Is Sudan Terrorism’s New Mecca?
CSC 1997
Subject Area – Topical Issues
Table of Contents
Subject Page
Executive Summary ii
Introduction 1
Country Facts 2
Historical Perspective and Background 3
The Iran-Sudan Connection 4
The Link to Terrorism 6
World Reaction 8
Egyptian Reaction 9
Ethiopian Reaction 10
Eritrean Reaction 11
Libyan Reaction 12
U.S. Reaction 13
Sudan's Reaction to the Threat of U.N.
Sanctions
14
Conclusion 15
Endnotes 17
Bibliography 19
Executive Summary
Background
Is Sudan
terrorism's new Mecca, or a victim of anti-Islamic fear? If you ask Sheik Hassan al-Turabi, leader of
Sudan's National Islamic Front, Sudan has no connections to terrorism and is
being falsely accused because of its Islamic affiliation. However, if you ask any of Sudan's bordering
neighbors, the image of terrorism is quite vivid.
In a time when
terrorist oriented countries such as Iran and Libya were tempering their passion for openly funding terrorism,
an unlikely supporter emerged. Who
would have thought that a country desperately trying to stabilize after a 1989
coup d'etat, engulfed in civil war for the past thirteen years, and
economically crippled would openly engage in terrorist activities?
Iran-Sudan Connection
Despite the
historical religious animosity, for the first time in history, a minority Shia
sect of Islam forged links with a Sunni Muslim government... Iran and
Sudan. The world braced for the
resultant off-spring that this unholy alliance would produce. The courtship started in late 1991, and the
results were quickly revealed.
Revolutionary Guard personnel began training fundamentalist people's
militias set up by Sudan's Islamic regime.
Syrians, Palestinians and Iranians infiltrated schools looking for
recruits to indoctrinate into terrorist training. The ultimate goal of this Iran-Sudan connection was the spread of
radical fundamentalist Islam.
Links to Terrorism
Despite the
denials of Sheik Hassan al-Turabi, there are some peculiar coincidences that he
has failed to account for. Following
the Libyan shut down of some of its terrorist camps, elements of the radical
Palestinian Abu Nidal organization surface in Sudan. Lebanon's Hezbollah and the Palestinian Islamic movement Hamas
open offices in Khartoum. Terrorist
training camps are identified outside of Khartoum. Osama bin Laden, a known financier of terrorism takes refuge in
Sudan after being stripped of his Saudi citizenship. Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, convicted in the bombing of the World
Trade Center obtains his visa to the U.S. in Khartoum. Sudan's involvement in the attempted
assassination of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in June 1995.
Judgment
The evidence is
overwhelming, Sudan has not only provided a safe haven for terrorists, it has
also facilitated in the training of these groups, and become a launch pad for
terrorism.
With
the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of super power diplomacy,
state-sponsored terrorism appeared to be a casualty. However, there still remained a few countries who promoted
terrorism, and the list was about to increase with a newcomer. Who would have guessed that war-torn Sudan
would emerge as a pivotal player in the high stakes game of terrorism?
Tehran and Tripoli, two of the major sources
of funding, tempered their passion to openly engage in terrorists activities,
as a direct result of the 1986 U.S. airstrike against Libya and ensuing
sanctions. The message was clear: the price for open affiliation with
terrorism had become costly and surrogate warfare was not to be showcased, but
layered in plausible deniability.
"On
the other hand, Sudan without fanfare, has become for terrorists what the
Barbary Coast was for pirates of another age; a safe haven."1 Was the radical Islamic fundamentalist
regime openly supporting and encouraging the export of terrorism?
The
connections are tantalizing. Libya
shuts down some of its terrorist camps, and elements of the radical Palestinian
Abu Nidal organization surface in Sudan.
Lebanon's Hezbollah and the Palestinian Islamic movement Hamas set up
offices in Khartoum. Iranian President
Hashemi Rafsanjani visits Khartoum, and Iranian Revolutionary Guard personnel
soon arrive to train the fundamentalist people's militias set up by Sudan's
Islamic regime.2
Here is a country still trying to
stabilize after a 1989 coup d'etat, engulfed in a civil war for the past
thirteen years, a fledgling Islamic government with an economy crippled by near
triple-digit inflation, and a staggering debt of some sixteen billion dollars;
what was the strategy? What were the
motivating factors for this politically isolated, bankrupt, culturally
fractured nation-state to become a safe haven and alleged exporter of
terrorism? Is Sudan terrorism's new
Mecca, or as the National Islamic Front (NIF) government claims, the victim of
anti-Islamic fear?
