Submarine Shipbuilding
| Service Date |
Huludao / Bohai |
Wuhan Shipyard |
Jiangnan Shipyard |
| 7th Five-Year Plan | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| 1986 | |||
| 1987 | 1 | 1 | |
| 1988 | 2 | ||
| 1989 | 1 | ||
| 1990 | 1 | ||
| 8th Five-Year Plan | |||
| 1991 | 2 | ||
| 1992 | 1 | ||
| 1993 | 1 | ||
| 1994 | 1 | ||
| 1995 | 1 | ||
| 9th Five-Year Plan | |||
| 1996 | 2 | ||
| 1997 | |||
| 1998 | 2 | ||
| 1999 | 3 | ||
| 2000 | 1 | ||
| 10th Five-Year Plan | |||
| 2001 | 3 | ||
| 2002 | 1 | ||
| 2003 | 1 | ||
| 2004 | 1 | ||
| 2005 | |||
| 11th Five-Year Plan | |||
| 2006 | 1 | ||
| 2007 | 1 | 2 | |
| 2008 | 1 | 2 | |
| 2009 | |||
| 2010 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| 12th Five-Year Plan | |||
| 2011 | 2 | 2 | |
| 2012 | 1 | ||
| 2013 | 1 | ||
| 2014 | 1 | 2 | |
| 2015 | 1 | 2 | |
| 13th Five-Year Plan | |||
| 2016 | 2 | 2 | |
| 2017 | 2 | ||
| 2018 | 1 | 2 | |
| 2019 | 2 | 1 | |
| 2020 | 2 | 2 | |
| 14th Five-Year Plan | |||
| 2021 | 1 | 4 | 1 |
| 2022 | 3 | 1 | 2 |
| 2023 | 2 | 2 | 1 |
| 2024 | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| 2025 | 2 | 4 | 1 |
From the length and breadth, it can accommodate a total of six SSN or SSBN nuclear submarines. Nuclear submarine construction sequence at the plant is first completed module are built, then sectional construction takes place, with sections finally entering the Assembly hall. The plant seems designed to produce at least three boats per year, and possibly as many as six boats per year. Presumably these would be next-generation Type 095 attack submarines and Type 096 ballistic missile submarines.
From the perspective of China's completion of the world's largest nuclear submarine production plant, it is clear that China was poised to accelerate the construction of nuclear submarines. Although commercial satellite imagery confirm that China's project to build 095 and 096 nuclear submarines does exist, speculation on the number of construction is somewhat arbitrary. If the Chinese Navy really decides that it must build 10 to 12 nuclear submarines within three years, then it would not be surprising. After all, under the weight of the United States, the Chinese Navy must significantly improve the structural comparison between conventional submarines and nuclear submarines in order to deal with the current adverse situation in the Western Pacific.
At the same time, if it is really necessary to reach a larger construction scale as stated by foreign media, then the type 095 will account for 2/3, and the type 096 only accounts for 1/3, so a reasonable ratio is more scientific. In other words, only with a larger number of 095 attack nuclear submarines in service, can China's domestic aircraft carriers and 096 strategic nuclear submarines be safe.
The year 2019 marked a curious lull in Chinese submarine building. The next to last Type 094 Jin-class Ballistic Missile Submarine was delivered in 2018, with one mor ein the pipelien, and construction of the first of the subsequent Type 096 SSBN Tang-class Ballistic Missile Submarine was not expected until the early 2020s. The final Type 093 Shang-class Attack Submarine was delivered in 2018, and the first of a subsequent design Type 095 Sui Class SSN [possibly laid down in 2018] was not expected until the early 2020s, or possibly Type 093B/G cruise missile submarine, which is not expected until the mid-2020s. The conventionally powered Yuan Type 039 seems to have been completed at 17 boats, with the final unit delivered in 2017. A further three units have been anticipated for several years, but they may have been delayed by problems with their novel Li batteries.
Submarine building under the country's 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-20) may have paused before the end of the plan, with construction slated to resume under the country's 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-25). Correlation with the Five Year planning cycle is tenuous, since planning covers inputs such as the start of production with greater fidelity than it can predict outcomes, such as a boat entering service.
Submarine Building - Background
There were various reasons for the steady decline in the rate of construction of Romeo-class diesel attack submarines (SSs) in China since the mid-1970s. From as many as nine Romeos a year in the early 1970s, production fell to only three Romeo SS per year by 1983. The number of Chinese shipyards involved in diesel submarine construction remained the same since the early 1970s. At Shanghai Shipyard Kiang-nan Dock Company (Co), the largest builder of Romeo SSs in China during the 1970s, all submarine construction ceased in early 1980. At Fuling Shipyard, however, submarine construction began in 1978. Fuling had extensive unused construction capacity, which may be due to the inexperience of the work force and the diminishing importance of diesel submarine construction. The 1980-1982 production output of one submarine a year was far below its capability.
