F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Lightning II Program
F-35/JSF production totals have been suggested to more likely be in the 2,000-3,000 aircraft range than the 4,000-5,000 or 6,000 sometimes cited. Foreign partners have expressed intent to buy about 700 aircraft between 2012 and 2015, but no formal agreements had been signed as of early 2005.
In 1996 the program included 2,978 aircraft for the US: 2,036 for the Air Force, 642 for the Marines, 300 for the US Navy, as well as another 60 for the Royal Navy. The May 1997 QDR reduced procurement for the US to 2,852: 1,763 for the Air Force, 609 for the Marines, and up to 480 for the Navy. The 1997 QDR noted that up to 230 of the Navy's 480 JSFs could be replaced by F/A-18E/Fs, depending on the progress of the JSF program and the price of its Navy variant compared to the F/A-18E/F.
As of 2001 the first operational Joint Strike Fighter, re-designated as the F-35, was scheduled for delivery in FY08. A total of 2,852 planes were scheduled for delivery starting in 2008 for the US Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and a small number to the British Royal Navy. Other nations interested in participating in the program included the Netherlands, Belgium and Norway. The requirements of 1,763 strike fighters for the Air Force, 609 for the Marine Corps and 480 for the Navy had held steady since the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review.
As of 2001 program estimates pegged the recurring JSF unit flyaway costs at $37 million for the Air Force conventional takeoff and landing variant, $46 million for the Marine Corps short takeoff vertical landing variant and $48 million for the Navy carrier version, in 2002 dollars.
As of late March 2002 the Pentagon was reviewing a proposal to cut JSF production by 400 aircraft and limit the Navy's F/A-18E/F acquisition to 460 aircraft versus 548. The JSF reductions, which could be split about equally between the Marine Corps STOVL and the Navy's carrier versions, would reduce the total buy to about 2,600.
In April 2002 the Navy, concerned that it could not afford the number of tactical aircraft it planned to purchase, reduced the number of JSF aircraft for joint Navy and Marine Corps operations from 1,089 to 680 by reducing the number of backup aircraft needed. News reports in 2002 indicated that the proposed reduction would cut 259 jets from the Marine Corps buy, and 50 from the Navy purchase, resulting in a total F-35B buy of 350.
JSF Program 2003 Developments
The Pentagon requested $3.4 billion for JSF development in FY03, up from $1.5 billion in FY2002. At that time the planned budget was $3.8 billion in FY04, $5.7 billion in FY05 and $5.7 billion in FY06.
As of early 2003 the Air Force was tentatively scheduled to receive its first F-35 in 2008, but initial operational capability (IOC) for the service was set for 2011. The US Navy, along with the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force, was scheduled for a 2012 IOC. The Marine Corps, with an IOC planned for 2010, would be the first of the military services to operate a fleet of F-35s.
By the end of 2003 it appeared that the cost of developing the Joint Strike Fighter could increase by as much as $5 billion, to $38 billion, and the project could fall more than a year behind schedule. The increase would be mostly because of the higher-than-expected cost of developing parts of the technology and the addition of new capabilities for the fighter jet. Part of the additional cost would be to add anti-tampering technology to the plane, which would prevent foreign buyers from replicating sensitive systems. That could add $1 billion to $2 billion to the program's budget. The proposed increase would also put aside more money for unforeseen changes in design requested by the military or for development problems. The Joint Strike Fighter was expected to be the largest weapons program in Pentagon history, ultimately costing nearly $200 billion. The first fighter was expected to enter service in 2008.
JSF Program 2004 Developments
According to the DOT&E, weight growth was a significant risk for all three variants of the F-35 JSF. Aircraft weight was not a key performance parameter, but weight would impact the aircraft's ability to satisfy key performance requirements. No variant of the F-35 JSF design exceeded the weight at which key performance parameters predictions are breached. However, the STOVL design remained consistently above target weight projections. The JPO was aggressively pursuing weight reduction initiatives. Additional aircraft weight reductions were required, particularly in the case of the STOVL variant, to satisfy all key performance parameters and preserve sufficient weight reserve for post SDD block upgrades.
