Air Strategy in the 1967 Arab/Israeli War.
CSC 1997
Subject Area - Aviation
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: Air Strategy in the 1967 Arab/Israeli War.
Author: Major
Charlie Hughes, United States Marine Corps
Thesis: Air
Power was decisive factor the Arab/Israeli war in June 1967?
Discussion: The
history of the Islamic people has been one of
conquests. Arab nationalism considered Zionism and
Israel as an enemy in themselves and at the same time the spearhead of western
imperialism. The underlying assumption of Arab doctrine was that in the long
run time was against Israel; that two and a half million Jews could not hold
out forever against one hundred million Arabs.
The military balance in early 1967 was in favor of the United Arab
Republic. It had two armored divisions
with a third being formed, four infantry divisions, one parachute brigade and
twelve artillery regiments. Egypt's
estimated regular armed forces were 180,000-200,000 men. There were plans for military action against
Israel by the United Arab Republic but there may not have been a master plan
for a concerted campaign in May or June 1967.
From documents that fell into Israeli hands it is know that there was a
plan for the destruction of the Israeli Air Force on the ground and for a tank
offensive in the Southern Negev, with the intention of cutting it off from
Israel and to seize Eilat. Zahal - the
Israeli defense establishment - knew how it would proceed in a general war
against any Arab combined force that included the United Arab Republic. It would knock out Egypt first; for if Egypt
collapsed the others would fall.
Conclusion:
Following Syrian raids on Israeli settlements, Israel attacks
Syria. Nasser closes Israel's southern
port by blockading the Strait of Tiran and expels the United Nations emergency
force in Sinai. Israel launches
pre-emptive air strikes on the airfields of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and
Jordan. Within six days, Israel
occupies the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip, the Sinai, and the West Bank,
including Jerusalem. Israel
successfully crippled the Arab world by striking first and effectively
crippling their air power while it sat on the ground.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SECTION PAGE
I INTRODUCTION 1
II BACKGROUND TO THE SIX DAY WAR 3
A.
Chronology
3
B.
Political and Military Leadership
5
III POLITICAL AND MILITARY STRATEGIES 9
A.
Egypt/Jordan/Syria
9
B.
Israel
10
IV STRATEGY COMPARISON 13
A.
Objectives
13
B.
War-fighting Doctrine
14
C.
Effect of Available Technology 16
D.
Influences of available Resources 18
E.
Objective Accomplishment 20
V SUCCESS VS. FAILURE 23
VI CONCLUSION 28
VII END NOTES 30
VIII BIBLIOGRAPHY 32
SECTION I
INTRODUCTION
On June 5 1967, Israeli planes destroyed
the Air Forces
of Egypt, Jordan,
and Syria, launching the briefest war in
the history of the
Middle East. By June 11 1967, Israel
had
captured all of
Palestine and more: Egypt's vast Sinai
Peninsula and
Syria's Golan Heights as well as the West bank
of Jordan. It was a complete and decisive victory. The
scope of this
paper will cover the facts and forces behind
one of history's
longest feuds, and shortest wars.
Although
the war lasted
"six days" the outcome of the crisis was
decided on the
morning of June 5, 1967. All that
remained
was for the
Israeli army to drive forward in Sinai to
confirm the
military victory. This particular
conflict was
chosen for
analysis because for the first time, air power
had effectively
won a war. Within hours of Israel's air
strike, the
Israeli decision makers were aware of reduced
threat due to the
ensuing air supremacy and an overwhelming
shift of the
military balance in their favor.
In June 1967, Israel had two qualitative
advantages
over her Arab
adversaries: surprise and motivation.
The
devastating air
strike on June 5, 1967 caught the Arab
leaders totally by
surprise and ensured Israel's aerial
supremacy for the
rest of the war. As for motivation, the
outpouring of
hatred during the crisis period convinced all
Israelies they
were fighting for survival. The
combined
Arab armed forces
were superior to the Israel Defense Force
(IDF) total
strength in personnel as well as weapon systems.
