Operation Eagle Claw: A Catalyst for Change in the American Military
CSC 1997
Subject
Area Operations
Executive Summary
Title: Operation Eagle
Claw: A Catalyst for Change in the American Military
Author: Major C.E.
Holzworth USMC
Thesis: This paper will
analyze Operation Eagle Claw’s impact on the U.S. Military. The analysis will prove that the lessons
learned from the mission are undeniably linked to several revolutionary
military reforms. Specifically, the
mission was a catalyst for change in three distinct areas: Force Structure, Joint Doctrine, and Special Forces
Capabilities.
Discussion: On November 4,
1979, three thousand Iranian students stormed the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. The students seized the compound, capturing
66 Americans. When five months of
diplomatic negotiations failed to gain the release of the hostages, President Carter issued an executive order
for a military rescue mission. The
mission demanded the combined capabilities and assets of all four
services. The rescue mission, code
named Eagle
Claw, ended with catastrophic results. The mission was aborted in the first staging/refueling area known
as Desert One with the deaths of eight servicemen.
Although
the results of the mission were tragic, Operation Eagle Claw’s contribution to
the American military was invaluable.
The lessons learned from the mission illustrated serious deficiencies in
the capability of the American military.
The mission forced the political and military leadership to address
these inadequacies and initiate changes. Military reforms would be
complete and revolutionary.
Conclusion: The analysis
will present Operation Eagle Claw as a catalyst for a Revolution in Military Affairs
in America. In particular, the mission
was a major contributor to the changing of service parochialism. The mission contributed to the development
of Jointness.
Chapter 1
The Carter Administration, the Military,
and the Times
“The fifty-two hostages held
captive in Tehran seemed to symbolize the ineffectiveness of the President and
of the United States under his leadership.” [1]
It is important to review the time period of the
rescue mission, Operation Eagle Claw.
A study of the two most influential organizations involved with the
mission is essential to the analysis.
The Carter Administration was unique because of the President’s personal
beliefs and values. Additionally, the
United States Armed Forces had cultural and physical inadequacies that were
symbolic of the post-Vietnam war
period. The study of these two
institutions provides a "window" of understanding to analyze the
planning and execution of the mission.
The Administration
Carter-the man, the leader:
Carter’s successful bid for the presidency was a direct response to the
loss of the Vietnam war and the immorality of
two former Presidents-Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon.[2] As a presidential candidate, Carter’s lack
of experience in national politics and foreign affairs was a favorable asset,
which he skillfully exploited to seek the presidency. Clearly
a man of deep religious convictions, Carter’s character appealed to an America
that was thirsty for moral leadership.
His moral standards played a critical role in his decisions and
policies. His inexperience in foreign
policy would also impact his leadership.
Carter was a proponent of the team concept among
his senior advisors. Unpretentious and
open minded, he preferred to be briefed to the fullest before rendering a
decision. He encouraged frankness and
debate among his advisors to ensure a thorough evaluation of issues.
Carter’s Advisors and Foreign Policy Team:
Carter’s principal criterion for the organization of his cabinet and
advisors was compatibility. In his selection process, Carter considered
qualities of confidence and selflessness equal to intelligence and experience.
Carter
selected Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski to be his National Security Advisor
(NSA). The President considered
Brzezinski an astute and gifted analysts of foreign policy and security
matters. However, Carter was warned
that Brzezinski was inclined to speak out forcefully on issues; Brzezinski was
an aggressive and ambitious individual.[3]
There
were differences of opinion on foreign policy issues between Carter and
Brzezinski. Brzezinski believed that a
position of strength was the ideal negotiating platform for foreign policy.[4] He believed that force was an essential
element in shaping foreign policy. The
primary question for both Brzezinski and Carter was whether effective foreign
policy could be driven by moral and ethical principles.[5] Carter believed that morality was the first
principle in the guidelines for shaping foreign policy.
Nevertheless, Carter selected Brzezinski to be
his NSA. Carter knew there would be
differences of opinion between Brzezinski and himself. Additionally, with the selection of Cyrus
Vance as his Secretary of State (SecState), Carter acknowledged there would be
conflicting viewpoints between Vance and Brzezinski. Carter thought his leadership would forge the two staff members
into an extremely effective foreign policy team. Unfortunately, he was disappointed with his top two advisors’
lack of professionalism and team work.
