Societal Framework
Self
Instead of asserting their separateness and privacy as independent individuals, Iraqi Arabs tend to interact as members of a group-family, clan, village, neighborhood, tribe, etc. Group norms guide individual behavior, and Iraqi Arabs display a high need for social approval. Shaming is the primary instrument with which Iraqi Arab society enforces conformity. The group often determines a person's identity, status, and prospects for success in life. As a result, Iraqi Arabs are subjected to immense family and community pressures.
Group/Tribe/Clan
Within Arab culture, the group takes precedence over the individual. Loyalty to the group is highly valued, and responsibility is generally considered to fall upon the group in its entirety rather than on any particular individual. Distant cousins, neighbors, and friends can develop bonds as strong as any between close family members. Kinship ties are sometimes fabricated, denied, and manipulated to accommodate these social realities. Because of the primacy of the group, obligations of group members to one another are wide, varied, and powerful.
The basic units of tribal social structure are a series of concentric circles, from the outermost (the tribe) to the innermost (extended family). Historically,
the extended family had its own herd and was the center of daily activities. The sub-tribe is composed of a number of extended families tracing themselves back to one patrilineal father. The sub-tribe traditionally constituted the main defense unit. The tribe consists of four to six sub-tribes tracing itself to a real or fictional ancestor. The tribe's activities are mainly political, consisting of managing relations with other tribes and governments. At this level, the tribe is led by a sheik and advised by a council. The tribal system in most of the Shia Arab south is different from that of the Sunni Arab center-north in that the Shia sheiks often had to share power with the sadah-holy men-and the ulema. Finally, some tribes join together to form confederations. Iraqi tribes are characterized by solidarity, hospitality, and independence. Tribal values also include courage, gallantry, attachment to and mastery of arms, and manliness. In general, the degree of hierarchy and centralization in a tribe correlates with the length of time it had been sedentary. Tribal membership did not impose a rigid structure on behavior. The tribe provided its members with an identity, a sense of security, and a blueprint for the resolution of conflicts, but everyday behavior was pragmatic and adaptive to specific situations.
Most contemporary tribal groupings in Iraq still revolve around their old cores and occupy the same regions. (Certain surnames reveal the area or tribe from which a person's family originated: for example, al-Najafi, al-Samawi, al-Mashhadi, al-Zubaydi, and al-Asadi.). The importance of tribe, clan, and village affiliations has increased in Iraq despite urbanization and other changes, largely because of war, economic sanctions, and Saddam Hussein's manipulation of tribal identity and tribal values. Rather than eliminate the tribal sheik as a socio-political power, Saddam Hussein has bought their loyalty. Throughout the 1990s, Baghdad explicitly encouraged the reconstruction of clans and tribal extended families where they existed. Tribal customs began to permeate the state's legal system. The tribal roots of Baath Party leaders were emphasized. Tribal honor has motivated foreign policy decisions. By moving his family and tribe to the capital city and making them its rulers, Saddam Hussein himself has acted in classical tribal fashion.
The government also encouraged the manufacture of new "tribal" groups based on economic ties. These new "tribal" entities are predominantly based in the cities. Instead of the traditional guest houses, the leaders-who are in most cases middle class professionals-rent apartments to serve as centers of tribal social life. Some functions remain the same, however. The new tribes maintain order and settle disputes among their members and between members and other clans. Because of the corruption of state law enforcement agencies and courts, many Iraqis approach powerful and influential tribes to settle disputes or provide protection. This appeal for protection is taken as a measure of the strength and importance of the tribe to which the person appeals. Tribes therefore are careful to observe the custom.
Tribalism has become, along with Arabism and Islam, a major ingredient of Iraqi identity. Tribes also play something of a unifying role in contemporary Iraq. Many encompass Sunni and Shia sections. Even Saddam Hussein's Al-bu Nasir tribe has a Shia branch in the Najaf area. Tribal loyalty among Iraqi Arabs is far from complete but when combined with repression and social and economic benefits, Saddam Hussein's tribal policy
created a strong bond between the Arab tribes and the regime.
Kurdish tribes are similar in many ways to Arab ones. Traditionally, Kurdish tribes were pastoralist. Sedentary Kurds maintained close association with tribes from whom they received protection and direction. The tribal chief struck alliances or entered into tribal confederations with other groups. These confederations in turn paid varying degrees of homage to the dominant kingdoms and empires. More often, they exercised autonomy.
A large Kurdish tribal confederacy called a shiret is divided into a number of tribes or sub-tribes called tira. The tira is the primary political and landowning group. Membership in it is patrilineally inherited. The genealogical depth of the tiras varies. Each tira is led by a hereditary raiz (leader). The leader's position is hereditary within the clan and a new leader must have the approval of the senior male members of the tira. Growth of population and internal tension may lead a branch of a tira to split and form a new tira. The whole tira rarely camps in one unit, but generally divides into several tent camps called khel (composed of a number of households.) Each khel is led by an older man informally elected because of his prestige, power, and capabilities.
