer?
Mr. Kantrowitz. No, I am not.
The Chairman. Where did you go to school?
Mr. Kantrowitz. I went to high school in Brooklyn, the
Eastern District High School.
The Chairman. How old are you now?
Mr. Kantrowitz. Thirty-six years.
The Chairman. Married, I assume?
Mr. Kantrowitz. Pardon?
The Chairman. Are you married?
Mr. Kantrowitz. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Do you have any brothers and sisters who work
either for any government agency or in any plant which is
handling defense work?
[The witness conferred with his counsel.]
Mr. Kantrowitz. I have a brother who is working for a
company who I don't know whether or not does government work.
They manufacture electrical equipment.
The Chairman. What company is that?
Mr. Kantrowitz. I think it is called the Davon Company.
The Chairman. The Davon Company?
Mr. Kantrowitz. Yes.
The Chairman. And the Davon Company is doing a lot of
defense work, is it not?
Mr. Kantrowitz. I am totally unfamiliar with what they are
doing.
The Chairman. Electrical work?
Mr. Kantrowitz. I know the thing that they make is meters,
testing meters, like voltmeters.
The Chairman. And what is his first name?
Mr. Kantrowitz. Joseph.
The Chairman. And his last name is the same as yours?
Mr. Kantrowitz. Right.
The Chairman. Do you have any other brothers?
Mr. Kantrowitz. No, sir.
The Chairman. Do you have any sisters working in government
work or in defense plants?
Mr. Kantrowitz. No, sir. I don't have any sisters.
The Chairman. Is your brother a Communist?
Mr. Kantrowitz. I refuse to answer that question on the
grounds already stated.
The Chairman. Does your wife have any sisters or brothers
working in government work or in any defense plant?
Mr. Kantrowitz. No, sir.
The Chairman. How many brothers and sisters does she have?
Mr. Kantrowitz. My wife has only one sister.
The Chairman. And that sister is not working for the
government?
Mr. Kantrowitz. No, sir.
The Chairman. Is her husband working for the government?
Mr. Kantrowitz. No, sir.
The Chairman. Or in a defense plant?
Mr. Kantrowitz. No, sir.
The Chairman. Mr. Rabinowitz, that will be all for this man
for today. We will want him back Tuesday morning at 10:30 in
the morning.
Mr. Rabinowitz. Is that a public session?
The Chairman. Yes.
Let me ask you one question: Why did you quit when you were
served with a subpoena? Why did you quit your job?
Mr. Kantrowitz. Well, I could be very truthful and say that
I didn't want to have the company I worked for to be in any way
connected with publicity that might come out of this committee.
The Chairman. Can you tell us this: Did your present boss,
the man who hired you, know that you had left
Telecommunications because of Communist activities on your
part?
[The witness conferred with his counsel.]
Mr. Kantrowitz. That, it seems to me, sir, is an assertion
which I haven't made, and I haven't testified on that ground at
all.
The Chairman. Well, will you answer the question, then?
Mr. Kantrowitz. I don't believe I can answer that question
in the form in which you state it.
The Chairman. Well, let's restate it, then.
When you got this job working on army ordnance, do you know
whether or not the man who hired you knew that you had been
accused of Communist activities prior to that time?
[The witness conferred with his counsel.]
Mr. Kantrowitz. Again, sir, you assert that I worked on
army ordnance----
Mr. Cohn. You did, did you not?
Mr. Kantrowitz. I said that is the kind of contracts that
they held, and I may have worked.
Mr. Cohn. But the fact is, isn't it, that you did work on
those contracts?
The Chairman. Look, Mister, I am not going to waste all
afternoon with you. I have asked you a very simple question.
You will answer it, unless you want to take the Fifth
Amendment. If you think it will incriminate you, you can take
the Fifth Amendment.
Mr. Kantrowitz. Restate the question.
[The reporter read from his notes as requested.]
[The witness conferred with his counsel.]
Mr. Kantrowitz. Sir, I never stated and do not now know
whether I ever worked on army ordnance.
Mr. Cohn. Your files show you did, doesn't it?
The Chairman. When you got your present job, then, did the
man that hired you know that you had been accused of Communist
activities prior to the time you were hired?
[The witness conferred with his counsel.]
Mr. Kantrowitz. I don't know what the employer who hired me
knew about me. I gave him my references, that is all.
The Chairman. Did you ever tell him that you were a member
of the Communist party?
[The witness conferred with his counsel.]
Mr. Kantrowitz. No, sir.
The Chairman. What was his name?
Mr. Kantrowitz. The man's name is Mr. Vasselli.
The Chairman. Vasselli.
Did you have to have any type of security clearance before
you went to work for this job?
[The witness conferred with his counsel.]
Mr. Kantrowitz. I don't know, sir.
The Chairman. Who was your reference when you got this job?
Mr. Kantrowitz. I don't know if I understand the question.
The Chairman. Do you know what a reference is?
Mr. Kantrowitz. Yes.
The Chairman. I said who was your reference, or references,
when you got this job.
Mr. Kantrowitz. I didn't have any references.
The Chairman. Did you get a letter of recommendation from
the Telecommunications?
Mr. Kantrowitz. No, sir.
The Chairman. Have you ever engaged in espionage?
Mr. Kantrowitz. No, sir.
The Chairman. Have you ever discussed any classified work
with individuals whom you know of had reason to believe were
espionage agents?
Mr. Kantrowitz. I discussed classified work at the time
that I worked at Federal Telecommunications Laboratories with
only those persons who were authorized to do so, and to no one
else.
The Chairman. Answer the question.
[The witness conferred with his counsel.]
Mr. Kantrowitz. No, sir.
The Chairman. Did you know Harry Hyman personally?
[The witness conferred with his counsel.]
Mr. Kantrowitz. I refuse to answer that question on the
grounds already stated.
The Chairman. For your information, Hyman has been named as
an espionage agent. I will ask you this question: Did you ever
discuss classified work with Harry Hyman.
[Witness conferred with his counsel.]
Mr. Kantrowitz. I refuse to answer that question also on
the grounds stated.
The Chairman. You will be ordered to answer the question.
First, let us have it clear. You are refusing to answer on
invoking that part of the Fifth Amendment which provides that
in a criminal case, no one need incriminate himself, is that
correct? Is that the basis for your refusal?
[The witness conferred with his counsel.]
The Chairman. This is a simple question. You are invoking
the self-incrimination part of the Fifth Amendment?
Mr. Kantrowitz. Yes, I am.
The Chairman. Then you are ordered to answer it because you
have already waived the Fifth Amendment in so far as espionage
is concerned by the previous answer.
[Witness conferred with his counsel.]
Mr. Kantrowitz. I still refuse to answer on the grounds
already stated.
The Chairman. Did you know or have reson to believe that
Harry Hyman was an espionage agent?
[The witness conferred with his counsel.]
Mr. Kantrowitz. I refuse to answer that question on the
same ground.
The Chairman. You are ordered to answer that question.
Mr. Kantrowitz. I still refuse on the same grounds as
stated.
The Chairman. Did you ever engage in a conspiracy to commit
espionage?
[The witness conferred with his counsel.]
Mr. Kantrowitz. No, sir.
The Chairman. Are you a member of the Communist conspiracy
as of today?
[The witness conferred with his counsel.]
Mr. Kantrowitz. I refuse to answer that question on the
same grounds.
The Chairman. Did you know anyone at Telecommunications
whom you either knew was an espionage agent or thought might be
an espionage agent?
[The witness conferred with his counsel.]
Mr. Kantrowitz. No, sir.
The Chairman. The answer is no? Is that the answer?
Mr. Kantrowitz. Yes, the answer is no.
The Chairman. And you refuse to tell whether or not you
thought Hyman was an espionage agent?
Mr. Kantrowitz. As I said, I refuse to answer that question
on the grounds stated.
The Chairman. Did you attend any meetings with Hyman at
which there was discussed either confidential, secret, top
secret work?
[The witness conferred with his counsel.]
Mr. Kantrowitz. No, sir.
The Chairman. Did you attend any meetings of the Communist
party at which classified government work was discussed?
Mr. Kantrowitz. I refuse to answer that question on the
grounds already stated.
The Chairman. You will be ordered to answer. I assume you
still refuse?
Mr. Kantrowitz. I still refuse to answer.
The Chairman. That will be all for today. We will want you
back at 10:30 Tuesday morning. May I say for your information
that I do not know whether your case will be submitted to the
Senate for contempt or not. We have the question which was
submitted to the Justice Department, and this is particularly
for the benefit of Mr. Rabinowitz. I take the position--I think
we discussed this before--I take the position that where a man
answers a question in so far as espionage, he waives in so far
as the entire field is concerned. If the Justice Department
agreed with me on that, then your case will be submitted, of
course, with a recommendation for indictment. If the Justice
Department agrees, in view of the fact that they will be
prosecuting, your case may not get to the grand jury. Come back
at 10:30 Tuesday morning.
Raise your right hand. In this matter now in hearing before
the committee, do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the
whole truth, and notning but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. Finestone. I do.
TESTIMONY OF MAX FINESTONE (ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, VICTOR
RABINOWTIZ)
Mr. Cohn. May we have your full name, please?
Mr. Finestone. Max Finestone.
Mr. Cohn. Is that F-e-i-n-e-s-t-o-n-e?
Mr. Finestone. F-i-n-e-s-t-o-n-e.
Mr. Cohn. Where do you live, Mr. Finestone?
Mr. Finestone. 3386 Decature Avenue, Bronx.
Mr. Cohn. And do you have a telephone there?
Mr. Finestone. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. What is that?
Mr. Finestone. Owenville 4-4070.
Mr. Cohn. What is your occupation?
Mr. Finestone. I am a freelance market research man.
Mr. Cohn. Do you have any connection with any company?
Mr. Finestone. No.
Mr. Cohn. For how long a period of time have you followed
this occupation?
Mr. Finestone. About four and a half years.
Mr. Cohn. Working freelance all the time?
Mr. Finestone. That is right.
Mr. Cohn. What did you do prior to that?
Mr. Finestone. I was in school.
Mr. Cohn. Which school?
Mr. Finestone. Cornell University.
Mr. Cohn. What did you study at Cornell, a college course?
Engineering?
Mr. Finestone. No, I studied industrial and labor
relations.
Mr. Cohn. Industrial labor relations at Cornell?
Mr. Finestone. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. During what years did you attend Cornell?
Mr. Finestone. 1946 to 1949.
Mr. Cohn. What did you do prior to that?
[The witness conferred with his counsel.]
Mr. Finestone. Prior to that I was in the merchant marine.
Mr. Cohn. For how long a period of time?
Mr. Finestone. For about a year.
Mr. Cohn. And prior to that?
Mr. Finestone. Prior to that? I was in school.
Mr. Cohn. What school?
Mr. Finestone. Ithaca College.
Mr. Cohn. Ithaca College?
Mr. Finestone. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. While you were attending Cornell, did you know a
man named Alfred Sarant?
Mr. Finestone. I refuse to answer that question on the
grounds of the Fifth Amendment.
Mr. Cohn. Did Sarant recruit you into the Rosenberg spy
ring?
Mr. Finestone. I refuse to answer that question on the
grounds of the Fifth Amendment.
Mr. Cohn. Did you engage in a conspiracy to commit
espionage with certain persons working for the Army Signal
Corps?
Mr. Finestone. I refuse to answer that question on the
grounds of the Fifth Amendment.
Mr. Cohn. Did you ever visit Julius Rosenberg at the
Emerson Electric Company and obtain from him material which you
transmitted to a Soviet spy ring?
Mr. Finestone. I refuse to answer that question on the
grounds of the Fifth Amendment.
Mr. Cohn. In 1950 did you ask David Greenglass for
classified government material, on which he was working, for
the Communist party?
Mr. Finestone. I refuse to answer that question on the
grounds of the Fifth Amendment.
Mr. Cohn. In the year 1952, were you asked by William Perl
to place a person working in the Army Signal Corps in contact
with the Soviet underground in this country?
Mr. Finestone. I refuse to answer that question on the
grounds of the Fifth Amendment.
Mr. Cohn. Did you transmit instructions to various members
of the Rosenberg spy ring within the last eighteen months?
Mr. Finestone. I refuse to answer that question on the
grounds of the Fifth Amendment.
Mr. Cohn. Did you pass money to various members of the
Rosenberg spy ring during the past eighteen months?
Mr. Finestone. I refuse to answer that question on the
grounds of the Fifth Amendment.
The Chairman. Have you been in contact with any one at the
Signal Corps Laboratories or Telecommunications within the past
six weeks?
Mr. Finestone. I refuse to answer that question on the
grounds of the Fifth Amendment.
The Chairman. Have you been engaging in espionage?
Mr. Finestone. Sir?
The Chairman. Have you been engaging in espionage?
Mr. Finestone. I refuse to answer that question on the
grounds of the Fifth Amendment.
The Chairman. Are you an espionage agent as of today?
Mr. Finestone. I refuse to answer that question on the
grounds of the Fifth Amendment.
The Chairman. Are you in the pay of the Communist
conspiracy as of today?
Mr. Finestone. I refuse to answer that question on the
grounds of the Fifth Amendment.
The Chairman. Were you born in this country?
Mr. Finestone. Yes.
The Chairman. How many brothers and sisters do you have?
Mr. Finestone. Yes, one.
The Chairman. Where does he work?
[The witness conferred with his counsel.]
Mr. Finestone. He works in New Jersey.
The Chairman. What kind of work?
Mr. Finestone. He is a buyer.
The Chairman. For whom?
Mr. Finestone. For a department store.
The Chairman. He is not doing any work that has any
connection with the government?
Mr. Finestone. No.
The Chairman. Is your father living?
Mr. Finestone. No.
The Chairman. Your mother?
Mr. Finestone. Yes.
The Chairman. And she is not working for the government?
Mr. Finestone. No.
The Chairman. Are you married?
Mr. Finestone. Yes.
The Chairman. Is your wife working for the government?
Mr. Finestone. No.
The Chairman. Does your wife have any sisters and brothers?
Mr. Finestone. Yes.
The Chairman. How many?
Mr. Finestone. One.
The Chairman. A brother or a sister?
Mr. Finestone. Sister.
The Chairman. Does that sister work either in a defense
plant or for any government agency?
Mr. Finestone. No.
The Chairman. Where does she work?
Mr. Finestone. She doesn't.
The Chairman. Does her husband work?
Mr. Finestone. Yes.
The Chairman. Where does he work?
[The witness conferred with his counsel.]
Mr. Finestone. He is a teacher.
The Chairman. Where does he teach?
Mr. Finestone. I don't know the name of the school.
The Chairman. What is his first name?
Mr. Finestone. His first name is Benedict.
The Chairman. What is his last name?
Mr. Finestone. Goldsmith.
The Chairman. You do not know where he is teaching?
Mr. Finestone. I don't know the name of the school.
The Chairman. What school system is he teaching in?
Mr. Finestone. It is a----
[The witness conferred with his counsel.]
Mr. Finestone. It is in upstate New York.
The Chairman. What city?
[The witness conferred with his counsel.]
Mr. Finestone. Potsdam, New York.
The Chairman. Potsdam, New York?
Mr. Finestone. Yes.
The Chairman. How large a city is Potsdam?
Mr. Finestone. It is a small town. I don't have the least
idea of the population.
The Chairman. Is he a Communist?
[The witness conferred with his counsel.]
Mr. Finestone. I refuse to answer that question on the
grounds of the Fifth Amendment.
The Chairman. Will you have him subpoenaed, Dan?
Mr. Buckley. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Anything else?
Mr. Cohn. Nothing else.
The Chairman. If there are no more questions, you will
return Tuesday morning at 10:30 to this room.
I have one further question: Is it correct that you are
still in touch with the remainder of the Rosenberg ring, and
that you and that ring are actively engaged in espionage as of
this time?
Mr. Finestone. I refuse to answer that question on the
grounds of the Fifth Amendment.
The Chairman. Do you consider yourself a traitor to your
country?
[The witness conferred with his counsel.]
The Chairman. Is that a hard question for you to answer?
[The witness conferred with his counsel.]
Mr. Finestone. No.
The Chairman. I, of course, assume you did not consider the
Rosenbergs traitors, either?
Mr. Finestone. I refuse to answer that question on the
grounds of the Fifth Amendment.
The Chairman. Mr. Finestone, you have been accused, and
obviously have been guilty of, espionage, which is treason
against your country, or otherwise you would answer these
questions. You have had an accusation against you of being a
part of the Rosenberg spy ring. How many deaths that spy ring,
including you, have caused, no one will ever know, of course.
How many more people have died because of your activities
as a traitor, no one will know. Let me ask you this question:
In view of the fact that the Rosenbergs were executed for the
same crime of which you are obviously guilty, can you see any
reason why you should not meet the same fate that they did?
[The witness conferred with his counsel.]
Mr. Finestone. I don't believe I can answer that question.
I don't see the relevance or the assumptions that it is
based on.
The Chairman. Ten-thirty Tuesday morning.
Would you raise your right hand and be sworn, sir. In this
matter now in hearing before the committee, do you solemnly
swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth, so help you God?
Mr. McGee. I do.
TESTIMONY OF FRANK M. McGEE (ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, VICTOR
RABINOWITZ)
Mr. Cohn. Mr. McGee, where do you reside?
Mr. McGee. Monroe, Louisiana.
Mr. Cohn. What is your address there?
Mr. McGee. 1008 North Fourth Street.
Mr. Cohn. And what is your occupation?
Mr. McGee. I am a television service man.
Mr. Cohn. For what company?
Mr. McGee. Twin City Television Service, Inc.
Mr. Cohn. For how long a period of time have you worked
there?
Mr. McGee. Since September.
Mr. Cohn. What did you do before that?
Mr. McGee. Well, prior to that, for several years I taught
at the Pierce School of Radio and Television.
Mr. Cohn. Where is that located?
Mr. McGee. It is now located at 52 East 19th Street, New
York City.
Mr. Cohn. Did you ever do any teaching in Louisiana?
Mr. McGee. No, sir.
Mr. Cohn. What did you teach at the Pierce School?
Mr. McGee. Television.
Mr. Cohn. And what did you do before that?
Mr. McGee. Before that I worked at Federal
Telecommunications Laboratories.
Mr. Cohn. Did you work on government work there?
Mr. McGee. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Up to what classification?
Mr. McGee. Well, I cannot say exactly. I believe that at
one time I may have handled some papers that were classified as
secret. I can't be certain.
Mr. Cohn. When you worked on those papers, were you a
member of the Communist party?
Mr. McGee. I refuse to answer that.
Mr. Cohn. On what ground?
Mr. McGee. On the grounds of the Fifth Amendment.
Mr. Cohn. What part of the Fifth Amendment? You can talk to
counsel any time you want.
Mr. McGee. The answer may tend to incriminate me.
Mr. Cohn. And are you a member of the Communist party
today?
Mr. McGee. I refuse to answer that.
Mr. Cohn. Did you engage in a conspiracy to commit
espionage when you were working in the Federal
Telecommunications Laboratory?
Mr. McGee. No.
Mr. Cohn. Did you know Harry Hyman?
Mr. McGee. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Did you know him to be a Communist?
Mr. McGee. I refuse to answer that question.
Mr. Cohn. Did you know him to be a spy?
Mr. McGee. No.
Mr. Cohn. You did not? Did you attend Communist meetings
with him?
Mr. McGee. I refuse to answer that question.
Mr. Cohn. While you were at FTL, did you hold Communist
cell meetings at your home and at them did you teach the duty
and necessity for the overthrow of the government of the United
States by force and violence?
[The witness conferred with his counsel.]
Mr. McGee. I refuse to answer that on the grounds of the
Fifth Amendment.
Mr. Cohn. Did you use ``State and Revolution,'' by Lenin,
as your text?
Mr. McGee. I refuse to answer that question.
Mr. Cohn. Were you educational director of this Communist
cell of FTL employees?
Mr. McGee. I refuse to answer the question.
Mr. Cohn. Are you on the payroll of the Communist party
today?
Mr. McGee. I refuse to answer the question.
Mr. Cohn. Nothing more, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Bring him back at 10:30 Tuesday.
Mr. Cohn. Colonel Brown?
The Chairman. Would you raise your hand. In this matter now
in hearing before the committee, do you solemnly swear to tell
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help
you God?
Col. Brown. I do.
TESTIMONY OF LT. COL. CHESTER T. BROWN, UNITED STATES ARMY
Mr. Cohn. Can we have your full name, Colonel?
Col. Brown. Chester T. Brown.
Mr. Cohn. And what is your assignment at the moment?
Col. Brown. Assistant chief of staff, G-2, Camp Kilmer.
Mr. Cohn. For how long a period of time have you held that
assignment?
Col. Brown. Since the eleventh of June 1953.
Mr. Cohn. Have you had any contacts with the case of Irving
Peress, the late Major Peress?
Col. Brown. Any contact I may have had with that case was a
classified matter.
Mr. Cohn. I didn't ask you that, Colonel; I asked, did you
have any contact?
Col. Brown. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. You did have contact with that case, is that
right?
Col. Brown. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Were you aware of the fact that Major Peress was
up for promotion in the fall of 1953?
Col. Brown. No.
Mr. Cohn. You were not?
Col. Brown. No.
Mr. Cohn. When did you first learn that he had been
promoted or that there were steps being taken to promote him?
Col. Brown. I first learned that he was promoted, I
believe, the day the letter was received at our headquarters.
Mr. Cohn. Pardon me?
Col. Brown. I believe the day the letter of promotion was
received at our headquarters.
Mr. Cohn. That is the first time you heard anything about
it, is that right? You did not know he was up for promotion?
Col. Brown. Right.
Mr. Cohn. Did you submit to him at any time a
questionnaire, or did your office submit to him at any time a
questionnaire, concerning his status in the army?
Col. Brown. I cannot answer that question. It is
classified.
Mr. Cohn. You cannot tell us whether or not you submitted a
questionnaire?
Col. Brown. I am not permitted to tell you, sir.
The Chairman. On what grounds? May I say something to you,
sir, and to the others of you officers. I will listen to
Communists refuse to answer; I will listen to no army officer
protecting a Communist, and you are going to answer these
questions or your case will come before the Senate for contempt
and I intend to shove it all the way through. I am sick of
this, sick and tired of it. This whole case is the greatest
scandal I ever heard. Somebody in your command--and yours,
General--has been protecting a man guilty of treason. We are
going to find out who. Answer the question, and you are going
to be ordered to answer it.
Col. Brown. I will have to refer the committee, with
regret, to special Regulation 380-320-10, paragraph 43, which
states: ``The disclosure of the nature, sources or even the
existence of counter-intelligence information to persons
mentioned in such report or to any other persons not normally
entitled to such information, may be made only when
specifically authorized by the assistant chief of staff, G-2,
Department of the Army, or higher authority.''
Under that regulation----
The Chairman. I do not recognize that as authority to
refuse to answer this question. You will be ordered to answer.
Col. Brown. I respectfully must refuse to answer.
The Chairman. All right. And I want you to know, John, that
I am sick of this. These cases are going to be made public. I
am going to let the public see you, sir--see what your new
administration, John--is doing, protecting and covering up
Communists. Let me ask you this question, Colonel: Who advised
you not to answer these questions?
Col. Brown. No one.
Mr. Adams. Mr. Chairman?
The Chairman. Just a minute.
Col. Brown. No one advised me.
The Chairman. You didn't discuss your testimony with
anyone?
Col. Brown. I have discussed----
The Chairman. You are under oath now, Colonel.
Col. Brown. That is correct.
The Chairman. You did not discuss your testimony with
anyone?
Col. Brown. I discussed it with counsel.
The Chairman. What counsel?
Col. Brown. Mr. Adams.
The Chairman. Did he advise you you could not answer these
questions? Is that correct, Mr. Adams?
Col. Brown. I told him I was unable to answer them for that
reason, and he agreed with me.
The Chairman. Did he advise you not to answer the
questions?
Col. Brown. No.
The Chairman. Did he tell you you should or should not
answer them?
Col. Brown. He agreed with me----
The Chairman. I would suggest you tell the truth, Colonel.
Col. Brown. I am telling the truth, sir.
The Chairman. You say that Adams did not advise you?
Col. Brown. No, sir. I quoted the regulation and he agreed
with me.
The Chairman. Mr. Adams, will you stand and raise your
right hand? You are more than a lawyer, you are a government
employee. I am ordering you, Mr. Adams, to be sworn, because
you are also an employee of the government.
Mr. Adams. Mr. Chairman, I respectfully request the
opportunity not to appear as a witness before the committee.
The Chairman. That will not be granted.
Mr. Adams. I appear as a representative of the secretary of
the army at your invitation, sir.
The Chairman. You are here as an employee of the
government, Mr. Adams, and I intend to order you to be sworn.
You are now ordered to stand up and be sworn.
Mr. Adams. Mr. Chairman, may I request the opportunity to
get instructions from the secretary of the army?
The Chairman. You may.
Mr. Adams. That will take me some time, and I probably
cannot accomplish it this afternoon in time before the
conclusion of your hearing.
Mr. Chairman, the colonel is not lying.
The Chairman. If you are going to testify, Mr. Adams, you
will be sworn.
Mr. Cohn. Well, the question, Colonel, of course is whether
or not any questionnaire was submitted. I am not asking you for
any loyalty or security information.
Col. Brown. If any questionnaire was submitted, it would be
part of a classified----
Mr. Cohn. No, Colonel, your interpretation is entirely
wrong. There is no foundation in law whatsoever.
Col. Brown. I still must refuse to answer.
Mr. Cohn. You are wrong.
The Chairman. I want the room completely cleared of
everyone except the witness.
[The chairman's request was complied with.]
Col. Brown. I would like to clarify an earlier statement as
to instructions which I received.
Mr. Cohn. You aren't being frank with the committee, are
you, Colonel?
Col. Brown. I was not instructed. I was reminded by the
commanding general and by the Department of the Army counsel of
the regulation which I just quoted. I was already familiar with
that regulation.
Mr. Cohn. You say you were reminded?
Col. Brown. I was reminded, yes. However, at the time I was
familiar with the regulation. And I understood that I could not
give the committee any classified information.
Mr. Cohn. Well, do you think it is classified information
whether or not a questionnaire was submitted to this man?
Col. Brown. Any intelligence file is classified.
Mr. Cohn. But Colonel, we haven't asked you for an
intelligence file.
Col. Brown. Any information I might have would be in a
classified intelligence file, and I cannot even admit the
existence of such a file, if there is one.
Mr. Cohn. Colonel, is this your own decision, or have you
received advice and instructions from superiors? If it is your
own decision, it is an awfully bad one.
Col. Brown. It is my own decision based on the regulations.
Mr. Cohn. It is your own, and you received no instructions
from a superior at all?
Col. Brown. No. As I say, I was reminded of the
interpretation of the regulation. May I repeat again, reading
from the special regulation, ``disclosure of the nature,
sources or even the existence of such counter-intelligence
information to persons mentioned in such a report or to other
persons not normally''----
The Chairman. We have heard the regulations, Colonel.
Mr. Cohn. If you will look at the wording of that thing, we
have not asked you anything that is covered by that regulation.
We have only asked you whether or not a questionnaire--it might
be a questionnaire about buying potatoes or something for all
we know, at this point. When you get to the proper point, you
can assert the privilege.
Col. Brown. Would you repeat that question? I assure you I
want to cooperate as much as I can. Would you repeat the
question about the questionnaire?
Mr. Cohn. No, that is all right.
Mr. Rainville. May I make a statement, Senator?
Who pays your salary, Colonel?
Col. Brown. The United States government.
Mr. Rainville. Where do they get the money from?
Col. Brown. From Congress.
Mr. Rainville. Then the paymaster is the guy that is in
charge of you, and you ought to realize that you don't even
have a job if this man decides that there is going to be no
appropriation for the army. I mean, don't you realize that the
Senate----
Col. Brown. I cannot see that that has a bearing on it,
sir.
Mr. Rainville. That certainly has a bearing on it. That
statement says that you can only give the information to
authorized people. Who creates your job? Who promotes you? The
president of the United States cannot promote you unless the
Senate agrees.
Col. Brown. That says when specifically authorized by the
assistant chief of staff, G-2, the Department of the Army, or
higher authority.
Mr. Rainville. And what higher authority is there than the
guy that raises your dough?
Mr. Cohn. Have you requested authorization from higher
authority?
Col. Brown. I have not.
Mr. Cohn. Why?
Col. Brown. I have not had the opportunity. I only knew I
was coming here at 5:30 last night.
Mr. Cohn. Did you see Mr. Adams yesterday?
Col. Brown. Mr. Adams? Yes, late yesterday evening.
The Chairman. How long were you with Mr. Adams yesterday?
Col. Brown. I should say approximately an hour.
The Chairman. And what did you discuss?
Col. Brown. The fact that we were to report up here today.
The Chairman. You know, of course, he is the legal counsel
for the army, do you not?
Col. Brown. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. You say you did not have an opportunity to
tell him that you wanted to come down here and tell us the
truth?
Col. Brown. No, sir; I didn't say that.
The Chairman. Did you suggest to him that it might be well
if you came down and told us the truth, if he would get
permission for you to do that?
Col. Brown. No, sir.
The Chairman. Do you not think it would be a good idea if
you got permission to come down here and tell us the truth
about this Communist?
Col. Brown. Yes, I would be very glad to, if I could get
the permission.
The Chairman. Why have you not asked for it?
Col. Brown. Because, as Mr. Adams was Department of the
Army counsel, I assumed that if permission were necessary, he
would request from the proper authorities.
The Chairman. Did you discuss the question of whether or
not you should ask for permission? Did you discuss that?
Col. Brown. No, sir.
The Chairman. You never talked about it?
Col. Brown. No, sir.
The Chairman. You never brought it up?
Col. Brown. No, sir.
The Chairman. In that hour's time, what did you discuss?
Col. Brown. Well, we spent about, I should say, twenty
minutes discussing the procedure of the committee, the fact
that we would be called up, and most of the rest of the time
was just batting the breeze, waiting for his transportation.
The Chairman. What time did he get down there?
Col. Brown. I don't know, sir.
The Chairman. What time of the day did you first see him?
Col. Brown. I believe it was shortly after five o'clock in
the afternoon.
The Chairman. You have no idea what time he got down there?
Col. Brown. No.
The Chairman. No idea?
Col. Brown. He was already there when I went in.
The Chairman. And when did you first learn that Peress was
a Communist?
Col. Brown. There, again, sir, I will have to respectfully
refuse to answer on the grounds that that information came to
me in classified information, if it came.
The Chairman. You are ordered to answer.
Col. Brown. I must respectfully refuse.
The Chairman. Did you have any part in his promotion after
you knew that he was a Communist?
Col. Brown. No, sir.
The Chairman. Did you take any action to have him removed
from the army after you learned that he was a Communist?
Col. Brown. Again, sir, any action I might have taken was
part of the classified files and I am not permitted to answer.
The Chairman. You are ordered to answer.
Col. Brown. I must respectfully refuse, sir.
The Chairman. Did you ever take any action to have Peress
removed from the army?
Col. Brown. I must refuse to answer on the same grounds.
The Chairman. You are ordered to answer.
Col. Brown. Again, I must respectfully refuse, sir.
The Chairman. Did you ever call the attention of your
superior officers to the fact that you had reason to believe
this man was a traitor?
Col. Brown. Would you repeat that question, please?
[The reporter read from his notes as requested.]
Col. Brown. I did have occasion to inform my commanding
general that we had certain information about Peress.
The Chairman. And you recommended his removal? Did you?
Col. Brown. That, again, is probably in a classified file,
if it exists, and I cannot reveal it.
The Chairman. Do you mean to say that to recommend the
removal of a person in the army is classified?
Col. Brown. In a case such as this it would be, sir.
The Chairman. What is the classification?
Col. Brown. Confidential.
The Chairman. Are you sure of that?
Col. Brown. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Who classified it confidential? Did you?
Col. Brown. No, sir; not originally.
The Chairman. Do you know who is responsible for keeping
this man on after it was known that he was a Communist?
Col. Brown. No, sir; I do not.
The Chairman. Do you have any idea?
Col. Brown. No, sir.
The Chairman. Do you think such a man should be court-
martialed?
Col. Brown. If there is sufficient evidence to warrant
trial, yes, sir.