A
World War II veteran who had served in several previous administrations, Cyrus
Vance brought an incredible resume in foreign affairs to the office of Secretary of State. More specifically, he had extensive
experience in the Department of Defense.
With
Vance as his Secretary of State, Carter thought that he had achieved a balance
between his two principle advisors in foreign affairs.[6] Vance’s
philosophy was traditional diplomacy.
He agreed with Carter in establishing moral principles and human rights
as a central theme in foreign policy.
He accepted military force only as a last resort in solving
international issues.
Dr.
Harold Brown, a physicist and President of the California Institute of
Technology, was selected to be Secretary of Defense (SecDef). Carter regarded Brown as a top man in
science and business. Brown’s background was perfect for Carter’s
plans to streamline the department.
Admiral Stansfield Turner was
Carter’s choice for the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (DCI).
Turner had a strong academic background.
He was a classmate of Carter’s at the Naval Academy and a Rhodes Scholar. Professionally, he had risen to the position
of Commander of NATO forces in Southern Europe.
Carter believed the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) practiced unethical
activities . He directed Turner to
police up the covert activities of the CIA.
As a result, Turner de-emphasized intelligence gathering by human
sources. Turner developed technology to
replace human intelligence gathering.
Unfortunately, the technology was not as efficient or reliable as the
human resources. Turner’s shift towards
technology decreased the effectiveness and reliability of the CIA in gathering
human intelligence.
The four years of the Carter Administration are
considered by some political experts to be the most significant in the history
of American foreign policy.[7] Carter viewed foreign policy as a means to
improve the human condition. The
purpose of foreign policy was not
necessarily to promulgate power, security or material needs, but a means to
spread American ideology for the betterment of mankind. In addition, Carter insisted that the
protection of human rights be the foundation of his foreign policy.[8]
Carter, Brzezinski, and Vance all
believed U.S. foreign policy should move away from the bipolar “zero sum”
framework of containment. Vance, in
particular, felt U.S. foreign policy was too narrowly rooted in the
geopolitical struggle between the Soviet Union and the U.S.[9] This one dimensional attitude neglected the
rapidly changing world and the increasing problems concerning Third World. Vance sought to influence U.S. foreign
policy away from the bipolar focus.
Brzezinski also believed that the
U.S. should attempt to restore its political relationship with the Third
World. However, Brzezinski did not
believe that human rights should be a central element in foreign policy. His priority was to improve America’s
strategic leverage against the Soviet Union, whom he feared would attempt to
use its power base to exploit its position in the Third World.[10]
The U.S. Military
Carter
and the National Military Strategy. The
post-Vietnam period was a period of decline for the U.S. Armed Forces.
As a result of the Vietnam war, national support and acceptance of the
military was at a low. During this
period, the American military force levels declined while the Soviet Union
expanded its force levels and military budget.
Advocates for increasing the U.S. Defense budget had to fight a wealth
of political opposition.[11]
Carter endorsed the military force reduction
policy. The President’s view of foreign
policy did not include a large standing military to enforce his
initiatives. His military force
structure was initially based on the 1 ˝
Major Regional Conflict (MRC) force-sizing concept.
In reality, Carter never actually believed in
preparing for anything other than the defense of NATO against the Warsaw Pact.[12] Carter focused Secretary Brown on rebuilding
the NATO forces at the expense of naval forces, amphibious assault forces and
Special Operation Forces (SOF). In
particular, SOF units were reduced to 95% of their maximum strength in the
Vietnam war.[13] After the Vietnam war, SOF suffered in terms
of readiness and training due to the lack of funding. Additionally, the connotation of an undesirable career path
forced talented personnel to avoid SOF units.[14] Heavy lift helicopter assets were removed
from the SOF units to be used elsewhere.[15] Carter and his military advisors could not
envision anything other than a conventional war scenario against the Soviet
Union. An unconventional threat calling
for special capabilities, training, and equipment was not viewed as realistic
by the military experts. The
Department of Defense had limited capability to respond to anything other than
the defense of NATO; this was a conscious decision of Carter and his advisors.[16]
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine, Capabilities. As military advisors to the President, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) were an effective collection of service experts.
Representative of the entire group was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (CJCS), Air Force General David C. Jones. Jones was a gifted administrator as well as a combat
veteran. During this tenure, the
Service Chiefs were responsible for force structure, training, equipment
procurement, and budgetary issues.