Arab leaders and
knowledgeable observers anticipated and
predicted a
different outcome to the impending conflict
based on known
statistics. However, the combination of
superior motivation, leadership, training, and the tactical
exploitation of surprise, speed, and air superiority more
than made up for
those advantages.1
SECTION II
BACKGROUND TO WAR
Generally
the United Nations believed the Holy Land
belonged to either
the Arab or Jew and probably to both; but
not in any way to
Great Britain. A review of a number of
key events occured
between 1948 and 1967 to set the stage
for the subsequent
1967 conflict.
CHRONOLOGY
May 1948 - The British Mandate over Palestine was
terminated
and the State of
Israel proclaimed. It is recognized by
the
United States and
the Soviet Union and is attacked by its
Arab neighbors.2
May 1949 - Armistice agreement with the Arabs gives
Israel
more land, but the
Arabs retain Old Jerusalem.3
1952 - In Egypt, King Farouk is forced to
abdicate by young
military officers
and Colonel Gamal Nasser becomes president
of Egypt and the
leader of the Arab world in the 1950's and
1960's.4
1953 - At the age of eighteen, Hussein becomes
King of
Jordan.5
July 1956 - The Suez Crisis begins when Nasser
nationalizes
the canal. Having long been denied passage through the
Suez Canal and
following repeated border skirmishes, in
October Israel
invades Egypt's Sinai and the Gaza Strip, and
along with the
British and French, occupies the canal area.6
March 1957 - Under pressure from the United Nations,
the
United States and
the Soviet Union, foreign forces
withdraw from all
Egyptian territory and the Gaza Strip.
United Nations
forces are assigned to patrol strategic areas
of the Sinai.7
February
1958 - Syria and Egypt
merge to form the United
Arab Republic and
maintain a close relationship with the
Soviet Union.8
1961 - The Syrian-Egyptian merger is dissolved
because of
Egypt's
domineering attitude toward Syria.9
June 1964 - The Palestine Liberation Organization is
estab-
lished with the
goal of destroying Israel and gaining
control over
Palestine. Persistent terrorist attacks
against Israel are
launched.10
1965 - The Arab States and Israel intensified the
border
skirmishes that
had been going on between wars.11
Nov 1966 - Israel reacts to Syrian border raids by
destroy-
ing a Jordanian
village.12
April 1967 - In an air clash, Israeli pilots down six
Syrian
jets.13
April-June
1967 - Following Syrian
raids on Israeli
settlements,
Israel attacks Syria. Nasser closes
Israel's
southern port by
blockading the Strait of Tiran and expels
the United Nations
emergency force in Sinai. Israel
launches
pre-emptive attacks on the airfields of Egypt,
Syria, Iraq, and
Jordan. Within six days, Israel
occupies
the Golan Heights,
the Gaza Strip, the Sinai, and the West
Bank, including
Jerusalem.14
This conflict occurred because of the
irreconcilable
difference between
Arab and Jewish national goals. The
Arab League had as
its goal the elimination of the Jewish
state while the
Israelis sought survival and military
security.15
Political
and Military Leadership
- The following
individuals and
groups played important roles before and
during the
conflict:
Egypt Gamal Abdel Nasser Egyptian President
Abel
Amer Commander
and Chief
Mahmound
Riad Foreign
Minister
Mohammed
Kony Ambassador
to UN
Anwar
Sadat Legislator
Israel Levi Eshkol Prime Minister
Abba
Eban Foreign
Minister
Moshe
Dayan Defense
Minister
Yitzhak
Rabin Chief
of Staff
Ezer
Weizman Chief
of Operations
Ephraim
Euron Minister
to the US
David
Ben Gurion Former Prime Minister
Menachem
Begin Opposition
Leader
Jordan Hussein ibn Talal King
Mohammad
Farra Ambassador
to the UN
Syria Nureddin Attassi President
Yousef
Zayyen Prime
Minister
Hafez
Assad Defense
Minister
Fatah Guerrilla
Organization
Ba'th Ruling
Government Party
The government of Egypt, with Gamal
Nasser at its head,
supported
Nasirism. Its main ideas were
Pan-Arabism,
positive
neutralism and Arab socialism. Pan-Arabism
is Arab
nationalism with a
stress on political unification. Positive
neutralism was
Nasser's policy of not aligning Egypt with
either the
communist bloc or the United States and Arab
Socialism required
the government to run the major
industries and
public utilities in order to divide the
economic pie more
evenly among the people.16
Israel has a relatively democratic
government fashioned
after that of
Great Britain. In Israeli politics
there is a
tendency toward
division and fragmentation. This was
the
prevailing
atmosphere at the time of the conflict.
