Japan Maritime Self Defence Force
Nihon Kaijyo Jieitai
Two kinds of operations are conducted by the Japan Maritime Self Defence Force [JMSDF] for the purpose of defending Japan: securing maritime traffic and securing Japanese territory. For Japan, which relies on foreign countries for the supply of almost all energy and food, the influence to national life is quite serious in case that maritime traffic is cut off. It can also be said that the impact to the world economy is significant in such case. Therefore, the JMSDF must be able to secure maritime traffic against attack by enemy submarines, surface ships and aircraft by effectively combining each operation such as surveillance, escort and defense of ports and straits. In case of aggression which aims at territorial occupation, it is necessary to stop it at sea in order to prevent direct damage to our territory. For that purpose, the JMSDF, in cooperation with the JGSDF and the JASDF, contributes defense of Japan by destroying enemy surface ships aircraft and, according to the situation, laying mines around the expected landing place.
The nation is vitally dependent on maintaining access to regional and worldwide shipping lanes and fishing areas, but it is incapable of defending the sea routes on which it relied. Its energy supplies came primarily from Middle Eastern sources, and its tankers had to pass through the Indian Ocean, the Strait of Malacca, and the South China Sea, making them vulnerable to hostilities in Southeast Asia. Vulnerability to interception of oceangoing trade remained the country's greatest strategic weakness. Efforts to overcome this weakness, beginning with Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko's statement in May 1981 that Japan would attempt to defend its sea lines of communication (SLOC) to a distance of 1,000 nautical miles, met with controversy. Within the Defense Agency itself, some viewed a role for the MSDF in defending the SLOC as "unrealistic, unauthorized, and impossible." Even the strongest supporters of this program allowed that constitutional and other legal restrictions would limit active participation of the MSDF to cases where Japan was under direct attack. Japan could, however, provide surveillance assistance, intelligence sharing, and search-and-rescue support to United States naval forces.
The large volume of coastal commercial fishing and maritime traffic limits in-service sea training, especially in the relatively shallow waters required for mine laying, mine sweeping, and submarine rescue practice. Training days are scheduled around slack fishing seasons in winter and summer--providing about ten days during the year. The MSDF maintains two oceangoing training ships and conducted annual long-distance on-the-job training for graduates of the one-year officer candidate school.
The naval force's capacity to perform its defense missions varies according to the task. MSDF training emphasizes antisubmarine and antiaircraft warfare. Defense planners believe the most effective approach to combating submarines entails mobilizing all available weapons, including surface combatants, submarines, aircraft, and helicopters, and the numbers and armament of these weapons were increased in the Mid-Term Defense Estimate. A critical weakness remains, however, in the ability to defend such weapons against air attack. Because most of the MSDF's air arm is detailed to antisubmarine warfare, the ASDF has to be relied on to provide air cover, an objective that competes unsuccessfully with the ASDF's primary mission of air defense of the home islands. Extended patrols over sea lanes are also beyond the ASDF's capabilities. The fleet's capacity to provide ship-based anti-air- attack protection is limited by the absence of aircraft carriers and the inadequate number of shipborne long-range surface-to-air missiles and close-range weapons. The fleet is also short of underway replenishment ships and seriously deficient in all areas of logistic support. These weaknesses seriously compromise the ability of the MSDF to fulfill its mission and to operate independently of the United States Air Force and the United States Seventh Fleet.
When two North Korean spy boats were later discovered in Japanese territorial waters, Japanese Naval Forces fired their guns in anger for the first time in 54 years. Japan’s sensitivity to spy infiltrations and abductions are driving Tokyo’s probe. With some evidence indicating the ship is from North Korea; Tokyo will have to weigh the merits of raising the ship against the economic cost and the political fallout from Pyongyang that may follow. Beijing’s willingness to allow the recent probe probably indicates that it will also approve a salvage operation should Tokyo decide to attempt one. Moreover, it may also indicate that Beijing has no connection with the ship’s activities or doubts that any connection can be drawn. Should Tokyo receive permission and decide to conduct the salvage, look for North Korea to protest and threaten to cancel future talks.
On 21 December 2001, Tokyo scrambled 20 patrol vessels and 14 planes in pursuit of a suspected North Korean Spy Boat that was cruising within Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The ship, which did not appear to be carrying any fishing gear, ignored repeated orders to stop. According to Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) officials, its patrol boats fired 13 warning shots from 20mm machine guns. On the evening of 22 December, the ship's stern caught fire, reportedly from a round fired by one of the coast guard patrol boats and came to halt 90 minutes later after it was surrounded by four Japanese vessels. While held at bay, the suspect crew used submachine guns to fire back at the patrol boats and injured two coast guard sailors. The boat sank abruptly at 2213 local time within China’s EEZ in approximately 90 meters (297 feet) of water.