Joint Doctrine was undeveloped after the Vietnam
war.[17] Integration was a misunderstood and under
utilized concept. The American military
had fought in the past as a combined force, but had never known any structure
for joint planning or training. Joint
warfare was nothing more than what each service brought to the fight while
operating independently of each other.
Combining assets did not equate to synchronizing the efforts of the
whole into one unit. The military
was not prepared for missions demanding interoperability.
A parochial mindset prevailed in the
services. There was a natural
competition among the services that fostered mistrust.[18] Intense service loyalty was enhanced by
budget fights at the JCS level. In the
U.S. Armed Forces, the concept of jointness could not overcome the parochialism
prevalent in the services.
Capabilities were stretched thin during
this time. There was a mismatch between
obligations and resources. The U.S. was
committed to providing 330,000 servicemen for forward presence in Europe, while
simultaneously maintaining a readiness posture in other regions of the world.[19] Force level cuts in excess of 56,000 service
personnel coupled with an increase in military obligations, created a large gap
between resources and commitments.[20] This had a negative affect on the morale of
all service members.
Conclusions
Carter and his Administration.
Carter’s limited experience with foreign affairs forced him to depend on
the judgment of his staff. His
inexperience had been a selling point to the American people during the
election, but it proved to be a major detractor to his effectiveness as the
leader of the free world.[21] On many issues, his staff had different
viewpoints on courses of action. Only a
President with a deep experience in foreign affairs and an equal grasp of the
issues could ascertain guidance from such competing advisors.
Carter would vacillate on foreign policy
decisions during his term. Before the
Soviets invaded Afghanistan, Carter was against threatening the use of military
force in diplomatic negotiations. His
foreign policy did not include a large military to enforce American resolve
around the world. After the invasion by
the Soviets, Carter completely reversed his policy about the use of force in
foreign affairs. In response to the
invasion, he approved an increase in both the Defense budget and in
conventional force strength.
Carter was prone to alarmist reactions, never
really finding the balance between cool intensity and being overwrought during
times of crisis. With the capture of
the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union,
Carter swung from being an internalist, concerned with human rights, to a
militant externalist, advocating military force.[22] Because of his extreme reactions, he lost
the image of a confident, calm leader in the face of adversity.
Carter’s personal belief that moral principles
were the foundation of all political actions and decisions was a harmful influence
on his strategic decision making.
Although a popular theme, Carter’s emphasis on moral principles as a
framework for strategic decision making was naďve. His philosophy of reform and repentance was appropriate after the
fact, but did nothing to deter future abuses of power.[23]
The Kremlin criticized the administration for
emphasizing human rights.[24] The Soviet Union was quick to take advantage
of what they interpreted as weakness of the President. Carter used power with restraint preferring
to negotiate settlements without the threat of military employment to leverage
the talks. Unfortunately, to make this
concept work, other nations must play with the same rule book or respect and
practice the same policies.
Carter’s two principle advisors on foreign
policy were philosophically incompatible with each other.[25] Carter knew that Brzezinski and Vance
represented different approaches to foreign policy and national security; this
was part of the reason for their selection.
A large part of the success or failure of Carter’s foreign policy
depended on his advisors. The
differences in philosophy between his Secretary of State and National Security
Advisor proved to be crippling to the administration.
Each advisor would work independently of one another,
developing conflicting solutions to the issues. Their relationship was so unhealthy, effective debates were lost
in their meetings. In addition,
contempt for each other permeated to their respective staffs, escalating the
confrontational environment. On several
occasions, Carter would referee and resolve grievances between the two
advisers, taking valuable time away from issues of importance.
The security strategy did not adequately address
the threat from Third World nations.
Additionally, there was a mismatch between resources and military
obligations. An imbalance in military power
was created between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. To adjust for the imbalance, the administration shifted resources
to NATO. The result was reduced force capabilities, especially in
SOF units, based on a flawed assumption that the Soviets were the only credible
threat.
There was a reduction in resources in the
military while the security of the nation focused on countering a
large conventional based Soviet Union.
On top of the personnel cuts already initiated by past administrations,
Carter reduced the military force levels by an additional 50,000 personnel. The defense budget fell a total of 28% over
the course of ten years from 1969-1979.[26] Force structure reduction and budget cuts
for the military were ill-timed considering the Soviet Union had increased its
conventional combat power by 20 percent.
