Egyptian Air Force (Al Quwwat al Jawwiya il Misriya)
Egypt has the largest air force in the Arab world, with over 550 airplanes, more than half of which are of Western origin. Unlike the U.S. military where all services fly aircraft, in Egypt, only the EAF flies aircraft. Not only does the EAF operate U.S. aircraft, but also French, Czechoslovak, Russian, Chinese, and Egyptian aircraft. Some items of U.S. equipment, SH-3 and CH-47, were manufactured underlicense in England and Italy. The U.S. supports only a portion of the total EAF inventory. Managing the logistics support for any one service is a difficult task, combining three U.S. Services as well as seven other countries under both Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Commercial Contracts.
As of 1989, the Egyptian air force had more than 500 combat aircraft and 30,000 personnel, of which 10,000 were conscripts. Its front-rank fighters consisted of sixty-seven multimission F-16 A/Cs and thirty-three F-4Es from the United States, as well as sixteen Mirage 2000s from France. A large inventory of older MiG aircraft (some of which were Chinese versions assembled in Egypt) backed up the more modern fighters. The air force had fitted many of the MiGs with advanced Western electronics, including radars, jamming equipment, and Sidewinder and Matra air-to-air missiles. The Air Defense Force exercised operational control of about 135 MiG interceptors, although their aircraft and personnel remained part of the air force. Egypt also planned to exchange crude oil for fifty Pucara light ground-attack fighters from Argentina. The air force operated seventy-two combat helicopters and a number of electronic-monitoring, maritime-patrol, reconnaissance, and earlywarning aircraft. Some of these aircraft were capable of detecting low-flying targets at great distances.
When the Soviet Union became Egypt's principal arms supplier in the 1950s, it also played a preeminent role in advising and training the Egyptian air force. Much of the Soviet influence on the air force's structure and organization still prevailed in the 1980s, although training and tactics were affected by the changeover to Western equipment and the advanced training provided by the United States and other Western countries. Flying units were organized into air brigades that were headquartered at a single base. Brigades officially consisted of three squadrons that each had sixteen to twenty aircraft. Many brigades, however, had only two squadrons. With its headquarters at Heliopolis near Cairo, the air force had about seventeen principal air bases out of a total of forty major installations, as well as reserve and auxiliary bases.
General Nasser started after the Suez War of 1956 to reconstruct and reconfigure the Egyptian Air Force (EAF) with the help of massive Soviet resources. At the same time, he had to recognize the nature of his own population — half urban and concentrated on only four percent of the land, prone to await plans and orders from above, and generally lacking education and industrial skills. Nasser, therefore, concentrated his efforts at recruiting from the elite, educating them as airmen, and making their profession respectable among their peers. However, his Soviet instructors tended to reinforce the Egyptian lack of initiative by their massive welded-wing formations and high-altitude tactics.
The Arab-Israeli War of 1967 began on June 5, 1967, when Israeli airplanes attacked the Egyptian air force and destroyed many airfields. Israel's war plans put high priority on quick action against the Egyptian Air Force because of the threat to its own more vulnerable airfields and vital centers. The striking nature of the Israeli success reflected great superiority in maintenance, leadership, training and discipline rather than numerical superiority. Israeli intelligence was outstanding, having pinpointed the location of every Egyptian squadron, revealed the layout of every air base, and mastered every detail of Egyptian Air Force operational procedure. During the course of the morning, the Israelis struck 18 of Egypt’s Air Force bases, cratering runways, blowing up aircraft, and destroying support facilities. The Egyptians lost over 300 of their 420 combat aircraft, and 100 of their 350 qualified combat pilots. When the war did break out and the stunning news of the total collapse of the Egyptian Air Force reached the Egyptian GHQ in a quick sequence of disastrous reports, Marshall Hakim Amer, Nasser's deputy and Minister of Defense, ordered a general ground forces withdrawal from the Sinai. The successful Israeli surprise attack, which destroyed the main body of the Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian Air Forces, opened the Arab ground forces to relentless air attacks and unhindered Israel ground forces pursuit.
After the June 1967 War and again after the October 1973 War, Egypt had to rebuild totally its air force. Only a few hours after the June 1967 War began, Israel had virtually wiped out the Egyptian air force. The government later tried and imprisoned the commander of the air force and a few other officers and purged many other senior officers. The combat efficiency of the air force, which had dropped almost to nil as a consequence of the war and its aftermath, was restored by renewed deliveries from the Soviet Union and intensified Soviet-led training of pilots and crews.
After the 1967 defeat, Nasser forced the EAF to practice against low-level attacks, hardened his bases, and engaged in electronic warfare. But the Egyptian air force, with a severe shortage of trained and qualified combat pilots, was unable to either challenge the Israelis effectively in the skies over Egypt or to launch significant retaliatory attacks against Israeli targets. The situation was so bad in fact that Nasser even admitted it in public. More and better planes — there had been speculation on an improved MIG–21 or so-called MIG–23 — would not alone help Nasser, although there was pressure to provide them. The Egyptians were unable to employ effectively what they already had.
