A Proposed Littoral Dominant Battle Group Centered Around The Arsenal Ship
CCS 1997
Subject Area -
Warfighting
Executive Summary
Title: A Proposed Littoral Dominant Battle Group Centered Around The Arsenal Ship
Author: Lieutenant Commander John P. Looney, United States Navy
Thesis: For the projected $500 million investment in a demonstrator Arsenal Ship, the Navy will likely get what it is asking for, a ship designed to help the aircraft carrier battle group make the transition from a blue-water dominant team to a littoral dominant team. Just as the Navy built the aircraft carrier battle group team and doctrine to dominate the blue-water for the past 50 plus years, the Navy now needs to build the team and the doctrine that can dominate the littoral battle space of the 21st century. The Arsenal Ship concept should center around having industry build a ship that could be the centerpiece of a littoral dominant battle group.
Background: The United States Navy has shifted its strategic focus from the blue-water to the littorals; therefore, it would make sense for the Navy to develop doctrine and force structure to dominate the littorals. The Navy is in the process of building a revolutionary new class of warship--Arsenal Ship. The Arsenal Ship's operational concept is focused on a ship that will enhance the fire power of existing aircraft carriers, land attack capable combatants and submarines. In this period of austere funding and downsizing, the Navy must look not only to new technologies but to new organizations and doctrine to effectively and efficiently meet its mandated missions. There are two areas where shortfalls exist to building a littoral dominant team: 1) the Navy does not have a staff that is organized and trained to plan and execute littoral dominance operations; and 2) the Navy has critical shortfalls in naval surface fire support assets.
Recommendations: The United States Navy should build a littoral dominant battle group centered around the Arsenal Ship: a typical aircraft carrier battle group with an Arsenal Ship in the place of the aircraft carrier, and an Amphibious Group (PHIBGRU) commander leading it instead of a Carrier Group (CARGRU) or Cruiser Destroyer Group (CRUDESGRU) commander. An Arsenal Ship Battle Group, led by an experienced littoral warfare expert, would be a viable forward presence and power projection entity; furthermore, it would be an effective building block for follow-on forces if a large-scale crisis were to develop.
Table of Contents
Chapter One The Arsenal Ship's Impact on Future Naval Operations ........... 1
Thesis ........................................................................................ 2
Naval Power Projection Today ................................................. 3
Chapter Two Employing a Littoral Dominant Battle Group .......................... 5
Background .............................................................................. 5
Key Issue .................................................................................. 7
Proposed Littoral Dominant Staff ............................................ 11
Chapter Three Arsenal Ship--The Centerpiece of a Littoral Dominant ........... 14
Battle Group
Background .............................................................................. 14
Arsenal Ship Requirements ..................................................... 14
Long-Standing Deficiencies .................................................... 15
Predicted Deficiencies ............................................................ 16
Vertical Launched Ordnance ...................................... 16
Naval Gun System ...................................................... 17
Specifications .......................................................................... 18
Advantages ............................................................................ 20
Limitations ............................................................................ 23
Potential Operational Effects of the Arsenal Ship .................. 30
Dominant Maneuver Enhanced by Naval Surface .................. 31
Fire Support--Arsenal Ship
Recommendations ................................................................... 33
Chapter Four Conclusion .............................................................................. 37
Bibliography .................................................................................................. 39
A
PROPOSED LITTORAL DOMINANT BATTLE GROUP
CENTERED AROUND THE ARSENAL SHIP
THE
ARSENAL SHIP'S IMPACT ON FUTURE NAVAL OPERATIONS
We have entered a period of uncertainty where threats are indeterminate even as changes in technology accelerate. Rapid innovation--apparent in the impact of stealth and precision weaponry in the Gulf War--appears likely to continue. Yet the Armed Forces are not apt to receive anything close to the resources enjoyed during the Cold War. With less money and greater ambiguity on the nature of opponents and wars in the future, we must innovate.[1]