Country Facts
Sudan
is the largest country in Africa, comprising approximately 967,500 square
miles, roughly the size of the U.S. east of the Mississippi river. Although it is the largest county in Africa,
it is also one of the poorest, with forty percent unemployment and spiraling
inflation. Of the twenty seven million
inhabitants, approximately eighty percent live in rural areas. The ethnic make-up of the country is
approximately seventy five percent Sunni Muslim, who live mainly in the north;
the remainder of the 550 ethnic groups comprise mainly African black christian
and animist groups, who preside mostly in the south.
Historical Perspective
Sudan
has a proven history of political and economic instability. Since gaining independence from Britain in
1956, the country lapsed into civil war.
The civil war pitted the ruling Arab northerners against the black
southerners. The war lasted until 1972
and caused the deaths of more than half a million people.
After
a series of civilian and military governments, power was seized in 1969 by
Gaafar el-Nimeiri with support from the communists. Nimeiri ruled Sudan for sixteen years. Nimeiri's major accomplishment was the 1972 Addis Ababa accords,
which promoted secularism and southern autonomy, temporarily ending the civil
war. With his secular support wavering
in the 1980's, Nimeiri turned to the Islamists and named Hassan al-Turabi
attorney general. "Reversing his
earlier policy of tolerance, in 1983 he decreed the September laws, which
reimposed the sharia, including the notorious hudud, the amputation of the hand
for theft".3
Southern
army units mutinied over the decree and civil war broke out again in 1983. A combination of war, desperate economic
conditions, and a crippling foreign debt resulted in Nimeiri's dictatorship
being overthrown in 1985. A democratic
civilian government emerged after elections in 1986, and once again Turabi and
the Islamists were subdued. The
dominant political movement was the Umma party, and the prime minister elected
in 1986 was Sadiq al-Mahdi. In June
1989, Mahdi was overthrown in a military coup led by General Omar Hassan Ahmed
al-Bashir, who immediately proclaimed Sudan an Islamic state.
Today,
Sudan's two most powerful leaders are President Bashir and Sheikh Hassan
al-Turabi, who heads the National Islamic Front. Turabi, now 65, is a smooth, Western-trained ideologist of
Sudan's Islamic counterreformation. He
is man of brilliant intellect and ineffable charm; admired by many, and even
more feared by some. He is at ease both
in tie and turban, articulate in English and Arabic, and highly educated, with
law degrees from universities in Khartoum, London, and Paris. As a lecturer at the University of Khartoum
in the mid-1960's, he founded the Sudanese chapter of the Muslim brotherhood,
currently known as the National Islamic Front.4
In
the 1989 coup d'etat by middle-rank military officers, Islam rode to power, and
Turabi, although holding no official post, became the director and architect of
Sudan's Islamization. He says he turned
to Islam because without it "Sudan has no identity, no direction".5
Sudan's twenty-seven million
inhabitants speak one hundred different languages. They are divided into a multiplicity of ethnic groups and
separated by regional and tribal loyalties.
Most divisive of all, the population in the north of the country, where
the majority resides, is culturally Arab, while the south shares the
civilization of black Africa. It is not
hard to understand why Turabi is looking for a unifying element, but is that
element Islam? Turabi and his National
Islamic Front think that Islam is the "cure" for Sudan's ills, and
will be the catalyst to create a nation.
Turabi's
vision extends beyond his borders. He
sees Sudan as the heartland of an Islamic revolution which will sweep the
Middle East, and he conceptualizes Sudanese security in terms of this
revolution. Although he held no official
position in the present government until this year, he always held more power
than the president, ruling through shadow security forces and secret cells
created by the NIF.
General
Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, leader of the 1989 coup was the military
connection to the successful coup.