By 1970, the combination of the EAF with Soviet flak defenses, formalized by Anwar Sadat after Nasser’s death in September 1970, brought a stalemate. Egyptian and Israeli air forces used the War of Attrition to conduct major evaluations of technology. The Egyptian Air Force (EAF) accepted over 100 MiG-21s and hundreds of other aircraft from the Soviet Union to replace Egyptian aircraft that Israel had destroyed on the ground in its preemptive strike on Egypt at the outset of the Six-Day War. Throughout the war, the Soviets blamed Egyptian losses on operator cowardice or failure to understand Soviet training.
The Soviets began to supplement Egyptian pilots with their “volunteers.” This probably required the use of Soviet ground controllers, since the Egyptians are not very effective in this area either, the language problem would seem to necessitate this and Soviet pilots have never been known to fly missions without using their own people for ground support. The Soviet aircraft-pilot-ground control option, however, ran a greater risk of significant escalation. In July 1970, the Soviet Union decided to "teach Israel a lesson" by patrolling the Canal Zone with MiG-21s. The Israelis responded by shooting down five Soviet MiGs on 30 July.
Unlike in 1967, when Egyptian troops had fought disgracefully, the Egyptian Army and Air Force had stood their ground against the superbly trained IAF, and the average Egyptian regained some lost pride.
When Egypt initiated the October 1973 War, the air force was much better prepared for its mission. Egypt's air reconnaissance along the Suez Canal and its air strikes against Israeli strong points provided essential support to the ground forces that were crossing the canal. The air force then shifted to Israeli targets in Sinai and engaged in frequent dogfights over Suez and Port Said. Despite the courage and competence of the pilots, Egypt's air force suffered the loss of more than 200 aircraft in eighteen days of combat. Egypt and Syria together lost an estimated twelve aircraft for every aircraft lost by Israel.
When the war ended, Sadat repeatedly pressed the Soviets to replace Egypt's losses with more advanced aircraft that could rival the American aircraft being flown by the Israelis. Angered by Soviet delays, Sadat ordered Mirage 5 aircraft from France and, later on, F-4E fighters from the United States. Deliveries of the latter began in mid-1979.
One of the first sales from the U.S. after the Camp David meetings was for two squadrons of F-4Es for the Egyptian Air Force. This sale characterizes an important aspect of the U.S. security assistance program to Egypt. The F-4s were sold as much for their political impact as for their military practicality. A far more practical aircraft to sell Egypt would have been F-5s -- cheaper, easier to maintain, easier to fly, and still effective. However, the F-5 wasn't as capable as the F-4, which was the aircraft IsraeL had beaten the Egyptian Air Force with in 1973. Therefore, the U.S. delivered the F-4s to the Egyptian Air Force despite the fact that they were unable to support that type of weapons system and despite the cost. It was politically important for the Egyptians to posses the same quality of equipment as the Israelis.
In addition, two batches of more advanced F-16s were delivered between 1986 and 1989. Delivery of a third batch, which would bring the total number of F-16s in operational units to 120, began in 1991. As of 1990, Egypt was negotiating a fourth batch of forty-six aircraft. Egypt originally planned to purchase forty Mirage 2000s from France, but as of late 1989 no decision had been reached on acquiring the remaining aircraft. In the 1990s Egypt spent as much as 80 percent of US military aid on the air force. As part of the 'Peace Vector Program', the Egyptian air force made four orders of F-16s, totaling 190 planes. About 130 F-16s had arrived and the last batch, which will be assembled in Turkey, will start arriving around 1997. Egypt also obtained approval for the purchase of 21 F-16C aircraft. The EAF modernized its F-16 fighters to have the capability of carrying and lunching AIM-7 Sparrow AAM and AGM-84 Harpoon anti-shipping missiles and GBU TV stand off guided bombes. The Air Force has continued to receive a flow of F-16 fighter aircraft from the US. By 1995, the EAF had a total of some 170 F-16A/B/C and D variant fighters in service. Planning for a fifth batch of F-16C/Ds under Peace Vector V program, was underway by mid-1995. The F-16 is now the backbone of the EAF (220 fighters were 196 are operational and 24 are in order).
Egyptians has also acquired a modern helicopter fleet. The EAF ordered an initial batch of 24 McDonnell Douglas AH-64 Apache attack helicopters in 1994, and was expected to take delivery of twelve more. These helicopters posses state-of-the-art night-flying equipment and carry up to 16 Hellfire antitank weapons and 38 rockets. These AH-64A attack helicopters are being upgraded to D Longbow version.
