DEATH FROM ABOVE: I MEF's use of Marine TACAIR during Desert Storm
CSC 1997
Subject Area - Aviation
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY i
LIST OF FIGURES AND GRAPHICS iii
MAP iv
INTRODUCTION 1
CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND -- FROM SHIELD TO STORM 5
Initial Deployment and Planning 5
The Great Void -- beyond the first three days of the ATO 9
The Offensive Mission, Commander's Intent, and Concept of Operations 14
CHAPTER 2: THE PLAN -- SHAPING THE BATTLESPACE AND 18 DECISIVE OPERATIONS
Attrition or Battlespace Shaping 18 TACAIR Shaping Innovations 23
I MEF's Plan to Shape the Battlespace 24
Promulgation of the MEF's Plan 28
Supporting the Ground Offensive 32
Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I) 34
CHAPTER 3: DEATH FROM ABOVE -- A PILOT'S PERSPECTIVE 38
Baptism by Fire 38
A Word on Khafji 41
Finding Them and Killing Them -- Execution without the Plan 42
Support for the Grunt 44
CHAPTER 4: LESSONS AND IMPLICATIONS 46
The Marine Corps' new Paradigm 46
MEF as a Warfighter -- Only with the TACC 47
The MEF & TACAIR -- The plan is only good if the players know it 49
BDA -- You need to plan to get it 51
Train the way you Fight 52
CONCLUSION 56
GLOSSARY 59
NOTES 61
BIBLIOGRAPHY 68
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: DEATH FROM ABOVE: I MEF's use of Marine TACAIR during Desert Storm
Author: Major Jurgen M. Lukas, United States Marine Corps
Thesis: By an evolutionary process, I MEF developed an air plan to shape its battlespace during Desert Storm. However, the plan was neither promulgated to the lowest level, nor was the command and control architecture adequate to support its execution. As a result, the MEF's plan was never really executed, neither was Marine TACAIR utilized as effectively as it might have been. Despite these shortcomings, the lessons learned by I MEF's experience have paved the way for many of today's Marine Corps warfighting concepts such as the "single battle," battlespace shaping, and the "Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) as a warfighter." As a result of the lessons learned during Desert Shield and Desert Storm and these new warfighting concepts, the criticality of the effective utilization of Marine TACAIR within the MEF's single battle has become more evident than ever before.
Background: This paper analyzes those operations conducted by I MEF which make the Marine Corps unique among America's armed forces -- the Marine Air-Ground Task Force's (MAGTF) capability to shape its battlespace and to conduct combined arms operations utilizing its organic tactical aviation (TACAIR) assets. The discussion begins with an explanation of how I MEF's planning process evolved from the initial deployment for Desert Shield to the opening air strikes of Desert Storm. This explanation focuses on the fact that I MEF was hampered by a total lack of Marine Corps doctrine and experience in corps level operations. Terms and concepts such as battlespace shaping and the "single battle" were not even in the Marine Corps' vocabulary in 1990, neither was the MEF considered to be a warfighter by its major subordinate commands. Next, the MEF's plan to prepare the battlespace for decisive ground operations is discussed. This discussion becomes the central theme of the paper. The problems encountered by the MEF and its subordinate commands, as well as the tactical innovations and plans developed to combat those problems are analyzed. Specifically, the problems of battlespace intelligence, targeting, combat assessment, command and control, and most importantly plans promulgation are developed. This analysis is followed by a study of events from the supporting aircrew's perspective. In this section of the paper, the dichotomy between the MEF's plan and the actual execution of the Marine Corps' airwar is discussed. The study is concluded by the submission of several lessons and implications drawn from I MEF's Gulf War experience, which are intended to fuel further discussion and study on the evolution of TACAIR's role and function within the Marine Corps.
Recommendation: This paper seeks to illustrate only a fraction of the lessons to be learned from the MEF's use of TACAIR in Desert Storm. There are many others with no less import and relevance yet to be examined. It is the author's hope that this paper has awakened a renewed interest in the subject and that its further study will benefit the ongoing evolution of TACAIR's role in the Marine Corps. The Marine Air-Ground Task Force's (MAGTF) capability to shape its battlespace and to conduct combined-arms operations utilizing its organic tactical aviation (TACAIR) assets that make it unique among America's armed forces. The conduct of these unique capabilities by I MEF and its subordinate commands during the Gulf War is what made Desert Shield and Desert Storm a capstone event in Marine Corps' history. This is true, not because every aspect of I MEF's use of Marine TACAIR was executed correctly, but because of the lessons which can be learned by studying the mistakes that were made and why they occurred. As a result of the recognition of these mistakes, I MEF's role in Desert Storm has become the driving force behind much of the developing Marine Corps doctrine and operational concepts. However, doctrine and operational concepts will not by themselves ensure that the mistakes made in the Gulf War are not repeated. With that in mind the following summation of the lessons illustrated by this study is offered.