The Chairman. Say that the only evidence is you knew he was
a Communist. Would that be sufficient in your opinion for a
court-martial?
Col. Brown. I am not a legal expert; I couldn't say.
The Chairman. I want your opinion on it, Colonel. You are
handling matters down there affecting the life and death of
this nation. Or cannot you answer that, Colonel? Do you not
know, do you not know whether or not----
Col. Brown. No, sir; I don't.
The Chairman. You do not know whether or not an officer
that keeps on a Communist should be court-martialed? Is that
your testimony?
Col. Brown. No, sir; I don't mean to say that at all. If we
have evidence of some overt act, yes, sir; certainly.
The Chairman. What do you call an overt act?
Col. Brown. An actual--well, it might be any one of a
number of things.
The Chairman. Would membership in the Communist party be
enough?
Col. Brown. I do not know, sir.
The Chairman. In other words, you don't know whether or not
membership in the Communist party would be sufficient to remove
a man from the military, is that your answer?
Col. Brown. No, sir; that is not my answer.
The Chairman. Then what is your answer?
Col. Brown. I would say membership in the Communist party
is certainly enough to remove him from the service, but whether
it is enough for a court-martial, I don't know.
The Chairman. How about the man who takes part in the
promotion of an individual, knowing he is a Communist? Would
you say that officer should be removed from the service?
Col. Brown. Knowing that he is a Communist?
The Chairman. He is.
Col. Brown. All I could give on that would be my own
personal opinion, sir. My personal opinion would be yes.
The Chairman. Give us a personal opinion. What is your
answer?
Col. Brown. My personal opinion would be yes.
The Chairman. How about an officer who knew that a man
refused to answer a questionnaire concerning alleged Communist
activities and invoked the Fifth Amendment, and then such an
officer took part in his promotion. Would you say such an
officer should be removed? I am speaking now not of the
Communist himself, as I am speaking of the officer who took
part in having him promoted.
Col. Brown. I don't know the answer to that one.
The Chairman. Well, what do you think?
Col. Brown. I think he would certainly be worthy of
investigation, sir.
The Chairman. Let's say you have investigated, now, and the
investigation has ended. The investigation shows that Colonel
Jones knew that Captain Peress had refused to answer questions
about his communist activities, invoking the Fifth Amendment
and thereafter Colonel Jones approved this man's promotion to
major. Would you say Colonel Jones should be removed from the
military? Let's assume all of those facts are proven
positively.
Col. Brown. I don't consider myself qualified to state an
opinion on that, sir.
The Chairman. You are ordered to. Being a servant of the
people, sir, like I am, we are entitled to know how you are
handling your job. One way to find out is to know how you feel
about these Communists, especially when you, yourself, were
part and parcel of the organization that kept on a traitor. So
you are ordered to answer that question.
Col. Brown. I would say, sir, that some disciplinary action
should be taken.
The Chairman. The question is, do you think he should be
dismissed, and gotten out of the army?
Col. Brown. On the basis of the other man's refusal to
answer under the Fifth Amendment? Is that correct?
The Chairman. You heard my question. I will restate it, if
you want me to.
Col. Brown. If you would, please.
The Chairman. I said let us assume that Colonel Jones knew
that Captain Peress had refused to answer questions about
Communist activities and membership in his party, and Colonel
Jones thereafter approved the promotion of Captain Peress to
major. Would you say Colonel Jones should be retained in our
military?
Col. Brown. No, sir.
The Chairman. Let us go a step further. Let us assume that
Colonel or General Jones is aware of the fact that Major Peress
has been before this committee, has been identified as a
Communist, has been identified as having attended Communist
leadership schools, that his wife has been identified as a
Communist, and that Peress refuses to answer any questions
asked him by this committee about Communist activity on the
grounds of self-incrimination. Then, say, subsequent to that
the chairman of the committee writes a letter to the secretary
of the army urging a court-martial of Major Peress, and that
the day after that letter is made public, Colonel Jones signs
an honorable discharge for this man, knowing all the facts
which I have just related. Would you say that Colonel Jones
should be removed from the army?
Col. Brown. Not necessarily, sir, because Colonel Jones
would only give an honorable discharge upon a direction from
higher authority.
The Chairman. Well, how about the higher authority, then?
Do you think he should be removed from the army, assuming he
knows those facts?
Col. Brown. If the higher authority knew all the facts,
yes, sir; I think he should.
The Chairman. You think he should be removed?
Col. Brown. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Do you think that a committee should be able
to get the information as to who is responsible for the
promotion, and the honorable discharge of this man, or do you
think that would endanger the national security if we got that
information?
Col. Brown. Simply as my personal opinion, as one of the
Indians on the lower level, I think the committee might well be
given the facts by the proper authorities.
The Chairman. Do you know who is responsible for the
ordering of the honorable discharge for Major Peress?
Col. Brown. I don't know the name of any individual, no,
sir.
The Chairman. Have you not discussed that since he got this
honorable discharge?
Col. Brown. No, sir. The directive came from the Department
of the Army. It was not questioned at our headquarters.
The Chairman. Who signed that order?
Col. Brown. If I may look into my file, I have a copy of
that letter.
The Chairman. Certainly.
Col. Brown. I must state that this letter is not
classified. It is purely administrative. I have only a carbon
copy here. It does not show any name, but it does say ``by
order of the Secretary of the Army,'' and typed under that
``Adjutant General.'' Whether the adjutant general himself
signed the original, I do not know, sir.
The Chairman. May I see that?
Col. Brown I believe the committee has probably a photostat
of the original.
[Document handed to the chairman.]
The Chairman. If he had gotten a dishonorable discharge,
would he have been entitled to payment of mileage, in other
words travel payment, lump sum payment for unused leave?
Col. Brown. I do not believe so, sir.
The Chairman. So that he was financially rewarded as well
as rewarded by this honorable discharge, is that right?
Col. Brown. I believe that is correct, sir.
The Chairman. I am not sure if you answered this question
or not. Do you feel that a man with a record which Peress has
should got an honorable discharge?
Col. Brown. As a matter of my own personal opinion, sir, I
would say no.
The Chairman. Do you think somebody was derelict in his
duty by giving this honorable discharge?
Col. Brown. Not necessarily so. Whoever ordered the
discharge may not have known all the facts.
The Chairman. Colonel, may I say to you that this committee
has a very difficult job, a job of digging up traitors. We have
been finding some, such as Peress, with the complete
wholehearted opposition of men like yourself, men who give no
cooperation at all, men who like yourself are responsible for
covering up the facts so that we can not find out who has been
placing Communists in the army and keeping them there. For your
information, I want you to know that this is something that we
are going to have to bring to the attention of all the American
people. I want them to see our army officers sitting here,
refusing to give the facts about traitors and spies, saying
that if they tell us about those traitors, about those spies,
if they let the senators know, that that will endanger the
security of the nation. I think, may I say this, that any man
in the uniform of his country, who refuses to give information
to a committee of the Senate which represents the American
people, that that man is not fit to wear the uniform of his
country. And in my opinion he is in the same category, Colonel,
as the traitor whom he is protecting. I just want to make that
very clear to you, so you know it will be made very clear to
the people.
Col. Brown. May I say, sir, as a soldier, it is my duty to
obey my military superiors. The regulations and my military
superiors forbid me to give you the classified information
unless released--unless I am so authorized by G-2, Department
of the Army, or higher authority. Not only that, but at this
level we do not know, and have no way of knowing, what went on
on higher levels. Furthermore, the complete information can be
obtained from a higher level.
The Chairman. Colonel, you have recited to us an order
which does not apply. You are hiding behind an order which does
not apply. You have told us that no one interpreted that for
you, that you yourself interpreted it. I have just gotten
through telling you that that order does not apply. You are
hiding behind that to protect, cover up, information which this
committee needs if we are to protect this country.
Let us be completely clear on that. Following your line of
reasoning, you could come in here and cite one of the verses in
the Bible and say that prevents my giving the committee
information. I told you before I do not recognize that as valid
grounds for your refusal. I am going to ask the Senate to have
you cited for contempt, for failure to give information which
the committee is entitled to, relying upon a phoney order. I
want it very clear also, and if you want to correct it, let us
hear it now, that you have told us that you did not even ask or
get the advice of the legal representative of the army, who was
with you for one hour last night. If you were interested in
properly interpreted legal orders, you were with the legal
officer last night for an hour, you would have asked him that
question. I must say I, frankly, Colonel, do not believe you
are telling us the truth. I don't believe you spent an hour
with Mr. Adams last night, without asking his advice, without
getting it. I know that Mr. Adams traveled to Camp Kilmer to
see you and other witnesses who were to come here to testify,
and he advised you. You denied that.
Col. Brown. No, sir; I did not. I remarked earlier that
both my commanding general and Mr. Adams advised me about the
regulation, with which I was already familiar.
The Chairman. Who is your commanding general?
Col. Brown. General Zwicker, sir.
The Chairman. And he advised you that----
Col. Brown. He reminded me of the regulation.
The Chairman. Did he advise you what type of questions you
could not answer?
Col. Brown. He reminded me that I could not answer any
questions with regard to classified matter in this case. I have
also here a copy of Change I of Army Regulations 380-10,
paragraph 55, to which has been added:
Hereafter, no information regarding individual loyalty or
security cases shall be provided in response to inquiries from
outside the executive branch, unless such inquiries are made in
writing. Where proper inquiries are made in writing, replies
will be confined to two categories of information, as follows:
(1) If an employee has been separated on loyalty grounds,
advice to that effect may be given in response to a specific
request for information concerning that particular Individual;
and (2), if an employee has been separated as a security risk,
replies to specific requests for information about that
individual may state only that he was separated for reasons
relating to suitability for employment in that particular
agency. No information shall be supplied as to any specific
intermediate steps, proceedings, transcripts of hearings, or
actions taken in processing an individual on a loyalty or
security program. No exceptions shall be made to the above
stated policy unless the agency head determines that it would
be clearly in the public interest to make specific information
available as in instances where the employee involved properly
asked that such action be taken for his own protection.
The Chairman. Colonel, you need not read that to me. I know
all about that order. When was that signed, incidentally?
Col. Brown. That is dated 28 May 1952, sir, by order of the
secretary of the army, J. Lawton Collins, chief of staff.
Mr. Jones. Colonel, when was the first time that the
counsel of the army discussed the Peress case with you?
Col. Brown. Last night, sir.
Mr. Jones. That was the first time?
Col. Brown. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jones. Colonel, did he advise you to stand squarely and
unequivocally on those regulations when you appeared before
this committee?
Col. Brown. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jones. He did advise you to stand squarely?
Col. Brown. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jones. Did General Zwicker indicate the same position
or suggest that you take the same position?
Col. Brown. He did.
Mr. Jones. Did the counsel of the army advise you not to
discuss the Peress case?
Col. Brown. He advised me not to discuss any classified
matter, and if there was a file on the Peress case, it was
classified.
The Chairman. Mr. Jones is asking a simple question. He
asked you if he advised you not to discuss the Peress case.
Mr. Jones. Did he advise you not to discuss the Peress
case?
Col. Brown. Not in those words, no.
Mr. Jones. You spent an hour with him last night, Colonel.
In the period of that hour, did he say to you, ``Colonel, if
Senator McCarthy or any member of the committee should ask you
about any particular information regarding Captain or Major
Peress, do not answer those questions''?
Col. Brown. No, you left out one word. He said, ``If the
committee or any member thereof asks you for any information
which is classified, you will not give it.''
Mr. Jones. And he advised you not to discuss the Peress
case?
Col. Brown. Not to discuss any classified matter in
connection with the case.
Mr. Cohn. Colonel, if it were not for these regulations,
would you like to tell us exactly what happened in the Peress
case and exactly what steps were taken?
Col. Brown. As far as I know of them, I would.
Mr. Cohn. You would?
Col. Brown. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Why don't you request permission, as the
regulations provide, from the assistant chief of staff of G-2,
and tell him you want to come in here and tell us, and ask his
permission to do that?
Col. Brown. I don't feel that I have the authority to make
such a request.
Mr. Cohn. Colonel, you have the duty, under that
regulation, of doing that, when a request is made.
Col. Brown. I would like to point out that I am a staff
officer. I have no command function.
Mr. Cohn. That regulation applies to anyone who is called
as a witness. If he wants to stand on that regulation, he will
not give certain information unless he receives permission to
do so from the assistant chief of staff, G-2. In other words,
you get the request, you are asked the questions, you are told
what is expected and then you go to the assistant chief of
staff of G-2, and say, ``I have been asked these questions, and
the regulations say I can not answer them unless you tell me I
can.'' Then he answered you that you can. And you have
permission to come in and tell us, and if he says no then you
say, ``Pursuant to the regulations I have consulted assistant
chief of staff of G-2, and he says I may not.''
Then you call in the assistant chief of staff, G-2, and we
know who is giving orders. Isn't that the sensible way of doing
it?
Col. Brown. Well, I believe----
Mr. Cohn. The fact is you have been made to understand you
are not to discuss this case. Doesn't that save a lot of time?
Col. Brown. Yes.
Mr. Rainville. Isn't there a further consideration if you
do answer, you will not be protected as Major Peress was?
Col. Brown. If I answer, I will be subjected to court-
martial.
Mr. Cohn. For telling us who protected a Communist, you
would be court-martialed?
Mr. Jones. You would be court-martialed for protecting the
country?
Col. Brown. You can put it that way, if you wish.
The Chairman. Colonel, you have cited to us an order which
says that you cannot give certain information without the
permission of the assistant chief of staff. Do you interpret
that to mean that you cannot give us information about a
Communist who is promoted, with special treatment, given an
honorable discharge? Do you interpret that to mean that you
just, to fulfill your oath, must protect people who protected
this Communist?
You are ordered, and in conformity with that order, to
request of the assistant chief of staff, G-2, the right to
answer the questions asked you today. You are ordered to do
that within forty-eight hours, and send us a copy of the
request for permission to answer so that we will know that the
order has been fulfilled.
Col. Brown. Very well, sir.
Mr. Jones. Colonel, did any other person other than the
counsel of the army and General Zwicker advise you not to
discuss the Peress case here?
Col. Brown. No, sir.
Mr. Jones. These were the only two persons?
Col. Brown. That is right.
The Chairman. That will be all for the time being, Colonel.
You will consider yourself under subpoena. You will be notified
when we want you back. We will want you back in public session.
Col. Brown. Right, sir. When I receive the answer to this
request, sir, where shall I get that to you?
The Chairman. You can call Mr. Cohn collect at the Senate
investigating committee.
Mr. Cohn. Call the Capitol in Washington. Extension 1145,
collect. Anybody there will take care of it.
The Chairman. The number is National 8-3120, Extension
1145.
Let me ask you this: Do you think it in a disgrace to the
army to have the word go out to the country that army officers
refuse to give the names of people who have been protecting
known Communists? Do you think that is one of the most
disgraceful things that can happen to the army?
Col. Brown. I cannot say I am in favor of it.
The Chairman. Pardon?
Col. Brown. I am not in favor of it.
The Chairman. I think when an officer comes in also and
says ``I can't tell about a Communist who got an honorable
discharge because it I told the truth I would be court-
martialed,'' I think that is the most disgraceful thing that I
have ever heard. It gives the army the blackest eye
conceivable. I think that your failure, when you are so fully
aware of this order, to contact the assistant chief of staff,
G-2, and ask him whether you can tell the truth about this
case, is inexcusable.
Col. Brown. May I say a word of explanation on that
regulation, sir?
The Chairman. Yes.
Col. Brown. That regulation was not written--this is just
my own opinion--was not written with the intent of protecting
any guilty person, but it was written to protect the security
of classified matter in general. For example, if that entire
file were brought out in an open session--there is more to it,
of course, than what I have ever seen--the chances are that
some secret investigative processes and names would be
disclosed to the public, which would certainly hinder any
future investigative procedure.
Mr. Rainville. May I ask a question. In view of what you
know and your own feelings about this case, and your
recommendations, don't you think John Adams is quibbling when
he says ``We do not have the facts before us''?
Col. Brown. No, sir; we do not have facts.
Mr. Rainville. Then why did you fire the man?
Col. Brown. Because we were ordered to do so.
Mr. Rainville. Somebody has the facts, and he represents
that somebody, doesn't he? Somebody had enough facts to fire
the man and he sits there and says, ``We don't have enough
information, enough facts to move on, to answer your letter.''
You know he is quibbling?
Col. Brown. Well, no, I won't say that, because I don't
know that facts actually exist, proven facts.
Mr. Rainville. If your superiors have enough facts to take
a man's commission away and say that he can never again hold a
commission in the army, they must have facts for that. For him
to sit there and say they can not answer the letter because
they do not have facts, that is something beyond quibbling.
Col. Brown. That is something beyond me. I am just one of
the Indians.
Mr. Rainville. Don't answer it, then. I advise you not to
answer it. He obviously is quibbling.
The Chairman. You may step down, Colonel.
The Chairman. Would you raise your right hand and be sworn?
In the matter now in hearing before the committee, do you
solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth?
Capt. Woodward. I do.
TESTIMONY OF CAPT. W. J. WOODWARD, UNITED STATES ARMY
The Chairman. We are just going to ask you one or two
questions about the general's health. Your name is what?
Capt. Woodward. Dr. Woodard.
The Chairman. And your first name?
Capt. Woodward. William.
The Chairman. There is a question here as to whether or not
it would endanger the general's health if he were to testify
before the committee today.
Capt. Woodward. I think it would depend, Senator, on how
much he got upset.
The Chairman. If you sit beside him and if you see he is
getting disturbed, if you will let us know, we will act
accordingly. All right?
Capt. Woodward. All right, sir.
Mr. Jones. Has he a heart condition?
Capt. Woodward. We are not sure of it. He came into the
hospital yesterday complaining of some vague chest pain over
the heart area, that actually radiated like angina pain. We
have had two electrocardiograms on him.
Mr. Cohn. What do they show?
Capt. Woodward. They are just about normal. Just because of
that, our commanding officer thought it would be wise for a
medical officer to come up here with him.
The Chairman. Do you want to sit here with him?
Capt. Woodward. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. If you feel there is anything that is
endangering his health, do not hesitate at all to call it to
our attention.
[Brigadier General Ralph W. Zwicker testified next. His
testimony was made public on February 24, 1954 and published in
Communist Infiltration in the Army, part 3 (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1954).]
[Whereupon, at 5:15 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
ARMY SIGNAL CORPS--SUBVERSION AND ESPIONAGE
[Editor's note.--In the subcommittee's August 1953 hearings
concerning the Government Printing Office, Mary Stalcup
Markward (1922-1972) testified that she had joined the
Communist party in Washington, D.C. at the request of the FBI.
At an executive session of the House Un-American Activities
Committee on February 22, 1954, Markward identified Annie Lee
Moss (1905-1996) as a former cafeteria worker whose name had
appeared on the Communist party's membership roles in 1944. At
the time of the hearings, Moss was a communications clerk at
the Pentagon.
Immediately following this executive session, Markward
testified in a public hearing that as treasurer of the
Northeast Club of the Communist party she had ``a woman by the
name of Annie Lee Moss on the list of card-carrying, dues-
paying members,'' although she had not met Moss personally.
Because of illness, Moss did not testify until she appeared at
a public hearing March 11, 1954.
Charlotte Oram and Sallie Fannie Peek (1909-1980) testified
publicly on February 24, 1954. Genevieve Brown, William S.
Johnson and Lamuel Belton were not called to testify in
public.]
----------
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 1954
U.S. Senate,
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
of the Committee on Government Operations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 10:00 a.m., pursuant to notice, in
room 357 of the Senate Office building, Senator Joseph R.
McCarthy (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican, Wisconsin;
Senator Karl E. Mundt, Republican, South Dakota; Senator
Charles E. Potter, Republican, Michigan; Senator John L.
McClellan, Democrat, Arkansas; Senator Henry M. Jackson,
Democrat, Washington.
Present also: Roy M. Cohn, chief counsel; Robert Francis
Kennedy, chief counsel for the minority; Francis P. Carr, staff
director; Ruth Young Watt, chief clerk.
The Chairman. I wonder if the young lady would raise her
right hand. In this matter in hearing before the committee, do
you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and
nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mrs. Oram. I do.
TESTIMONY OF CHARLOTTE ORAM (ACCOMPANIED BY HER COUNSEL, JOSEPH
FORER)
Mr. Cohn. Could I get your full name?
Mrs. Oram. Charlotte Oram.
Mr. Cohn. And for the information of others present,
counsel is Mr. Joseph Forer of the Washington Bar, who has been
before the committee on prior occasions.
Mr. Forer. That is correct.
Mr. Cohn. You have been before the committee on prior
occasions and you know the rules?
Mr. Forer. Yes, sir; I do.
Mr. Cohn. Now, Mrs. Oram, in 1944 were you a member of the
northeast branch of the Communist party with a woman named
Annie Lee Moss?
Mrs. Oram. I decline to answer that question on the basis
of my privilege under the Fifth Amendment not to be a witness
against myself.
Mr. Cohn. Did you hold membership card 53582 in the
Communist party during those years?
Mrs. Oram. My answer to that question is on the same basis.
Mr. Cohn. Do you know Annie Lee Moss?
Mrs. Oram. I am sorry.
Mr. Cohn. Do you know Annie Lee Moss?
Mrs. Oram. That name doesn't mean anything to me.
Mr. Cohn. Can you name for us the members of the Communist
cell to which you belonged?
Mrs. Oram. I decline to answer that question on the basis I
stated previously.
Mr. Cohn. Are you a Communist as of today?
Mrs. Oram. I decline to answer that question on the same
basis.
Mr. Cohn. All right.
The Chairman. Would you have the witness over to 318 at a
quarter of eleven? I do not think we will call her but we would
like to have her there.
Mr. Forer. 318 at 10:45? I did not catch the last sentence.
[Discussion off the record.]
Senator Jackson. I had a question. What is your occupation?
Mrs. Oram. I am a housewife.
Senator Jackson. What is your occupation?
Mrs. Oram. I am a housewife.
Senator Jackson. What does your husband do?
Mrs. Oram. He works in a drugstore.
Senator Jackson. He works here in Washington, D.C.?
Mrs. Oram. Well, in Arlington County.
Senator Jackson. Did you know a Mrs. Markward?
Mrs. Oram. I decline to answer that question on the basis
that I have stated previously.
Senator Jackson. That is all.
Senator McClellan. May I ask you a question? Are you now
employed in the government in any way?
Mrs. Oram. No, I am not.
Senator McClellan. Have you ever been?
Mrs. Oram. No, I never have been.
Senator McClellan. You are declining to answer whether you
are a Communist or have ever been a Communist? Is that correct?
Mrs. Oram. I am declining to answer that question.
Senator McClellan. You are unwilling to cooperate with your
government and its agencies to the extent of giving it any
information that you may have that the government or its
agencies may need in order to properly function and discharge
its responsibilities in preserving our country, are you?
[The witness consulted with her counsel.]
Mrs. Oram. I decline to answer the questions for the
reasons I gave.
Senator McClellan. Are you an American citizen?
Mrs. Oram. Yes.
Senator McClellan. Do you owe any obligations to your
country as a citizen?
Mrs. Oram. Certainly.
Senator McClellan. Do you regard an obligation to your
country that protects you----
Mrs. Oram. I don't believe I understand that.
Senator McClellan. Yes, you know what I mean. Do you regard
an obligation to the country in which you have citizenship to
try to serve it?
Mrs. Oram. Yes, of course.
Senator McClellan. You do?
Mrs. Oram. Certainly.
Senator McClellan. Do you think that you are serving your
country as a good citizen and as a patriotic citizen when you
refuse to give information that your government needs?
[The witness consulted with her counsel.]
Mrs. Oram. I believe it is my duty and every citizen's duty
to protect and uphold the Constitution and I believe that in
relying upon my constitutional rights I am certainly carrying
that out.
Senator McClellan. Is there any part of the Constitution
that you hold allegiance to except the Fifth Amendment?
Mrs. Oram. I hold allegiance to every part, including the
First Amendment,
Senator McClellan. One of the parts of the Constitution is
to preserve the United States, is it not?
Mrs. Oram. That is right.
Senator McClellan. Are you going to contribute anything
towards preserving your country?
Mrs. Oram. I believe I am doing that.
Senator McClellan. If you are willing to do that, will you
tell us and give us the information that has been asked as a
good citizen of this country?
Mrs. Oram. I give you what information I feel I can and
should give you.
Senator McClellan. What information you feel you can and
should give?
Mrs. Oram. Under the rights of the Constitution.
Senator McClellan. Is there any information that you can,
or that you are willing to give us, under the Constitution?
Mrs. Oram. That is rather a broad question.
Senator McClellan. It is a broad question, but is there
any, and I make it broad for your benefit? If you can indicate
any information that you are willing to give us, to help to
this fight against communism and to preserve our country. Is
there any, and I make it broad to cover everything? Is there
any that you are willing to give us?
Mrs. Oram. Well, of course.
Senator McClellan. All right. Tell us. What is it? Mention
one thing.
Mrs. Oram. Well, I don't know. I would have to have a
specific question. I can't answer anything out of the blue.
Senator McClellan. Are you willing to help your government
fight this conspiracy of communism?
Mrs. Oram. I refuse to answer that question on the basis
that I have already stated.
Senator McClellan. You think that would incriminate you to
say that you are willing to help fight a conspiracy against the
United States of America?
Mrs. Oram. I think that I have to stick to my declination
to answer.
Senator McClellan. Do you think that would incriminate you?
I am not asking you; I want you to state it under oath.
Mrs. Oram. It might.
Senator McClellan. Do you think that it would incriminate
you to help your government fight a conspiracy that is trying
to destroy it?
[The witness consulted with her counsel.]
Mrs. Oram. I am afraid I don't understand that question,
sir.
Senator McClellan. You do understand the question and it is
just as simple as it can be. Do you think that you would be
incriminated if you gave information that would help your
government light a conspiracy, the conspiracy of communism that
is undertaking to destroy it? You certainly understand that.
Mrs. Oram. I am afraid I don't.
Senator McClellan. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. You will be over to 318 at a quarter of
eleven. Mr. Forer, do you have any more clients?
Mr. Forer. Yes.
The Chairman. Will you bring your witness in. Would you
raise your right hand, please.
In this matter now in hearing before the committee, do you
solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing
but the truth, so help you God?
Mrs. Peek. I do.
TESTIMONY OF SALLIE FANNIE PEEK (ACCOMPANIED BY HER COUNSEL,
JOSEPH FORER)
Mr. Cohn. May we have your full name?
Mrs. Peek. My name is Sallie Fannie Peek.
Mr. Cohn. Any time you wish, you may confer with your
counsel regarding the answers to any question or he may confer
with you. I would like to ask you first of all whether or not
you were a member of the city committee of the Communist
Political Association in 1944?
Mrs. Peek. Will you repeat that name?
Mr. Cohn. Were you a member of the city committee of the
Communist Political Association in 1944?
Mrs. Peek. I refuse to answer that question because of my
privilege under the Fifth Amendment not to be a witness against
myself.
Mr. Cohn. Did you see in attendance at meetings of the
Communist Political Association a woman named Annie Lee Moss?
Mrs. Peek. What is the last part of the question?
Mr. Cohn. Did you see a woman named Annie Lee Moss in
attendance at these meetings of the Communist Political
Association?
Mrs. Peek. I refuse to answer that question on the same
grounds that I stated before.
Mr. Cohn. Did you recruit Annie Lee Moss into the Communist
party?
[The witness conferred with bar counsel.]
Mrs. Peek. I refuse to answer that question on the same
grounds that I before stated.
Mr. Cohn. Did you attend a Communist party national
training school in New York City in 1947?
Mrs. Peek. I refuse to answer that question on the grounds
that I before stated.
Mr. Cohn. Are you a Communist today?
Mrs. Peek. I refuse to answer that question on the grounds
that I before stated.
Mr. Cohn. I have nothing further.
The Chairman. I may say to the other senators that I know a
lot of them have questions and I would like very much to
dispose of the other three witnesses before a quarter of
eleven.
Senator McClellan. We can shorten this if we are going to
have these witnesses to public hearings.
Senator Jackson. This is a completely independent question.
Do you know or do you recall Annie Lee Moss?
Mrs. Peek. I refuse to answer that question on the same
grounds I before stated.
Senator Jackson. Do you know Mrs. Markward?
Mrs. Peek. I refuse to answer that question on the grounds
that I before stated.
Senator McClellan. Mr. Chairman, we can take this up in
public session, but I have an idea and I may be wrong but I
want the counsel on this staff to determine whether people can
refuse to answer whether they know someone on the ground that
it might incriminate them. I doubt that to a valid point. There
may be some court decision on it.
The Chairman. I have been into that in great detail not
only with the staff but also with some of the people in the
Justice Department. They take the position that the
interpretation has been so liberal that anything which might be
even a remote link in the chain would be applicable.
Senator McClellan. That may be true.
The Chairman. I think the witness could not refuse in the
ordinary case. Where it deals with someone who has been
identified as a Communist and identified as an undercover agent
for the bureau, I think that she is entitled to refuse,
unfortunately.
Mr. Forer. What time do you want her?
Mr. Cohn. We would like her at a quarter of eleven.
Mr. Forer. Before you start, can I tell you something off
the record?
The Chairman. Yes.
[Discussion off the record.]
The Chairman. Now, will you raise your right hand? In this
matter in hearing before the committee, do you solemnly swear
to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth,
so help you God?
Mrs. Brown. I do.
TESTIMONY OF GENEVIEVE BROWN (ACCOMPANIED BY HER COUNSEL,
JOSEPH FORER)
The Chairman. We have a very few questions to ask you. Do
you know Annie Lee Moss?
Mrs. Brown. I don't recall her name.
The Chairman. Do you recall the name at all?
Mrs. Brown. No.
The Chairman. As I understand, your sight is not too good
so, perhaps, you would not be able to identify her if you had
her before you.
Mrs. Brown. I am sure I couldn't.
The Chairman. Did you know a Mary Stalcup?
Mrs. Brown. The name is not familiar to me.
The Chairman. Now, do you know Mrs. Markward? Does that
name ring a bell?
Mrs. Brown. I decline to answer that question on the basis
of the privilege granted in the Fifth Amendment.
The Chairman. The reason we have you here this morning, I
may say, is because we have had sworn testimony that you were a
part of a Communist cell which also included Annie Lee Moss and
Mary Stalcup. Would you want to tell us whether that is true or
not?
Mrs. Brown. I don't get the question.
The Chairman. Would your counsel repeat it to you?
[The witness conferred with her counsel.]
Mrs. Brown. I refuse to answer that question for the reason
previously given.
The Chairman. Pardon me?
Mrs. Brown. I refuse to answer that question for the reason
previously given.
[Witness excused.]
The Chairman. Will you raise your right hand? In this
matter before the committee, do you solemnly swear to tell the
truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you
God?
Mr. Johnson. Yes.
TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM S. JOHNSON (ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL,
JOSEPH FORER)
The Chairman. May I make it very clear that before you
answer any question you have an absolute right to consult with
your lawyer. You understand that?
Mr. Johnson. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Your full name is what, sir?
Mr. Johnson. William S. Johnson.
Mr. Cohn. Do you know a woman named Annie Lee Moss?
Mr. Johnson. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. Cohn. Do you know a woman named Mary Stalcup?
Mr. Johnson. I decline to answer the question on the basis
of my privilege under the Fifth Amendment not to be witness
against myself.
Mr. Cohn. Do you know a woman named Genevieve Brown?
Mr. Johnson. Genevieve Brown? Yes, I know her.
Mr. Cohn. You know her?
Mr. Johnson. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Is that right?
Mr. Johnson. Yes.
Mr. Cohn. Is she a Communist?
Mr. Johnson. I decline to answer the question on the basis
of my privilege under the Fifth Amendment.
Senator Mundt. Where are you employed, Mr. Johnson?
Mr. Johnson. Inspectors Restaurant.
Senator Mundt. What is that?
Mr. Johnson. Inspectors Restaurant.
Senator Jackson. Where is that located?
Mr. Johnson. In Silver Spring.
Senator Jackson. What do you do?
Mr. Johnson. I am a cook, and do a little general work
around.
Senator Jackson. Are you now a member of the Communist
party?
Mr. Johnson. I decline to answer that question on the basis
of my privilege under the Fifth Amendment.
