BEIRUT, LEBANON: 24TH MAU, MAY-DEC 1983
CSC 1997
Subject Area – History
Author:
MAJOR PETER J. FERRARO
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. HISTORICAL and POLITICAL OVERVIEW
A. The
People and Religion pp. 1-3
B. Geography
and Climate p. 4
C. Transportation p. 4
D. Government
and Politics pp. 4-5
II. 24TH MAU DEPLOYMENT and EMPLOYMENT
A. General
Situation pp. 6-8
B. Military
Presence in Lebanon (1983) pp. 8-11
C. Deployment pp. 11-12
D. Chain
of Command pp. 13-15
III. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT pp. 16-17
IV. LESSONS LEARNED pp.
17-19
V. CONCLUSION pp.
19-20
APPENDIX
I (pp. 1-5) Mission/ROE
APPENDIX
II Weinberger/Powell Doctrine
OCTOBER 23, 1983:
"The bombing is etched as indelibly
in my mind as is the day John F. Kennedy was murdered."
Eric Hammel,
Historian and Author.
My Military Issues paper is about the
24th Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) in Beirut, Lebanon with particular emphasis
upon the August-October 1983 period.
However, I will touch on former and later periods encompassing August 1982 to February 1984.
My intent is to discuss/focus on the
facts of the mission in order to understand the dilemma facing the 24th MAU
during their deployment. Additionally,
the lessons learned from this ill-fated mission was the foundation for present
day Rules of Engagement (ROE), Force Protection and the conduct of US Forces
participating in what we now call Operations Other Than War (OOTW), e.g.
Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, Peace-Enforcement, Disaster and Humanitarian relief
and domestic support operations.
This is not a paper about Lebanon’s
problems with its Syrian and Israeli neighbors. However, I will begin with a
brief historical and political overview.
The political and cultural problems involved in the Lebanese conflict
were, and still are, extremely complex, difficult, and confusing. I strongly feel that it is impossible to
fully understand the dynamics behind the problems in Lebanon without exploring
her past. The appreciation of Lebanon’s
past is essential in recognizing the numerous challenges faced by the 24th MAU.
I.
HISTORICAL and POLITICAL OVERVIEW:
A. The People and Religion:
The population of Lebanon is approximately 3 million based on a 1981
estimate. The major
populated areas are Beirut, Sidon, Tripoli,
Tyre and Zahle. The population forms a
mosaic of
religious communities comprised of
Christians, Druze and Muslims. Many
Christian sects are
represented in Lebanon including Maronites,
Greek Orthodox, Roman Catholic and
Protestant.
The Maronites are by far the largest of the Christian groups and the
largest single
religious group, Christian or Muslim. Maronite Christians through various
political parties and
groups have traditionally wielded the most
political power. (1)
The other half of the population is comprised of Lebanese Muslims. The
Muslims are nearly equally divided between the two branches of Islamic faith,
with the Sunni Muslims holding a slight advantage over the Shia Muslim
group. Muslims trace their faith to the
teachings of the 7th century prophet Mohammed and his followers. The word Islam, in Arabic, means submission
to the will of God. Muslims believe
that the Jews and Christians have strayed from the true teachings of their
prophets. Muslims accept all the Old
Testament prophets and Jesus, but regard Mohammed as the greatest prophet. They deny, however, that Mohammed or any of
the other prophets had any divine qualities.
God in his oneness, they hold, cannot appear
simultaneously in several forms. Islam has a total outlook which claims
authority over the
believers’ political, social and economic
behavior. Traditionalists believe there
can be no separation of church and state.
A Muslim should believe in the oneness of God and the prophethood of
Mohammed. He should pray in a
prescribed manner five times daily, facing Mecca, the Prophet’s birthplace and
if possible make a pilgrimage to Mecca at least once in his lifetime. (2)
The split between the two branches of
Islam, Sunni and Shia, first appeared after the death of Mohammed in A.D.
632. It developed out of the
controversy as to whether Ali or someone else should succeed Mohammed. Sunni Muslims are mainly clustered in
coastal cities, especially Beirut and Tripoli.
Sunnites are in all professions and trades; many are wealthy village
farmers. (3)
Shia Muslims have traditionally played a subordinate role in the
political life of Lebanon.
Most are low-income farmers and unskilled
laborers. (4) Adherents to the Druze religion constitute another significant
minority. The Druze religion is, in
part, a historical derivative of Shia Muslim.
However, Druzes do not regard themselves, or are they regarded by others
as Muslims. The Druzes believe in the
divine character of the prophets and Imans and that God became incarnate in man
in a series of ten successive divine manifestations. (5)
The Druze religion is a tightly organized
and independent community. It is
estimated they make up six percent of the population. (6) There were also a
significant number of Palestinian refugees in various groups and camps
throughout Lebanon. Approximately 300,000 were in Lebanon in 1983. Palestinian presence increased after the
Arab-Israeli wars and the expulsion of Palestinian commandos from Jordan in
1971. The majority of Palestinians
(approximately 90%) are Muslims. (7)
Arabic is the official language with Armenian, English and French spoken as
well. (8)
The individual’s position in society, his
chances of success in life, his expectations of educational advancement and the
attainment of wealth are largely determined by the family into which he or she
was born. As in other Arab countries,
the family is the most important social grouping. The Lebanese family, whether Christian, Druze or Muslim is based
on patrilineal descent. Families
cooperate in forming businesses, in restraining other members when social
discipline is necessary, and in helping needy members. (9)
B. Geography and Climate:
Lebanon is a small mountainous country
situated on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea. It is about the size of
Connecticut. It is bounded on the north
and east by Syria and on the south by Israel.