Weight issues and significant fundamental configuration changes forced the conclusion that the air vehicle design was insufficiently mature to satisfy all criteria for an upcoming Air System Critical Design Review. Thus, a new culture emerged that involved establishment of new indicators of progress, directed by clearly identified goals for the 2004-2005 time frame. Expect the Exceptional became much more than a Guiding Principle, it was a daily operating principle.
The F-35 JSF Program SDD schedule was aggressive and aircraft weight reduction efforts eroded a significant portion of available development time. The first flight of the US Air Force conventional takeoff and landing variant was scheduled for 2005, followed by the STOVL variant. The schedule was very challenging. The F-35 JSF Program should remain event driven with continued weight reduction efforts and design optimization before producing SDD test aircraft. The decisions the JPO faced at this point in the program were significant drivers to cost and performance limitations through the life cycle of an aircraft.
In 2004, DoD extended the JSF program schedule to address problems discovered during systems integration and the preliminary design review. Design efforts revealed significant airframe weight problems that affected the aircraft's ability to meet key performance requirements. Software development and integration also posed a significant development challenge. Program officials delayed the critical design reviews, first flights of development aircraft, and the low-rate initial production decision to allow more time to mitigate design risk and gather more knowledge before continuing to make major investments. As a result, the initial operational capability date was delayed.
As of late 2004 there was uncertainty about the number and mix of variants the services planned to purchase would also affect JSF's acquisition plans. While the Air Force had announced its intention to acquire the short takeoff and vertical landing variant, it had yet to announce when or how many it expected to buy or how this purchase would affect the quantity of the conventional takeoff and landing variant it plans to buy. In December 2004, Air Combat Command officials indicated that the Air Force was considering buying about 250 short takeoff and landing JSFs and about 1,300 conventional takeoff and landing JSFs. However, these numbers were not official.
The number and mix of JSF variants that the Navy and Marine Corps intend to purchase, and their related procurement costs, remained undetermined. However, as of late 2004 the Navy had not indicated to the developer the exact mix of the carrier and short takeoff and vertical landing variants it intended to purchase.
The cost estimate to fully develop the JSF had increased by over 80 percent from 1996 to 2004. DoD expected that by using a joint development program for the three variants instead of three separate programs, JSF development costs could be cut by about 40 percent. However, cost increases had nearly eroded all of the estimated savings. Development costs were originally estimated at $24.8 billion. By the 2001 system development decision, the costs had increased by $9.6 billion largely because of a 36-month schedule extension to allow more time to mature the mission systems and a more mature cost estimate.
The program successfully completed a DAB review on 17 June 2004. However, there continued to be some concerns with Congressional funding, as represented by the House Armed Services Committee decision to reduce funding to the program pending the IRT report and the JSF program office response.
In November 2004 Defense Department's Acting Undersecretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Michael Wynne approved program changes to fix a weight problem plaguing one version of the plane. He also authorized a transition production contract for the F136 engine, made by General Electric and Rolls-Royce Group. This review was focused on the cost and schedule implications of the re-baseline effort, contractor performance to date on STOVL weight reduction, and the program's response to the IRT report on the program.
By 2004, costs increased an additional $10.4 billion to $44.8 billion. The program office cited several reasons, including efforts to achieve greater international commonality, optimize engine interchangeability, refine the estimating methodology, and extend the schedule for unexpected design work. Almost half of this increase, $4.9 billion, was a result of an approximately 18-month delay for unexpected design work caused by increased aircraft weight that degraded the aircraft's key performance capabilities.
JSF Program 2005 Developments
By early 2005 increased program costs, delayed schedules, and reduced quantities had diluted DoD's buying power and made the original JSF business case unexecutable. Program instability at that time made the development of a new and viable business case difficult to prepare. The cost estimate to fully develop the JSF had increased by more than 80 percent. Development costs were originally estimated at roughly $25 billion. By the 2001 system development decision, these costs increased almost $10 billion, and by 2004, costs increased an additional $10 billion, pushing total development cost estimates to nearly $45 billion. As of early 2005 estimates for the program acquisition unit cost were about $100 million, a 23 percent increase since 2001. Ongoing OSD cost reviews could result in further increases to the estimated program cost. At the same time, since 1996 procurement quantities have been reduced by 535 aircraft and the delivery of operational aircraft had been delayed.
