The Paradigm of Naval Mine Countermeasures: A Study in Stagnation
CSC 1997
Subject Area - Warfighting
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: The Paradigm of Naval Mine Countermeasures: A Study in Stagnation
Author: LCDR Joel T. Griner, Jr., USN
Thesis: Significant deficiencies in the development of naval mine countermeasures doctrine have hampered the effective employment of naval forces in both blue water and littoral operations for many years.
Discussion: The U.S. Navy has struggled with the difficult task of mine clearance operations for well over 100 years. These struggles have been marked by a propensity to react to current or past mine threats in developing force structure and employment methodologies. This reactionary approach to mine countermeasures is identified in three recurring themes; the lack of a published doctrine, the failure to fully integrate mine countermeasures forces into the operating forces, and the fragmentary development of technology without the focusing element of a coherent doctrine to guide research and development efforts. These themes are recognizable in the changing mine countermeasures force structure that has resulted from the Navy's reaction to mine threats manifested in various conflicts. Naval mine countermeasures and procedures have been historically reactionary and essentially unfocused in their evolution. Examples of these difficulties can be identified in Wonson Harbor during the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, and in present day planning for expeditionary warfare employment.
Contemporary mine countermeasures forces reflect the reactionary developmental process followed in the past. The paradigm that is reflected in the recurring themes discussed in the foregoing continues to paralyze mine countermeasures development. The Navy has published a number of documents that purport to move the mine countermeasures forces into a more effective and efficient force posture. The problems with these documents are that they universally fail to include the U.S. Marine Corps as a full participant, and seek to solve conceptual problems with technological solutions.
Conclusion(s) or Recommendations(s): There are four recommendations to be made. First, a comprehensive, coherent, naval mine countermeasures doctrine should be developed by the Naval Doctrine Command. Secondly, a reorganization of the Mine Warfare Command should be undertaken to fully integrate the Marine Corps, by rotating leadership between a Navy Flag officer and a Marine Corps General officer. Thirdly, the operational command and control hierarchy for amphibious operations should be adjusted so that the Mine Warfare Commander reports to and works for the Landing Force Commander. Within this recommendation is the suggestion that the relationship between Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF) and Commander, Landing Force (CLF) be changed to co-equal for planning and execution. Finally, the training cycles for all MCM forces, both Navy and Marine Corps, should be aligned with the inter-deployment cycles of the forces which they will support.
Preface
This paper discusses the past, present, and future conceptual foundations of naval mine countermeasures and the development of operational concepts and procedures. It is my intent to illustrate recurring themes in force development and seek to determine the possible causes of these themes. The central focus of this paper is to discuss how the lack of a coherent doctrine has had a detrimental effect on the evolution of mine countermeasures forces. The issue of mine countermeasures is particularly relevant as the services seek to assume an expeditionary warfare posture. The requirement for effective mine countermeasures as an enabling activity is crucial for the continued success of amphibious operations. This paper looks briefly at historical precedents that have formed the paradigm of naval mine countermeasures. The focus, however, is mainly on the thought process and ideology that created and sustains the force structure for mine countermeasures.
This Master of Military Studies paper is not meant to be a historical recounting of operational failures. The brief discussion of force development is offered to build an understanding of rationales used for force development and operational employment. Additionally, little space is given in accounting for specific details of how many and what type of assets have been used in the past. Most of the sources consulted and used are contemporary concept publications and joint and service doctrinal works. There is one notable exception: the superb work by Dr. Tamara M. Melia, “Damn The Torpedoes”: A Short History of U.S. Naval Mine Countermeasures, 1777-1991.
The conclusions reached are that the lack of a coherent doctrine has, and continues to constrain, the evolution of naval mine countermeasures. Secondly, many of the published concept works fail to include the Marine Corps as a inseparable part of naval mine countermeasures operations. Finally, mine countermeasures as they are currently envisioned will not permit a seamless integration of forces for power projection ashore.
The author wishes to gratefully acknowledge the invaluable assistance of LCDR Chris Dunphy, USN, and Mr. Mark Klett, of the Naval Doctrine Command for their assistance in the research effort for this paper.
CONTENTS
Chapter Page
1. NAVAL NIME COUNERMEASURES DEVELOPMENT 1
Cold War Doctrine, 2
Gulf War Operations, 9
2. EXPEDITIONARY WARFARE CONCEPTS 14
Requirements and Capabilities, 19
3. TECHNOLOGY AND FORCE STRUCTURE 22
Technological Advances, 25
4. MAGTF INTEGRATION 30
MCM Command and Control, 32
Seamless Integration of all MCM Assets, 34
5. CURRENT AND FUTURE DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT 40
Appendixes
A. Acronyms 46
B. Mine Types 54
C. MCM Forces and Capabilities 56
Bibliography 61
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure
Page
1. SW Geometry 18
2. VSW Geometry 18
3. Supporting Infrastructures 24
4. CATF and CLF Relationships 31
5. MAGTF and MIW Integration 37
THE PARADIGM OF NAVAL MINE COUNTERMEASURES:
A STUDY IN STAGNATION
CHAPTER 1
NAVAL MINE COUNTERMEASURES DEVELOPMENT
Significant deficiencies in the development of naval mine countermeasures doctrine have hampered the effective employment of naval forces in both blue water and littoral operations for many years. The operational employment doctrine of naval mine countermeasures (MCM) forces has not evolved in a directed manner: rather it is based essentially on procedures developed in the early 1950's. The words "operational employment doctrine" are used here to facilitate the principle assertion of this master's paper that the U.S. Navy does not have, nor has it ever had, a comprehensive, coherent stand alone doctrine for naval mine countermeasures. Naval mine countermeasures operations are articulated principally in NWP-27 (series) Mine Warfare, which has recently been revised and renumbered as NWP 3-15, Mine Warfare to coincide with the numbering system for joint publications. These publications do provide some broad guidance, but are principally a compilation of the tactics. techniques and procedures employed in naval mine warfare. These publications are "how to" manuals instead of overarching doctrinal pieces. These significant deficiencies can lead but to one conclusion: there is no comprehensive, coherent stand alone doctrine for naval mine countermeasures.