In order for the MEF to effectively utilize its ACE in the single battle to shape the battlespace and to conduct decisive operations, whether it is operating in a joint, multinational, or unilateral environment, it must recognize and act upon the following requirements:
1. Adequately structure the MAGTF C3I architecture to allow the MEF commander to influence the battle by direct access to his aviation assets (the MEF physically or electronically co-located with the TACC).
2. Ensure thorough promulgation of the plan of execution to include commander's intent and planning methodology. Additionally, at the TACAIR operator level, a better understanding of the importance of knowing the plan must be achieved in order for Marine TACAIR to reach its potential in the MAGTF's single battle.
3. Adequately plan for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of battle damage assessment in order to know how the MEF is doing in its efforts to shape the battlespace and ultimately to know when shaping operations can give way to decisive actions.
4. Marine TACAIR must recognize the fundamental importance of the armed reconnaissance mission and how it relates to the MEF commander's single battle.
5. The MEF must train in peacetime the way it will fight in war. MEF and subordinate staffs must focus on and train for their combat responsibilities.
Only when these requirements have been met will the MAGTF be ready to be a warfighter -- because next time the enemy might fight back.
LIST OF FIGURES AND GRAPHICS
1. Initial Target Precedence List[1] page 12
2. Marine Corps Single Battle Concept[2] page 13
3. Shaping page 18
4. Iraqi Positions in Southern KTO[3] page 19
5. MEF Air Targeting PDE Cycle page 21
6. Shaping (description)[4] page 22
7. I MEF Artillery Boxes[5] page 25
8. I MEF Maneuver Boxes[6] page 25
9. I MEF Ground Offensive-Phase IV Stage A[7] page 32
10. Supporting the Ground Offensive-"push CAS"[8] page 33
11. Fire Support Coordination Lines[9] page 33
12. Marine Corps Single Battle Concept[10] page 47
13. Shaping Assessment[11] page 51
iii
AE AF
AG AH
4 5 6 7
MAP OF KUWAIT AND JFACC KILL BOXES
LEGEND
LOCATION OF MISSION ANECDOTES
1. Introduction -- 26 Feb 91 5. Conclusion -- 24 Feb 91
2. Chapter 2 -- 26 Jan 91 6. Battle of Khafji -- 30- 31 Jan
3. Chapter 3 -- 1 Feb 91 7. Highway of Death -- 26 Feb 91
4. Chapter 4 -- 24 Feb 91
DEATH FROM ABOVE:
I MEF's use of
Marine TACAIR during Desert Storm
INTRODUCTION
For nothing can seem foul to those that win.
-William Shakespeare, King Henry,
in King Henry IV, pt.1, act 5, sc. 1.
26
February 1991, approximately 1400:
I was
leading Major "Boomer" Knutzen, our squadron Ops.O., back from our second Armed Recce mission of the day. The weather had been very restrictive (3-4,000' overcast with rain -- not a good
place to be with AAA in the area), but the
Iraqis were fleeing in droves from their positions in and around Kuwait
City. Finding them and killing them had been easy,
and there were many more targets out
there. So after some inter-cockpit
deliberations, we diverted into Jubayl to refuel,
rearm, and talk the TACC into letting us go out again. After quickly going through the pits and getting five Mk-83s each, "Boomer"
walked over to the TACC to give them a
debrief and get the "ok" for one more flight. In less than 30 minutes we
were airborne heading back into Kuwait... The weather got better as we went north past Ali Al Salem Air Base just
west of Kuwait City and the highway going toward Basra. We called the FastFAC working the highway
(later known as the "Highway of
Death"), but he was busy with other aircraft, so we proceeded a little bit west and found a column
of tanks and APCs moving along a dirt road toward the north. The airspace belonged to the ABCCC, so after
getting their frequency from the FastFAC,
I called them, gave them our position in
AF 5 Northeast and got clearance to attack.
