Air Strategy in the 1967 Arab/Israeli War.
CSC 1997
Subject Area - Aviation
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: Air Strategy in the 1967 Arab/Israeli War.
Author: Major
Charlie Hughes, United States Marine Corps
Thesis: Air
Power was decisive factor the Arab/Israeli war in June 1967?
Discussion: The
history of the Islamic people has been one of
conquests. Arab nationalism considered Zionism and
Israel as an enemy in themselves and at the same time the spearhead of western
imperialism. The underlying assumption of Arab doctrine was that in the long
run time was against Israel; that two and a half million Jews could not hold
out forever against one hundred million Arabs.
The military balance in early 1967 was in favor of the United Arab
Republic. It had two armored divisions
with a third being formed, four infantry divisions, one parachute brigade and
twelve artillery regiments. Egypt's
estimated regular armed forces were 180,000-200,000 men. There were plans for military action against
Israel by the United Arab Republic but there may not have been a master plan
for a concerted campaign in May or June 1967.
From documents that fell into Israeli hands it is know that there was a
plan for the destruction of the Israeli Air Force on the ground and for a tank
offensive in the Southern Negev, with the intention of cutting it off from
Israel and to seize Eilat. Zahal - the
Israeli defense establishment - knew how it would proceed in a general war
against any Arab combined force that included the United Arab Republic. It would knock out Egypt first; for if Egypt
collapsed the others would fall.
Conclusion:
Following Syrian raids on Israeli settlements, Israel attacks
Syria. Nasser closes Israel's southern
port by blockading the Strait of Tiran and expels the United Nations emergency
force in Sinai. Israel launches
pre-emptive air strikes on the airfields of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and
Jordan. Within six days, Israel
occupies the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip, the Sinai, and the West Bank,
including Jerusalem. Israel
successfully crippled the Arab world by striking first and effectively
crippling their air power while it sat on the ground.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SECTION PAGE
I INTRODUCTION 1
II BACKGROUND TO THE SIX DAY WAR 3
A.
Chronology
3
B.
Political and Military Leadership
5
III POLITICAL AND MILITARY STRATEGIES 9
A.
Egypt/Jordan/Syria
9
B.
Israel
10
IV STRATEGY COMPARISON 13
A.
Objectives
13
B.
War-fighting Doctrine
14
C.
Effect of Available Technology 16
D.
Influences of available Resources 18
E.
Objective Accomplishment 20
V SUCCESS VS. FAILURE 23
VI CONCLUSION 28
VII END NOTES 30
VIII BIBLIOGRAPHY 32
SECTION I
INTRODUCTION
On June 5 1967, Israeli planes destroyed
the Air Forces
of Egypt, Jordan,
and Syria, launching the briefest war in
the history of the
Middle East. By June 11 1967, Israel
had
captured all of
Palestine and more: Egypt's vast Sinai
Peninsula and
Syria's Golan Heights as well as the West bank
of Jordan. It was a complete and decisive victory. The
scope of this
paper will cover the facts and forces behind
one of history's
longest feuds, and shortest wars.
Although
the war lasted
"six days" the outcome of the crisis was
decided on the
morning of June 5, 1967. All that
remained
was for the
Israeli army to drive forward in Sinai to
confirm the
military victory. This particular
conflict was
chosen for
analysis because for the first time, air power
had effectively
won a war. Within hours of Israel's air
strike, the
Israeli decision makers were aware of reduced
threat due to the
ensuing air supremacy and an overwhelming
shift of the
military balance in their favor.
In June 1967, Israel had two qualitative
advantages
over her Arab
adversaries: surprise and motivation.
The
devastating air
strike on June 5, 1967 caught the Arab
leaders totally by
surprise and ensured Israel's aerial
supremacy for the
rest of the war. As for motivation, the
outpouring of
hatred during the crisis period convinced all
Israelies they
were fighting for survival. The
combined
Arab armed forces
were superior to the Israel Defense Force
(IDF) total
strength in personnel as well as weapon systems.
Arab leaders and
knowledgeable observers anticipated and
predicted a
different outcome to the impending conflict
based on known
statistics. However, the combination of
superior motivation, leadership, training, and the tactical
exploitation of surprise, speed, and air superiority more
than made up for
those advantages.1
SECTION II
BACKGROUND TO WAR
Generally
the United Nations believed the Holy Land
belonged to either
the Arab or Jew and probably to both; but
not in any way to
Great Britain. A review of a number of
key events occured
between 1948 and 1967 to set the stage
for the subsequent
1967 conflict.
