Afghanistan - Army
During the 1980s the Afghan army was divided into 11 infantry divisions and three armored divisions in late 1985. There were also two mountain infantry regiments, a mechanized infantry brigade, an artillery brigade, three artillery regiments, a commando brigade, and three commando regiments. The IISS estimated in 1985 that divisions were at about quarter strength, i.e., about 2,500 men. There were several elite Afghan army units: the 24th Airborne Battalion, and the 37th, 38th, and 444th Commando Brigades. The status of the airborne brigade was unclear in late 1985; it had revolted in 1980. The commando units were considered politically loyal but had endured heavy casualties. As a result, they were reorganized as co-dependent battalions.
The Taliban-led "Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan" lacked the administrative efficiency of a state. The military did not exist on a national basis. Some elements of the former Army, Air and Air Defense Forces, National Guard, Border Guard Forces, National Police Force (Sarandoi), and tribal militias existed, but were factionalized among various groups. The Taliban's "army" was a coalition of militia formations composed of assorted armed groups with varying degrees of loyalty, commitment, skill, and organizational coherence.
The ultimate objective of the post-Taliban military reform effort was the formation of an Afghan Naitional Army [ANA] that was effective and politically reliable. This process faced a number of problems, notably low recruitment and a high desertion rate. The most evident consequence of these problems was the army’s slow numerical growth, but on the horizon are also issues of military effectiveness and political reliability. The goal of reaching a critical mass of 20,000 troops, which would imbue the ANA with considerable influence in the political landscape, is achievable, but was dependent on increased international support and improved recruitment. But an ANA of this size would be far from sufficient to guarantee security on a countrywide level.
As of February 2005 around 24,000 people had been recruited in the ANA since its creation in 2002 and 28,000 people in the ANP. The country plans to have a trained 70,000-strong army and 50,000-strong police force by 2006. At that time there 20,000 people on standby in 34 ANA recruitment centers. The ANA can recruit 3,000 every month, but can only recruit 100 applicants from each province every month to maintain the ethnic balance of the Army. In addition to ex-poppy growers, many of the demobilised ex-combatants had also chosen to join the ANA.
The task of building an effective volunteer army of the size originally planned (up to 60-70,000 men), will be exceedingly difficult. The primary reason for this is socio-cultural; Afghan men are keen on remaining close to their families. Keeping troops in the ranks has perennially posed a major problem to efforts to form centralized military structures in Afghanistan. Pay rises could partially address this issue, but the financial sustainability of such a measure is doubtful at best.
The centerpiece on the 1st Battalion of the Afghan National Army patch is an outline of Afghanistan underneath a fountain pen and two crossed rifles. The fountain pen signifies the re-writing of Afghan’s history, and also the intent of the soldiers to learn and become better educated. Near the top of the patch the words “God is Great” is embroidered. Unit identification (1st Bn, National Army), is inscribed below two sheaves of wheat. Near the bottom of the patch a small black, red and green rectangle is placed to replicate the colors of the Afghanistan national flag.
Other Kandaks [battalions] that will be formed and take part in the training are expected to use the same patch, but with its battalion designator inscribed, (i.e., 2nd Battalion, 3rd Battalion, etc.)
Starting on May 1, 2002, the Afghanistan National Army’s first regular army battalion underwent 10 weeks of basic infantry and combat skills training at the Afghan Military Academy in Kabul. New recruits in the Afghan National Army (ANA) receive training, advising and assistance from U.S. Army Special Forces members.
U.S. Special Forces members, assigned to 1st Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group stationed at Fort Bragg, N.C., were tasked with providing the training for several battalions before commissioned and noncommissioned Afghan officers can assume responsibility for training future Afghan soldiers. U.S. Green Berets were faced with the daunting challenge of developing the nucleus of a national army with recruits representing all provinces within Afghanistan. The unit was ready to form one new battalion every two weeks if the Afghanistan Interim Authority’s recruiting efforts can supply such a demand. With resources initially available, training of up to four battalions could take place simultaneously.
Classes tought by U.S. Army Special Forces included basic rifle marksmanship, weapons maintenance class and drill and ceremony training. As part of the training, at a firing range at the Academy, recruits took part in a drill that was part of the first squad level competition conducted by U.S. Special Forces members which involved several squads of Afghan recruits competing against one another in marksmanship and a timed obstacle course run.
