AMAL
Afwaj al-Muqawamah al-Lubnaniyyah
Lebanese Resistance Detachments
Amal is an acronym for 'The Lebanese Resistance Detachments' (Afwaj al-Muqawamah al-Lubnaniyyah) as well as a word which means "hope" in Arabic. Amal was founded by the cleric Musa Sadr in 1974. Al-Sadr was a cleric of Lebanese origin who came from Iran and contributed significantly to improving the situation and position of the Shia community in Lebanon. At the beginning of his career he was a peace seeker and achieved his goals through a popular protest movement, demonstrations and political connections he created in Lebanon. But before the civil war in 1975, al-Sadr realized that the Shiites must establish a military body to protect the community from armed organizations in Lebanon and against Israel.
Amal was initially the name given to the military arm of the Movement of the Disinherited. This latter organization was created by Sadr as a vehicle to promote the Shia cause in Lebanon. A sense of embattlement caused generations of Shi’ites to join the ranks of Musa al Sadr’s Amal. In 1975 a military wing was formed and a year later Amal became an Islamic political organization. The Amal movement played a major role in Lebanon’s 1975–90 civil war before the creation of Hezbollah.
Imam Musa as Sadr, an Iranian-born Shia cleric of Lebanon Ancestry who had founded the Higher Shia Islamic Council in 1969. Sadr sought to bring about change in the Shi'i community through an evolutionary process of reform of the existing Lebanese political system. He attacked the left, which was gaining support among young Shi'is, as well as the established socio-political order, using radical rhetoric and appealing directly to the masses. As a Shi'i cleric he had a considerable advantage over leaders of other political trends, granted a high degree of legitimacy by the Shi'i masses. His political agenda stemmed from his interpretation of faith. "Faith", as one Arab historian explained, "was not about ritual, but about social concerns... Religion was not something that had to be quarantined and kept pure by stem guardians; it could be made to address modem needs. Thus, the man of religion, Rajul al-Din, need not hide and solely concern himself with old books and rituals," but should "bring back religion into the social and political realm."
Al-Sadr received some patronage from Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, from whom he received weapons. Amal was originally established as a body whose purpose was to protect the Shia community, unlike Hezbollah which is an offensive organization that set two goals for itself: to be a dominant force in Lebanon and to threaten Israel. A-Sadr, who was revered among the Shiites, was nicknamed "Imam" (spiritual leader). He was kidnapped during a trip to Libya in August 1978 and since then his traces have disappeared and he is considered a saint in his community.
Sadr, who at first established his own militia, later resisted a military solution to Lebanon's problems, refusing to engage Amal in the fighting during the 1975 Civil War. This reluctance discredited the movement in the eyes of many Shias, who chose instead to support the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) or other leftist parties. Amal was also unpopular for endorsing Syria's intervention in 1976.
Sadr went missing in August 1978 while traveling to Libya, most likely kidnapped by the Libyans, and his whereabouts have been unknown since. Sadr's disappearance wreaked havoc in the ranks of Amal. With no other figure to fill the leadership gap, personal rivalries and ideological disagreements eventually divided Amal into two distinct groups: a secular one, headed by Nabih Beri, and an increasingly more religiously radical one - al- Amal al-Islami - headed by Husayn al- Musawi, both claiming to faithfully represent Sadr's legacy. Sadr, elevated to the position of a hidden imam whose return was anticipated, in accordance with traditional Shi'i belief, still formally occupies the chairmanship of the Supreme Islamic Shi'i Council and still symbolizes the Shi'i awakening in Lebanon.
After al Sadr vanished, Amal lost much of its popular appeal and seemed to be little different from the other groups vying for dominance. When Mussawi sought to swing Amal to an Islamic path in line with the Iranian Revolution, he was booted out of the organization. In response, he created Islamic Amal in 1982, the precursor to Hezbollah. Islamic Amal sought legitimacy through resistance to the Israeli occupation and through Islam.