CHRONOLOGY
May 1948 - The British Mandate over Palestine was
terminated
and the State of
Israel proclaimed. It is recognized by
the
United States and
the Soviet Union and is attacked by its
Arab neighbors.2
May 1949 - Armistice agreement with the Arabs gives
Israel
more land, but the
Arabs retain Old Jerusalem.3
1952 - In Egypt, King Farouk is forced to
abdicate by young
military officers
and Colonel Gamal Nasser becomes president
of Egypt and the
leader of the Arab world in the 1950's and
1960's.4
1953 - At the age of eighteen, Hussein becomes
King of
Jordan.5
July 1956 - The Suez Crisis begins when Nasser
nationalizes
the canal. Having long been denied passage through the
Suez Canal and
following repeated border skirmishes, in
October Israel
invades Egypt's Sinai and the Gaza Strip, and
along with the
British and French, occupies the canal area.6
March 1957 - Under pressure from the United Nations,
the
United States and
the Soviet Union, foreign forces
withdraw from all
Egyptian territory and the Gaza Strip.
United Nations
forces are assigned to patrol strategic areas
of the Sinai.7
February
1958 - Syria and Egypt
merge to form the United
Arab Republic and
maintain a close relationship with the
Soviet Union.8
1961 - The Syrian-Egyptian merger is dissolved
because of
Egypt's
domineering attitude toward Syria.9
June 1964 - The Palestine Liberation Organization is
estab-
lished with the
goal of destroying Israel and gaining
control over
Palestine. Persistent terrorist attacks
against Israel are
launched.10
1965 - The Arab States and Israel intensified the
border
skirmishes that
had been going on between wars.11
Nov 1966 - Israel reacts to Syrian border raids by
destroy-
ing a Jordanian
village.12
April 1967 - In an air clash, Israeli pilots down six
Syrian
jets.13
April-June
1967 - Following Syrian
raids on Israeli
settlements,
Israel attacks Syria. Nasser closes
Israel's
southern port by
blockading the Strait of Tiran and expels
the United Nations
emergency force in Sinai. Israel
launches
pre-emptive attacks on the airfields of Egypt,
Syria, Iraq, and
Jordan. Within six days, Israel
occupies
the Golan Heights,
the Gaza Strip, the Sinai, and the West
Bank, including
Jerusalem.14
This conflict occurred because of the
irreconcilable
difference between
Arab and Jewish national goals. The
Arab League had as
its goal the elimination of the Jewish
state while the
Israelis sought survival and military
security.15
Political
and Military Leadership
- The following
individuals and
groups played important roles before and
during the
conflict:
Egypt Gamal Abdel Nasser Egyptian President
Abel
Amer Commander
and Chief
Mahmound
Riad Foreign
Minister
Mohammed
Kony Ambassador
to UN
Anwar
Sadat Legislator
Israel Levi Eshkol Prime Minister
Abba
Eban Foreign
Minister
Moshe
Dayan Defense
Minister
Yitzhak
Rabin Chief
of Staff
Ezer
Weizman Chief
of Operations
Ephraim
Euron Minister
to the US
David
Ben Gurion Former Prime Minister
Menachem
Begin Opposition
Leader
Jordan Hussein ibn Talal King
Mohammad
Farra Ambassador
to the UN
Syria Nureddin Attassi President
Yousef
Zayyen Prime
Minister
Hafez
Assad Defense
Minister
Fatah Guerrilla
Organization
Ba'th Ruling
Government Party
The government of Egypt, with Gamal
Nasser at its head,
supported
Nasirism. Its main ideas were
Pan-Arabism,
positive
neutralism and Arab socialism. Pan-Arabism
is Arab
nationalism with a
stress on political unification. Positive
neutralism was
Nasser's policy of not aligning Egypt with
either the
communist bloc or the United States and Arab
Socialism required
the government to run the major
industries and
public utilities in order to divide the
economic pie more
evenly among the people.16
Israel has a relatively democratic
government fashioned
after that of
Great Britain. In Israeli politics
there is a
tendency toward
division and fragmentation. This was
the
prevailing
atmosphere at the time of the conflict.
Levi
Eshkol succeeded
Ben Gurion as Prime Minister only to be
attacked by his
predecessor as totally unfit for the job.