Senator Jackson. Have you ever worked for the United States
government?
Mr. Johnson. No. I never worked for the government.
Senator Jackson. Did you ever work for any government
agency, local, state, or other, or city or county?
Mr. Johnson. I never worked for them.
Senator Mundt. Did you ever work for any of the cafeterias
or restaurants in government buildings?
Mr. Johnson. I worked extra a short while in one of the
government buildings.
Senator Mundt. Which one? In a restaurant?
Mr. Johnson. In a restaurant; yes.
Senator Mundt. Which building?
Mr. Johnson. Bolling Field.
Senator Mundt. How long did you work there?
Mr. Johnson. I am not certain. It was a short while;
probably ten or fifteen days, extra work.
Senator Jackson. For the officers' club or for the
government directly?
Mr. Johnson. I don't recall whether it was the officers'
club or the government directly.
Senator Jackson. Were you paid by government check?
The Chairman. Do you have any brothers or sisters who are
working for the government?
Mr. Johnson. Do I have any brothers or sisters working for
the government? No, not to my knowledge. I don't have any
brothers.
The Chairman. Does your wife have any brothers or sisters
working for the government?
Mr. Johnson. No.
The Chairman. I have no further questions.
I think you had better have him over at 318 in case we want
to call him.
Mr. Carr. That is all, Mr. Johnson.
[Witness excused.]
The Chairman. Will you raise your right hand, sir, and
stand up if you will. In this matter now in hearing before the
committee, do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole
truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. Belton. I do.
TESTIMONY OF LAMUEL BELTON (ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, JOSEPH
FORER)
The Chairman. You understand that you can consult with your
lawyer at any time you went to before you answer any questions.
Mr. Belton Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Do you know Annie Lee Moss?
Mr. Belton. No, not that I recall.
Mr. Cohn. Did you ask Annie Lee Moss to join the Cafeteria
Workers Club?
Mr. Belton. Beg pardon?
Mr. Cohn. Did you ask a woman named Annie Lee Moss to join
the Cafeteria Workers Club?
Mr. Belton. I don't recall knowing a lady by the name of
Annie Lee Moss.
Mr. Cohn. Did you have any connection with the Cafeteria
Workers Club?
Mr. Belton. What do you mean when you say Cafeteria Workers
Club?
Mr. Cohn. Did you ever hear of anything called the
Cafeteria Workers Club? Were you not the chairman of the
Cafeteria Workers Club?
Mr. Belton. I was chairman of the education committee, but
I don't remember.
Mr. Cohn. I am talking about the Cafeteria Workers Club of
the Communist party.
Mr. Belton. No, that I refuse to answer under my privilege
under the Fifth Amendment, not to be a witness against myself.
Mr. Cohn. Well, now, when I spoke the words ``Cafeteria
Workers Club,'' did that mean anything to you?
Mr. Belton. That, I refuse to answer.
Mr. Cohn. Were you answering honestly when I asked you the
question and you did not recall anything about it when I asked
you about the Cafeteria Workers Club and whether you were a
member of it and you did not seem to know what I was talking
about? Was that an honest answer?
Mr. Belton. I refuse to answer that for the same reason I
just gave.
Mr. Cohn. You will not tell us whether that was an honest
answer? I asked you a little while ago and the first question
was about the Cafeteria Workers Club and whether you asked a
lady to join that and I asked you if you were a member of it
and your answer was to the effect you did not know anything
about the Cafeteria Workers Club. Now, was that an honest
answer?
Mr. Belton. That I refuse to answer.
[The witness consulted with his counsel.]
The Chairman. Will you have the witness over in room 318?
Senator Jackson. For the record, I do not think you asked
his name.
Mr. Forer. Do you want to answer the last question?
Mr. Belton. I am confused. I thought you were speaking of
one of the things in the union.
Mr. Forer. There is a Cafeteria Workers Union.
Mr. Cohn. Was the Cafeteria Workers Union under Communist
domination?
Mr. Belton. That I can't say, and I don't know who was in
the union. We have got about three thousand members in that.
Mr. Cohn. Was that union under Communist domination?
Mr. Belton. That I refuse, and that I can't say, and I
don't know who is running that.
Mr. Cohn. At the time you were connected with that union,
were you chairman of the Cafeteria Workers Club of the
Communist party?
Mr. Belton. That I refuse to answer.
Mr. Kennedy. Have you ever heard of the Cafeteria Workers
Club? Have you ever heard of it?
[The witness consulted with his counsel.]
Mr. Belton. That, as I say before, I refuse to answer for
the reason I gave before.
Senator Jackson. Did you give his name?
Mr. Cohn. What is your name?
Mr. Belton. Lamuel Bolton.
Senator Jackson. What is your present occupation?
Mr. Belton. Right now, I don't know how long it will be,
when you all get through. I won't have a job, I guess, but
right now I am baking at the S&W Cafeteria, as of this morning.
Senator Jackson. You are a baker?
Mr. Belton. Yes.
Senator Jackson. Do any of your family work for the
government?
Mr. Belton. No.
Senator Jackson. How long have you been a baker at the S&W
Cafeteria?
Mr. Belton. I have been working at the S&W for almost
nineteen years, up to date.
The Chairman. We will recess.
[Whereupon, the committee recessed at 10:45 a.m.]
ARMY SIGNAL CORPS--SUBVERSION AND ESPIONAGE
----------
MONDAY, MARCH 1, 1954
U.S. Senate,
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
of the Committee on Government Operations,
Washington, DC.
[On March 1, 1954, Private David LaPorte Linfield and Mr.
Sidney Rubinstein testified in executive session during
hearings held by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations on Army Signal Corps--Subversion and Espionage.
This testimony was made public on March 2, 1954, by members of
the subcommittee and was published as part 9 of the
subcommittee's hearings on Army Signal Corps--Subversion and
Espionage (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1954).
Private Linfield had also testified in executive session on
December 16, 1953.]
ARMY SIGNAL CORPS--SUBVERSION AND ESPIONAGE
[Editor's note.--At a public session on the morning of
March 10, 1954, Peter A. Gragis (1913-2001) identified Harriman
H. Dash (1910-1993) as a member of a Communist cell at the
Federal Telecommunications Laboratory in New Jersey, and also
at Local 231 of the Federation of Architects, Engineers,
Chemists, and Technicians. Dash testified in response but also
asked for an executive session. Senator McCarthy responded that
``you may not like the way the committee proceeds. That is up
to us to decide. It is very important for the public to know
the extent of Communist infiltration over the past number of
years. The public cannot get that information if we take a
written statement from you in a darkroom down here.'' ``Why
not?'' Dash asked. After some additional exchange, the chairman
agreed to hear Dash's testimony in executive session that
afternoon.]
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 10, 1954
U.S. Senate,
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
of the Committee on Government Operations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 3:30 p.m., pursuant to notice, in
room 357 of the Senate Office building, Senator Joseph R.
McCarthy (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican, Wisconsin;
Senator Stuart Symington, Democrat, Missouri.
Present also: Roy M. Cohn, chief counsel; Robert Francis
Kennedy, chief counsel for the minority; Francis P. Carr, staff
director; Daniel G. Buckley, assistant counsel; Ruth Young
Watt, chief clerk.
The Chairman. We will proceed.
Mr. Cohn. Let us start this way: Is there anything you want
to say first?
TESTIMONY OF HARRIMAN H. DASH (PREVIOUSLY SWORN)
Mr. Dash. Yes, definitely.
Mr. Cohn. I figured there was.
Mr. Dash. I wish to apologize to this committee for some of
the comments. I didn't at the time realize that it would appear
as filibustering. I have been told and I heard comment that
that is what it was. It was never my intention, and I shall try
not to inject any opinions and stick to the facts in the
situation.
My intention in coming before this committee is to tell the
truth and nothing but the truth.
The Chairman. Let me say, I realize that a witness gets
nervous when he comes before a committee for the first time,
and I don't blame you at all for it.
Mr. Dash. If the committee wishes to know what my thoughts
were at the time, I was quite distraught. As I say, I have
always feared economic repression for the stigma of having been
a Communist.
Last night I heard that Gragis and Saunders had been
dismissed from their jobs. I have since learned this morning
from the FTL representative that Saunders was not dismissed,
but was suspended. It made me feel much happier, I assure you.
I realize now that the protection of this committee will be
offered to me.
Mr. Carr. Mr. Dash, I don't believe we got very far this
morning in your general background.
Mr. Dash. Am I supposed to be under oath or not?
Mr. Carr. You were sworn this morning.
You joined the Communist party in what year?
Mr. Dash. I joined, to the best of my recollection, around
1933 or 1934.
Mr. Carr. And you were active until when?
Mr. Dash. I was active until 1939 at which time I dropped
out.
Mr. Carr. And your dropping out in 1939 consisted of
dropping out of active participation in club activities?
Mr. Dash. Not directly. At that time they were thinking of
setting up small groups so that they would be able to
participate in activities without being detected. That small
group never materialized, and I dropped away.
Mr. Carr. And so you just dropped out of active
participation?
Mr. Dash. Yes, sir.
Mr. Carr. But you maintained your contacts with Communist
party members?
Mr. Dash. I didn't maintain any contacts, sir, and I can't
say that my ideology wasn't Communist.
Mr. Carr. Then you became active again in 1947?
Mr. Dash. I became active again in 1947; and the reason at
that time during the testimony I wasn't quite clear, it wasn't
at FTL that I joined because for a brief period in 1947, at a
housing development in Rowville, where I got an apartment, I
joined a cell and remained in that cell for a short period of
time.
There again I did it because I felt under an obligation to
the administrator of that housing project.
Mr. Carr. Now, to keep this as brief as possible,
concerning this past activity, you joined the Communist party
in 1933 when you were employed at the Bellevue Hospital in New
York City?
Mr. Dash. That is right, sir.
Mr. Carr. There was an organized cell there at that time?
Mr. Dash. At that time there was; it was called a branch,
and as I recollect there were about five or six people in it.
Mr. Carr. Now, the persons in this cell at Bellevue
Hospital, were any of those government employees at the time,
or were they all city employees?
Mr. Dash. To my recollection, I don't know what the
employees were. They must have been employees of the hospital,
undoubtedly.
Mr. Carr. Which is a city hospital?
Mr. Dash. Which is a city hospital. And so I take it they
must have been employees of the city. I myself was not an
employee of the city.
Mr. Carr. Have you given Mr. Buckley the names of as many
of these people as you can remember?
Mr. Dash. Whatever I recollect of that time, I gave Mr.
Buckley.
Mr. Carr. It is true then that the only name you could
recall was a woman intern named Sturges?
Mr. Dash. That is correct.
Mr. Carr. At that time there were possibly two nurses, a
couple of doctors, and then others were hospital maintenance
people?
Mr. Dash. To the best of my recollection, that was the
make-up of it.
Mr. Carr. Then, briefly, again, between 1934 and 1937, you
worked on a WPA project?
Mr. Dash. That is right.
Mr. Carr. That is when you first joined the Federation of
Architects, Engineers, Chemists, and Technicians?
Mr. Dash. During the years 1934 and 1939, I was in the
Federation of Architects organization, and they had what was
known as a Communist party faction. That is what it was called
at that time.
Mr. Carr. Now, were you active in the Communist party
faction of the FAECT?
Mr. Dash. Yes, I was.
Mr. Carr. Was that faction in which you were active
entirely dominated by the Communist party?
Mr. Dash. Yes, it was dominated by the Communist party.
Mr. Carr. How about the----
Mr. Dash. It was known as a Communist party faction.
Mr. Carr. How about the whole organization, the whole
union?
Mr. Dash. The union, as such, was not a Communist party
organization, but the leadership, a good part of the leadership
was Communist party leadership.
Mr. Carr. Now while you were working for the government----
Mr. Dash. I would like to distinguish facts because when I
say ``Communist party'' I don't know actually which people hold
cards, because they also hold open meetings. Those people that
you know hold cards are those people who work with you at the
various places, that I have worked at.
Mr. Carr. While you were working for the WPA, during this
period of time, you knew two other chemists who were Communist
party members, is that right?
Mr. Dash. That is right, sir.
Mr. Carr. And their names were?
Mr. Dash. Michael Kausner and Sigmund Cuttner, to the best
of my recollection.
Mr. Carr. Now this WPA project was located at the Central
Testing Laboratories----
Mr. Dash. That is right.
Mr. Carr [continuing]. On Canal Street, 480 Canal Street,
New York City?
Mr. Dash. That is right.
Mr. Carr. Now these are the only Communists you knew in the
WPA at the time you were active?
Mr. Dash. That worked with me and I knew that they were.
Mr. Carr. Now, were they members of your particular cell,
or did you know them from some other more broader contact?
Mr. Dash. No, they were members of this faction that I
indicated. But I knew them to have cards because I saw them
daily and I saw their cards; and they knew me to be a
Communist.
Mr. Carr. Do you know whether or not they are still
employed by the government in any way?
Mr. Dash. No, sir, I do not.
Mr. Carr. You haven't had any contact with them in recent
years?
Mr. Dash. No, sir.
Mr. Carr. This WPA cell was it fifteen or fourteen members,
or how large was the cell?
Mr. Dash. The faction varied from time to time. At one time
it was something like twenty-five of them and at another time
something like 150.
Senator Symington. What year was this?
Mr. Dash. Over the years, as I said, from 1934 to 1939. It
was 1935. It is so far back, sir, that my recollection of the
exact date is almost an impossibility. But between the years
1935 to 1939 was when I participated in that faction.
Mr. Carr. Now, following that you left government
employment?
Mr. Dash. Well, no, after I left Central Testing
Laboratories, I did work for a short time at Fordham University
which was also a WPA project.
Mr. Carr. Now, you remained there until 1939?
Mr. Dash. Roughly, that is correct.
Mr. Carr. While you were working with WPA at Fordham
University, were there any other persons employed or receiving
money from the government who were known to you to be
Communists?
Mr. Dash. There was one person there who was known to me to
be a Communist and his name was Maurice Shiller.
Mr. Carr. He is the only Communist you knew during that
period that was employed in the WPA project?
Mr. Dash. A member having a card, that is correct.
Mr. Carr. Now, after that, after that period, in September
of 1939, you left the government employ?
Mr. Dash. That is right.
Mr. Carr. You were no longer with the WPA and that is when
you accepted employment with the testing laboratories at the
Consumers Union?
Mr. Dash. That is correct.
Mr. Carr. Now, can you tell me what employment Maurice
Shiller has today?
Mr. Dash. Yes. Well I can tell you up until the time of
1950, I believe, because after I left FTL I went to visit him,
and he had a paint manufacturing place.
Mr. Carr. He is not employed by the government?
Mr. Dash. At the time I saw him at that time, no. I have
not had any contact with him since 1950.
Mr. Carr. In 1950.
Mr. Dash. I did see him for a short period of time to try
to establish a business relationship with him, and I tried to
go to work for him.
Senator Symington. I was not paying proper attention, but
who was it that you tried to establish a business relationship
with?
Mr. Dash. This is Mr. Shiller, I went to see him, and for a
short period of time I worked in his lab there. And at that
time I did not know whether he was or was not a Communist; I
strongly suspected he was not and that he had also dropped his
connections. I had not discussed it with him at the time.
Mr. Carr. But he was not employed or connected with the
government in any way at that time?
Mr. Dash. No, sir, not that I know of.
Mr. Carr. And this firm that he was operating, you have
given Mr. Buckley what details you can remember concerning
that?
Mr. Dash. I don't recall whether I gave it to Mr. Buckley.
But as we discuss it now those are the details, sir.
Mr. Carr. The Consumers Union for which you worked,
beginning in September of 1939 has been cited as a Communist
front since that time, in 1944. Were there other Communists
employed with you at the Consumers Union?
Mr. Dash. There was no cell that I knew of, sir; but I had
known two members to have attended that Communist party faction
in the union, and now whether they held cards or not I do not
know. If you care to have their names. That is, Carl Mataneek,
and the other one was Sidney Wang.
Mr. Carr. You have given their latest addresses and
background concerning them to Mr. Buckley, to the best of your
recollection?
Mr. Dash. I have had no contact with them since that time,
whatsoever, except Mataneek had visited my house at one time in
Levittown and said he was interested in getting a home there.
And I was polite to him and I showed him the house; and he left
there for that time.
Senator Symington. Have you resigned from the Communist
party yet?
Mr. Dash. Since 1950, sir, I have had no contact with the
Communist party; and there have been occasional contacts with
people that I had known in the past, and that is a natural
consequence.
Senator Symington. When did you turn your card in?
Mr. Dash. We did not have a card, at the FTL local, or
cell.
Senator Symington. How did you know you were a member then?
Mr. Dash. Just by mutual agreement between the people.
Senator Symington. Did you pay dues regularly?
Mr. Dash. I paid dues, and I had attended rather
sporadically myself.
Senator Symington. How much did you pay?
Mr. Dash. Sir, I don't recollect the exact amount, but I
think in my case it was something like $2 a week.
Senator Symington. A week?
Mr. Dash. Yes, and it is very vague as to whether that was
on appropriate basis or not, or whether everybody paid the same
amount.
Senator Symington. To whom did you pay your dues?
Mr. Dash. Well, there was a treasurer in the group for
awhile, and I remember Mr. Gragis being treasurer.
Mr. Carr. That is the gentleman that testified this
morning.
Senator Symington. When did you go to the FBI?
Mr. Dash. I didn't go to them, they came to me.
Senator Symington. When did you decide you were going to
confess?
Mr. Dash. When the FBI came to me, and talked to me; I do
not know for what reason they came to me, but when they came to
me I was very reluctant to tell them anything, again because of
the fear of being exposed as having been one. And then I
realized that I would only be compiling perjury on top of
perjury. And I realized the gravity of the situation, and as I
said this morning that I could not possibly----
Senator Symington. Did you decide to say you were perjuring
yourself before Mr. Gragis had gone to the FBI or afterwards?
Mr. Dash. I didn't know that anybody had gone to the FBI,
sir.
Senator Symington. You didn't know that Mr. Gragis had
confessed his membership in the party at any time?
Mr. Dash. No, at any time.
Senator Symington. Before you decided to confess or say you
perjured yourself?
Mr. Dash. That is right, and as a matter of fact Mr.
Saunders tells me now that there had been open testimony, and I
didn't even know about it. And he told me that yesterday.
Mr. Carr. But you were visited by the FBI during February
after you had been subpoenaed?
Mr. Dash. If you want me to give you the details of how it
occurred----
Senator Symington. Just answer the question.
Mr. Dash. Yes, they visited me after I was subpoenaed.
Mr. Carr. And before that you had no contact with them?
Mr. Dash. That is correct.
Mr. Carr. The decision to cooperate with the FBI came at
the time they visited you?
Mr. Dash. That is right, they came right at the time, and
as a matter of fact, as I said, I was very reluctant; and I let
them go out of the house without telling them, and without
confessing to them; and I went out after them and called them
back.
Mr. Carr. Now, following your employment by the Consumers
Union, you were drafted into military service?
Mr. Dash. That is right, I was drafted; and I served in the
army from 1942 to 1946.
Mr. Carr. And you were finally discharged as a lieutenant?
Mr. Dash. I was discharged as a captain in 1946, that is
correct.
Mr. Carr. All of the time you were in the army, did you
maintain your membership in the Communist party?
Mr. Dash. No, sir, I had no connection with the Communist
party whatsoever during that time at all.
Senator Symington. What did you say when you signed that
thing about your question did you ever belong to an
organization, subversive organization?
Mr. Dash. I don't recollect, sir; but I must have denied
belonging to any subversive organization.
Senator Symington. You perjured yourself as far back as
1942.
Mr. Dash. Even before then, because I tried to get jobs;
wherever I went, I did not want to be known as a Communist for
economic purposes.
Mr. Carr. Wasn't it also for the purpose of the Communist
party that you didn't want to be known as a Communist; wasn't
that a policy of the Communist party that your identity as a
Communist not become known?
Mr. Dash. No, because--at times yes, and at times no. In
the Bellevue cell, that is correct. In the faction of the
Communist party, in the union, that was not so. There people
were known as Communists, generally; we invited people who were
not known to be Communists, and they all came to that meeting.
Unless you worked with somebody and you knew that he carried a
card, factually speaking, those are the people who were
Communists.
Mr. Carr. Now, concerning your leaving the Communist party,
Mr. Dash, isn't it known to you that following and in 1948
there were no party membership cards and no obvious
registration and for you to leave the party merely meant that
you disassociated yourself with Communists in your group. Isn't
it true that you just dropped out of activity rather than
making any formal statement?
Mr. Dash. That is right, and I never held any card in the
FTL, and there was no card from the time I joined and the time
I left; and I didn't have to give up any card.
Senator Symington. How can you prove to us that you were a
Communist?
Mr. Dash. I couldn't prove to you, except if somebody else
testified, knew that I was, and was with me and present at the
time.
I would have no way of proving it, sir, and if I wanted to
prove to another Communist that I was a Communist, I would not
be able to do it unless he knew somebody else who knew me as a
Communist.
Mr. Carr. Your only purpose now in telling this is to get
the record straight as far as you are concerned?
Mr. Dash. As far as I am concerned, I am here to tell the
truth. I have no other intention whatsoever.
Mr. Carr. Now, to skip over some of this time and get to
when you first went to the Federal Telecommunications
Laboratory, when was that?
Mr. Dash. I am sorry, I didn't get that.
Mr. Carr. When did you first get employment with the
Federal Telecommunications?
Mr. Dash. I got employment in 1947, sometime in 1947.
Mr. Carr. You have explained how you happened to go back
into the party at that time, this morning, and was it through
Harry Hyman that you realized yourself with the party in active
membership?
Mr. Dash. Yes, the actual situation was that I went to the
union, and people who had known me formerly as a Communist
introduced me to him. They didn't tell me that he was a
Communist, but just introduced me to him. He must have known
that I was because they must have known, and they must have
told him that I had been. And he said that there may be a job
at FTL several weeks later, and there was.
As I say, I think, if the right man, who wasn't a
Communist, came along at the time, he probably would have
gotten the job, too.
Mr. Carr. But you did begin to associate yourself with the
cell in which Harry Hyman was active among employees of FTL.
Mr. Dash. He asked me to attend; I don't think I attended
immediately, it must have been several weeks, or a few months,
after I started to work at FTL.
Senator Symington. When you say, therefore, in a hearing
this morning that you were in the party and out of the party
and back in the party, how could you define going back into the
party? Did you start paying dues again?
Mr. Dash. I started paying dues again.
Senator Symington. That would be the criteria, would it?
Mr. Dash. The criteria, that is right, sir. The criteria of
being a party member is you have to in one way or another
associate with a group of party members and pay dues, otherwise
you are a party unto yourself, which I don't know what meaning
that has.
Mr. Carr. When you went back to FTL and back to the party
did you know anybody in the personnel department of FTL who was
a Communist?
Mr. Dash. No sir, absolutely not.
Mr. Carr. Did you know the personnel director, Mr. Warner?
Mr. Dash. He wasn't the personnel director, he was director
of the technical section that I worked for; I hadn't known him
before I went to FTL at all.
Mr. Carr. Did you know him to be a Communist?
Mr. Dash. No sir, it would be a surprise to me. I had heard
certain rumors, and these are purely rumors and they are not
facts, that I wouldn't know anything about. I heard talk that
he had served in the Spanish Civil War on the side of the
Loyalists.
Senator Symington. Who did you pay your dues to when you
went back into it?
Mr. Dash. I remember paying dues to Gragis, and I don't
remember paying dues to anybody else.
Senator Symington. You paid dues to him before, and then
you paid dues to him after you were in the army?
Mr. Dash. I am sorry, sir, I didn't get your question.
Senator Symington. You paid dues to him before, and then
you paid dues?
Mr. Dash. Before, when?
Senator Symington. Before 1942?
Mr. Dash. No. I hadn't known Gragis until I entered the
cell at FTL.
Senator Symington. Who did you pay your dues to before?
Mr. Dash. Before when?
Senator Symington. Before you left the party?
Mr. Dash. That was back in 1939, and in this Communist
party faction there was a treasurer there that I must have paid
dues to; I can't remember.
Senator Symington. So you started paying this Gragis when
you went back, when you went to FTL, is that right?
Mr. Dash. When I went there, Gragis was the treasurer and
he was the one I paid to. I hadn't known any of those people
from previous years.
Senator Symington. Just as a matter of interest, what was
the job that Hyman held in the company?
Mr. Dash. The job that Hyman held in the company, I don't
know what job he held in the company because his job was union
president, and I think the company gave him, by right of the
contract, I believe, the time to function, on company time, as
union president. Now, I couldn't be quite certain that that was
the situation, but I do know he spent a lot of time on union
activity.
Senator Symington. And you also know he was the head of the
Communist party in the plant?
Mr. Dash. He was the head of the cell, and he was also the
head of the union. As a matter of fact, if I remember
correctly, he was president of the local.
Senator Symington. How do you know he was the head of the
Communist cell?
Mr. Dash. He was known as the chairman of the cell.
Senator Symington. And you would meet and he would take the
chair?
Mr. Dash. That is right.
Senator Symington. And he ran the show?
Mr. Dash. Just like any other organization, sir, it would
be purely a cell office.
Senator Symington. He didn't keep anything in writing?
Mr. Dash. There were no records at all. I believe that
Gragis may have given us receipts, if I recollect; if anything
they had our initials only on it, and no other identification.
Senator Symington. Say that again, I didn't get that!
Mr. Dash. He may have given us receipts, and he may have
kept records; I don't recollect now whether I received them or
not. But if I did they would only contain an initial, and they
wouldn't contain any identification with respect to its being
dues for the Communist party.
Mr. Kennedy. What sort of things did you discuss at these
meetings?
Mr. Dash. At the meetings primarily, the discussion was how
to participate in the union activities, and how to keep control
of the union, and what the union would do with relation to
grievances, and so on. It seemed a little stupid to me to take
up so much time for them to discuss it when they could do that
right actually in the union, but apparently it was necessary
because there were other people in the union who were against
Commies, and at all times trying to take over the leadership.
Mr. Carr. Would it be fair to say it was the prime object
of your cell at FTL to maintain the Communist control of the
union and keep Hyman in charge of the union?
Mr. Dash. Not necessarily keep Hyman, but to keep the union
under the control of the Communists, I would say that was the
prime thing.
Senator Symington. Did you ever discuss the importance of
the Communists because of being in that type and character of
work?
Mr. Dash. I am sorry, I don't get the question.
Senator Symington. The FTL was manufacturing a good deal of
signal equipment and so forth for the IT&T. Was it the idea of
the cell that it was important to be in communications and
signal work as an especially good thing to have a cell in, or
were you just Communists because it was the job there?
Mr. Dash. The job was there, that was all.
Senator Symington. How about Hyman? Did he ever give you
any inkling he was an espionage agent of any kind?
Mr. Dash. No, sir, if there was any such thing, it was not
to my knowledge.
Senator Symington. Do you know any way of any kind directly
or indirectly whether there was any espionage in the FTL of any
kind whatever?
Mr. Dash. No, sir. I do not know of any.
Mr. Kennedy. Mr. Dash, did you discuss national affairs, in
these cell meetings?
Mr. Dash. Yes, we discussed the political issues of the
day, and we received literature in the terms of political
affairs, and if you go back on the record as to what political
affairs contained at that time, those are the things that we
discussed. We also received the Daily Worker and I remember
having copies of the Daily Worker to give to a few people in
the company. That is the extent of the activities.
Mr. Kennedy. You discussed Russia, I suppose, did you not,
and her relationship to the United States?
Mr. Dash. Generally, what we discussed was the question of
the war, inevitability of the war and whether it was inevitable
or not inevitable, and it was felt that war was not necessarily
to come and the efforts of the group were directed to
maintenance of peace as they saw it.
Mr. Kennedy. Did you discuss what your position should be
in case a conflict came between the USSR and the United States?
Mr. Dash. Well, yes, at times we did, and it was felt very
definitely that people who would be in the party would
definitely be subversive elements and they would know
definitely that they were.
Mr. Kennedy. And you were supposed to work for the
interests of Russia rather than the United States?
Mr. Dash. That wasn't discussed at all.
Mr. Kennedy. But it was taken for granted that you were to
work for the interests of Russia.
Mr. Dash. I imagine everybody who was there, on their own
had their own opinions about that.
Mr. Kennedy. Why was it that you were going to wait until
the time of conflict or war came before you would help Russia?
Mr. Dash. I never considered that I would help Russia if
war came.
Senator Symington. How did you discuss being a subversive
if you did not discuss that you would help the people running
the show in Russia. What would be the concept of subversive if
it was not to help the Soviets?
Mr. Dash. The concept of subversive naturally or subversion
naturally would be that if the time ever came, subversive
activities would be discussed. But it never was at that time.
Senator Symington. You say you never discussed any
subversive activities?
Mr. Dash. We never discussed any.
Senator Symington. I thought you said----
Mr. Kennedy. I am sure if we look back on the record, I am
sure you said that you all took it for granted that you would
be subversive agents.
Mr. Dash. I said I realized that it would be subversive,
and how the others felt, I do not know. I said each one had his
own individual feeling.
Mr. Kennedy. Now, you did not.
Mr. Dash. Well, read it, sir. That is what I meant, if I--
--
Senator Symington. What do you mean by ``subversive,'' and
if you felt you would be subversive, what did you mean by that?
Mr. Dash. Well, by subversive, if anybody wanted to help
the Soviet Union, while the United States was at war with the
Soviet Union, that would actually be treason and to my mind it
just couldn't be. You would have to be a spy agent.
Senator Symington. You did not feel you were subversive?
Mr. Dash. At the time I didn't feel subversive because I
wasn't engaging in any kind of espionage, and I never intended
to.
Senator Symington. Did you ever feel you would be a
subversive?
Mr. Dash. That is right.
Senator Symington. You were sort of a Communist for fun, is
that right?
Mr. Dash. No, I wasn't a Communist for fun. I was a
Communist for these other issues that we had talked about.
Senator Symington. What other issues?
Mr. Dash. The issues as I said, the political issues of the
day, the questions of fighting for peace, as the Communists saw
it and the question of union activities.
Senator Symington. You thought that you could improve your
position in this country, as a Communist and at the same time
keep away from international communism, is that right?
Mr. Dash. That is right.
Senator Symington. Did you really feel that way?
Mr. Dash. Yes, sir, I felt at the time, I felt that way,
sir, and I would never engage in any espionage, and I never did
and I never would and I never intended to. There is no question
about that, sir, there was no espionage activities going on.
Mr. Cohn. You realize handling classified material----
Mr. Dash. Yes, definitely.
Mr. Cohn [continuing]. And other Communists were around
there handling it that whereas you might have high principles
and not want to engage in espionage, the others could?
Mr. Dash. That is correct, sir, and if that ever happened I
don't know. It was never my intention to engage in any kind of
espionage, and I never did, and I wrote confidential reports
and I might say that the security regulations were pretty lax,
and they were definitely quite lax at the time.
Senator Symington. What was your job in the company?
Mr. Dash. I was chief analytical chemist and I had a
chemical laboratory under my jurisdiction, and I wrote a number
of confidential reports for the company.
Senator Symington. What kind of a chemist were you?
Mr. Dash. As I say, I was chief analytical chemist.
Senator Symington. Where did you get your training?
Mr. Dash. I got my training, my undergraduate training was
at the College of the City of New York, and I had attended
Columbia for some defense training courses.
Senator Symington. What degree did you get in chemistry?
Mr. Dash. I got the B.S. in chemistry.
Senator Symington. From where?
Mr. Dash. From the College of the City of New York.
Senator Symington. From the College of the City of New
York?
Mr. Dash. Yes, sir, and then I also would have a
certificate from Chicago University.
Senator Symington. And you would write confidential
reports?
Mr. Dash. Did I write confidential reports?
Senator Symington. Yes.
Mr. Dash. Yes.
Senator Symington. About what?
Mr. Dash. About the work we were doing in the laboratory,
and it involved dielectric materials or improvement of cable
materials and improvement generally of plastics.
Senator Symington. How could they be confidential, if you
write a dielectric material report about the dielectric
strength of materials and how could that be confidential?
Mr. Dash. Well, maybe, I am not using the term
``confidential'' correctly.
Senator Symington. The word ``confidential'' means
classified.