There was no Joint Doctrine to integrate the
capabilities of all services into
effective Joint Task Forces (JTF). The
infrastructure for integrated operations involving a combined effort was
nonexistent at this time.
The Service Chiefs were still actively involved
in providing advice on the employment of their services at the operational and
tactical levels. The chain of
command for joint operations was confusing because of the regular involvement
of the Service Chiefs in the operational and tactical decision making
process. The Unified Commands had not
been empowered to report directly to the National Command Authority (President
and the SecDef) during combat operations.
Chapter 2
Prelude To The Mission
U.S.-Iran Relations
The
United States had enjoyed a long standing relationship with Iran since World
War II. Iran was considered a vital
link to U.S. security interests in the Middle East. Carter’s strategic objectives were first, to ensure that Iran
remained an “island of stability” in the region, and second, to ensure that
Iran maintained its status as a military ally.[27] Iran’s positive relationship with the U.S.
guaranteed western access to the region for goods and services. Finally, Carter wanted to ensure Iran
maintained its influence over the oil export trade in the region; Iran was a reliable
supplier to the NATO countries as well as to Japan.
The Shah of Iran
Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi was the authoritarian
leader of Iran. He had represented
American interests in the region for more than thirty-five years. No stranger to American politics, he had
personally maintained close consultations with all eight presidents prior
Carter taking office.[28]
Since the end of World War II, the Shah had
fostered a relationship with the U.S. based on mutual strategic interests. Security of Iran against Soviet aggression
was paramount to both the Shah and the U.S.
The Shah would exploit this mutual strategic interest to garnish military
and economic aid.
In the decade of the 70s, the Shah concentrated
on modernization for industrial development and military expansion.[29] The Shah was driven to achieve economic
diversity as well as military security for Iran while oil revenues were still
high. At the time, Iran was spending
four billion dollars a year in arms purchases from the U.S.[30]
The Shah’s vigorous efforts toward modernization
were extremely successful. The Iranian
military was considered to be one of
the most powerful in the region.
By 1976, there were more than seventy thousand Americans working in
Iran, supporting the economy and the military infrastructure purchased by the
Shah.
Unfortunately, the Shah did not have a true
perspective of the social ramifications of his modernization policies.[31] Blinded by his own megalomania and driven by
his own personal desire to gain world prominence, the Shah was callous to the
internal problems that were arising from the effects of his programs.
The Fall of the Shah
The Iranian Revolution of 1978 was a unforeseen
historical event. The President
conducted a state visit and acknowledged there was no “visible evidence of the
currents of dissatisfaction” in Iran.
Although Carter was aware that a potential threat did exist in Iran, he
was accepting of the Shah’s estimate that the discontent represented a small minority
of his people.[32] Protests against the Shah took place during
the summer months. The Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) assessed the situation not to have a revolutionary or
even prerevolutionary nature.[33] Although State Department, Central
Intelligence Agency, and Defense Department personnel were studying the
situation, no one gave an accurate forecast to the President on the combined strength
of the opposition and their capabilities to challenge the Shah.
There were several factions aligned with the
Islamic Fundamentalists demonstrating against the Shah. In addition, there was great diversity in
the factions. There was a leftist,
radical group organizing the protesters.
A secular nationalists faction was also actively demonstrating against
the Shah. They were primarily concerned
with regaining power in the government and securing sovereignty. All the factions combined for a common
objective: to rid Iran of the corrupt western influence that was represented by
the Shah.
Personally, Carter was torn between his human rights principles
and his support for the Shah.[34] Emotionally, he had trouble supporting a
regime that was so authoritarian in nature.
His personal conflict with his own value system tore at the fiber of his
being and influenced his future decisions.
Externally, Carter heard conflicting voices
within the top levels of his Administration.[35] Vance suggested a policy of concession and
conciliation towards the protesters. He
believed the nature of the instability
in Iran was due to violations of human rights.
Brzezinski advised the President that the Shah’s only solution was an Iron Fist. He believed the situation demanded the Shah
act with firm, unwavering, and confident application of force.[36]
By this time in the crisis, the National
Security Council and the State Department were at extreme odds with one
another. George Ball, an independent
advisor invited to analyze the Iran situation, stated the conflicting advice by
Brzezinski and Vance was paralyzing the ability of the President to intervene
with an appropriate course of action.[37] He worked at an office at the National
Security Council but derived information from State Department sources. He stated that Brzezinski was doing
everything in his power to exclude the State Department from the participation
in or knowledge of any developments regarding Iran-U.S. relations.