A
competent
administrator, it was not clear whether Eshkol had
the qualities of
leadership and quick decision needed at a
time of
crisis. Needing a recognized, decisive
figure to
inspire the
confidence of the people, Moshe Dayan was named
Minister of
Defense. The officers of the Israel
Defense
Forces as well as
the members were highly motivated,
competent
professional soldiers, confident and sure of their
mission. Withstanding an attempted coup, Jordan remained a
monarchy with a
conservative government.
Syria's leaders were Arab
nationalists. Haliz al-Assad
graduated from the
Syrian military academy and rose rapidly
through the ranks
to become a general; Commander in Chief of
the Air Force and
then in 1966, Minister of Defense. An
Army Coup in 1966
brought to power a radical wing of the
Ba'th party. Most of the new leaders belonged to the
Alawi
religious sect,
many of whose young men joined the Syrian
officer corps as a means of moving up socially.
Military
Doctrines- Israel
believed an arms balance was the
only guarantee of
peace in the Middle East. Ensuring the
existence and
military security of the nation was the top
priority by first
strikes if necessary.17
Israeli military
thinking was
governed by three basic premises:
victory is
assured to the
side that obtains complete superiority in the
air; armor should
be used as a concentrated mailed fist to
smash through the
fortified positions of the enemy; once
the break-through
has been achieved, the accent would be on
exploitation with
maximum speed and flexibility.
The overall Arab military doctrine
concerning Israel
was the
"total" annihilation of the Jewish State. Almost
all of the
officers in the Egyptian Armed Forces were
devoted followers
of President Nasser. They were
convinced
of the justice of
the Arab case over the question of the
Palestine
refugees. Most of them believed the
Israelis
were usurpers and
that in the long run war was inevitable,
for there could be
no peace in the Middle East until Israel
was
annihilated. They regarded Zionism as a
capitalist
movement,
controlling most of the world's capital.
SECTION III
POLITICAL AND MILITARY
STRATEGIES
Egypt /
Jordan / Syria. The political and military strategy
to force Israel into
a confrontation and then annihilate the
Jewish nation was
based on three assumptions made by
President Nasser
of Egypt:
1. After the United Nations forces would be
withdrawn
at his request, he
would close the Straits of Tiran to
Israeli shipping.
2. Following this action, the Israelies would
be
likely to try to
open the Straits by force and break the
blockade. This would lead to war.
3. In the event of an outbreak of war, the
ratio of
forces and the
state of preparedness of his forces
guaranteed Egypt
military success. Nasser was convinced
that, in a
combination of both military and political
struggle, he would
gain the upper hand.18
There were plans for military action
against Israel but
there may not have
been a master plan for a concerted
campaign in May or
June 1967. From documents that fell
into
Israeli hands it
is known that there was a plan for the
destruction of the
Israeli Air Force on the ground and for a
tank offensive in
the Southern Negev, with the intention of
cutting it off
from Israel and to sieze Eilat. The
Egyptians intended
to defend against an Israeli first strike
and deal a
retaliatory fatal blow. The Egyptian
Air Force
consisted of four
hundred fighter-interceptors and seventy
bombers intended
to protect the Nation's heartland and
provide close air
support for the army in the Sinai. On
May
30, 1967, King
Hussein of Jordan and Nasser signed a Mutual
Defense Treaty
like one that already existed between Egypt
and Syria. Its Article I declared that "any attack
on
either state"
would be considered "an attack on both."
Article 7
stipulated that "in the event of military
operations
starting, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
of the United Arab
Republic shall assume Command of
Operations in both
states." Nasser had now added to
his
military machine
an elite force of fifty-five thousand
soldiers and a
small Air Force made up of mainly British
made subsonic
Hawker Hunter fighter-bombers and a few
United States
F-104 interceptor jets.19
Israel. The
morning of June 5, 1967 found Israel's armed
forces facing the
massed Arab armies around her frontiers.
Israel's citizen
army had been quietly and efficiently
mobilized over
several weeks to defend the country against
the impending Arab
attack which every Arab medium of mass
communication
announced was imminent. Zahal, the
Israeli
defense
establishment, knew how they would proceed in a
general war
against any Arab combined force that included
the United Arab
Republic. It would knock out Egypt
first,
for if Egypt
collapsed the others would certainly fall.
