Military

Rules of Engagement and Non-Lethal Weapons: A Deadly Combination?

 

CSC 1997

 

Subject Area - Warfighting

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

Title:  Rules of Engagement and Non-Lethal Weapons: A Deadly Combination?

 

Author:  Major D. B. Hall, United States Marine Corps

 

Thesis:   In the chaotic and volatile world of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)  can Rules of Engagement (ROE) and Non-lethal weapons (NLWs) co-exist while facilitating force protection and mission accomplishment?

 

Background:  The world at peace is a very dangerous place.  Since the end of the Cold War the number of peace operations and humanitarian assistance contingencies that the Marine Corps has been committed to has increased exponentially.  In all of these operations Marines are thrust in harm's way armed with a rifle and rules of engagement and told not only to protect themselves and accomplish the mission, but now to prevent as many non-combatant casualties as is possible.  There are many inherent problems with the first two requirements alone, but the increasing demand that the committed force assume sole responsibility for the third makes an already extremely difficult mission nearly impossible.  In an attempt to respond to the public outcry to limit civilian and non-combatant casualties in these types of operations, the Marine Corps, tasked by the highest levels of our government, has developed and fielded a non-lethal weapon capability that it is forward-deployed.  While this sounds like the answer to the problems raised above, it really serves to complicate matters.  Looking solely at the  ROE issue, the United States military establishment has made significant, positive strides since the tragedy of the Beirut bombing in 1983.  This can clearly be seen by comparing the ROE used then and the ROE used in Somalia during UNITAF and UNISOM II.  However, with the addition of NLWs to the MOOTW scenario, the same issues that helped contribute to the disaster in 1983 once again rear their ugly heads. 

 

Recommendation:  Leaders at all levels of command, from our nation's policy makers through the combatant commanders and the Marine Corps' senior leadership, need to take a hard look at the ROE and NLW issue.  In combination, these two components of future peace operations could have potentially hazardous results for the young men and women tasked to employ them.  The leadership, mentioned earlier, needs first to look at the types of ROE they are issuing, based on the mission, and how it is being issued.  Next they must consider whether or not NLWs are truly the right type of systems to be employed in a MOOTW environment?  The answer might be surprising.

CONTENTS

 

INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................ 1

 

ROE                                                                                                                                        ................................................................................................................................... 3

            Definition, 3

            History, 4

            Right of Self-defense, 9

            Drafting ROE, 10

BEIRUT................................................................................................................................ 12

            Peacekeeping/Peacemaking, 14

            ROE, 15

            Blue Card ROE/White Card ROE dichotomy, 18

SOMILIA.............................................................................................................................. 13

            Mission Statement/ROE, 17

            UNITAF vs UNISOM, 29

            ROE Expanded, 30

            ROE Restricted, 33

NON-LETHAL WEAPONS................................................................................................ 36

            Crowd control useage, 40

            Expectations, 41

            Enemy Perceptions, 44

            ROE Concerns, 46

CONCLUSIONS.................................................................................................................. 49

            Recommendations: Policy makers, 49

            Recommendations:  JCS and Combatant Commanders, 51

            Recommendations:  USMC, 52

 

 

Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called children of God.

                Matthew 5:9

 

 

Rules of Engagement and Non-Lethal Weapons: A Deadly Combination?

 

You are about to embark on a mission of great importance to our Nation and the free world.  The conditions under which you carry out your vital assignment are, I know, demanding and potentially dangerous.  You are tasked to be once again what Marines have been for more than 200 years -- peacemakers.^[1] 

 

            This excerpt of a message from President Ronald Reagan was broadcast to all members of the 32d Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) on 25 August 1982 prior to their insertion into Lebanon to assist with the Syrian and Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) evacuation.  However,  it is an announcement that any forward-deployed Marine unit can expect to hear in today's highly unstable world.  As General Carl E. Mundy Jr. stated in a 1993 article, peace operations are not unfamiliar missions to Marines.  In fact, as Mundy stated, the United States Navy and United States Marine Corps have been involved in humanitarian intervention since the inception of American Naval power.^[2] 

            Today, as never before, the prospects of United States Marines being committed to Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) in the name of humanitarian or other morally just causes has reached a new plateau.  From the civil wars in Somalia and Bosnia to the most recent crisis in Zaire, the international aid agencies, aided by the real time media coverage, have strongly and consistently called for military intervention.  At face value, this argument makes practical sense, since lives are normally saved by Marines interposing themselves between warring factions and protecting relief workers and supplies.  The problem is that in their increasing zeal to advocate a military response, the humanitarian advocates have become the newest interventionalists in the post-cold war era.  This position is fraught with political, military, and moral risks that Americans normally ignore until it is too late.^[3]  While these missions are not new to the Marines, what is new is that as the American public's tolerance for world-wide suffering decreases, so too does their willingness to observe Marines using force in the execution of their duties when it leads to non-combatant casualties.  The same moral obligation that leads Americans to demand military force in resolving conflicts and feeding the hungry in MOOTW also, by extension, demands that the military find other means, less-lethal means to execute these missions.

            This cry for more humanitarian action by the nation's peace enforcers has lead to the development of what has become known as "Non-lethal Weapons" (NLWs).  While the idea behind NLWs appears well founded and fundamentally sound, when their use is tied to the ongoing dilemma of developing appropriate rules of engagement (ROE) today's Marines are faced with a dangerous combination that could lead to disastrous results.

            This potentially deadly combination provides the underlying theme for this thesis.  Can ROE and NLWs co-exist in peace operations (MOOTW) where minimum casualties are expected, even demanded, along with mission accomplishment and force protection?  To answer this question this thesis proposes to undertake a study of the development of ROE from an operator's perspective, as opposed to that of a lawyer.  Following the ROE introduction, two historical cases will be analyzed where ROE were significant factors in their apparent failure and success. The first case study will be the 1982-1984 intervention in Beirut where the U.S. Marines served as part of a Multi-National Force (MNF).  The second will be an analysis of the 1992-1995 U.S. involvement in Somalia as participants in Unified Task Force Somalia (UNITAF) and United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM II).  Using these two studies as backdrop, a treatment of the NLW issue and their potential hazards will follow.  The paper will conclude with several proposals for American leaders, civilian and military alike, to consider when contemplating NLW use in future peace operations.