Little progress has been made from a doctrinal standpoint in aligning force employment with evolving operational concepts. Naval mine countermeasures and procedures have historically been reactionary and essentially unfocused in their evolution. The U.S. Navy's historical approach to mine countermeasures has followed a flawed reasoning process summarized by Dr. Tamara M. Melia: "By its very nature MCM evolves as the result of new mine developments and changing threats."[1] The recurrent themes that form the basis for these problems are threefold: the lack of published doctrine, the failure to fully integrate mine countermeasures forces into the operating forces, and the fragmentary development of technology without the focusing element of a coherent doctrine to guide research and development efforts. The frequent failures of naval mine countermeasures operations lend credence to the premise put forward in NDP-1, Naval Warfare, that "The success of an organized military force is associated directly with the validity of its doctrine."[2]
COLD WAR DOCTRINE
Perhaps the most illustrative historical period in which to examine examples of the themes that sustain the stagnation of naval mine countermeasures operations is the period of the Cold War. The genesis of naval mine countermeasures for this period can be traced to the reactionary initiatives undertaken to counter mine threats and losses suffered in Wonson harbor during the Korean War.
In October 1950 Vice Admiral Arthur D. Struble, commanding Task Force 95 comprised of 250 ships, was tasked with making an amphibious landing at Wonson. Opposing this landing was an extensive minefield of over 3,000 mines laid over a 400 square mile area in and around Wonson harbor. The majority of these mines were Russian pre-World War I moored contact mines, but interspersed between them were new magnetic influence mines. These new Soviet influence mines were sophisticated enough to be activated be the magnetic signature of wooden hulled mine sweeper engines. The mine sweepers USS Pirate (AM-275), USS Pledge (AM-277), and the ROKN mine sweeper YMS-516 were all sunk by these new Soviet mines.[3]
The mine clearance operations delayed the landing at Wonson for over a week. The mine threat that manifested itself in these waters, and the attendant losses to the Navy that the mine threat achieved, infused funding into a mine countermeasures construction and development program. This resulted in a flexible mix of vessels designed to meet the Soviet threat encountered in Wonson harbor. This building program eventually delivered 85 ocean mine sweepers (MSOs) of the Aggressive and Agile class for U.S. and allied use, and 159 coastal mine sweepers (MSCs) of the Bluebird and Adjutant class, all but 20 of these vessels destined for export. Additionally, this building program was responsible for the conversion of eight existing amphibious ships to use for surface and air mine countermeasures support, as well as MCM command and control ships.[4]
Unfortunately, the building program was not based on a comprehensive doctrine that detailed how these vessels would be integrated into the operational fleets. This building program was essentially a reactionary response to address shortfalls illuminated in Wonson harbor, and not a sustained commitment to the development of mine countermeasures.[5]
One positive aspect of the Wonson operations was the successful integration of helicopters as mine spotters, working ahead of surface ships for safety and mine clearance operations. These successful coordinated operations engendered interest in development of a mine clearance system which could be towed from a helicopter, and used as a precursor sweep in front of surface MCM vessels. The first successful operational of helicopter sweep gear was achieved in early 1952, when a helicopter successfully towed sweep gear to clear moored contact mines. This research and development initiative continued on a small scale until the beginning of the Vietnam War, in which aviation mine countermeasures were eventually to play a major role in mine countermeasures.[6]
As the Navy had no published doctrine to sustain interest in mine countermeasures, and there were no further catastrophic events to focus MCM efforts in the late 1950's and 1960's, mine countermeasures receded from importance in the Navy. This stagnation of effort is a recognizable recurring cycle. As U.S. naval historian Dr. Melia remarked, "Although Wonson made the entire Navy more mine-conscious, competing concerns quickly returned MCM to its isolated position."[7] The fragmentary development of technologies to meet the threats such as those in Wonson, without the focusing element of a coherent doctrine, virtually assured that the U.S. would again be unprepared to meet the next mine countermeasure challenge.
The experiences of the U.S. Navy during the Vietnam War both helped and hindered mine countermeasures efforts. Due to the nature of that conflict, mining and mine countermeasures were not common activities. The principle threat from mines were predominately shallow water and riverine mine types. These mines included a small number of Soviet influence mines, simple contact mines, drifting mines, rudimentary controlled mines, and limpet mines.[8] As these types of mines were not a significant threat to larger ships, and classic amphibious operations were not routinely undertaken, Dr. Melia assessed that the "Navy came to view MCM as a small-scale specialty rather than a major element of naval warfare."[9] This viewpoint exacerbated the Navy's tendency to isolate mine countermeasures forces from other operating forces.
