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PLAAF Modernization

The Chinese air force had rid itself of many elderly aircraft, and acquired a few modern units by the late 1990s. The total number of Chinese fighter aircraft has apparently decreased by one-third over the past five years, from about 4,000 to about 2,500. Force improvements have been limited almost exclusively to the addition of a few dozen first-rate Su-27s purchased from Russia, with the remaining inventory consisting of obsolete designs which date from the 1960s. The large force of J-6 and J-7 aircraft [Chinese-equivalent MiG-19s and MiG-21s] are so antiquated as to be useless against Taiwan's F-16s and Mirage 2000s. The PLA Air Force has no in-flight refueling tankers or airborne warning and command platforms in service, though both are under development. As of early 1998, some 1,300 aircraft were stationed at the air bases within 500 nautical miles from Taiwan, of which some 600 airplanes had a radius of operation over Taiwan proper.

The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and PLA Naval Air Force (PLANAF) are equipped with approximately 3,400 fighters of mostly obsolete Soviet design. Modernization efforts through the 1990’s were highlighted by the purchase of Su-27 and Su-30 FLANKER fighters from Russia and a license agreement to produce additional Su-27s in China. Beijing also has continued to pursue domestic aircraft programs, including the FB-7, and upgrades to the F-7 and F-8 fighters.

The PLA has used some of its increased modernization funding to purchase modern arms from Russia, to include Su-27 air defense fighters and Su-30 multi-mission fighters. Domestic production of the Su-27 is proceeding, albeit very slowly. China also continues to upgrade fighters already in the inventory. The primary focus is on improving sensors, weapons, electronic warfare capabilities, and information connectivity on aircraft in order to increase the lethality of the otherwise outdated airframes. To bolster strike capabilities, China reportedly is developing an improved version of the FB-7. The twinengine FB-7 is an all-weather, supersonic, medium-range fighter-bomber with an anti-ship mission. Improvements to the FB-7 likely will include a better radar, night attack avionics, and weapons. Over the next 20 years, production efforts for the air forces are expected to focus on an indigenous 4th generation-type aircraft, the improved FB-7 fighter-bomber, and possible upgrades to the Su-27/Su-30.

Since the Gulf War, China has sought to improve the capabilities of its special-mission aircraft, with a focus on electronic warfare aircraft, C4ISR platforms and tankers. China reportedly has developed jamming versions of several of its larger aircraft, and may have several programs underway to deploy new standoff and escort jammers using bombers, transports, tactical aircraft, and UAV platforms. China has been actively pursuing an advanced airborne surveillance and control aircraft since the early 1990’s. In 1999, it introduced an airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft, the Y- 8AEW. The cancellation last year of the more capable PHALCON program forced Beijing to pursue other alternatives, to include the possible acquisition of A-50 MAINSTAY AWACS aircraft from Russia.

Chinese aircraft modernization has followed four parallel tracks, none of which have entirely solved the twin challenges of improving the combat capabilities of individual aircraft while maintaining some approximation of existing force structure:

1. Mid-Life Updates to existing models, notably the J-7 "Super 7" and J-8IIM modifications which reworked the front end of the aircraft, adding a much larger radar and ventral air inlets, along with various other less pronounced improvements.
2. Indigenous development of new models, which has produced results ranging from the indifferent J-8 and Q-5 to the evidently problematic JH-7.
3. Domestic development of foreign designs, including the FC-1 derived from the abortive Russian MiG-33 and the J-10 based in some measure on the Israeli Lavi, with neither effort having born fruit after a decade of effort.
4. Importing and producing foreign designs, which despite considerable negotiating publicity has thus far resulted in the deployment of a few dozen Su-27s, with the promise of dozens more in coming years.

Within a few years the increasingly elderly Jian-6 fighters will be retired from military service, creating a substantial replacement problem. The efforts of the PLAAF to develop a low-cost replacement have not proven particularly successful, and the service life of the J-6 is almost certainly being extended beyond original plans as a result. With the PLAAF mainly composed of the Jian- 7, Jian-8, Jian-10, and Jian-11 [SU-27SKM] series, the overall quality of China's Air Force will be considerably enhanced, though the total number of combat aircraft will be substantially reduced.

China began developing its air-to-air refueling capability in the mid- 1980s using a converted B-6/BADGER bomber as an aerial tanker. PLANAF fighters and tanker aircraft successfully transferred fuel during aerial operations over the South China Sea in April 2000, suggesting that the PLANAF has achieved a very limited, clear weather, daytime aerial refueling capability. Training, however, remains rudimentary and it will be several years before either the PLAAF or the PLANAF incorporate aerial refueling into routine operations.

China is investing considerably in the development of UAVs. China already has a number of short-range and longer-range UAVs in its inventory for reconnaissance, surveillance, and electronic warfare (EW) roles. Research efforts also are underway across a range of UAV technologies with several developmental UAV programs underway related to reconnaissance, surveillance, communications, and EW.

Since China received its first 4th-generation fighter, the Su-27, in 1992, training, tactics and operational concepts progressed slowly as China integrated the new technologies and capabilities into the force structure. This protracted learning phase has allowed China to prepare for the introduction of larger numbers of 4th-generation aircraft into its inventories. Over the past two years, new Su-27s and Su-30s have been more rapidly integrated into operational units. Meanwhile, air combat tactics continue to evolve and training is becoming more advanced. By 2010, the PLA will have all the elements of a modern air force and should have developed the operational concepts and the training needed to fight as an integrated force. Although not all the PLAAF and PLANAF will be equipped with modern weapons by that time, a core of units will be in place to allow the PLA to execute the type of regional combat operations envisioned by its current military doctrine.

Although by mid 2002 the PLA had approximately 3,400 aircraft, only about 100 were considered modern, 4th-generation fighters. Development and acquisition efforts have been aimed primarily at defeating the regional air forces, defending against aircraft at long ranges from China’s coast, defeating high-value air assets, denying U.S. naval operations, and striking other targets such as airbases and air defense sites. A force-wide modernization focused on the acquisition of advanced systems, improved training realism, new tactics to complement modern technology, and technically proficient personnel is intended to improve combat capability over the next decade and help to extend operations farther beyond land and sea borders. By the end of the decade, China is expected to have a more robust fleet of 4th generation fighters augmented by modern missiles, electronic countermeasures, and several AWACS-type aircraft. Although PRC pilot capabilities will remain poor by Western standards, improvements across the board will increase their potential.

From 26-29 January 2004, President Hu Jintao paid an official state visit to France. While in Paris, Hu increased support for the repeal of 15-year-old European bans on weapons sales to China (imposed after the Tiananmen Square incident). China is eager to acquire advanced weaponry to fulfill force modernization goals in order to surpass Taiwanese and regional capabilities as well as to create a military whose strength is commensurate with the economic and political power emanating from Beijing. A lifting of the ban should not be expected in the near term, though, as U.S. pressure and discord among EU nations will cause delay.