As of early 2005 estimates for the program acquisition unit cost were about $100 million, and the total estimated cost to own an aircraft over its life cycle was $240 million, an increase of 23 percent and 11 percent, respectively.
In 1996, the program established unit flyaway cost goals for each variant. Unit flyaway costs included the recurring costs to produce the basic aircraft, propulsion system, and mission systems. It was expected that the variants would have a high degree of commonality and would be built on a common production line. However, commonality among the variants had decreased, and the cost to produce the aircraft had increased. By early 2005 the unit flyaway cost for the conventional takeoff and landing variant had increased by 42 percent, the cost for the short takeoff and vertical landing variant by a range of 37 to 55 percent, and the cost for the carrier variant by a range of 29 to 43 percent. According to program data, a large part of the cost increase since the start of development could be attributed to labor costs for building the airframe and to the costs for producing the complex mission systems.
The timely delivery of the JSF to replace aging legacy aircraft was cited as a critical need by the warfighter at the program start. When the program was initiated, in 1996, it planned to deliver initial operational capabilities to the warfighter in 2010. However, largely because of technical challenges, the program delayed the delivery of operational aircraft, and early 2005 estimates put delivery at 2012 to 2013. Because of these delays, the services would likely have to operate legacy aircraft longer than expected. These challenges have also delayed interim milestones such as the start of system development, design reviews, and production decisions.
Program officials recognized that JSF's development schedule was aggressive and as of early 2005 were examining ways to reduce program requirements while keeping costs and schedules constant. Design and software teams found greater complexity and less efficiency as they developed the 17 million lines of software needed for the system. Program analysis also indicated that some aircraft capabilities would have to be deferred to stay within cost and schedule constraints. As a result, the program office was working with the warfighters to determine what capabilities could be deferred to later in the development program or to follow on development efforts while still meeting the warfighter's basic needs. Many of these capabilities are related to the software-intensive mission systems suite. They also examined the content and schedule of the planned 7-year, 10,000-hour flight test program. According to the program office, the test program was already considered aggressive, and program changes had only increased the risks of completing it on time.
As of early 2005, between 2007 (the start of low-rate production) and 2013 (the scheduled start of full-rate production) DoD planned to buy nearly 500 JSF aircraft, 20 percent of its planned total buys, at a cost of roughly $50 billion. Under the program's preliminary plan, DoD expected to increase low-rate production from 5 aircraft a year to 143 aircraft a year, significantly increasing the financial investment after production begins. Between 2007 and 2009, the program planned to increase low-rate production spending from about $100 million a month to more than $500 million a month, and before development had ended and an integrated aircraft had undergone operational evaluations, DoD expected to spend nearly $1 billion a month.
In its FY06 budget submission, DoD reduced the planned procurement quantities for the US by 38 aircraft through FY11. This included planned quantities for the United Kingdom of 2 aircraft in FY09, 4 aircraft in FY10, 9 aircraft in FY11, 9 aircraft in FY12, and 10 aircraft in FY13. To achieve its production rate, the program would invest significantly in tooling, facilities, and personnel. According to contractor officials, an additional $1.2 billion in tooling alone would be needed to ramp up the production rate to 143 aircraft a year. Over half of this increase would be needed by 2009, more than 2 years before operational flight testing begins.
In 2002 total program costs had been estimated at $175.6 billion in constant 2002 dollars, and $231.0 billion in then year dollars, for 2,866 aircraft. By September 2005, with a reduction in 408 aircraft, to a total of 2,458, program costs had grown to $192.519 billion in constant 2002 dollars $256.617 billion in then year dollars.
JSF Program 2006 Developments
The F-35 program of record for the US and UK held steady at 2,593 for four years, and those numbers were reaffirmed in the January 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. There were reports in early 2006 that the Air Force had an internal plan to ultimately reduce the number of joint strike fighters from 1,763 to somewhere between 1,000 and 1,200.
