LHA 6 / LHX / LHA(R)
Beginning in FY01, the Navy conducted an analysis of alternatives study to determine the preferred choice between a modification to the LHD class design or a brand new hull configuration, variously known as the LH(X) or LHA(R) class. The Navy intended to determine the appropriate design for the LHA(R), including a modified-repeat of the LHD design, a modified LHD, and a completely new design. LHA(R) may also benefit by incorporating C4I technologies from the CVNX program.
In March 2001, the Navy and Joint Staff approved and validated the LHA(R) Mission Need Statement. The office of the Under-secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics authorized Milestone ÒAÓ Acquisition status for the program, as well as its entry into the Concept Exploration phase in July 2001.
The LHA Replacement was the only class of ship in the SCN plan not intended to be a new design. The Marine Corps expected that their future requirements would include a 16.5% increase in ground equipment weight and a 40% increase in topside weight. These calculations did not include the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, which was planned to be introduced to the fleet in 2008. The future ACE may include as many as 12 MV-22's, 8 UH-1Y, 4 CH-53E and 10 F-35 JSF's, which would weigh approx 314,000 lbs more than 6 AV-8s. Also expected were 4 CH-60's as part of the Navy detachment. LHD's were designed for 2.5% growth in weight. The CNO's policy (1986) was for 5% growth factor in ship construction programs.
LHX amphibious assault ships were a conceptual next-generation assault ship intended to replace the LHA Tarawas. The Navy's initial plan was to conduct a service life extension program (SLEP) overhaul on the LHA Tarawa class amphibious assault ships when they reached the 35 year point in their operating life. The SLEP would provide another 15 years of life at a cost of nearly $1.0 billion per SLEP. The SLEP would extend the machinery operating life and provide communications upgrades. However, stability would remain a main concern and the LHA had limited capabilities to support 21st century littoral warfare systems such as the landing craft air cushion (LCAC) and MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft.
In the event the Tarawa SLEP was not funded, and if possible further units of the LHA-1 Wasp class were not authorized, the first of the LHX class was planned for authorization 2005 with commissioning in 2011, with at least five units to be constructed. The design would have likely been based on the Wasp design, apart from the use of a dry deck for hovercraft instead of a docking well.
This LHA Replacement schedule was viewed with great concern. First, it was unrealistic to believe that a ship being built to last until the 2050 timeframe would have little to no evolutionary design built into it. Second, funding for the replacement ships was an issue when stacked closely together as they are. This was not an affordable acquisition strategy.
As an all-new design, the LHX could be designed to be more capable and more cost-effective than a modified LHD-1. The opportunity for a "clean sheet of paper" design could take maximum advantage of new technologies, permitting large reductions in crew size that could reduce the life-cycle cost of the ship. Developing the LHX could cost more than a billion dollars and require several years of design and engineering work. If LHD-8 replaced the first LHA, then the $1 billion in development costs would be amortized over an LHX production run of as few as four ships, increasing the LHX's total unit acquisition cost by at least $250 million per ship. Since these ships would be the first built to the new design, they would have learning curve risks that could elevate their price further relative to the LHD-8, which was further along the learning curve.
Under Department of Defense guidance, the Navy conducted an analysis of alternatives (AoA) study to determine the best method of replacing the four remaining LHAs. This study, completed in the summer of 2002, evaluated the following alternatives: a repeat LHD 8 with evolutionary modifications, a modified LHD 8 (77 feet longer and 10 feet wider), upgraded to enhance its ability to operate the larger and more capable new-generation amphibious systems, and new ship designs spanning a wide range of size and capability.
By December 2002 a slightly longer and wider version of the Wasp-class amphibious assault ship was one of three designs under consideration as a "sea base" to replace four aging LHA-class "big deck" amphibious ships by 2015. A second alternative would be to continue building additional units of the Wasp class, with some improvements on the current design without enlarging the ship to make room for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and the MV-22. The third alternative would be an all-new design, with room for both new planes, including deck space to launch helicopters and conventional aircraft simultaneously. At about $3 billion per ship, the "plug plus" would be more expensive than the existing Wasp design, but cheaper than the $4 billion needed for a completely new design. The new design ship would feature a dual tram design, with the command and control island amidships and center deck, allowing concurrent rotary wing and fixed-wing flight operations. The result would be a ship with two flight decks.