Levi
Eshkol succeeded
Ben Gurion as Prime Minister only to be
attacked by his
predecessor as totally unfit for the job.
A
competent
administrator, it was not clear whether Eshkol had
the qualities of
leadership and quick decision needed at a
time of
crisis. Needing a recognized, decisive
figure to
inspire the
confidence of the people, Moshe Dayan was named
Minister of
Defense. The officers of the Israel
Defense
Forces as well as
the members were highly motivated,
competent
professional soldiers, confident and sure of their
mission. Withstanding an attempted coup, Jordan remained a
monarchy with a
conservative government.
Syria's leaders were Arab
nationalists. Haliz al-Assad
graduated from the
Syrian military academy and rose rapidly
through the ranks
to become a general; Commander in Chief of
the Air Force and
then in 1966, Minister of Defense. An
Army Coup in 1966
brought to power a radical wing of the
Ba'th party. Most of the new leaders belonged to the
Alawi
religious sect,
many of whose young men joined the Syrian
officer corps as a means of moving up socially.
Military
Doctrines- Israel
believed an arms balance was the
only guarantee of
peace in the Middle East. Ensuring the
existence and
military security of the nation was the top
priority by first
strikes if necessary.17
Israeli military
thinking was
governed by three basic premises:
victory is
assured to the
side that obtains complete superiority in the
air; armor should
be used as a concentrated mailed fist to
smash through the
fortified positions of the enemy; once
the break-through
has been achieved, the accent would be on
exploitation with
maximum speed and flexibility.
The overall Arab military doctrine
concerning Israel
was the
"total" annihilation of the Jewish State. Almost
all of the
officers in the Egyptian Armed Forces were
devoted followers
of President Nasser. They were
convinced
of the justice of
the Arab case over the question of the
Palestine
refugees. Most of them believed the
Israelis
were usurpers and
that in the long run war was inevitable,
for there could be
no peace in the Middle East until Israel
was
annihilated. They regarded Zionism as a
capitalist
movement,
controlling most of the world's capital.
SECTION III
POLITICAL AND MILITARY
STRATEGIES
Egypt /
Jordan / Syria. The political and military strategy
to force Israel into
a confrontation and then annihilate the
Jewish nation was
based on three assumptions made by
President Nasser
of Egypt:
1. After the United Nations forces would be
withdrawn
at his request, he
would close the Straits of Tiran to
Israeli shipping.
2. Following this action, the Israelies would
be
likely to try to
open the Straits by force and break the
blockade. This would lead to war.