Tribal loyalties continue to dominate Kurdish society, and the allegiance of the majority of the Kurds has been to their extended families, clans, and tribes. Kurdish tribal leaders have played key roles in galvanizing and leading the Kurdish nationalist movement, but tribal ties undermined a more general and all-encompassing Kurdish nationalism. During the early 1970s, rivalries and enmity among the tribes led some tribes to cooperate with the government against the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP). Aware of the power of tribal leaders, both the KDP and its rival the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) have attempted to gain their support.
Modern Nation State
When modern Iraq was put together from three disparate Ottoman provinces, it lacked a common religion, language, or ethnicity. Both the religious split between Sunnis and Shia and the ethnic split between Arabs and Kurds have undermined a sense of shared Iraqi identity. Every Iraqi government has attempted with varying degrees of success to create a nation from the diverse elements within its boundaries. To that end, the regime experimented with methods ranging from pluralism and assimilation to oppression and annihilation. It also periodically embarked on explicit campaigns to create a culture that would be both uniquely Iraqi and common to Kurds, Shia Arabs, and Sunni Arabs. Under the current regime, this culture has somewhat awkwardly combined elements of Iraq's Mesopotamian, Arab, Islamic, and tribal heritages. However, no single formula has been capable of rallying all parts of the population. To the contrary, such fluctuating and contradictory policies further undermined the creation of a clear Iraqi national identity.
Despite these efforts, sectarianism, tribalism, and other forms of local communal solidarity have persisted in Iraq. Moreover, Iraq's circumstances over the past 20 years have forced Iraqis to revert increasingly to "pre-state" networks of religious sect or tribe. The regime's repression as well as the growing economic deprivation of both the Shia and Kurdish regions has fed a sense of Shia and Kurdish identity. As a result, the contemporary regime has reinforced Iraqi diversity and factionalism.
The 1991 uprisings in both the north and the south, both brutally repressed, constituted the most serious challenge to the cohesion of the Iraqi state and the identity of Iraqi citizens. They revealed the level of Shia and Kurdish disaffection for the regime. Significant distrust continues to exist between the Shia community and the government. However, because of the absence of a clear and common goal for the community and the virtual disappearance of their religious and secular leadership, the Shia have never seriously challenged the Iraqi state or expressed a desire for self-government. The tremendous tension that exists between the Shia and the Sunni government is not because of a Shia desire to separate from the state or merge with Iran, but from their desire to gain access to power and resources proportionate to their numbers. At various times in the modern history of Iraq the Kurds have raised demands ranging from independence to federal union with Iraq to the liberation and unification of "Greater Kurdistan." Most Kurds advocate autonomy in a federated Iraq as a middle ground. Overall, most Iraqis, with the possible exception of the more militant Kurds, want the unity and the territorial integrity of the state maintained.
Other Centers of Authority
Arab culture favors centralization of authority. Arabs are generally submissive and obedient to their superiors. Projecting a paternal image, leaders securely occupy the top of the pyramid of authority. Power in Iraq, according to one scholar, is personalized and finds "expression in the coercive and suppressive apparatus of the state and derives its legitimacy not from some formal (constitutional or even traditional) sources but from the reality and possession of power."
For more than 20 years, Saddam Hussein's regime has had lethally effective mastery of the pillars of authority in Iraq: the Baath Party, the military and security services, and the tribal and religious leaders. To maintain its power, the regime practiced repression, monopolized wealth, and manipulated religious and tribal values and affiliations. The destruction of those modern institutions that exist outside of state control (political parties, unions, etc.), forced much of the population to seek refuge in their traditional institutions (sect, tribe, family). The regime managed to expand its powers and authority by controlling both traditional and modern institutions.
Iraq has developed an intricate sort of family rule. Upon assuming power, Saddam Hussein appointed members of his extended family, clan, and tribe to key posts. Specifically, Iraq has come to be ruled by members of the Bejat clan, which is part of the Al-bu Nasir tribe and based in Saddam Hussein's hometown of Tikrit. The Bejat clan is made up of 10 households. When Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr assumed the presidency of Iraq in 1968, his al-Bakr segment gained clan leadership. When al-Bakr relinquished control in June 1979 to Saddam Hussein, power shifted to three households, the Talfah, al-Majid, and Khattab, the section from which Saddam descends. Allied with Saddam's tribe are neighboring clan and tribal groupings such as the Duris, the Juburis, the Ubaidis, and the larger tribal confederation of the Dulaim. These clans especially dominate the military.
To reinforce his rule, Saddam Hussein also had drawn on the models of past Mesopotamian and Arab rulers. For example, he had traced his ancestors back to the Quarayshis, Mohammad's tribe, and has claimed descent from the prophet's grandson Husayn. Historically, descent from the Quraysh tribe (and especially from its Hashim sub-tribe to which Mohammad's family belonged) was one of the means of establishing the legitimacy of a Muslim ruler. Claims of decent from Husayn (a Shia martyr) boosted Saddam's legitimacy in Shia eyes.