This doctrine had
been fashioned by the prevailing
conditions: the terrain, a vast empty desert ideal for
armored warfare,
for speed of movement in which air support
for the ground
forces can be used to maximum effect; the
character of the
adversary- the Israelis had already
discovered in
previous wars that the Egyptians are at their
best in defending
static positions, but quickly lose their
heads in a fast,
rapidly moving battle; and most important
of all, by outside
intervention which, in Israeli eyes, made
speed an essential
factor in every plan.20
Israel's initial
political and
military strategy focused on defense and
survival. Israel's combat forces went all out to
destroy
the fighting power
of Egypt. Within three hours of the
successful
pre-emptive strike against Egypt, Israel's
strategy switched
from the defensive to a goal attainment:
the liberation of Jerusalem,
the maximum destruction of Arab
military power,
and the enhancement of Israel's secure
borders-ultimately
the Suez Canal in the South, the Golan
Heights in the
North, and the Jordan river in the East.
The
Israeli Air
Force's role was without doubt the greatest
gamble with the
largest pay off in the history of military
aviation. They assured total air supremacy by
destroying
the enemies air
force's on the ground.
SECTION IV
STRATEGY COMPARISON
The pressure on decision-makers is to
choose courses of
action. The closer strategic analysis comes to
actual
strategic
decisions, and the more concrete it becomes, the
more it is forced
into channels determined by the pressures
of the
moment. The strategic recommendations
which are used
are those dealing
with the allocation of funds, personnel,
and equipment;
with weapons systems design and with
logistics. In these areas there are few, if any,
opportune-
ities to cooperate
with the enemy.21 There was many
pressures and
decisions made by both the Arab and Isreali
leaders.
Objectives
Arab Forces. On
the eve of the 1967 War, political fragmen-
tation within the
Arab world gave way to unity-the goal
being to crush
Israel. By ordering the removal of the
United Nations
forces and closing the Straits of Tiran,
President Nasser
hoped to achieve the objective of provoking
a war with Israel
at a time and place chosen by the U.A.R.
The destruction of
the State of Israel was official Arab
policy. They believed their prestige depended upon a
military victory
that would revenge the defeats of 1948
and 1956. Syria's objective was the liberation of
Palestine
Israel. In
the early days of June, 1967, Israel was
fighting for
survival. Its citizen soldiers were
called
upon to accomplish
by force of arms what Israelis had longed
for since
achieving independence in 1948 - military
security.22 The primary objective for Israel's defense
establishment was
not a reconquest of Sinai's arid
wasteland but the
preserving of Israel's interior through
the destruction of
Egypt's air power.
War-fighting
Doctrine
Arab Forces. The
history of the Islamic people has been one
of conquests. Arab nationalism considered Zionism and
Israel as an enemy
in themselves and at the same time the
spearhead of
western imperialism. The underlying
assumption
of Arab doctrine
was that in the long run time was against
Israel; that two and
a half million Jews could not hold out
forever against
one hundred million Arabs; the State of
Israel like that
of the crusaders would inevitably be de-
stroyed. The Syrians were genuinely convinced that a
people's war of
guerrilla tactics against Jewish settlements
would compel the
Israelis to engage in massive retaliation
and thus, sooner
or later, involve the regular armies of
the Arab
countries. Their general assumption was
that the
combined might of
the Arab States was superior to Israel.
At the worst the
war would end in a stalemate, to be
repeated again
after a few years. The Arabs were
convinced
they could afford
these campaigns and that Israel could not.
Israel would
eventually disappear as a result of this
escalation of harassment. The Arabs genuinely believed that
Zionism regarded
Israel not as a homeland to be defended to
the last against
all enemies, but as a territory for
financial
investment, speculations and exploitation.
They
believed the Jews,
lacking patriotism and roots in the
country, would
lose their nerve and eventually give up
Israel, if they
were exposed to this treatment long enough.
Israel.
Defense Minister Dayan and other Israeli officials
put forth the
doctrine of defense, not expansion of Israel's
territory. In order to curb commando raids by Arab
guerrilla units,
the government adopted the policy of
devastating retaliatory raids. Although Israel's leaders
were willing to
seek peace, they were not eager to commit
national suicide.
After King Hussein concluded an agreement
with Nasser
on a joint
military command, Israel's cabinet assumed that
war was
inevitable. Most reserve units were
called up, and
the entire economy
was put on a war footing. Combining
traditional military
doctrines with common sense, Israeli
military
directives are logical and effective:
When in
doubt,
strike. The battle will never go as you
planned it.
Improvise. Surprise is your most effective weapon.23
Effect of Available
Technology
The
armies of Egypt and Syria had been equipped with
sophisticated
Soviet weapons in the years prior to the 1967
war, including
MIG-21 fighters, SA-2 anti-air missiles, and
the latest models
(T-54 and T-55) of Russian tanks, at the
time. Israel's military experts admitted after the
Six Day
War that Soviet
armor was superior to Israel's.