I rolled in on the lead tank and dropped
2 Mk-83s; one hit short, but the second hit the top of the tank. After that,
the column dispersed in all directions and we easily picked-off most of the rest, ending our attacks with multiple strafing
runs before heading back to Bahrain. Two
days later the war was over -- we had won.[12]
In the aftermath of welcome home parties, yellow ribbons, awards, accolades and ticker-tape parades, much has been said and written about the Gulf War. Of late it has come under considerable scrutiny and has been called a "Hollow Victory."[13] After all, Saddam is still in power. The Iraqis really did not fight back. The coalition forces enjoyed all the benefits of technology, had the time to use it, and in the end, American combat loses were only 148 killed in action during the entire war.[14]
Although the war against Iraq may have been an isolated and unique situation, its impact and significance should not be underestimated. Many of the lessons learned during the conflict are being used to form joint/service warfighting doctrine and force structure. Within the Marine Corps the lessons learned are being used to develop new concepts and procedures such as: the "single battle," battlespace shaping, and the "Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) as a warfighter." Concepts which, as they are understood today, did not even exist when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in the summer of 1990. At almost every level of Marine Corps operations, hardware is being procured and training has been tailored to incorporate the experience and lessons of Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Yet despite these fundamental changes, the Marine Corps has not done a formal, public analysis of its performance during the war.
Unfortunately, no single monograph can hope to accomplish this task. It is the purpose of this paper to analyze only one aspect of the Marine Corps' performance during Desert Storm, specifically, those operations conducted by I MEF which make the Marine Corps unique among America's armed forces -- the Marine Air-Ground Task Force's (MAGTF) capability to shape its battlespace and to conduct combined-arms operations utilizing its organic tactical aviation (TACAIR) assets. Through original documentation, interviews of participants, and personal experience this paper will examine I MEF's use of Marine TACAIR. The primary focus will be on the MEF's plan to shape the battlespace, how well that plan was promulgated at the operator level, and how it was executed by the Marine aircrews flying the missions. The command and control architecture, to include intelligence and battle damage assessment (BDA) support, will also be examined. Finally, this paper will suggest some lessons and implications for the present and future Marine Corps. Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) and other "joint" arguments will not be discussed. The MAGTF must look inward to resolve its own warfighting concerns before fully integrating into the joint world. Reference to specific individuals will be avoided as much as possible. It is important to know what happened and the resulting consequences, instead of who is to blame. Notwithstanding, personalities do count. In the Gulf War, as in all military endeavors, the personalities involved had more influence on the final outcome than any service doctrine or military principle.
Not all the missions went quite as well as the one described in the beginning of this introduction. A static defending enemy is hard to find in the open featureless desert. For the vast majority of aircrew and staff personnel, this was their first combat experience and there were many unknowns and uncertainties. For both aircrew and staff officers, there was much on the job training. MEF and wing staffs struggled to find the best way to plan the biggest air war the Marine Corps had been involved in since World War II without the benefit of adequate service doctrine. Aircrew had to struggle with imperfect knowledge of both the enemy and the plans devised to defeat him. This paper will show that, eventually, the MEF developed an air plan to shape its battlespace. However, the plan was neither promulgated to the lowest level, nor was the command and control architecture adequate to support its execution. As a result, the MEF's plan was never really executed, neither was Marine TACAIR utilized as effectively as it might have been. A word of caution before continuing; lest we be too critical -- it must be remembered that hindsight is always 20 / 20 and it is easy to know all the answers when you are not being shot at.
CHAPTER 1
BACKGROUND -- FROM SHIELD TO STORM
17 January 1991, approximately 0600:
Well, the war has started.
Day 1 Wave 1 just got back, and we were driving to our first combat brief wearing gas masks
because of an Iraqi scud attack -- not a real
good way to start a war. LtCol.
"Smut" Stuart, my squadron CO, is the mission commander for Day 1 Wave 2, but I had been briefing the
mission since we started planning in
September. After an additional short
period in a make-shift sandbag bomb
shelter because of another scud attack, I started the brief for a 24 plane strike against the IOC at Tallil -- you could
have heard a pin drop...The strike took
off from Shaikh Isa without further problems, maintaining radio silence.