3. In the event of an outbreak of war, the
ratio of
forces and the
state of preparedness of his forces
guaranteed Egypt
military success. Nasser was convinced
that, in a
combination of both military and political
struggle, he would
gain the upper hand.18
There were plans for military action
against Israel but
there may not have
been a master plan for a concerted
campaign in May or
June 1967. From documents that fell
into
Israeli hands it
is known that there was a plan for the
destruction of the
Israeli Air Force on the ground and for a
tank offensive in
the Southern Negev, with the intention of
cutting it off
from Israel and to sieze Eilat. The
Egyptians intended
to defend against an Israeli first strike
and deal a
retaliatory fatal blow. The Egyptian
Air Force
consisted of four
hundred fighter-interceptors and seventy
bombers intended
to protect the Nation's heartland and
provide close air
support for the army in the Sinai. On
May
30, 1967, King
Hussein of Jordan and Nasser signed a Mutual
Defense Treaty
like one that already existed between Egypt
and Syria. Its Article I declared that "any attack
on
either state"
would be considered "an attack on both."
Article 7
stipulated that "in the event of military
operations
starting, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
of the United Arab
Republic shall assume Command of
Operations in both
states." Nasser had now added to
his
military machine
an elite force of fifty-five thousand
soldiers and a
small Air Force made up of mainly British
made subsonic
Hawker Hunter fighter-bombers and a few
United States
F-104 interceptor jets.19
Israel. The
morning of June 5, 1967 found Israel's armed
forces facing the
massed Arab armies around her frontiers.
Israel's citizen
army had been quietly and efficiently
mobilized over
several weeks to defend the country against
the impending Arab
attack which every Arab medium of mass
communication
announced was imminent. Zahal, the
Israeli
defense
establishment, knew how they would proceed in a
general war
against any Arab combined force that included
the United Arab
Republic. It would knock out Egypt
first,
for if Egypt
collapsed the others would certainly fall.
This doctrine had
been fashioned by the prevailing
conditions: the terrain, a vast empty desert ideal for
armored warfare,
for speed of movement in which air support
for the ground
forces can be used to maximum effect; the
character of the
adversary- the Israelis had already
discovered in
previous wars that the Egyptians are at their
best in defending
static positions, but quickly lose their
heads in a fast,
rapidly moving battle; and most important
of all, by outside
intervention which, in Israeli eyes, made
speed an essential
factor in every plan.20
Israel's initial
political and
military strategy focused on defense and
survival. Israel's combat forces went all out to
destroy
the fighting power
of Egypt. Within three hours of the
successful
pre-emptive strike against Egypt, Israel's
strategy switched
from the defensive to a goal attainment:
the liberation of Jerusalem,
the maximum destruction of Arab
military power,
and the enhancement of Israel's secure
borders-ultimately
the Suez Canal in the South, the Golan
Heights in the
North, and the Jordan river in the East.
The
Israeli Air
Force's role was without doubt the greatest
gamble with the
largest pay off in the history of military
aviation. They assured total air supremacy by
destroying
the enemies air
force's on the ground.
SECTION IV
STRATEGY COMPARISON
The pressure on decision-makers is to
choose courses of
action. The closer strategic analysis comes to
actual
strategic
decisions, and the more concrete it becomes, the
more it is forced
into channels determined by the pressures
of the
moment. The strategic recommendations
which are used
are those dealing
with the allocation of funds, personnel,
and equipment;
with weapons systems design and with
logistics. In these areas there are few, if any,
opportune-
ities to cooperate
with the enemy.21 There was many
pressures and
decisions made by both the Arab and Isreali
leaders.
Objectives
Arab Forces. On
the eve of the 1967 War, political fragmen-
tation within the
Arab world gave way to unity-the goal
being to crush
Israel. By ordering the removal of the
United Nations
forces and closing the Straits of Tiran,
President Nasser
hoped to achieve the objective of provoking
a war with Israel
at a time and place chosen by the U.A.R.
The destruction of
the State of Israel was official Arab
policy. They believed their prestige depended upon a
military victory
that would revenge the defeats of 1948
and 1956. Syria's objective was the liberation of
Palestine
Israel. In
the early days of June, 1967, Israel was
fighting for
survival. Its citizen soldiers were
called
upon to accomplish
by force of arms what Israelis had longed
for since
achieving independence in 1948 - military
security.22 The primary objective for Israel's defense
establishment was
not a reconquest of Sinai's arid
wasteland but the
preserving of Israel's interior through
the destruction of
Egypt's air power.
