Military


Russia

In the political system established by the 1993 constitution, the president wields considerable executive power. There is no vice president, and the legislative branch is far weaker than the executive. The bicameral legislature consists of the lower house (State Duma) and the upper house (the Federation Council). The president nominates the highest state officials, including the prime minister, who must be approved by the Duma. The president can pass decrees without consent from the Duma. He also is head of the armed forces and of the National Security Council.

Duma elections were held on 07 December 2003, and presidential elections on 14 March 2004. The pro-government party, United Russia, won close to half of the seats in the Duma. Combined with its allies, United Russia commands a two-thirds majority. The OSCE judged the Duma elections as failing to meet international standards for fairness, due largely to extensive slanted media bias in the campaign. Vladimir Putin was re-elected to second four-year term with 71% of the vote in March 2004. The Russian constitution does not allow presidents to serve more than two consecutive terms.

Russia is a federation, but the precise distribution of powers between the central government and the regional and local authorities is still evolving. The Russian Federation consists of 89 regional administrative units, including two federal cities, Moscow and St. Petersburg. The constitution explicitly defines the federal government's exclusive powers, but it also describes most key regional issues as the joint responsibility of the federal government and the regional administrative units. In 2000, President Putin grouped the regions into seven federal districts, with presidential appointees established in Moscow and six provincial capitals. In March 2004, the Constitution was amended to permit the merger of two of the 89 region administrative units, effective in 2005; further consolidation is expected.

Authoritarian Restoration

Some had spoken of Vladimir Putin’s "creeping coup" against the forces of democracy and market capitalism in Russia. Putin eliminated independent media by imposing restrictive laws. These led to the takeover or arbitrary closing of all independent national television channels. The international media watchdog group Reporters Without Borders ranked 166 countries in its annual World Press Freedom report. Russia came in 148th.

Security enforcement in the "war against terrorism" consists of harassment of those perceived as "persons of Caucasian nationality" - a blurry category of assorted non-Russians. The "war against corruption" has focused on a series of high profile prosecutions of wealthy Jewish Russian oligarchs [such as Berezovskiy or Khodarkovskiy], for alleged violations of commercial and tax laws. And the "war on drugs" gradually degenerated during the 1990s, focused on the drug dealer (baryga in popular slang), namely, the "Gypsy" [roma].

The administrative and legal obstacles to civil society organizations reduce the prospects for human rights. In 2004, Putin triggered an offensive against human rights organizations when a presidential speech on 26 May 2004 used language reminiscent of the Soviet era. Putin said that foreign "political, economic and media pressure" was being used to weaken Russia's ability to competing globally. Rather than defending "the real interests of the people", Putin said that the priority of some independent groups is "getting financing from influential foreign and domestic foundations, while others serve dubious group and commercial interests".

Putin asserted control over Russia’s energy industry and used government power - including imprisonment - against executives who oppose him. The world has watched with concern over his single-handed attempt to put Russia’s largest privately held oil company out of business.

With the quagmire of the war in Chechnya and the series of terrorist attacks in recent years -- of which the most serious to date have been the October 2003 hostage taking in a Moscow theater and the September 2004 school hostage massacre in Beslan, North Ossetia -- an increased preoccupation with security at all levels of public life was taken for granted by the public.

After Beslan, the coup was no longer creeping - it was running full steam ahead. President Putin used the horrific Beslan attack to consolidate autocratic rule. Putin's reforms were not a result of Beslan, but were a directed effort to expand the power of an already top-heavy presidential administration. The measures that were announced by Putin and were described as anti-terrorist measures were in fact planned long before Beslan. The President had planned for months to centralize political authority, and merely took advantage of the Beslan seizure to unveil the decision.

The total effect of President Putin’s new proposals was to move Russia a long way down the road to autocratic rule.

  • He eliminated the popular election of Russia’s 89 regional governors, and instead appoint them himself, subject to confirmation by regional legislatures. If a regional legislature fails to confirm the president's nominee three times, the legislature may be dissolved. Regional leaders in power whenthe law entered into force in 2004 were given the option of either serving out their elected terms or resigning early and seeking a presidential appointment to serve a new term. . Putin's initiative to take control over the appointment of regional leaders could lead to future problems because Russia does not have effective political parties that act as transmission belts for the rising generation. The problem with having the presidential administration vet every key leadership position in Russia is that it is very easy to tell the leader what he wants to hear. It eliminates an important check and balance against corruption.
  • He eliminated independent members of parliament, so that Russians could vote only for political parties rather than specific candidates. Political parties - like the powerful one headed by Mr. Putin - would determine the slates. In the December 2003 elections, district races accounted for every independent and liberal serving in the Duma. Under Mr. Putin’s plan, these races were abolished. The 2005 election law specified that, for future national elections, the State Duma will be chosen strictly on the basis of party lists. Electoral blocs will be banned and the threshold for a party to be represented in the State Duma will be raised to 7 percent of the vote. According to some experts, the laws worked to the disadvantage of parties not currently represented in the State Duma.