JSF Program 2007 Developments
The JSF program was one of many defense programs reviewed as part of a broad Government Accountability Report in March 2007. In the report the GAO noted that JSF program data indicated that two of the system's eight critical technologies were mature, four were approaching maturity, but two were immature despite being past the design review. These critical technologies were mission systems integration and prognostics and health maintenance. Design stability was not reached by the design review, the two variants had released fewer design drawings (a measure of designs stability) than suggested by best practices and the program had not demonstrated the successful integration of the system. The program planned to enter production in 2007 with little demonstrated knowledge about performance and producibility. All three variants would not be in flight testing until 2 years after production began with a fully integrated aircraft in flight testing 4 years after testing begins. DoD organizations have raised concerns with the program highlighting cost, schedule, and performance risks.
Also cited in the 2007 report was that as of October 2006, JSF officials reported to the GAO that 91 percent of the short takeoff and vertical landing variant and 46 percent of the conventional variant drawings have been released. At the February 2006 design review, the program reported that 46 and 3 percent of the drawings had been released respectively, less than the best practices standard. Also, the program had not prototyped the expected designs or demonstrated the successful integration of the system. The program projected it would have released 47 percent of the carrier variant drawings at its design review in 2007. Issues with stabilizing the design have impacted the delivery of the first production representative aircraft by about 2 1/2 years.
The program was collecting information on the maturity of manufacturing processes. However, because the design had not been proven to work, the potential for design changes during flight testing weakened efforts to mature processes. A change in design could also require a change in the manufacturing processes, a costly proposition once production begins. The development uncertainties still facing the program were reflected in DoD's plans to use cost reimbursement contracts for initial production orders. The 7-year flight test program began in late 2006 and a fully integrated variant was scheduled to fly in 2011 leaving a significant time period where changes could occur. By 2011, DoD expected to have invested more than $20 billion in production aircraft. Further, manufacturing processes currently planned had not been proven. The first test aircraft (nonproduction representative) encountered inefficiencies requiring 32 percent more manufacturing hours to date than planned. Since entering manufacturing, the aircraft design and the manufacturing processes had changed substantially.
The GAO reported that since the program rebaseline in 2004, costs had increased more than $30 billion (then year dollars), delivery of the key development aircraft had slipped as much as 10 months with other development activities slipping as well. The contractor's cost performance had also decreased. Internal DoD organizations had expressed concerns about the program. A February 2006 operational assessment noted risks with the flight test schedule, software development, maintainability and mission effectiveness. DoD cost analyst and contract management officials had expressed concerns that costs to complete the program would be higher than estimates.
In response to the March 2007 GAO report the JSF program office said that for the third year, the GAO ignored F-35 successes, did not measure against the 2004 replan, and misapplied commercial best practices. The F-35, according to the PO was more mature than any comparable program at a similar development point. Advanced virtual prototyping tools would ensure structure, avionics and propulsion fit together before production. The first test aircraft was completed with unprecedented assembly fit and quality, problem-free power-on, rapid execution of engine and secondary-power tests and actual weight within 1 percent of predictions. Ten development aircraft were in manufacturing. Lab investment was substantially larger and earlier than in legacy programs promoting early risk burndown. The acquisition strategy provided the best balance of cost, schedule and risk via sequential development of variants and spiral blocks of mission capabilities. The GAO's approach would result in multibillion-dollar cost increases and significant legacy fleet impact.
The GAO countered that the evaluation did consider all pertinent information including JSF progress and program office technical comments on this assessment and found the JSF program consistently proceeding through critical junctures with knowledge gaps that exposed the program to significant risks. Like past programs that have followed this approach, the consequences were predictable as the JSF has continually missed its cost and schedule targets, even after the 2004 replan. If the program were to follow a knowledge-based approach it would lower risks allowing for more realistic cost and schedule estimates.