In 1997 it received SH-2G (E) anti-submarine helicopters to work with the navy. Egypt has enhanced its airborne early warning capabilities by taking delivery of five Grumman E-2C Hawkeyes. At the same time, the EAF began the process of trying to acquire ex-US Navy P-3C Orion maritime reconnaissance aircraft to replace its Tu-16 Badger-Gs. No decision has yet been made on this program.
With the cooperation of Chinese and Western manufacturers, Egypt developed a major domestic industry that assembled aircraft and produced parts. The Egyptian and Pakistani governments reportedly agreed in November 2000 on a major bilateral defense trade agreement which involved the refurbishment of Egyptian Air Force (EAF) aircraft in Pakistan in exchange for the supply of Egyptian F-16A/B spare parts to the Pakistan Air Force (PAF). The deal, which had been in preparation for some time, was reportedly finalized by Pakistan Chief Executive Gen. Pervez Musharraf and senior Egyptian officials at the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) summit in Doha on November 13-14, 2000. What was agreed, reportedly, included:
- The provision by Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) at Kamra, near Islamabad, of major overhauls and upgrades of some or all of the airframes and engines of the EAF's 13 Dassault Mirage 5 E2 tactical fighters; appr. 45 Dassault Mirage 5 SDE tactical fighters; less than 6 Dassault Mirage 5SDR tactical reconnaissance aircraft; and 5 Dassault Mirage 5 SDD operational trainers at the Mirage Rebuild Facility, which is part of PAC;
- The provision by PAC of major overhauls and upgrades of some or all of the airframes and engines of the EAF's appr. 45 Chengdu F-7B Fishbed tactical fighters at the F-6 Rebuild Facility, part of PAC. [Although called the F-6 Rebuild Facility, it undertakes major work on A-5, F-6 and F-7 types.] As well, similar work would be undertaken on some or all of the EAF's appr. 400 Mikoyan MiG-21PFS, MiG-21PFM and MiG-21MF Fishbed tactical fighters; appr. 10 Mikoyan MiG-21R Fishbed tactical reconnaissance aircraft; and appr.12 Mikoyan MiG-21UM/US Mongol operational trainers; as well as appr. 50 Shenyang F-6 Farmer tactical fighters; 5 Shenyang FT-6 Farmer operational trainers.
- The provision by Pakistan Ordnance Factories, at Wah Cantonment, near Islamabad, of a range of ordnance and munitions for the Egyptian Armed Forces;
- Other as-yet unidentified goods and services to be provided by Pakistan to the Egyptian Armed Forces;
- Provision by Egypt of spare parts for the PAF's appr. 35 F-16A/B fighters.
Egyptian Air Force sources indicated in January 2001 that the EAF was to acquire a significant quantity of Karakorum K-8 advanced jet trainer/light strike aircraft from Pakistan, basically to replace its approximately 25 Dassault-Breguet/Dornier Alpha Jet MS1 advanced trainers and approximately a dozen Dassault-Breguet/Dornier Alpha Jet MS2 light attack aircraft.
The improvement of the Egyptian air force is not limited to combat planes. The Egyptian air force, according to Israeli military analysts, have adopted Western command and control, attack techniques, support and aerial combat roles as well as training, most of it at US facilities. The Egyptians have also purchased advance ordnance, avionics and accessories. Egypt's defense capabilities were greatly enhanced by the acquisition of 180 Hawk and 1,000 Hellfire II missile.
The Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), AIR-1.4, SH-2G (E) Program Manager (PM) is responsiblefor the ongoing Program Management of the SH-2G(E) Program for the Gvernment of Egypt and forimplementing multiple programs to the SH-2G(E) weapon system, including Egyptian Depot LevelMaintenance (EDLM), upgrades, and tactics. The PM is also responsible for the development of a new SH-2G Search and Rescue (SAR) program for the Egyptian Air Force (EAF).
On October 9, 2009 the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Egypt of 24 F-16C/D Block 50/52 Aircraft and associated parts weapons andequipment, as well as other Non-MDE equipment and construction services. The total value, if all options areexercised, could be as high as $3.2 Billion. The Government of Egypt has requested a possible sale of 24 F-16C/D Block 50/52 Aircraft installed with either the F100-PW-229 or F110-GE-129 Increased Performance Engines (IPE) and APG-68(V)9 radars.
The EAF entered the third millennium with large upgrading and modifying programmers. Old L-29 is being replaced by advanced K-8E that will be locally built in Egypt and the German Group-105 will replace old HA-100 in the Egyptian air academy service. Egyptian Air Force: ongoing technical support, maintenance support and spare parts for C-130's, F-4's, F-16's, E2-C's, CH-47's, Falcon Business Jets, Apaches, and Black Hawks. There are construction projects for air base infrastructure for the Egyptian Air Force. They will probably also require control tower equipment and aircraft simulator support.