The Navy's reaction to the threats imposed by shallow water and riverine mines was to seek alternative methods of clearance to replace surface MCM vessels. This provided some positive developments in countermeasures technology with increased interest in airborne mine countermeasures. Developments in aviation mine countermeasures capabilities in the interim between the first operational testing in early 1952 and 1970 convinced Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, Chief of Naval Operations, that aviation mine countermeasures (AMCM) forces could provide the Navy with a safe, inexpensive, and rapid reaction counter to Soviet mine threats. In 1970 Admiral Zumwalt embarked the Navy on a significant building program, with aviation mine countermeasures as the Navy's central focus. This building program was undertaken at the expense of the surface mine countermeasure forces, which had fallen to a low state of readiness and operational capability.[10] Consistent with the Navy's historical approach to new mine threats, aviation mine countermeasures developed specifically to counter a current threat, bereft of a published doctrine to define the scope of AMCM within the larger context of naval operating forces.
During the period of the mid-to-late 1970's, as the Navy focused on development of aviation mine countermeasures capabilities, the Soviet Union continued development of a variety of new mines to use against the U.S. Navy. Through an aggressive research and development program, the Soviet Union was able to develop a family of "smart" mines, and more importantly, a family of deep-moored rising mines.[11] These “smart” mines employed basic microprocessor technology in order to discriminate between real and false targets, making it possible to employ them against a specific ship type or class. Deep-moored rising mines, usually some type of torpedo or rocket, are laid in deep water and are activated by a variety of influence triggers which release the torpedo or rocket to actively or passively attack the target ship.
The capability of the Soviets to employ deep-water rising mines presented a major threat to the capital ships of the U.S. Navy and its allies, specifically the aircraft carriers. This mine type also posed, perhaps for the first time, a strategic threat as variants of the rising mines were built for antisubmarine employment and thus posed a credible threat to the SSBN fleet.[12] The Navy once again found itself reacting to a significant threat, armed indifferently with the types of mine countermeasures forces that resulted from a piecemeal development of technology without the focusing element of a coherent doctrine for guidance. To further add to the level of consternation attendant with the new Soviet mine technologies, several breakout exercises in 1979 and 1980 using experimental models of several Soviet mine types occurred. The result: As Cyrus Christensen concluded "all of the forces the U.S. Atlantic fleet could bring to bear could not open one East Coast port in any acceptable period of time."[13]
The threat of deep-water Soviet mines sparked a resurgence of interest in surface mine countermeasures vessels with a deep sweep capability.[14] The long neglected and aging fleet of surface MCM vessels produced after the Wonson experience were insufficient to meet the new "blue water" threat: hence a new building program was undertaken to meet the new threat. Unfortunately, and as after the Korean War, this building program was not undertaken in consonance with a published doctrine for integration of the new ship types into the operating forces. Additionally, this lack of doctrine to guide research and development efforts produced a familiar approach, that of improving old equipment to do new tasks. This new building initiative, after several abandoned projects and concepts, eventually provided the Navy with ships of the MCM-1 Avenger class and MHC-51 Osprey class, built to provide the Navy with a blue water deep-sweep capability, and a coastal and harbor clearance capability.[15] In any event, the build up and decline cycles, based on current or historical threats, illustrate the reality that "The central problem of MCM throughout history has been the difficulty of sustaining maximum capability over time."[16]
During the Cold War, the U.S. Navy viewed MCM forces as small scale specialty forces. Thus, conscious policy dictated reliance on NATO allies for MCM forces in the event of conflict with the Soviet Bloc.[17] The failure to fully integrate mine countermeasures forces into the operating forces of the fleet was a deliberate convention. Hence, shortfalls in MCM assets were known and discounted as the Maritime Strategy,
. . implicitly admitted that the United States did not possess adequate forces to protect even our own harbors and coastal waters, let alone project mine countermeasures platforms into regions where the global battles would be fought.[18]
GULF WAR OPERATIONS
Naval operations during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1990 and 1991 did validate to some extent the Cold War maritime strategy of reliance on NATO allies for mine countermeasures forces. During the Gulf War period coalition mine countermeasures forces numbered 36 surface MCM (SMCM) ships, six airborne MCM (AMCM) helicopters, and two self-propelled acoustic-magnetic sweep (SAMS) systems from eight countries. These forces came from Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States.[19] The United States provided five surface MCM (SMCM) ships, six airborne MCM (AMCM) helicopters, two Self-propelled Acoustic-Magnetic Sweep (SAMS) systems, and several detachments of Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel. US MCM forces ranked fourth in the number of total mines cleared during the Gulf War period. This included the notable accomplishment of being the only units to successfully hunt and neutralize the advanced "Manta" bottom mine.[20]
The success of coalition MCM forces could be argued as a "proof of concept" of the Cold War maritime strategy except for one major pointed result: the Iraqis were successful in shaping sea borne operations by their use of naval mines employed in consonance with well constructed beach defensive positions; This ultimately prevented an amphibious landing into Kuwait. Also, the majority of successful clearance operations were undertaken after the cessation of hostilities. Significantly, operational shortfalls during hostilities permitted the Iraqis to achieve shaping objectives in three distinct areas: preventing an amphibious assault, stalling the forward movement of a battle group (TF 151), and damaging two warships and permitting the successful targeting and engagement of a capital ship with anti-ship cruise missiles.[21] The use of naval mines, in conjunction with elaborate beach defenses, thus allowed the Iraqis to manipulate the spatial and temporal aspects of the battlespace.