In November, the violence increased in
intensity. The Shah decided to empower
a military transition government on a limited basis. At the same time, he continued to make reforms and
concessions. He arrested several top
officials in the SAVAK, the Shah’s secret security force, and implemented
measures against corruption in the government.
At this time, William Sullivan, the U.S.
Ambassador to Iran, suggested the U.S. establish a line of communication with
the Alloyatollah Khomeini. Khomeini,
the ultraconservative leader of the Shi’ite Islamic sect, was dedicated to
overthrowing the Shah’s regime. He
became the identifiable leader of the anti-Shah forces. He united the factions of the opposition and
orchestrated their demonstrations through the cleric. Khomeini was an extremist who condoned all actions, violent and
non-violent, to oust the Shah. He
believed the Shah was the evil representative of the western world.
The situation in Iran continued to escalate
against the Shah throughout the month of November. The CIA submitted an analysis of the Shah’s psychological state
as being solid and in touch with the changing situation. Again, the intelligence reports on the Shah
would be false and misleading. Contrary
to the CIA reports, the Shah was not providing the leadership necessary to cope
with the crisis.
Ironically, one year after President Carter
proclaimed Iran an “island of stability,” the Shah was forced to step down as
ruler. The Shah, in failing health,
would leave Iran for Egypt on January 16, 1979. He would never return to his homeland.
The Shah’s demise set the stage for the
continuation of the revolution by the Islamic Fundamentalists in Iran. For nearly forty years, the Shah had aligned
himself with the U.S. He catered to
U.S. interests in the region to garnish economic and military support. Khomeini’s return from exile meant Iran was
no longer an extension of U.S security interests. His objective was to expel the unholy western influence from his
country; he sought to create a complete Islamic state, ridding the Iranian
people of the corruption of the west.
Khomeini continued to incite the Iranian people against America. The U.S. Embassy in Tehran, representing the
last island of U.S. official influence would be the next target of the
revolution.
Chapter 3
The Mission
“A military raid is…a high
risk venture that operates on the outer margins of the possible, relying on
skill, daring, and a goodly measure of luck.
When the raid succeeds, it requires almost magical qualities and endows
its authors with the badge of genius.
Hence the appeal. When it fails,
it invites ridicule and the second-guessing of armchair strategists.
Gary Sick,
All Fall Down
The Fall of the American Embassy
In the fall of 1979, the Iranian Revolution was
far from over. Different factions were
now in conflict over the direction of the Iranian government. A Revolutionary Council, headed by Prime
Minister Bazargan, was making domestic and foreign policy decisions for Iran
with the support of Khomeini. Bazargan
was allowed to run the government, but the ultimate authority was Khomeini.[38]
After the departure of the Shah, revolutionary
dynamics were causing an extremely unpredictable and unstable political
environment. Several different factions
of the revolutionary force fought to secure a position of power. Iran was in a state of chaos as competing
mobs protested for their ideologies.
Khomeini’s leadership did not have a calming effect on the turmoil
within the country. To the contrary,
his behavior incited the radical elements of his followers. Khomeini’s actions and rhetoric galvanized
the factions against a common enemy, the United States.
On October 20, Carter decided to
allow the Shah to enter the U.S. for advanced cancer treatment. Before making the decision, Carter advised
the Iranian government of his intentions via Bruce Laingen, now the U.S. ambassador
in Iran. The Iranian Prime Minister
assured Laingen of the embassy’s security.
However, the Prime Minister warned that there could be a reaction of
uncertain magnitude by the people.
Finally, on 4 November 1979, 3000 militants from radical student groups
stormed and seized the U.S Embassy compound.
Days prior, Khomeini made the political decision to align himself with
the militant mobs. He called for
increased anti-American activity to force the U.S. to return the Shah.
The official count for the mass
kidnapping was 66 Americans. On 17
November, the militants released thirteen women and African Americans. For the remainder of the crisis, the
militants held 52 American hostages.
Supported by Khomeini, the students’ purpose was to continue the
elimination of western influence in Iran.