The combined Arab armed forces were
superior to the
Israel Defense
Force quantitatively and regarding weapons,
qualitatively as
well. Because of this, knowledgeable
and
qualified
observers did not anticipate anything approaching
the actual course
of the war.24 Israel's
biggest problem
was the all-around
threat from Arab air bases. They could
put up enough jet
bombers, such as the TU-16 and IL-28 along
with MIG-21
transonic fighters and MIG-17's to outnumber
Israel's
comparable types, like the Vatour fighter-bomber
and the Mirage
IIIC, by better than two to one. With
four
air bases in
Sinai, two of them new, Egypt could put MIG's
over Tel Aviv
within seven minutes from takeoff.
Because of
this capability,
Israel planned and executed the pre-emptive
strike on eleven
Egyptian air fields that were the hard core
threat to Israel's
interior.
The over-all contribution of the Fougas
to quick
victory was
incalculable. The Fouga Magister, built
in
Israel, is the
basic trainer for jet pilots, and this
relatively slow
aircraft had been souped up with two
matching guns and
thirty-six rockets to operate as a tank
killer over Sinai. These "turtles" of the air force
destroyed over
seventy Egyptian artillery pieces, took on
the enemy armor
whenever they found it, and softened the
base camps before
the armored spearheads came up.
Certain brigades became highly specialized
in precise
knowledge of the
terrain and all possible routes for
military
movement. Soil experts, archaeologists
and other
scientists were
consulted about the possibility of moving
around dunes and
across badlands where not even camel cara-
vans had
traveled. The premise was that to
conquer Sinai
swiftly, it would
have to be done with armor. Israel's
army
got to know the
possibilities of Sinai far better than the
Egyptan army that stood there.
Influence of Available
Resources
The military balance in early 1967 was in
favor of the
United Arab
Republic. It had two armored divisions
with a
third being
formed, four infantry divisions, one parachute
brigade and twelve
artillery regiments. Egypt's estimated
regular armed forces
were 180,000-200,000 men (not including
the National
Guard). Of these, about 30,000-35,000
were
stationed in
Sinai. Syria's armed forces comprised
about
60,000-70,000
regulars and 40,000-45,000 reservists.
Jordan's Arab
Legion consisted of about 50,000-55,000
regulars, and its
National Guard unit consisted of
15,000-20,000
men. The number of men in the Israel
Defense
Force, on full
mobilization was estimated to be 270,000-
300,000. The troops made up 23 Infantry Brigades, 8
Armored
Brigades, and 12
Artillery Brigades.25
The U.A.R. had a combined air force of
522 fighters, 76
bombers, and 106
transport aircraft. The Israeli Defense
Force had 200-300
fighter-bombers, 25 bombers, 60 trainers
/ground attack
planes, and 20 transports. The U.A.R.'s
strength in armor
was over 2,000 tanks and self-propelled
guns, 2,100 plus
armored personnel carriers, 2,600 artillery
and 28 SA-2
anti-air batteries. The I.D.F. had in
its force
only 1,050 tanks
and self-propelled guns and 1,000 armed
fighting vehicles.26
Politically the U.A.R. had the backing of
the Soviet
Union who had been
providing them with advanced weaponry and
training since
1955. President Nasser believed that in
a
confrontation with
Israel, Russia would not let Egypt be
destroyed. The United States was reluctant for
political
reasons to give
arms to Israel and was focused on her own
involvement in
Vietnam.
Up against a small country,
geographically and
politically alone,
qualitatively and quantantively inferior
(on paper) in both
manpower and weaponry, President Nasser
proceeded with his
strategy of troop concentrations in the
Sinai and
fortification of the Golan Heights and Jordanian
border. When all was in place he would close the
Straits of
Tiran forcing the
Israelis to attack there to re-open
shipping. He believed both his air and ground forces
could
withstand a first
strike by the Israelis and respond with a
fatal retaliatory
second blow.27
Surrounded and faced with superior
numbers of enemy
forces and
equipment, Israel's primary objective was the
preservation of
Israel's interior through the destruction of
Egypt's air
power. The strategy which had been
planned and
practiced for over
two years was a pre-emptive morning air
strike against
eleven targeted air fields whose destruction
would shock Egypt
and paralyze its air arm. With air
supremacy achieved
the Israeli Air Force would then provide
close air support
to ground forces conquering the Sinai and
seek out and
destroy enemy infantry and armor divisions.