Iraqi shaping initiatives were facilitated by operational and institutional shortfalls within US Naval forces whose employment, as the Naval Doctrine Command concluded in Mine Countermeasures: A Fighting Concept for the 21st Century, reflected the reality that "Naval MCM has changed little from operations conducted during World War II and Korea to how we approached the mine threat during Desert Storm."[22] These shortfalls were not limited to just the MCM assets themselves, but included command and control issues as well. The lack of a trained MCM staff in theater led to the establishment of the U.S. Mine Countermeasures Group (USMCMG): It served as the command and control staff for MCM operations in the Persian Gulf, but the staff was constituted and trained in theater. Thus, USMCMG required several months to stand up as an operational entity. Once fully constituted and trained, it embarked in USS TRIPOLI (LPH 10) in January 1991, and commenced operations to clear a 15 mile long, 1,000 yard track toward Kuwaiti beaches, as well as naval gunfire support areas.[23]
The employment of US MCM forces in the Persian Gulf reflected the legacy of the recurring themes of failure, lack of doctrine, lack of integration, and technology developed to meet historical threats. The lack of good intelligence about the actual deployment of Iraqi mines complicated "a very real threat with psychological implications."[24] This particular issue goes to the heart of the real value of naval mines. Naval mines can achieve an objective without actually being laid, for the mere implication of the presence of mines is sufficient in many cases to act as a deterrent.
In naval operations it is just as critical to know where the mines are, as well as where they are not. Military planners in the Gulf War were presented with the difficult task of determining "where the mines were and how many of what types were actually in place."[25]
What happens when such information is lacking? Two examples show the results. On 18 February 1991, while operating in the northern Persian Gulf in an area thought previously to have been cleared, USS Princeton (CG-59) struck an Italian Manta magnetic-acoustic influence mine. This mine type represents a state of the art "smart" bottom mine. The mine was laid in less than 60 feet of water and detonated at a lateral distance of 15 feet with 375 pounds of high explosive. On the same day, operating in the same area, USS Tripoli (LPH-10) struck a LUGM-145 mine. This moored, contact mine represents technology that was introduced prior to World War I and was indigenously produced in Iraq.[26] The two mine types employed illustrate the spectrum of the mine problem, spanning the width of the technological range of mine development from before the First World War to 1991.
Mine countermeasures operations are integral to successful maritime operations which employ supporting arms. Mines can be used as a primary means to engage shipping, or they can be used to funnel those forces into areas where they can be engaged by other defensive weapons. Another example of effective Iraqi shaping operations, and the inability of U.S. MCM forces to counter them, was the cruise missile attack directed at USS Missouri (BB-63). On 25 February 1991, the Missouri engaged in naval gunfire support (NGFS) in the Northern Persian Gulf and was screened by U.S. and Royal Navy escorts. The escorts were not properly positioned to provide AAW protection to her due to the suspected location of minefields. During this NGFS mission, the Iraqis fired an Silkworm anti-ship cruise missile. The missile actually overflew Missouri (believed to be a guidance system failure) and was destroyed by HMS Gloucester.[27] One major conclusion should be drawn from this incident: "[T]he threat is the overall enemy defense, not just the mines."[28]
On another occasion during lead through operations in another portion of the northern Persian Gulf operations area, TF-151 received reports of the Silkworm missile launch. In response, all of the mine clearance vessels discontinued operations and rushed for safety behind combatant escorts. Surface combatants were assigned protection roles in consonance with NWP 3-09.11M Supporting Arms in Amphibious Operations, which states that "Protection from shore battery and air attack must be furnished by ships whose primary mission is gunnery."[29] The vulnerability of surface mine countermeasures vessels effectively stalled any forward movement of the battle group, and as such deprived the battle group commander of one of the principle features of naval forces, that of rapid maneuver.[30] The results of this most recent combat experience can by succinctly stated: The presence of mines in the previous three cases prevented an amphibious assault, stalled the forward movement of a battle group, damaged two warships, and permitted the successful targeting and engagement of a capital ship with anti-ship cruise missiles.
The difficulties encountered during operations to clear an amphibious operation area during the Gulf War illustrate the inadequacy of Cold War doctrine in a contemporary conflict. The types of assets available were representative of antiquated operational concepts and were of little operational value to the operational commanders. The missions required for MCM forces changed, but the operational concepts and the technology procured to support those concepts were stagnant. The doctrine for MCM employment must evolve with the concept of operations for Naval and Marine forces. MCM doctrine must be cognizant of contemporary technology, but most importantly, must drive the development and procurement of future technology to match conceptual objectives.