At the local level, tribal authority has come to play an increasingly important role. The authority of the tribal sheiks traditionally stemmed from both personal influence and largess as well as from nobility of lineage. In theory, especially among the Shia tribes, leadership was confined to one lineage. In practice, however, nobility often turned out to be a function of the success of the leader in defending the tribal lands and managing and resolving intra-tribal conflicts. Contemporary tribal authority largely stems from the fact that the regime delegated it to them. Tribal influence is derived from personal attributes such as generosity, honor, and the ability to deal with government officials.
The Shia in Iraq have no discernable local leadership or organization. The most notable opposition group is the SCIRI (The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq), but it is headquartered in Tehran and largely controlled by Iran. It is unclear how much support this group has among the Shia of Iraq. The clerical leadership of the community, usually a strong source of leadership, centered in Najaf and Karbala, has been systematically assassinated or executed by the regime. As a result, the Shia religious establishment has been greatly weakened.
The Kurds are represented by two major political parties with well-established leadership and organization: the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) under the Barzani family and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) under Jalal Talabani. Their leaders behave and are perceived as neo-tribal leaders. As long as they maintain the fundamental virtues associated with such leaders-courage, loyalty, dignity, and magnanimity-they remain popular. For the past 40 years, the KDP has been the most active Kurdish political party. Other parties, including some Islamic groups and tribal elements, also competed for a share of leadership.
There is a long-standing rivalry, occasionally erupting into civil war, between the KDP and PUK. The KDP controls the northwestern region; the PUK the southeastern parts of the Kurdish-inhabited areas. Both have limited appeal outside their tribe and region. The Barzani-led KDP is familial, with firm grass-roots connections through tribal and local elders and community leaders. The Barzanis are religious, with their followers being traditionalist and inward-oriented people. The T-b-led PUK represents a more urban, modern, and outward-looking population. The party is less religious, accommodates multiple political ideologies and agendas, and its leaders seldom consult local tribal or religious leaders.
Rule of Law
The regime's security services penetrated every aspect of Iraqi society, even in the Shia south. There was little organized opposition after 30-plus years of ruthless repression. The Kurdish north was an exception because it was mostly self-ruled.
In later years, the regime grafted tribal traditions, such as blood money and honor killings, onto the legal system and has respected tribal customs in criminal cases. There is some tension between tribal traditions and the regime's totalitarianism. At the heart of the tribal system is a fairly democratic process of consultation with elders, and, in some cases, the ability of tribesmen to challenge the sheik.
The rule of law is uneven across the Kurdish region. The KDP and the PUK have occasionally engaged in armed conflict. The KDP is now in control of the northwestern region, with its headquarters in Irbil; the PUK controls the southeastern portion, with its headquarters in Sulaymaniyyah. Both have weak control over their borders with Turkey and Iran. The Kurdish militia, or peshmerga, numbers between 50-70,000 men and women. However, Kurds cannot maintain border security or defend against Baghdad without outside assistance.
Role of State vs. Role of Ethnic Group
Each of the three main groups that make up Iraq's population-Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, and Kurds-is torn between two affiliations: as Iraqi and as a member of an ethnic or religious group. Because the Iraqi state is a relatively recent creation, the Iraqi identity is the least rooted. The ethnic and religious affiliations have deeper roots, greater historical weight, and a transnational character. Historically, Arab identity has been based primarily on language and a collective memory of their place and role in history. Kurds, despite speaking different dialects, are bound together by their lack of a state and their history of experiencing repression. These ethnic and religious ties have impeded the emergence of an Iraqi nationalism, created dilemmas of self-identification, and made relations among the three groups problematic.
The Sunni Arabs, as the ruling elite, have tried to balance and reconcile "Iraqiness" and a broader pan-Arabism. By its very nature, however, a pan-Arab ideology precluded a separate Shia identity and by definition excluded the Kurds. These efforts were accompanied by a divide and rule strategy, discouraging contacts between the Shia and the Kurds. The geographic location of the Sunnis in the center of the country facilitated this approach. In addition to benefiting from the current political hierarchy in Iraq, Sunni Arabs tend to support the regime if only because it represents a bulwark against possible Shia or Kurdish power.
The establishment of modern Iraq posed a major dilemma for the Shia and sharpened the problem of their identity. Unlike the Kurds, who constitute a distinct ethnic group, the Shia are Arab. In coping with their identity crisis, the Shia explicitly stressed their Arab culture as compared with their Iranian co-religionists. For the most part, Shia have made attempts to accommodate their religious identity to the framework of the Iraqi state. Although Shia resent the Sunni minority's repeated questioning of their loyalty and Arab bona fides, the Shia community has never unified behind a Shia cause. The Shia political groupings that did occasionally emerge lacked a strong, leading personality, unified leadership, and a well-developed organization. In 75 years of modern Iraqi history, there have been only two serious initiatives by the Shia aimed at effecting political change: the "Great Iraqi Revolution" of 1920 and the intifada of 1991. Both attempts failed. For the most part, the Shia are a silent, passive majority in Iraq.
The Kurds have consistently emphasized their separateness as an ethnic group, insisting, for example, on using the term "Kurdistan." For the past 30 years, Kurdish nationalism has been in open conflict with Iraqi Arab nationalism disseminated from Baghdad. Overall, the collective memory that Iraq had been made up of three separate provinces remains powerful.