Several factors caused the movement to undergo a dramatic resurgence in the late 1970s. First, Shias became disillusioned with the conduct and policies of the PLO and its Lebanese allies. Second, the mysterious disappearance of Sadr while on a visit to Libya in 1978 rendered the missing imam a religious symbol, not unlike the occultational absence of the twelfth Shia Imam. Third, the Iranian Revolution revived hope among Lebanese Shias and instilled in them a greater communal spirit. In addition, when the growing strength of Amal appeared to threaten the position of the PLO in southern Lebanon, the PLO tried to crack down on Amal by sheer military force. This strategy backfired and rallied even greater numbers of Shias around Amal.
By the early 1980s, Amal was the most powerful organization within the Shia community and perhaps was the largest organization in the country. Its organizational strength lay in its extension to all regions of the country inhabited by Shias.
Amal's ideology had evolved somewhat since Sadr's disappearance, when Husayn Husayni (also spelled Husseini) assumed leadership from April 1979 to April 1980 and was then followed by Nabih Birri (also cited as Berri). Although its charter considers the Palestinian cause a central issue for all Arabs. In the mid 1980s, the Amal militia laid siege to Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut, in retribution for years of abuses at the hands of Palestinian liberation groups that operated in southern Lebanon. Amal stressed resistance to Israel, and Amal's leadership was perceived by many as being pro-Syrian. The Amal platform called for national unity and equality among all citizens and rejected confederation schemes. Amal was linked less closely to Iran than some other Shia organizations, and it did not propose the creation of an Islamic state in Lebanon.
In 1982, as a reaction to the Lebanon War, some small Islamic militia groups tied themselves together around extremist religious sages, and set up the Hizbullah. Hassan Nasrallah was one of the youngest founders. In those days, with fateful timing, the Iranians came to Beirut, for all intents and purposes, to aid Syria against the Israeli invasion in Lebanon. Hizbullah, as an organization, turned its gaze towards controlling the concentrations of Shiites in Lebanon, traditionally the role of the Amal movement.
During the 1980s, battles erupted between the two organizations. Nasrallah was one of the military commanders. He was injured lightly in a batttle with Amal in South Lebanon. The battles introduced politics into the picture. Iran supported Hizbullah, Syria backed Amal. When the fighting was about to go out of control, Syria and Iran forced the warring factions to accept political agreements.
The rise of Hezbollah's power at the expense of Amal led to a bloody war between the two organizations ("The War of the Brothers" 1988-1990 about 2,500 dead). Despite Amal's numerical advantage, it failed in the war because Hezbollah received close support and guidance from the Iranian "Revolutionary Guards". In 1990, a ceasefire was reached through the mediation of the organizations' two patrons - Syria and Iran. Since then, it was decided on a "division of labor" between the Shiite duo: Hezbollah is a military body and Amal is a political organization. Amal was disarmed and Navia Beri served as Speaker of the Parliament, a position he holds to this day.
However, the division of labor has not been faithfully maintained over the years. Hizbullah introduced representatives to the Parliament and two ministers to the government, and Amal established a number of small forces to assist Hizbullah, mainly for internal policing in the Shia communities - " A-Difaa al-Madani" (Civil Defense) and scout movements, which prepare children to become fighters. In the Second Lebanon War in 2006, a small number of Amal operatives were reported killed in southern Lebanon.
After al-Sadr's disappearance, his secretary Navia Beri / Nabih Berri , a secular lawyer with political ambitions, took command of Amal, and has headed Amal since. In the 1980s Berri was a minister in the Lebanese government and had served as Speaker of Parliament continuously since 1992, when the first post-war legislature was elected. Berri was more practical and much less radical than the leaders of Hizballah. He was also very close to the Syrians. His organization has lost its predominance however, due to infighting and lack of charismatic leadership.