The capture of the embassy was a logical progression towards the
“westoxication” of the people as the final objective.[39]
Carter and his Administration were shocked by
the actions of the students. He called
the seizure of the embassy an act of international terrorism violating all
international law. The President
admitted later the hostage crisis was “the beginning of the most difficult
period of my life.”[40]
Strategic Implications:
The hostage crisis had several strategic and
political implications for the U.S. To
many U.S. allies, Iran’s actions humiliated the U.S. and weakened its
resolve. The lack of decisive action by
force or otherwise had been damaging to the U.S. posture around the world. The most powerful nation in the world was
stymied and transfixed by a mob of militants who had become heroes in their triumph
over the “Great Satan,” America.[41] Other Third World nations gained a lesson
learned in how to impose their will on the U.S. The Soviets saw the capture of the embassy as a weakening of U.S.
security and influence in the region.
The hostage crisis offered an opportunity for the Soviets to expand
their influence in the region; the Soviet Army invaded Afghanistan a month
after the American Embassy in Tehran fell.
Carter and his administration were under
considerable political pressure to resolve the hostage crisis. The longer the crisis continued, the more
inept the President appeared to the American public and the rest of the
world. Domestic political support was
on the chopping block for the President.
Khomeini was a factor in the political future of Carter.[42] The crisis was a pivotal issue in Carter’s
failed reelection campaign.
Initially, Carter was committed to a political
solution to end the crisis. In
addition, he stated the use of force was not a consideration in resolving the
crisis. He feared retaliation against
the hostages if the Iranians perceived a threat of force.
Vance agreed with the President’s course of
action. He believed a diplomatic
solution was the only means to gain the release of the hostages. Diplomatic relations between the two
countries remained open. Carter
negotiated with the Iranian government.
However, the President did decide to impose economic sanctions, freezing
twelve billion dollars of Iranian
assets in the United States.[43]
Negotiations failed to secure the release of the
hostages. The President was forced to look
at other alternative solutions. The
crisis became an issue of national honor with the American people. The media brought the hostages’ plights into
the living rooms of the American public.
Negotiations broke down in early April of
1980. The U.S. threatened to sever
diplomatic relations. Carter was faced
with the greatest dilemma of his political career: to break the stalemate by a
diplomatic solution or to risk gambling on a military option. Either course of action threatened both the
hostages’ lives and the political career of
the President.
The Military Option. The
concept of a military response was initiated by Brzezinski on the day the
hostages were taken. He advised the
President that concurrent planning should begin for some type of military
response.
The JCS confirmed to the President that the
services did not have the capability for an immediate military response for
either an assault or a rescue mission.[44] It was apparent the Armed Forces did not
anticipate a threat of this nature. The
Services were focused on the defense of
NATO against a large scale conventional war. The reduction in forces and in the Defense budget had taken its
toll on readiness and capabilities.
Many would define this period as the U.S. possessing a “hollow force,”
unable to meet its worldwide operational commitments. However, the major reason the Armed Forces could not immediately
respond to the crisis was lack of
foresight in considering the threat from emerging Third World
nations. The military seemed to be
locked into the bipolar conventional threat from the Soviet Union. Military leadership did not believe such an
event as the Embassy take-over and kidnapping by unconventional means could
pose a threat for the world’s most powerful military.
Although in the development stage, a Rapid
Deployment Joint Task Force for Southwest Asia was being tested, but was yet to
be declared operationally ready.[45] Fortunately, the U.S. Army had certified
their first counter-terrorist SOF unit.
This was the only unit adequately trained and capable to perform a
rescue mission.
Upper Level Chain of Command: Carter
tasked Brzezinski to be the White House coordinator for the development of the
military option. His job was to oversee
the military’s planning for the mission.
Brzezinski directed the NSC to
assist with the development of the military option. He immediately established a military planning committee, which
he chaired. The members included the
Secretary of Defense, the Director of
the Central Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Strategic and operational decision making
was the focus within this committee.
The chain of command for the mission
was modified from the standard reporting system. Usually, the Commander of the Joint Task Force (CJTF) reported
directly to the National Command Authority, (the President and the
SecDef). However, in Operation Eagle
Claw, the CJCS opted for more involvement in the mission. He became the
de
facto Commander in Chief (CINC). Eagle
Claw’s reporting chain had the CJTF reporting to CJCS, who was actively
involved in the operational and tactical planning. CJCS reported to the SecDef, who informed the President. Additionally, another level of command was
inserted with Brzezinski’s planning committee.
