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Army Order of Battle

The South African Army is very un-American. The United States Army trains like it fights and fights like it trains - it has a single chain of command and set of units for both training and actual combat operations. But the South African Army, reflecting a British colonial heritage, has distinct training and operational echelons. The Colonial British Army consisted of Battalions, which were combat units, and Regiments, responsible for organizing, training, and equipping Battalions. The South African Army had two brigade headquarters, to which it assigned units as required for a particular operation. Its units otherwise fall under so-called “type formations”, which are essentially what most other armies call branches or corps, and of which there are nine: Infantry, Artillery, Air Defence Artillery, Armour, Engineer, Intelligence, Training and Support.

The army is organized into territorial forces and conventional forces, both commanded by the chief of the army through different command structures. This division reflects the army's dual mission -- to ensure internal security and to defend the country against external threats. The territorial forces are organized by region and are primarily responsible for internal security tasks, such as helping the police ensure law and order, combating terrorism, patrolling national borders, protecting strategic sites, providing emergency and disaster relief, and administering military reserve forces within their region. In 1996 most members of the former homeland military forces were being incorporated into the territorial forces.

The ten regional military commands were headquartered at Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, Johannesburg, Kimberley, Durban, Bloemfontein, Pretoria, Potchefstroom, Nelspruit, and Pietersburg. In 1996 the boundaries of the military regions were being changed to conform more closely to the country's new administrative regions. After the 1998 Defense Review, it was announced that the Army's nine provincial commands were to go, along with that of the other Arms of Service (AoS). In their place were five regional task forces: headquartered in Pretoria, Cape Town, Durban, Port Elizabeth, and Pietersburg, respectively. These will be controlled by the SANDF-level Chief of Joint Operations (C JOps), not the AoS chiefs.

Like the territorial forces, the army's conventional forces are stationed throughout the country, but their training and organization are separate from the territorial forces. The conventional forces fall under the operational control of the army headquarters in Pretoria, not under the regional commanders. The conventional forces are trained to confront traditional security threats, such as a foreign enemy.

The 2014 Defence Review concluded that the larger portion of South Africa’s landward defence capability must be configured and maintained as a projectable, multi-roled medium-combat capability with enhanced fire-power, manoeuvre and protection making it suitable for a range of contingencies. Such medium forces would be the bulk of South Africa’s contribution to enduring multinational operations, own safeguarding operations and other directed tasks. These medium-combat forces will be self supporting, having embedded armour, artillery, engineer, communications, intelligence, logistics, medical support and other requirements. This medium capability may be further augmented by heavy-combat capabilities. These forces also have the contingent obligation to support civil authority, the Police Service and protect critical infrastructure if so required.

The configuration and maintenance of a heavy-combat capability is required to deter South Africa’s potential adversaries and conduct landward operations in high-threat situations. It must be maintained at a core-growth level within a self-supporting armour brigade comprising: armour, mechanised infantry, artillery, combat engineering, communications, intelligence, logistics, medical support and other requirements. Although relatively small, this heavy-combat capability must be able to augment the combat requirements of other multi-roled medium and lighter capabilities, specifically where the threat situation dictates enhanced protection, firepower and manoeuvre. This core must be able to expand in response to changes in the strategic environment.

Under the 2014 Defence Review, the Army’s operational forces were to be grouped under a Land Command, with the combat elements organized into brigades grouped into three divisions, each of which has a specific operational focus. In addition, some specialized elements will be under direct command of the Land Command. The three divisions are:

1. A Mechanised Division, which will be the primary Army component of the overall deterrent capability, and which will provide medium and heavy force elements for peace enforcement and similar operations. This division is to have three brigades being an armoured brigade (tanks and mechanised infantry), a mechanised brigade (mechanised infantry and armoured cars) and a motorised brigade (infantry and armoured cars) as well as divisional troops such as reconnaissance, medium artillery, air defence and engineers.

2. A Motorised Division, which will provide border and rear area protection elements and the main force elements for peace support and similar operations. This division is to have six motorised infantry brigades. Some of the infantry battalions of these brigades must be multi-roled as light forces and others also developed for complex environments, such as mountain and forest operations. The divisional troops include some light armour and light artillery.

3. A Contingency (special operations) Division, which will provide rapidly deployable capability as well as the highly mobile elements to support the other divisions. The contingency Division’s highly mobile airborne brigade, air-landed brigade, sea-landed brigade and division troops will be structured and equipped to support deep operations, rapid deployment and early entry and follow-on forces.

As this future force design would only be achievable over the long term, the interim focus (Milestone 3) was to be on the motorised division, a contingency brigade (building block of the contingency division) and an armour brigade (building block of the mechanised division). Current capabilities were to be developed into multi-mission units with more lethal asymmetric capabilities that can execute a range of missions across the conflict spectrum and serve as interim counters to larger conventional forces. These multi-mission capable forces will be established at battalion and combat group level, and will be suitably armed and equipped to give the required multi-role capability, with particular emphasis on highly mobile, medium and specialist infantry capabilities. These units will be structured to allow rapid aggregation in various proportions for customised, mission-oriented application. They will also be capable of full integration with the military capabilities of the SADC Standby Force.

The Defence Force was in a critical state of decline, characterised by: force imbalance between capabilities; block obsolescence and unaffordability of many of its main operating systems; a disproportionate tooth-to-tail ratio; the inability to meet current standing defence commitments; and the lack of critical mobility. The current balance of expenditure between personnel, operating and capital was both severely disjointed and institutionally crippling.

In 2020 Parliament’s Portfolio Committee on Defence and Military Veterans raised alarms about the deteriorating abilities of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). In a presentation on 27 May 2020, the committee said that it is concerned that the defence force is fast losing its capabilities, owing to successive budget cuts. The committee said that this has had a resultant knock-on effect on the entire defence industry. “With the defence force in a state of decline, the country is losing its sovereign capability, something that will take many years to rebuild,” said chairperson of the committee Cyril Xaba. The decline in budget significantly inhibits the ability of the SANDF to provide effective training for individuals, single service and joint domains. As a result, training has been significantly reduced. The army lacked the infantry units to handle and sustain any serious contingency beyond its deployment in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and along the border; had good but mostly obsolete equipment from 1980-1990 and some from the 1970s and even 1950s, and lacked key capabilities such as modern air defense systems.

On 12 July 2021 President Cyril Ramaphosa has approved the deployment of 2,500 members of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) in response to the country’s violent riots and looting. Defence and Military Veterans minister Nosiviwe Noluthando Mapisa-Nqakula said that the deployed SANDF members will work in cooperation with the South African Police Service for the ‘prevention and combating of crime and maintenance and preservation of law and order in the Republic of South Africa’. This will be known as ‘Operation Prosper’ and the deployment will take place from 12 July 2021 until 12 October 2021.

The Modern Brigade was deployed during Operation Prosper, the SANDF’s response to the insurrection in July. It was drawn from 4 South African Infantry Battalion in Middelburg, 8 South African Infantry Battalion in Upington and 1 Parachute Battalion in Bloemfontein, supported by armour, air defence artillery and engineers. It was the first of three planned modern brigades; with a second to be based in Bloemfontein and a third in Pretoria, trained and held in reserve to quickly deal with any insurgency or terrorism anywhere in Africa.