ROE

            ROE are defined as directives issued by competent military authority to delineate the circumstance and limitations under which naval, ground, and air forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered.^[4]  ROE has its genesis in the international law of armed conflict (law of war).^[5]  While the law of war serves as the basis for ROE, they cannot be used as a substitute for the law of war.  In fact, ROE are more restrictive than the law of war and serve to emphasize those critical aspects of the law relevant to a specific mission.^[6]  Besides the law of war there are numerous other factors that make a significant impact on ROE.  These elements include domestic law, U.S. policy, diplomacy, and operational concerns.^[7]  In his 1983 article titled "Rules of Engagement," Captain J. Ashley Roach provided two Venn diagrams to help clarify these two notions.  These two diagrams are reproduced in Appendix A.  Figure 1 represents the restrictive nature of ROE with repect to the law of war.  Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between the factors which impact on the creation of ROE and the ROE themselves.  As can be seen, ROE serve to restrict military operations more than domestic or international law.

            While their genesis are in the law of war, ROE are a distinctly modern method of constraining the military's use of force with its roots surprisingly no further back than the early 1950s.^[8]  Since that time three factors have forced American leaders to issue ROE in an attempt to bring military means more in line with desired political ends.  First, a growing worldwide inventory of weapons of mass destruction, following the successful U.S.S.R. testing in 1949,  precipitated a fear of  nuclear holocaust brought on through the escalation of minor incidents and conflicts.  This trepidation mandated restraint on the use of force by America's forward deployed forces.  Second, technological advances in telecommunications dramatically increased policy makers' ability to influence subordinates' actions.  Third, aggressive news media, providing real-time reporting, has brought the actions of the military into America's living rooms.  The media's willingness to question the military's use of force and its consequence has raised the sensitivities of the public and served to throw their wrath onto the political figures responsible for controling the military's actions.^[9]   America's air and sea forces, forward deployed with nuclear capability, developed ROE early in the 1950s to prevent tense encounters from escalating rapidly into nuclear war.  Ground forces, however, remained somewhat removed from the nuclear arena and continued to train for conventional conflicts.  This conventional mentality led the ground component to develop it's ROE on an "as needed" basis, placing them several years behind their air and naval brethren.^[10] 

            As late as the U.S. intervention in Lebanon in 1958, the term "ROE" had not entered the ground combat element (GCE) vocabulary.  Instead, during this operation troops were merely following a "standing order" not to return fire unless they had a clear target.  The success of this contingency operation challenged leaders to develop a framework for constraint under crisis conditions which would assure future successes in operations of this nature.^[11]

            Peace operations in the Dominican Republic during 1965-66 also required restraint on the part of American ground forces.  Once the intervention had effectively blocked a perceived communist power grab, the military mission soon gave way to diplomacy and political leaders exercised firm control over troop activities.  This intervention helped make the term "ROE" familiar to American ground forces, who assimilated it into their vocabulary as a curse word.^[12]

            The Vietnam War made tremendous leaps in familiarizing ground forces with ROE.^[13]  Careful study of regulations, directives, standard operating procedures, annexes, and cards used  to impart ROE reveals striking similarities to those produced today.  This close resemblance provides a sobering illustration that, despite some twenty additional years of experience with operations short of war, ground units still use the same basic methods in the attempt to bring their operations in line with political and legal constraints.^[14]

            Despite the noticeable similarities of Vietnam era ROE and those used today there have evolved two significant developments in ROE promulgation.  First is the inclusion of the self-defense boilerplate added to all ROE.  This development arose in the aftermath of the 1983 bombing of the Marine's headquarters building in Beirut.  The result was an admonishment, usually printed in bold capital letters at the top of all ROE cards stating "NOTHING IN THESE RULES LIMITS YOUR RIGHT TO EXERCISE YOUR INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE."   The second development, a clear trend towards joint service ROE, was born of the increased proclivity towards joint operations.  This trend resulted in the adoption of a basic analytical framework and set of terms that became known as Peacetime ROE (PROE).  The PROE provided definitions of hostile act and hostile intent, stating that one or both of these needed to be present before using force (necessity).  The PROE also stated that the reaction must be tailored to the level of the threat (proportionality).^[15]

            In October 1994, the PROE was replaced by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Standing ROE (JCS SROE).  The JCS SROE directs U.S. forces to exercise force consistent with the U.N. Charter and customary international law.  It is intended to govern the conduct of the vast majority of U.S. forces operating overseas at all levels of command.  ROE specific to certain areas of responsibility (AORs) are drafted by the unified command Commander in Chiefs (CINCs), approved by the JCS, and then included in the JCS SROE as Annexes to the base document.^[16]

            The SROE are divided into three major sections, termed enclosures to Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3121.01.  Enclosure A is the unclassified section that contains the actual SROE.  The policies and procedures set forth within this enclosure are always in effect unless they are rescinded or augmented by supplemental ROE for a specific operation.  Specifically, the ROE outlined in this enclosure are intended to be used in MOOTW.  Included is the inherent right of self-defense and definitions of national self-defense, collective self-defense, elements of self-defense, hostile act, hostile intent, and hostile force.^[17]  Enclosure B is classified SECRET and describes the procedures by which SROE may be supplemented.  It is important to note that supplemental ROE relate only to mission accomplishment, not to self-defense.  They never override the right and obligation of self-defense.  Enclosure C, also classified SECRET, contains JCS approved AOR specific ROE.^[18] 