Brzezinski’s committee passed White House guidance for the mission down
through the CJCS.
Constraints:
Brzezinski determined early that the only feasible military action for
the situation was a rescue mission. The President and Brzezinski developed
guidance for the mission. The guidance
included several of the President’s own personal principles.
On
5 November 1979, Brzezinski requested that the CJCS begin planning for a
military option with the following constraints:
1. Maintain absolute secrecy in all phases
of the development of the plan.
2. Protect the lives of the hostages.
3. Minimize Iranian casualties and damages.
4. Minimize the size of the planning group
and the assault force.
Brzezinski
gave additional guidance stating that the President envisioned a surgical,
quick, incisive operation involving just U.S. forces. He wanted the forces to maximize surprise and success; this
guidance was considered by many as the President’s own Commander’s Intent for
the mission.[46]
The CJCS quickly assembled a planning staff for
the mission and gave the President’s guidance, but with additional
interpretation. The mission constraints drove the planners to build a
minimalist or limited concept of operations for the mission; this was a
contributing factor to the outcome.[47]
The constraints forced the planners to think in
terms of what they could “not do.”
They would build a plan based not on resources necessary to succeed, but
on meeting the dictated constraints.
The constraints would limit everything from numbers of planners to
actual numbers of helicopters.
Additionally, the constraints were not based on an initial analysis of
the mission, as there was no viable plan at the time, but on the political
consideration.
Operational Considerations
CJCS determined that the capabilities of one
service could not fulfill the mission’s requirements. Along with establishing a planning cell for the mission, a Joint
Task Force (JTF) was activated.
The Activation of the JTF. Normally, a mission requiring multiple capabilities was assigned
to a Unified Command or a Specified Command.
The advantage would be a headquarters element already task organized and
properly manned with the right mixture of military experts.
However, it was not a violation of doctrine to
have the NCA activate a separate JTF with the commander reporting directly to
the Secretary of Defense.[48] Neither one of these events happened. For the mission, the CJCS formed a JTF
planning staff comprised of a small adhoc group of officers.
Sensitive to operational security and without a
standing JTF headquarters at his disposal, General Jones rapidly pulled a staff
together to work within the JCS. JTF
1-79 was virtually a subset of the JCS.[49] The existing Unified Commands were never
asked to participate.
The CJCS selected Army Major General James B.
Vaught as the Commander of JTF
1-79. A combat veteran of three wars,
Vaught was a gifted and ambitious Army officer who consider himself a
“soldier’s soldier.”[50] Vaught finished forming his staff, keeping the headquarters to a small group of
approximately twenty personnel. The
CJTF had operational control of all the service components in his JTF. Additionally, commanders for those
components reported directly to him.
General Jones did not use his own JCS/Special
Operation Division for planning. Nor
did he use existing contingency plans.
To maintain operational security (OPSEC), he accepted a narrower
experience base and a lack of working continuity between staff personnel. Because the staff and reviewers were
virtually one and the same, an independent review of the mission was never
accomplished.
Selection of service components for the JTF was
determined by the Service Chiefs. In
order for the JTF concept to work, all of the services were obligated to cooperate
with the CJTF. Interoperability between
the services was not a strong point and in some cases, the parochial attitudes
hampered the efforts of the JTF.
Service rivalries emerged in the task organization of the force.
Planning. The planning for the mission was
continuous until the middle of April.
The largest problem was overcoming the incredible distances to the
objective area.[51]
American presence in the Gulf region was limited. There was a limited rotation of ships to the Gulf and
accessibility to support bases was restricted.
Israel, Egypt and Oman were the most reliable allies for the basing of
assets. A major portion of the
planner’s attention was focused on finding the most achievable way to overcome
the distances. For the plan to be
feasible a combination of locations, tactics, and equipment was assembled. Simplicity was sacrificed. The rescue plan was called the most “complex
amphibious raid in military history,” stretching the operational limits of both
men and machinery.[52]
The self imposed constraints and the inherent
operational limitations added to the mission complexity. OPSEC drove a large portion of the decision
making and created procedural limits on the planners. The Joint Staff used compartmentalization to the detriment of
continuity, coordination, and the effective interaction of the staff.
Human intelligence sources in Iran were
virtually non-existent. The CIA had
informed the staff that they had no agents in the objective area.[53] OPSEC forced the planning staff to disregard
contacting existing Special Operation’s points of contact around the
world. Planners were told not to
contact the State Department.