As of August 2007, the contractor said it had released 99 percent of planned engineering drawings for the short takeoff and vertical landing variant, 91 percent for the conventional takeoff and landing variant, and 46 percent for the carrier variant. All three variants fell significantly short of meeting the best practices standard of 90 percent of drawings released by the time of their critical design reviews, 46 percent for the short takeoff and landing variant, 43 percent for the carrier variant, and 3 percent for the conventional takeoff and landing variant. The late release of drawing had led to late parts deliveries, delaying the program schedule and forcing inefficient manufacturing processes. The program began production before delivering an aircraft representing the expected design.
Flight testing, which began in late 2006, was still in its infancy, with only 19 of some 5,500 planned flights completed as of November 2007. The JSF development program in 2001 was estimated to cost $34 billion with an aircraft average aircraft procurement unit cost of $69 million. The December 2007 estimated development cost was $44 billion -- a 30 percent increase -- and an aircraft average unit cost of $104 million -- a 50 percent increase per aircraft over 2001. And the initial operation capability date has slipped at least two years, to 2012.
JSF Program 2008 Developments
As of March 2008 two of the eight JSF critical technologies were mature, three were nearing maturity, and three (mission systems integration, prognostics and health management, and manufacturing technologies) were still immature 6 years past the start of development. None of the variants demonstrated design stability at their design review, though two had met the standard by the time of the report. The program collected data to manage manufacturing maturity, but currently unproven processes and a lack of flight testing was of concern to the GAO because of a potentially costly future of changes to design and manufacturing processes. Program costs continued to increase and the schedule had slipped since the 2004 rebaseline. Very little flight testing occurred as of the report's publication and the first fully integrated aircraft was not expected to begin flight testing for at least 4 years. In 2007 DoD cut the number of test aircraft and flight test hours to maintain cost and schedule plans.
A fully integrated, capable aircraft was not expected to enter flight testing until 2012, increasing risks that problems could be found and would require design and production changes, as well as retrofit expenses for aircraft already built.
Since 2007, the JSF program office estimated that total acquisition costs increased by more than $23 billion, primarily because of higher estimated procurement costs. According to the GAO estimated procurement costs rose due to greater material costs, labor costs, and labor hours, a 7-year extension of the procurement schedule from FY27 to FY34, and a reduction in annual production rates. Development costs since the 2004 rebaseline had been stable largely because the program removed about $2.8 billion for risk reduction and an alternate engine program. Development costs were held constant by reducing requirements, eliminating the alternate engine program, and spending management reserve faster than budgeted. Facing a probable contract cost overrun, DOD implemented a Mid-Course Risk Reduction Plan to replenish management reserves from about $400 million to about $1 billion by reducing test resources. The program restructured development efforts to meet schedule and budget requirements. DoD cut the number of flight test aircraft and flight test sorties, putting greater reliance on the remaining flight test aircraft, as well as ground tests to free up funds to replace dwindling management reserves.
As in 2007, the US Air Force responded to the GAO report, and challenged its balance, use of best practices, and depiction of program status. They noted that the first aircraft was in flight test, included all major subsystems, and along with other aircraft in work was showing unprecedented assembly fit and quality improvements with each aircraft. They stated the flying test bed was flying mission systems software and reducing risk prior to their first flight on a JSF in early 2009, and all mission systems were maturing as planned. The final software block was planned to enter testing in 2011, and later blocks mainly incorporated sensor and weapons updates after lab testing. Officials asserted that data on design maturity and drawing release at critical design reviews were not accurately presented, saying drawing changes were very low compared to legacy systems. They said their plan for spiral blocks of capability balances cost, schedule and risk, while GAO's approach would have increased costs by billions and delayed delivery of capability to warfighters.
The GAO again responded by saying that JSF cost increases and schedule delays were indicative of a program that consistently proceeded through critical junctures with knowledge gaps that exposed the program to significant risks. The new plan to cut test assets and test activities was another example of adding risk.
In December 2008, the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) approved full fundingfor 7 Conventional Take-Off and Landing (CTOL) aircraft and engines, plus sustainment and associated equipment as part of the Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) Lot 3 acquisition decision memorandum. In addition, the DAE approved full funding for seven STOVL aircraft plus sustainment and associated equipment contingent upon successful completion of the F135Pratt & Whitney lead engine Stress Test, Flight Test Engine 6 Proof Test and receipt of fullSTOVL flight clearance [which occurred on 30 January 2009].