            Colonel Hayes Parks, USMCR (Ret.), a noted ROE authority, described the JCS [PROE] as a document to facilitate planning.  He states that, "It never was intended to substitute for the judgment of the on-scene commander or the individual soldier, sailor, airman, or Marine."^[19]  In actuality, the purpose of ROE is much more expansive.  ROE are the means by which the National Command Authorities (NCA) and operational commanders regulate the use of armed force in any given military operation.^[20]  However, they also serve three more specific purposes. Politically, ROE prevent military operations from expanding beyond political objectives, thus upholding Clausewitz's dictum that war is an extension of policy by other means.  Militarily, ROE represent limitations the on-scene commander may take in achieving mission accomplishment.^[21]  The conduct of operations in a tense, chaotic situation such as MOOTW always involves a balance of threat and counterthreat by both sides.  In this instance, ROE serve to ensure this balance is not upset, thus resulting in escalation of the crisis.   Legally, ROE represent operational guidance, including that required for self-defense, ensuring a commander's actions stay within the bounds of national and international law.^[22]  

            Today there are two categories of ROE that are generally recognized.  These categories are the SROE and Wartime ROE (WROE).  The underlying principle of the SROE is the general limiting of military actions, including the use of force, to defensive responses to hostile acts or demonstrations of hostile intent in situations short of actual armed conflict.^[23]  WROE, on the other hand, are used during declared war and do not limit military responses to defensive actions alone.^[24]  Since this paper focuses mainly on MOOTW, WROE will not be discussed.

            SROE are premised on the inherent right of self-defense.  It is defined as the authority and obligation of a commander to use all necessary means available to defend and protect his unit, and other nearby U.S. forces, against hostile acts or demonstrations of hostile intent.  The commander must employ these measures in concert with the requirements of necessity and proportionality.  The JCS SROE defines the right of self-defense in terms of unit and national self-defense.  Unit self-defense is that described above.   National self-defense pertains to the defense of the U.S., U.S. forces, citizens, property or commercial assets.^[25]  Collective self-defense is a subset of national self-defense and includes the act of defending other designated non-U.S. forces, personnel, and property.  Only the NCA may authorize collective self-defense.^[26]

            As noted early, the right of self-defense contains the caveats of necessity and proportionality.  Necessity exists when a hostile act has been committed or hostile intent has been exhibited.  The law of proportionality requires that any necessary use of force be reasonable in intensity, duration, and magnitude, based on all facts known to the commander at the time.^[27]   ROE also restricts the operational concepts of retaliation and pursuit.  In other words, the use of force must be immediate, of short duration, and in the right proportion to the threat.  These two qualifiers on the use of force, whether lethal or non-lethal, are truly the crux of the ROE debate. 

            The conditions under which the mandates for necessity are met differ from operation to operation and must be explained in each set of ROE issued.  The same is true for proportionality or what is considered the correct level of response.  If ROE are worded such that Marines feel restricted or confused about appropriate force application, they tend to avoid using the force necessary to protect themselves.   Further, in a nation that abhors American casualties, public support for a foreign deployment will fade quickly as friendly casualties mount.  Conversely, Marines who interpret the ROE too loosely and fire their weapons too readily erect obstacles to tactical and strategic success as well as undermine the moral high ground the intervening force assumes as a benefactor to a beleaguered state.^[28]

            It is because of this delicate balance between the dilemma of "shoot -- don't shoot" that ROE must be carefully crafted for each operation.  One of the first problems in the drafting of ROE is the misperception that they are the lawyer's domain.  Commanders tasked with executing an assigned mission have the right and obligation to review his higher commander's published ROE to ensure applicability and suitability for his assigned mission.  The commander can then make recommendations for changes through the chain of command.  More often than not a commander faced with this action will turn to his Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) and tell him to review the existing ROE or write a set of appropriate ROE.  This is wrong!  Commanders must understand that ROE belong to him.  ROE are the commander's tools, used in accomplishing his assigned mission.  The SJA is an advisor and should work in concert with the commander and his operations and intelligence officers.  The SJA's role is to ensure that the ROE the commander develops fit within the construct of national and international law and the other determinants described above.  It is important to remember that ROE should support the mission not vice versa.^[29]

            The problem with the current practice of SJA's writing ROE is that they tend to be written in legalese.  This "legislative" model of ROE development produces a mind set that ROE are laws from on high that must be adhered to in the strictest sense.  This mind set leads the servicemen implementing the ROE to err on the side of caution, interpreting ROE as exceedingly restrictive.  Legalistic and ambiguous language is confusing and frustrating to the young Privates First Class and Lance Corporals who have to implement them.  On a moonless night, in a pitch black alley or side street, these young Marines do not have lawyers standing nearby to answer their questions about whether or not they have the right to shoot.^[30]  Therefore, it is important that ROE are written with words found in the common vocabulary so that they are easily understood.  This is imperative because an inappropriate interpretation or negligent application of ROE can have dire results.  Ultimately, ROE are intended for the individual service member, not lawyers.^[31]  Incorporating this notion in the writing of ROE will go a long way towards achieving the desireable balance between political objectives and friendly casualties.

            Equally important in drafting ROE is the notion that tactics drive ROE and not the other way around.  Therefore, prescribing tactics in ROE is wrong and needs to be avoided.  Doing so denies the using force flexibility.^[32]  As Captain Roach tactfully put it in his paper, "ROE should never be rudder orders"^[33]; they should never iterate specifics about how a commander should employ his unit.  They should be declarative (written as actions that define conditions and limits) but never prescriptive.^[34]

            With this limited historical background and basic understanding of ROE it is time to turn to two case studies that will help illustrate the apparent failures and successes of ROE in operations short of war. 

