Joint Cargo Aircraft [JCA]
It was announced on June 13, 2007, that the U.S. Army and the U.S. Air Force selected the team led by L-3 Communications that also included Alenia North America (a Finmeccanica Company), Boeing Integrated Defense Systems, and Global Military Aircraft Systems (GMAS) to build the Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA). The award was for a baseline contract estimated at $2.04 billion over the life of the program to supply a minimum of 78 C-27J Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) to the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force.
On June 22, 2007, the Team JCA partnership led by Raytheon Company and EADS CASA North America filed a protest with the Government Accountability Office to contest the Joint Cargo Aircraft selection process. The protest centered on three points, as enunciated by Team JCA:
- The JCA source selection board rated Team JCA equal to its competitor on all non-price factors in its criteria, including technical, logistics, management/production and past performance.
- Raytheon beat its competitor's price by more than 15 percent
- There were errors in the specific evaluation of data and the application of the evaluation criteria
In late 2005, the Department of Defense directed the Army's "Future Cargo Aircraft" program and the Air Force's "Light Cargo Aircraft" program be merged into the single "Joint Cargo Aircraft" program. In March 2005, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council approved the Army's Initial Capabilities Document. That document identified the Army's capability gap in organic airlift. The JCA Request for Proposals was released 17 March 2006 after the Acquisition Strategy Report was signed that morning.
With the signing of a memorandum of agreement 20 June 2006, the vice chiefs of staff of the Air Force and the Army have agreed on a way ahead for converging the service's independent acquisition programs for a joint cargo aircraft. The Air Force and the Army agreed in June 2006 that the aircraft each needs will have the same basic platform, with some intra-service requirements. The services signed a memorandum of agreement (MOA) which outlined missions, roles, command and control, service responsibilities and the way ahead for doctrine, organizations, training, maintenance, logistics, leadership, personnel and facilities. The memorandum of agreement signed last month by the two services to pave the way ahead for the aircraft's development defies all who said it would never happen. A Joint Program Office, comprised of personnel from both branches of service, will open Oct. 1 in Huntsville, Ala., with the Army taking the lead.
The Joint Cargo Aircraft will be a small aircraft developed for both the Army and the Air Force. It will be smaller than the Air Force's C-130 Hercules, but larger than the Army's C-23 Sherpa.
Most likely, the aircraft will be a variant of an aircraft already available in the civilian sector, and the manufacturer will modify it for military use. Joint Cargo Aircraft will not build, from the bottom up, a new airplane and take six or seven years to get it in the field. The services looked for something to fill this capability gap now. Purchasing an aircraft already being manufactured by a contractor would ensure a lower cost acquisition and a speedier delivery of the capability. Both the services agree the selection will be based on speed, range, capacity, and the ability to land on unimproved runways or in more austere locations.
Both services say they expect delivery of the aircraft to the Army to begin in 2008, with "source selection," that is the choice of the manufacturer, to be made by December 2006. The Air Force should take delivery of its first aircraft in 2010.
There have been discussions about the purchase of nearly 150 of the aircraft, though that number could change based on any number of factors, including what is determined to be the unified commanders' requirements. As of 2006 there was general agreement the Army will proceed with about 75 aircraft. The Air Force will pick up, using the Army's initial requirement, to round out the fleet at about 145 aircraft. Ongoing studies would further refine the requirement. The acquisition authorities are the ultimate decision makers.
For years, the Army has used the C-23 Sherpa, the C-12 Huron and the C-26 Metroliner to provide "organic" intratheater airlift. "Intratheater" means inside a theater of operations. For example, anything meant to fly exclusively inside Iraq today would be intratheater. "Organic" means exclusive to a service -- the Army using Army aircraft to move Army supplies and people between Army units is considered organic. The Army uses the Sherpa and other rotor-wing assets to move goods "the last tactical mile," the final distance between far out Army depots and the troops scattered in the field in places like Afghanistan and Iraq.
The Army's Sherpa fleet is getting old, though. At the same time, the aircraft is no longer meeting the new demands of the Army mission. The plane is not pressurized, for instance, so it has altitude restrictions. In addition, the aircraft has a short range that makes it difficult to get into the Southwest Asia theater of operations. Because the aircraft isn't pressurized, it cannot be used for medical evacuation missions. Additionally, the aircraft is not large enough to carry a standard Air Force cargo pallet. So pallets need to be broken down and reconfigured for use on the Sherpa.