CHAPTER 2
EXPEDITIONARY WARFARE CONCEPTS
The decline of the Soviet Bloc and the experiences of the Gulf War provide impetus to the changing focus of naval forces. The recognition of the littorals as a primary theater for future operations has given rise to three naval strategy documents that chart the course to the future, ... From The Sea, Forward . .. From The Sea, and Operational Maneuver from the Sea. Succinctly stated, "The new direction for the Naval Service remains focused on our ability to project power from the sea in the critical littoral regions of the world."[31] The role MCM forces must play if expeditionary warfare concepts are to be successful is that of an enabler, fully integrated conceptually and operationally into battle groups and operating forces. The purpose of the expeditionary warfare concept is to support the National Military Strategy of overseas presence and power projection.[32] The presence of combat troops embarked on amphibious shipping off foreign shores is power perceived, a feature of overseas presence. The insertion of those combat troops ashore is power achieved, a feature of effective force projection. The ability of naval forces to achieve the larger purpose of the National Military Strategy depends heavily on the full integration, at all levels, of Navy and Marine assets. The tendencies of the naval service to devise service unique solutions to MCM problems must be circumvented and replaced with a combined developmental process that drives MCM solutions toward a common objective. The method that could achieve that end is a coherent Naval doctrine "Composed of 'shared convictions' that guide naval forces as a whole, [and] fuses our service-unique tactics , techniques, procedures, and warfighting philosophies."[33]
Since the conclusion of the Gulf War the Navy has published several authoritative documents that purport to guide naval MCM operations. These publications include such titles as Mine Warfare Plan: Meeting the Challenges of an Uncertain World (1992), Mine Warfare Campaign Plan (1995), and Concept of Operations for Mine Countermeasures in the 21st Century (1995). Generally, much of the direction in these publications is very similar, but universally fails to address fully the mine countermeasures and in-stride breaching capabilities and concerns of the Marine Corps. The missing keystone, past and present, is a coherent Naval MCM doctrine for all Naval forces. A comprehensive understanding of this issue is reflected in Naval Doctrine Publication 1, Naval Warfare, which states that:
Naval doctrine forms a bridge between the naval component of our nation's military strategy and our tactics techniques and procedures, such as those found in our Naval warfare Publications and Fleet Marine Force Manuals.[34]
The evolution of the naval maritime strategy to encompass expeditionary warfare concepts recognizes that:
The demise of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, coupled with recent mine crises in the Middle East, have altered the paradigm by which we have structured our mine countermeasures requirements and concepts of operations.[35]
The difficulty will be to avoid reacting to the mine threats represented in the Persian Gulf by seeking technological solutions to conceptual problems. This type or approach, which has plagued MCM development for many years, is analogous to an inept physician treating a patient's symptoms without regard to the disease. Now, an opportunity presents itself to develop a concept to integrate fully all naval MCM forces and direct the research and development of technology in an appropriate direction. NDP-1, Naval Warfare, articulated such a premise: "Success in naval warfare is founded on properly applying sound doctrine and understanding the principles of war."[36]
The propensity of the Navy to build MCM forces and systems to react to past threats is the legacy that has created the small, contemporary force structure of MCM-1/MHC-51 class MCM vessels, MH-53E AMCM aircraft, and EOD/SPECWA.R units.[37] The sea change in military strategy forced by the end of the Cold War brings into sharp focus several significant shortfalls in MCM operations. Contemporary MCM forces continue to be "the result of the policies of the previous decade which favored using complex technologies to overcome perceived military shortcomings in East--West
competition."[38]
Policies and concepts which were intended to counter a blue water threat present significant shortfalls for an organization with an expeditionary mission. Unfortunately, the employment which is envisioned for naval MCM forces is very reminiscent of the Cold War. What are these taskings at the end of this century? These are stated in Mine Warfare Plan: Meeting the Challenges of an Uncertain World, which enumerated the new priorities: ensuring the security of U.S. ports, foreign port mine clearance tasking, clearance of straits, choke points and forward operating areas, and finally conducting MCM operations in Amphibious Operating Areas (AOAs).[39]
Expeditionary forces seeking to project power ashore must cope with a new landscape. MCM operations must encompass a variety of water depths and contend with a complex and deadly mixture of mine variants. Illustrated examples of these are represented in figures II-1, and II-2. The shallow water (SW) region lies between the 200 to 40 foot water depth. Very shallow water (VSW) spans the 40 to 10 foot depth, and the surf zone (SZ) transits from 10 feet of water to the high water mark on the beach. One additional point must be stressed: MCM operations do not stop at the high water mark. Effective MCM operations must continue across the beach to craft landing zones (CLZs) and into the objective area.[40]
FIGURE II-1 (SW GEOMETRY)[41]
FIGURE II-2 (VSW GEOMETRY)[42]
The sequencing through varying water depths and across the beach must be enabled by a commonality of effort and purpose. Mine Warfare Plan: Meeting the Challenges of an Uncertain World makes a key point: "MCM operations are always part of the "offensive" -- either proactive or enabling -- missions of the Navy".[43] To this end, rapid improvements must be made to doctrinal concepts and command and control procedures of existing mine countermeasures assets to fully support a seamless integration of Navy and Marine Corps initiatives for amphibious littoral operations.