BEIRUT

            On 6 June 1982, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) executed a lightning quick invasion into southern Lebanon.  At first it seemed that the Israeli objective was to secure a 40 kilometer artillery buffer zone in southern Lebanon to protect northern Israel against PLO shelling.  This, however, was not the case and within three days they had reached the outskirts of the capital city of Beirut.^[35]  By  14 June, the IDF had linked up with the Christian Lebanese Forces in East Beirut.  The combined objective of these two forces was the destruction of PLO forces in Lebanon, thereby neutralizing PLO political and military influence in the region.^[36]

            On 2 July, the IDF instituted a citywide blockade of Beirut.  This action initiated a barrage of diplomatic activity aimed at preventing a full-scale battle that would destroy the city.  In consonance with an agreement coordinated by Ambassador Philip Habib, the 32d Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU), as part of a Multinational Force (MNF), successfully evacuated 15,000 armed Palestinians and Syrians.  By 10 September 1982, all MNF forces had been withdrawn.^[37]  At this stage, the 32d MAU had successfully completed its rather straightforward "peacekeeping" mission in what became known as MNF I.

            On 14 September 1982, the assassination of President-Elect Bashir Gemayel, coupled with the IDF occupation of West Beirut and the 16-18 September massacre of Palestinian and Lebanese civilians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps, resulted in reconstituting the MNF.  On 29 September, the 32d MAU re-entered Lebanon at the request of the new Lebanese President Amin Gemayel to begin MNF II.^[38]

            The Marines entered a country about the size of Connecticut that contained three million people, 17 officially recognized religious sects, two foreign armies of occupation, three other national contingents of peacekeeping forces besides themselves, and some two dozen extralegal militias.  Over 10,000 people had been killed during the preceding eight years.  Lebanon was a country where criminals involved in indiscriminate killing and every other type of conceivable illicite activity, issue political manifestos and hold  press conferences.  The Marines found themselves in a lawless quagmire where there is no shortage of endemic surrogates willing to carry out hostile acts against the U.S..^[39]

            To couple this extreme environment with the anarchy of an unsupported government and the high anxiety following the assassination and massacre and call it peacekeeping is stretching the limits of that definition.^[40]  The Marines were not going into a benign environment at the request of all parties involved and there was no peace to keep.  A more accurate and appropriate definition of the Marines' mission would have been that of peace enforcement.^[41]  The difference in mission definition is significant because peace enforcement missions have a much more robust set of ROE than does the primarily defensive mission of peacekeeping.   Nonetheless, the Marines were interposed between the IDF and the populated areas of Beirut as peacekeepers and directed to take up positions at the Beirut International Airport (BIA).  The JCS instructions to the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) explicitly stated that the U.S. forces would not engage in "combat."  It went on to say that, in accordance with USEUCOM PROE, the U.S. forces were directed to exercise restraint and to use force only in self-defense so not to escalate any conflict, endanger innocent lives, or to become enmeshed in factional infighting.^[42]  In essence, the military mission of the Marines in Beirut boiled down to a symbolic "presence."^[43]  Mandate compliance was assured by USEUCOM issuing highly restrictive ROE.^[44]

            Thus, the United States Marines embarked on a mission in which the ROE forbade the use of force unless a hostile act was committed.  These ROE contained language such as::

When on the post, mobile or foot patrol, keep loaded magazine in weapon, bolt closed, weapon on safe, no round in the chamber.

Do not chamber a round unless told to do so by a commissioned officer unless you must act in immediate self-defense where deadly force is authorized.^[45] 

The restrictive language of the ROE led the Marines to believe that they had to take the first hit before force was authorized.  These restrictive ROE, started on 28 September 1982 and remained in effect for three MAUs (32d, 24th, and 22d) that deployed to Lebanon.^[46]  This set of ROE became known as the "White Card ROE" because of the white paper used in making the ROE pocket cards.^[47]

            As pointed out earlier, the Marines erroneously assumed they were going into a permissive, or at least benign, environment.  This error soon became apparent as the situation visibly changed in front of the Marine's eyes.  Between October of 1982 and February 1983, many previously absent young men began reappearing in Beirut -- it was assumed that they were members of the Syrian and PLO forces that had been evacuated just the preceding month.  The Marine presence went from tacit acceptance to "hard" stares, taunts, verbal (slang) assaults, the appearance of Khomeni posters everywhere, and rock throwing incidents.^[48]  Since no response was authorized, the marvelous restraint shown by the Marines was interpreted as a lack of resolve by the factional elements which encouraged them to up the ante.

            Complicating the rising Muslim sensitivities was the commencement of  military training of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) by the USMNF.  This training, conducted by the Marines of Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 3/8, 24th MAU, began in November 1982.^[49]  The decision to broaden the USMNF's mandate was made by the NSC staff over the strenuous objections of commanders on the ground in Beirut and in apparent disregard of the necessity of preventing the force from becoming enmeshed in the ongoing conflict.^[50]  This phenomenon, commonly referred to as "mission creep", was the beginning of the end of the USMNF mission.  In the eyes of the factional militias, the USMNF was now exhibiting pro-Israeli, pro-Phalange, and anti-Muslim tendencies.  The Marines, by becoming an active participant, sacrificed their impartiality and the moral high ground.  They were now viewed simply as another militia that had to be dealt with.^[51]  The consequence of this neutrality breach was to become readily apparent as the USMNF's stay in Lebanon dragged on.