The United States Navy is investing scarce resources in the development of a revolutionary new class of capital ship--Arsenal Ship. The Arsenal Ship will capitalize on technological advances in ordnance, hull design and manufacturing capability, propulsion and damage control automation, and command and control systems. The Navy should capitalize on the Arsenal Ship by leveraging, through innovation, the opportunities that its myriad technological advances provide. Unfortunately, the Navy's operational concept for the Arsenal Ship states that it will be an affordable strike and naval fire support ship that will enhance the fire power of existing aircraft carriers, land attack capable combatants and submarines, in essence aircraft carrier battle groups.[2]
It is not a replacement for these or for land-based air. Instead, it is part of the whole-just as the Battleship was a part of the whole for nearly a century. Operating under the control and umbrella of regularly deployed Aegis combatants, arsenal ship will supply substantial firepower, early: giving unified Commanders-in-Chief (CinCs) the capability to halt or deter invasion and, if necessary, enable the build-up of coalition land-based air and ground forces to achieve favorable conflict resolution.[3]
During a recent hearing of a House subcommittee on military procurement, in response to a question concerning the "core need" for the Arsenal Ship, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy John Douglass said, "I don't think there is an incremental core need."[4] Additionally, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations Vice Admiral Donald Pilling said essentially that the Arsenal Ship was "...a "land-attack platform," intended to influence events ashore from the sea. When asked whether the Arsenal Ship could attack a specific target that could not be struck by an existing weapon system, the admiral admitted there was not."[5] That prompted the observation that "...the Arsenal Ship seems like the ship of the future with everything. Everything except a mission."[6]
Thesis
For the projected $500 million investment in a demonstrator Arsenal Ship, the Navy will likely get what it is asking for, a ship designed to help the aircraft carrier battle group make the transition from a blue-water dominant team to a littoral dominant team. That operational concept is strikingly similar to the operational concept espoused by the battleship sailors of the 1930s who tried to keep battleships relevant as blue-water dominant ships by neatly fitting the aircraft carrier into a supporting role of providing aerial spotters for battleship battle lines.
The Navy has shifted its strategic focus from the blue-water to the littorals. Now, it should focus its intellectual power on being innovative because resources will continue to be scarce and force structure is likely to go through additional cuts. Just as the Navy built the aircraft carrier battle group team and doctrine to dominate the blue-water for the past 50 plus years, the Navy now needs to build the team and the doctrine that can dominate the littoral battle space of the 21st century. The Arsenal Ship concept should center around having industry build a ship that could be the centerpiece of a littoral dominant battle group.
Naval Power Projection Today
The Navy currently employs two types of forward deployed entities, the Aircraft Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) and the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG). The CVBG with its composite air wing (F-14, F/A-18, S-3, E-2C, EA-6, and SH-60), surface combatant escorts (cruisers, destroyers, and frigates), direct support attack submarines, and logistics ship is clearly a blue-water dominant battle group. The ARG consists of an amphibious assault ship (LHA, LHD, or LPH), a Dock Landing Ship (LSD), an amphibious transport dock (LPD), and a Special Operations Capable Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU(SOC));
by itself, except in the most benign battlespace, the ARG is neither a blue-water dominant group nor a littoral dominant group. The only littoral dominant group is a combination of the ARG and elements of the CVBG.
There are two clear points in the Navy’s strategic vision: (1) the Navy must retain its ability to dominate the blue-water regions of the world (i.e., keep sufficient Aircraft Carriers to accomplish that mission), and (2) the Navy must improve its ability to provide decisive crisis response in the littoral regions of the world. This thesis suggests an alternate and fiscally responsible way to improve decisive crisis response capability in the littoral battlespace. It will address the who and what of decisive operations in the littoral battlespace.
EMPLOYING A LITTORAL DOMINANT BATTLE GROUP
Background
The United States Naval Service--the Navy and Marine Corps--operates in the oceans and littoral regions of the world to “project power and influence of the nation across the seas to foreign waters and shores in both peace and war.”[7] For most of the twentieth century, the United States Navy was mostly interested in blue-water operations. During the Cold War, the Navy’s strategic focus was on achieving global maritime dominance. Due to the demise of the Soviet Union and with it the only global fleet seen as a potential adversary, the United States Navy’s strategic focus shifted to littoral operations and power projection from the sea. That shift in strategic focus was articulated in the Department of the Navy’s publications--"From the Sea" and "Forward...From the Sea."