REQUIREMENTS AND CAPABILITIES
Shortfalls in capabilities exist in areas of sensors and reconnaissance, as well as clearance and sweeping methods. Surface MCM vessels are hampered by a lack of environmental sensors such as weather observation equipment, sonar in-situ mode assessment systems, and sonar range prediction models. Aviation MCM assets are constrained by a lack of night operations capability. There are no in-water optic sensors fielded and no clandestine capabilities for very shallow water reconnaissance. This issue is exacerbated by limited very shallow water environmental surveys/databases for most of the worlds littoral regions. Sweeping and clearance methods are similarly hampered by a limited buried mine detection capability, no close--tethered mine mechanical sweep, and no pressure mine sweep.[44] There is some disparity between the Mine Warfare Campaign Plan and Joint Publication 3-15, Joint Doctrine for Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare which observes:
At present, the only method capable of activating a sophisticated pressure mine is the use of an actual ship. This is not a practical, routine, sweep method; however, most pressure mines are encountered in very shallow waters and are susceptible to minehunting.[45]
The disparity between the two publications regarding pressure mine sweep capability is probably one of semantics. Clearly, it is not feasible to sacrifice a ship to sweep a mine, because if the ship detonates a mine and sinks or is disabled it effectively creates an obstacle that must be moved or breached. The closing statement about pressure mines in very shallow water is inaccurate. The U.S. possesses little capability for minehunting in very shallow water, especially for buried mines. The problem continues to grow in complexity in the surf zone "in which conventional mine countermeasures have very limited or no capability."[46]
Shortfalls in capabilities are as disruptive to joint force operations as they are to Navy/Marine operations. Mine Countermeasures: A Fighting Concept for the 21st Century raises a critical concern regarding interoperability of forces:
Our current mine countermeasures (MCM) capabilities are limited by an inadequate integration and coordination of assets within a JTF, minimal reconnaissance means (especially clandestine), a lack of an organic in-stride breaching capability, and operational pauses created by the slow deliberate nature of MCM clearing operations."[47]
The dichotomy between the requirement for rapid movement ashore and slow deliberate MCM operations signals a shift in focus to instride breaching techniques. This shift in focus is recognized in Joint Pub 3-15, Joint Doctrine for Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare which observes: "Therefore, MCM activity in amphibious operations will probably focus more on rapid "brute force" lane-breaching techniques than on conventional MCM procedures."[48]
CHAPTER 3
TECHNOLOGY AND FORCE STRUCTURE
U.S. Naval mine countermeasures operations have failed to develop in consonance with the expeditionary focus articulated by the Navy White Papers, Forward . . . From the Sea, and the Marine Corps Concept Paper, Operational Maneuver from the Sea. The recurrent themes of failure, particularly the fragmentary development of technology without a doctrinal focus, continue to isolate MCM forces from the operational forces they serve. The paradigm of naval MCM continues to constrain the evolution of MCM forces into an expeditionary warfare posture. Technology can provide many solutions to the shortfalls discussed earlier, but not in a reactionary application: rather, the focus must be on a new perspective for how forces are organized and what tasks are performed. The traditional viewpoint of MCM must be abandoned. Operations In The Littoral addresses this key point:
The comfort of orthodoxy constrains programmatic and tactical thinking, as well, too often seeing technological developments as new tools to do old jobs better, rather than as tools to redefine what jobs are done, by whom, and how.[49]
If the recurrent themes of MCM failure are to be overcome, then the paradigm
that has stymied the evolution of MCM forces must be broken. Unfortunately, the understanding articulated in NDP-1 Naval Warfare, that "Doctrine is the underlying philosophy that guides our use of tactics and weapons systems to achieve a common objective"[50] is not fully realized in many contemporary operational concepts.
The current mine warfare concept of operations articulated in the Mine Warfare Campaign Plan includes a four stage concept of operations hierarchy that transitions from peacetime to conflict. These stages include survey, mapping and intelligence; surveillance; organic MCM; and dedicated MCM. The supporting infrastructures that provide a lockstep development method for this concept of operations begins with intelligence and analysis with foreign mine exploitation. Step two of the process is preliminary tactics and doctrine. Step three is composed of war gaming and modeling and simulation, followed by fleet exercises in step four. Step five provides proven tactics and doctrine. A graphical representation is provided as figure III-1.
FIGURE III-1 Supporting Infrastructures[51]
This thought process identifies partially the historical difficulty in developing a coherent doctrine that drives tactics and technology. The process proposed in the foregoing is based on past and present threats, as evidenced by the initial activities of the process. This approach, of reacting to individual threats, outside of the larger context of
force employment is a theme that has plagued MCM force structure development for many years. Additionally, it should be observed that any doctrine derived from past intelligence analysis and exploitation is backward looking from the outset. Developing doctrine to meet a current or historical threat will obviate any possibility of a comprehensive, forward-looking approach to mine countermeasures. This developmental process illustrates a flawed approach that gives growth to the recurring theme of operational concepts that are driven by technology. This reverses the process, which should be doctrinal precepts which are then supported by technology.
TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES
The introduction of Global Positioning System (GPS) hardware represents one of the most significant enhancements to mine clearance operations in recent history. The ability to precisely fix a geographic point through a shared common relationship with other assets provides a capability for detailed mapping of mine-like contacts. This revolutionary capability is essentially ignored by current operational procedures that continue to rely on primitive methods of buoy marking for mine-like contacts and transit lanes. The time savings for marking contacts and transit lanes electronically rather than the time intensive method of manually laying buoys to mark the same contact or transit lane would be significant. The same concept of using GPS data to vector EOD teams to a suspected mine would also greatly enhance the speed of prosecution.