            On March 16, 1983, Marines routinely patrolling a Palestinian neighborhood in West Beirut were ambushed in a grenade hurling engagement.  Five Marines were wounded.  All hands immediately locked and loaded their weapons.^[52]  Despite the heightened tensions, the ROE had not been changed.  A month later, a young Marine PFC was the first to return fire after being fired on.  On 18 April, amid the press conference covering this incident, a truck bomb destroyed the American Embassy in Beirut, killing over 60 people (including 17 Americans).  From this point on, the number of incidents where the USMNF was on the receiving end of hostile fires began to increase.  For instance, on 5 May a helicopter carrying the MAU Commander was hit by small arms fire.  On the next day five rounds traced to a Druse artillery battery in the mountains overlooking the BIA plunged into the water near one the U.S. transports that was stationed in the waters just off BIA.  Two more rounds impacted on the beach.^[53]  Despite the increased danger to the Marines and the willingness of the militias to up the ante on the Marines' presence, the only incident that caused a stated change in the Marines ROE was the embassy bombing. However, even these minor changes were localized around the new embassy.^[54]

            Following the 18 April terrorist bombing of the U.S. Embassy, embassy functions were relocated, at the invitation of the British government, to the Duraffourd Building, which housed the British Embassy and the U.S. Ambassador's residence.^[55]  It was determined that these vital facilities needed a force to perform external security missions.  The Marines at BIA were now tasked to expand their already thin defensive perimeter to include the Duraffourd Building.  After being assigned this new mission the local commanders requested a specific change in ROE to counter the perceived vehicular and pedestrian terrorist threat to these facilities.  After considering the requested change, USCINCEUR promulgated a set of ROE specifically for that security force.  This new set of ROE expanded the definition of hostile act to include attempts by vehicles or pedestrians to breach established barricades or roadblocks.^[56]  The new ROE was printed on a "blue" card and distributed to the forces charged with security at the Duraffourd Building.  Thus, in the first week of May 1983 the blue card -- white card dichotomy began which the Long Commission contends contributed to the 23 October 1983 disaster.

            The white card ROE -- issued on 28 September 1982 -- remained in effect for the Marines providing security at BIA or patrolling in West Beirut.  The blue card, however, was only to be used by those Marines providing security at the Duraffourd Building.  The perception was that there were two distinct ROE which was OK because "it was more dangerous to stand duty up at the embassy than at the airport."^[57] Thus, from May - October 1983 there were two "formal" sets of ROE in effect for the Marines, however, this was not the end of the confusion. Appendix B provides a copy of each set of ROE.

            The 24th MAU returned to Lebanon on 30 May 1983 under the command of Colonel Timothy J. Geraghty.  A spate of so-called accidental discharges shortly after their arrival at BIA brought firm, definitive orders from stateside that suggested all but a select few Marines at BIA should remove the rounds from their weapons.^[58]  In response to this guidance from the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Geraghty and his BLT Commander, LtCol. H.L. Gerlach, set about changing the guard orders in the headquarters area.  The interior guard mission at the BLT HQ was separate from the overall presence mission.  The guard posts were divided and designated as either interior or exterior posts.  Interior post guard rules required the sentry's magazines to be in the magazine pouch.  Exterior posts had their magazines in the weapon, no round in the chamber, and weapon on safe -- standard white card ROE.  To combat the accidental discharges, Geraghty and Gerlach changed two guard posts, in name only, from external to internal posts, thus taking the magazine out of the weapon.^[59]  Marine units rotated between the numerous posts and were exposed to three different sets ROE regarding the use of force.^[60]  An analysis of the situation in the summer of 1983 clearly suggests that the Marines had every reason to be confused by the multiple ROE.

            Further confounding the situation, the world around the Marine's little security enclave at BIA began to degenerate even more, and was now encroaching on their territory.  Direct, flagrant attacks against the Marines and the airport were increasing in frequency and duration as summer progressed into fall.  Twenty-two Marines were killed or wounded between 30 May and 23 October and still the ROE for the majority of the USMNF did not change from the original issued in September 1982.^[61]  This was in spite of several requests from Geraghty to change them.^[62]

            Opposition Moslem militiamen were aware of the restraints on the Marines and brazenly manipulated the rules.  Knowing that the Marines were forbidden from firing at gunmen who were not actually employing their weapons, the militiamen freely walked past the Marines with their weapons slung over their shoulders.  They would then enter buildings or bunkers fronting the Marine's positions and fire on the Marines until they either ran out of ammunition or got bored.  They would then sling their weapons and walk unmolested back to their base of operations, often mocking the Marines as they went.  This restraint by the Marines, which stemmed from their restrictive ROE, gave the initiative to the other side and made the Marines a "soft target."  As a result, the U.S. ceased to be a serious player in Lebanese internal affairs and the objective of the Moslem players became the neutralization of the MAU.^[63]  In fact, intelligence reports indicated that the forces opposing the Marines believed that public pressure on the home front could be brought to a crescendo if they could kill or wound one or two soldiers or Marines each day; resulting in the eventual withdrawal of all MNF forces.^[64]

            As the situation continued to deteriorate, and the militias became even more emboldened, there evolved a situation that threatened to make the Marines' position even more precarious.  Acoording to an arrangement made through diplomatic channels, the IDF agreed to abandon their positions in the Suq Al Gharb in the Shouf Mountains.  These positions looked down on BIA and all of Beirut.  If factional militias gained control of these heights it would make the Marine's position untenable.  In an effort largely aimed at averting this potential disaster, President Reagan approved, on 10 September 1983, National Security Decision Directive 103 (NSDD 103).^[65]  This executive order directed that the Marines assume a more "aggressive self-defense" posture in their actions in Beirut.  Most important of all was an addendum to the NSDD that made an explicit determination that the fall of the Suq Al Gharb would endanger the Marines and other U.S. personnel.  Thus, LAF defense of this area was deemed vital to the self-defense of the USMNF.  Through this decree, the NSC made it permissible under the existing ROE for U.S. forces to aid the LAF in gaining and retaining the Suq Al Gharb thereby negating the prior meaning of the "neutral, peacekeeping, presence, and multinational force," as well as distorting the USMNF ROE beyond recognition.^[66]

            On 19 September 1983, U.S. warships fired 368 rounds into the Suq Al Gharb in support of an LAF offensive to gain control of this region.^[67]  Amazingly, in White House press conferences on 19 and 20 September, White House Press Secretary Larry Speakes, State Department Spokesman John Hughes, and President Reagan himself insisted that neither the USMNF nor the ROE had been changed.^[68]  If the training of the LAF that began in November 1982 signaled the beginning of the end of the USMNF mission, then the direct support on 19 September 1983 put the first nail in its coffin.  The earlier concerns the opposition militias had  about the USMNF's neutrality were, in their minds, confirmed in September of 1983.  They now became more determined to do something about it.