Both of these initiatives expanded the already strong ability of Putin to recruit a new power elite.

Supporters of Putin's policy of "recreating the vertical system of power" said that they would abandon skin-deep facade democracy in the name of genuine democracy that would facilitate the political and spiritual recuperation of Russia. After destroying the Soviets in 1993, Boris Yeltsin created elected authoritarianism with a democratic facade. And now Putin was trying to rationalize democracy in order to control the country and save the social fabric. In Russia, which has never had civil society before and where the living standards of the majority of the population are poor, elections often became a farce. Public politics and electoral democracy outstripped the real interests and requirements of the bulk of population. Thus the nation was largely been indifferent to the debates on the election procedure and the appointment of heads of Federation entities, as it had no bearing on the life of ordinary people.

On 01 October 2007 President Vladimir Putin said he could become prime minister in 2008, if the United Russia party wins the December 2007 parliamentary elections, and that he will head the pro-presidential party's list. "Heading the government is realistic, but it is too early to consider it," Putin said at a party congress in reply to a proposal from United Russia to head the government. He added that this would be possible under two conditions. He said the first condition was United Russia's victory in the lower house, State Duma, elections in December 2007, and the second is the election of an efficient person to the post of Russian president in March 2008.

Corruption is widespread throughout society, a conclusion supported by domestic opinion surveys, and was extensive in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches at the federal and regional levels of government. Manifestations included bribery of officials, misuse of budgetary resources, theft of government property, kickbacks in the procurement process, extortion, and official collusion in criminal acts. International organizations gave the country poor marks on corruption issues. In an October 2006 Transparency International report, the country received a score of 2.5 on the organization's 10 point index of the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among a country's politicians and public officials, indicating a perception that the country has a serious corruption problem.

Besides interfering in Ukrainian political affairs, Russia exerted pressure on pro-Western Georgia, supporting separatists in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. By refusing to withdraw Russian troop, Russia also encouraged separatism in Moldova's Transdniester region. And Russia has directed threatening rhetoric at the new-NATO Baltic states (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia.)

Military Prospects

Russia’s efforts to transform its Soviet-legacy military into a smaller, lighter and more mobile force continue to be hampered by an ossified military leadership, discipline problems, limited funding and demographics. Some steps by the Government of Russia suggested a desire to reform. There has been an increased emphasis on practical training, such as the Mobility 2004 Exercises, and the government is introducing bills to improve the organization of the military.

Despite increases in the budget, however, defense spending remains entirely inadequate to sustain Russia’s oversized military. Current troop strength, estimated at one million, is large in comparison to Russia's GDP and military budget, which continues to make the process of transformation to a professional army difficult. This was in part the result of the Soviet legacy and military thinking that has changed little since the Cold War. Senior Russian leaders continue to emphasize a reliance on a large strategic nuclear force capable of deterring a massive nuclear attack.

In 2002, a conscript’s salary was only 100 rubles a month, or roughly $3.50. Theoretically, the army provides all necessities, however, housing and food shortages continue to plague the armed forces. Problems with both discipline and brutal hazing are common as well. HIV infection rates in the Russian army are estimated to be between two to five times higher than in the general population, and tuberculosis is a persistent problem.

Such conditions and the poor combat performance of the Russian Armed Forces in the Chechen conflict encouraged draft evasion and efforts to delay their military service. Although the available manpower (males 15-49) for the Russian Armed Forces was projected at 39.1 million in 2004, only a tenth of eligible males did military service. Moreover, military officials complained that new recruit cohorts are plagued by increasingly incidences of poor education, communicable diseases and criminality.

The Russian government has stated a desire to convert to a professional army. However, implementation has been delayed repeatedly. Current plans envision a transition to a mixed force, in which professional soldiers fill the ranks of select units and conscription is gradually phased out. Some officials have talked of developing a non-commissioned officer corps to lead the professional army, but the military has yet to make any concrete investments in training or facilities that would begin this process.

The weakness of the 1990s is gone and forgotten, even though Russia has not regained the status of great power.