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Afghanistan - Politics

Central power does not mean a great deal. It means the promise of dividing up aid money. Two opposite dynamics are at work in Afghanistan’s government: on the one hand, the central government must gain control over de facto autonomous regions, in order to maintain order. On the other hand, those regions are de jure subordinate parts of a highly centralized state, and reformers eventually must find a way to increase rather than decrease their role in governance.

By early 2003 Afghanistan's northern parts were engulfed in the same factional rivalries that plagued the area in the 1990s. General Abdul Rashid Dostum's Junbish-e Melli-ye Islami party (National Islamic Movement) was battling former Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani's Jami'at-e Islami party (Society of Islam) in several northern provinces. A splinter group within Hizb-e Wahdat and loyal to Planning Minister Mohammad Mohaqeq was also battling Jami'at loyalists in Balkh Province. And the self-proclaimed "amir" of western Afghanistan, Herat Governor Mohammad Ismail Khan, was battling Pashtuns in his own province and in neighboring Badghis Province. Moreover, the Islmai'li Shi'ites had begun quarreling in Baghlan Province.

The Emergency Loya Jirga was held from 11-19 June 2002. The Loya Jirga, Afghanistan's "grand assembly," concluded nine days of meetings in June 2002, electing Hamid Karzai as President. The delegates - including over 220 women - elected by secret ballot the Head of the Transitional Administration, and confirmed ministers and other key figures. After decades of war, this marked the nation's first tentative steps towards a system where political decisions are made by a representative assembly of the people of Afghanistan at large and not based on military force. The process for the selection of delegates involved mass popular participation in a political exercise unrivalled in Afghanistan's history.

Karzai, an ethnic Pashtun selected as the interim head of the country at the Bonn Conference of November 2001, delivered major posts to several regional warlords in hopes of buying their allegiance. Some foreign observers found it more worrisome that the two most powerful warlords refused the posts they were offered. The warlords were brought in as vice-presidents, but a couple of them refused the vice-presidential posts because they wanted to retain their regional authority uncontested.

Whereas individuals such as Ismail Khan in the past have been essentially positive forces, two leaders seen as posing serious dangers to the authority and effectiveness of the Karzai government were Dostum, the ethnic Uzbek commander in the north, and ethnic Tajik Atta Mohammad of Jamiat-e Islami.

Dostum, considered Afghanistan's top ethnic Uzbek commander, previously sided with the Soviet Union during their occupation of the country in the 1980s. More recently he was one of several military leaders in the opposition Northern Alliance, also known as The United Front, attempting to regain territory lost to the Taliban. The Taliban's capture of Dostum's fortress and airfield in Mazar-e-sharif in 1997 forced him into exile in Uzbekistan and Iran. He returned in 2000 to join the Alliance, seeking to avenge that defeat. Dostum's force of some 20,000 militia fighters was composed mostly of ethnic Uzbeks who are members of his political group, Junbish-e Melli. Karzai appointed Dostum as his special adviser on security and military affairs, with effective control over security affairs in the northern Afghan provinces of Balkh, Jowzjan, Sar-e Pol, Samangan, and Faryab.

Atta Mohammad, from the rival ethnic Tajiks, fought against the Soviet invasion, and at the time of the fall of the Taliban commanded some 20,000 troops. Mohammad had close ties with Afghan Defense Minister Mohammad Qasim Fahim, with whom he was a member of Jamiat-e Islami, a predominantly ethnic Tajik political grouping.

Both Dostum and Mohammad joined the Northern Alliance, fighting alongside other Afghan commanders, as well as US forces, to help defeat the country's strict Islamist Taliban regime in 2001. But in the years since the Taliban was ousted from power, the same militias have turned on each other repeatedly in hit-and-run battles that have brought instability and lawlessness to parts of five northern Afghan provinces.

The involvement of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) helped bring Dostum and Mohammad towards an agreement in May 2002 to hold regular meetings between their factions. This worked to lessen active conflict, but fighting still occurred in Faryab province and Dar-I-Souf.

Since May of 2003, provincial governors have not been allowed to hold a military title. In Herat, in August 2003, President Karzai removed Governor Ismail Khan from his command of the 4th Corps.

In a 13-point declaration signed on 20 May 2003 by Afghan Transitional Administration Chairman Karzai and 10 provincial governors, one deputy governor, and two military commanders, the provincial authorities agreed to "follow and implement the laws, regulations, and legislative documents of the country and their job descriptions," Radio Afghanistan reported on 20 May. The provincial authorities also pledged to implement internal and external policies as directed by the central administration; not to interfere in the affairs of other provinces; and not to hold military and civilian posts simultaneously. Further, Article 11 of the declaration abolished special titles that some of the regional leaders had adopted for themselves, such as "special envoy of the head of state" or "amir," adopted by Dostum and Herat Governor Mohammad Ismail Khan, respectively.