Diesel submarine construction at Wuhan Shipyard Wuchang and at Huangpu Naval Base and Shipyard dropped below those levels seen during the mid-1970s. This drop was primarily a result of a gradual shift in priorities at each shipyard. At Wuhan, a large proportion of the shipyard's resources had been allocated to submarine repair/overhaul. At Huangpu, in addition to submarine repair/overhaul, considerable emphasis had been placed on surface ship construction and construction support for the offshore oil industry. Submarine construction soon ceased at Huangpu in order to support those construction programs.
Traditionally, the most significant factor determining the level of submarine construction had been the low force level of the Chinese submarine squadrons. In the early 1970s, the force level of the five submarine squadrons was so low that a major diesel submarine construction program was initiated to expand the submarine force quickly to the level of 20 submarines per squadron. As a result of that construction program, all five submarine squadrons experienced rapid growth in force from the mid-1970s.
The Chinese had six submarine squadrons, divided equally among the three fleets. By the early 1980s the two squadrons in the North Sea Fleet (NSF) and East Sea Fleet (ESF) were at or slightly above strength. In the South Sea Fleet (SSF), only one of the two squadrons was near full strength. The sixth squadron, at Xiachuan Tao, was formed by the transfer of two Romeo SSs from Yulin. This was the only squadron that needed additional submarines. However, there was insufficient berthing space for more than four to six submarines at Xiachuan Tao. Because of this space limitation, it was doubtful that any significant expansion of the SSF submarine force would occur soon.
The Chinese continued with a limited construction program that can provide for export sales and replacements for older Romeos.
As of 2005, there were three shipyards involved in building submarines for the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), Bohai, Wuchang, and Jiangnan. The Bohai yard is involved with the construction of all nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs and SSBNs) while Wuchang and Jiangnan produce conventional-powered (diesel) submarines (SS).
By 2006 China was building modern diesel SS Type 039 Song at an average rate of 2 per/year, according to Vice Admiral Albert H. Konetzni, Jr. USN (Retired), former Deputy Commander and Chief of Fleet Forces Command. Konetzni predicted that China might have 75 modern submarines by 2020 [Statement of Before the Projection Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee 28 March 2006].
By 2007 there was some uncertainty as to whether the SONG would continue in serial production, or whether it would be replaced by the SS Type 041 Yuan, of which only one or two examples had been produced to date. Since the 1990s China has produced an average of two new conventional attack submarines annually, and has a demonstrated industrial capacity to produce at twice that rate, if required. Future force levels are also influenced by decisions on the pace of retirement of the SS Type 039 Song. The total number of diesel submarines in the Chinese inventory declined since the 1980s, when the "People's War at Sea" concept called for high numbers of low technology combatants. The number of submarines declined by about one-half. The large submarine force of that period, dominated by the 1950s-era ROMEO SS class, was drawn down during the 1990s and has been replaced by a smaller but more technologically advanced force of KILO SS, SONG SS, and YUAN SS. Each of these submarine classes, which are quiet platforms with anti-ship cruise missiles is an integral part of China's regional anti-access strategy.
China purchased Russian-built Kilo-class submarines and reportedly wanted to purchase associated technology to replace its aging, obsolete diesel-electric submarine force. The quieting incorporated into these submarines is required for successful operations in the open ocean operating areas which could facilitate the PLAN's wartime mission of keeping enemy combatants outside of strike range of the theater of operation. Long-range weapons are the means by which each individual submarine can influence a larger body of ocean, which is required with the expansion of the geographic scope of the maritime battlefield.
The US Department of Defense's Annual Report to Congress on "The Military Power of the People's Republic of China" for 2006 reported that the PLA Navy had 55 submarines, of which 50 were diesel and 5 nuclear. By the end of 2006 the Chinese Navy operated about 55 attack submarines the majority of which are diesel-electric powered. In May 2007, the "Annual Report" noted that the PLAN had 58 submarines, of which 53 were diesel and and 5 nuclear. These US Defense Department order of battle estimates appear to include only active operational units that are currently in commission, and do not units in reserve, or recently launched pre-commissioning units. China's next generation nuclear attack submarine, the Type 093 Shang-class, was expected to enter service in 2005. The new Type 094 Jin-class SSBN was launched in July 2004, but is not expected to be operational until around 2008-2010 [and thus does not appear to be included in the DOD total count]. Trends in nuclear submarines would suggest that priority was being given to modernizing a constant size force structure, rather than building up a larger force structure.
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