This was the first time in 48 years that Japan's coastguard had directly attacked an illegally operating foreign ship. After much discussion and initial reluctance, Beijing gave Tokyo the approval to probe the sunken vessel. On 1 May, several Coast Guard Ships and two ships from a private salvage firm began what the JCG termed as a “criminal investigation” of the sunken vessel. Chinese ships were also in the area to monitor the probe. Divers wearing special suits were assigned to search both sides of the ship and its stern, while the manned submersible Hakuyo was used to search areas surrounding the vessel. Originally scheduled for six days, the search had to be extended into a seventh day because of sea conditions. Divers saw a gaping hole in the deck just below the bridge, raising speculation that the crew may have scuttled the boat to avoid capture. Overall, two bodies and four weapons (including what the JCG believes to be a RPG-7 rocket-propelled grenade launcher; built by the former Soviet Union), several cartridges and "an object that looks like a bullet" were recovered from the site. The corpses were badly decomposed and some bones were visible. Both bodies were male. According to one media source, the Japanese government, judging from physical evidence recovered so far, has concluded that the boat came from North Korea and it has begun considering punitive measures. Among sanctions being considered is a restriction on the port calls made periodically by North Korean ships in northern Japan (based on a report from the nationally circulated Sankei Shimbun, quoting government sources it did not identify).
MSDF recruits receive three months of basic training followed by courses in patrol, gunnery, mine sweeping, convoy operations, and maritime transportation. Flight students, all upper-secondary school graduates, enter a two-year course. Officer candidate schools offer six-month courses to qualified enlisted personnel and those who have completed flight school. Graduates of four-year universities, the four-year National Defense Academy, and particularly outstanding enlisted personnel undergo a one-year officer course at the Officer Candidate School at Eta Jima (site of the former Imperial Naval Academy). Special advanced courses for officers are also available in such fields as submarine duty and flight training. The MSDF operates its own staff college in Tokyo for senior officers.
The Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) had an authorized strength in 1992 of 46,000 and maintained some 44,400 personnel and operated 155 major combatants, including thirteen submarines, sixty-four destroyers and frigates, forty-three mine warfare ships and boats, eleven patrol craft, and six amphibious ships. It also flew some 205 fixed-wing aircraft and 134 helicopters. Most of these aircraft were used in antisubmarine and mine warfare operations. The MSDF's former unit structure emphasized anti-submarine and mine warfare.
1995 National Defense Program Outline
The National Defense Program Outline which determines Japan's defense capabilities, was reviewed and newly established in December 1995. The MSDF's former unit structure emphasized anti-submarine and mine warfare. After reorganization, the MSDF will become a more functionally balanced force capable of conducting a variety of operations ranging from surveillance and patrol in surrounding sea areas to such public welfare support as disaster relief activities.
In order to ensure the safety of Japan's maritime transportation when an emergency such as aggression at sea takes place, the MSDF must constantly keep at least one escort flotilla as a mobile operating ship unit so that it can be dispatched to sea areas where armed attacks take place. However, four escort flotillas would be needed in order to constantly keep at least one escort flotilla on a rapid response posture. This is because a considerable period of time is needed for basic training of personnel following relief of crew members of ships, as well as for repair of ships, and the period of time for an escort flotilla to maintain a high level of proficiency in performing duties under difficult conditions is limited. Consequently, the MSDF will maintain four escort flotillas. "Anti-submarine surface ship units" mentioned in the previous Outline were renamed "destroyer units" in the new Outline, because all patrol chasers (PC) exclusively engaged in mission of anti-submarine warfare were removed from service.
The previous Outline divided Japan's sea areas into five districts (defense districts) in conformity with the nation's geographic characteristics, for the purpose of coastal surveillance and defense. Two destroyer divisions were assigned to each regional defense district for surveillance and defense so that at least one destroyer division was always on a combat ready basis. Accordingly, the MSDF possessed a total of 10 destroyer divisions. Under the new structure of the MSDF, from the viewpoint that the MSDF must ensure such a posture at least to leave no room for deficiencies in the regions, it will possess seven destroyer divisions in order to be ready to deploy one each destroyer division in the five defense districts, as well as in the Tsugaru and Tsushima straits. Accordingly, the number of destroyers assigned to destroyer units (for mobile operations and regional districts units) would be reduced to about 50 compared with about 60 under the previous Outline.