Mr. Dash. Yes.
Senator Symington. I am sort of interested in that.
Mr. Dash. I mean after the report was written and sent up
to the release section, it was stamped confidential.
Senator Symington. Was it confidential because you did not
want your competitors to get a hold of it, or was it
confidential because you thought it had military secrets in it?
Mr. Dash. Was it company confidential, you mean?
Senator Symington. Yes.
Mr. Dash. That is the thing that I cannot distinguish. To
the best of my recollection, it did not have a stamp on it
saying, ``Property of the United States Government.''
Senator Symington. Suppose you are testing one material and
it has a dielectric strength of something and then you test
another one and it has a dielectric strength of more. Is that
what you were doing?
Mr. Dash. And you write up a report.
Senator Symington. Which one has the most dielectric
strength, is that right?
Mr. Dash. No, these reports were under government
contracts.
Senator Symington. What is that?
Mr. Dash. Under government contracts.
Senator Symington. Suppose under government contract this
has more than that, and what is confidential about that?
Mr. Dash. Well, to my mind the information wasn't too
valuable to be under a classified nature, but the report as
finally issued was stamped ``confidential.''
Senator Symington. Have you any of those reports around?
Mr. Dash. Do I have any of those reports?
Senator Symington. Yes.
Mr. Dash. No, sir, I do not have any of those reports.
Mr. Kennedy. You are under oath now, Mr. Dash, you realize
that.
Mr. Dash. When you say do I have any reports, I have given
whatever I had to the FBI.
Senator Symington. Did you have any that showed what was
confidential in classifying materials for dielectric strength
in the laboratory?
Mr. Dash. I did confidential reports and if you wish I will
describe what those are.
Senator Symington. We will get those, but you gave those to
the bureau?
Mr. Dash. I gave those to the bureau, yes. They were only
my own work and they dealt with my own work and that was what I
had, and I kept them merely as evidence of my own work.
Mr. Kennedy. Mr. Dash, as I say, you realize that you are
under oath now.
Mr. Dash. Yes, sir, I realize that.
Mr. Kennedy. At these cell meetings, did you discuss Russia
at all in relationship to the United States?
Mr. Dash. We must have, but what we said about it I don't
remember.
Mr. Kennedy. You do not remember at all what you discussed
about Russia?
Mr. Dash. That is right. I remember on one or two occasions
saying that if the United States would go to war with Russia
and if we maintained our Communist party membership we would
definitely be subversive.
Mr. Kennedy. Then, you were not telling Senator Symington
the truth when you said that was just what you thought but it
was never discussed at these meetings, and now you said that
under oath.
Mr. Dash. That is what I thought and that is what I said at
the meeting.
Mr. Kennedy. That was said at these meetings, is that
correct?
Mr. Dash. That is what I said, and whether the others
agreed with me or not, I do not know what their sentiments were
and they must have expressed them.
Mr. Kennedy. You got up at a meeting and said that in case
of war you and your fellow members of the Communist party would
become subversive, is that correct?
Mr. Dash. Definitely, and I never intended to be a
subversive, and I wouldn't.
Mr. Kennedy. You said at these meetings that you would
become a subversive?
Mr. Dash. I didn't say that, now, you see, I didn't say
that I would become one, I said that if I would consider
maintaining membership under those conditions, I would consider
myself a subversive, and now I don't intend to do that, and I
never did.
Mr. Kennedy. But you said--or why did you feel that the
Communist party would be subversive?
Mr. Dash. Well, undoubtedly if they are going to help an
enemy, they will be subversive, and if Russia is going to be
the enemy, they are going to be subversive.
Mr. Kennedy. If you never discussed Russia at these
meetings, Mr. Dash, why did you feel that the Communist party
was going to help Russia?
Mr. Dash. I didn't say that the Communist party was going
to help Russia. It was general discussion around that question
and it was, what can we best do to maintain peace, and that was
the whole thing.
Mr. Kennedy. Why did you feel that the Communist party
would become subversive in case of time of war?
Mr. Dash. Because I can't see your being a Communist and
trying to help an international Communist organization, and not
be subversive.
Senator Symington. Do you not see how you are denying
yourself, and you just said that your interest in communism was
national, and now you say that you cannot see how you would be
a Communist without helping an international organization.
Mr. Dash. I wasn't interested in doing that.
Senator Symington. All we want to know or do is to help you
to get the record straight but I must say I am trying hard to
follow you and it is pretty hard.
Mr. Dash. If we should ever reach that point, that is when
I would have considered myself, but we never reached that point
and I never would have maintained any membership under those
conditions.
Senator Symington. As Mr. Kennedy pointed out, that is what
you told the people would be the situation if you did reach
that point.
Mr. Dash. That is right, and I don't know whether any of
them would want to keep any membership in any such kind of an
organization, and I know I wouldn't, and I didn't.
Mr. Kennedy. How could you reach the conclusion that you
would become subversive if you never discussed Russia? And why
did you feel that the Communist party in the United States was
an arm of Russia?
Mr. Dash. I don't know that it is an arm of Russia, sir.
Mr. Kennedy. Now, Mr. Dash, be frank with us, and it is a
waste of time if you are not going to tell us the truth.
Mr. Dash. I am giving you actually as I see it and as----
Mr. Kennedy. You are not. Obviously, you are not, Mr. Dash.
Mr. Dash. Well, if you make your question clear, I will be
glad to answer it.
Senator Symington. I would say the last thing in the world
we want to do is badger you about it, but as long as you have
confessed that you have committed perjury, that is that. For
what it is worth, that is it. Now, in these various degrees of
your interest, you seem to be denying yourself. What we want to
know is whether or not these people in this cell and in this
particular plant, were interested in becoming a subversive
organization or were subversive----
Mr. Dash. Definitely not, sir.
Senator Symington [continuing]. Which was interested in
helping Russia. As I understood it, you said that you
definitely were not and that you were just interested in
bettering conditions in America, but the questions that you
answered of Mr. Kennedy you seem to completely belie that
position that I had formed with respect to your opinion.
Mr. Dash. Maybe, that is a misinterpretation, sir.
Mr. Kennedy. I just have a problem and perhaps you can help
it.
Mr. Carr. Perhaps I can clear it up. Mr. Dash, you made a
statement a little earlier, before we got into this, which
seems to lead up into this: First, that you seemed to discuss
the problem of keeping the Communist control of the union, and
that was the first thing that you said. You then said that you
do not recall their discussing anything other than this union,
and then you said, ``Well, we had Political Affairs and we had
Daily Workers come in.'' Now, is it not a fact that among or
during the period between 1947 and 1948, or during this period
that you were involved in this club, that you received the
Political Affairs and you discussed the articles in the
Political Affairs and you received the Daily Worker and you
discussed the articles in the Daily Worker and now you said
that you had never given too much thought to the practice of
the Communist party in finding its place in industry?
Now, in these Political Affairs and in these issues of the
Daily Worker, I am sure, and I think perhaps on your
reflection, you can recall something about it, there were
articles which talked about the Communist party's need for
colonization in industry. Now, if there were such articles, you
must have discussed them. If there were in Political Affairs
articles concerning the so-called peace movement which was just
beginning in late 1948, you would have discussed them. So that,
at these meetings, you did discuss a variety of subjects
concerning Communist party aims and immediate objectives. Is
that not right? Did you not have somebody talk to you about
these things, and somebody make a point of that?
Mr. Dash. There were discussions but never relating to what
we would do if war came.
Senator Symington. Now, you mean you could sit down and
discuss the Daily Worker, day after day, and week after week?
Mr. Dash. We didn't discuss it day after day.
Senator Symington. But you discussed it week after week?
Mr. Dash. Yes, that is right, on occasions.
Senator Symington. And you could discuss the Daily Worker
and not talk about international problems and the relationship
of America to the Soviet conspiracy and the Soviet conspiracy
to America? What point of the Daily Worker did you look at if
you discussed it at all and didn't discuss those problems?
Mr. Dash. We didn't read the Daily Worker at the place. It
was just distributed.
Senator Symington. But you just said you discussed the
Daily Worker in the meetings.
Mr. Dash. We must have discussed issues that were in the
Daily Worker, sir, that is correct.
Senator Symington. If you discussed the issues in the Daily
Worker, did you discuss only the issues in the Daily Worker
that did not have to do with Soviet communism, and discuss the
ones involved?
Mr. Dash. I don't know at this point. Right now, I don't
recollect that there were such articles, sir.
Senator Symington. That is not fair, do you think? I have
read the Daily Worker.
Mr. Kennedy. Why did you get up in the middle of a meeting
and make a speech that if war came the Communist party and
members of the Communist party would be subversive, and did you
just suddenly get up, and did that bright idea suddenly come to
you and you got up and made a speech on it? That is the first
time it had ever been discussed at any time?
Mr. Dash. I remember saying that only in relation to the
sense that we could not possibly, or we should not and could
not possibly, engage in such kind of activities.
Mr. Kennedy. Now, Mr. Dash, that is not what you said. You
originally said you got up and made a speech that the members
of the Communist party would become subversives.
Mr. Dash. Then, it is purely a misinterpretation.
Mr. Kennedy. Nobody said anything prior to that, and you
got up and made that statement and sat down and no one made any
comment on it?
Mr. Dash. My feeling is----
Mr. Kennedy. Answer my question, Mr. Dash.
Mr. Dash. My feeling was at that time----
Mr. Kennedy. I just wanted you to answer the question, and
you said Russia was not mentioned and you got up and made the
speech and no mention had been made prior to that and nobody
mentioned Russia after that, and so that is it. Is that right?
You just got up and made the speech, is that right?
Mr. Dash. We must have been talking about the question----
Mr. Kennedy. That is what we are trying to find out.
Mr. Dash [continuing]. Of peace and war, and, as I say, all
of the efforts were directed towards the peace issues. I
remember distinctly having gotten up and said that we cannot
possibly engage in any kind of subversion.
Mr. Kennedy. Why was it even discussed? Nobody said
anything about that, then, Mr. Dash.
Mr. Dash. I don't recollect what it was.
Mr. Kennedy. I do not think that you can come into the
committee and appear before it and have the chairman say, ``I
am not going to make any recommendations to the Department of
Justice about your perjuring yourself,'' and then come in and
not be truthful with the committee when you are selling us
these facts. You are obviously not being truthful.
Mr. Dash. Perhaps, I don't understand you.
Mr. Kennedy. Mr. Dash, I cannot believe that. You have a
B.S. degree and you are a well-educated man.
Mr. Dash. What do you want me to answer?
Mr. Kennedy. You know what we want to find out.
Mr. Dash. There was no conspiracy.
Senator Symington. We want you to answer what the truth is.
Mr. Dash. There is no conspiracy.
Mr. Cohn. May I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that we let the
witness think this all over and come back tomorrow?
Senator Symington. You might give him the record so that
you can see where you have contradicted yourself.
Mr. Dash. Well, you virtually have got me convicted of
conspiracy, and there is no element involved in it at all, sir.
The Chairman. The committee will now recess.
[Whereupon, the committee recessed at 4:20 p.m.]
AMERICAN CITIZENS BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN
[Editor's note.--In 1953, Senator Charles E. Potter chaired
a series of executive sessions and public hearings of the
subcommittee on Korean War atrocities. The following year he
extended the inquiry to cover American civilian and military
personnel being held prisoners in Communist-controlled
countries. After holding two days of executive hearings in
March, the subcommittee anticipated holding public hearings,
until the People's Republic of China announced that it had
sentenced eleven American airmen and two American civilians.
The subcommittee deferred further hearings pending action by
the United Nations Assembly.]
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 3, 1954
U.S. Senate,
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
of the Committee on Government Operations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 10:30 a.m., pursuant to notice, in
room 357, Senate Office Building, Senator Charles E. Potter
(acting chairman), presiding.
Present: Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican, Wisconsin;
Senator Karl E. Mundt, Republican, South Dakota; Senator
Charles E. Potter, Republican, Michigan; Senator Henry M.
Jackson, Democrat, Washington.
Present also: Francis P. Carr, executive director; Donald
F. O'Donnell, assistant counsel; Robert Francis Kennedy,
counsel to the minority; Ruth Young Watt, chief clerk.
Senator Potter. The committee will come to order.
The purpose of the executive informal hearing this morning
is for the executive branch to be given an opportunity to aid
us in a study which we have under way to determine the people
that are being held behind the Iron Curtain against their will,
both military people and civilians. Senator McCarthy, the
chairman of this committee, has authorized me to act as
chairman of this study, and I was so authorized in December of
last year. It is not a subcommittee of the investigating
committee, but it is the full committee study; and I have been
authorized to act as chairman.
Now, as a result of the recent hearings that were held on
the Korean War crime atrocities last December and also in
January of this year, it was determined that about 11,500 plus
American military personnel were captured by the Communists. Of
that number, approximately 3,500 were returned in Little Switch
and Big Switch.
The information that the military gave us indicated that we
have fairly conclusive proof that approximately 5,000 American
prisoners of war were murdered or died in Communist prison
camps. This leaves approximately 3,000 that are still not
accounted for.
Since the end of the fighting in Korea, there has been
certain fragmentary reports that have been published in the
press concerning Americans behind the Iron Curtain. I think
probably, in order for you gentlemen to get a perspective of
what we are trying to do, that we ought to relate to you some
of the news accounts of Americans that are still behind the
Iron Curtain. Following the citation of these news accounts we
will ask you for whatever information you can give the
committee.
Therefore, if Mr. O'Donnell will briefly review or read the
news accounts that have come to our attention and those which
have been published concerning Americans who were held behind
the Iron Curtain against their will, we can proceed.
Mr. O'Donnell. Of course we do not know the sources of the
newspaper articles, and we have taken them for what value they
may be able to serve.
As to American military prisoners, the exact number
apparently being held behind the Iron Curtain countries is
unknown. But the newspaper accounts originally carried the
figure of around 944 Americans taken prisoner in Korea by the
Chinese Communists. That is the number of Americans who have
never been repatriated.
One of the articles breaks it down as follows, and this is
back in December of 1952: air force, 312; marines, 19; navy 3;
and army 610. Reportedly, most of these prisoners were
technicians.
On February 5th of this year, a recent article appearing in
the U.S. News & World Report, however, claims that on the basis
of information supplied by the Department of Defense the figure
of 944 has been scaled down to 80. Relative to civilian
citizens in Iron Curtain countries, generally it has been
estimated by the press that there are in the vicinity of 6,000,
who claim American citizenship, in various countries of Europe
and Asia. These persons technically are purportedly at liberty
but they are unable to leave the Communist-dominated countries.
The breakdown according to one of the articles is as
follows: Russia, 2,000; Poland, 3,000; Hungary, 450; Rumania,
300; Czechoslovakia, 300; Bulgaria, 80; and China, 101.
One article indicates that approximately 1,000 of these
persons has definitely been verified in number.
Now as to American civilians who are held as prisoners, we
had a breakdown in one article of 64, which ran as follows:
China, 31, most of whom are missionaries; Russia, 31; and
Rumania, 2. Of course, previously Czechoslovakia had about 12,
but all were released.
Senator Potter. I think, before we enter further
discussion, it would be well for you gentlemen to identify
yourselves for the record. I would suggest that the chief
representative from the various departments would identify
himself and his colleagues. Then we will go right down the
line.
First, the Department of State. Who is the chief
representative of the Department of State?
STATEMENTS OF BEN H. BROWN, JR., DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY FOR CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE; MR. W. BARBOUR, DIRECTOR OF
THE OFFICE OF EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS;
ALYN DONALDSON, DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF SPECIAL
CONSULAR SERVICES; AND EVERETT F. DRUMRIGHT, DEPUTY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FAR EASTERN
AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Brown. I am Ben H. Brown, Jr., deputy assistant
secretary for congressional relations; and on my left is Mr. W.
Barbour, who is the director of the Office of Eastern European
Affairs; next is Mr. Alyn Donaldson, who is the director of the
Office of Special Consular Services; and Mr. Everett F.
Drumright, deputy assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern
affairs.
Sir, I might say that this is somewhat divided up in the
departments. We do not really have a chief representative.
There are certain phases of it that can be covered by these
people.
Senator Potter. Whoever has the information will please
feel free to testify in accordance with his own field.
Mr. Brown. I would like to clear up one more point, if I
might.
Senator Potter. Would you wait until we make further
identification; then we will be happy to have you do that.
Is there anyone here representing the Department of
Defense, as a Department of Defense representative?
Lt. Col. Britton. I am liaison for the Department of
Defense. I am here as an observer, and I am not in a position
to testify this morning.
Senator Potter. You are here just as an observer?
Lt. Col. Britton. Yes, sir, and my name is John F. Britton,
assistant secretary of defense for legislative and public
affairs.
Senator Potter. The air force just came in. I understand,
also, that the navy has just entered. Will the chief spokesman
for the army identify himself and his representatives?
Mr. Barry. I am L. E. Barry, deputy department counselor of
the army. I have on my left Colonel Smity, the adjutant
general's office; Lt. Colonel Chandler, G-3; and Colonel
Trammel, in the background here, from G-2; and Mr. D. P. Hill,
also of the department counselor's office.
Senator Potter. Now, the Department of the Air Force.
Mr. Ayer. I am Frederick Ayer, Jr., and I am special
assistant to the secretary. On my left is Colonel R. W.
Springfield, who is of our casualty branch.
Senator Potter. And, the Department of the Navy.
Mr. Smith. My name is J. A. Smith, assistant secretary of
the navy for air. I have with me Captain Smedburg, director of
International Affairs Branch, chief of Naval Operations Office;
Lt. Colonel Nihart, U.S. Marine Corps, head of the Casualty
Branch, headquarters U.S. Marine Corps; and Lt. Commander
Martz, assistant director of personal affairs, Branch of the
Bureau of Personnel.
Senator Potter. Secretary Smith, would you care to move up
and take a seat here at the long table. If you need the council
of your other representatives, you may feel free to consult
with them at any time.
As I stated previously, there has been a great deal of
concern by many Americans concerning American citizens held
against their will by the Communist-dominated countries.
It used to be that when an American citizen was held
against his will, we would have a battleship in the harbor the
next day.
We have seen in the past that the Communists have used
American citizens as hostages in order to obtain concessions
from us. We made great concessions for the release of Robert
Vogeler, for example, and other American citizens.
There is a moral principal involved as to the right that we
have to draft Americans to fight a war; and then when they
become captured, and are held hostages against their will after
an armistice has been signed, we have a moral obligation not to
forget those men. I do not think we can sweep it under the rug;
I do not believe we can say, ``Well, we cannot talk about it.''
The American people are conscious that Americans are being
held against their will. And the purpose of the hearing here
this morning is not to harass anybody.
We are after information. You gentlemen have sources of
information which we do not have. We are interested, and we are
going to continue this investigation. We much prefer to do it
with your cooperation and to utilize whatever sources you think
would be desirable.
During the course of our other hearing, we secured most of
our information as to the Korean crime atrocities from the
army. But, I think, in this case, before we hear from the
military personnel, it would be probably desirable to receive
an expression from the Department of State.
If you have any questions as to the type of investigation
that we are undertaking, feel free to comment on it at this
time.
Mr. Brown. Mr. Chairman, I would like to first, if I might,
state our understanding of the nature of this particular
meeting this morning.
I realize that it is an executive session, and I assume
from that that in order to get information, as fully discussed
by the committee as possible, we could feel free to talk with
the knowledge that nothing will be published without our
consent.
Senator Potter. This is an executive session. The
information that you give here will be held in confidence.
Mr. Brown. Would you prefer us to ask to go off the record
at certain points or not?
Senator Potter. I would prefer if you would keep it on the
record. But I do not want to impede your frankness in any way
with the committee. If you feel that you can be more frank in
certain areas off the record, bring that to our attention.
Mr. Brown. Subject to reconsideration, if we get to a point
where it seems to be getting too delicate, we will try to put
it all on the record.
We have two bureaus of the department represented here this
morning. Is it the committee's pleasure that we start with the
Far East?
Senator Potter. Yes.
Mr. Brown. Mr. Drumright?
Mr. Drumright. Would you wish me to discuss the civilian
side?
Senator Potter. I would assume that that is where you have
more information.
However, if you have information as to military personnel,
we would appreciate that, too.
Mr. Drumright. Well, in my area, the Far East, our
information is that there are American civilians held in
Communist China. Insofar as other areas are concerned, we do
not have information that American civilians are being held.
Senator Potter. How many American citizens do you have or
do you know are being held in Communist China?
Mr. Drumright. I will discuss Communist China first. At the
present time according to our information, there are thirty-two
American civilians held in Communist China in prison. Apart
from those thirty-two, there are something like sixty-eight or
seventy, according to our records, who are in Communist China,
but who are not being detained.
Senator Potter. How many did you say?
Mr. Drumright. A total altogether of about one hundred.
That is a total of about one hundred American civilians, of
whom about thirty-two, according to our information, are in
prison.
But an exact tabulation is not possible since there are
some dual nationals and since there may be a few Americans in
China whose presence has not been reported.
Senator Potter. Are the seventy being held there against
their will?
Mr. Drumright. Not necessarily, sir. According to the best
information that we are able to obtain, thirty-two are in
prison and, perhaps, another fourteen are detained under what
we might call ``house arrest.''
Senator Potter. There are about fourteen of those?
Mr. Drumright. For a total of forty-six who might be
detained against their will, altogether.
Of the others, we have no breakdown. Perhaps some are
married to Chinese women, or vice versa; perhaps some are
elderly retired people living in China who want to live out the
rest of their lives there; or perhaps there are a few
missionaries who are still able to do a little of their work
there and who have not wanted to come out.
In addition, there are a few other people who are being
held because they have not liquidated debts demanded by the
Communists or something of that sort.
Senator Potter. What is the breakdown as to their
professions, are most of the American citizens that are held in
prison missionaries?
Mr. Drumright. Most of them are missionaries, Senator.
Senator Potter. Do you have a breakdown?
Mr. Drumright. I have a list.
Senator Potter. I would appreciate it if you could make
that available for the record. Do you have extra copies of that
list available?
Mr. Drumright. I will give you the copy we have. We have
other copies over in the department.
This is a list of American citizens under arrest, and I
have a Tab ``E'' on that. I also have under Tab ``F'' a list of
American civilians not under arrest but retained because of
Communist refusal to grant an exit permit. I have their names
and their addresses there.
Senator Potter. I do not know whether you are familiar with
an article which appeared in the New York Times in April of
1952 where it gave the names of the Americans that were being
held as prisoners of Communist China. Are you familiar with
that article?
Mr. Drumright. No, sir.
Senator Potter. Would you care to read some of the names in
order to see if that is the same group of people and if we are
talking about the same group of people? [Indicating] I notice,
by checking this, that it is the same list that was published
by the New York Times.
Mr. Drumright. Yes.
Senator Potter. I believe that was the one that was
released after a mild controversy that the Department of State
had with Senator Knowland.
Mr. Drumright. I was not here then; I was in the field.
Perhaps I might give you a little rundown of the situation by
projecting back.
When the Chinese Communists began their campaign southward
late in 1948, there were approximately five thousand Americans
in China. As a result of warnings issued by our embassy and the
consulates out there, most Americans left China between
December 1948 and April 1950. Americans in prison have
uniformly been held incommunicado and kept in ignorance of the
charges on which they are held, denied benefit of legal counsel
and refused basic personal needs.
In some cases, prisoners have been tortured according to
our information, and forced to submit to Communist
indoctrination, and in general treated in a barbarous fashion.
Four Americans are known to have died as a result of
maltreatment received from the Communists, and it is suspected
that the number may be greater.
Chinese Communists maltreatment of Americans was
intensified after hostilities started in Korea. Of the thirty-
two Americans now detained, in jail, all but one were arrested
after the Korean War started. In short, the situation of our
people out there became much worse from the Chinese
intervention and the war there.
With the withdrawal of our representation from the China
mainland in April of 1950, the British government agreed to
represent us and to endeavor to protect our interests in
Communist China. Since that time, the British government has
endeavored, to the best of its ability, at our request, to do
what it could to protect those Americans remaining in Communist
China. They have made numerous representations, written
representations, at our request, in general, and in individual
cases.
Senator Potter. Have we had any released as a result of
their intervention?
Mr. Drumright. We have people released in driblets all of
the time, but it is difficult to say whether that stems from
the representation of our British allies.
In any case, not one of the British approaches has been
officially acknowledged by the Chinese Communist authorities.
But that is not particularly significant because the Chinese
Communists never reply to written British inquiries.
The British have worked very hard, however, and I think
they are due a great deal of credit, for they have been able to
collect a considerable amount of information, and some of this
information that I am passing on now comes from the British.
They have been able to provide food on occasions to
incarcerated Americans, and vitamins, and certain other
necessities.
They have been able, also, to provide a certain amount of
financial assistance to Americans stranded in China, and who
had no way of obtaining funds.
Senator Jackson. Do we have any other friendly allies that
are helping in that regard?
Mr. Drumright. Yes, I will come to that. The British have
done their best. I do think that we owe them a debt for what
they have been able to do under the very difficult
circumstances which we have there.
In September of 1951 when it became evident that the
Chinese Communists were not responding to British efforts in
our behalf, not as much as we would certainly like anyway, we
asked a number of other governments which maintained diplomatic
establishments in Communist China if they would be willing to
approach the Chinese Communist authorities in efforts to obtain
the release of imprisoned Americans; also, if they could use
their good offices to have these people accorded more humane
treatment than they had been getting.
We asked the following countries to assist as they could,
informally, or otherwise. Those included: Norway, Sweden,
Denmark, Switzerland, Pakistan, Burma, Indonesia, Soviet Union,
India, and the Netherlands.
Senator Potter. I assume you did not get too much help from
the Soviet Union?
Mr. Drumright. Not as far as we know. I think most of these
governments did speak to the Chinese Communist officials in
Peiping, and it is possible that most of them did. We have no
word that the Soviet Union did so, however. It may be that some
of these representations had some little effect, maybe; there
is no real evidence of it.
Senator Potter. What are the charges that the Communists
use to hold these people?
Mr. Drumright. They have never brought any formal charges,
according to our information. They have said to some of the
representatives of these countries that so and so is a spy, or
so and so had worked for the National government when it was in
power, and so on. There is that sort of thing.
But they have not felt any compulsion whatever to give any
valid reasons, or to give any reasons why they are being
detained, or to furnish them with counsel, or anything of that
sort, or to give them a speedy trial.
Senator Potter. Have we been put in a negotiating position
for some of these men, have they tried to bargain with us, as
they did in Europe?
Mr. Drumright. No, they have not attempted that. The
significant fact is that from time to time they do let out a
few, and that is continuing.
Senator Jackson. How many of this one hundred-odd are
sympathetic with Communists?
Mr. Drumright. I would not know, sir, perhaps a few.
Senator Jackson. How many of them might have information of
any kind that would be of value to the enemy?
Mr. Drumright. Very few, because most of them are rather
closely held. Apart from the thirty-two in prison and the
fourteen who are under ``house arrest,'' I should say most of
the others, barring Communist sympathizers, are not allowed to
move around much.
Senator Jackson. I did not mean that. How many of them, for
instance, have a technical background or have information that
might be valuable to the enemy?
Mr. Drumright. I doubt if any of them have any information,
really, that would be of much value to the Communists.
Senator Jackson. Do you know of any?
Mr. Drumright. I do not, offhand.
Senator Jackson. Could anybody answer that?
Mr. Drumright. I do not believe there are any real
technicians; they are business people and missionaries, most of
them. We have the two press correspondents who were picked up
last year, and one sailor and one captain of a ship, who were
picked up at the same time the two newspapermen were.
Senator Potter. Then, the efforts of our government at the
present time in order to secure their release have been
directed in the direction of having other friendly governments
intercede with Communist China for us, is that correct?
Mr. Drumright. That has been going on persistently, yes,
sir.
Senator Potter. Has there been any direct approach by our
government to the government of China?
Mr. Drumright. No, sir, not directly.
Senator Potter. Do you know whether that was discussed or
whether we intend to take this up with the government of China
when we meet in Geneva?
Mr. Drumright. I do not know that for certain; but based on
instructions we gave to Ambassador Dean, when he went to
Panmunjom, which were that he might mention this or bring it up
if he found a suitable opportunity. I should say that we would
probably issue the same instructions to our representatives who
go to Geneva. If they can find a suitable occasion there, I
think so, yes.
Senator Potter. Did Dean bring it up in his negotiations?
Mr. Drumright. He did not find any opportunity, Senator, to
bring it up in view of the way the negotiations went, with the
acrimony and all.
Senator Potter. Do you know whether Secretary of State
Dulles at the Berlin Conference discussed this question with
representatives of the Soviet Union?
Mr. Drumright. I am not aware that he did.
Mr. Barbour. I believe he did not; I do not know.
Mr. Drumright. I cannot be absolutely certain, and I do not
know anything to that effect.
Senator Potter. Do you have any other information that you
would like to present at this time?
Mr. Drumright. I would like to say that our friendly allies
who have been assisting us, and I think they have done some
good because Americans are continuing to come out, desire that
their rolls be kept confidential.
Senator Potter. I can appreciate that. Do you have any idea
as to the number of American citizens that have been released?
Mr. Drumright. I have some figures here, Senator, which I
would be glad to spread on your record.
Senator Potter. Would you supply those for the record? In
order that the record will be fairly complete, can you in round
numbers give the number?
Mr. Drumright. According to our information: In January of
1948, there were 6,900 Americans in China, Communist China. By
January 1949 that figure had gone down to 5,000; by January of
1950 to 4,500; and by April of 1950 to 1,500. That was the
period when we issued a strong request to our people to get
out. That was when the Nationalist government was collapsing on
the mainland, and we felt that it would be advisable for our
people to get out.
So between January and April of 1950, our record shows
about 3,000 people left. In December of 1950, there were 1,300
left. In September of 1951, the figure was down to 350. In
January of 1952, it was 243. In January of 1953, the figure was
146. And now we reckon that 100 or 101 or 102 are left.
Senator Potter. Have any of the American citizens returned,
were they in prison?
Mr. Drumright. Oh, yes. They are letting some of them out.
I have some other figures here, which I would read, if you care
or desire?
Senator Potter. Yes.
Mr. Drumright. Of those in Communist China there have been
between 25 and 50 under arrest at any given time since 1951. In
all, 117 of the American civilians in China have been under
arrest at various times. Of those, 85 were eventually released
and deported. Eight of those in jail and 10 under ``house
arrest'' were released in 1953. You see, we do have a slow
trickle coming out all of the time.
Senator Potter. I am wondering if you could tell the
committee what our policy is and what the State Department's
policy is in an effort to secure the release of these American
citizens held behind the Iron Curtain. You have stated that we
are working through friendly governments, and also that
instructions were given to Ambassador Dean. And I assume that
the Secretary of State plans on bringing it up at Geneva; but I
do not know.
Do you have any policy as to what you are going to do in an
effort to secure their release?
Mr. Drumright. Our present policy is to carry on through
our friendly allies, chiefly the British, to play it patiently
and slowly, and not to give publicity because we feel sometimes
that that is derogatory to the objective which we want to
achieve. Our policy is to just go along and try to get them
out, a few at a time, ten, fifteen, or twenty a month. We are
down to about one hundred now.
Senator Potter. When the Communists do release some of our
prisoners, do they make any statement as to why they were
released or why they were held?
Mr. Drumright. No, sir, they usually escort them to the
Hong Kong border and give them a boot across and say nothing.
Mr. O'Donnell. Have the people been interviewed to
ascertain why they have been released?
Mr. Drumright. They have, yes, sir.
Mr. O'Donnell. What are their reasons for the release? What
do they say?
Mr. Drumright. They give a great variety of reasons.
For example, Robert T. Bryan, an American lawyer in
Shanghai, had been an employee of the municipal council there
for about twenty years. Then he was with us as a legal adviser,
after the war, for about two years. Then he was practicing law,
but the Communists picked him up immediately, and said that he
had done many things during his term as the municipal counselor
and legal adviser to damage Communist interests; that he was a
spy of the United States, and he was still an agent and all of
that sort of thing.
Mr. O'Donnell. He knew of no reason why he had been
personally released, is that correct?
Mr. Drumright. He did not know. And nobody seems to know
specifically why he is released at any given time. It is very
arbitrary, the whole operation.