Because of the changing battlefield, the brigade combat teams modularity and the logistics concept of support changing to a push system, the Army needs additional intra-theater lift capability to fill the last tactical mile. Historically, the Air Force does not perform missions in the tactical spectrum, down to that point. Tactical wheeled vehicles and helicopters have performed that role. Combining the two aircraft was a natural step because of the similarities in the capability gaps of each service.
With JCA, the Army could fly into 29 additional airfields in Iraq and another 10 airfields in Afghanistan. The JCA will absorb much of the stress being placed on the Army's CH-47 helicopter fleet, which has amassed almost 1.2 million flight hours since October 2001.
The Air Force also needs new lightweight intratheater airlift. The Air Force has used the C-130 to do intratheater airlift for over 40 years now. But the aircraft is often too large for some aircraft movements today in support of the global war on terrorism. The aircraft is frequently not carrying capacity loads, especially when something is needed immediately. There is a significant cost associated with loading up a C-130 with just one pallet of supplies, or 10 people to move when it can carry almost five times that amount. A smaller plane would be ideal to move small amounts of cargo and personnel with the kind of immediacy needed.
In the experience in Afghanistan, where there are dispersed strongholds of U.S. forces, there is not good infrastructure with highways and roads and safe travel. That caused the Air Force to pause and ask, 'Is there something here for both our services?'. Evidence of the Air Force's need for light intratheater airlift capability came during Hurricane Katrina support efforts in and around New Orleans. The Air Force would have been able to put to good use an aircraft that can move a small amount of cargo a short distance from unimproved runways. In the case of Katrina, of course, it wasn't unimproved runways, but damaged runways -- those covered with water and debris from the storm. Air Force senior leaders see a need for these aircraft, based on the commitments around the world. They are also sensitive to what they saw with Hurricane Katrina disaster relief and the emerging role of US Northern Command and the homeland defense mission.
The Army and the Air Force had been working separately to develop a small-capacity, intratheater airlift capability. But the Department of Defense asked the services to work together to develop the capability jointly. By October 2006, the services would stand up a Joint Program Office in Huntsville, Ala., to address their similar needs.
For the Army, it means they will maintain and improve on their ability to move Army supplies out to the very troops that will use them: providing munitions, supplies, and personnel support to soldiers scattered out to the farthest reaches of the global war on terrorism. For the Air Force, it means improved responsiveness, flexibility and quality of service to the joint warfighter by pushing supplies out past established, improved runways. It means a new ability to do light cargo and personnel movements inside a theater of operations, and during humanitarian missions in the United States. And, it means doing those things at a cost far lower than what is now possible with the C-130 or the C-17.
On 01 August 2006, was eliminated from the Army competition to build a new cargo aircraft that could have been worth as much as $5 billion. Lockheed's C-130J transport, a candidate for the Joint Cargo Aircraft for use with the Army and Air Force, did not meet some initial technical requirements, according to a letter from the Army. The C-130J is more airplane at a higher price than is required to meet the Army’s requirements.
The elimination left two competitors. The first was a joint venture between L-3 Communications Holdings Inc. and Alenia North America Inc., a subsidiary of Finmeccanica SpA of Italy. Global Military Aircraft Systems (GMAS) is a joint venture between L-3 Communications Integrated Systems (L-3 IS), a division of L-3 Communications, and Alenia Aeronautica (a Finmeccanica company), through its Alenia North America Inc. subsidiary. GMAS aimed to provide the US Army and Air Force with a solution for its Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) operational and support requirements, and to pursue the opportunities with the DoD and internationally, through the production and the outfit of the C-27J tactical transport aircraft. The team headed by L-3 Communications Integrated Systems, which includes Italian aircraft manufacturer Alenia Aeronautica and Boeing, planned to build planes in Florida and do much of the other work in Mississippi were it to win the contract. L-3 would perform finish work and paint the C-27J in Waco.
The second was a team of Raytheon Co. and EADS North America. It was expected to offer a version of a twin-engine aircraft produced by CASA, Spain’s aerospace company that is part of the European Aeronautic Defence and Space consortium. Team JCA -- led by Raytheon Company with EADS CASA North America -- chose the Mobile Regional Airport (MRA) as the final assembly and delivery site for its proposed CN-235/C-295 solution for the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) requirement. In addition, EADS CASA North America would establish at the MRA a new final delivery center for CN-235 and C-295 transport aircraft to be sold into the North American market.