Currently, the Navy contributes combat power to theater commanders in the form of Aircraft Carrier Battle Groups, Amphibious Ready Groups, and Independent Deployers (e.g., Maritime Patrol Aircraft Detachments and one or more surface combatants). Those forces are trained, organized, and equipped to conduct a wide range of tactical evolutions including peacetime engagements (e.g., port visits and exercises), maritime dominance (e.g., protection and denial of sea lines of communications), and power projection from the sea (e.g., amphibious demonstrations and forced entry operation). Because forward deployed Naval forces are available to respond quickly, require minimum support, and are less constrained by potential diplomatic restrictions that could be imposed on land-based forces by their all too necessary host nations, naval forces enjoy far greater employment options as compared to the Army and Air Force. This means that the naval services can respond to most crisis situations quicker than other services and with a wider range of tactical options.
The congressionally mandated roles of naval forces are maintaining maritime superiority, contributing to regional security, conducting operations from the sea, seizing or defending advanced naval bases, and conducting such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of naval campaigns.[8] The management of those naval campaigns is the job of navy staffs. During the early days of a crisis situation the Navy has basically two staffs and their associated forces readily available to respond to the crisis: (1) the Aircraft Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) commanded by a Carrier Group Commander (CARGRU) or a Cruiser Destroyer Group Commander (CRUDESGRU) both Rear Admirals (O-7 or 8 grade officers), and (2) the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) with its embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) commanded by an Amphibious Squadron Commander (PHIBRON) and a MEU commander, both O-6 grade officers, respectively. If the crisis situation is too large in scope or has the potential for escalation, then those forward deployed staffs and assets become the “building blocks” for follow-on naval forces.
Building on normally deployed forces, the Navy can mass, if the situation requires, multiple Aircraft Carrier Battle Groups into Carrier Battle Forces, Amphibious Ready Groups with embarked Marine Expeditionary Units, and as needed project those naval expeditionary forces ashore using the afloat Maritime Prepositioning Force. Such massing of naval units can be
complimented by the deployment of Army and Air Force units to provide a joint force capable of the full range of combat operations that may be required.[9]
Those follow-on naval forces of the littorally focused future will likely include a Marine Expeditionary Force Forward (MEF Forward), which is a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) whose size is variable but somewhere between a MEU-sized force and an entire MEF. A MEF Forward will typically be commanded by a Marine Corps Brigadier General. It is safe to assume that if a MEF Forward sized force is dispatched overseas to respond to a crisis, then Maritime Preposition Force (MPF) ships will also be routed to that crisis area to provide sustainment for the MEF Forward. Therefore, per current doctrine, the Navy will send an Amphibious Group (PHIBGRU) commander (Rear Admiral) and staff to the area to coordinate the off-load and marrying-up of the MEF Forward and the MPF assets. Once in theater, that PHIBGRU commander and staff will most likely stay to command, as Amphibious Task Force Commander (CATF), any MEF Forward-sized amphibious operation, as was the case during the Gulf War. This is due in part to the limitations of a PHIBRON staff to effectively coordinate much more than an ARG sized Amphibious Task Force (ATF). However, there is one flaw with that practice which has to do with the organization and employment of the PHIBGRU staff.
Key Issue
A PHIBGRU staff is primarily organized for administrative functions (i.e., managing maintenance, basic training, and other non-operational functions such as personnel issues for the amphibious ships that are not on deployment or working-up for a deployment) rather than tactical operations. The PHIBGRUs, 2 in the Atlantic, 3 in the Pacific, and 1 in the Western Pacific, own all the amphibious ships and the nine PHIBRONs (four each assigned to PHIBGRU 2 and 3, and the remaining one assigned to PHIBGRU 1). Three ship ARGs are assigned to a deploying PHIBRON approximately six months prior to deployment. The PHIBRON oversees the operational employment and training of the ships throughout the work-up phase and the deployment while maintenance and administration are still the responsibility of the PHIBGRU staff.