Although he is more than just a figurehead, he defers in many ways to
Turabi. Bashir, known for his piety,
can nevertheless be ruthless in fulfilling his Islamic objectives. Most importantly, he is not only the head of
state, but the military leadership. As
long as he can control the military, he controls the power base.
The Iran-Sudan Connection
Sudan is only the second country to declare
itself an Islamic government, Iran being the first. Presumably both countries would be working towards a common
goal...Islam. The reality is that Islam
is a dichotomy, and the gap between the Sunni and the Shia spans the width of
the Grand Canyon. Iran is predominantly
Shia, which advocates radical fundamentalism; the spread of Islamic
fundamentalism through violent means, at any cost. The Shia believe that only they know "Allah's will" and
everyone else is an "infidel" or enemy of Islam. Of course, the Shia believe that infidels
must be treated like vermin and exterminated.
Sudan, which is predominantly Sunni, advocates a more
"submissive" and relaxed brand of Islam. Sunni are no less devout than the Shia, but believe that Islam is
the fountain of redemption and anyone who does not drink is termed a
"nonbeliever." Nonbelievers
are not necessarily Sunni enemies, but they must be shown the "true
path"...the path of Islam. Sunni
are much more tolerant and follow the real meaning of Islam, which is Arabic
for "submissive." Muslim
means "one who submits (to God)."
The Sunni do not believe in the violent overthrow of existing
governments, and believe in peaceful coexistance with other religions. Historically, the Sunni and Shia have been
fervent enemies and have taken every opportunity to annihilate each other.
In
1991, for the first time in history, a minority Shia sect of Islam forged links
with a Sunni Muslim government... the Iran-Sudan connection. Those ties sent shudders through the largely
conservative Sunni Arab world.6
The Arab world sat up and took notice of this unlikely alliance and the
implications for terrorism.
Iranian
President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani accompanied by his Defense and
Intelligence ministers and the commander of the Revolutionary Guard visited the
Islamic regime in Khartoum in late 1991.
A number of economic and military agreements were reached, including
additional Revolutionary Guard personnel to train fundamentalist people's
militias set up by Sudan's Islamic regime.
Rumors abound of Syrians, Palestinians and Iranians infiltrating schools
in northern Sudan to recruit students for terrorist training camps in eastern
Sudan.7 Sudan claims that these camps were simply for its Popular
Defense Forces, but Western Intelligence agents were convinced that the
presence of Tehran's Revolutionary Guard indicated that far more insidious
activities were on going.
This
unholy alliance between Sunni and Shia did in fact share a common ideal, both
regimes have a passionate disdain for neighboring secular states. "Now that Libya and Syria are attempting
to curry favor in the West by cutting their support for terrorist groups, says
Philip Robins, Middle East expert at London's Royal Institute of International
Affairs, 'Sudan is the best ally Iran has got."8
The
Iran-Sudan link is a marriage of convenience.
Turabi dreams of spreading Islamic law far beyond his borders. Tehran sees Sudan, as a springboard into the
Mideast and Africa. Sudan needed a
patron willing to train and supply its military, as well as provide badly
needed oil. Tehran needed another place
to plant the seeds of radical Islamic fundamentalism.
The
Iran-Sudan relationship flourished until early 1993. Besides the basic philosophical differences between the two
sects, finances became an issue. Iran
was supplying military hardware and training expertise, but not at the rate
Sudan was expecting. Also, Sudan was
displeased that Iran had forced the bankrupt regime to buy its oil at world
market prices. Thus, Sudan began
distancing itself from its sole patron and champion of absolutist Islam--the
Islamic Republic of Iran.
The Link To Terrorism
Sudan
denies any connection or affiliation with terrorist training camps or with
terrorist organizations. Turabi has
specifically denied the allegations that Iranian Revolutionary Guards operate
training camps in his country, and also denies that Sudan harbors members of
Hezbollah, Hamas, and other Islamic "liberation" groups. There is however, ample evidence to refute
Sudan's proclaimed innocence.
When
Libya began shutting down some of its terrorist camps after the U.S. air strike
in 1986, elements of the radical Palestinian Abu Nidal organization departed
and surfaced in Sudan. British
diplomats believe Sudan has also taken in many non-Iranian fundamentalists that
Syria kicked out of Lebanon during the Gulf War. Hezbollah and the Palestinian movement Hamas both set up offices
in Khartoum.