Senator Jackson. How many have been executed?
Mr. Drumright. None.
Senator Jackson. How many have died in prison?
Mr. Drumright. We have a record of four who have died, and
I believe that I have a list of those people here.
Senator Jackson. You might read their names into the
record.
Senator Potter. I think that that would be appropriate.
Mr. Drumright. The first is Bishop Francis Exford, whom I
happen to know personally.
Senator Jackson. What was he?
Mr. Drumright. An American Catholic missionary who died in
a Communist prison in February of 1952, after over a year of
continuous brutal questioning. He had a starvation diet and
constant humiliation.
He was never accorded a trial, and he could not communicate
with the outside world. Every attempt by the government here,
the U.S. government, to get information about him through the
good offices of friendly governments was ignored or rebuffed.
Another case is that of Philip Cline, arrested in April
1951 on charges of spying. Mr. Cline was suffering from heart
disease and diabetes at the time of his arrest. After several
months, he was released from prison and then rearrested and
forced to withstand endless questioning by Communist agents. In
October of 1951, he was again released. He and his wife were
destitute. In mid-November of 1951, Mr. Cline died as a result
of being denied insulin for his diabetes while in prison.
We have two other cases of Americans who were not confined
to prison.
Senator Potter. You say they were not confined to prison?
Mr. Drumright. No, but they were denied permission to leave
China.
Senator Jackson. Did they die of natural causes?
Mr. Drumright. Miss Gertrude Cone, a Methodist missionary
applied for permission to leave Communist China in January of
1951. No action was taken by the Communist authorities. In
August she developed cancer. When she applied for permission to
telegraph Hong Kong for funds, she was refused. She was forced
to go on a starvation diet. In December of 1951, she fell as a
result of weakness from malnutrition and injured her hip. In
early January of 1952, she again applied for permission to get
funds from Hong Kong. This permission was refused.
Later that month, when she was already on a point of death,
permission was finally granted for her to leave. The
authorities then decided that it would be more convenient if
she died outside China. They gave her an exit permit. She was
escorted to the border and died in Hong Kong on February 18,
1952.
The other case was that of Dr. William L. Wallace, a highly
respected Protestant medical missionary who was reported to
have died under brutal treatment, at a place in southwest
China. That was on February 10.
Senator Potter. Is this in a prison camp?
Mr. Drumright. That may have been. It was in southwest
China, on February 10, 1951. Details of his arrest and the
exact circumstances of his death have never been obtainable on
a reliable basis.
But there appears to be little doubt that he died as a
result of Communist mistreatment, which was meted out to him
despite his years of self-sacrifice and work.
Senator Potter. Could you know whether the thirty-two
Americans are held in one prison or not?
Mr. Drumright. No, sir, they are scattered about.
Senator Potter. Do you have the names of the prison camps?
Mr. Drumright. That record I believe shows the places where
they are said to be incarcerated.
Senator Potter. Could you supply that for the record?
Mr. Drumright. That would be in the tabulation I have
already furnished.
Senator Potter. I see.
Mr. Kennedy. These American business men in China, I
presume that they are accused of not paying taxes, or does the
American government allow money to be sent into China to pay
those funds?
Mr. Drumright. We have under special permits on occasion
done that. The Treasury Department would have to clear that.
Mr. Kennedy. We would have to get the total figure from the
Treasury Department on that, is that right?
Mr. Drumright. I think so, yes, sir.
Mr. Kennedy. We cannot get it from the State Department?
Mr. Drumright. I am not sure, I would have to check.
Senator Jackson. How many of these people had an
opportunity to get out?
Mr. Drumright. Which people?
Senator Jackson. The civilians that we have been talking
about here this morning, the one hundred-odd people?
Mr. Drumright. I could not say. I would say that forty-six
or so have no opportunity. Perhaps some of the others would
have.
Senator Jackson. Perhaps I did not make my question clear.
How many of these people had an opportunity to leave?
Mr. Drumright. Previously, you mean?
Senator Jackson. Yes.
Mr. Drumright. I should imagine that most of them could
have left in 1950, or 1950 would have been the best date; that
is when most of them did leave.
Senator Jackson. Most of these people stayed on
voluntarily?
Mr. Drumright. I assume that they did, yes, sir; or for
family reasons, or business reasons, or missionary work.
Senator Jackson. Compelling local reasons.
Senator Potter. In answer to Counsel Kennedy's question
about the money that we have put into Communist China, I wonder
if you could get that information; we would like to have that
information for our records.
Mr. Drumright. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Are there any other questions that you
would like to ask Mr. Drumright?
Mr. Drumright. I would like to say that as regards North
Korea, we have no evidence that any American civilians remain
there. At the time of the Communist attack, in June of 1950, we
had about thirteen Americans seized, most of whom were
missionaries who were caught on or near the border.
Senator Potter. Have they all been returned?
Mr. Drumright. Seven of them have returned; and according
to our information, the remainder have died.
Senator Potter. Could you know anything about their death;
was it a natural death?
Mr. Drumright. For instance, Bishop Byrne, who was a
resident or native of Washington, died in a camp of
malnutrition and exhaustion.
Senator Potter. I know, we have had testimony before the
committee before, that some civilians, particularly I know one
was a missionary, who was thrown into a camp with military
personnel and forced to make long forced marches.
Mr. Drumright. Yes.
Senator Potter. What is the Department of State's position
concerning the release of the names of the civilians that are
being held in Communist China?
Mr. Drumright. I do not believe that there is any objection
to that.
Senator Potter. The names have been released?
Mr. Drumright. Yes.
Senator Potter. And, as I understand it, since the release
of the names in April of 1952, some of the people whose names
were mentioned have been returned?
Mr. Drumright. Undoubtedly.
Senator Potter. I know that Robert Bryan that you mentioned
was one of the men. His name was published; afterwards, he was
returned. It was the same with Reverend Thornton and Sister
Ann.
All right. If there are no further questions, we will
switch over to the Western European affairs.
The Chairman. May I say that I have to leave, not because I
do not have a great interest in this, but I have other work
back in the office. I came over here mainly to make sure that
you were not running a one-man committee.
Senator Potter. I wonder if you would also supply the
committee with the names of the civilians that were detained in
North Korea and the ones that were returned and the ones that
died while in Communist hands.
Mr. Drumright. Yes, sir; I do not have those presently
available but I will supply those.
Mr. Donaldson. If you wish to fill in with some of the
reports that have come from China, the background information,
we might be able to add a little to what Mr. Drumright has put
on record.
Senator Potter. We would like to have your statement on
that.
Mr. Donaldson. I have not heard it on the record though it
may be there, but this government does not officially recognize
Communist China, as you know. Because of that, we have to deal
through powers that have the representation in China to work
for us. Consequently, it is a very slow and tedious procedure
at best. Because of reports that have come out, we have learned
from prisoners that individuals have been encouraged and in
fact exhorted by the Communist government to make so-called
``confessions.'' On the basis of the confessions, the
individual was picked up by the police and incarcerated in a
jail and are then informed that if you wish to be released,
then you in turn report your sins and the sins of those who
have been related with you in your activities.
That, in turn, brings in other names, and they then offer
concessions, that they will reconsider your case, and make
concessions on terms of seconds. These approaches and
procedures are repeated about every quarter. It is a wearing
down operation and eventually the individual becomes softened
up and you have this ad infinitum of bringing in name after
name.
It is involved speculation and exchange which is contrary
to the law of China, and it involved all of those things under
the Communist code which are foreign to our code, and the
result is that there are practically no admitted crimes under
our code and people are picked up in China and incarcerated. It
appears that the people's courts generally give sentences of
two years or longer. It might be explained that some of these
people who are released now is the result of the termination of
sentences.
Senator Potter. In other words, they are following the
typical Communist pattern that they use, not only in China but
in the Soviet Union itself.
Mr. Donaldson. It appears to be a form of jurisprudence and
Communist philosophy that exists behind the Iron Curtain.
Senator Jackson. Is it that, or is it simply the means by
which they rationalize their holding these people? The real
objective would be to show to the rest of the world and
particularly the satellite areas that the United States no
longer is a powerful country, and the United States can no
longer do anything about its citizens who have been
incarcerated abroad. Is it not really the purpose to bring it
locally in China, to demonstrate to the Chinese people that we
can no longer send a gunboat up the Yangtze and get our people
out? I mean is it not that the real reason why they are holding
these people?
Mr. Drumright. That would certainly be one.
Senator Jackson. More than anything else, it is to degrade
the United States and humiliate our country and to demonstrate
to the people of China that Mao is now a real ruler and he is
not a weak ruler, and he is a strong ruler and that Mao is able
to really rule China, and that the white man is now inferior?
That is the real reason, is it not?
Mr. Donaldson. There seems a basis for power politics to
apply itself in that manner, definitely.
Senator Jackson. Now, obviously, they are not really trying
these people in a court of law to go through the even Communist
routine of justice. That is merely a means to an end and it is
the real objective to utilize the Americans in China for
propaganda purposes. I think the primary objective in that
regard is to humiliate them locally in China and throughout the
satellite area, Russia and in the neutral zones. If I am wrong
in my own reasoning on this, I would like to have your opinion
on it.
Mr. Donaldson. There appears to be sound basis for your
conclusions.
Senator Potter. If they can degrade an American citizen,
that, in turn, degrades the United States, in the eyes of their
people.
Senator Jackson. Yes; to the yellow people all over Asia.
Senator Potter. Are there any other questions before we go
on to the European end of it?
Mr. Donaldson. There is just one other thing that you
might, for the purpose of the record again, want to know. These
jails are so loaded that in a nine-by-twelve jail they put in
as many as forty people, and they cannot lie down and sleep,
and even when they put them at the rate of three and four in
smaller cells, they have to lay on the side like sardines in a
can in order to sleep.
Senator Potter. You are talking now about the civilians?
Mr. Donaldson. Yes; I am talking about civilians actually
in jail in the Chinese interior of Communist China. This is
typical, and these are cases that have been reported of facts
as they exist, and this is just background information, of
course.
Mr. O'Donnell. You mentioned a figure of around forty. Do
you have any more than thirty-two that have been discussed this
morning that have been held in prison over there?
Mr. Donaldson. When you get into this group, you are
getting into not only U.S. citizens, but this is the condition
that exists in the jails entirely and it is the Americans who
are thrown in with them.
Senator Potter. All right, let us switch over to the
European theater now.
Mr. Barbour. I would like to apologize for my laryngitis. I
may be a little difficult to understand, but I will do the best
I can.
Senator Potter. That is all right.
Mr. Barbour. The situation in the Soviet Union and the
satellites is somewhat different in that there is usually, in
most of these cases for which the figures are quoted, a
question of the citizenship. The large proportion of these
people are dual nationals. That is they have American
nationality, and Soviet or satellite nationality, or the
Soviets are claiming or the satellites are claiming they do.
They may or may not be justified in so claiming.
The people that are included in these figures are largely
made up of three categories. That is the people who have come
over here and have been naturalized and have returned to their
countries of origin, and children who have been born in this
country to people who came over probably and were not
naturalized, and have returned to their countries of origin, or
children born in the foreign countries to people who were
naturalized citizens of the United States and have returned.
We have relatively few cases--and I do not have the figures
but Mr. Donaldson may have--of American citizens having only
American citizenship who went behind the Iron Curtain for
business, or other reasons, or were living there for reasons
connected with some American concern or something of that kind.
They have been caught and cannot now get out.
We, also, do not have figures on how many of these people
if any, and we assume there must be some, are actually in jail,
or how many just cannot get out of the Soviet Union. The
figures that were quoted at the beginning did not specify they
were in jail, and I do not think most of them are. Of course,
we have great difficulty in getting information as to where
these people are. Most of them are there because they cannot
get out.
The general Soviet attitude has undergone a certain amount
of changes in the past several years, and up until 1947, it
could be said, generally, although there were certain
differences in various of the satellite countries, that the
people who wished to return and could prove a preponderance of
American citizenship and the Soviets did not have some
particular reason to keep them, we were able to get them out.
In 1947, as far as the Soviet Union was concerned, they put
down a complete block and we have never been able to get any
out from that time up until the death of Stalin. Since the
death of Stalin, for Soviet political reasons, I think it is
obvious that they wish to present to the world an appearance of
more reasonableness without costing them anything. They have
released a few. We have succeeded in getting a few out in
Poland and Czechoslovakia particularly. One or two came out of
Hungary. We have made a numerous number of representations over
the past years in the case of these individuals, and recently
as you all have seen in the press, we have been getting some
information on possible new cases from prisoners of war which
have been returned by the Soviets to Western Europe. There has
been a process of trying in the first place to identify the
individuals so mentioned because the information given by these
prisoners is pretty sketchy. Then there is the problem of
establishing the citizenship and then to get them out. We did
establish the identity and citizenship of two which were Cox
and Towers, and we succeeded in getting those out.
Senator Potter. Have you been able to establish the
identification of any others that you have not been able to get
out?
Mr. Barbour. We have established the identity and
citizenship of three more which we have taken up, and we have,
also, taken up with the Soviets more tentative basis and some
that it looks probably like they are identifiable as American
citizens.
Senator Jackson. What is that total now in the Soviet Union
that you have been able to identify as American citizens?
Mr. Barbour. The total in the Soviet Union is usually given
as two thousand. That is a very round figure.
Senator Potter. Many of those have dual citizenship, is
that correct?
Mr. Barbour. Well, certainly I would not like to give a
percentage figure, but, by far, the largest number.
Senator Jackson. How many of them are natural born
citizens?
Mr. Barbour. That, I do not have, but it would be a
relatively small number.
Senator Potter. Do you have that information and could you
secure that information?
Mr. Barbour. We have that.
Senator Potter. I think it would be desirable to have that
information for our records.
Mr. Barbour. Yes, and by that I take it you mean children
born in this country, I believe born under the citizenship act,
and it applies to born anywhere of American citizens. You mean
people born in this country, or people born of American
citizens?
Senator Jackson. No one has ever defined that term,
``natural-born citizen.'' That is the constitutional provision.
Mr. Barbour. I believe citizenship uses that term in both
ways, whether born in the United States, or obtained
citizenship by birth any place through American citizens.
Senator Jackson. The 14th Amendment provides, if I am not
mistaken, that all people born in the United States or subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States
in the state wherein they reside.
My point is that I think it would be well, Mr. Chairman, to
have a list of the people, who, we will say, were born in the
United States, where the question of dual citizenship might not
arise.
Senator Potter. I think it would be well to have the entire
list, and then break it down as to the ones who have dual
citizenship and the ones where there would be American
citizenship.
Mr. Barbour. I can get both of those figures.
Senator Jackson. We have also had a problem on this
question of dual citizenship and that can arise in two
situations; one, where a Russian migrates to the United States
and becomes an American citizen, naturalized, and returns to
the Soviet Union, and that is a clear case of the problem of
dual citizenship. The next situation would be where the son of
a Russian immigrant, or the parents come to the United States
and the son is born in the United States, and the son returns
to the Soviet Union. Am I correct in understanding that Russia,
and I guess most of the countries, recognize citizenship based
on blood, and we recognize citizenship based on blood, and we
recognize citizenship based on place?
Mr. Barbour. We recognize it both ways.
Senator Jackson. Yes, but primarily that is the basic
distinction, so that they claim the individual born in the
United States because his parents were Soviet citizens, and you
cannot lose it by reason of birth abroad.
Mr. Barbour. That is correct.
Senator Potter. I would like to have you comment on an
article that appeared in the U.S. News and World Report,
February 5, 1954, wherein it states, ``In Russia, 21 American
citizens have long been known to be held in prison, or forced
labor camps. Now, at least 10 other cases have come into
light.'' Can you comment on that?
Mr. Barbour. I have seen that report, sir, but I am not in
a position to know just which cases he has in mind. I do not
know which ten cases he is referring to. He may be referring to
some of these cases such as the Cox and Tower cases.
Senator Potter. He goes on a little further and he says,
``Now at least 10 other cases have come to light based on
eyewitness accounts from German and Austrian prisoners of war
let loose by the Russians last year.''
Mr. Barbour. That is what I think. In those cases, we are
endeavoring to identify the individuals. The information from
the German and Austrian prisoners of war is obviously very
sketchy. They sometimes see somebody and they get the name
probably phonetically, and probably have no idea of the place
of birth or any other identification, and it is somewhat
difficult to identify them.
Senator Potter. Now, the figure of twenty-one Americans
being held in prison is correct or not?
Mr. Barbour. I think it probably would be very difficult at
any given time to give a definite figure on that twenty-one.
There may be a few or there may be more.
Senator Potter. Have these twenty-one been identified as to
name?
Mr. Barbour. We have identified some of these old cases,
Senator, several hundred of them, but where they are, we do not
have any current information. That is whether they are actually
in jail or whether they are free in the Soviet Union, but not
free to leave.
Senator Potter. Do you have knowledge of the location of
these prisoners?
Mr. Barbour. In most cases all we have is a last known
address and when it was possible before the war in some cases,
or just following the war, for these people to come to the
embassies in Moscow and identify themselves. Since then, the
Soviets prevented any of these people coming to the embassy,
and have prevented the embassy staff getting any mail to them
or going out to see them. So, it is very difficult to tell
exactly where they may be now. We usually have an address where
they last were.
Senator Potter. I understand that there is a prison camp
about two hundred kilometers from Moscow at Vladimir, I think
it is, where some American prisoners are being held. I do not
know whether they are civilian or military personnel. Do you
have knowledge as to that?
Mr. Barbour. That, also, is from the same report, sir. The
reports of these various prisoners that the Soviets have sent
out to Western Europe. I believe that Cox and Towers were held
in that camp, and some of their information suggests very
definitely that there may be some more. We are endeavoring to
check that.
Senator Jackson. How long have some of these people been
held prisoners? By that I mean the longest period.
Mr. Barbour. I do not have any information on that, sir.
Some of the cases and some of the old cases that we have been
trying to get back from the Soviet Union, are very old. We have
been trying since the time of the recognition in 1935, and some
of them we have been arguing about dual nationality.
Senator Jackson. Are they being held for propaganda
purposes, or are they being held for intelligence purposes, or
just what is it?
Mr. Barbour. I feel certain that they are held as a matter
of general policy in the Soviet Union. That involves definitely
the propaganda aspects which you mentioned earlier. I do not
just see how they would be valuable from an intelligence
standpoint. Most of these people have been there so many years.
Senator Jackson. I realize that, but how about in the last
few years, have they taken any prisoner in the last four or
five years, and are most of these cases old, or what is the
situation?
Mr. Barbour. Well, there have been some, and there have
been some disappearances, of course, from Western Europe, and
there have not been any new cases that I am aware of in the
Soviet Union in recent years.
Senator Jackson. How many of these people might be military
personnel from Korea?
Mr. Barbour. That is anybody's question, sir, and I do not
have any information on that. I have no firm information on
that; firm information is very difficult to find. It is quite
possible that some of them are military personnel from Korea
who may have been taken to the Soviet Union.
Senator Jackson. I assume the military people will cover
that.
Senator Potter. Are there any other questions you would
like to ask the Department of State?
Mr. O'Donnell. We have limited this so far to Russia, and
we have several other European countries to go into, but
getting back to Russian figures again, actually what is the
number that the State Department has of American citizens who
are being held prisoners, and do they have any firm figure of
those actually held on the basis forever?
Mr. Barbour. I do not think we have any figures.
Mr. Donaldson. I think the best way we can answer that is
that the information which has been collected is collected from
communications, individuals returning from behind the Iron
Curtain, and members of families in this country, and in no
case can you say that it is a dependable census but if you wish
to put down what has been used as a record which the department
has worked up on the basis of information available to it--it
appears that there is one in Albania. These are behind the Iron
Curtain, and not in prison. Are you only interested in prisons?
Mr. O'Donnell. At the present time, the ones being held in
prisons or forced labor camps are the ones we are interested
in. Do we have any estimate of probable individuals by name who
are being held in either jail or in slave labor camps, in any
countries behind the Iron Curtain?
Mr. Donaldson. Listed by name? Not to my knowledge. That
record has never been made available.
Mr. O'Donnell. Do you have it on a figure basis?
Mr. Donaldson. We do have a collection of figures of
persons which we believe are still behind the Iron Curtain by
countries.
Senator Potter. But you do not know as to whether they are
imprisoned or not?
Mr. Donaldson. That is correct.
Senator Potter. Will you give us that figure that you have,
then? Do you have these by name?
Mr. Donaldson. By countries and only by number.
Mr. O'Donnell. Excuse me just a moment. Is the information
available in this country by name as distinct from number?
Mr. Donaldson. No.
Mr. O'Donnell. Is it available anywhere by name as distinct
from number?
Mr. Donaldson. It would be available from the Iron Curtain
countries if they would give it to us. Let me explain that, so
that I may make myself clear. We get inquiries from a man in
Chicago that he would like to know about his father-in-law or
about his sons, and we will send out a whereabouts inquiry to
our mission and sometimes we get a reply which says, ``Ask my
father not to communicate with me, and I don't want to hear
from him.'' We can only draw one deduction and that is in the
best interests of the person behind the Iron Curtain to keep
his face completely undisclosed. We have a record then that
there is a person behind the Curtain and that is the way these
figures have been drawn up, just as individual returning from
abroad who said they talked to ``X'' in such and such a camp.
That only leads us to believe that there is a person there
who has identified himself to a former prisoner but we have no
way of confirming that.
Mr. O'Donnell. On the basis of probabilities, I conclude
Cox and Towers after they were released were interviewed
concerning other Americans who may be held in slave labor camps
or in prison camps.
Mr. Donaldson. That is right. Everybody who comes out is
interviewed as they come through the U.S. forces in Germany, or
through a mission where we have a representation.
Mr. O'Donnell. We have a case of probabilities by name as
distinct from those who actually have been confirmed?
Mr. Donaldson. We could draw up those names, which have
been reported, and in many cases, as Mr. Barbour has pointed
out, phonetically without definition and very indistinct as to
description.
Senator Potter. If you will give us the numbers of persons
that are behind the Curtain.
Mr. Donaldson. Albania, 1; Bulgaria, 79; Czechoslovakia,
330; Hungary, 420; Poland, somewhere between 7,000 and 10,000.
Now, that has to be on a very broad basis, because of the
terrible destruction of the number of people who have been
completely lost sight of in Poland.
Senator Potter. You do not know whether they are dead or
whether they are alive?
Mr. Donaldson. We have nothing at all to go on. Warsaw was
wiped out and it is practically little if any information on
many people. We have inquiries come in and we will go back and
while we say that they are not living there, there are no
records and we do not know. Further figures are Rumania, 236.
As Mr. Barbour has pointed out, it is estimated that 2,000 are
in USSR.
Senator Jackson. Most of these people have been over there
for a long, long time?
Mr. Donaldson. Yes, a number of cases have definitely
indicated that they do not want to come out.
Senator Jackson. They want to stay there?
Mr. Donaldson. We do not know. For instance, when these
inquiries come from relatives, or from members of the
Congress--believe me there are many, every time your
constituents come to you and ask you for information, you come
to us, and we go to the mission. When we go to the mission, we
ask one of our men to go out and make an inquiry or send a
registered letter and in Russia the procedure is to put it in
an envelope that is registered and sometimes it is returned
with a notation on it, ``received,'' and that is all. You hear
nothing.
Mr. Barbour. Your question, also, was whether they were new
cases or not. I think that breaks down into two categories.
Those that we are hearing about now from the returned prisoners
may represent relatively new cases, who got behind the Curtain
for one reason or another during the war or since the war. The
big backlog of the two thousand cases in the Soviet Union, and
these other figures in the other countries, by and large, are
old cases which have gone on for ten years or more. It is
usually pre-war.
Senator Jackson. Out of this number, how many of them have
been kidnaped, either taken from American zones in Germany or
are any of them taken from any of our missions in the Soviet
Union, or in the satellite countries?
Mr. Barbour. That is very difficult to determine,
unfortunately, unless we get one out. We do not know the exact
circumstances under which he disappeared or how he happened to
fall into their hands.
Senator Jackson. How many are missing from our missions,
and do you know that?
Mr. Barbour. I was going on to say on that that I was
talking first about going across the frontiers and things of
that kind in Germany and Austria. But from the missions, we
have had several dual nationals who were with the missions and
who have disappeared. I do not happen to have the figures off-
hand, but I should say it would be, my best guess would be
somewhere around twenty-five or thirty. That is a pretty rough
guess, over the period of since the war.
Senator Jackson. That would even include the Soviet Union?
Mr. Barbour. All of the satellite countries; yes. Those are
people who are there and not ones we have sent in.
Senator Potter. Have we lost any that we have sent into the
countries?
Mr. Barbour. No, sir; we got them all out now, but we had
lost some.
Senator Jackson. I am trying to refresh my recollection.
Did we not have a sergeant in an American embassy that took off
in Moscow?
Mr. Barbour. That is another matter. We have two people in
Moscow who are defectionists, who went over voluntarily to the
Russians. There is a sergeant and a girl clerk.
Mr. Donaldson. There was an employee of the consulate at
Bratislava, but he is out. At the time he was arrested, he left
the employ at the time of his arrest.
Senator Jackson. He was arrested by the Soviets?
Mr. Barbour. He was arrested by the Czechs.
Senator Jackson. He has previously left the mission?
Mr. Donaldson. Yes.
Mr. Brown. I think that we might clarify this a little bit,
by pointing out in addition to the foreign service people who
are sent from here to our missions, our missions employ local
employees, clerks and people of that nature. Now, the twenty-
five to which Mr. Barbour referred were locals employed by
missions, and we did not send them in. But they may have dual
nationality.
Senator Potter. They had dual citizenship, you mean?
Mr. Brown. But they were not people we sent in as our
representatives in that country, but they were hired like a
resident of that country might have been hired.
Mr. Donaldson. There is another figure that should be put
in with that group, I believe, to make it more complete. The
department has estimated that approximately six thousand of
these people that are behind the curtain, are dual nationals,
which, of course, raises immediately the sovereign right of the
curtain country. I suppose that the committee is informed that
leaving curtain countries requires what is known as an exit
permit or visa and the control is exercised over people within
the country by that procedure. How these things are all brought
to bear is when you go in and ask for a permit and you do not
get it, then you are in.
Senator Jackson. I think it would be helpful if we could
get a breakdown from all of the countries.
Senator Potter. That would be very desirable.
Senator Jackson. That is of those people who were born in
the United States where there is no question raised as to dual
citizenship and then another category of the people who were
born in the United States but where the question of dual
citizenship can be raised and so on down the line so that we
can get a clearer picture. I think that unless we have that, it
could be distorted.
Senator Potter. It clouds it considerably, I think. Would
you provide that?
Mr. Barbour. We will be very happy to supply that.
Mr. Brown. You understand, of course, Mr. Chairman, that
some of these names or numbers will be unidentifiable as to
their particular status.
Senator Potter. I would say that is so.
Senator Jackson. Status unknown, you can give that. If we
could break it down, because when you say that there are people
or if something should come out in the paper that there are two
thousand in Russia, they immediately start writing to us.
Mr. Kennedy. Do you have the numbers as far as people taken
from this side of the Iron Curtain, over the border, for
instance, from the American zone in Vilinia or Anson in Berlin,
and were kidnaped or went over into the Soviet zone? Do you
have that as far as numbers or names?
Mr. Barbour. I suppose that could be compiled.
Mr. Donaldson. We would have to get up a record from
available information. To identify as positive kidnaping would
be the big problem.
Mr. Kennedy. Could you at least start to give us that?
Mr. Donaldson. We could say those who disappeared.
Mr. Kennedy. And the ones you know were kidnaped?
Mr. Donaldson. If we can identify them as such, we would be
very glad to do that. We will have to search the record on
that.
Mr. Kennedy. I appreciate your doing that.
Senator Potter. What has been the situation there? It is
different than in China, because we do have an embassy in the
Soviet Union, and just what has been the procedure of the
Department of State in securing release of these men that are
being held in the satellite countries of Europe and the Soviet
Union?
Mr. Barbour. Well, the procedure has generally followed the
line that we have taken the cases up with the foreign office
and some of these cases we have made representations over a
period of ten or fifteen years, and have written notes by the
dozen, virtually, and I think in some cases we have written as
many as two or three dozen notes over a long period, and we
have had officers go down and argue and we have taken it up
with the foreign minister. That is the American ambassador has,
and we have, in other words, made all of the possible
representations in all of these cases over a long period.
Senator Potter. You do run into the situation there of in
many cases having to bargain with the government, is that not
true?
Mr. Barbour. What is that?
Senator Potter. You do run into the situation of having to
bargain with the government. We had to bargain for Oatis, for
example, did we not, and in Hungary on the aviators and for
Vogeler.
Mr. Barbour. In those individual cases, it is difficult to
say that there was any particular pattern. It depends upon the
circumstances as to how we have been able to successfully
negotiate in getting them out. We have not made or we did not
make any deal in the Oatis case. We negotiated a long time, and
we exerted a lot of pressure on the Czechs by cutting off their
trade and cutting off their airline over Western Germany, and
eventually the Czechs for their own face-saving reasons, of
course, ostensibly, released him on the plea from his wife.
Senator Jackson. I thought I read in the paper that the
Czech government announced immediately after the release of
Oatis, that trade relations were being resumed with the United
States.
Mr. Barbour. They were resumed, but it was not part of a
deal. One time we were negotiating on that basis and I would
not wish to give that impression.
Senator Jackson. Frankly, I think it made us look very
silly, to say that there was no quid pro quo and the day after
we did not announce it but the Czech government announced the
resumption of trade, at a time when we were investigating trade
in Red China. I was just curious how it was possible that they
would announce it before we announced it. We apparently have
not denied it and I guess we have resumed trade.
Mr. Barbour. The resumption of trade, I might say, we
resumed trade on the same basis that we trade with the rest of
the block and it is no resumption of free trade.
Senator Potter. Our trade prior to that time had been
halted?
Mr. Barbour. Yes, sir.
Senator Jackson. All trade was cut off?
Mr. Barbour. That is correct.
Senator Potter. And, certainly, we gave $125,000 for the
four aviators shot down in Hungary.
Mr. Barbour. That is right.
Senator Potter. Certainly, there were concessions made as
far as Vogeler was concerned, on the part of our government?
Mr. Barbour. That is a question, sir, and what we did there
was to resume restitutions from Germany of Hungarian property
which we had already been obligated to restitute under the
peace treaty, but which we stopped when Vogeler was captured.
So we merely resumed the carrying out of an obligation which we
already had, and which we as an extraordinary measure of
pressure had declined to do during his incarceration.
Senator Jackson. We made a pretty heavy concession on
Oatis. The announcement of the resumption of trade relations
with Czechoslovakia, in coming from the Czechoslovakian
government and not coming from our government, I think, was
quite a propaganda victory for them. I must say that I do not
think we handled it very well. I think we should have at least
beat them to the punch. My memory does not serve me too well,
but somehow or other I read down the corner of the paper that
the Czech radio had announced it the day after or that day of
the release of Oatis. I think we are just kidding ourselves,
when we try to rationalize that there was not any quid pro quo.
I do not know that we got any of these people out, without
heavy concessions.
Senator Potter. I was going to ask about the two former
GI's that were released, Towers and Cox. Was there favorable
trade concessions made?
Mr. Barbour. No, nothing of the kind. Representations were
made by our ambassador in Moscow to the Soviet foreign minister
and in response to those requests for release, they were
released after a relatively short time.
Senator Jackson. But that was due to the death of Stalin,
probably, more than anything else, was it not?
Mr. Barbour. Of course, the whole policy of releasing any
of these people has been as a result of the death of Stalin,
and following the death of Stalin. That is quite true.
Senator Jackson. Do not misunderstand me; I am not saying
you should not make concessions, but I do not think we should
kid anybody in saying we did not.
Mr. Brown. On that very point, Mr. Chairman, I would like
to try to draw a distinction here between--let us put it in
this context, to decide whether the country had a net gain as a
result of holding an American and then later releasing him. You
must not overlook the fact that anything that might be agreed
to at the time of his release which was putting the situation
back to where it was at the time he was taken cannot be
considered a net gain.
In other words, if we cut off something in order to get a
man out, and then resume it at the time he is out, then they
have not made any net gain. We have used a bargaining weapon
and then upon their agreeing to release him, we are back where
we stood.
Senator Jackson. But it must have been discussed.