Signatories to the 20 May 2003 Agreement:

• General Mohammad Ismail Khan, Governor of Herat Province
• General Abdul Rashid Dostum, Deputy Defense Minister
• Lieutenant General Atta Mohammad, Commander of Army Corps No. 7
• Lieutenant General Gol Agha [Sherzai], Governor of Kandahar Province
• Haji Din Mohammad, Governor of Nangarhar Province
• Abdol Latif Ebrahimi, Governor of Konduz Province
• Sayyed Mohammad Ali Jalali, Governor of Paktika Province
• Mohammad Abdul Karim Barawi, Governor of Nimroz Province
• Abdol Hayy Ne'mati, Governor of Farah Province
• Mohammad Eshaq Rahgozar, Governor of Balkh Province
• Sayd Ekramoddin Masumi, Governor of Takhar Province
• Abdul Hakim Taniwal, Governor of Khost Province
• Afzali, Deputy Governor of Badakhshan Province

In a decree issued on 21 May 2003, Karzai appointed Deputy Defense Minister General Abdul Rashid Dostum as a special adviser on security and military affairs. Dostum was instructed to dismantle Army Corps No. 7, commanded by his Jami'at rival, General Atta Mohammad. Mohammad, however, stated that he would not relinquish his command of the Army Corps No. 7, effectively challenging Dostum's job description. In a related development, Mohammad resigned from his post as "first deputy head of the Leadership Council of the northern provinces of Afghanistan," Balkh Television reported on 20 May 2003.

In late September 2003 troops belonging to the longtime rival commanders Dostum and Mohammed clashed in northern Afghanistan's Sar-e Pul province. The two commanders are nominally aligned with the central government, but are considered independent warlords, autonomously ruling the areas occupied by their troops. Their forces frequently engage each other in efforts to take control of Afghanistan's north. The United Nations and other mediators have repeatedly sought a regional truce, on several occasions brokering meetings between Dostum, Mohammad, and other local commanders.

In October 2003 the Afghan central government deployed police in northern Afghanistan in an effort to bring an end to the recurring battles between the rival groups. About 300 police officers from Kabul were deployed in the northern Afghan city of Mazar-i-Sharif to help monitor a cease-fire between the forces of the two feuding warlords.

The police force was token in size against the tens of thousands of militiamen loyal to each of the warlords. And yet, the deployment had enormous symbolic significance because it appeared to signal the start of a serious effort by Karzai and his international backers to extend the authority of the Kabul-based government.

Dostum and Mohammad signed an agreement on 11 October 2003 to extend their shaky cease-fire into other areas that have suffered from factional violence since the collapse of the Taliban regime nearly two years ago. Those areas include the provinces of Balkh, Samangan, Jowzjan, Sar-i-Pul, and Faryab. Dostum and Mohammad last signed an initial cease-fire on 9 October that involved only their private militia forces close to Mazar-i-Sharif. That deal came after a fierce tank and artillery battle advanced to within 20 kilometers of Mazar-i-Sharif. Some reports said as many as 60 militia fighters were killed.

US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was in Afghanistan 4 December 2003 on a one-day visit, during which he met with Dostum, whose forces had been accused of acting too slowly in disarming. Defense officials said that while Dostum's faction had handed over three tanks to Afghan security forces, his rival Mohammad had turned in more than 50.

04 January 2004 - A new Constitution

Following nationwide election of delegates, the Constitutional Loya Jirga was convened on 14 December 2003 and successfully concluded after 22 days with the unanimous adoption of the new constitution. 502 delegates from all over Afghanistan participated, 344 of whom had been elected by the Emergency Loya Jirga district representatives. 103 were women, over 20 percent of the total at the Constitutional Loya Jirga. With the completion of this exercise, Afghanistan can be said to be equipped with a progressive constitutional framework, which fosters the establishment of the rule of law as well as national unity. The new constitution articulates a number of values that are not only shared among the vast majority of Afghans, but also with the international community at large.

Afghanistan's Constitutional Loya Jirga approved a 162-article constitution on 04 January 2004, establishing a presidential system of government with a bicameral legislature. The president, both chief of state and head of government, is directly elected to a maximum of two five-year terms. The lower house of the National Assembly, Wolesi Jirga (House of People) is to be comprised of a maximum of 250 persons directly elected to five-year terms. And the upper house, Meshrano Jirga (House of Elders) is made up of representatives from provincial and district councils, as well as presidential appointees.