The training was in line with long term U.S. administration and U.N. Organizers' plans for providing for Afghanistan's internal and external security through a national army and police force. The training program and the formation of a national army in Afghanistan is considered one of the cornerstone of success for the Afghan government. The training program calls for U.S. forces to train up to 18 battalions of infantry soldiers to form the core of the Afghan National Army. Some Afghan military leaders are reported to have voiced that they would like to form an army of 200-thousand men, provided enough financing for the effort can be found.
According to U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Afghan recruits would be provided military training at the individual, squad, platoon, company and battalion levels. A cadre of commissioned and noncommissioned Afghan officers would also be formed to assume the responsibility of training future Afghan soldiers with Afghans possibly taking charge of the training program by the end of the year.
Air Force Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was quoted as saying that U.S. service members involved in training Afghans could be "in the low hundreds, at most". Training started with individual infantry skills and progressed to small-unit operations -- fire teams, squads, platoons and so forth.
The ANA first battalion, consisting of approximately 350 officer and enlisted trainees, graduated on July 23, 2002. A second battalion, of nearly 320 trainees, began week one of its training on June 8, 2002, under the supervision of French military instructors. U.S. trainers were to begin training a third battalion of approximately 330 soldiers on July 27.
More than 500 showed up during the initial recruiting drive for the 1st Battalion, but nearly half of them dropped out due to misunderstandings, among which the pay rate, and the belief that trainees would be taken to the US for training, be taught to speak English, and to read and write. Soldiers in the new Army initially received $30/month during training and $50 after graduation, although pay for trained soldiers rose to $70. Some of the recruits were under 18 years of age and most were illiterate. Recruits who only spoke Pashto had difficulties because instructions were given through interpreters who spoke Dari.
New Uniforms and equipment for the recruits of the ANA were provided by the United States. A number of countries are providing equipment, including one thousand AK-47 rifles from Romania, which are to remain at the training center. Heavy weapons include 82mm mortars, 75mm recoilless rifles and PKM machine guns. Equipment shortages were among the initial challenges to training the recruit. Some weapons were recovered from caches throughout the country, but not all were suitable for training.
According to SecDef Rumsfeld, finding the money to train, equip and pay an Afghan army was an issue with the size of a national army being proportionate to available funds. The United States and coalition countries were, according to him, trying to raise money for both the interim and follow-on international security assistance forces and for the training of the Afghan army.
Training for the ANA is being conducted at the Afghan Military Academy; many of whose buildings had either been destroyed or fallen into disrepair over the years. Parts of the Academy were being refurbished by the U.S. for use as a military academy once again.
The first ANA battalion is garrisoned in Kabul so as to be centrally located in the event it is needed to provide security. It is specifically assigned to the presidential palace amid security concerns for the president following the July 6, 2002, assassination of Vice President Abdul Qadir. The unit falls under the command and control of the Afghan Ministry of Defense.
The second ANA battalion graduated on August 15, 2002.
The third ANA battalion of more than 360 trainees graduated on October 3, 2002. The battalion was dispatch to a Ministry of Defense facility outside the city of Kabul. The battalion was the first to complete a 10-week program of instruction that culminated in a company-size raid exercise, and which included live-fire. The exercise included the use of 82mm mortars, PKM Machine Guns and SPG-9 Recoilless Rifles.
The fourth battalion under French instruction from the 27th Brigade d’Infanterie de Montagne, began training in early September 2002. The battalion, with more than 400 Afghan soldiers, graduated on November 13, 2002.
Training of the fifth battalion under US instruction was scheduled to begin on October 21, 2002, with more than 530 soldiers. The sixth battalion's training, under French instruction, was scheduled to begin in late November/early December with almost 270 soldiers. The sixth battalion completed basic training on February 9, 2003.
On July 23 ANA soldiers accompanied by US-led coalition troops were deployed in Operation Warrior Sweep, marking the first major combat operation for the Afghan troops. Six ANA companies numbering approximately 1,000 soldiers participated in combat operations in Paktiya Province's Zormat District, where they were tasked with killing, capturing, and denying sanctuary to anti-coalition fighters and with disrupting anti-coalition activity in the Zormat Valley region.