Mr. Barbour. Oh, it was.
Mr. Brown. Definitely.
Senator Potter. With $125,000 to Hungary, for example, for
the fliers, it seems to me that is just plain paying hostage or
paying tribute to a country who committed an act of violence. I
may be wrong, and I think it is desirable to get those men
back, but it is an embarrassing situation for our country to be
in to have to pay tribute to the Soviet block countries.
Now, it is twelve o'clock and I am sorry we could not get
around a little faster this morning, but I think probably it is
desirable for other gentlemen to listen to this, and this is a
line in inquiry that we are going into and we will meet this
afternoon. I am hoping that we can get permission to sit while
the Senate is in session, and unless you hear otherwise from
us, we will meet at two o'clock this afternoon in this room. At
that time, I think we will continue. I think it would be best
to hear from the air force first, and then the navy and then
the army. I believe we will be through at this time with the
Department of State.
I wish to thank you.
Mr. Donaldson. Would you mind inserting in the record then
in the case of China that in 1950 the department undertook to
make available a vessel at Shanghai and notified all Americans
known to the missions that in the opinion of the U.S.
government, they should get out, and they were warned to get
out. We did then deliver those who came out safely to the
United States.
Senator Potter. Before you leave, at this particular time,
we have no particular desire for any further discussions, but
we would like to have you present to the committee all of the
information that you have relating to this subject in
unclassified material, and to go over it with our staff. If
there is material that is classified, and you cannot get it
released, we will request, if it is necessary for our record,
the declassification.
Mr. Barry. Will you need the army representatives this
afternoon, then?
Senator Potter. I believe not, but I believe we will let
the army wait until tomorrow. I think probably it would be
desirable if all of the agencies that are represented here, if
they will have somebody here to act as liaison during the
entire hearing. This afternoon we will hear the air force and
navy, and I hope we can hear both.
Mr. Smith. The type of question is primarily the numbers
and the names of personnel?
Senator Potter. All of the information you have we would
like to have.
Mr. Smith. I see.
Senator Potter. We will recess until two o'clock this
afternoon.
[Whereupon, the committee recessed at 12:00 p.m., to
reconvene at 2:00 p.m. the same day.]
after recess
[The hearing was resumed at 2:30 p.m.]
Senator Potter. The committee will come to order. As long
as Bob Kennedy, the minority counsel, does not bring up a point
of order that we are sitting as a one-man committee, we will
proceed. I can assure you that all the minority has been
invited to participate, and I assume that Senator Jackson will
be here very soon. Now, this morning we heard from the
representatives of the Department of State and this afternoon
we would like to discuss this question with the air force and
the navy. The question is to correlate as much information as
we can as to the American citizens, military and civilian, who
are behind the Iron Curtain against their will. I think it
might be well if at this time I read a portion of the statement
made by General Ridgway, chief of staff, U.S. Army, when he
appeared before our Korean War Atrocities Committee in January.
I quote: ``A total of 13,238 United States Army, Navy, Marine
and Air Force personnel are known to have been either in a
prisoner of war or missing in action status, since initiation
of the Korean conflict on June 25, 1950. These figures show
that a total of 4,631 have since been returned to military
control. As may be noted, we now reach a tragic void. I believe
most of this discrepancy between the number of people returned
and the number of those who are still listed as missing in
action and presumed to be dead, namely, 8,690, is directly
attributable to Communist mistreatment in their prisons.''
Now, in other words, General Ridgway is saying that there
are 8,690 prisoners of war from all branches of the military
that are missing in action, but we have apparently no knowledge
as to whether they are dead or alive. I think that is the key
figure in the general's statement. Now, according to testimony
given before the committee by Colonel Todd, and Colonel Wolf,
based upon a formula which they had devised and which held
pretty true in their other calculations, we can presume that
5,000 of the 8,000 and so on are dead. But that still leaves a
total of approximately a little over 3,000 that may be
prisoners in the hands of the Communists.
As a result of the testimony that was given and one of the
conclusions reached in our report, we state this: ``Several
thousand American soldiers who have not yet been returned were
victims of war crimes, died in action, or presently confined
behind the Iron Curtain.'' That, gentlemen, is what we are here
today to discuss and get as much light as we can on those that
are still confined behind the Iron Curtain.
I think it would be best to hear from the air force first
on this because it is our understanding that because of the
possible technical information that many of the personnel had
and the nature of their military operations, the air force
personnel were more susceptible to being taken back into
Manchuria or China and possibly we know some are still there.
If you would like to comment on that, I would appreciate what
the air force has to say on that.
STATEMENT OF FREDERICK AYER, JR.,
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE;
AND LT. COL. R. W. SPRINGFIELD, CASUALTY BRANCH,
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
Mr. Ayer. Mr. Chairman, I will comment on that. I am going
to comment very briefly because Colonel Springfield of our
casualty branch is much more able than I am to go into detail
on that.
I would like to come back first of all to the figure of 312
mentioned this morning. They were individuals who were not
accounted for. That is to say between the list of those the
Russians said they had and would return and the air force
personnel that we had reason to believe, some type of reason to
believe, had at some time or other been alive back of the
lines. It was not a figure of people that we knew positively
were in the hands of the Russians.
Since that time, we have received or been able to dig up in
interviews with returning men and other available sources of
information, no positive evidence that any one of those 312 are
still alive. We do have a statement which originally came, a
series of statements, from Peiping radio which were to a
certain degree reinforced by a statement from Wilfred Burchett.
Senator Jackson. He is the correspondent from the Communist
paper in Paris?
Mr. Ayer. That is correct, that there had crashed in
Manchuria--this is according to the Peiping statement--eighteen
United States Air Force personnel, fourteen in one B-29 crash
and four separately in jet crashes, and that three were dead,
that one was in rather bad shape and might or might not live
and that fifteen were still alive. We have been unable to
verify that statement, but it is a reasonable presumption, I
think, that would be a fair statement of it, that they are
telling the truth and they do have these people. They were shot
down while south of the Yalu. It is impossible to say whether
they floated to earth inside the Manchurian line or came across
and dragged them back. We have no way of knowing that.
Of the balance, that would be 294, or whatever the figure
is, we have pretty good evidence from interrogations of
returnees and so on and so forth that the majority of them are
probably dead. There are some twenty that we are not sure of or
have no information as to whether they are dead or alive. That
is a very broad statement.
Senator Potter. Does the twenty include the fifteen that
you mentioned before?
Mr. Ayer. No, that is an additional twenty.
Senator Potter. There are thirty-five that there are a
possibility of?
Mr. Ayer. That is twenty who had been seen going down in
parachutes.
Senator Jackson. What is the highest ranking officer out of
this total group?
Col. Springfield. A full colonel, sir.
Senator Jackson. How about in the aggregate, out of the
total of 312 that are missing, would anyone higher than a full
colonel be involved there?
Col. Springfield. No, sir.
Senator Potter. Now, Colonel Springfield, can you elaborate
a little more on the statement that has just been given?
Col. Springfield. I can go into more detail if you would
like.
Senator Potter. I think that would be well. Now, there has
been an assumption that the number is much greater than what
you have given. Now, I assume that probably some of that data
has been confused with the marine air rather than with the
straight air force.
Col Springfield. No; there are nineteen marines. They are
not included there. The 312 figure was arrived at just at the
same and just subsequent to the crossing of the last repatriate
at the end of Big Switch. That figure was made up of personnel
who by some reason or another we had reason to believe were or
may have been in the hands of the Communists at one time. It
has to be clarified in that if a man crossed the border and
said, ``I knew John Jones. He was in prison camp awaiting
repatriation,'' they put the name on that list for an
accountable purpose, and I think rightly so.
In checking that to find out for my own reasons and for the
reasons of the next of kin, if this man's name was on there, I
went back to the repatriates and said, ``You made the statement
that this man was still in prison camp. I would like to get
further information so I can justify one way or the other.'' In
every instance that we ran such an interrogation, we found that
John Jones in fact was First Lieutenant John Jones of another
service, within the United Nations forces, and that he had in
fact been in prison and was repatriated and sometimes we would
find two men of the same rank and would be the same.
Senator Potter. Every time you checked into it, you found
that it was a different man than you had originally assumed?
Col. Springfield. Of the names that we feel got on the list
with no valid reason for having been there. Now, there were
other names where there was a valid reason for being there, and
I am talking of this 312 names which were reduced to probably a
figure of 156 by virtue of the fact that the information was
believed to be solid information, but we finally through
interrogation and research resolved that in fact they had
someone else in mind. That may sound like a big figure, but
such was true.
Senator Potter. But that boiled down to approximately 150,
did you say?
Col. Springfield. One hundred fifty-six, approximately, we
feel were justifiable on that list. Now, of that 156, he has
just told you the eighteen names, fifteen of whom we still have
some reason to believe may be alive. That is from propaganda
sources.
Senator Jackson. Some of these officers have a certain
amount of important technical information?
Col. Springfield. There is no pattern from the air force
standpoint that would lead us to believe that anyone has been
kept for technical knowledge reasons. We have four jet pilots
we are talking about, and we had jet pilots come through and we
have a high-ranking colonel and still he is among the bunch and
we had two or three high-ranking colonels who at one time were
in positions in the air force maybe having access to more
knowledge that came home. There is no pattern that we have been
able to find certainly from our source of information.
Senator Jackson. But of the ones missing out of this total
of 312, did some of them have a certain amount of technical
information that would not normally be available to other
officers?
Col. Springfield. I think we should consider the figure of
312 in order to understand what we are discussing here. Of this
number, as I say it was reduced to 156, and the eighteen of
sixty-three whom we have spoken of, allegedly who landed in
Manchuria, and fifteen of whom may possibly be alive. Quite a
number of those we know definitely, and we have positive proof,
that they in fact did die in prison.
Senator Potter. But they are still part of that 156 figure?
Col. Springfield. Yes, the Communists in the trust
agreement agreed to furnish the list of those who died in
prison, and that they did not do. Even though we have our own
persons who as many as eight or ten were present at the time of
death and actually can tell us the exact spot the body is
buried, we still feel we have a right to an accountability and
so on, on section nine. There was probably some of this
reduction to 186 over all and some of those were not on the
list, and I do not want to confuse you number-wise, but a total
of 186 plus eleven, which would be 197, we have positive proof
of death from our own sources.
All of these were not on that list. So, we have those
people on there. We have other people on that list who when
last seen were alive and in prison but I can cite several
cases. They were last seen and had both feet frozen and they
had gangrene in both feet and they were receiving no medical
attention. In one case, it was left behind in a little outhouse
as a result of the march which you probably went into before.
I have another captain who bailed out and lost his shoes,
and unfortunately he landed in the wreckage of the aircraft
which was burning and he was badly burned both by hands and
feet and with no shoes he stayed for three days in that shape.
His feet froze and he had gangrene and he was irrational the
last time he was seen but the last time he was seen he was
alive and they gave us no information, but I have at least
eight people who saw him in that condition.
Then, it simmers down to a possibly twenty people on this
list, who bailed out successfully--this is the twenty he was
speaking of before--who, according to their wingmen who were in
the air, they stated that they bailed out successfully. They
were never to be seen or heard of again.
Now, those people are rather low ranking officers and I do
not believe would come under the category of personnel that you
spoke of Senator Jackson. The highest is a lieutenant colonel
and there are eight captains.
Senator Jackson. Was he a squadron commander?
Col. Springfield. He no doubt was, and I do not have his
position here. I believe there are about eleven captains here,
one major; actually your highest rank is one major and the
other a lieutenant colonel, and the other were company grade
officers.
There are people, of course, that circumstances surrounding
the crash was such as to preclude survival, and we know nothing
further than our witness statements that the airplane crashed,
and exploded, burned, and a parachute was not seen.
Senator Jackson. We had some B-29s that went down off
Vladivostok.
Col. Springfield. You are speaking of B-50s, that would not
be considered missing in action.
Senator Jackson. Is one of them the B-50 that landed in
Manchuria?
Col. Springfield. No.
Senator Jackson. What about the B-50 case?
Col. Springfield. As you recall, one person survived and he
was rescued. That was Roach. The pilot, O'Kelly's body washed
ashore on the Island of Hokkaido. Also, the engineer's body
washed ashore on Hokkaido about three months afterwards and in
checking with the oceanic currents we find that would
approximately the time that it could be expected to make that
cycle.
The other persons aboard the B-50 we have absolutely no
information on other than search aircraft stated they believed
they saw, I believe it was from three to six which they dropped
a boat to. They further stated they believed they saw PT boats
of unknown nationality rushing to the scene and representation
to Russia has failed to get any results whatsoever.
Senator Jackson. What rank would they be?
Col. Springfield. The highest aboard or all of them would
be in the company grade, and I do not have their listings or
airmen grade.
Senator Potter. Were they all air force personnel?
Col. Springfield. Yes.
Senator Jackson. Have you included those in these figures?
Col. Springfield. No.
Senator Jackson. They probably should be included; they
were last seen alive.
Col. Springfield. Not in missing in action, but missing
cases. That is a technicality.
Senator Jackson. I understand but they are missing behind
the Iron Curtain.
Senator Potter. They would fit into the category in which
we are interested. I do not think that there should be lumped
in with yourselves, but I think that you should cite them.
Mr. Ayer. They would be correctly included in a list of
people who are missing and we do not know where they are. We do
not know whether they are dead or not.
Senator Jackson. I think, Mr. Chairman, that it would be
well to have a list of all personnel that there is reason to
believe are behind the Iron Curtain. That is with reference to
air force personnel, without reference to the reason why they
were taken.
Senator Potter. Can you put them in the category of
miscellaneous or something, or other air force personnel?
Col. Springfield. Yes, but the word reasonable to believe
they might be behind the Iron Curtain bothers me a little, and
I have no information reasonably to believe the boys in the B-
50 or the B-25 are behind there.
Senator Jackson. Is there not a justifiable presumption if
they parachuted and PT boats were moving in to pick them up and
there is no other evidence to indicate that they were not
there?
Col. Springfield. Well, O'Kelly--I still cite him--got out
safely and he talked to Roach and they held together for quite
some time and when the boat was dropped they separated and
O'Kelly washed ashore but he was alive in the water.
Senator Jackson. But how long after were the PT boats seen
in the area?
Col. Springfield. They were at the same time O'Kelly was in
the water, sir. I mean it was a simultaneous operation and we
dropped the boat to Roach and we dropped the boat to the others
and the PT boats were seen and Roach was picked up by the navy
and these two bodies were washed ashore, and we have reason to
believe one of the boys aboard there was knocked unconscious
and the word ``reasonable'' to believe they are behind the Iron
Curtain, I think requires clarification.
Senator Jackson. I think you have probable cause to believe
that or let us put it this way: I think there is a presumption
that they are alive if last seen alive and boats were in the
area.
Senator Potter. How many were in that flight?
Col. Springfield. I do not recall, sir, I think it was
eleven.
Mr. Ayer. I think it was seven, and I think that is
correct.
Senator Jackson. What about the one off Hokkaido?
Mr. Ayer. It was a full crew of eleven, I believe, sir.
Senator Jackson. Now, all that you have on that is that a
plane from an unknown country appeared on the radar scope and
thereafter the B-29 disappeared?
Col. Springfield. We have some statements from fishermen
and this is probably classified. We have some statements from
some fishermen who were in the harbor at the time who were
being held by the Russians who saw the aircraft fly over and
explode and go into the ocean. There was a knoll between them
for a short period of time that they did not see exactly what
did happen and they did not see any parachutes, but we do not
know whether they went down with the plane or subsequent to the
time they saw the plane some might have bailed out. It is an
unknown factor. It is reasonable to presume, again, or can we
reasonably presume something.
Mr. Ayer. I think I would like to, on behalf of the air
force, make this differentiation, that the total figure which
we will include the B-29 off Hokkaido and the B-50 that we know
was shot down.
Certainly it should be included in the over-all figure of
air force personnel whose ultimate we do not have any idea what
it was. The difference is that we know or are pretty certain
that of the 312 eventually reduced to 156, we knew there were
156 people who were at one time in enemy territory, or in enemy
hands, and we have no knowledge whatsoever that if there were
any survivors after a while of those two crashes or whether any
of those people were ever in enemy hands. It is a different
category of fish.
Senator Potter. How does the air force carry the men in
those two planes? Still as missing in action?
Col. Springfield. Just missing, sir. Just carried as
missing.
Mr. Ayer. There is no reason, or we have no reason, to
believe that they are alive. We have no positive knowledge that
they are dead, but there is no reasonable presumption, or at
least I as a lawyer would not certainly say there was a
reasonable presumption they were back of the Iron Curtain. That
is stretching a point.
Senator Jackson. I would just say that according to the
information submitted to the committee, it would appear that at
the time O'Kelly was in the water, that two or three others
were likewise in the water, and that these PT boats came out
from this unknown country.
Col. Springfield. They were not seen in the area where
these people were.
Senator Jackson. How far out was that?
Col. Springfield. They were proceeding toward the crash
when seen.
Senator Jackson. Well, was this at night or during the day?
Col. Springfield. It was during the day, as I recall, and I
believe they did go into night.
Senator Jackson. What was the temperature of the water?
Senator Potter. Did O'Kelly get to shore before the PT
boats arrived?
Col. Springfield. He, in fact, died in the water and his
remains washed up.
Senator Potter. How long can you remain in the water there?
Col. Springfield. In that northern climate, it varies, I
would have to get that for you. Sometimes it is fifteen minutes
and sometimes it is eight hours.
Senator Potter. That is frozen over eight months of the
year.
Col. Springfield. Roach remained in the water, I believe it
was approximately eight hours and did survive and he was
deathly sick when he was recovered. He was in the water about
that long and he did manage to survive, but your survival point
is a question in the water, if not picked up.
Senator Jackson. I do not think it is unreasonable to
presume. I do not know about it, if Roach lived and he was in
the water eight hours and the other boats were seen coming to
the area.
Mr. Ayer. It is a possibility, I would admit that.
Col. Springfield. We had a strong protest to the Russians--
and this would be the State Department's business--and one of
the notes admitted they shot it down, but reiterated very
strongly there were no survivors to their knowledge or
certainly they did not have them.
Senator Potter. What has the air force done about these
cases where you have fairly conclusive evidence that the air
force personnel are being kept behind the Iron Curtain, and
what have you done in order to protest or what has been done
through our Department of Defense or has it been turned over to
the Department of State?
Mr. Ayer. It has been turned over through the Department of
Defense to the Department of State.
Senator Potter. Were there any of the air force personnel
who signed germ warfare confessions that are still over there
that have not been recovered?
Col. Springfield. The ones we know were returned.
Senator Jackson. Do you have any reason why they might be
holding up to twenty in one group?
Mr. Ayer. Fifteen we know they have and twenty we do not
know where they are.
Senator Jackson. Can you account for any reason why they
would be holding them?
Senator Potter. Is there anything in the record and were
these people susceptible to communism as individuals or was
there any pattern as to why they might be held?
Mr. Ayer. Correct me if I am wrong, colonel, but of the
twenty that were seen parachuting or otherwise landing, there
is obviously no pattern to them and they are a group of people
that in individual instances floated to the ground. Those who
Radio Peiping claims they have, of who fifteen are still alive
according to their statement, I cannot out-guess the Russians
on this or would not be as accurate as the State Department
estimate of the situation, but I think it is a good idea in
their mind to have something that they claimed violated the
Manchurian border and to hold them for whatever use they may be
able to make of them later. That is not an answer because I do
not know.
Senator Potter. Have you received any information from the
returned Japanese prisoners of war that were at the end of
World War II, recently returned--have you received any
information as to whether they ran into any captured air force
personnel of the Korean War in their prison camps in either
Manchuria or China?
Col. Springfield. No, sir. There was a statement in the
press. They said they had heard English-speaking people in
Siberia and that was investigated, but there was no way which
could tie it in to any air force or military personnel. There
was some speculation it might be of any nationality since the
English language is rather fluently spoken among other
nationalities.
Senator Potter. The reason I ask is that I had some
information from an intelligence source that indicates that
there were four either pilots or air force personnel, and I am
not certain whether it was air force or marine personnel, who
were seen in a prison camp in Manchuria, and as a matter of
fact, I think they moved three times to three different camps,
actually, and later on they were last seen being shipped down
one of the rivers there from Manchuria towards Siberia. Do you
have that information?
Col. Springfield. No, sir.
Senator Potter. If your intelligence had it, would you have
it?
Mr. Ayer. Yes, we would have.
Senator Potter. It was either air force or marine
personnel.
Mr. Ayer. We would have received a copy of whatever
intelligence report that was.
Senator Potter. You say you would have received it?
Mr. Ayer. Yes.
Senator Potter. Did you have any questions?
Col. Springfield. I believe, sir, maybe it would be well to
state here that in our interrogation and re-interrogation of
repatriates, particularly, we did get a lot of information and
many of them, while this would be more or less hearsay, but it
would be from being active in the prison camp over there, would
state that they knew this person and we would run this down and
he was either dead or he came back or he would say if he was
ever in prison camp. We would have known it if he was processed
and from those names we would check and we come up with
nothing. The thing I am trying to say is that there is a vast
amount of information which precludes survival which cannot be
said as a definite statement that they in fact did not survive.
There is a vast amount of it. We have re-interrogated most of
our patriots, as many as three times, many of them personally.
Mr. O'Donnell. Have you interrogated all of the repatriates
as a result of Big Switch?
Col. Springfield. Yes, sir, and to the air force we have
gone out second and third times and talked to them personally
and by phone and by letter.
Senator Potter. You are fairly confidant that you have
about all of the information that is available, as far as the
whereabouts of the air force personnel that are still missing?
Col. Springfield. Yes, sir, and I feel we can only
reasonably presume that fifteen might still be alive. That
comes down to the figure of fifteen, sir.
Mr. Ayer. It would be a fair statement, would it not,
colonel, that the twenty that we added to the fifteen, we do
not have positive evidence that they are dead?
Senator Potter. You have no positive evidence that they are
alive or dead?
Mr. Ayer. That is right.
Col. Springfield. But from our interrogation, it is no
longer reasonable to assume that they are not still alive.
Senator Jackson. The last bit of knowledge that you have
been able to sift out of all of the steps that you take as
normal operating procedure on your part was that they were last
seen parachuting out and they made a successful drop and
thereafter you do not know what happened?
Mr. Ayer. We are not sure that they all landed alive.
Colonel Springfield. We had information that one of them
landed on a land mine.
Senator Potter. What was the normal Communist practice as
to their treatment of airmen?
Col. Springfield. It was wretched. They were treated very
poorly, sir.
Senator Potter. Were any of them killed on the spot?
Col. Springfield. Yes, some of them were shot.
Senator Potter. So there is a possibility of that twenty
that they were just murdered on the spot.
Senator Jackson. That is by local people?
Col. Springfield. By North Korean guards. That is what the
evidence shows that I have.
Senator Jackson. I would think that they would try to
interrogate them and then shoot them.
Col. Springfield. Some of them they shot after they
interrogated, whether they shot them right away or not.
Senator Potter. Are there any further questions?
Mr. O'Donnell. Do you know whether the State Department has
made any effort on an inquiry basis to find out if these twenty
are alive as distinct from the fifteen?
Col. Springfield. As distinct from the fifteen? No, sir, I
do not.
Mr. O'Donnell. Do you know, by any chance?
Mr. Brown. I do not know whether we have been asked to
because we have made a good many representations.
Col. Springfield. I think they have not been asked.
Senator Potter. I wonder why that is true.
Senator Jackson. What could they really do? I am just
trying to understand that.
Mr. O'Donnell. To verify the fact that they are over there.
Senator Jackson. As I understand the situation from the
testimony this morning, the State Department could run down
every known American to get a rumor about someone and they
would run them down, is that not it? I believe that was stated.
Mr. Brown. They would try to run them down.
Senator Potter. That would be the case here and you have
twenty that you do not know whether they are dead or alive and
it would seem to me and I may not be correct, but you probably
will not get much information any more than you get on the
other.
Col. Springfield. The army is the executive agent of the
forces, and the commission itself over there has made certain
steps and so on and so forth, and I believe they will tell us
certain things that are being done and certain intelligence
efforts trying to verify it. It has not, to my knowledge, come
to a point yet to where it will get into diplomatic channels
versus military channels.
Senator Jackson. Is the army handling that information for
the United Nations?
Col. Springfield. They are the executive agent for the
fighting and so a lot of things probably have gone between them
and the people representing the Korean side. I would rather
they would discuss that and I am familiar with many of those
things.
Mr. Kennedy. Have the Chinese said that these fifteen are
the only ones that they are holding and did they say that they
have returned everybody except the fifteen?
Col. Springfield. Mr. Burchett made the statement.
Mr. Kennedy. What about the Chinese themselves?
Col. Springfield. The Peiping Radio only told us within
twenty-four to forty-eight hours they had captured these people
and that is the only information we have on these fifteen
people that I am speaking of and no more.
Mr. Kennedy. As I understand the armistice terms, it was
agreed that they would return all prisoners of war from one
side to the other and so I presume that they have not said that
they are holding any back?
Col Springfield. They have never admitted that.
Mr. Kennedy. If they were asked about it, I presume that
except for the fourteen which they do not consider in this
category they would deny they held them.
Col. Springfield. These names were on that list handed to
the Communists for accountability and we have no satisfactory
answer from the Communists as such, officially speaking.
Mr. Kennedy. And, if they did admit holding any of these
others, they would have to admit violating the armistice terms,
would they not?
Col. Springfield. That is right.
Senator Potter. All right. We wish to thank you for giving
us that information.
Mr. Secretary, do you want to tell us what information you
have as far as the navy is concerned, or the navy and marine
corps?
STATEMENTS OF JAMES H. SMITH, JR., ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR AIR; CAPT. W. R. SMEDBURG,
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY; LT. COM. T. J. MARTZ,
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY; AND LT. COL. NIHART AND
COMMISSIONED WARRANT OFFICER JACK GOODALL,
MARINE CORPS, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Mr. Smith. With your permission, I am going to ask
Lieutenant Commander Martz to give the information with regard
to the navy and the coast guard, and Lieutenant Colonel Nihart
will give it for the Marine Corps.
Senator Potter. That is perfectly all right.
Col. Nihart. Before the Armistice occurred, Mr. Chairman,
we had a total of 145 marines carried in a captured status.
That is they were known to have survived the action in which
they became captured. Most of this information we had as a
result of interrogations after Little Switch, and they brought
back some rosters with names and so on, some from the Peiping
Radio broadcasts, and some from agents, I presume. One hundred
and twenty-seven of this 145 were returned to military control
as a result of Big Switch. That left eighteen still in the
captured status.
Senator Potter. Of the eighteen, were they infantry
personnel, or airmen or both?
Colonel Nihart. Both. At least one to my personal knowledge
was an airman; there may have been more. Prior to the time that
the list was submitted to the Communists by the Military
Armistice Commission, I believe, with a demand for an
accounting, there were a total of 944 names of all services on
this list; we were asked to furnish names to go on this list,
of people we had reason to believe might still be in Communist
hands.
We submitted our list of these eighteen names. Apparently,
before they got out to the Far East, the Far East Command and
the Armistice Commission submitted their own list, which
included nineteen marine names. About half of these nineteen
names that were submitted by the Far East Command corresponded
to names on our list of eighteen.
Approximately half of the nineteen either had already been
returned to military control, or were subsequently declared
dead based on the interrogations of the returnees.
Senator Potter. Of the nineteen, the list submitted by the
Far East Command----
Colonel Nihart. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter [continuing]. And half of them were on your
list, and the other half either had been returned to military
control, or were dead?
Col. Nihart. That is right. The names on our list, that
were not included on that first list, were added to the list at
a later date when the names were submitted a second time, or a
correction was submitted. Now, of this eighteen, these eighteen
marine names, on evidence or strong circumstantial evidence of
returnees, we have declared thirteen to be dead, either as a
finding under Public Law 490, the Missing Persons Act, or as a
finding, with a presumptive date, that is, if we have positive
evidence someone saw him dead in prison camp; and the other
with a presumptive date of death, that is, if when last seen
alive he was in a sinking condition from illness or wounds or
something of that nature.
We still carry five in the captured status. One of these
was a first lieutenant, pilot. He was shot down near the front
lines; and he was observed both from the air and from the front
lines to be marched off by captors at the point of a gun. He
has never been seen nor heard from since; and he never got to
prison camp.
Senator Potter. He was never seen in a prison camp?
Col. Nihart. That is right.
And the other four were privates, infantrymen. All four
were seen in prison camp by people who were returned to us, as
late as April of 1953. They were never seen after April. The
name of one was mentioned on a Peiping Radio broadcast.
Senator Potter. How was his name mentioned, was it
mentioned as being alive, or what?
Col. Nihart. That I do not know, sir.
Mr. Goodall. Quite often on propaganda broadcasts they
would say that Private Smith, John A. Smith, sent his regards
and he is safe and happy, or something of that nature.
Senator Jackson. Were the four enlisted personnel in good
health when last seen?
Mr. Goodall. No, sir.
Senator Jackson. They were not in good health?
Mr. Goodall. No.
Senator Jackson. Was there any reason to believe they might
be dead by reason of their condition when they were last seen?
Col. Nihart. I do not think their condition had that far
deteriorated, or we would have declared them dead.
Senator Potter. Then you would have presumed them dead?
Col. Nihart. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. Did you have any evidence that these four
might have been what is commonly referred to as progressives
that stayed over because of their own will?
Col. Nihart. Absolutely not, sir, none whatsoever.
Senator Potter. The reason I asked that was because people
who know considerably more about this than I, and know a lot
more of what the Communist tactics are, claim that the fact
that they have these twenty-one GIs that they use for
propaganda purposes, that undoubtedly there are many more who
have deviated and are still over there; but they use these for
propaganda value. I assume probably that is because their names
were known in many cases, and they were known to be captured. I
was wondering if these four were in that category of
progressives.
Col. Nihart. So far as I know, they are not,
Mr. Goodall. There is a peculiar story on one. We are
checking now to decide whether or not he was actually a marine.
There is some doubt in our mind as to whether he could be from
another service.
Col. Nihart. That is not meant the way it sounds.
Senator Potter. That would be a dirty army trick, would it
not?
Mr. Goodall. There were other marines in this same prison
camp. He cannot be identified by any other marine. He was
identified by personnel of other services. He was a Negro boy
and from Louisville, Kentucky. The name was the same and we
picked him up on that basis, as captured.
Col. Nihart. No other marines knew him. I think there were
four soldiers reported that they knew him and he was a marine.
Mr. Kennedy. There were no marines among the twenty-one who
stayed over?
Col. Nihart. No.
Senator Potter. Then yours boils down to the fact that
there are four which you have reason to believe may still be
behind the Iron Curtain?
Col. Nihart. We carried five, four infantrymen and an
aviator. I would not go so far as to say we have reason to
believe they are behind the Iron Curtain. When the aviator was
last seen, he was close to the front lines being marched off at
the point of a gun, and he was never seen or heard from since.
The four privates were seen maybe five or four months
before the armistice. When last seen, and they were never seen
after that, while they were not sinking rapidly at that time,
their health was poor.
Senator Potter. And you carry them, I assume, as missing in
action?
Col. Nihart. We carry them as captured. We have others that
we carry as missing in action, but that is a different matter.
Mr. O'Donnell. The only thought that I have again, and it
applied to the air force: Have you completed all
interrogatories of returnees and marines who were prisoners?
Col. Nihart. Yes, we have, sir.
Mr. O'Donnell. Do you have any outstanding leads as to
these five individuals?
Col. Nihart. Absolutely none, sir.
Mr. Kennedy. You have their names, do you not?
Col. Nihart. Yes.
Mr. Kennedy. Can you check them and find out whether the
one that you had a question about was actually a marine?
Col. Nihart. We have letters out now to these four men, as
well as other people in the same count, marines in the same
camp with him.
Senator Potter. Will you supply the names of the five for
the record?
Col. Nihart. Yes, we will do that.
Senator Potter. All right. Now, perhaps, we can hear from
the navy!
Com. Martz. The Navy Casualty Section maintains that we
have a possibility of four officers, a lieutenant, a
lieutenant, j.g., and two ensigns. Through these interrogation
reports, telephone calls to the mother of one boy, and little
incidents like that, we are led to believe that these men are
held in Communist territory.