We had planned and rehearsed this
thing since early September and now it
was really happening...The weather was perfect. We all made the tanker rendezvous, and soon we were entering
Iraqi airspace. Almost immediately the radio crackled with an
emergency call from the crew of a British Tornado which had been hit by a SAM. The crew was ejecting and needed help -- my heart was now where my throat used to be...I
could see our target from 50 miles
away. Soon I heard "Walt"
Garrison's "Magnum" call, signifying that the SEAD package was firing the first HARMs. Shortly thereafter, "Smut" signaled for our attack formation and we rolled-in from
30,000 feet. I made a quick aim point
adjustment and dropped 2 Mk-84 2,000 pound bombs. Pulling out at 14,000 feet (a
little lower than planned!), I looked behind me to see the bombs impacting on target (it was the first time I had ever
seen bombs hit a real target). By now, the perfect weather had given way to small
white smoke puffs and long smoke trails
(only later would we realize that it wasn't a change in the weather, but Iraqi AAA and SAMs -- who knew, none of us had seen
it before)...I made a call to my wingman,
"Otis" Day, to make sure he saw me and turned to join on
"Smut" as we climbed to
40,000 feet to start our egress back
towards home. I took one more look behind me to see the other bombs impacting
and shortly thereafter the last guy
called "off target"...The AWACS called the area clear of enemy
aircraft and soon we were safe back over
Saudi Arabia...Later, Intel reports would indicate that the IOC at Tallil ceased to be operational after our strike.[15]
Initial Deployment and Planning
On 8 August 1990, six days after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, LtGen Walter E. Boomer took command of the First Marine Expeditionary Force. He found that his staff was undermanned and untrained. In fact the staff as a whole had not been involved in a MEF level field exercise for over two years.[16] This situation was not uncommon within the Marine Corps. The Marines had not conducted a MEF (Army corps equivalent) combat operation in nearly a generation. Forty-five years had passed since a Marine general had commanded a corps-sized unit with two or more maneuvering divisions. In recent history Marine operational emphasis had been placed on smaller brigade or battalion sized operations. In fact, the possibility of a MEF going to war seemed so remote that it had all but been removed from the Marine Corps' Command and Staff College curriculum.[17] Only the Army had doctrine to support a corps sized combat operation, and that was based on an European campaign against the Soviet Union.[18] Nothing had been written or practiced to prepare I MEF for the crisis in which it would now be involved.
I MEF was the Marine component command, Marine Forces Central Command (MARCENT) for the US Central Command (CENTCOM). It was CENTCOM's job to solve the crisis caused by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The initial defensive operation would be called Desert Shield. The ensuing deployment and force build-up would result in LtGen Boomer commanding two full divisions and a heavily reinforced aircraft wing, a force equivalent to almost two-thirds of the Marine Corps' combat power -- a position he, his staff, and the Marine Corps in general had not planned for.[19]
Luckily, earlier that summer several I MEF staff officers participated in a CENTCOM wargame called Operation Internal Look. The scenario had been remarkably similar to what was now happening in the Gulf, so I MEF was not totally unprepared for the rapid deployment of its forces to the region and its initial defensive mission. By 3 September 1990, LtGen Boomer had set up his initial headquarters in the port of Jubayl, Saudi Arabia. Once established in theater, he and his staff were busy integrating their rapidly growing force into CENTCOM's defensive plan, and beginning the early planning of the offensive operation called Desert Storm.[20]
Desert Storm was to take place only if the sanctions which had been placed on Iraq by the United Nations did not force Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. If executed, Desert Storm was to be conducted in four phases:
Phase 1: Strategic Air Offensive
Phase 2: Air Superiority in the Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO)
Phase 3: Attrition of Enemy Ground Forces
Phase 4: Ground Offensive
Phase 1 was to attack the strategic center of gravity, Saddam Hussein and his ability to adequately communicate with and lead his forces. This phase also aimed to destroy Iraq's war making infrastructure and national resolve. Phase 2 was to be conducted almost simultaneously and would allow Coalition Air Forces free reign over the KTO. Next, Phase 3 was to attrite Iraq's operational centers of gravity, the Republican Guard and the armor and artillery heavy ground forces occupying Kuwait, paving the way for a ground offensive. The ground war was to liberate Kuwait and to destroy the Republican Guard.[21] The Marines of I MEF were to participate in all four phases of Desert Storm, but the initial planning revolved around Phase 1 -- the strategic air offensive and the role Marine aviation was to play in it.