Behind-the-scenes negotiations led to a breakthrough on disputes that had threatened to derail the assembly after 16 days spent amending and debating a document to replace the revised 1964 constitution. The main split at the assembly was between the Pashtun supporters of Karzai's government and the Tajiks, Uzbeks, and other minority ethnic groups led by former President Burhanuddin Rabbani, Uzbek Commander Abdul Rashid Dostum and Islamic conservative Abdul Rabb al-Rasul Sayyaf. One issue that delayed the agreement was over the status of the national language. Dari and Pushto would be the two official languages, but the tongue of northern minority groups were been granted official status in their respective regions. The formal ratification of the country's seventh written constitution fulfilled a major goal of the internationally sanctioned Bonn process, paving the way for democratic presidential elections.

According to the 2004 CIA World Factbook, the constitution "highlights a strong executive branch, a moderate role for Islam, and basic protections of human rights." The June 2004 issue of "Peace Watch" by The United States Institute of Peace calls the constitution, "the most liberal...in the region stretching from Syria to Pakistan."

09 October 2004 Presidential Election

After delays from the original timetable agreed at the Bonn Conference, On 9 October 2004, Afghanistan, with the help of the UN, held presidential elections for the first time since the Taliban's fall in 2001. With over 8 million men and women voting, and feared violence from former Taliban forces and regional warlords less than expected, the vote was widely viewed as a success for Afghanistan's nascent democracy.

With over 98% of votes counted as of 26 October 2004, Karzai was poised to win outright with 56% of the tally. Runner-up Yunus Qanooni, an ethnic Tajik, leading figure in the Northern Alliance, and former education minister in Karzai's interim government, garnered 16%. Mohaqeq, leader of the minority Shia Hazaras, and Dostum, took 12% and 10%, respectively.

Though observers were pleased with the relative absence of violent disruptions to the poll, the elections did not come off without controversy. In the weeks before the election, the number of registered voters came to exceed the estimated number of eligible voters in the country, raising many eyebrows as multiple-registration was added to the list of fraud allegations. To prevent people from voting more than once, each voter's thumb was to be marked with indelible ink after casting a ballot, so they could be easily identified when trying to vote a second time. However, through the day it became evident that some of the markers contained an ink that could be easily washed off, thus undermining the protection against multiple-voting.

These problems, in addition to other claims of fraud and intimidation, prompted all 15 candidates opposing Karzai to call for a boycott of the poll mid-way through election day. Support for the boycott soon crumbled, however, under pressure to respect the election results, and due to the view that the candidates were selling Afghanistan's goals for their own short-term political gain. Candidates agreed to heed the opinion of a United Nations investigation into the irregulaties, and on 24 October 2004 runner-up Qanooni conceded defeat.

Despite Karzai's outright victory, and opponents' acceptance of the result, hopes that the election would provide a broad, multi-ethnic mandate for Karzai's reform agenda were not fully realized. Some were disappointed that the margin of victory was not larger. And perhaps more worrying, of the 21 provinces Karzai - an ethnic Pashtun - won, 19 were in the Pashtun-dominated south. In the other two provinces Karzai carried, he took pluralities but not majorities. Similarly, Qanooni seemed to bank the Tajik vote and Dostum the Uzbek vote. What is more, many Afghans believed the outcome pre-determined, with Karzai the American-ordained victor from the outset. Still, international opinion has viewed the election as a net positive and a cause for cautious optimism.

On November 3, 2004, Hamid Karzai was declared the winner of Afghanistan's first-ever presidential election, after the United Nations-Afghan joint electoral commission endorsed the election results as free and fair and announced that Karzai had won more than 55% of the votes. He was inaugurated December 7, 2004, for a five-year term as Afghanistan's first democratically elected president.

23 December 2004 - Cabinet Appointments

On December 23, 2004, Afghan President Hamid Karzai announced appointments to his Cabinet. According to criteria set by the Afghan Constitution, all Cabinet ministers must have at least a university education. Hamid Karzai also declared that candidates for Cabinet appointments had to renounce any nationality other than Afghan. Following the announcement, most of the Cabinet positions went to technocrats with work experience relevant to their assigned portfolios; a marked change from the interim Cabinet which included several wartime commanders representing various ethnic factions. The new Cabinet is to be subject to the approval of the Afghan National Assembly once that body is created pursuant to parliamentary elections that were scheduled for April 2005.