If a PHIBGRU commander is called on to conduct tactical operations (normally large-scale operations), standard procedures call for the PHIBGRU commander to subsume one of his or her PHIBRON commanders as the chief of staff for the tactical operation while PHIBGRU’s billeted chief of staff and other selected members stay behind to perform the PHIBGRU’s administrative functions. In contrast, nothing like that happens in the CVBG structure: CARGRU, CRUDESGRU, and even Destroyer Squadron (DESRON--the equivalent of a PHIBRON) staffs retain all administrative and tactical duties at all times. The CARGRUs, CRUDESGRUs and DESRONs have, since August 1995, permanently assigned ships. Their staffs are organized and manned to enable them to manage simultaneously and over the life-cycle of the ships both the administrative and operational employment of their assigned ships
The subsumption of a PHIBRON commander also includes subsumption of the rest of the PHIBRON staff to help perform the tactical planning and execution functions of the PHIBGRU. The subsumption of a PHIBRON builds an ad hoc amphibious staff that has a great deal of individual operational experience but lacks operational experience and cohesiveness as a tactical staff. That potentially promotes unnecessary friction within the staff. It also promotes unnecessary external friction, as the ad hoc PHIBGRU staff inter-operates with other staffs and ships that have had little tactical experience working with and for the PHIBGRU staff. Those internal and external frictions are potentially magnified if an amphibious operation, often deemed the most complex type of military operation, is being employed.
The Navy, if truly committed to its littoral and maneuver warfare focus, must promote the understanding of the land battle from its inception well out to sea through its transition of command ashore. The littoral battlespace and maneuver warfare are far different from Alfred Thayer Mahan’s massed fleet theory of seeking out and destroying the enemy’s fleet to gain unimpeded use of the sea. Tomorrow’s coastal defense threat (mobile, lethal, and survivable) will require the Navy to build and train forces to employ maneuver warfare from over the horizon. The Arsenal Ship, a strike and fire support platform, goes a long way towards building the required forces. What is needed are littoral warfare experts trained and experienced employing maneuver warfare.[10] They must be able to understand how the Navy can best maneuver and shape the enemy while optimizing force protection and sustainability of naval forces at sea and ashore. They must also be equipped with the best command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems available in order to maximize their ability to operate on the increasingly fast-paced and widely dispersed battle field.
The Navy faces some challenges developing commanders and their staffs to be capable of planning and executing operational maneuver from the sea. Currently, the only navy staffs getting tactical experience in littoral warfare and ground operations in the overseas operating areas, where crises are likely to occur in the future, are the PHIBRONs: CARGRUs and CRUDESGRUs have little to do with ARG operations overseas, and PHIBGRUs do not deploy nor do large-scale amphibious exercises occur frequently enough, due to their high costs, to provide them with high quality at-sea training. To borrow a phrase from the Marine Corps, the MEF or MEF Forward commander is the “warfighter.” Who is the Navy’s littoral “warfighter?” The answer is not the CVBG staff due to experience and knowledge limitations in amphibious and ground combat operations. The answer is not the PHIBRON staff due to their size limitation and lack of strike warfare experience to coordinate the Navy’s shaping assets. More than likely, the Navy will turn to the PHIBGRU commander who suffers from staff limitation foremost in readiness because of the staff’s low operating tempo and manning that is not focused on tactical littoral operations. The PHIBGRU commander also suffers in the area of C4ISR capabilities. It is not very often that a PHIBGRU commander conducts amphibious warfare exercises from the decks of a Amphibious Command Ship (LCC), a ship designed specifically to serve as the command ship for the Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF) and the Commander, Landing Force (CLF). LCCs have become the home of the numbered fleet commanders. LHAs and LHDs have good C4ISR capabilities but they have not received the same priority for upgrades as the navy's premier capital ship, the aircraft carrier.
Proposed Littoral Dominant Staff
To rectify the problems that plague the Navy’s ability to develop littoral warfare dominance, I propose the creation of deploying PHIBGRU staffs, two per coast, organized more along the lines of the CARGRU and CRUDESGRU staffs. Furthermore, the PHIBGRUs must redistribute custody of amphibious ships and have PHIBRONs assume the permanent ownership of their ARGs, a concept recently proven in the DESRON community. That will require some minor changes to the PHIBRON’s organization and manning, and a reduction in the number of PHIBRONs from nine down to eight in order to keep one staff for each deploying ARG.