Western
Intelligence agents confirmed the presence of Iranians associated with the
Revolutionary Guard in Sudanese training camps. Although unconfirmed, there were rampant rumors of Syrians,
Palestinians, and Iranians attempting to recruit students from schools in
northern Sudan for terrorist training.
Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, spiritual leader of the Egypt-based Islamic
Group, some of whose members were convicted in the World Trade Center bombing,
obtained his visa in Khartoum.
Osama
bin Laden, a wealthy Saudi Arabian stripped of his Saudi citizenship in 1994
for financing terrorism, took refuge in Sudan and became one of the most
notorious patron's of Sudan's terrorist camps. From his base in Sudan, Bin Laden is known to have bankrolled
Arab participation in the Afghan war and other militant causes.
U.S.
Ambassador to Sudan, Donald Peterson says he's seen a compelling body of
evidence indicting Sudan on terrorist charges, but can't divulge the full range
of proof because of its sensitive nature.9
The
U.S. ordered the expulsion of a Sudanese diplomat, Ahmed Yousif, suspected of aiding terrorists who plotted
to blow up the UN and assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. U.S. officials had identified Yousif as
being involved in terrorist and espionage activities.
Egyptian
sources say Sudanese camps are training foreigners in terrorism. In December of 1995 they said there were
about 20 camps, with trainers from Iran's Revolutionary Guard and Afghan
veterans of the mujahadeen.
The
student population is diverse. Trainees
come from a few distant states and all the neighboring ones: Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Algeria, Tunisia
and Uganda. The powerful Islamic
extremist groups Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah have all sent members to
Sudan for Training10
Despite the fact that Turabi denies
that Sudan harbors members of terrorist groups, exisitng evidence indicates
otherwise. A case in point, Judith
Miller, a senior writer with the New York Times went to Sudan in the spring and
summer of 1994 and personally interviewed members of Hezbollah, Hamas
and other "liberation" groups.
Her essay, "Faces of Fundamentaism" documents these interviews.11
Several
events have also pointed the accusing finger at Sudan for complicity in
terrorism. In June 1995, an attempted
assassination plot against Egyptian President Mubarak was carried out in
Ethiopia, where Mubarak was attending a meeting of the Organization for African
Unity. Three suspects fled to Sudan
following the failed attempt and Sudan has refused to extradite them to
Ethiopia. Investigators soon discovered
Sudanese complicity in the attack on President Mubarak.
The
evidence is insurmountable, Sudan has not only provided a safe haven for
terrorists, it has also facilitated in the training of these groups. Perhaps the most damaging evidence against
Sudan is the fact that terrorists, such as Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman used Sudan
as a launch pad for terrorist actions.
World Reaction
The
reaction by Sudan's neighbors to an Islamic government creating a safe haven
for terrorists and training them with Iranian assistance was predictable, all
of them proclaimed condemnation.
However, when Sudan became the springboard for launching radical Islamic
fundamentalism across its neighbor's borders, the game became much more
personal and deadly.
Egyptian Reaction
Egypt,
ever mindful of their dependency on the Nile, view the Sudan as their rightful
hinterland and take a proprietorial interest in its affairs. Once the National Islamic Front (NIF) seized
power, they promptly offered a home to Islamist insurrectionists from Upper
Egypt and played host to radical Egyptian clerics such as Sheik Omar Abdel
Rahman and Ayman Zaawahri (leader of the sect that assassinated Anwar
Sadat). Mubarak recognized Sudan's ties
with Iran, the terrorist training camps, and its affiliation with terrorist
groups like the Islamic Jihad, Hamas and Hezbollah. Mubarak played the political card and denounced these operations
to the United Nations Security Council.
He increased his anti-terrorism rhetoric against Sudan, and backed it up
with increased military actions in the vicinity of northeast Sudan (the Habib
Triangle).
After
the June 1995 attempted assassination plot, most of the world was ready to
support Egypt in punishing Sudan.
Finally, in January 1996, the United Nations Security Council
unequivocally and unanimously condemned Sudan for terrorist activity and
involvement in the assassination attempt on Mubarak.