Contemporary training methods for surface MCM vessels vectoring EOD teams
in a small boat is to range a mine-like contact by sonar and compare the location to the location of a metal sphere called a "Diablo" suspended into the water from the small boat. The surface MCM vessel then directs the EOD team by voice radio commands by resolving the position differences between the Diablo and the mine-like contact. Clearly, a much more rapid method would be to down load the contacts GPS position to a hand held GPS transceiver and let the EOD team drive to the waypoint. This capability exists, as global positioning system hardware is widely installed on units throughout the fleet, including MCM units.
The introduction of digital data link capabilities for inter-unit coordination has provided enhanced methods for command and control. Unfortunately, none of the current US mine countermeasures assets have any type of data link capability, or any high speed method for sharing position information with any other unit. Tactical data link systems are fairly mature technologies and many of the systems currently in use in the fleet have been operational for over a decade. A representative sample of mature technology shortfalls in MCM forces include digital secure voice, officer in tactical command information exchange network (OTCIXS), tactical information exchange system, (TADIX A), and tactical intelligence data system (TACINTEL).[52]
The lack of mature technologies installed in MCM units is symptomatic of the recurring theme of failures to integrate MCM forces into the operating forces. The building and procurement programs that provided the current mix of MCM units apparently did not envision these units as integrated parts of a battle group or naval
expeditionary force. Consequently, the construction and outfitting cycles failed to provide for the basic equipment required to function as an integral part of the larger force structure.
Perhaps the most troubling aspect is the omission of a reliable long haul communication system for surface MHC vessels. Surface MHC vessels are outfitted with a limited number of antiquated high frequency (HF) transceivers. This communication method is not frequently used in the operating forces, and surface MHC vessels are faced with great difficulty in communicating effectively over long distances. This significant shortfall continues to be a high priority for correction in the operating forces directed by Commander, Mine Warfare Command.[53]
The lack of interoperability of forces is not limited to operations between MCM forces and battle groups. Difficulties are also resident in the interoperability of individual types of MCM assets. It is not possible to directly share or exchange data between the MCM-1 class ship outfitted with the SSN-2 Precise Integrated Navigation System (PINS), and the MHC-51 class ship outfitted with the AN/SYQ 13 navigation/command and control system. The only method for transferring data between these two units is to make a voice report or transmit a hard copy message. Similarly, it is not possible for either of the two ship classes to directly transfer data with AMCM MH-53E aircraft. The inability to rapidly transfer position and location data between units creates an operational pause during a turnover of efforts during MCM operations. The problem is magnified at the command level, as the Mine Warfare (MCM) Commander must collate and display all of the locating information to develop a complete picture of the battle space.
The critical issue for expeditionary warfare missions is to continually recognize that the battle space covers more than just the fluid medium, for it continues across the beach to the objective. The MCM commander must remain cognizant that "analysis of current mine threat data and map reconnaissance of critical zones are keys to mission planning."[54] The command and control problem becomes increasing complex as operations transition into the joint arena. As remarked on in Mine Warfare (MIW) C4ISR Systems Architecture, " ... in addition, the MIW Commander must be able to share a MIW-oriented subset of the Joint Force C4I information set with the MIW-specific platforms."[55] A comprehensive effort must be made to modernize mine countermeasures doctrine in consonance with the expeditionary focus of the Navy White Paper, Forward . . . From The Sea, and the Marine Corps Concept Paper, Operational Maneuver from the Sea. Operations in the Littoral identifies a basic paradox that must be conceptually resolved:
Technology is creating problems and opportunities. Systems are too often developed on a stand-alone basis, in scenarios designed to emphasize individual systems or missions, devoid of a larger context.[56]
The United States military has been highly successful in harnessing technology to provide proper solutions to complex problems. The technological issues discussed in the foregoing can be resolved, and the means to allow MCM forces to operate with each other, as well as larger force structures, are within current capabilities. However, once the hardware issues are resolved there remains a basic problem: how to train an entire community, SMCM, AMCM, and EOD units, to operate with battle groups and amphibious groups with which they have had little historical experience.[57] Aligning the training cycles of the MCM forces with that of the battle groups and amphibious groups that they are expected to support, whether they actually deploy or not, would serve to increase the interoperability of those forces. A common training and workup cycle would address the historical shortfall discussed in Mine Warfare Plan: Meeting The Challenges of an Uncertain World. This publication noted that,
... our MCM forces have only rarely conducted coordinated MCM exercises with the battle groups and amphibious groups that they could be called upon to support.[58]
CHAPTER 4
MAGTF INTEGRATION
Complementary training initiatives that encompass doctrine as well as tactics, techniques, and procedures must be developed in consonance with technology employed to support expeditionary warfare concepts. These training initiatives should recognize the high degree of cooperation and commonality of effort required to achieve clearance objectives for force insertion. The opportunities to facilitate these initiatives have been greatly enhanced by organizational and institutional improvements in the mine warfare organization since the close of the Gulf War.[59]
Organizational effectiveness has been enhanced by designating the, Commander, Mine Warfare Command, as an operational commander with cognizance over all mine warfare assets in the US Navy. Institutionally, operational effectiveness has been enhanced by the creation of deployable MCM staffs. MCM squadrons ONE and TWO provide two fully deployable operational staffs, with expertise in surface, air, and EOD aspects of mining and mine countermeasures. This is a significant improvement over past procedures in which control of MCM operations was generally a collateral duty of a battle group staff, or an ad hoc organization such as the U.S. Mine Countermeasures
Group (USMCMG) formed during Operation Desert Shield.