Berri was described as temperamental, easily angered, and egotistical. Berri, unlike Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, was not accessible to his subordinates and was regarded as aloof. Berri tries to make all decisions himself, but he makes those decisions in the interests of his family members' finances, not for the sake of the party. Berri's inner circle acts as his gatekeepers; they use their access to information to increase their personal wealth. Berri acknowledged Amal's shortcomings in his conversations, but he appeared too old and tired to do anything about it.
Berri became wealthy and owns a large estate outside of Sidon. No one knows how Berri became wealthy, but his practice of taking a cut of investments in southern Lebanon was one source of income. Berri insists on becoming a partner in any new venture in southern Lebanon without investing any of his own capital, according to southern Lebanese businessmen. Berri scares off investment in the economically depressed south by demanding a share and the hiring of his cronies.
The Shia community paid a heavy price for the war between Fatah and the IDF in southern Lebanon. Today, the Shiites are ashamed to admit the fact that they accepted the IDF's invasion of southern Lebanon in 1982 with joy and breathed a sigh of relief after the Fatah terrorists were removed from their villages. When the Palestinians tried to return to southern Lebanon, Amal fought against them ("the war of the camps" 1986-1985), and killed more than two thousand terrorists from the Palestinia nmovement.
In the southern suburb of Beirut and in the Shiite center in the Lebanon Valley in the Baalbak region of eastern Lebanon, Iran established a new Shiite organization - "Hezbollah" (Party of God). It presented a different ideology, much more extreme than that of Amal. Hezbollah was founded by Iran in 1982, in which an Islamic revolution took place three years before. The new organization was much more attractive to young Shiites in Lebanon. Amal lost its charismatic leader "the Imam" al-Sadr, and was seen as a passive defense organization belonging to the past. Hezbollah called for a fight against the US and Israel, and gained great prestige after the severe attacks against the Marine headquarters in Beirut (October 1983, 241 American soldiers were killed) and the IDF headquarters in Tire five days later (60 killed, of which 28 Israelis).
By 1984, Amal was profoundly challenged by the more radical Hizballah, which supplanted Amal in the environs of Beirut. In 1984 Hizballah took control of West Beirut, pushing aside Amal, and after the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 1985 began challenging Amal's strongholds in southern Lebanon through a combination of violence, intimidation and indoctrination as well as investment in developing various social welfare services.Hezbollah’s success in legitimizing its cause through suicide bombing was underlined by the rush of its competitors, especially the Syrians, to use the tactic.
Its broad geographical base notwithstanding, neither Amal's rank and file nor its leadership was especially cohesive. Amal's various geographic branches did not embrace a single position but were subject to particularist tendencies. Moreover, its two leading bodies--the Politburo, headed by Birri, and the Executive Committee, led by Daud Daud--appeared to effect a balance between two competing socioeconomic groups. The members of the first group, personified by Birri, were educated, upper middle class, and secularly oriented (in relative terms). The second, exemplified by Daud, was composed of members who had been in the movement since its inception, who generally were of peasant origins, and who were religiously oriented. In late 1987 the first group was in control of most of the movement, its radio and television stations, and its weekly magazine.
As of early 2000 Amal held 10 seats in the Lebanese parliament and its platform calls for a return of Lebanon to the situation in 1982, namely, no foreign forces in Lebanon, including Palestinians. Amal engaged to this end in attacking the IDF and SLA. While Berri's wealth has increased, Amal appeared to be having difficulty raising money. Amal was losing members to Hizballah. Amal's street fundraising was also drying up. More Shia imams are directing charity money to Hizballah projects. Wealthy Lebanese Shia expatriates in Africa are no longer sending donations to Amal because they do not trust Amal leaders to spend the money on the people.
Amal supporters are often more anti-Hizballah than pro-Amal. Amal supporters cite Hizballah's extreme Islamist ideology as the reason they lean to Amal. At the same time, moderate, pro-Western Shia admit that Hizballah was clean of corruption, efficient at providing social services, and considered heroic for forcing the Israeli Army to withdraw from southern Lebanon in 2000.