The 3d Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW), commanded by MajGen Royal N. Moore, was the air combat element (ACE) of the MEF. As such, 3d MAW was the MEF's fighting force for the first three phases of Desert Storm, and the traditional supporting arm of the Marines' ground offensive plans for Phase 4. MajGen Moore's ACE was the largest Marine Aircraft Wing ever assembled. At the height of the Gulf War 3d MAW would be comprised of six Marine Aircraft Groups with a total of over 35 squadrons, a Marine Aviation Command and Control System (MACCS) totaling 18 squadrons, battalions and detachments, over 16,000 Marines and almost 500 combat aircraft.[22] It contained every type of aircraft in the Marine Corps' inventory. Assembled very quickly, with ad hoc staff augmentation, 3d MAW commanded units from all three active duty Marine aircraft wings, the 1st Marine Brigade and from the Marine Corps reserve.[23]
The MEF's (and 3d MAW's) interface with CENTCOM's JFACC was established early in the planning phase of Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Prior to deployment there were no formal written agreements between the Marines and CENTCOM regarding the apportionment of Marine aviation for use by the JFACC. By 20 August, a verbal agreement had been made between the two commands. The agreement called for 50% of all F/A-18s, all the A-6Es and EA-6Bs, and two KC-130s, but none of 3d MAW's AV-8B's to be given to the JFACC for utilization in the first 36 hours of Phase 1 of Desert Storm. In this way the MEF and the ACE assured the reasonable application of Marine air power by the JFACC, while at the same time husbanding their assets for the other three phases of the planned offensive. For the defensive operations during Desert Shield, the Marine F/A-18s of Marine Aircraft Group-11 (MAG) were tasked with providing a 24-hour defensive combat air patrol (CAP) in the north Arabian Gulf. This continuous Marine CAP provided the MEF with its own integrated air defense system for Desert Shield -- keeping with the tradition of Marines supporting Marines in combat. In addition to flying the north Gulf CAP, Marine TACAIR was busy planning air support operations for the Marine and coalition ground forces, in case the Iraqis moved further south, and planning for Phase 1 of the proposed offensive operations[24]
The first 36-hours of Desert Storm-Phase 1 and the corresponding air tasking order (ATO) were planned very early in the fall of 1990.[25] The Marine portion of the plan was to include multiple, large, joint/combined strikes against targets in southeastern Iraq and northern Kuwait. These strikes were planned, rehearsed and re-planned throughout the fall and early winter of 1990-91. This phase of the offensive became the focus of effort for wing, group, and squadron planners. JFACC and Marine planners alike became so confident that most genuinely felt that this phase of the offensive alone would cause Iraq's defeat.[26] As Dr. Cochran states in the Gulf War Air Power Survey: Planning Report, "by concentrating all of the CENTAF planner's efforts towards the first phase of the overall theater campaign plan, they implicitly stated their vision that air power alone could prevail and would bring victory within the first week."[27] This mindset may have caused the MEF, its ACE, and the aircrew planning the missions to pay less attention than they should have to what would happen after the first few days of the ATO.
The Great Void -- beyond the first three days of the ATO
Officially the MEF did not start planning for offensive operations until 5 October, when LtGen Boomer directed a "special team to begin planning for an offensive operation."[28] However, planning had been going on from the very beginning of the crisis. Aside from the planning for Phase 1, which has already been discussed, the targeting cell for the 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) had been established on 18 August and tasked with developing policies and procedures for decisive combat operations. The 7th MEB had been the initial Marine command element in theater and was subsumed by the MEF on 6 September. The MEB targeting cell then became the MARCENT / I MEF targeting cell. This initial planning group consisted of only three officers -- an artillery lieutenant colonel, an artillery major, and an infantry captain. Targeting had never been a high priority for the Marine Corps, and as a result no real doctrine or procedures existed to help this initial planning cell.[29] Concepts used today to plan this type of targeting, the single battle and battlespace shaping, were not even in the Marine Corps' vocabulary. Furthermore, since the MEF relied almost exclusively on its organic TACAIR to target the opposing Iraqi forces, the cell lacked the aviation experience necessary to make adequate planning decisions. Despite these handicaps, this group spent the next four months in a self-training and planning process to devise I MEF's offensive targeting plan, with their focus on Phase 3 and Phase 4 of CENTCOM's campaign plan. Their offensive targeting for Phase 3 was to set the conditions for successful Phase 4 operations (the ground offensive), where it was envisioned that close air support (CAS) would become the focus.[30]
Concurrent with the initial targeting plan, the MEF and its subordinate commands planned for the eventuality of defensive or offensive ground operations. Interface between the MEF's ground combat element (GCE) and the ACE was continuous throughout the entire Desert Shield period. Several Marine and joint CAS seminars were held to discuss policies and procedures. The ACE also hosted visits by the GCE tactical air control parties (TACP) and direct air support center (DASC) personnel at Shaikh Isa Air Base in Bahrain. Although these meetings were valuable and productive, detailed planning was made difficult by the uncertain ground scheme of maneuver and ever changing force structure.