These organizational and institutional improvements can greatly enhance the effectiveness of amphibious operations.[60] Current amphibious doctrine, Joint Publication 3-02, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, recognizes the relationships of the Commander. Amphibious Task Force (CATF), and the Commander, Landing Force (CLF) as illustrated in figure IV-1.[61]
FIGURE IV-1 (CATF and CLF relationship)[62]
The reporting relationship for the MCM commander is particularly germane to the foregoing discussion of organizational improvements.
The capability of a trained MCMRON staff to deploy as part of an amphibious task force as an MCM commander provides a new level of capability to the CATF and CLF. This capability poses a new question for achieving a better integration of Navy and Marine MCM efforts. Which commander (CATF or CLF) is most appropriate for the MCM commander to report? This command reporting relationship issue is also resident in the evolving concept of the Naval Expeditionary Task Force (NETF). The Naval Expeditionary Task Force command and control concept is an evolutionary one which seeks to reconcile Navy operational issues with the precepts of Operational Maneuver From The Sea.[63] This reporting relationship issue will be developed in the following discussion of NETF command and control, recognizing that the central point is to devise a method in which the forces going ashore do not suffer an institutional operational pause.
MCM COMMAND AND CONTROL
The concept of the NETF seeks to propose a command and control method in which a battle group and an amphibious group could be integrated into a single entity. The method of achieving this integration would be to build on the composite warfare commander concept, redesignating the CLF as the Landing Force Component Commander (LFC). The traditional responsibilities of the CATF are performed by the Commander, Naval Expeditionary Task Force (CNETF) if the entire NETF is involved, or by the Amphibious Warfare Commander (AMWC) if only the amphibious and landing forces are involved.[64]
Embedded within the concept of the Naval Expeditionary Task Force command and control structure is the Mine Warfare (MIW) Commander, replacing the term MCM commander. The MIW commander is directly responsible to the Commander, Naval Expeditionary Task Force (CNETF) for planning and conducting mine warfare activities within the area of operations (AO). These activities are envisioned to include offensive and defensive mining, as well as mine countermeasures in deep and shallow water, up to the high water mark and into craft landing zones (CLZs).[65]
What is noticeably absent is the idea of ship to objective maneuver. This concept has a built in operational pause in that it fails to address the seamless transition of mine countermeasures from sea to shore. If the MIW commander is responsible for the operational area seaward into the high water mark, who then would be responsible for MCM operations across the beach to the objective? This issue is particularly critical as the size of the operations area becomes increasing large for over the horizon operations, and the requirement for speed and maneuver become the determining factors for mission success. If the NETF is to achieve a rapid breach or insertion, it can ill afford to suffer an operational pause for a shift of effort for MCM activities. If there is an institutional disconnect that causes an operational pause in the sequencing of forces, then it is not
possible to achieve the fundamental requirement detailed in A Concept for Mine Countermeasures (MCM) in Littoral Power Projection: that "Surprise, speed and momentum are critical to successful power projection."[66]
SEAMLESS INTEGRATION OF ALL MCM ASSETS
For a Command and Control concept to be successful for expeditionary forces, it must consider all aspects of naval forces. Mine countermeasures is not a Navy only endeavor. The Marines, or any landing force, must deal with a variety of mines[67] from the point that Navy assets stop until the objective is reached. To be valid, any expeditionary doctrine must take into account the capabilities and shortfalls of all naval MCM forces and seek to seamlessly integrate them in a command hierarchy that is appropriate to the task. The difficulty in developing a useful command and control system is the conceptual paradigm that has constrained the evolution of Naval MCM doctrine and is illustrated in Focus on the Littorals, which observes that:
Clearly, one of the major conceptual challenges in coming years will be the development - and implanting in the mainstream of air, surface, and submarine warfare communities -- of an integrated doctrine linking the increasingly varied mine warfare areas of intelligence/surveillance, organic MCM (on ships, helos, MCMVs) and dedicated MCM (both U.S. forward deployed units, as in the
Arabian Gulf now, as well as coalition capabilities).[68]
What is most noticeable in the foregoing is the complete absence of the capabilities and focus of the Marine Corps. If naval forces are to ever develop a viable doctrine, and subsequently a command and control system to execute that doctrine, there must be a recognition that "the increasingly varied mine warfare areas"[69] includes as a full participant the Marine Corps, and in some cases may include the U.S. Army.[70] Ideally, there would be no discernible point where USN MCM efforts stop and Landing Force MCM efforts begin. This is the major conceptual challenge in coming years.
The development of hardware and technology is incidental to the conceptual framework of a command and control architecture. A command and control system should be defined by the doctrine it serves and not by the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP's) that it directs. The Naval Doctrine Command provides a clear conceptual linkage regarding doctrine and TTPs; as Dr. James Tritten wrote in 1996:
The Naval Doctrine Command does not intend that doctrine replace the word tactics nor that naval doctrine extend into the tactical-level of warfare other than to shape and guide multi-service naval or Navy and Marine Corps individual Service TTP.[71]
An appropriate command and control system for expeditionary forces would be focused on naval doctrine and serve as an enabler for the execution of TTPs. Naval