            Just over a month later, on 23 October 1983, a truck bomb crumbled the BLT Headquarters killing 241 Marine and sailors.  Four months later, the USMNF was backloaded on amphibious shipping and the "presence" mission in Beirut ended.  What had begun as an interpositional mission with restrictive ROE designed to maintain the force's neutrality ended with the USMNF directly supporting the LAF and operating under confused and twisted ROE that, at least in practice, did not resemble those initially issued.  Thus, mission creep and inappropriate ROE must be considered the primary reasons for this mission's failure.

            Much has been learned from the travesty of the Marine intervention in Beirut.  The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 helped clarify and streamline the operational chain of command and the "Weinberger Doctrine" helped establish guidelines for force commitment in these types of operations.^[69]  Additionally, ROE generation underwent a review.  The result was a more robust set of ROE that stressed the necessity to protect the force in order to achieve mission accomplishment. A decade after the tragedy of Beirut, operations in Somalia put these lessons to the test. 

SOMALIA

            As with Beirut, Somalia was in the midst of a devastating civil war when the Marines were inserted.  Before 1960, Somalia was ruled jointly by Italy and Great Britain.  A military coup in October 1969, put General Mohammed Siad Barre, commander of the army, in power.^[70]  Over the years, his military regime became progressively corrupt alienating most Somalis.  In January 1991, Barre was overthrown by a rebellion begun in 1988 in northern Somalia.  A number of Somali insurgent factions drove Barre from Mogadishu and the United Somali Congress (USC) retained control of the capital.^[71]  Following Barre's flight, the victorious factions elected Ali Mahdi Mohammed as President of Somalia.  However, as in Beirut, there was insufficient support for the new regime.  In addition, other parts of the country were dominated by other separate insurgent groups.  When the Marines were inserted there were at least 16 separate, clan-based factions operating throughout the country.^[72]

            Starting in April 1991, fighting between various groups plunged Mogadishu, and other parts of Soamlia, into chaos.  Mogadishu, like Beirut, was devastated.  Fierce fighting between rival factions of the USC left much of the capital in ruins and many Somalis dead.  In addition, Mogadishu was also plagued by armed gangs.  These gangs, associated either with rival Somali factions or operating independently, not only stole food from relief agencies but also contributed to the general disorder in the city.  The civil war, utter chaos, and factional fighting in Mogadishu led to wide spread famine.  It was at this point that the plea for assistance by the international aid agencies, bolstered by real-time film footage of starving children, was answered by the U.N.  A decision was made to deploy large-scale forces to Somalia to assist with famine relief and to provide security.^[73]

            As with Beirut ten years earlier, the Marines were preparing to deploy into a very confused, chaotic, and potentially hazardous environment.  Devoid of competent central government, Somalia had become a lawless frontier.  The only authority in the country was wielded by the armed gunmen, dubbed "militiamen," who supported the dominant clans.  That authority was derived not from law, but from influence, bribery, arms possession, intimidation, and outright violence, including murder.  The situation had deteriorated so much that people were starving because the shattered infrastructure was unable to provide food equitably.  Armed clansmen, roving gangs, and thugs commandeered food from warehouses and convoys, then sold it at extortionary prices or hoarded it to be used later as an instrument of power.  By some estimates more than 300,000 Somalis had died of starvation by mid-1992 and millions more were at risk.^[74]

            Operation Restore Hope, the humanitarian relief effort in Somalia that began 9 December 1992, was conducted in that gray area between peace and war -- an environment of political anarchy, with no Somali government or normal state institutions, and an unprecedented UN Chapter VII mandate authorizing peace enforcement by all means necessary.^[75]  Robert B. Oakley, the Presidential Special Envoy to Somalia, described this operation as an "unprecedented humanitarian peace enforcement mission" that neither the Secretary General of the U.N., nor his Security Council, was prepared to handle.^[76]  The lessons of Beirut were loud and clear, provide a clear mission statement and sufficient ROE to achieve accomplishment of that mission while providing for force protection.  Also essential was the importance of not taking sides.^[77]  Therefore, the initial operational requirement was for a clear mission statement.  Great care was taken to develop an approved, well-defined mission with attainable, measurable objectives.^[78]  The next requirement was a set of ROE tailored to allow the on-scene commander maximum flexibility in determining what constituted a threat and what response was appropriate, including first use of deadly force.^[79]

            U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), the unified command responsible for this area of the world, was given control of the U.S. led operation.  Accordingly, CENTCOM promulgated an initial ROE for Operation Restore Hope.  These ROE, referred to as UNITAF ROE  since they were employed by Unified Task Force (UNITAF) Somalia, were in effect from 9 December 1992 to 4 May 1993 when control was turned over to the U.N.^[80]  However, this was not the only set of ROE issued to the 15th MEU(SOC), the forward-deployed Marine unit tasked with executing the initial phases of Restore Hope.  Appendix C contains a sample UNITAF ROE card. 

            The MEU also received, from the JCS, a very liberal set of ROE.^[81]  These ROE clearly reflected the character of the JCS Chairman, General Colin Powell, and his belief that a committed force should use whatever force, to include overwhelming force, necessary to achieve its mission and protect the force.  While two sets of ROE is eerily reminiscent of Beirut, and also representative of the inherent problems in ROE generation, it must be noted that, unlike Beirut, these ROE were very liberal, allowing the on-scenc commander maximum flexibility in interpreting what force was necessary.  This was an obvious advance in ROE thinking.  CENTCOM's ROE were more conservative than the JCS ROE.  This was appropriate according to CJCSI 3121.01, which allows a subordinate commander to make ROE more restrictive, but never less so.  However, even CENTCOM's ROE were very different from the restrictive nature of USEUCOM's ROE in Beirut; another step forward.