Objective
Accomplishment
Brigadier General Mordechai Hod,
Commander of the
Israeli Air Force
came up with the plan to take out the
Arab Air
Forces. For two years, the Israeli Air
Force had
followed the same
training route, at the same time every
morning. The formation would take off from their base
in
the Negev Desert
and sweep out to the west across the
neutral
Mediterranean Sea. In due time the
Israeli jets
would dive to wave
top height and turn for home. All of
this was noted by
Egyptian radar operators. There was a
dawn alert by the
Egyptians every day. Israeli
intelligence
provided the exact
time and location of alert jets and
combat air patrols
along the Egyptian-Israeli frontier in
the Sinai. The June 5th attack was planned around the
Egyptians taking
the morning maneuvers for granted and on
the intelligence
data that at 0740 the dawn alert was
canceled and
nearly every pilot in the Egyptian Air Force
would be eating
breakfast.28 The key to the
master plan was
a synchronized
attack against eleven Egyptian air bases.
The lift-offs were
timed and staged so that each formation
would go at its
target at the same minute. Thereafter
the
same eleven bases
would be pounded steadily for eighty
minutes. At the exact start of the air strike, an
Israeli
land assault would
advance along three axis in the northern
Sinai.
The Arab political and military leaders
believed
that by constant
harassment of Israeli settlements and the
closing of the
Straits of Tiran, the Israelis would be
forced to defend
themselves. In the event of an outbreak
of
war, the ratio of
forces and the state of preparedness of
the Arab forces
would guarantee the Arab alliance military
success. Soviet and Arab delegates to the United
Nations
made every effort
to pre-empt any Western intervention that
might obstruct
Arab plans; they went out of their way to
minimize the
seriousness of the situation and to permit
developments to
take their course. The Arab air forces
role
was combat air
patrol along the Israeli Sinai frontier as
protection for
massed ground forces. They were
assigned a
defensive role
rather than an offensive role.
SECTION V
SUCCESS VS. FAILURE
On June 5 1967, Israel launched a series
of pre-emptive
air strikes
against its Arab neighbors. Its
consequent
victory over
Egypt, Syria, and Jordan in the war took only
six days. It refuted the belief, common after 1956
that the
Jewish State could
not defeat the Arabs without Western
allies. It exploded the myth that "unity of
goals" among
the Arab states
would lead them to defeat Israel. It
proved
that the Israel Defense
Force could attain high levels of
skill,
coordination, and valor in order to ensure the
country's
survival.29
It is always misleading to compare
military data on a
one-to-one
basis. First, there are significant
differences
between plane and
plane, tank and tank, missile and missile,
their
concentration or dispersal and tactical use.
Secondly
leadership,
training, technology, motivation, and organiza-
tion cannot be
quantified but are of crucial importance.
In June 1967, Israel had two qualitative
advantages
over her
adversaries: surprise and
motivation. Clausewitz
states surprise is
"when it is successful in a high degree,
confusion and
broken courage in the enemy's ranks are the
consequences.30 The shadow and lessons of the Sinai War
hung heavily on
the Israeli decision-makers. There was
a
feeling of
isolation in the face of growing danger.
There
was no certainty
the United States would support Israel if
she went to war,
and there was a great deal of apprehension
regarding the role
of the Soviet Union in such an event.
This feeling of
uncertainty was heightened by conflicting
estimates on the outcome of the war.
Among the Israeli leadership and
military
commanders, there
was no doubt of an Israeli victory; but
the rate of
casualties would, it was feared, be very high
in view of the
strong defense deployment of the Egyptian
Army, the
possibility the Egyptians might use their navy for
offensive
operations and the uncertainty regarding the use
of missiles. Military experts warned the civilian
leadership that if
Israel went to war to expect at least
10,000 casualties
if she won and as many as two million dead
if she lost.31
The devastating air strikes on the 5th
were crucial to
the survival of
the State of Israel and to the second phase
of the strategy to
achieve "defense in depth."
It caught
Arab leaders
totally by surprise and ensured Israel's aerial
supremacy for the
rest of the war. In fact, Israel's
victory was
certain within the first three hours.
The
superior quality
of IDF leadership and training, the quick
exploitation of
the tactical advantages gained on the first
day- air supremacy
and the break through of the Arab front
line- led to
disarray and retreat among the Arab forces.