For
now, Mubarak has ruled out war and has even excluded a punitive military
strike. The reason for Egypt's
restraint is the surprisingly complex relations between the two countries. Cairo has even attempted to dissuade fellow
Security Council members from imposing sanctions on Sudan to protect an export
market and to avoid reinforcing the legitimacy of existing sanctions on Iraq
and Libya.12 Mubarak is frequently accused of indecision due to this
conflict of policy goals. He is not
prepared to simply turn the other cheek.
In lieu of military action, Mubarak is gearing up Egyptian covert
operations south of the border.13
Ethiopian Reaction
In
stark contrast to Egypt, Ethiopia's reaction has been confrontational. For years, Khartoum provided a haven for
Eritrean rebels and Ethiopian dissidents whereas Addis Ababa lent bases and
supplies to the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA). The fall of the Mengistu regime was a major
victory for the NIF. Turabi switched to
sowing radicalism among the Ormo, the Muslim ethnic group which comprises
roughly half of Ethiopia's population.
The NIF is allegedly supplying arms to the Oromo Liberation Front but
this is difficult to confirm.
Ethiopia
cannot tolerate a radicalized Ormo secession movement. President Ministe Meles Zenawi devised a
two-pronged strategy for neutralizing the Sudanese threat, militarily and
diplomatically. He has increased
support for Sudanese guerrillas, including the SPLA. There is some truth to the rumors that Ethiopian troops fight
alongside the SPLA. Although Ethiopian
officials remain wedded to the notion of plausible deniability, informed
sources confirm that Ethiopia is chest-deep in rebel operations.14
Zenawi
is even more formidable as a diplomatic adversary. The attempted assassination of Mubarak was considered a
humiliation and an outrage to the Ethiopian leader. The Ethiopian Foreign Ministry unleashed a barrage of diplomatic
and media initiatives against Sudan and proved particularly adept at
outmaneuvering Khartoum in the Organization of African Unity. Zenawi's determination offset Mubarak's
hesitancy and gave the UNSC the ammunition it needed to make sanctions
credible.
Eritrean Reaction
The NIF was also supporting an Islamic
faction in Eritrea, the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF). The Eritrean People's Liberation Front
(EPLF) however, won control of newly independent Eritrea and isolated the
ELF. Relations between Asmara and
Khartoum were therefore cool.
Eritrea
is reluctant to accept ELF refugees, who fled to Sudan to avoid the violent
battles for independence during the civil war in Ethiopia. The ELF refugees want to return to Eritrea,
but Eritrea is reluctant for fear they will bring Turabi's Islamist agenda with
them. Paradoxically, Eritrea's
hesitancy has served to radicalize the refugee communities, providing Turabi
with an incubation ground for the extremist Eritrean Islamic Jihad (EIJ).
After
protests regarding the EIJ went unheeded, Eritrean President Issais Afwerkis
severed diplomatic relations with Sudan in December 1994. He then attempted to heal some of the rifts
in the Sudanese opposition. His
initiative produced the Sudanese National Democratic Alliance (NDA), the first
umbrella group to successfully unite Sudan's leading opposition parties.
Within
days of the NDA's conference in Asmara in January 1996, President Afwerkis
pledged sweeping military support to its military wing the National Alliance
Forces (NAF). The NAF remains a paper
force at present but the Eritreans are serious about giving it teeth.
Uganda
Uganda
has depended upon Sudan's civil war to keep its northern neighbor
preoccupied. The NIF actively supported
an unlikely surrogate--an extremist Christian faction known as the Lord's
Resistance Army (LRA). Uganda President
Museveni broke off relations in April 1995, after the NIF refused to curtail
its support to the LRA. Sudan was
undeterred.
Consequently,
Museveni has stepped up support for the SPLA, led by John Garang. Much of the credit for the SPLA successes
must go to Ugandan support. President
Museveni has made no secret of the fact that he wants to see an independent
southern Sudan act as a buffer between Uganda and Arab North Africa and, in
December 1995, threatened direct military action unless Sudan discontinued its
support of the LRA.