            The plethora of weapons in Somalia and the presence of the much maligned "technical"^[82] created the need for the UNITAF ROE to use innovative language, of a nature never used before.  This was done to give commanders the flexibility to accomplish the mission and protect the force.^[83]

"Crew served weapons are considered a threat to UNITAF forces and the relief effort whether or not the crew demonstrates hostile intent.  Commanders are authorized to use all necessary force to confiscate and demilitarize crew served weapons in their area of operations. . . Within areas under the control of UNITAF Forces, armed individuals may be considered a threat to UNITAF and the relief effort whether or not the individual demonstrates hostile intent.  Commanders are authorized to use all necessary force to disarm individuals in areas under the control of UNITAF.  Absent a hostile or criminal act, individuals and associated vehicles will be released after any weapons are removed/demilitarized.^[84]

 

It is important to note the difference in language used concerning crew served weapons (also  read "technicals") and armed individuals.  Because of the abundance of weapons on the streets and the fact that they were not all intended for hostile or criminal use, this language ("may" as compared to "are") was designed to provide flexibility when dealing with armed individuals who did not pose the same threat as crew served weapons.^[85]  As can be seen, these ROE were carefully crafted to allow local commanders wide latitude.  This is in stark contrast to the directive and restrictive nature of the Beirut ROE.  It appears that the U.S. military had learned a valuable lesson from that earlier operation.

            On 4 May 1993, UNITAF Somalia terminated operations and responsibility was passed to United Nations Operations in Somalia II (UNOSOM II).^[86]  This transition marked the successful end of Restore Hope, with its narrowly defined mission.  The transition to U.N. control signaled the start of a much bolder and broader mission intended to tackle underlying social, political, and economic problems.  It was designed to put Somalia back on its feet as a nation.  In short, it was the start of an attempt at nation-building.  Along with a mission change, UNOSOM II was soon employing different ROE.^[87]

            UNOSOM II began its operation by initially adopting UNITAF ROE, but its greatly expanded mission would severely test its personnel and the guidelines for the use of force in Somalia.  Perhaps the fatal flaw in the concept behind UNOSOM II's mission was the idea that peace could be imposed at gunpoint on a reluctant, independent, confrontational, and notoriously proud people.  Another underlying fault was the notion that the social fabric of Somalia could be rewoven at the direction of outsiders.^[88]

            Soon after UNITAF departed, conditions in Mogadishu began to deteriorate.  The Somalis began to test the resolve of the UNOSOM forces and confrontations increased.  Lieutentant General Bir of Turkey, the U.N. appointed commander of UNOSOM II, responded to the new threat by issuing "Frag Order 39" at the end of May 1993.  This order contained the following language:

"Organized, armed militias, technicals, and other crew served weapons are considered a threat to UNOSOM Forces and may be engaged without provocation." (Emphasis added)^[89]

 

This was tantamount to declaring the named personnel and weapon systems as "hostile forces," a classification usually reserved for WROE.  This order greatly expanded the ability of UNOSOM personnel to apply deadly force and was a change from the UNITAF ROE in that it was now a stated capability, rather than an interpreted one.^[90]

            On 5 June 1993, shortly after the issuance of Frag Order 39, UNOSOM forces made a forced entry into a weapons storage facility controlled by Aideed.  Two of Aideed's soldiers were killed in the confrontation.  Shortly thereafter, 27 Pakistani peacekeepers were killed by Aideed supporters.^[91]  The U.N. Security Council's response to the "premeditated armed attacks" on UNOSOM peacekeepers was swift and extraordinarily firm.  The Security Council called for action to bring the responsible parties to justice which resulted in declaring Aideed an outlaw and putting a price on his head.^[92]  The U.S. initially supported this decision and a series of special operations were launched to capture Aideed.  Suddenly, the U.S. was taking sides, something they had scrupulously avoided during the UNITAF operation.  As with the USMNF decision to train the LAF in Beirut, this signaled the beginning of the end of U.S. involvement in Somalia, and the killing of 18 U.S. Army Rangers on 5 October 1983 put the first nail in this coffin.  It also caused President Clinton to abandon pursuit of Aideed and announce a full U.S. pull-out by the end of March 1994.  However, it was not the end of the ROE dilemma.

            When the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) arrived in Somalia in late October 1993, they were informed that they would be operating under the UNOSOM II ROE, to include Frag Order 39.  This was a conscious decision made in CENTCOM to combat the ever worsening situation in Somalia.^[93]  The situation in Mogadishu deteriorated to the point that it resembled  pre-UNITAF conditions.  Vast amounts of the city once patrolled regularly by the Marines and soldiers of UNITAF were now off limits to UNOSOM forces.  These changing conditions caused U.S. commanders to focus primarily on force protection.  As with the Marines in Beirut, UNOSOM forces, including their U.S. protectors, were essentially confined to their strong points and compounds.  Similarly, the Somali militiamen, as did their Muslim counterparts a decade earlier,  perceived a new weakness and took advantage of it by periodically firing into these compounds, including occasional mortar rounds.  As in Beirut, the Marine sniper was the weapon of choice and assumed a great deal of the responsibility for force protection.^[94]  Operating within the parameters of the UNOSOM ROE, snipers began to engage Somalis armed with crew served weapons, whether or not they demonstrated a hostile act or showed hostile intent.  Word spread fast in Mogadishu that if you were spotted with a crew served weapon you would be shot.  This proved highly effective in keeping most of the weapons off the street, thereby reducing the threat to the UNOSOM and U.S. forces.  However, this effective self-defense mechanism would not last long.