Another principle of war used
successfully by the
Israelis was
maneuver. The overall strategy of
Israel's
Southern Command
was based on a three pronged break-in by
means of three
principle phases. The first phase was
to
open the northern
and central axis by destroying the
fortified Egyptian
infrastructure along them and thereby
breaking the back
of the Egyptian forces in the Sinai; the
second phase was
to penetrate into the depths of the Sinai;
while the third
phase was to take the two mountain passes
leading to the
Suez canal and thereby cutting off the
Egyptian army from recrossing the canal. The general
impression created
by the Israeli deployment of forces,
which in the
Southern Sector were moved to and fro along the
border openly,
succeeded in misleading the Egyptians as to
the probable
planned main thrust of the Israeli forces.
The impression was
given that the attack would be launched
to the south. As a result the Arab forces were caught off
guard when the
opening attack took place in the north in
areas they
considered impassable. The best
strategy is
"always be
very strong, first then at the decisive point."32
There is no more
imperative and no simpler law for strategy
than to "keep
the forces concentrated."33
The Israelis
proved this
concept with their concentration of air power
against Egypt
alone and only after air supremacy had been
achieved on that
front did the air forces plan attacks
against Jordan and
Syria.
Another major element in the success of
their strategy
was the bravery of
the Israeli soldiers in such classic
battles as the
struggle of the paratroopers in east
Jerusalem, and of
the incredible armored and infantry
assault on the
Golan Heights. A measure of the example
and
leadership ability
within the Israel Defense Forces can be
gauged from the
fact that 23 percent of the casualties were
suffered by
officers and NCO's. One of the main
secrets of
Israel's success
lay in the fact that the officers and NCO's
were at the head
of their men in battle. In this war,
the
Arab forces were
completely outgeneraled by the Israelis.34
While the Israelis kept their
"objective" uppermost in
mind and
successfully used all their skills and resources
in ensuring
survival of the State, the Arab forces in their
conduct of the war
made several cardinal errors. President
Nasser disregarded
the virtues of surprise, superiority of
numbers, economy
of mass, and maneuver. Though superior
in
numbers, he exaggerated
the strength of his own forces and
the Arab
armies. The fact that Egypt and other
Arab armies
had succeeded in
mastering sophisticated modern aircraft,
electronic
equipment and masses of armor, caused him to
exaggerate and lay
excessive emphases on the equipment as
opposed to the men
who had to use it. He did not envisage
a rapid,
hard-hitting war of maneuver in the desert but saw
it more (as the
deployment and fortifications of his forces
would indicate) as
a long drawn-out slogging match.
Finally, he did
not appreciate the decisive importance of
the surprise first
strike as borne out by the gradual
cautious opening
of hostilities on the part of the Arab
forces in which no
use was made of the powerful potential of
the first strike. The long period of waiting several weeks
under conditions
of tension enabled the IDF to mobilize
effectively and to
be prepared for the initial strike.35
SECTION VI
CONCLUSION
The Arab-Israeli "Six Day War"
ended on June 10 1967.
When acceptance of
a cease fire halted fighting, Israel
occupied a land
more than three times her own size.
Israeli
troops had
penetrated on three fronts, taking the Syrian
Heights above the
Sea of Galilee; the West Bank of Jordan,
including the old
city of Jerusalem; and the entire Sinai
Peninsula in
Egypt. With these areas as a bargaining
point
Israel hoped to
protect her frontiers from the kind of
harassment that
precipitated the June, 1967 War. Israel
had
achieved her
objectives of "survival" and "defense in depth"
through the bold
use of its air force in a pre-emptive,
first strike
strategy.
The Six Day War was brought on by
President Nasser of
Egypt. One of the biggest mistakes he made was
exaggerating
the strength of
the Egyptian and Arab combined forces and
their commitment
to the objective "the destruction of the
State of
Israel." The strategy to force
Israel into war,
i.e. Syrian
guerrilla raids, massing troops along all
borders and
closing the Straits of Tiran, was a success.
What Arab
leadership failed to have was a follow on strategy
of how to fight
the Israelis once a war started. You
can't
win from the
defensive. You can't win by being
predictable.
The Arab forces
were guilty of both.
They made no use of the powerful first
strike and
their aircraft alert schedule might as well been posted in
every Israeli
flying squadron. The actual hour of the
attack was chosen
on intelligence that it would find most
Egyptian Air
Command personnel in their cars in route after
breakfast from
their homes to their bases. The
intelligence
was correct. The Egyptian-UAR forces had superior
equipment
and forces in
their favor. If they had used their
numbers
with maneuver and
economy of force they could have
overwhelmed the
Israeli Army. Instead they dug in
behind
ten years of
desert fortifications and became targets for
the Israeli Air
Force. The outcome of this war would
have
been different if
the Arab leadership had developed a
strategy based on
the offensive using their sophisticated
air arm in unison
on all fronts. The outcome of the war
was
a direct result of
the Israeli air strikes that caught the
entire Arab world
off guard.