On August 14, 2003 at the KMTC, 104 ANA non-commissioned officers (NCOs) graduated from the fourth ANA NCO Course. This and previous ones before it were administered by the British Army. Future classes are to be conducted primarily by Afghan National Army instructors, with gradually diminishing British assistance as more Afghan instructors become qualified. The British Army, in turn, was to shift its focus on administering a more senior-level NCO Course.
On August 24, 2003, the graduation ceremony of the first Corps Staff Officer Course held at the KMTC took place, with over 30 Afghan National Army (ANA) officers graduating. The four-week course prepared Brigade and Corps staff officers in the grades of lieutenant to major general to perform command and staff functions at their respective levels. The course curriculum covered subjects including the role of a staff officer, preparing and conducting briefings, providing staff estimates, and preparation and issue of operational orders.
On August 30, 2003, the formal activation of Central Corps took place at Pol-e-charki.
On September 29 the 11th battalion was ready, boosting the force to about 6000. The 11th battalion was a combat support battalion for the Army's 3rd Brigade, and was capable of providing engineering, medical and scout skills.
By February 2004, $US 500 million spent on ANA and police force training. The ANA troop count reached 7000. On April 30, 2004, ANA reached 8,300 soldiers, with another 2500 in training.
On May 27 2004 the US Department of Defense announced an increase in the number of cohort battalions being trained at the Kabul Military Training Center, with an expected impact on the expansion of the fledgling army. Each battalion graduates with approximately 750 soldiers. Four cohort battalions (3000 soldiers) were simultaneously training at the time to learn markmanship, first aid, drill and ceremony, and communications. At the time, more than a third of all Afghan National Army soldiers were deployed forward to Herat, Kandahar, Gardez and Mazar-i-Sharif for security purposes. Training officers estimated that 13,000 more soldiers would be trained over the next six months.
According to an Associated Press account of May 29, 2004, with elections to be held in September 2004, plans were reported underway to have Afghanistan's 15 battalions of the ANA deploy around the country to bolster security. It was also reported that training for new units had been recently expanded to four battalions at a time. Another press account, carried by the Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and featuring Gen Zaher Azimi, spokesman of the Afghan National Defence Ministry, reported the existence of only 11 battalions.
A British House of Commons Foreign Affairs committee report found that about 10,000 members of the ANA had been trained as of 15 June 2004. According to a report published by the International Crisis Group in March 2004, the ANA's establishment was below coalition targets, was not ethnically representative of the population, and suffered from a high rate of desertion. A mid-March 2004 estimate suggested that 3000 soldiers had deserted. In the summer of 2003 the desertion rate was 10%.
Ministry of Defense control of the recruitment process initially led to a disproportionate representation of Tajiks in the ANA, prompting the establishment of recruitment centers in Jalalabad, Kabul, Gardez and Bamiyan in an effort to encourage a more diversified army. A number of measures had been taken to address the desertion problem but the strength of approximately 7,500 troops fell short of the 40,000 projected by Coalition officers. Afghan president Hamid Karzai had set a goal of an army of 70,000 men by 2009 and hoped to acheive a "central core" of 9,000 to 12,000 personnel by the summer of 2005.
On July 20, 2004 sixty ANA officers from the ranks of captain to colonel graduated from the second Command and General Staff College in Macroriyan, Kabul, according to Combined Forces Command officials. The graduates attended the three-month long course of advanced military officer training, conducted by an instructional cadre from the French Army, to gain critical Field Officer skills. Topics of instruction ranged from military tactics to the military decision making process to current theories of leadership principals.
By August 13, 2004 ANA units were deployed to various parts of the country, accompanied by American units on security missions. When fighting broke out in the Herat province on August 14th between Ismail Khan's forces and other militia factions, President Karzai ordered three battalions of the ANA and units of the national police to the area, near Herat, to intervene between the warring parties and start policing the region. About 1,500 ANA soldiers were deployed. A ceasefire was negotiated on August 17th.
On August 19th US Central Command announced the graduation of 103 Afghan military recruiters from the second class of the ANA Recruiting Academy. The instruction received by the graduates focused on teaching the latest recruiting methods, communication skills and marketing of the ANA. These graduates would be responsible for recruiting approximately 850 new recruits every three weeks to meet the Ministry of Defense's goals of fielding the ANA's four regional commands by this fall.