            On 9 January 1994, Marine snipers engaged a pickup truck with a Somali in the bed holding a machine gun on its roof.  The target was clearly within the limits of the ROE and the snipers fired two shots.  One shot hit and killed the gunman.  Shortly after the shooting, a group of Somalis approached a U.S. checkpoint and claimed a pregnant woman had been killed by a U.S. sniper.  The news media got hold of the story and on 10 January Associated Press headlines read, "U.S. snipers kill pregnant Somali woman."  The press focused on rules of engagement that would allow such a thing to happen.^[95]

            The Marine snipers in this incident were acting within the ROE and had taken the proper precautions to avoid collateral injury (a sniper and his rifle is a discriminate weapon) and were therefore not culpable.  However, the press' argument evoked the subsequent warning stamped on all ROE cards to TAKE ALL MEASURES TO MINIMIZE COLLATERAL CIVILIAN CASUALTIES.  This rebuke is one that Colonel Hayes Parks feels should be purged from ROE because it incorrectly implies that U.S. forces would not take reasonable measures to minimize collateral civilian casualties, consistent with mission accomplishment and force protection.^[96]   Nonetheless, within three days the sniper ROE would change.

            On 12 January 1994, a USCENTCOM message was issued which applied only to snipers and essentially returned them to PROE.  Word of the new change spread fast and within days a dramatic change took place in the streets of Mogadishu.  Machine guns and RPGs were brandished openly as the local populace became aware of the new restraint the forces were required to exercise.^[97]

            This change in ROE had a number of other, unintended consequences.  Since the restriction applied only to U.S. snipers, now U.S. forces were faced with a ROE dichotomy similar to the one in Beirut in 1983.  Suddenly soldiers and Marines, standing side by side, had different ROE depending on their duty status.  U.S. forces who were not acting as snipers could continue to engage targets under the UNOSOM II ROE, whereas snipers, previously charged with the primary responsibility of force protection, could not.  This put the snipers in a potentially precarious situation, one which was neither necessary nor warranted.  However, it did serve to alleviate political and public pressure.  Fortunately there were no friendly casualties that resulted from these disparate ROE.

            By the end of 1994, more than 130 peacekeepers had been killed in Somalia and more than two billion dollars spent on the failed U.N. mission.  As a result, the U.N. ordered the withdrawal of the remaining peacekeepers by the end of March 1995.  Lieutenant General Anthony Zinni, I MEF Commander, and the Marines of the 13th MEU(SOC) were tasked with covering the withdrawal of the U.N. forces.^[98]

            This deployment was a first in that General Zinni requested and received authority to employ NLWs.  General Zinni felt that this operational capability was necessary because the Marines would likely face large bands of looters and thieves competing for the booty the U.N. forces left behind.  He was concerned about a means to fill a perceived void between verbal warnings and the use of lethal force when dealing with these criminal elements.^[99]

            Planners had four months to prepare a workable set of ROE for United Shield which was in sharp contrast to the two weeks allocated for Operation Restore Hope.  Additionally, on 1 October 1994 the new JCS SROE become effective.  This tool helped to clarify and simplify the United Shield ROE process.  Nevertheless, the final ROE was not received by the Marines until four days before landing.  The reason for this delay was over-legislation on the use of the recently authorized NLWs.^[100]  The ROE  issued by CENTCOM and approved by CJCS, contained terms that were not always clear or concise.  As a result, the 13th MEU issued their own ROE cards to conform with existing training practices within the MEU.  This resulted in two ROE cards, one that summarized the ROE for the operation, and one that reflected the standing ROE training model used by the 13th MEU.^[101]  While this initially elicits ominous visions of the White Card/Blue Card controversy of Beirut, closer examination of both cards shows that the 13th MEUs ROE cards were more conservative than those issued by CENTCOM.  Appendix D provides a copy of both sets of ROE.

            As can be seen from the two case studies presented in this paper, the U.S. has made tremendous progress in the generation and application of ROE in the decade between Beirut and Somalia.  The ROE used throughout UNITAF (Restore Hope) and UNOSOM II were remarkably flexible and allowed the commander wide latitude in their interpretation and application with respect to mission accomplishment and force protection.  This is in sharp contrast to the ROE used during MNF II in Beirut.  However, the deployment of NLWs during United Shield, with their accompanying restrictive ROE, raises several important issues concerning ROE and carries ominous undertones reminiscent of those MNF II ROE.  These ROE issues provide the underpinnings for the NLW discussion that follows. 

NON-LETHAL WEAPONS

"I will . . . direct the Office of the Secretary of Defense to accelerate efforts to field non-chemical, non-lethal, alternatives to riot control agents for use in situations where combatants and non-combatants are intermingled."^[102]

 

            This statement by President Clinton clearly sets the course for the Department of Defense (DOD)  in developing NLWs.   It also reflects the American Judeo-Christian ethic that detests the bloodletting of our soldiers and Marines, and increasingly, our adversaries.  Thanks largely to what has been termed the "CNN effect," instantaneous global communications, Americans have come to detest casualties.  The result is a public expectation, even demand, that future conflicts be pristine and antiseptic.  This desire for "bloodless battles" dovetails nicely with Sun Tzu's dictum that, ". . . to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill.  To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill," however, it is also unrealistic, even when using NLWs.^[103]

            Using high technology weapons and ingenuity to defeat an enemy while minimizing casualties and collateral damage is fundamentally appealing, especially when considering the number of civilians killed accidentally in Somalia as a result of peacekeeping efforts -- somewhere between 7,000 -- 10,000 according to a government source.^[104]  The technological advances of these publicly and politically desirable NLWs is mind-boggling.  Their applicability ranges all levels of warefare, from tactical through strategic, and they have a great deal of potential to contribute positively on the two upper levels.^[105]  However, the intent of this study is to focus on the tactical level NLW employment in MOOTW, such as Somalia.

            The Marine Corps is in the process of fielding 14 "Non-lethal Weapon Capability Sets" designed for use by the GCE of forward deployed MEU(SOC)s in MOOTW.