Amal's armed element was no match for Hizballah's military wing. Observers estimate that by 2005 there were as many as 5,000 armed members of Amal, but they do not train or operate as an organized militia. At one time Amal commanded 15,000 militiamen, though it atrophied since then. Amal's armed element was not a "real militia", though Syria and Iran restrain Hizballah from routing Amal by force.
The Amal Movement, Hizballah's rival for leadership of Lebanon's Shia community, was corrupt and disorganized under the leadership of Parliamentary Speaker Nabih Berri, according to Shia politicians and citizens. Amal's leadership was referred to as "the thieves". Berri delivers social services and development aid to predominantly-Shia southern Lebanon. But the way he does it ("wheeling, dealing, and stealing," according to a relative of Amal's founder Imam Musa Sadr) gives him a poor reputation. While Hizballah uses Iranian money and donations to fund its social services, Berri simply redirects Lebanese taxpayer money to his supporters. Berri has been successful in obtaining international development aid, but many Shia doubt if it goes to the Lebanese people.
During the 2018 parliamentary elections, Hezbollah and Amal were the only two parties that formed joint electoral lists across the country’s 15 electoral districts. All other major political forces found themselves allied in some constituencies but competing elsewhere. Amal was increasingly weak (even if not in an electoral sense); it takes its marching orders from Hizballah and likely will experience internal squabbling and broader travails after the passing of Berri, who turned 81 in January 2019. There was no heir apparent in Amal, according to Hamzeh. All of the candidates come from Berri's family. Hamzeh said Berri's son, Abdallah, was being groomed, but Berri had not begun to prepare him until around 2005.
By 2020 Hizballah retained a solid grip over the Shi`a (its electoral strength notwithstanding, Amal enjoys no real autonomy or independence of action from Hizballah). Hizballah’s continued popularity with its Shi`a base means that it remains the hegemonic force within the country’s largest sect Although much of the Shi`a community stands behind Hizballah and Amal, many Shi`a professionals and much of the Shi`a intelligentsia do not identify with either organization. They are deeply troubled by Hizballah’s top-down, militarized structures; theological and populist outlook; and links to Tehran. They also feel alienated from Amal due to that organization’s legacy of corruption and militia practices.
Amal and Hezbollah’s relationship was volatile because Amal and its huge Shia support base had seen their role marginalized by the highhanded and unrestrained manner in which Hezbollah exposed the Lebanese political system. The traditional archaic clientelist system had previously allowed Berri to cater to his supporters, but times changed, making this system no longer feasible given Lebanon’s horrible collapse.
By 2021 thousands of Amal supporters in Lebanon’s overcrowded bureaucracy had seen their salaries plummet to less than $90, not to mention the disappearance of life-savings seized by the banks. Thus, most of these Amal supporters looked towards Hezbollah and their Maronite ally Bassil as the real reason for the collapse of this delicate corrupt system they have benefited from for so long.
Moreover, members of Amal were equally enraged by the fact that their supposed allies, at least those who are employed by Hezbollah as fighters and support staff, were paid in fresh dollars which they received from Iran and their criminal activities – such as the smuggling rings they operate into Syria. Through these smuggling operations, Hezbollah not only made millions of dollars of illegal money, but in fact siphoned subsidized products, which are paid for with Lebanese tax-payers money, including gasoline and other essentials, such as medicine and food.
Equally, within Hezbollah support bases and with its junior cadre, Amal was looked upon as the epitome of corruption. For these Hezbollah zealots, Amal, having been in power since 1990, shared in the spoils of war, as well as a peace time economy, making it morally unacceptable to continue to defend Berri and Amal.
Nabeh Berri will not be around forever, and Amal’s aspiring leadership will have to try to make a play to replace him – sooner than later. The fallout from such a move will have direct repercussions on their alliance with Hezbollah. Naturally, Hezbollah will then try to win over Amal’s support base – especially those who were born after 1990 and thus were not party to the violent conflict between the two sides during the Lebanese civil war between 1975-1990.