As part of the planning for possible ground operations, the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) the Marine landing force for NAVCENT in I MEF's area of operations, conducted an Amphibious exercise called Imminent Thunder in November of 1990. During Imminent Thunder the MEF tested its CAS operating procedures and command and control architecture in preparation for either defensive or offensive ground operations.[31] Poor weather hampered the exercise, but all aviation functions were conducted. Communications between the MACCS, GCE and air assets were very poor and at times it seemed few air controllers knew what was going on. Furthermore, CAS procedures proved very difficult to execute in the desert environment. Traditional marking of CAS targets was not possible because the area being utilized was not a live-fire range. So CAS "talk-on" procedures were attempted, to direct attacking aircraft onto mock targets. The results were dismal at best. The anticipated surface-to-air threat and resulting tactics caused attacking aircraft to loiter above the target at about 15,000 feet. At this altitude the aircraft were next to invisible to the TACP personnel trying to direct the simulated attacks. Furthermore, for the TACPs to describe and direct attacks on a target within the featureless desert terrain proved next to impossible. "Imminent Thunder" was a real "wake-up" call to the problems that could be anticipated if the GCE really needed CAS. Fortunately that need never truly materialized, because the problems of poor communications and the inability to mark the targets were never adequately resolved. As Col. Manfred Rietsch, commanding officer of MAG-11, stated in his Battle Assessment Team interview after the war, "We couldn't talk to them and they couldn't mark targets. Unless they can do those two things it's almost not worth doing."[32]
On 1 January 1991, the MEF targeting
cell briefed its initial Phase 3 and Phase 4 plan to LtGen Boomer. This initial targeting plan and the
corresponding operations plan (OPLAN) was approved by the MEF commanding
general. Unlike what is prescribed by
today's Marine Corps planning process, the MEF's OPLAN hinged almost entirely
on the ground scheme of maneuver and was not in keeping with the contemporary
single battle concept. Furthermore, the
initial targeting plan was merely a list of targets to be attacked by Marine
and JFACC assets; as such, the initial target precedence list did not
constitute a comprehensive plan to shape the battlespace. However, by the middle of January 1991, the
MEF and subordinate staffs received heavy augmentation from MAWTS-1, the Marine
Corps University and other commands throughout the Marine Corps. Under direction of LtGen Boomer and his new
deputy commander MajGen Hearney, this new staff revised the initial targeting plan to encompass the additional
planning expertise, increased force structure, changing enemy situation as a consequence
of the initial air war phases, and
resulting overall offensive plan. This
revision did not happen overnight, but was an evolutionary process which
continued until the end of the campaign.
Prior to this augmentation, the MEF
staff was not adequately manned to provide the necessary staff functions to
plan and execute operations at this level of warfare. Their late arrival and the criticality of the assigned mission
forced this "new" ad hoc staff
to form, organize and coalesce very rapidly. The new staff had to accomplish
this without the benefit of an established MEF staff organizational structure,
staff training program, or specific doctrine to cover the MEF's role in shaping
and deep operations.[33] To compound this problem, the number and
seniority of augmentees to both the MEF and Wing staffs was such that
duplication of effort and competing initiatives were almost inevitable. Lastly, the issue of battlespace shaping
versus enemy force attrition had, up to that point, never been studied by the
Marine Corps or the military establishment as a whole. The concepts of shaping the battlespace and
the MEF's role in the "single battle" as they are understood today
did not even exist. It was, in fact,
new ground for the MEF and its subordinate commands. As a result these concepts evolved from, but were never fully
implemented during the war.[34]
Despite the ongoing planning for CENTCOM's strategic air offensive and the MEF's air support procedures and targeting of Iraqi forces, the question of how operations were to be conducted following Phase 1 (and before ground operations) was not being answered at the operator (squadron/battalion) level prior to the commencement of hostilities on 17 January 1991. This was due in part to the overconfidence in the effectiveness of the strategic air plan (Phase 1), the late arrival of an experienced planning staff at the MEF and wing level, and the lack of established planning doctrine. It was also due to the shifting force structure, since final approval to augment CENTCOM's forces in preparation for offensive operations did not come until 7 November, and finally due to the evolving mission directives of CENTCOM, which were based on these arriving augment forces.[35]
For those of us flying the north Gulf CAP, planning the first strikes of the strategic air plan, and working out CAS procedures, the real likelihood of war was still remote at the beginning of January 1991. Perhaps that is the real reason that we did not have a plan -- we were just not scared enough. The bottom line is that what was missing, as the war approached, was a plan to shape the MEF's battlespace during Phase 3 of the campaign in order to successfully conduct decisive ground operations in Phase 4 should they be required to fulfill the commander-in-chief's (CINC) mission, and in turn the MEF's mission.