The reorganization of the PHIBGRU staff bears some additional comments. The flag support (N0x personnel that work for the Chief of Staff), administration (N1), and intelligence (N2) departments are adequately structured and do not need to be changed. Specifically, the PHIBGRU's intelligence department works out of the amphibious flagship's intelligence center, therefore, the intelligence center becomes the focal point for all-source intelligence fusion through the combined efforts of the flagship, PHIBGRU, and MEU(SOC) intelligence personnel.
The operations department should have the following divisions to support execution of maneuver warfare from the sea: surface, ground, air, and submarine. Heading up the operations department should be a navy captain or a marine colonel. The surface operations division should be led by a post-commander command navy surface warfare officer with strong amphibious warfare experience. The surface operations division should be staffed with an appropriate mix of supporting personnel, such as operations, combat systems, or deck experienced officers. The air operations division should be led by a post-commander command aviator with strong air assault experience. The air operations division should be staffed with appropriate supporting personnel, such as strike warfare specialists in tomahawk and attack aircraft communities, and assault support aviators. The ground operations division should be led by a field grade ground combat officer. The ground operations division should be staffed with an appropriate mix (infantry, artillery, or armor) of company grade or junior field grade ground combat officers as well as a marine logistician. The submarine division should be led by a post department head submarine officer. Also, the operations department requires a host of talented enlisted personnel to support the management and execution of the departments responsibilities.
The material department (N4) should be reorganized by decreasing the amount of navy engineering influence, due to the reduction in ships assigned, and emphasize more the logistics and sustainment at sea. The MAGTF forces that go ashore should look to the MEU(SOC) staff and PHIBGRU's ground and air operations divisions for logistics support. An operational planning group (N5) should be organized to support future planning. The personnel should come from the various departments and supporting or associated ships and staffs (e.g., MEU(SOC) and DESRON). The communications department (N6) should expand to take on a more robust command and control warfare posture. The training and readiness department (N8) should decrease in size, due to the reduction in ships assigned, and come under the control of the operations department or become the core of the operational planning group.
In order to achieve operational expertise in maneuver warfare and littoral operations, the PHIBGRU commander needs to work throughout the work-ups and deployment with the ARG and MEU. Therefore, the PHIBGRU’s flagship should be the LHA or LHD, both very capable command and control platforms. But, what happens to the CVBG and its commander because clearly the three ship ARG is not such a significant command to warrant a flag officer and staff? It does not seem reasonable to assume that during a crisis situation the entire CVBG command could be efficiently and effectively commanded by a PHIBGRU staff embarked on an amphibious ship: it is a matter of the very close relationship between the carrier air wing staff and the CVBG staff.
The alternative that I propose is to have the Arsenal Ship take the place of an aircraft carrier as the centerpiece of what used to be called the CVBG. But can the Navy’s mission still be accomplished effectively without the aircraft carrier forward deployed? The answer to that question is yes. During every recent Mediterranean deployment, the aircraft carrier has spent at least one quarter of its deployment out of the Mediterranean theater, and sometimes as much as half of the deployment. The ships that remained in the theater accomplished, in conjunction with other joint and combined forces, all of the required theater missions. If a crisis situation had developed in the theater, the remainder of the CVBG stood ready to provide TLAM strike support and escort missions for the ARG to allow it to perform its mission. Would that strike and escort support have been enough to accomplish maritime dominance in crisis area's littoral without the aircraft carrier? Would there have been enough strike assets to have a decisive or substantial shaping effect on the enemy? Clearly that is all situational dependent. This is where the Arsenal Ship can play a key role. But, what is an Arsenal Ship, and what are its capabilities?