Libya
Sudan
and Libya appear to enjoy a confluence
of interests: they are both on the
wrong end of UN resolutions, they both reject the Middle East peace process,
and they both dabble in terrorism.15 Libya supplied Sudan with arms for a short time after the NIF
came to power. Libyan pilots also flew
bombing missions against the Sudanese rebels in the south. In return, Sudan allowed Libyan operatives
to conspire against Hissein Habre in Chad, who they managed to replace with the
more acceptable Idris Deby in 1990.
Ghadaffi's interest in Sudan dwindled after Deby took power, but both
leaders continued to express token solidarity with the other.
Credible
reports indicate that Libyan authorities unearthed an NIF-backed extremist cell
shortly after the Mubarak incident.
Thousands of Sudanese workers were expelled a few weeks later. To placate Ghadaffi, Sudan repatriated four
Libyan Islamists to the authorities in Benghazi last October.
For
now, Libya is content to let Sudan take the UN heat and feels no need to take
direct measures against Khartoum. This
may change if Ghadaffi's burgeoning Islamist opposition gets out of hand.
U.S. Reaction
The United States reacted to Sudan's terrorist
training camps and affiliations with subversive groups by adding Sudan to the
list of State sponsored terrorists in 1993.
Since the attempted assassination of President Mubarak, the U.S. has
ordered all its diplomats out of Sudan.
The U.S. cited vulnerability to terrorist attack and Khartoum's refusal
to guarantee its 25 diplomats safety as reasons for the pull-out. The U.S. did not play this as a break in
diplomatic relations, however, this maneuver had more to do with politics than
security. Even after the U.S. bombed
Tripoli in April 1986, when a U.S. diplomat was shot in the head and
Libyan--backed troops had plans to attack U.S. and British targets, Washington
only removed "non-essential" employees from its embassy. The U.S. is saying it will not return
"for the foreseeable future".
It looks like the U.S. will await a change in government.
The
U.S. has been vocal and active in attempting to convince fellow members of the
UNSC to impose sanctions on Sudan.
These efforts however, have met with little success predominantly due to
Egypt's reluctance.
In
Sudan, the administration has tried the good cop--bad cop routine; they have
tired to get President Bashir to stop Islamic extremists from using his country
as a haven and staging center by promising better relations, which did not
work, and then by threatening strict UN
sanctions. Since the diplomatic tactic
is not working, the U.S. has tried a much more direct approach in dealing with
Sudanese indiscretions.
The
U.S. is sending nearly twenty million dollars in surplus U.S. military
equipment to Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Uganda.
These three countries support Sudanese opposition groups, who are
preparing a joint offensive to topple the Khartoum government.
U.S. officials said all of the military aid
is non-lethal and defensive, and includes radios, uniforms, boots and
tents. But Congressional and Pentagon
sources said this could be expanded to include rifles and other weapons.16
Sudan's Reaction to the Threat of UN
Sanctions
The
United Nations Security Council's 31 January condemnation called on Sudan to
extradite the three men who attempted to assassinate Egyptian President
Mubarak. It also called on Sudan to
desist from activities of assisting, supporting and facilitating terrorist
activities and from giving shelter/sanctuaries to terrorist elements.17
Sudan
has twice taken limited steps against terrorist groups in response to Western
pressure. In 1994, it expelled to
France the notorious terrorist known as Carlos the Jackal, and in the fall of
1995, faced with charges of involvement in the attempt against the Egyptian
President, the government said it would end a policy that allowed all Arab
passport holders to enter the country without visas, and it dismissed its
external intelligence chief, Nafi al-Nafi.
The
Sudanese government tried to put on a cooperative public face following the
attempted assassination of Egyptian President Mubarak, going as far as to
publish newspaper notices appealing to citizens to assist in handing over the
suspects wanted in the attempt to kill Mr. Mubarak.
The
Washington Post (August 18, 1996) reported that Lebanon has become a haven for
Islamic extremists previously based in Sudan, where the fundamentalist
government has yielded to heavy pressure to halt backing for such groups. The Sudanese government announced that Osama
bin Laden, the wealthy Saudi financier of terrorism departed Sudan in February
of 1996.