In addition to those four, we had another incident somewhat
divorced from that, where a patrol plane was shot down off
Swatow, in southern China.
The plane went down and the personnel did get away, or got
out; and a coast guard PBY went in and crashed on take-off.
There was another loss of personnel. It is a possibility that
two of them got away. Someone saw a life boat with two men
aboard, two silhouettes in that boat of men who had gotten
away.
And out of that incident we have one navy officer with five
enlisted men missing; and there is one coast guard officer and
four enlisted men missing.
Now, they are missing. And the other four that we had
reference to were missing in action. There is a total of
fifteen altogether, including the five coast guard, ten navy
and five coast guard.
Senator Potter. Are they carried as missing in action?
Com. Martz. The four engaged in Korean action are missing
in action.
Senator Potter. Were any of these men put on the list that
we sent over to the Communists?
Com. Martz. The four are declared missing. And the
commander-in-chief of the Far East carried them on his list.
Mr. O'Donnell. Have any of these fifteen ever showed up
anywhere in any PW camp?
Com. Martz. All of these are covered up to this moment. We
screen the navy and the marine reports, and they screen ours;
we have an exchange between air force and army, where they are
screening their own and if they uncover any statement regarding
navy personnel, they report to us, and if we uncover anything
in our screening of the naval reports that pertain to army and
air force, we report to them.
There has been nothing show up on the fifteen. We did have
a report that a newspaper in Manila and Hong Kong carried the
story of an incident where it said that two American personnel
were hauled up through the streets in a cage, ridiculed and so
forth.
And that would lead us to believe, or it ties in in such a
manner that it would lead us to believe that the two who were
silhouetted in the life boat may be the two that are involved.
Senator Jackson. In all probability the ones that went down
off the China coast would not be in the prison camps in North
Korea, in any event.
Com. Martz. We have no reason to believe that they are, but
it is hard to tell.
Senator Jackson. It would not be reasonable to assume that
they would take them all of the way back.
Mr. O'Donnell. They would be held as diplomatic prisoners,
if anything.
Com. Martz. I think Captain Smedburg can elaborate on
these.
Mr. Kennedy. Why do you think that the four navy personnel
are still alive?
Com. Martz. In the case of one ensign, we have a letter
from his mother telling of a phone call from a Marine Sergeant
Estes, who was one of eighteen that escaped from a prison camp.
He reported to her that he had seen her son in a camp north of
the 38th Parallel on the 18th of May.
Mr. Kennedy. What year?
Com. Martz. That would be in 1952.
Senator Jackson. A telephone call from him after he was
repatriated?
Com. Martz. After he came back on Big Switch.
Senator Jackson. After you had interrogated him?
Com. Martz. I do not know whether the intelligence
authorities have or have not. I wound not say for certain.
Undoubtedly, they have.
Senator Potter. The boy's mother received this telephone
call?
Com. Martz. And the letter. We have a letter from her. The
sergeant called her by phone, and she notified us by letter.
Then to verify it, we have his name mentioned in three of
the interrogation reports, where the boys making the reports
state that they had seen him at various times. Some of them
reported that he was in bad health. But there was no one that
saw him dead, or knew of him dying. So we have the three
reports and the phone call from the sergeant that tells us he
is possibly over there.
Another man by the name of Brown is reported missing. We
have the report from the general headquarters of the Far East
in which they disclose that one of their commissions out there
that inspected one of the cells or one of the prison camps
found Brown's name freshly carved in the walls of the cell. He
had been held there about eight days, and that tied in.
We had him missing as of the 20th, and about the 28th or
29th was the date they had picked him up. He had been moved to
another camp and that is when they went into make the
inspection. That shows us that he had been in that area, and in
the camp, probably.
Another one of the men, a Lieutenant Venis, navy air force,
we have two statements of returnees wherein they said that they
had had contact with him. Statements by two different boys.
They had been in camp 3 and camp 5 together. They had been in
both of those camps at different times.
Now, we have not tied them down just what camp it was; but
he was in one of the two because those two boys make reference
to him. And those are the only two places that they had been
together.
Senator Potter. When was he last seen?
Com. Martz. I will have to look at the case, and I have it
with me back here. But I can find out very shortly.
Then his name was added by the commanding general of the
U.S. Army forces, Far East, after they had started their
screening out there. He wired us to pick Venis up and add him
to our list. We have done that. So that means that they
uncovered something out there in their interrogations that
would lead them to believe that he was out there.
Senator Potter. Are the records in the Far East more
complete than they are here?
Com. Martz. I assume that they are. They do send back
reports and tell us how their list is. And we check it against
ours in here. But probably they do have information out there
in their intelligence setup.
Senator Potter. If I may digress for just a moment, is that
true with the air force?
Col. Springfield. No, sir.
Senator Potter. What about the army?
Mr. Barry. I think we will have everything here that they
have out there; if we have not, we can get it.
Com. Martz. Perhaps Captain Smedburg can answer that.
Capt. Smedburg. I feel that all of the information is
relayed back here, but not the details.
Senator Potter. We found that pretty much true with our
atrocity hearings, that is, that actually the raw files were
out there. They had the information here, but it was in a
condensed form, rather than the raw files that were out there.
Com. Martz. I am speaking from the navy casualty section.
What our intelligence section has I do not know. It may be that
they do have it all.
Our other case has to do with the lieutenant junior grade
Chochran, who was assigned to one of the bases, or one of the
islands, in Wonsan harbor. He had charge of a boat detail, as
we understand it, he had two repairmen, two enlisted boys from
a destroyer that was anchored close by. They were working on
one of the boats that had been assigned to the island.
Near dusk, Chochran took the boat and went out. It was the
boat that they had been working on. While there had been one of
the native military personnel assigned to the boat, Chochran
felt he knew more about the trouble with the engine and he
could render immediate repair if it broke down. Rather than
sending the other man out alone with the boat, he accompanied
him for the purpose of returning the two repairmen to the
destroyer.
A fog set in and the boat never showed up again. But in
screening the boats that were tied up in the area, they found
that the boat had started out after it dropped the two
repairmen off on the destroyer. It had started out in the
direction of enemy-held territory.
Several mornings later, the boat was seen, but there was no
report on Chochran or the man who was with him. Therefore,
there is reason to believe that Lieutenant Chochran is probably
out there in that area, that is, in Wonsan harbor.
Senator Jackson. Of this group of four or five, do you have
any evidence that any of them desired to stay behind the Iron
Curtain?
Mr. Smith. Not to my knowledge. I would have to check up on
that. But I came here on the basis that we were going to take
steps to get these fellows back. I never checked that
information.
Senator Potter. That is true. Do you have any information
concerning military or naval personnel that might be held in
Europe?
Com. Martz. We have no record of any.
Mr. Smith. I think this sums up all that we have.
Senator Potter. Does the air force have any information on
that?
Colonel Springfield. No.
Senator Jackson. Or any that are in the Soviet Union?
Col. Springfield. No.
Senator Potter. I think we wanted to speak with you first,
and I have discussed this with the Department of Defense, also
with other intelligence agencies; this is more to attempt to
funnel our information together. We hope that we can make some
policy to strengthen our hand in getting these men returned.
I think we have, as I stated before, a real obligation to
do everything in our power to get these men back who are being
held. I realize at best our information is not concrete.
We probably will never be able to get complete information
on this. We do have, with the returning of Japanese and other
prisoners of war, who have returned from Communist prison
camps, information available which I think some of the army
people and probably other intelligence people have seen. I
think they have interrogated some of the returned prisoners of
war of other nationalities. I think we want to get as much
information as we can about this, and we are not in any sense
trying to be critical.
It is hard to do business with people and with a country
which has no concept of human life, whose word means little. I
will be very frank with you, what I hope we can do: I would
like to see, if we can correlate this information as much as
possible, our delegation at the United Nations present this as
an argument to the United Nations, and say ``Now here, we know
we are not holding any Communist prisoners against their will,
as a result of the Korean War, nor are our allies. We invite an
impartial inspecting team to come in here and see this
situation for themselves. But we want to be able to do the same
thing behind the Iron Curtain.''
Now, I do not envision that they would ever accept that,
but at least it would put them on the defensive. It will just
strengthen our hand.
In order to do that, we have to correlate as much
information as possible. I think the public, due to so many
newspaper reports coming out with fragments of information, is
much concerned about it.
I have a stack of letters which say, ``I had a son who
fought in Korea. He was declared missing in action. Is he still
behind the Iron Curtain?''
I do not think it is something that we should hide. I think
we should come out and give the public as much information as
we can.
Now, what has been discussed here has been off the record,
and it will stay that way until we have further information and
get further along.
Certainly, you will have an opportunity to make deletions;
we can discuss that with you. That is our purpose. We are more
or less feeling our way.
And I know that you gentlemen are just as much interested
in this as the committee.
Senator Jackson. I wonder if we could determine, Mr.
Chairman, what type of plan is under consideration to deal with
this problem. Is there a plan for the purpose of bringing about
effective pressure against the Chinese and the Soviet Union?
Senator Potter. I think that we would have to receive that
from a higher echelon.
Senator Jackson. I assume Mr. Brown could tell us that.
Mr. Brown. I am afraid I am not in a position to give any
information on that simply because I do not know.
Senator Potter. Well, Senator Jackson, what I am hoping we
shall be able to do is to correlate this information. Then
possibly we can have Secretary of State Dulles and, possibly,
Charles Wilson, or someone from the Department of Defense,
state just what is the plan, what do they recommend, and how
are they trying to implement an effort to get these men back.
I do not know how well organized it is; but I think once we
obtain the information we will then be in a position to
determine what we are going to do about it and what we are
doing about it.
Senator Jackson. Before we conclude, Mr. Chairman, I have
been reading the article in the New York Times of December 30,
with reference to Cox and Towers. I note from the article that
Towers disappeared in Finland after having gone ashore from an
American vessel.
Does anyone have the story on Towers? How did he get into
the Soviet Union?
Senator Potter. I believe you will find that Towers was one
that went over of his own volition.
Senator Jackson. Into Russia?
Mr. Kennedy. I understand that he was a Communist.
Senator Potter. He became disillusioned after he got in
there, and he came back.
Senator Jackson. All I noted from the article was that he
went ashore in Finland, and then turned up in the Soviet Union.
Mr. Smith. We have one other individual that might fall
between the State Department and us, a captain in the United
States Marine Corps Reserve, who was a civilian at the time he
was seized by the Chinese Communists. His name is Lawrence
Buoli and I wonder if the State Department has included him in
their account of civilians in this category.
Mr. Brown. I do not know, the committee has the list. We
turned it over to the committee this morning.
Senator Jackson. Where was he at the time of the capture?
Col. Nihart. He was a pilot for the Chinese Nationalists
Airways. He was captured or arrested by the Chinese Communists,
I think it was the 15th of January 1950, before the Korean War
started.
Senator Potter. How do you spell his name?
Mr. Smith. B-u-o-l. And he has been handled as a civilian.
Senator Potter. Yes, they have him listed in their report.
Mr. Smith. I just wanted to be sure that he did not get
dropped somewhere.
Col. Springfield. I would like to clarify perhaps something
that was not entirely clear in our statement about the twenty
in addition to the fifteen.
They are not people that we do not have any information
about. As a matter of fact by the end of this month, they will
be listed on the basis of interrogation reports, and one thing
and another, as presumed dead.
We feel that although, as Secretary Smith has said, it our
duty to do everything possible, it is also our duty to the
next-of-kin not to raise hopes that there are twenty people we
think may be still alive in North Korea, because it may not be
true. We just have not yet gone through the statutory period or
the evidence of March 1st to have declared them presumed dead.
Senator Potter. I think that is a good point.
We do not want to raise false hopes. We have to be very
careful not to raise such hopes in people whose son or husband
has been declared missing in action. We do not want to build
false hopes to the effect that they are still alive because we
do not have good evidence.
Now, I would like to ask one question which will be
applicable to each one of the branches. If you were to receive
inquiry from a mother, for example, concerning one of the men
who you have some information that he is still behind the Iron
Curtain, what would you tell her?
Col. Springfield. If we were to receive information from
the mother of a man missing, and she says that she has
information from behind the Iron Curtain, we get that
information and thoroughly investigate it from the origin of
its source.
Senator Potter. What about the mother of one of the
fifteen, what would you tell her?
Col. Springfield. For example, we would tell her that
Peiping Radio testified that he had been captured. We cannot
tell her if her son was on a B-29, whether he was one of the
three dead.
Senator Potter. In other words, you give them the truth.
Col. Springfield. We give them the facts.
Senator Potter. What is the navy's position on that, Mr.
Secretary?
Com. Martz. I have lost your point there, sir.
Senator Potter. What do you do when someone writes in, say
the mother of one of the five, who you have reason to believe
may still be alive behind the Bamboo Curtain, what do you tell
them, the next-of-kin if they contact you about it?
Com. Martz. We tell them that we will refer the information
that she has to our intelligence department.
Senator Potter. I am referring to an inquiry from them.
Com. Martz. We furnish her any information that we have up
to that point. If there is nothing additional to add, we inform
her to that effect.
Senator Potter. You give her the information that you have
given us, is that right?
Com. Martz. That is entirely right.
Mr. Barry. The policy of the army has been that we are
going to process them under Public Law 490. They will be
presumed as dead from the missing status as the time expires on
each one of them.
We do not tell them that we think they are behind the Iron
Curtain, naturally, because we do not have enough information
to go on. We only know that there are some that at one time
were behind the Iron Curtain, whether dead or alive now we do
not know.
Senator Potter. Would you report this to them then, sir,
that you had an infantry soldier who was seen in Camp No. 5,
for example; that he was not returned in either Little Switch
or Big Switch? And the mother writes in. Do you tell the mother
that this boy was seen by another man?
Mr. Barry. We do not, because we do not have enough
information to know what has happened to them since. And the
fact that you have so much confusion, as the air force has
said, some of their people turn out to be our people, and vice
versa, therefore, we cannot tell them that they were seen. Of
course, what was done, as you well know, we asked for an
accounting, and all of the services did, and we got zero from
that. They gave us no satisfaction whatsoever.
Senator Potter. You do tell them, or you say, that they are
still missing in action, but you are still investigating?
Mr. Barry. And if we can find out anything and if it comes
out that they are actually there, certainly their government
will do everything that it can to get them back, obviously. But
you cannot give them anything definite because you are only
raising false hopes, and we have no reason to believe that we
may be able to get them back.
Now, I wonder along this line, since the army has the
biggest problem, number-wise, on this thing. All of my
backstoppers are not here, but I need their help so that
perhaps we can get this information for you much faster. Are
you going to desire to have a list by names of those that we
had some reason to believe might still be there, and nothing
further has happened to them?
Senator Potter. That is right.
Mr. Barry. We can give you that.
Senator Potter. That will be kept as a confidential list
for the purposes of this investigation.
Mr. Barry. I have one step further: Over and above those
that we had some reason to believe were at one time behind the
Iron Curtain, are you going to want a list of all of those that
have been listed as missing in action? We have nothing further
on them, one way or the other. We can provide that, but it is a
big list, there were sixty-seven hundred to start with.
Senator Potter. I do not think it is necessary to have that
by name.
Mr. Barry. If there was no information at all, you mean?
Senator Potter. The only information you have is that they
are missing in action, is that right?
Mr. Barry. That is right.
Senator Potter. And there was no other information on them?
Mr. Barry. In the case of the army, there were over thirty
thousand statements developed from returnees, people who
escaped, or those who were repatriated, from which this list of
616 were definitely established as having been there at one
time; that is the figure that we would use unless you want
something different.
Senator Potter. We want the names.
Capt. Smedburg. May I make one comment, that is, in regard
to the young officer in Wonsan harbor.
I have been at sea for thirty-two years, and I have been
lost in a fog many times, with good coxswains, compasses, and
charts. This kid probably had no charts. He probably did not
have much experience in the boat.
I have been in Wonsan harbor myself a number of times. On
several occasions, I could not see my own fog signal from the
bridge. So, I know that there is every chance that that kid got
lost.
I just want to be sure that some time it does not get out
that the kid probably headed for the beach.
Senator Potter. I suggest you strike out of the record my
reference to that. I was asking a question.
Capt. Smedburg. There was something in there that indicated
that he might have gone to the beach; that he was last seen
when he was headed for the beach.
Senator Potter. That is the reason that I asked if you had
any information about this, and I assumed that you had no
information, now, that would have clarified the whole thing.
Com. Martz. He was headed in the direction of the beach,
and I may have stated it poorly.
Capt. Smedburg. The beach is all around there.
Senator Potter. That was the reason I asked that, and I
assumed that there was no information, and that was all.
Mr. Smith. We could have that reference stricken from the
record.
Mr. Barry. You will want the army representatives in the
morning, will you not?
Senator Potter. We will have the army representatives
later. We will notify you later. I do not believe that we will
be able to hear you tomorrow. So probably it will be the
following day.
Before you gentlemen leave, you know the purpose of the
investigation here, and we are seeking advice from you. If you
have any suggestions, we would like to have them, that is, on
how best to approach this problem and what can be done about
it.
Mr. Smith. I might suggest this: That if it were decided to
take this matter up at the Geneva Conference, where it would be
possible for this government to discuss it directly with the
other governments concerned, I think we should do everything to
have all of the facts and figures available for that so that
the lack of facts would not prevent that.
Senator Potter. Naturally. And that is the reason, after
discussing this with you people today, who have the
information, then we can take it up with the secretary of state
and the secretary of defense. We will be in a much better
position to say ``Here is the information that is available.''
And we can ask what is planned to be done with it and I assume
the secretary will take it up if the opportunity presents
itself.
It may have been discussed as something to be on the
agenda, I do not know. But I think our first job is to gather
the information.
I wish to thank you gentlemen. You have been most
cooperative, and I wish to assure you, captain, I was not in
the navy, but I was in the service a little while myself, that
I have no intention of slighting the loyalty of anybody.
We will stand in recess. As far as the other branches of
the services, I think it might be desirable to have an observer
here, if you care to. That is entirely up to you.
[Whereupon the hearing recessed at 4:00 p.m., Wednesday,
March 3, 1954.]
AMERICAN CITIZENS BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 9, 1954
U.S. Senate,
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
of the Committee on Government Operations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met (pursuant to Senate Resolution 40,
agreed to January 30, 1953) at 10:00 a.m., in room 357, Senate
Office Building, Senator Charles E. Potter (acting chairman),
presiding.
Present: Senator Charles E. Potter, Republican, Michigan;
Senator Stuart Symington, Democrat, Missouri.
Present also: Donald F. O'Donnell, assistant counsel;
Robert F. Kennedy, counsel to the minority.
Senator Potter. The subcommittee will come to order.
Before we start the hearing, could I ask that each person
present identify himself for the record. Mr. Berry, suppose we
start with you and then proceed right around the table.
Mr. Berry. L. E. Berry, deputy department counselor,
Department of the Army.
Col. Chandler. Lieutenant Colonel Homer B. Chandler, Jr.,
G-3, Department of the Army.
Com. Martz. Lieutenant Commander David J. Martz, Department
of the Navy.
Col. Nihart. Lieutenant Colonel Franklin B. Nihart,
personnel department, United States Marine Corps.
Maj. Garcia. I am Major L. R. Garcia, Office of the
Secretary of the Air Force.
Mr. Brown. John H. Brown, Department of State.
Mr. Watkins. Alex S. Watkins, Jr., special agent, counter
intelligence corps, Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
Col. Trammell. Lieutenant Colonel Trammell, Charles N.
Trammell, Jr., Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,
Department of the Army.
Col. Smith. Colonel Vernon M. Smith, adjutant general
office.
Senator Potter. Thank you, gentlemen.
This is a continuation of a hearing that was held last week
in an effort to determine what information our various
government agencies have concerning Americans who are held
behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains against their will. I did
not know until this morning that the Democrats were having a
meeting at ten o'clock this morning, so they will not be
present. However, they are ably represented by their counsel,
Bob Kennedy.
Wait a moment, we do have a Democrat. Senator Symington has
just arrived.
In discussing it with the Democrats, they had no objection
to continuing the hearing this morning to wind up the executive
sessions. We have heard from the air force and the navy and the
Department of State. All we have left is the army.
Mr. Berry, do you want to designate your spokesman for the
army?
STATEMENTS OF L. E. BERRY, DEPUTY DEPARTMENT
COUNSELOR, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY; COL. VERNON M.
SMITH, ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICER, DEPARTMENT OF
THE ARMY; LT. COL. HOMER B. CHANDLER, JR., G-3,
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY; AND LT. COL. CHARLES M.
TRAMMELL, JR., ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2,
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Mr. Berry. Yes. If the committee please, we have Colonel
Smith, who is head of the casualty branch, adjutant general's
office, and I believe we will have him lead off.
Senator Potter. All right.
Col. Smith. I am the chief of the casualty branch of the
adjutant general's office, and in such position I administer
the missing persons act in the name of the secretary. On
September 30, 1953, we had on our rolls 6,513 missing. That has
been reduced to less than 500 at the present time and we are
still working. The reason it has not been exhausted is because
of the limitations in the number of cases that we can turn out
per day.
Senator Potter. When you speak of them as missing, what do
you mean? Do you mean with no information as to their
whereabouts?
Col. Smith. Some of these were believed to have been
captured at that time, but we had nothing positive.
Senator Potter. It could be just missing in battle?
Col. Smith. That is right, missing in action. Yes, these
are all combat cases I am speaking of.
When the PW's returned from Big Switch, we received from
those returning men about--well, I will put it this way: Over
twenty thousand statements concerning men that they had seen
who they did not believe would come back. As each was
interrogated--they were interrogated several times--many of
them submitted duplicate statements and hundreds of statements
would be submitted on one man, some particular case that was
very evident. In sifting through those, we found that they only
referred to a little over two thousand of the total of sixty-
five hundred. That left a great number on which we had nothing.
It was just a void.
Senator Potter. But the interrogation of the prisoners
returned in Big Switch identified about two thousand, did you
say?
Col. Smith. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. And they were not returned but were in the
hands of the Communists?
Col. Smith. Yes, sir; or some that they knew were killed on
the battlefield, and they told about those, too. The 610 that
we referred to as being a part of this list that General Clark
asked for an accounting for were included in this total figure.
We have been working on those cases. In my office we have no
reason to believe that any single one of those individuals is
alive today. We have reduced that list, that is, with the
exception of those twenty-one who were dishonorably discharged
and the two that came back. As of this morning, the status of
the 610 is that two returned to military control, and twenty-
one were dishonorably discharged. We have made a report of
death on 235.
Senator Potter. Is that based upon statements?
Col. Smith. Yes, sir. The report of death is where we feel
we have conclusive evidence of death. We know where he died,
when he died, and what he died of. We have issued 275 findings
of death. That is a presumptive finding. On those men we had
nothing, and we feel that they are no longer living. It is
presumed they are no longer living because we have no
information at all.
Senator Potter. You have no information that they are
alive, but by the same token you have no information that they
are dead, is that correct?
Col. Smith. That is right. So we put it this way, sir: They
are not presumed living, therefore they must be dead. But in
order to administer the law and to get them off the books, as
we might say, I have to issue a finding. I have seventy-seven
cases left to work.
I would like to make it clear, sir, that because I have
seventy-seven cases it is not implied that those men are alive.
It is a time limitation with the amount of people now. We are
reducing that. By the end of this week, I expect I will
practically zero out on those cases. There are a few of them
that we have a few leads on that we are still trying to
exploit, statements of returning prisoners that we are still
interrogating, trying to determine for sure whether the man
they saw was the individual referred to and whether or not he
is dead. We prefer very much, of course, to make a report of
death instead of a finding of death, if it is at all possible.
But it is not implied that any of those men are alive at all.
That is, from my office.
Senator Potter. These seventy-seven that are left, do all
of them have statements one way or the other?
Col. Smith. No, sir. Yesterday I had----
Senator Potter. It is just a matter of time?
Col. Smith. That is right. Yesterday I had ninety left.
Last Friday I had one hundred and some left. Last Thursday when
we met here, I had 149 left. So it is a daily proposition. We
are reducing it as fast as we administratively can do so.
Senator Potter. When do you expect you will have the
seventy-seven cases finished?
Col. Smith. By the end of this week, I hope, except maybe
for a few isolated instances where we are trying to get
additional information.
Senator Potter. As I understand, these figures of 235 and
275 and 77 are out of the 610?
Col. Smith. That is right. And the twenty-one and the two
and that totals 610.
Senator Potter. The 610 you have no statements from the
returned prisoners of war that they were alive in prison camp
or alive in good health when they left? Your findings, if you
have a report of death, I assume you have fairly conclusive
evidence to that effect, that the person died, on 235. On your
findings of death, 275 findings of death, I assume you have no
information, not even from returned prisoners of war?
Col. Smith. A few isolated statements on hearsay, Senator.
They will say, ``I heard that'' so and so ``was alive and he
was in another camp.'' But it is so vague that we can no accept
it.
Senator Potter. And you make a finding of death in those
cases?
Col. Smith. Yes, sir; in order to administratively lose the
case, and to close out the financial aspects of the case. It
does not mean that the man may not come back alive some day. I
hope they would all do that. But we can not expect it. It is
purely the legal side of the missing persons act that I
administer.
Senator Potter. The seventy-seven that are left, there is
no particular significance to the seventy-seven?
Col. Smith. None at all. We have been able to reduce our
cases in total about fifty a day from the over-all picture and
these work right in with the others that have been hanging fire
since last fall. I think I can answer your question. By the
10th of April, all workable cases should be disposed of, and
then we have about three hundred cases that are year-and-a-day
cases. Under the law we cannot conclude a case until a year has
passed. Unfortunately, last July the army suffered 208 men in
the missing status. Those men will be carried until the
comparable date this coming summer. Then they will be dropped.
We have a few in April, May, June, July, which will finish it.
Senator Potter. Are the families notified, such as in the
case of the 275 where you have a finding of death? How are they
notified that there is a finding of death?
Col. Smith. By registered letter. They are notified it is a
finding and they are furnished copies suitable for legal
purposes to settle estates and any matters of a personal nature
they may need.
Senator Potter. The review of the total 610 cases including
the seventy-seven that are left, I assume a certain review was
made of all cases. Do you have any evidence at all that any of
the 610 are still alive?
Col. Smith. No, sir.
Senator Potter. You have no statements from returned
prisoners of war that they saw John Hones or Private John Hones
at prison camp No. 5 and he was in good health?
Col. Smith. Yes, sir. We had statements but nothing
conclusive. As I mentioned, it was hearsay.
Mr. Berry. Maybe this will clarify it: The original figure
of 610 was composed, or the list of 610 was composed of people
that there was some information on at one time that they were
in enemy hands. Isn't that right?
Col. Smith. Yes, sir.
Mr. Berry. That is where we got the figure of 610 to start
with. Is that what you wanted to know, Senator?
Senator Potter. Yes, sir. I wondered what type of
information you had. I assumed from what you stated that you
interviewed quite thoroughly the returned prisoners of war in
both big and little switch. I know I have had letters--I have
letters on my desk from returned prisoners of war and they say,
``I saw Private John Jones at prison Camp No. 5, and he was in
good health and just before Big Switch he was picked out and
sent to another camp. That is the last we have heard of him and
he hasn't been returned.''
We have had cases of that kind brought to our attention. I
was just wondering if that hasn't been brought to your
attention.
Col. Smith. Yes, sir; we had some similar statements and we
exploited them to the best of our ability by interviewing other
returned prisoners. We have come up with zero. As far as my
administering Public Law 490, for my purpose, I must come up
with a solution to each case in one manner or another.
On those findings, we have nothing conclusive at all. We
had some little strings.
Senator Potter. In other words, the doubt is weighed in the
favor that the man is dead, if there is any question. Is that
correct? Is that a correct statement or would you care to
phrase it a different way?
Col. Smith. I don't want to say that I am just weighing
people off to get them off the army rolls. That is not the
intent at all, Senator. We intended to take each case and
administer it properly and as the law provides. We have made
every effort to identify these individuals to find out what has
become of them. We followed hundreds and hundreds of leads. We
never quit even though we can determine that a man died at a
certain place, after we have made a finding of death, we go
back and correct those records in order to make it easier on
the family and to make it a record for future use, if such
should come up. But after these interrogations were made, we
sifted through them, we weighed them carefully and where it is
indicated, we have re-interrogated and then re-interrogated
again. It is endless. We have sent officers all over the world
to interview these individuals where that is deemed necessary
and would contribute something.
Senator Potter. It would be possible, however, that some of
this group of 275 could be alive and in the hands of the
Communists?
Col. Smith. It is quite possible. By the same token, sir,
we had thirty-four hundred that we made findings on the last
day of December, and they have disappeared.
Senator Potter. They would be in the same category?
Col. Smith. They may have died on the battlefield. I am
sure many of them did. They were killed and left on the
battlefield in those retreats that were made and those terrible
massacres that went on. But they may be alive. I don't know.
But the present assumption is that they are not.
Senator Potter. The point I want to bring out is that there
is no evidence either one way or the other as to whether the
person is alive or dead, but--and I think it is a sound
position on the army's part--after that certain period of time
and after doing all the interrogating that you can on returned
prisoners of war, you presume them dead.
Col. Smith. That is right. And might have been carried on
army rolls since 1950. The law provides they be carried a
minimum of one year and then they may be continued to be
carried or there may be a determination or finding of death
made at that time. So these cases have gone on and on and on
and from the financial aspects it behooves us to conclude them,
one way or another.
Senator Potter. Could we get a breakdown on the 610 case as
to why they were selected? I assume the majority of them were
on reports from returned prisoners of war. But is there any
other evidence that put them in that category, the 610?
Col. Smith. I would like to pass that one to G-2, if I may.
It was based on the Far East and the Department of the Army's
reasons. And I don't know myself, exactly why. I would say,
though, before he discusses it, that for the record I have a
list of the names of those individuals.
Senator Potter. That is of the 610?
Col. Smith. Yes, sir. And I would like to present that to
you.
Senator Potter. That will be made a part of the record at
this point.
Col. Smith. That is just the army list.
Mr. Berry. With your permission, I think we will go to G-3
next, as to what was done about these people, what steps were
taken.
Col. Chandler. Senator, I am from the G-3 operations
division, Department of the Army, specifically the Far East and
Pacific Branch. It is a small organization that handles,
exclusively, those matters that pertain to the Far East
Command. We act for the commander in chief of the Far East, and
his official matters which would come under scrutiny of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the chief of staff of army, or in
connection that he might have that would be of primary interest
to the Department of State or any other governmental agency.
Frankly, we are not policy makers. However, in any case, at
his suggestion we do recommend actions. Mainly my work since
the 27th of July has dealt with and in the implementation of
the armistice agreement itself with all that that brings into
being. The missing persons part of the thing is only a very
small part of what we have had to handle.
I have compiled briefly a chronological order of events
that have transpired in the Military Armistice Commission. As
you know, that commission has equal representation between the
Communists and the United Nations Command, with both sides
being equal in every effort to present demands or to request
information from the other side. Neither side is obliged to
comply. As you can well imagine, the Communists have been most
reluctant to cooperate at all in the Military Armistice
Commission.
The thing started off around the sixth of September when
the Communists made a statement that they had returned all
United Nations prisoners of war. That included Americans, South
Koreans and all other nations fighting under the heading of the
United Nations Command.
At that time, General Clark directed the senior member of
the Military Armistice Commission to present on the ninth of
September to the Communists a list of names of personnel of
United Nations forces and republic of Korea who are known to
have been captured by the Communists and to have been in their
custody.
Senator Potter. Was that the list of 900 and some?
Col. Chandler. That is right. The reason for compiling the
list, the names on that list, was that these individuals were
identified as POW's through Communist reports, radio or through
their newspaper corps, broadcasts from their own radio
stations, supporting statements from UNC personnel already
repatriated either in Big Switch or Little Switch and from
letters these men had mailed while in the POW camps. The idea
of presenting that request for an accounting to the Communists
at that time was to avoid putting them on the spot of having to
answer for these people after the twenty-fourth of September.
Technically speaking, they had until the twenty-fourth to
turn them over. So it was sort of putting them on warning that
we were going to want to see some of these people, or an
accounting for them. That letter was given to the Communists
and on the ninth of September they had no comment but noted
they had received it.