Additionally, capability limitations, as far as readiness of units and
equipment, limited contingency plans for alternate solutions.
Despite all the limitations, the planning staff
conceived a plan that was within commander’s guidance and the capabilities of
the JTF. A combination of a helicopter
supported force with additional C-130 transport aircraft was the best option
for a clandestine insert. The
difficulty with the helicopters was the range restrictions. A refueling point would have to be planned
along the route. Aerial refueling was
not an option at this time, so ground refueling from a EC-130 aircraft would
have to be planned.[54] A remote site that was flat enough to land
the aircraft and perform fueling operations was found some 265 miles south of
Tehran; it was code named Desert One.
The
helicopters selected for the mission would be the RH-53D Navy minesweeper.[55] Performance data indicated that the RH-53D
would meet payload considerations. In
addition, the RH-53D had a mission capability rate of 74.0% in
fiscal
year ’79. However, this was not the
actual mission capable rates of the eight mission aircraft, but a rate that was
a fleet wide average. In a demanding
flight environment, the mission capable rate would not be the fleet wide
average for the aircraft but something much lower. The fleet wide rate of 74% was misleading to the planners. The
number of aircraft for the mission was determined based on the fleet wide
figure. This would cause the number of helicopters to be less then what was
realistic to complete the mission. The
actual mission capable rate of the aircraft could only be determined by taking
the maintenance history of the mission aircraft and calculating the percentage
of full mission capable time over the
course of the year.
Several increases in the size of the assault
force hampered planning efforts. The
assault force initially consisted of 70 personnel. By the time the mission was executed, the assault force had
increased to 139 personnel. Additional
requirements increased the numbers of helicopters and C-130s.
Tactical Implications
The tactical deployment of the forces would have
the most disconnects. Some of the
disconnects were accepted because it was deemed necessary to comply with
mission constraints, limitations, and guidance.
Tactical
Planning. The tactical planning was
compartmentalized. Although this was a
multiple aircraft assault support mission, none of the air elements planned
together under one Air Mission Commander.
From the start, there was a lack of unity of command between the air
components.
The weak link was the heavy reliance
on helicopter assets. The helicopters
were tasked to accomplish a low level, long range navigation route at
night. The route for the first night of
flying was a total of 865 nautical miles.
Timing and navigation accuracy were critical. The selected execution day had only nine hours and sixteen
minutes of darkness. Figuring an air speed of 120 knots and
adding time for the refueling evolution, the mission time was 8 hours. This would leave only an hour and sixteen
minutes of additional time.[56] This allowed a small margin of error for the
planners or mission personnel. Because
of the fuel requirements, the helicopters would fly above max gross weight, a
condition not normally accepted due to safety and operational
restrictions. Performance capabilities
of the aircraft were degraded. Planned
mission airspeed of 120 knots was unrealistic because the power required for
max gross weight flight was not available to maintain an airspeed of 120
knots. Only after reducing the weight
of the helicopter, by expending several hundred pounds of fuel, would the
aircraft obtain the power to sustain 120 knots of airspeed.
The demanding flight profile
required experienced pilots and a comprehensive training program. Although qualified Air Force crews were
available, the JCS chose Marine Corps pilots because of their shipboard
experience. The helicopter mission was
the Marine Corps “piece of the pie.”[57] Team building, developed during training,
was crucial to success. A comprehensive
training program in long distance navigation and NVG operations would enhance
proficiency and teamwork among the crews.
Abort criteria for the helicopters were a difficult tactical planning consideration. Based on the number of personnel in the assault force, the abort criteria was set at seven aircraft crossing the Iranian coastline, six aircraft to take-off from Desert One, and five aircraft for the second day’s assault. The hostages and the assault force could be lifted with four. Accounting for the fleet wide mission capability of the RH-53D, the planners decided on eight aircraft as a minimum requirement to initially launch from the ship. With only four needed for the extract and a mission capable rate of 74%, eight aircraft for the two day mission was acceptable but not flexible. Figuring the mission capability rate of 74%, after the first day of flying there would be five mission capable helicopters remaining.[58] The planner’s decision to take only eight helicopters left few options for adjustment to a higher rate of mechanical failure. In actuality, the mission capable rate of the mission helicopters probably was lower than the fleet aver