U.S.
pressure so far has resulted in the expulsion of some extremists and closing of
some camps. But U.S. officials are
skeptical of those gestures and characterize them as "cosmetic" or
"tactical", taken to avoid further UN sanctions.18
Egyptian authorities say the Bashir
regime has simply reorganized the "closed camps" into smaller, mobile
centers to avoid detection by overhead U.S. reconnaissance satellites. Despite the PR campaign they've been
launching lately, they are still receiving terrorists, arming them and
providing them with forged travel documents.19
Conclusion
Sudan
has taken some cosmetic steps to reduce the political and diplomatic pressure
being exerted upon it. The Islamic
government sacrificed a few lambs to convince the world that it was conforming
to the UNSC's threat of sanctions. But
the bottom line is Sudan is still a safe haven and involved with the training
of terrorists.
Why
did Sudan become involved in this surrogate warfare? One need not look farther than the NIF's architect and guru,
Hassan al-Turabi. It was his vision to
convert the world to Islam, and he was going to start with the Horn of
Africa. His association with the
radical Shia sect from Iran was the catalyst that produced an exporter of
terrorism. This was fitted nicely with
Iran's strategy of spreading radical Islamic fundamentalism. This was truly a symbiotic relationship,
Sudan needed arms, training, and a patron; Iran needed a springboard for the
spread of radical Islamic fundamentalism.
It
is the author's opinion that Sudan eagerly engaged in this relationship with
Iran and was quite willing to be the "new terrorist center," after
all who would bother with a disheveled third world country like Sudan? Turabi thought he would be able to do
whatever he wanted to destabilize the Horn of Africa and no one would notice or
care. Once this miscalculation surfaced,
it was too late. The Sudanese
government had lost control and their open door policy to Arabs took on a life
of its own. They could not temper the
beast they so wantingly created, and were forced to distance themselves from
their patron (Iran) in order to regain some control.
The
Islamic government of Sudan is in a perilous situation. The civil war continues to drain what little
resources the country can bring to bear.
Sudan has the majority of its neighbors joining in the attempt to see
its demise. Sudanese opposition groups
are slowly attempting to join forces, and should they succeed, it may be over
for the Islamic regime. Compounding the problem is the steady increase of
internal opposition: student
demonstrations, riots, troop mutinies, attempted coups, and worsening
human--rights abuses.
Sudan's
suffering might carry the seeds of political realism for North Africa and the
Middle East. Militant Islam, like Arab
nationalism, cannot deliver what it promises.
Just as communism could not deliver what it promised, and eventually
imploded...so to will militant Islam.
Endnotes
1 Walter Laqueur, ''Postmodern
Terrorism." Foreign Affairs 75, no. 5 (September/October
1996): 27.
2 Marguerite Michaels, "Is SudanTerronism's New Best Friend?" Time Magazine, 30 Aug 1993, 30.
3 Milton Viorst, "Sudan's Islamic Experiment." Foreign Affairs 74, no. 3 (May/June 1995): 50.
4 Viorst, 46.
5 Viorst, 46.
6 Robert S. Greenberger, "Arab Nightmare: Sudan's Links To Iran
Cause Growing Worry Over Islamic Terrorism," Wall Street
Journal, 18
Augaust 1993, Sec. Al.
7 Michaels, 30.
8 Michaels, 30.
9 Joyce Hackel "Sudan Plays 'David' to U.S. 'Goliath' Using
Islam," The Christian Science
Monitor, 19
July 1995, Sec. A1.
10 Christopher C. Hannon, "Sudan's Neighbors Accuse It of Training
Terrorists," The Christian Science
Monitor, 19
December 1995, Sec. A 19.
11 Judith Miller, "Faces of Fundamentalism," Foreign Affairs 73, no. 6 (Nov/Dec 1994): 130‑131.
12 Robert Waller, " Sudanese Securi ty, Jane's
Intelligence Review, July 1996, 3 12.
13
Waller,
312.
14 Waller,
315.
15 Waller,
313.
16 David Ottaway, "Wielding Aid, U.S. Targets Sudan," Washington Post, 10 Nov 1996, See. A34.
17 Gill Lusk, "Sanctions 'in the Air," Middle East International, 16 Feb 1996, 12.
18 David B. Ottaway, "U.S. Considers Slugging it Out with
International Terrorism," The Washington Post, 17 October 1996, See. A25.
19 Ottaway, A25.
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