END NOTES
1. Brecher, Michael, Decisions in
Crisis: Israel 1967 and 1973,
University of California Press, LA, CA, 1980, p. 417,418.
2-14. Carter, Jimmy, The Blood of Abraham: Insights into the Middle East, Houghton
Mifflin Co., Boston, 1985, p.
XIX-XV.
15. Laquer, Walter and Rubin, Berry, Eds, The
Israeli-Arab Reader: A Documentary
History of the Middle East Conflict, Penguin Books, New York, 1984, p.179.
16. Laquer, Walter and Rubin, Berry, Eds, The
Israeli-Arab Reader: A Documentary
History of the Middle East Conflict, p. 183.
17. Laquer, Walter and Rubin, Berry, Eds, The
Israeli-Arab Reader: A Documentary
History of the Middle East Conflict, p. 185.
18. Herog, Chaim, The Arab-Israeli Wars,
Random House, Inc., New York, 1982, p. 151.
19. Neff, Donald, Warriors for Jerusalem, Linden Press/ Simon & Schuster, New York, 1984, p. 172.
20. Bawly, Dan and Kimche, David, The
Sand-Storm: The Arab-Israeli War of
1967,Stein and Day Publishers, New York, 1968, p. 174.
21. Clausewitz, Carl von, On War, Penguin
Books, New York, 1985, p. 75.
22. Marshall, Brig Gen S.L.A., Swift
Sword: The Historical Record of
Israeli's Victory in June 1967, p. 6.
23. Marshall, Brig Gen S.L.A., Swift Sword: The Historical Record of Israeli's Victory in
June 1967, p. 133.
24. Brecher, Michael, Decisions in
Crisis: Israel 1967 and 1973,
p.418.
25. Laquer, Walter, The Road to
Jerusalem: The Arab-Israeli Conflict
1967, Macmillan Co., New York, 1968, p. 62.
26. Laquer, Walter, The Road to
Jerusalem: The Arab-Israeli Conflict
1967, p. 66.
27. Laquer, Walter, The Road to
Jerusalem: The Arab-Israeli Conflict
1967, p. 99.
28. Hammel, Eric, Six Days in June,
Clarks Scribner and Sons, New York, 1972, p. 165-166.
29. Goldschmidt, Arthur Jr., A Concise
History of the Middle East, Westview Press, Colorado, 1991, p. 293.
30. Clausewitz, Carl von, On War, p. 269.
31. Bawly, Dan and Kimche, David, Sand-Storm: The Arab-Israeli War of 1967, p. 140.
32. Clausewitz, Carl von, On War, p. 276.
33. Clausewitz, Carl von, On War, p. 276.
34. Herzog, Chaim, The Israeli Wars, p.
189-190.
35. Herzog, Chaim, The Israeli Wars, p.
190.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Bawley, Dan and Kimche, David, The Sand-Storm: The Arab-Israeli War of 1967, Stein and
Day Publishers, New York, 1968.
2. Brecher, Michael, Decisions in
Crisis: Israel 1967 and 1973,
University of California Press, LA, CA, 1980.
3. Carter, Jimmy, The Blood of Abraham: Insights into the Middle East, Houghton
Mifflin Co., Boston, 1985.
4. Clausewitz, Carl von, On War, Penguin
Books, New York, 1985.
5. Goldschmidt, Arthur Jr., A Concise
History of the Middle East, Westview Press, Colorado, 1991.
6. Hammel, Eric, Six Days in June, Charles
Scribner and Sons, New York, 1972.
7. Herzog, Chaim, The Arab-Israeli Wars,
Random House, Inc., New York, 1982.
8. Laquer, Walter and Rubin, Barry, Eds., The
Israeli-Arab Reader: A Documentary
History of the Middle East Conflict,
Penguin Books, New
York, 1984.
9. Laquer, Walter, The Road to
Jerusalem: The Arab-Israeli Conflict
1967, Macmillan Co., New York, 1968.
10. Marshall, Brig Gen S.L.A. Swift Sword: The
Historical Record of Israel's Victory June 1967, American Heritage Pub.
Co., 1967.
11. Neff, Donald, Warriors for Jerusalem, Linedn Press/Simon & Schuster, New York, 1984.