The Offensive Mission, Commander's Intent and Concept of Operations
CINCCENT DIRECTIVE:
USCINCCENT CONDUCTS OFFENSIVE
OPERATIONS
TO EJECT IRAQI FORCES
FROM
KUWAIT AND DESTROY THE
IRAQI
WARFIGHTING CAPABILITY.[36]
Based on the CINC's directive issued in mid-November 1990 and the assignment of the supporting attack for Phase 4 - the ground offensive, to MARCENT, the Marines were to achieve the following mission:
1. Fix and destroy Iraqi forces in zone.
2. Prevent reinforcement of Iraqi forces in the west.
3. Block retreat of Iraqi forces from southeast Kuwait and Kuwait City.
4. Assist Arab forces in passing through MARCENT to enter Kuwait City.[37]
Following an analysis of these mission objectives and integration of reinforcements which recently arrived in theater from II MEF and the 1st MEB, LtGen Boomer issued his
commander's intent:
1. Penetrate Iraqi forward defenses in two places.
2. Bypass all enemy forces east of Burqan and Ahmadi oil fields.
3. Exploit the penetration rapidly with combined arms.
4. Consolidate our gains and assist Arab forces in entering Kuwait City.[38]
The assigned mission, commander's intent, and overall four phase CENTCOM campaign plan gave the impetus for detailed planning by the MEF and subordinate staffs. While the MEF OPLAN for Operation Desert Storm was approved by LtGen Boomer on 1 January, the OPLAN changed twice during the execution of the air war, with the final plan for the MEF's ground offensive being approved on 14 February.[39] This second change to the MEF OPLAN called for two division breaches of the Iraqi defenses in Kuwait to be conducted by the 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions respectively. These changes in the MEF's OPLAN, and developments during Phase 1 and 2 of the campaign, resulted in planning for air support and battlespace shaping to continue and evolve until the start of the ground offensive on 24 February. Priorities and commander's intent for the ACE in support of the MEF changed and evolved accordingly.
For MajGen Moore and the ACE staff the overriding precept was the conservation of aviation assets for Phase 4. This was based on MajGen Moore's belief that Phases 1, 2, and 3 would last longer than the JFACC predicted, and on the overarching ethos of Marine aviation -- supporting the Marine on the ground. In this context, the following concepts of operations were developed by 3d MAW starting in December of 1990.
For Phase 1, the ACE's concept of operations was for the AV-8Bs to attack Iraqi forces in Kuwait according to the MEF's targeting priorities (for the Marine Corps, this in effect began Phase 3- Attrition of Enemy Ground Forces, before any detailed planning was conducted ). At the same time F/A-18, A-6, EA-6B, and KC-130 assets (above those in direct support requirements of the MEF) would support JFACC tasking, striking targets in southern Iraq. This approximated 75 percent of available F/A-18 and EA-6B aircraft.[40]
For Phase 2, F/A-18 and EA-6B support to the JFACC was reduced to 50 percent of available aircraft, while MEF objectives were to be met through approximately four large aircraft packages, in addition to section and division size missions. All F/A-18Ds were to operate as FastFACs to support AV-8B missions in Kuwait. During this phase, A-6Es were to be used exclusively for night, solo, armed recce and interdiction missions to provide continuous night observation/attack over the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations (KTO) as a hedge against an Iraqi assault on Marine ground forces and to prevent Iraqi movement within the KTO.[41]
During Phase 3, the level of JFACC support decreased to 25% of available F/A-18 and EA-6Bs. MEF strikes changed to predominantly division and section sized armed recce missions, which were assigned a geographical area with last known target location. Authority was also granted to hit targets of opportunity if the assigned targets were not located. As the ground offensive neared, what would now be called battlespace shaping efforts were to be increased, with specific "prep fires" in the following sequence:
a. Concentrate on the breach frontages.
b. Shift deep to the Iraqi indirect fire systems and armor counterattack forces.
c. Shift back to the breach frontage just prior to the penetration with napalm and fuel air explosives (FAE).
d. Shift back to the Iraqi indirect fire systems.[42]
Lastly, for Phase 4 the ACE's intent was to provide continuous support for all functions of Marine aviation for a two division ground assault, with support "weighted" to the 1st Division as they penetrate the barrier fields, due to the vulnerability of their right flank and the quantity of indirect fire threats. The concept of operations for this intent was to provide three days of surge operations as ground forces moved into attack positions, proceeded through the breach sites and continued their attack. Priority throughout the ground war was to provide CAS with 100% of all Marine TACAIR assets. CAS was to be provided utilizing a "push CAS" system with a division of F/A-18s and a section of AV-8Bs arriving every seven and one-half minutes. All aircraft were to be sent to a "main" CAS stack to support the two division front. All aircraft that were not utilized for CAS were to be directed to secondary, east and west, stacks to perform armed recce and interdiction with the targeting priorities of:
a. Long range indirect fire systems
b. Mechanized counterattack forces
c. Other targets of opportunity[43]
Knowing this, we can now turn to the details of the MEF and ACE plan to shape the battlespace and conduct decisive operations.