Submarine units engage in surveillance and defense in major straits. In order to ensure the safety of Japan's maritime transportation, the MSDF needs to maintain the posture capable of deploying two submarines each in the three straits of Soya, Tsugaru and Tsushima, where necessary. In order to maintain such capability, it would be necessary to possess six divisions with 16 submarines, taking into account geographical relations between submarine bases and sea areas where submarines engage in surveillance and defense. The MSDF would maintain six divisions with 16 submarines.
Under the previous Outline, minesweeping units, as ship units which engage in, as necessary, removal and disposal of mines laid in main harbors and straits, were maintained with two minesweeping flotillas one each assigned to the East Japan and West Japan Sea areas, in conformity with Japan's geographical characteristics. Under the 1995 Outline structure of the MSDF, the two flotillas would be unified into one from the viewpoint of maintaining minimum functions.
Under the 1995 Outline, the number of land-based patrol aircraft units was set at 13 squadrons, compared with 16 set in the previous Outline. Broken down into details, 1) fixed-wing patrol aircraft units engaging in surveillance in nearby seas will be reduced to eight squadrons from 10, and 2) land-based patrol helicopter units engaging in surveillance and defense in main harbors and straits would be reduced to five squadrons from six. Aircraft previously called "anti-submarine aircraft" were referred to as "patrol aircraft" in the Outline because anti-submarine aircraft would engage in extensive surveillance patrols over the sea, not limited to anti-submarine missions.
As to fixed-wing patrol aircraft units, the MSDF previously possessed eight squadrons with 80 aircraft needed to conduct patrols at least once a day in Japan's nearby seas where necessary, and two squadrons with 20 aircraft capable of escorting ships. Under the new MSDF structure, the two squadrons with 20 aircraft engaging in the latter mission would be abolished because assignment of patrol aircraft for the escort of ships would no longer be considered from the viewpoint of defense buildup.
As to land-based patrol helicopter units, the MSDF previously possessed six squadrons, one each assigned to the two straits of Tsugaru and Tsushima, as well as four regions of Keihan, Hanshin, Japan Sea and Okinawa, to provide defense for straits and harbors. Under the new structure, MSDF would possess five squadrons, one each to five defense districts, from the viewpoint of ensuring the minimum posture and not creating a lack of regional capability.
Due to the MSDF structural changes, the number of combat aircraft was to be reduced to about 170 from about 220 possessed under the previous Outline.
2004 Mid-Term Defense Program (JFY 2005-2009)
The National Defense Program Guidelines in and after JFY 2005 and Mid-Term Defense Program (JFY 2005-2009) were adopted by the Security Council and the Cabinet on 10 December 2004. The latest changes to MSDF organisation was elaborated in the December 2004 guiding documents, the National Defence Program Outline (NDPO) and the Mid-Term Defence Program (MDP). The MSDF is to be reorganised by planned moves to consolidate the number of escort divisions of the destroyer units for mobile operations into eight, each of which is deployed four destroyers; and abolish one of Escort divisions for regional deployment. Additionally, there is a plan to consolidate the number of divisions of the submarine unit into five, flight squadrons of fixed-wings patrol aircraft unit into four and patrol helicopter unit into five.
The 19DD program is linked to a restructure outlined in the JDA's core policy document, the National Defence Program Guideline. This would see the number of Maritime Self-Defence Force (MSDF) escort divisions reduced to eight from the previous 12, with the number of ships in each increased to four from two to three. The plan envisaged four flotillas, each composed of two types of escort divisions: four DDH groups, consisting of one of the future helicopter carrier destroyers, one Kongo-class destroyer and two other destroyers; and four DDG groups, comprising one Kongo and three other destroyers. Thus a total of thirty two destroyers of various types are required, including eight Kongo class destroyers. A 19DD will be deployed with each group to provide protection against surface, sub-surface and air threats, to allow the Kongo to focus on missile defense. Exact classes making up the two types of escort division had yet to be released as of 2008. However, the two types of escort division are geared to become the main tactical units of the MSDF surface-combat fleet, providing the navy with more operational flexibility. Parallel to this change, the MSDF planned to reduce the number of its district-level escort divisions to five from the current seven.
The number of major surface combatants would drop from 52 to 47 during the FY05-09 Mid-Term Defense Plan. Exactly how this is to be achieved was not immediately clear, but one plausible scenario would focus on retiring the least capable and oldest vessels assigned to the district-level escort divisions. This would encompass retiring the single unit of the DE-226 Ishikari class, the two units of the DE-227 Yubari class, and three units of the DE-229 Abukuma.