F-35 2009 Program Developments
The F-35 is projected to meet all Key Performance Parameters (KPP) and as of 10 May 2009, AA-1 had completed 84 test flights, including a deployment to Eglin AFB. The first system design and development (SDD) Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) aircraft, BF-1, had completed 14 flights. The second SDD STOVL aircraft, BF-2, had its first flight in February 2009.
Despite the program’s continued manufacturing problems and the infancy of the flighttest program, DOD officials want to accelerate F-35 production from 485 to 654 aircraft over a 6-year time frame from fiscal years 2010 through 2015. This would require up to $33.4 billion in additional procurement funding for those 6 years and expose the government to additional risk from future cost increases because of the contract type. On April 6, 2009, the Secretary of Defense announced that DOD intended to increase F-35 production to 513 aircraft across the 5-year defense plan.
Defense Secretary Robert Gates recommended buying 30 F-35s in fiscal 2010, up from the 14 funded for FY2009, boosting funding from $6.9 billion to $11.2 billion. The FY 2010 budget request contained $2.7 billion for procurement of 22 EA–18G and 9 F/A–18E/F aircraft, and $4.5 billion for procurement of 20 F–35B/C aircraft for the Department of the Navy. This represented a reduction from the fiscal year 2009 program of record of nine F/A–18E/F aircraft and an increase of two F–35B/C aircraft. The Department of the Navy had a fiscal year 2009 strike-fighter inventory shortfall of 110 aircraft and predicts a fiscal year 2010 shortfall of 152 aircraft, with a potential peak strike-fighter shortfall of 312 aircraft by fiscal year 2018. A variety of factors caused the current and projected strike-fighter shortfall. Those factors include a fiscal year 2002 decision to reduce F/A–18A through D inventory by 88 aircraft, a reduction in the program of record quantity for F–35B/C by 409 aircraft, delays in development of the F–35B/C program, and F/A 18A through D aircraft reaching forecasted service life sooner than expected.
The FY2010 budget request contained $1.9 billion in PE 64800F, and $1.7 billion in PE 64800N, for development of the F–35, but contained no funds for development of a competitive F–35 propulsion system. The aggregate amount requested for F–35 development is $1.4 billion higher than projected in 2008, and that $476.0 million of that amount conformed to increases recommended by a recent joint estimating team, which amount will be used primarily for management reserve. The budget request also contained $2.0 billion for procurement of 10 F– 35As and $300.6 million for F–35 advance procurement in Aircraft Procurement, Air Force, but contained no funds for either procurement of competitive F–35 propulsion systems or for advance procurement of competitive F–35 propulsion system long-lead components. Additionally, the budget request contained $4.0 billion for the procurement of 16 F–35Bs and four F–35Cs and $481.0 million for F–35 advance procurement in Aircraft Procurement, Navy, but contained funds for neither procurement of competitive propulsion systems nor advance procurement of competitive F–35 competitive F–35 propulsion systems long-lead components. The Aircraft Procurement, Navy budget request also contained $1.3 billion for spares and repair parts.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Director of Portfolio Acquisition testified before the Air and Land Forces Subcommittee on May 20, 2009, and stated that the Department planned a 75 percent higher year-over-year production rate for the F–35 program for fiscal year 2010 and that this rate, ‘‘seems to be an achievable rate.’’ The the production rate for fiscal year 2009 is 17 aircraft, of which 14 are for the Department of Defense and 3 are international aircraft. A 75 percent higher production rate for fiscal year 2010 would total 30 aircraft, and 2 international aircraft are planned, leaving 28 DOD aircraft in fiscal year 2010 necessary to achieve the 75 percent year-over-year production rate, two less than the 30 F–35s contained in the Department of the Navy and Department of the Air Force budget requests. The House Armed Services Committee recommended a reduction of one F–35B in Aircraft Procurement, Navy and one F–35A in Aircraft Procurement, Air Force.