The Amal organization that existed before Hezbollah was disarmed more than 30 years ago and is now returning to military function. Hezbollah entered the campaign against the IDF "on small fire" since October 8. Since then, the funerals of more than 70 Shiite terrorists eliminated by our forces have been held in the villages of southern Lebanon. In the last few days, there was an unusual funeral for activists from a Shiite organization, who supposedly retired from military activity more than three decades ago. This is the Amal (Hope) organization, short for "Afwaj al-Makauma al-Islamiyya" (Lebanese Resistance Brigades). This is an organization that was founded about a decade before Hezbollah and was much bigger and stronger than it until the 90s. Amal activists can be identified by their spotted clothes and red ribbons on their foreheads. They have a rounded symbol with the name of the organization and green flags. On the uniform they wear yellow badges with the name of the organization.
It seems that Amal's significant comeback process as a fighting body began in 2021. On the anniversary of al-Sadr's disappearance, Navia Berry declared that his organization should mobilize for Palestine and face the enemy on the border with Israel. He delivered another aggressive speech on the anniversary of 2022 and added that "the jihad of our organization will take place alongside Hezbollah's struggle to protect the Lebanese border."
The comeback was not only verbal. In September 2021, the first military exercise of its kind was held in Amal, under the name "A-Ruab al-Azam" (The Great Terror), in the Nabatia region of southern Lebanon. The exercise mainly involved jeeps and vans and small arms. Since then, Amal's operational force has been training under the name "Abbas Force" which was documented on social media. Amal's training raised fears in Lebanon about the emergence of another force that would further strengthen the military control of the Shia community in the country.
Since the outbreak of the war in Gaza, Amal's military arm has been recruited for the war in southern Lebanon. Amal operatives function as firemen for fires and provide medical aid to Hezbollah's wounded. Amal mainly assists in the home front in activities within the Shiite villages. In the city of Tzur, Amal established a center for the reception of war refugees. The organization's activists on social networks sympathize with the terrorists in Gaza and are proud of the fact that they also kidnapped the navigator Ron Arad in 1988. They do not mention the fact that his abduction was carried out by a squad that left Amal and cooperated with Hezbollah.
On November 13, a huge funeral was held in the town of Nabatia for the organization's first "martyr on the way to Jerusalem" from the Abbas squad. The event was a show of strength by thousands of Amal supporters who raised its flags The Greens. It is important to note that not a single yellow Hezbollah flag was raised at the funeral. Many of the participants carried pictures of the "disappeared Imam" Musa al-Sadr. According to Amal's videos, they have anti-tank missiles in addition to light weapons and are also equipped with motorcycles. One video also shows a special unit for fighting in snowy conditions. On November 18, another development occurred, when Amal took responsibility for firing anti-tank missiles at Israel.
Amal in its new form is no longer the large defense organization that dominated southern Lebanon in the 1980s, but a half-civilian, half-military militia subordinate to Hezbollah. Amal has no Syrian patronage. As in the past, it is therefore dependent on Iran just as much as Hezbollah is for weapons and funding. The fighting of the Shiite duo bears little resemblance to the cooperation of Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza, working together in the "joint operations room". But Amal has a separate legacy and his comrades do not forget that they once were The rulers of the Shia community in southern Lebanon and they claim they have 4,300 martyrs in the war against the IDF since the 1980s. There are also quite a few sediments from the war waged by the previous generation, of the "greens" of Amal against the "yellows" of Hezbollah. But now Amal is a loyal partner of Hezbollah.
In the future, Amal, as an entrenched Shiite organization, can return to being a leading body if Hezbollah is severely damaged in the war against Israel. Until then, the organization will continue to be the "frontline command" of the Shia community in southern Lebanon. Israel should monitor the development of Amal's new military arm, which is now attacking Israel, along with other Hezbollah-affiliated militias along the border.
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