On the twenty-first of September they replied to that
letter. The reply essentially covered the following points:
They stated or claimed our list contained names of 519 persons
who have already been repatriated and 380 names of persons
accounted for on previous rosters, in other words that were
duplications of the 3,400 that were on the initial list, there
they have accounted for only 899, if you accepted it on its
face value.
At the same time, they requested that we account for 98,742
Chinese and Koreans that they claimed were in our custody at
one time. That occurred on the twenty-first of September.
General Clark's reply to that was that the Communists'
answer was totally unsatisfactory and unacceptable.
Senator Potter. I assume that you checked your list to make
sure that none of them had been returned? Had any been
returned?
Col. Chandler. The ninety-eight thousand?
Senator Potter. No, I mean of the American prisoners of
war. None of them had been returned?
Col. Chandler. Well, from the initial list there were
corrections that were made right up to the twenty-fourth of
September, at which time we presented a corrected list and
indicated to the Communists that we would give them corrections
to the initial thirty-four hundred as they occurred.
Of course, obviously one of the corrections we all know
about is when we deleted from our list of demands the twenty-
three Americans, two who came back and twenty-one who deserted.
So you can see, it has been a continuing process all the way
through.
But the deletions have, in many cases, been offset by
additions, so the list, essentially, today would be about the
same as it was previously.
Mr. Kennedy. Are you going to tell the Communists now that
we were completely wrong about the list because these people we
assumed now are dead?
Col. Chandler. No, we would not.
Mr. Kennedy. Why wouldn't we, if we say over here they are
dead and we have no reason to believe they are dead?
Col. Chandler. If we have reason to believe they are dead,
we would like to get them also to make a statement that they
are dead.
Mr. Kennedy. I don't see how we can say on one hand that we
are going to inform the parents and families of these soldiers
that we have reached the conclusion that they are dead and we
tell the Communists we think they have some.
Col. Chandler. We would not say that until official
notification has been sent out by the adjutant general, at
which time we would send out a correction to our list. But the
correction would be one where you would not only have a finding
based on the public law, but a report that the man is dead.
Then we would make a correction. Not on a finding of death.
Senator Potter. Even though the family had been notified
that there had been a finding of death. But I assume that is
based upon law that after a year has elapsed that, for purposes
of insurance and other things, that they will be permitted to
do that.
Mr. Berry. It is analysis to a presumption of death after
seven years under civil law.
Mr. Kennedy. It is based on fact, is it not?
Col. Chandler. Not the presumptions. Where they make a
report of death, then you have proof of death. Otherwise they
say one year or more having elapsed and, no information
developing, we presume this man is dead and we will go ahead
and wind up his affairs.
Mr. Kennedy. That means just information in that year. But
what about information prior?
Col. Chandler. No, all information together. It does not
add up to enough to say definitely that he was dead, but enough
time has elapsed that they wind up his record.
Mr. Kennedy. Then there was information that these people
were alive at one time?
Col. Chandler. Yes. Of the 610, yes, at one time.
Col. Smith. I believe, to answer his question, I believe I
can clarify his mind very quickly.
In the original request it wasn't implied that anyone was
alive at all.
Mr. Kennedy. To the Communists?
Col. Smith. That is right. It was never implied that they
were alive. They asked for an accounting, what happened to
these people, what do you know about them. But it was never
implied that they were alive. I think that will straighten you
out on that part, if I may put it that way.
Mr. Kennedy. Then when the Communists made their answer,
the fact that they did not know anything about the majority of
these people, wouldn't that have been a satisfactory answer?
Col. Chandler. No, sir; that would not. Because of the
3,400 they attempted to claim some knowledge of only 699, and
their answer on that was extremely evasive. They did not come
down and say, ``We will take the whole list and go through it
and this man died here, and that man died there.'' They merely
said that 518 have already been repatriated, but they did not
say who. We knew that 518 had not been repatriated.
Mr. Kennedy. How many mistakes had been made?
Col. Chandler. Well, actually of the total number turned
back at the end of Big Switch, none of it, shall we say, none
of the 610 that we gave were returned in Big Switch. None were
returned.
Mr. O'Donnell. Could we take the breakdown this way: The
610 which was your initial figure, what was the figure on
September 24?
Col. Chandler. The figure on September 24 would still be
610.
Mr. O'Donnell. It would remain the same?
Col. Chandler. That is right. You see, we did not make any
changes to that until we got their first reply. Well, to go on
from September 24, General Clark then sent another letter
through the Military Armistice Commission again demanding an
accounting and replying that their first answer to our request
was completely unsatisfactory. The Communists answered that on
the third of October in which they again stated that they had
accounted for everybody or had returned everybody an again
demanding that we account for the 98,742. We simply noted that
statement and replied that we were checking their list of
98,000.
Senator Potter. Did they send a list of names?
Col. Chandler. That is right, sir. On the twentieth of
October the Communists wanted to know had we completed our
checking and the answer on that was no, we had not.
From the last of October up until the first of December,
very little discussion was made in the Military Armistice
Commission meetings. This group meets once a week. Matters
taken up during that particular period involved, actually, the
explanations, charges and counter charges, involving the non-
repatriated prisoners of war in the hands of the Neutral
Nations' Repatriation Commission. Consequently, they were
satisfied, apparently, on the 20th of October that we would
notify them when we completed our checking and would not reply
until that time.
On the seventh of December, three former ROK soldiers
escaped from the North Korean army and crossed the
demilitarized zone and came into custody of the United Nations
Command. They reported that large numbers of former POW's were
still in Communist custody and impressed into military service.
The Military Armistice Commission, our side, made a protest to
the Communists at a meeting. The Communists simply noted the
statement and again demanded where are their ninety-eight
thousand. On the tenth of December, two additional ROK soldiers
crossed over and reported the exact unit to which they had been
impressed and the fact that large numbers of UNC personnel were
still under Communist control.
Senator Potter. Did this include Americans?
Col. Chandler. However, their statements discussed only
former ROK soldiers. They had no knowledge whatsoever of any
Americans, or any other UNC, other than ROK soldiers.
On the eighteenth of December the United States delegation
in the Military Armistice Commission proposed to the Communists
that a joint investigation of the charges brought by the five
ROK soldiers be made by the Neutral Nations Supervisory
Commission, a body that is set up to investigate any alleged
violations of the Military Armistice as requested by the
combined commission or either side. The Communists, of course
refused to have anything to do with it. On the twenty-first of
December General Ridgway sent a message to the commander in
chief of the Far East. I would like to, as a matter of record,
indicate his statement and his personal interest in this whole
proceeding. The cable read in part as follows:
General Ridgway personally desires that this matter of
demanding an accounting be vigorously pursued and that detailed
reports be submitted to the Department of the Army concerning
actions, new developments, or future plans.
That is, of any actions taken by the Military Armistice
Commission.
Senator Potter. What is the date of that, colonel?
Col. Chandler. The date of that cable, sir, is the twenty-
first of December. That was cabled to General Hull, from
General Ridgway.
My one reason for getting this in, sir, is to point out
that our chief of staff is personally concerned about the
matter and is attempting to take every action possible in order
to satisfy, of course, the logical and justifiable request of
the American people to have a final accounting.
Senator Potter. I know that General Ridgway is very much
interested in this whole question.
Col. Chandler. General Hull replied to General Ridgway's
message and on the 31st of December in which he gave us a
round-up of all actions that had been taken to date concerning
this particular problem. Followed a discussion he had with Mr.
Robertson of the State Department on a visit during the early
part of December of Mr. Robertson to the Far East, and in which
they discussed this matter very thoroughly between them.
At that time General Hull pointed out the difficult
situation facing us, practically a dilemma, you might say, if
we continued through the Military Armistice Commission to harp
on this particular subject, for the simple fact we were now
getting to the point where we were going to have to account for
the 98,742, because the Communists actually had a logical
reason to demand that accounting since we in turn had demanded
an accounting on our own.
Senator Potter. Before you go into that further, I assume
that the names that the Communists submitted, most of those
were men who refused to go back, is that correct?
Col. Chandler. Shall we say over twenty-two thousand were.
Senator Potter. And what were the others? Were they just
names?
Col. Chandler. Yes, sir. To break it down, actually the
categories that they had submitted: Escaped from our own
enclosures, 50 Chinese and some 26,800 Koreans. Those 26,000 in
there are the ones that President Rhee opened the gates on.
Senator Potter. Is that an accurate figure, about, of the
ones that escaped?
Col. Chandler. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, 26,803. So
you can see it is right down to the last man. Repatriated
during Little Switch, Chinese 15, Korean 332. Repatriated
during Big Switch, Chinese 4, Korean 2,219. Understand, this is
the accounting that the Communists are demanding.
Here are a large number of people that have already been
returned to them. Duplication of names 668. Delivered to the
NNRC, Chinese 14,704, Koreans 7,479.
Senator Potter. What is the NNRC?
Col. Chandler. That is the Neutral Nations Repatriations
Commission. The custodial force of India would be a better
name. Here is their effort to try to get us to type them off
exactly as to who refused to be repatriated.
Korean civilian internees whose status as civilians had
been determined and they were consequently released from a
prisoner of war status, 37,527. They never were soldiers.
Additional Koreans not qualifying as prisoners of war and later
released, 142. Deceased Chinese 4, Korean 250.
The deceased, incidentally, were reported to the Communist
side through the International Red Cross, as required by the
Geneva Convention. Never in NC custody, no record of ever
having seen those people: Chinese, 91, Korean 2,008. Status not
yet determined, 6,655.
He has a comment about this last category that I believe is
well taken.
Senator Potter. Who has?
Col. Chandler. General Hull:
Whether we shall be able to complete identification of the
6,655 is highly problematical. Difficulties inherent in present
records stem from the early days of the Korean conflict when
prisoner of war registration was not fully established.
In addition, identification has never been completely
accurate because of deliberate switching of identities about
the PW's.
In many cases that was done by the non-repatriates in an
effort to avoid identification.
Necessity for relying upon internment serial numbers rather
than names.
In many cases you would find ten or fifteen of them with
the same names, so you had to revert to numbers.
And duplication of records occurring prior to the
centralization of all prisoners of war on Koje-do in aid 1951.
Which was eighteen months after the Korean conflict
started.
Generally speaking, he said that it is going to be
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to make it right down
to the last individual.
General Hull and Mr. Robertson both expressed through this
cable and through later discussions an extreme reluctance to
give to the Communists a full accounting for the ninety-eight
even if we could.
First of all, we can expect nothing from them unless we are
willing to provide them with the full information they have
demanded. While we may realize some public benefit by a
reiteration of our demands, they can produce a logical argument
that we must do likewise. Any data that we can receive from the
Communists is suspect at the very start. If we account for the
98,000 they may submit additional lists with just enough
accuracy to keep us on the defensive. If we continue to demand
an accounting of UNC personnel they can move further to demand
return of additional alleged PW's, and from there to civilians
So this thing would never end. We would never get a
completely satisfactory accounting from them. In the meantime,
we are giving them information which is of extreme importance
to them, extreme importance on this basis.
They know that the bulk of the number they have requested
are composed of civilian internees, escapees and prisoners of
war turned over to the custodial force of India. They probably
have barely an idea, however, of the breakdown by names in each
category.
They can not identify this man specifically as being a non-
repatriated prisoner of war.
In their long-range intelligence exploitation program in
Korea, and in any covert penetration of Formosa, additional
information as to the identities of these 98 would be extremely
helpful to them. There are many pressures which would be
brought to bear on such individuals, particularly those whose
families and relatives remain in Communist control.
In other words, we would have in a sense, some twenty-two
thousand families immediately becoming hostages to the
Communists without any question. And some of the individuals,
as long as they feel that their identity can not be
specifically established by the Communists, feel safe in
remaining as non-repatriates, or now as civilians. There is
another consideration, of course, we could expect that we would
receive violent protest from the ROK government or from the
Nationalist government of the Republic of China, if we were to
turn over all of this information which we fought so hard to
keep back.
That, generally, is General Hull's standing on the matter.
Senator Potter. So from that time on there has been no
effort on our part to get the names or to follow up and find
out if they are holding any of our prisoners?
Col. Chandler. That is not exactly correct, sir. So go in
and just to demand an accounting again of the thirty-four
thousand and to give them the names of the ninety-eight
thousand, no, that has been held in abeyance.
Agreement was made through all three services and the State
Department to hold up, in taking that step. As General Hull
said, he felt that it would only result in a series of charges
and counter charges with no real result obtainable.
However, based on the cases of escapees, these five ROKs,
we have again and again requested the Communists to join us in
making an impartial investigation of these people who
definitely have been established beyond a reasonable doubt as
having been former members of the South Korean army. We have
asked the NNSC to make an investigation, but once again you
have a committee where there is no head. The Swiss and Swedes
are willing to go north and make an investigation of any unit
we have requested. The Poles and Czechs refuse to go. Unless
all four are represented, you can have no meeting.
Consequently, we have come to the stalemate now. The Poles
and Czechs will not move, and the Swiss and Swedes, of course,
are powerless to act.
Senator Potter. I assume India will refuse to act, is that
correct?
Col. Chandler. The Indians you see, sir, are not in on
this. This is the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission which
consists of the four powers, Poland, Czechoslovakia,
Switzerland and Sweden. Their whole purpose in being in Korea
is to investigate alleged violations of the military armistice.
The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission dealt only with
the non-repatriated prisoners of war, and it was dissolved on
the 25th of February. So we have no chairman, and you have two
sides of the table and nobody gets any place.
Nevertheless, we have, during the month of February,
submitted four letters to the NNSC, requesting an investigation
based on the five ROK soldiers and other violations of the
Military Armistice. It is quite evident that the Polish and
Czech representatives are not going to cooperate. It is quite
evident that the Communist members of the commission are not
going to cooperate. We have one action left, which we hope will
result in some of the findings of death becoming actual reports
of death, and that is a search and recovery program. The
Military Armistice agreement provides that joint efforts will
be made to investigate known dead or reported dead where there
are indications of locations of graves. Prior to the first of
March of this year, the majority of that work was done inside
the demilitarized zone. It was very easy to conduct such
search-and-recovery programs there because of the fact that we
have as much right to go into the zone as they do. It is
almost, you might say, our territory, the same as it is theirs.
That work does take time. I believe you can appreciate the
reluctance on the part of some of these teams to stomp around
in an area that they know to be mined, and consequently it
takes a bit of time in doing. However, we have about completed
that program and the next step is to go north, beyond the
demilitarized zone. To do that, we must receive permission from
the Communist forces.
Senator Potter. By the same token, you are allowing them to
come south of the line?
Col. Chandler. Therefore, negotiations on that are going to
have to be very thorough and very painstaking to prevent them
from conducting simply intelligence operations in South Korea
rather than search and recovery. Our people are going up there
solely for the purpose of attempting to find remains.
Senator Potter. I assume that they have certain leads as to
where bodies were buried, is that correct?
Col. Chandler. Yes, sir, based on operational reports.
We know, for example, that the Second United States
Division fought quite a battle in the vicinity of Kunu-ri, that
their sudden withdrawals subsequent to the battle, there is
every reason to believe that there are a number of individuals
who died on the battlefield and were either thrown into the
ditch by the Chinese forces, were buried by local natives in
rice paddies or in some other location.
It is amazing, the number of individuals that you can
account for if you can get back on to the battlefield. We have
great hopes that a large number of these people will be
accounted for.
Senator Potter. This is in the process of being negotiated
at the present time?
Col. Chandler. That is right, sir.
Senator Potter. Is there any reluctance on the part of the
Communists to agree to that, or don't you know?
Col. Chandler. They have not stated either way yet, sir,
because it is just being brought up. If our proposals indicate
that we will follow their instructions and limit ourselves to
the requirements that they place on us, they may go right on
through with it, because of the fact we in turn are giving them
a chance to come south.
Once again, we are going to run into difficulty, I am
afraid, with the ROK government, on permitting these teams to
just go an place they want to. We are not going to be able to
permit them to do that. By the same token they are going to be
very cautious on where our teams can operate.
Fortunately, some of the bigger battles were fought a
considerable distance behind their main battle position at the
present time. So once we have crossed that, we may be in the
back areas and they may not be quite as reluctant to let us
look around. But that is another action that is being
undertaken.
Mr. O'Donnell. How would your search and recovery program
in any way dovetail into the figure of 610? Would not that
primarily be concerned with missing in action cases that have
been closed?
Col. Chandler. No, sir; it could dovetail in with the 610,
such as there is a possibility that one of the individual in
the 610, his squad leader said, ``I saw him captured, and
wounded, and he was walking up the road under the guns of a
Communist squad.'' Then we do have information that that man
was actually captured. What happened to him afterwards, we
don't know. But he would have been one of the 610.
There is no satisfactory accounting for him.
Senator Potter. If they should get him out of sight and
shoot him and bury him in a ditch----
Col. Chandler. The last we saw of him he was a prisoner.
Mr. O'Donnell. Have the interrogations with Big Switch
returnees been completed?
Col. Chandler. Not completely. I do not believe. There are
still re-interrogations going on, where it is indicated.
Col. Trammell. I would say that the initial interrogations,
as such, using that as a word of art, have been completed. But
those interrogations have indicated additional lines of
inquiry. That is part of the intelligence processing, which is
still going on.
Senator Potter. Colonel, do you have any knowledge as to
whether the Far East Command has requested the United Nations,
in our delegation at the United Nations to establish an
impartial commission to investigate behind both lines as to
whether any prisoners of war are still being held against their
will?
Col. Chandler. I would say that the information I have is
of a negative nature on that. I was in the offices of the
United States delegation to the United Nations yesterday and
spoke to Mr. Ross. We were discussing another matter that is
going to be presented to the United Nations.
I just briefly mentioned the subject, and he stated no,
there had been no contemplation on our part at this time to
bring up the subject.
Senator Potter. What was the reluctance, or what is the
reluctance on our part to bring it up at this time?
Col. Chandler. There is no reluctance, particularly, sir,
except that the United Nations is not in meeting. Until such
time as they meet.
Senator Potter. I think they are supposed to meet some time
in April, are they not?
Col. Chandler. I believe that will probably be postponed,
sir, until shall we say the Korean political conference in
Geneva has concluded its meetings. Of course, there are
advantages and disadvantages to bringing this up in the United
Nations. If any of these people are alive, and we have, as
Colonel Smith points out, no definite proof that they are, but
say that they were, if somebody was alive, the Communists would
not dare to have that evidence suddenly presented, particularly
in the United Nations.
Senator Potter. It has been strange in that respect,
because from time to time they have released other prisoners,
even after their names have been known. I believe there have
been civilians interned over in China, for example. We had
testimony the other day that even after this became public,
some of those have been returned. Apparently no reprisals have
been made against those people. Whether it might be different
if they were taken up in the United Nations, where I assume the
propaganda value would be much greater, whether they would act
differently, I don't know. But I grant you that is a problem.
Col. Chandler. It is a technicality, sir. However, if is
enough of a technicality that were we able, with this document
that they have signed, to be able to hold it up in front of the
entire world and say, ``You have violated without any question
this particular agreement,'' it then throws them on the
defensive for the rest of the time. It would hardly be possible
for them to defend their position. Consequently we have gone
along with the State Department on determining some other means
of, if a person is alive, of getting him back, or of completing
the accounting.
Senator Potter. I assume that the interrogation of, we will
say ROK prisoners that escaped and got back or even some
returned Japanese prisoners of World War II, I assume that
probably falls in G-2 category rather than yours, is that
correct?
Col. Chandler. Yes.
Mr. Berry. I think we should correct the record in one
instance. The gentleman from the State Department informs me
that you are correct, that India is a member of the supervisory
commission.
Senator Potter. I did not know whether they had a
subcommittee.
Col. Chandler. If they have, sir, I must admit that they
have suddenly become a member. They are not provided for in the
armistice agreement as a member of the supervisory commission.
Mr. Berry. Do you know if they were added, John?
Mr. Brown. It is the five-nation commission which is to
supervise the armistice. The same general who was general of
the custodial troops acted for India on this commission. There
were several votes taken by the commission, actually, that were
a 3-2 vote. I just called in and checked that, sir. I did not
want to depend entirely on my memory.
Col. Chandler. Did you say repatriation or supervisory?
This is the document that was signed by both sides, in which
they listed Sweden, Switzerland, Poland and Czechoslovakia.
India is not mentioned in this particular article.
Senator Potter. That is the supervisory commission?
Col. Chandler. That is right. There were three bodies: The
Military Armistice Commission which, you might say, are the co-
belligerents. Then you have the supervisory commission, and
then you had the reparation commission.
Senator Potter. I think probably so that our record will be
clear, if you will check back on that, we will have it so that
our records will be correct.
Mr. Berry. We have Colonel Trammell of G-2 who can follow
on from here and answer most of the other questions that have
been brought up in the other hearings.
Col. Trammell. I am Colonel Trammell, from G-2, army. I
understand that the primary thing that you are interested in is
the information supporting United States government claims that
there might be persons unaccounted for. I will keep my remarks
along those lines, unless you decide to expand it by questions.
First I might say that in the Far East, the army, in an
administrative sense, has been the executive agent for the
three services. Therefore, a good bit of the information which
G-2 army has collected, it has collected in that capacity, that
is for all services. So some of the figures that I want to
present this morning, since we have kept them on a three
service basis including marines, I will give them that way.
Senator Potter. I assume you have a breakdown as to the
service?
Col. Trammell. We can in any case tell you which service is
involved. As executive agent, we collected as much intelligence
information on persons who might be held as possible, and of
course made a complete dissemination to the interested
services. But in the Far East, and while the repatriates were
being returned to the United States in Big Switch, we collected
information particularly on this subject, along with many other
subjects. We were the collecting agent in this sense for the
adjutant general's office.
We have an entirely different criteria than the adjutant
general. The adjutant general, as he has indicated himself, is
concerned with the administration of the public law, and other
army regulations concerning the accounting of individuals. We
are interested in any proof that would convince a reasonable
man of the existence of a fact. G-2 as executive agent has
compiled a list of our persons who have disappeared from United
States control and has sent them up in three main
classifications. In fact, this book here, we have sections 1, 2
and 3. Section 1, to identify it for the record, are missing in
action from all services. That really means missing in action
in the sense of all disappearances except known captured.
Senator Potter. Known captured are excepted?
Col. Trammell. Yes, all disappearances except known
captured. I want to say there is no disagreement between the
adjutant general's office and G-2 on this figure. We agree upon
that figure. That is applying adjutant general's standards to
what constitutes missing in action. Then section 2 are the
known captured, also applying adjutant general's standards. We
have no disagreement on that figure.
The third section are those section 1 cases----
Senator Potter. Those missing in action?
Col. Trammell [continuing]. Those missing in action, while
not meeting the legal standards required by the adjutant
general for inclusion in section 2, namely for known captured,
but are considered by G-2 to have been in Communist hands alive
at one time.
We consider them to be in Communist hands alive for a
number of logical reasons. One would be Communist admissions.
This would include, among other things, China publications as
the China Monthly Review, the Shanghai News, Peking News, and
radio broadcasts.
However, we are aware that this source might be deceiving
because it is known that the Communists on several occasions
have stripped battlefield dead of their dogtags, and taking
these tags, they would be in a good position to give
considerable details about a man's rank and serial number and
would give the appearance publicly of having a very authentic
record there. But at least, from a G-2 standpoint, in the
absence of any other proof, if the Communists say they have a
man alive, we say we will list them as being alive and in their
hands.
Senator Potter. How many would you have in that category,
with Communist admissions?
Col. Trammell. I don't think we have that particular
breakdown.
Senator Potter. I also assume that probably you receive
certain information from Communist prisoners of war, that they
were interrogated as to whether certain Americans were captured
in certain areas?
Col. Trammell. We exploit every source, but so few of the
Communists captured would be able to identify individuals. They
would be on a prominent figure, but the ordinary--but to the
Chinese, all the Caucasians look alike. Not much was produced
from that source. Other evidences which convinced us that the
man was alive would be of a positive nature--in other words, it
would not be speculation--would include, just for example, such
things as the cooperation, that is, information produced by the
cooperation of families who had actually received a letter from
their son or relative, and simply informed the adjutant general
that they had received that letter. That would be wholly by
their cooperation that we would get that type of information.
Senator Potter. Have there been many cases like that?
Col. Trammell. Yes, quite a few families have actually sent
in letters from their family where the family is willing to say
that that was the man's handwriting and it was a genuine
letter.
Then we have other cases of positive proof of being alive
but generally speaking other sources would be classified
sources on which it would be important not to go into details
on. But other intelligence sources would confirm this. I want
to emphasize that we cannot say that each person whom we had
some evidence of being alive on is alive today. All we can say
is that the Communists had some basis which should have
required them to account for those persons and they did not
account for them.
We have considerable confidence in our evidence as to these
people being alive, because we have had a chance to test it in
one respect. A substantial number of army personnel in Big
Switch who were carried by the adjutant general as missing in
action----
Senator Potter. Finally turned up?
Col. Trammell [continuing]. Finally were accounted for
which meant that they should have been classified as known
captured and the Communists should have accounted for them but
did not. G-2 runs a little bit behind the accounting of the
adjutant general's. Our figures cannot be as up to date as the
adjutant general's for this reason. We accept, and we feel we
should accept, any of the adjutant general's proof of known
dead. When we get known dead, we eliminate the man from our
list of our section 3 list.
That does not, in our opinion, excuse the Communists for
having accounted for him, but at least it removes him from
those classes of persons who might still be there now if we
have positive proof that he is known dead. Having in mind that
we run somewhat behind, for all services, on the eighteenth of
January 1954, because we had to pick a cut-off date for this
type of evidence, G-2 considered, for all services, that there
were 11,012 persons where there was evidence that they were
alive, that they had been alive at one time in Communist hands.
Also on that same day of those whom the adjutant general had
listed as known captured, 120 of those were not accounted for.
Senator Potter. One hundred and twenty that the adjutant
general had classified----
Col. Trammell. Classified as known captured were not
accounted for. In other words, both the adjutant general and G-
2 agreed that this certain number were known captured and yet
in Big Switch 120 of the known captured were not accounted for.
Senator Potter. You assume that that excludes the twenty-
one----
Col. Trammell. I have considered those in a separate
category, because we all have public knowledge of their status
of those that G-2 has listed in section 3 as having been in
Communist hands alive at one time, as of the eighteenth of
January, 892 were not accounted for. Among those we had some
evidence as late as April 1953 which we consider a positive
indication that the man was alive as late as that time.
Senator Potter. As late as April 1953?
Col. Trammell. As late as April 1953 we had convincing
evidence that the man was alive and in Communist hands. But
892, as indicated, were not accounted for in that group. The
two figures which I have just given you, that is, the 120 and
the 892 total the 1,012 which is the figure I started with as
of January 18. Because we run behind the adjutant general, the
figures will be revised downward materially because any time
the adjutant general comes up with a known dead we will
eliminate him from that list. But although he has perhaps
another week's processing to accomplish, we have approximately
six weeks' more work to accomplish.
At that time we will have a figure where we can advise that
there will be so many where there was positive evidence that
they were held and are not accounted for. By positive evidence,
I mean convincing evidence.
The least convincing of that evidence, however, are those
whom the Communists said were alive.
Senator Potter. That is the least convincing?
Col. Trammell. That is the least convincing, and we
recognize that many persons could be reported by them as having
been alive, and it could be completely false. We have no way of
judging that.
Senator Potter. You expect in about six weeks you would
have a final listing?
Col. Trammell. Yes, sir.
Senator Potter. In other words, the known dead would be
removed from those?
Col. Trammell. The known dead would be removed from those
otherwise indicated to have been held alive. Also I think I
should emphasize that we do not necessarily say those are alive
as of today. They could have been disposed of. But they did not
account for them.
Senator Potter. That you are saying is that there are 1,012
people that you have convincing evidence on who were alive and
in the hands of the Communists that have not been accounted
for?
Col. Trammell. Yes, sir; as of 18 January. Then there will
no doubt be a substantial figure 101 when we end up.
Senator Potter. And this includes members from all branches
of the service, is that correct?
Col. Trammell. This includes all the services, yes.
Mr. O'Donnell. Could you tie this into that figure of 944
for us now?
Col. Trammell. I think I should say one additional thing at
this point: The unaccounted for persons of which we are
speaking are only those of which we had evidence that they were
alive. If no evidence ever appeared that they were alive, there
could be a gray area, which we don't know whether they are
holding or not. But we consider this as a more conservative
approach.
Senator Potter. In other words, the figures that the G-2
presented about persons that they have no evidence on, I mean,
they classified them as missing in action with no evidence or
whether they were dead or alive, wouldn't be included in your
group?
Col. Trammell. That is right, and we wouldn't even pick
them up, because we would say that in the absence of that
evidence, we wouldn't carry them either.
Senator Potter. And the 1,012 are people that you have
evidence on where they were alive at one time?
Col. Trammell. Of the general categories which I gave you.
This 944, at the time the 944 figure was announced it was
announced by the Far East--at the time that they announced it
we were carrying a slightly larger figure, approximately 1200,
because we did not receive the proofs of death quite as rapidly
as they did. However, when they received our centralized list,
from all possible intelligence sources, they revised their
figure upwards to meet ours, still adjusted by known deaths.
Mr. O'Donnell. Was that new figure ever presented formally,
say, on September 24 or prior thereto?
Col. Trammell. Well, speaking strictly from an intelligence
standpoint, all I can say is that we disseminated our
information to those persons who would act. G-3 would be better
able to say exactly which figures they would have used. We make
the information available to them. I don't know whether I have
answered your question exactly about that 944.
Mr. O'Donnell. I would like to get a further breakdown, if
I can, Colonel. I know some of the difficulties you are facing.
But of the known captured that would be on the AG's list, you
have 120 not accounted for. Were those 120 listed on the
original list of 944?
Col. Trammell. Our complete information went to them and I
feel it would be accurate to say they must have been included,
because they were carrying them as known captured.
Mr. O'Donnell. In other words----
Col. Trammell. And they did not come back.
Mr. O'Donnell. In other words, all the evaluations based on
figures you presented were made by another unit?
Col. Trammell. Well, the actual figures selected for
presentation were made by another unit. But as an intelligence
agency, we kept them fully advised of the situation.
Mr. O'Donnell. The only thing I would like to get clear is
what figures were presented----
Col. Trammell. Maybe the fact that the 944 is all services
is causing some confusion.
Mr. O'Donnell. No, it isn't, not in my mind, because I have
been dealing with the 944 for the three services. But I am just
wondering if that figure was ever revised upward. Your figures
show 1,012 at one time, including both categories 2 and 3, and
then at one time around 1200. I am just wondering if that 944
figure was ever revised upward formally.
Col. Chandler. We did revise the figure we gave to the
Communists upward to 965.
Senator Potter. Did you submit to the Communists the list
as compiled by G-2?
Col. Chandler. No, as compiled by the adjutant general. And
we revised that based on his corrections. It went up to 965.
Senator Potter. I see. I assume that probably the adjutant
general was a little ahead, again, in the known dead.
Col. Trammell. If he had more current information about the
known dead he would have cut our figure down to 965, and that
would be what happened.
Senator Potter. From your experience with the known dead as
reported by G-1, are you in a position to give any estimate of
the approximate figure you will end up with at the end of your
six weeks?
Col. Trammell. The present indications, Senator, are that
of the cases being processed by the adjutant general, roughly
50 percent are coming up as known dead. But I don't know
whether we could establish that as a trend. I think we will
just have to complete our processing and then see, because
possibly the trend might change at the last and it might make
several hundred difference.
Mr. Berry. You are down to 77, are you not?
Col. Smith. Of the 610.
Col. Trammell. Yes, but we have not processed some of those
already completed by the adjutant general. That is simply a
personnel problem of processing.
Senator Potter. You have processed some of the 610,
however, have you not?
Col. Trammell. Yes, sir; we have processed some.
Senator Potter. Do you have any further questions? First do
you have anybody else, Mr. Berry?
Mr. Berry. No, but you had some other questions the other
day that you might want further information on as to any
patterns, and anything like that.
Senator Potter. Yes, sir. We have been talking pretty much
exclusively about the Pacific theater. I would like to have, if
possible, someone to develop what has happened in the European
theater.
Mr. Berry. Colonel Trammell will do that.
Col. Trammell. Before I go to the European theat 