ARSENAL
SHIP--THE CENTERPIECE OF A
LITTORAL DOMINANT BATTLE GROUP
The arsenal ship concept is a direct outgrowth of the Navy’s Shift in focus from
the open ocean to the littoral. It is fully consistent with “Forward...from the Sea”,
and “Operational Maneuver from the Sea”, and addresses current as well as anticipated future requirements for more decisive, responsive and varied naval support to the land battle. Through concentration of massive firepower, continuous availability and application of netted targeting and weapons assignment, the arsenal
ship will increase dramatically the scope and relevance of surface strike and fire support.[11]
BACKGROUND
The
concept of a modern arsenal ship is not a new idea. Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf III, USN (retired), the former Deputy
Chief of Naval Operations for Surface Warfare first introduced the concept in
his 1988 article, “Revolution at Sea Initiative.” In that article he foresaw the development of a new kind of
"dreadnought" based on the principle of maximizing a ship's ability
to deliver ordnance on target. He
surmised that the a ship would be built, a strike cruiser, to exploit vertical
launch and smart missile technologies.[12]
Arsenal Ship Requirements
Theater Commander in Chiefs have identified capability requirements based on existing shortfalls within their respective theaters. These requirements include:
• Conventional Deterrence against regional aggression inimical to United States interests,
• Flexible response for demonstration of power independent of diplomatic limitations’
• Credible forward firepower support to joint and coalition land forces early in a regional contingency if deterrence fails. The forward theater arsenal ship weapons load out will be robust, flexible and tailorable to Commander in Chief requirements in order to expand Commander in Chief options for use of assigned joint forces.[13]
Based on the above requirements, the United States Navy has embarked on an acquisition program to develop an arsenal ship to satisfy those requirements. Additionally, the Navy is looking to satisfy some of its long-standing warfare deficiencies and predictable future shortfalls.
LONG-STANDING DEFICIENCIES
The missions of naval surface fire support include: (1) suppression of enemy artillery, (2) interdiction of enemy reinforcing elements, (3) area neutralization and denial, (4) close support fires, and (5) protection for evacuation operations. Those missions must be performed in all weather, day and night, and from over-the-horizon.[14] Since the early 1960s, the navy has seriously decreased its Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) capability by the decommissioning of its Battleships and Heavy Cruisers with their multiple 16 inch (406mm) and 8 inch (203mm) guns respectively. Although re-activated twice to truss up its surface fire support capability, once for the Vietnam conflict and again during the mid-1980s through the Gulf War, the Navy’s Battleships were once again de-activated primarily because of their extremely high operating costs and the fact that, at the time of their de-activation, the Navy leadership had not shifted its focus from “blue-water” operations to power projection ashore from the sea.
Combine the decommissioning of Battleships and Heavy Cruisers with the post-Cold War era military drawdown, which is not yet complete, and the results are an all-time paucity of naval surface fire support in this century. In fact, the current inventory of United States. Navy gun weapon systems and ammunition is inadequate to meet naval surface fire support requirements.[15]
PREDICTED DEFICIENCies
A forward deployed aircraft carrier battle group has a finite number of vertical launch missile cells and large caliber naval guns. The load out of those cells and gun magazines is a question of theater requirements. Those requirements are driven by theater commanders and naval doctrine.
Vertical Launched Ordnance. Theater commanders recognize the flexibility provided by sea-based ordnance operating in international waters. They demand that a large percentage of the vertical launch missile cells available to a battle group commander are loaded with theater level weapons such as the Tomahawk Land Attack Cruise Missile.
Another potential theater level weapon carried by ships is the Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) surface-to-air standard missile that is being developed by the Navy. It is reasonable to assume that theater commanders will require additional battle group vertical launch cells be reserved for TBMD missiles.
The requirement for a certain number of those two types of theater weapons reduces the number of vertical cells available to a battle group for defensive ordnance such as surface-to-air missiles and vertical launched anti-submarine rockets. Additional ordnance that will be competing for space within the vertical launch missile cells are the self-defense surface to air Evolved Sparrow Vertical Launched Missile and the naval version of the Army Tactical Artillery Missile that is compatible with the current vertical launch weapons system.
Naval Gun System. Maneuver warfare from the sea requires shaping by lethal and non-lethal fires, and robust fire support capabilities. The navy which relies on a 5 inch 54 caliber (127 mm) gun system has severely limited shaping and fire support capabilities due to the range (maximum range of 13 nautical miles) and lethality of that weapon system's ordnance. Planned improvements to the existing inventory of 5 inch naval guns will not of itself meet NSFS requirements.