The "LHD plug plus" would be 77 feet longer and have a flight deck 10 feet wider than that of the Wasp class. The extra room would accommodate about twenty F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, along with an assortment of helicopters and MV-22 tilt-rotor aircraft. The "plug plus" name referred to the addition of two hull sections, one 21 feet long, the other 56 feet long, to the current LHD design. The 22% increase over the Wasp-class would provide room for the F-35 and the MV-22, both of which are larger than the aircraft they replace. The new ships would carry an assortment of landing craft and more than 1,800 Marines.
LHA(R) would feature expanded aviation capabilities, such as the ability to carry between 20 and 25 short takeoff, vertical landing versions of the multi-service, multinational F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) under development by Lockheed Martin. This would be a major increase in capability and durability from the present LHA force that can only accommodate about a half dozen Boeing (BA) AV-8B Harrier II strike aircraft.
The LHA-Replacement concept was a significant change from the program as conceived and supported by a Center for Naval Analyses analysis of alternatives (AoA) conducted in 2000. That study preferred a new hull design of about 40,000 tons to 45,000 tons displacement. The LHA-Replacement was envisioned and supported by the Marine Corps as not another LHD, but rather a completely new class of ship that would remain in service through 2050.
The Naval Sea Systems Command intends to award a sole source contract to Northrop Grumman Ship Systems, Inc. (NGSS), Pascagoula, Mississippi, for functional design support for the LHA(R) Amphibious Assault Ship, which would replace the LHA Class Amphibious Assault ships. The work would include functional design support, integrated logistics support, and developing/refining ship requirements, focusing on maneuvering, sea keeping and motions analysis, general compartment arrangements, propulsion/machinery/warfare/ mission systems, navigation, total ship design alternatives, protection, signature control, and ownership cost reductions. The contract would include effort for FY03 and would include options for additional effort in FY04 through FY06. NGSS had designed and constructed all LHA and LHD Class Amphibious Assault ships and was beginning construction of LHD 8. As the sole designer and shipbuilder for these ship types, NGSS possessed the requisite knowledge and experience to satisfactorily perform the requirements.
The first ship in the LHA(R) Program (a modified "Plug Plus" LHD-8) was scheduled for an FY08 (formerly 2007) contract award (as LHD-9) and an FY13-14 timeframe delivery, with the following ships in the class being acquired every 3 years. Procurement of the first of four planned LHA(R) ships was part of a spiral development approach that continued the successful and low risk evolution of large deck amphibious assault ships that began with the Tarawa (LHA 1) Class and continued with the WASP (LHD 1) Class.
The Department was in the process of determining the preferred designs for the remaining ships of the LHA(R) class. This extended procurement and construction schedule would result in the last Tarawa-class LHA being retired in 2022, seven years past its 35-year expected service life.
The Marine Corps supported construction of a new LHA(R) design that would allow concurrent flight operations (rotary wing/tiltrotor aircraft turning on deck during fixed-wing launch and recovery) and increased vehicle stowage. Although the schedule remains somewhat uncertain, detail design was expected to start in FY07 with construction beginning in 2009, followed by the first ship delivery in 2013.
The Navy, whose FY06 budget included money for just four ships, ranks its Number 1 unfunded priority as a $417 million bill to accelerate delivery of the big-deck amphibious ship, LHA(R).
As of early 2002, Northrop Grumman, which had sought to position itself as a RMA firm, had expressed a preference for modifying Ingalls' Wasp-class amphibious ships rather than developing a new design for the LHA Replacement (LHA-R).
In March 2003, the Navy proposed to Congress a fleet of 375 ships, including thirty-seven amphibious ships and eighteen new MPSs capable of conducting sea-basing operations. Over a thirty-year period up to 2035, this would involve purchasing twelve LPD 17s (San Antonio class), ten amphibious ships of a new class (LHA-R) similar to the present LHDs but carrying more aircraft, twelve dock landing ships of a new class (LSD-X), and up to twenty-one new MPF(F)s, far more capable than the current maritime prepositioning ships.