War-fighting
Doctrine
Arab Forces. The
history of the Islamic people has been one
of conquests. Arab nationalism considered Zionism and
Israel as an enemy
in themselves and at the same time the
spearhead of
western imperialism. The underlying
assumption
of Arab doctrine
was that in the long run time was against
Israel; that two and
a half million Jews could not hold out
forever against
one hundred million Arabs; the State of
Israel like that
of the crusaders would inevitably be de-
stroyed. The Syrians were genuinely convinced that a
people's war of
guerrilla tactics against Jewish settlements
would compel the
Israelis to engage in massive retaliation
and thus, sooner
or later, involve the regular armies of
the Arab
countries. Their general assumption was
that the
combined might of
the Arab States was superior to Israel.
At the worst the
war would end in a stalemate, to be
repeated again
after a few years. The Arabs were
convinced
they could afford
these campaigns and that Israel could not.
Israel would
eventually disappear as a result of this
escalation of harassment. The Arabs genuinely believed that
Zionism regarded
Israel not as a homeland to be defended to
the last against
all enemies, but as a territory for
financial
investment, speculations and exploitation.
They
believed the Jews,
lacking patriotism and roots in the
country, would
lose their nerve and eventually give up
Israel, if they
were exposed to this treatment long enough.
Israel.
Defense Minister Dayan and other Israeli officials
put forth the
doctrine of defense, not expansion of Israel's
territory. In order to curb commando raids by Arab
guerrilla units,
the government adopted the policy of
devastating retaliatory raids. Although Israel's leaders
were willing to
seek peace, they were not eager to commit
national suicide.
After King Hussein concluded an agreement
with Nasser
on a joint
military command, Israel's cabinet assumed that
war was
inevitable. Most reserve units were
called up, and
the entire economy
was put on a war footing. Combining
traditional military
doctrines with common sense, Israeli
military
directives are logical and effective:
When in
doubt,
strike. The battle will never go as you
planned it.
Improvise. Surprise is your most effective weapon.23
Effect of Available
Technology
The
armies of Egypt and Syria had been equipped with
sophisticated
Soviet weapons in the years prior to the 1967
war, including
MIG-21 fighters, SA-2 anti-air missiles, and
the latest models
(T-54 and T-55) of Russian tanks, at the
time. Israel's military experts admitted after the
Six Day
War that Soviet
armor was superior to Israel's.
The combined Arab armed forces were
superior to the
Israel Defense
Force quantitatively and regarding weapons,
qualitatively as
well. Because of this, knowledgeable
and
qualified
observers did not anticipate anything approaching
the actual course
of the war.24 Israel's
biggest problem
was the all-around
threat from Arab air bases. They could
put up enough jet
bombers, such as the TU-16 and IL-28 along
with MIG-21
transonic fighters and MIG-17's to outnumber
Israel's
comparable types, like the Vatour fighter-bomber
and the Mirage
IIIC, by better than two to one. With
four
air bases in
Sinai, two of them new, Egypt could put MIG's
over Tel Aviv
within seven minutes from takeoff.
Because of
this capability,
Israel planned and executed the pre-emptive
strike on eleven
Egyptian air fields that were the hard core
threat to Israel's
interior.
The over-all contribution of the Fougas
to quick
victory was
incalculable. The Fouga Magister, built
in
Israel, is the
basic trainer for jet pilots, and this
relatively slow
aircraft had been souped up with two
matching guns and
thirty-six rockets to operate as a tank
killer over Sinai. These "turtles" of the air force
destroyed over
seventy Egyptian artillery pieces, took on
the enemy armor
whenever they found it, and softened the
base camps before
the armored spearheads came up.
Certain brigades became highly specialized
in precise