Although a 62 caliber upgrade to the 5 inch 54 caliber gun and an associated Extended Range Guided Munition (ERGM) are being programmed, for every 5 inch ERGM that is put into the magazine of a surface ship, two existing rounds are removed. That is significant because shipboard gun magazines have a standard 600 round capacity; approximately 40 percent of that capacity is taken up by rounds specifically designed for air defense, surface ship engagement, training, and special purpose ground support ordnance such as white phosphorus and illumination rounds. Thus, either the multi-purpose capability of the 5 inch gun system will be sacrificed by reducing the amount or types of ordnance within its magazine or the amount of ammunition available for NSFS missions will be reduced by 50 percent. Perhaps the accuracy of ERGM will off-set the reduction in the amount of NSFS available, and then again, less than 200 five inch ERGMs per shipboard magazine does not seem to be a lot of fire power. Conversely, the benefit of those gun systems on escort ships is the ability to re-arm them at sea.
There are other trade-offs associated with the improved range (approximately 63 nautical miles) offered by the 62 caliber and ERGM upgrades to the 5 inch gun, those include: less destructive power of ERGM due to ordnance weight restrictions that require the use of submunition technology; increased potential for fratricide based on the failure rate of submunition technology; decreased responsiveness due to rate of fire decreases associated with gun loading procedures; and extended times of flight due to a high-altitude fly-out phase of an ERGM.
SPECIFICATIONS
Arsenal ship is designed to be a “fly before buy” acquisition program. The Navy has provided industry with a Concept of Operations and a Ship Capabilities Document. Industry teams take the functions described in the ships capability document and treat them as goals when conducting trade studies against the cost threshold. The goal is to leverage commercial technology and manufacturing processes with existing Department of Defense investments to rapidly (i.e., in less than half of the time of a typical major acquisition program) produce a functional and cost effective prototype arsenal ship for operational evaluation and testing. This prototype will be capable of being converted into a fully mission capable ship.[16]
The following is a synopsis of the relevant operational concepts and specifications that the Navy is asking industry to deliver in the Arsenal Ship:
• The Arsenal Ship’s launching system should have approximately 500 vertical launch cells, and room for an extended range gun system. The ship must be capable of firing the following weapons in support of the land campaign: Tomahawk Land Attack Cruise Missiles using off-ship targeting and mission planning, Standard Missiles using Cooperative Engagement Capability, and a vertical launched naval surface fire support weapon using digital call for fire technology.[17]
• Optimize the Arsenal Ship’s survivability in the littoral environment using
passive means. If survivability evaluations dictate, then provide the Arsenal Ship
with limited active self defense systems to augment passive defenses.
• Make Arsenal Ship a “remote magazine” that will receive all targeting, mission planning, and command and decision functions from off-ship through Cooperative Engagement Capability or an equivalent data link. Make the remote connectivity with other navy assets reliable, rapid, and secure over both satellite and line of sight media. Make it jointly interoperable with minimum impact. Successful employment of the Arsenal Ship will rest on effective command and control systems both internal and external.
• The Arsenal Ship will be designed for 35 years of service with an overall availability rate of 95 percent. It will be capable of underway refueling and vertical stores replenishment. Underway re-arming of vertical launch cells is not required. Provide it with the ability to store 90 days consumable and maintenance stores.
• Make Arsenal Ship capable of at least 22 knots and sufficient fuel to conduct a 90 day mission at the most economical fuel consumption speed. The ship shall have precise navigation capability independent of location, weather, or visibility.
Advantages
“The protection of forces will often be a friendly center of gravity during early entry operations. Therefore, early entry forces should deploy with sufficient organic and supporting capabilities to preserve their freedom of action and protect personnel and equipment….”[18] The Arsenal Ship enhances force protection because its vertical launch cells free up cells on cruisers and destroyers to be loaded with weapons that can be used to protect friendly forces. Also, Arsenal Ship’s long-range firepower can weaken potential counterattacks against joint forces by disrupting enemy C4ISR capabilities with standoff unmanned strikes and provide substantial capabilities to suppress enemy defenses (e.g., air and coastal), damaging logistics infrastructure, and attrite some of the enemy’s long-range offensive weapons.
The Arsenal Ship’s striking power is increased as the ship moves closer to the shore where its NSFS ordnance can effect the enemy. If designed properly (signature