On 11 February 2005, the Acting Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) (USD(AT&L)) approved the Acquisition Strategy Report for the Navy's Amphibious Assault Ship Replacement (LHA(R)) Program, thus enabling the Navy to proceed with their plans to negotiate an advance procurement contract for the first LHA(R) ship. This first ship, referred to as a Flight 0 ship, would be an enhanced aviation variant of the LHD-1 class. The advance procurement contract would include funding for long lead time material and systems engineering.
The FY06 budget requested $150 million for acceleration of the LHA(R) critical capability. In order to meet future warfighting requirements, the Navy and Marine Corps leadership was evaluating LHA (Replacement), or LHA(R), requirements in the larger context of Joint Seabasing, power projection, the Global War On Terrorism, and lessons learned from Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. The resulting platform would provide a transformational capability that was interoperable with future amphibious and Maritime Preposition Force ships, high-speed connectors, advanced rotorcraft like the MV-22, Joint Strike Fighter, and Expeditionary Fighting Vehicles.
According to a March 2007 audit by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), in 2005, DoD and the Navy determined that the LHA 6 program (formerly the LHA(R) program) had no critical development technologies because all of the ship's critical systems and equipment utilized technologies from existing Navy programs. However, the program office had identified six key subsystems needed to achieve the system's full capability, one of which was not mature. Almost 45 percent of LHA 6 was based on the design of the LHD 8 ship then under construction. A design review of LHA 6 was conducted in October 2005, and the Navy determined that LHA 6's preliminary design was stable.
The Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Science and Technology concurred with the DoD and Navy assessments concerning critical technology and the program proceeded without a formal technology readiness assessment. However, the Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence suite (C4I), Ship Self Defense System (SSDS), Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC), Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM), and Evolved NATO Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) were designated as key techonlogies. All were mature technologies used on numerous Navy ships. According to program officials, these technologies would not be modified for LHA 6 and further development would not be required for ship integration. The 500 ton air conditioning (AC) plants modified for LHA 6 were undergoing testing to ensure functionality. Finally, the Joint Precision Approach and Landing System (JPALS), a new GPS-based aircraft landing system, was not yet mature.
The AC plant was the only machinery/auxiliary technology that would differ from the LHD 8 ship, but according to program officials it would be a minor adaptation of plants used aboard Virginia-class submarines. Program officials stated that first article testing of the plant was in progress by March of 2007 and scheduled to continue through June 2007. According to program officials, the plant met all ship specifications during its initial testing.
JPALS would be used to support the all-weather landings of next-generation Navy aircraft, including the Joint Strike Fighter. The system, however, was not yet mature because its major components have not been tested together. JPALS had not yet started system development, but was expected to be fielded on other ships prior to its integration on LHA 6. Program officials stated that the LHA 6 design had incorporated space for the system based on initial estimates of its specifications. Furthermore, the legacy aviation control system, SPN-41A, would serve as the backup technology in the event that JPALS development was delayed beyond LHA 6 deployment and the introduction of the F-35 JSF. According to the program office, JPALS was not needed to achieve the operational requirements of LHA 6 and SPN-41A was sufficient to land the F-35 JSF if the aircraft was fielded before JPALS.
According to program officials, one area of risk for the ship was the development of new software code for a portion of the machinery control system. LHA 6 would be dependent on LHD 8 to provide 75 percent of its machinery control system software, as well as the automated bridge and diesel generator control systems software. Program officials said that this software had not yet been tested or demonstrated. All other software would be used on other Navy systems prior to LHA 6's delivery. Program officials expected LHA 6's schedule to accommodate this software development.
The Navy finalized a fixed-price incentive contract for detail design and construction with Northrop Grumman Ship Systems in June 2007. According to the program office, design of the ship was about 30 percent complete.
Navy officials noted that a production readiness review that would assess design progress was scheduled for March 2008.