CHAPTER 2
THE PLAN --SHAPING THE BATTLESPACE AND
DECISIVE OPERATIONS
26
January 1991, approximately 0630:
I
was a few hours away from briefing and leading a 24 plane strike against a JFACC assigned target just south of Basra. I just couldn't believe we were going to
send 24 Hornets, plus EW and tanker support, against a "possible"
scud site, with no real Intel or
pictures. It was going to be like
finding a needle in a haystack. I had already gone to see Group Ops to ask
them to change the target to something we
could find and hit, and they were checking on it with the wing... A half hour before the brief, I made one last stop at the Group before
going to the briefing room.
Much to my surprise, the wing had
approved a change to a MEF target. We were now going after Iraqi troop
positions and a C2 node in southern Kuwait
-- now that at least sounded more like a target, even if we still did not have a good target description or photographs. It was going to be the first major strike into southern Kuwait for MAG-11, so we
scrambled to change the plan; briefed a
little late, but launched on time...The weather was perfect, and we had no indications of enemy radar as we entered
Kuwaiti airspace. To avoid AAA
and hand-held SAMs, the planned release altitude was about 14,000 feet. Four miles from the target I started my attack. I put the pipper on my pre-planned aim point, but saw only one truck, an oil line, a road intersection, and a lot of sand. Without something better to aim at, I dropped on my aim point. Everyone dropped their bombs and we all got safely back to Bahrain...I never did find out what the mission BDA was.[44]
Attrition or Battlespace Shaping
…ACTIONS, BOTH LETHAL AND NONLETHAL, DESIGNED TO
CREATE CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONS. MCCWP 5-1 (DRAFT) “MAGTF
PLANING”
The commonly
accepted force ratio for an attacking force against a defending force in
prepared positions is 3 to 1
SHAPING
in favor of the attacker. What I
MEF's two division GCE faced as
Phase 4 - the Ground Offensive,
loomed near at the end of January
1990, was a force ratio of 1 to 7.
Furthermore, the roughly fourteen
Iraqi
divisions in southern Kuwait were
supported by large numbers of indirect fire
weapons, in the form of field artillery and surface-to-surface rockets, most of which could out-range the Marine Corps' organic artillery.[45] This force ratio was totally unacceptable to LtGen Boomer, whose intention was to fight the "deep" battle for the MEF in order to "shape" the enemy in preparation for the decisive close battle to be fought by his division commanders.[46] As stated in the commander's intent and concept of operations outlined in chapter 1, the MEF's fighting force for this "deep" battle was the ACE, augmented by JFACC assets. In order to direct his staff's and subordinate commanders' efforts, LtGen Boomer, in concert with CINCCENT, directed that a 50% reduction of Iraqi forces in the southern KTO be achieved prior to beginning the ground offensive. Specific USMARCENT battle damage requirements to be achieved by G-day (day ground offensive begins) were:
ARTILLERY - 50% (406)
FROGS/MRLS - 100% (82)
TANKS - 50% (690)
APCs - 50% (584)
INFANTRY [at breach site] - 50%[47]
note: Numbers in parenthesis indicate intelligence estimate of actual
number of Iraqi equipment in southern KTO.[48]
It was far easier to establish this requirement than to attain the goal.
The USMARCENT attrition guidance was the first thing that had to be studied and understood. As the air war progressed through Phases 1 and 2 at the end of January 1991, the large strike packages targeting fixed sites met with great success. These missions benefited from reliable targeting information, and because they were static, attaining battle damage assessment on these targets was relatively easy. However, as the targeting priorities shifted toward mobile positions such as indirect fire weapons, armor, and troop concentrations, assessment of mission results became more difficult to determine. The initial concept of attrition was understood to mean physical destruction of individual units and their warfighting equipment. Through study of the mission results from the first two weeks of the war, the MEF staff in the G-3 and the FSCC determined that physical destruction to the level demanded by the commanding general's battle damage requirements would be all but impossible due to the excessive number of TACAIR sorties and ordnance required to attain this goal[49] The problem was further exacerbated by the planners' initial assumptions that the individual Iraqi units being targeted according to the MEF's plan could be located by the assigned strike mission, accurately struck with the appropriate ordnance, and that battle damage assessment for each mission could be gained in such a way as to make timely re-attack possible if deemed necessary.
In practice this became next to impossible. Although targeting intelligence support at the MEF level had relatively accurate, reliable information, by the time the mission was assigned and flown the target was often no longer in the same location, or was camouflaged in such a manner as to make targeting identification impossible.[50] The Iraqi military proved to be masters at camouflage. Often artillery and armor were virtually buried in sand and covered with netting, thereby further