Its principal geographical regions are a narrow coastal plain behind
which are the high Lebanese Mountains, the fertile Bekaa Valley, and the
Anti-Lebanese Mountains extending to the Syrian border. (10)
East of the Lebanese Mountains is a
narrow central valley or plateau known as the Bekaa Valley. It is about 75
miles long and varies from five to eight miles in width. This valley is a major military avenue of
approach leading to Damascus, Syria.
C. Transportation:
There are over 4,000 miles of road in Lebanon, of which about 3,000 are
paved. Even the remotest village can be
reached by automobile on adequate, but narrow roads. There are two international highways: one leads eastward from Beirut across the mountains and the Bekaa
Valley to Damascus; the other, southward from the Syrian border through Tripoli
and Beirut to the frontier with Israel.
There have been railroads in Lebanon since 1986, when a narrow-gauge
line was built, connecting Beirut to Damascus.
There are standard gauge lines
which connect some smaller cities together.
There are 3 main ports in Lebanon of which Beirut is the largest. Airports are located at Beirut (Khalde),
Riyaq and at Kleiat in the northwestern corner of the country. The airport at Riyaq is small and was used primarily
by the Lebanese Air Force. (11)
D. Government and Politics:
Lebanon is a parliamentary republic based on the constitution of 1926,
its amendments and the National Covenant of 1943. The covenant provides that public offices shall be distributed
among the recognized religious groups.
The three top positions in the governmental system are distributed as
follows:
-The president is to be a Maronite Christian.
-The prime minister, a Sunni Muslim.
-The president of the Chamber of Deputies, a Shia Muslim.
The president has the strongest most
influential position. This system
distribution of top
governmental positions was based on numerical
strength in the different religious communities. The last census, taken in 1932 showed a slight Christian majority
and therefore the Christians secured the position of president. Since that time however, with a growing
Muslim birthrate and introduction of Palestinian refugees, the majority shifted
to the Muslim population. (12)
Lebanon is administratively divided into five provinces; Beirut, North Lebanon, South Lebanon, Mount
Lebanon and Bekaa. Each province is
headed by a governor appointed by the president. Lebanon’s judicial system is based on that of France. Juries are not used in trials. The Lebanese court system has three
levels: Courts of First Instance,
Courts of Appeal, and the Court of Cassation.
There is also a system of confessional courts of the religious
communities which have jurisdiction on personal status matters in their own
areas. (13)
Politically, Lebanon contains branches of almost all other political
parties of the Arab world as well as its own.
These parties cover the entire political spectrum from far right to far
left. The Arab, Christians and Muslims
generally look to particular political parties and leaders depending on the
sect to which they belong. Lebanese
political parties differ from the huge umbrella organizations found in the U.S.
in that they are generally vehicles for powerful leaders whose followers are
often of the same religious sect. The
rivalries for position and power among various factions produces a complex
political system difficult for Westerners to understand. Surprisingly, this system has worked to
produce a viable democracy. However,
events in the late 70's and early 80's have upset the delicate Muslim-Christian
balance and resulted in a tendency for Christians and Muslims to group
themselves for safety into distinct zones.
At the same time all factions have called for a reform of the political
system. The Reagan Administration felt
that reformation will most likely not take place until foreign troops withdraw
and internal turmoil rests. (14)
II. 24TH
MAU DEPLOYMENT AND EMPLOYMENT:
A. General Situation:
HISTORY:
Beginning from Lebanon’s independence in 1943, and the withdrawal of French
troops in 1946, Lebanon’s independence can be
defined largely in terms of its presidents, each of
whom has shaped Lebanon by his personal brand
of politics: Shaikh Bishara el-Khoury
(1943-52),Camille Chamoun (1952-58), Fuad Chebab (1958-64), Charles Helou
(1964-70), Suleiman Franjiyah (1970-76), Elias Sarkis (1976-82), Bashir Gemayel
(23 Aug-14 Sep 1982), and Amin Gemayel (21 Sep 1982-end of US participation in
Multi-National Peacekeeping Force).
(15)
Full scale civil war broke out in 1975 during President Franjiyah’s
term. For many years prior to 1975,
Muslim and Christian differences grew more intense. Difficulties centered around the large number of Palestinian refugees
and the presence of Palestinian commandos operating out of Lebanon. The Muslims were also dissatisfied with what
they considered an unfair distribution of political power in favor of the
Christian Lebanese.
In October 1976, during the first year of President Sarkis term, Arab
summits set forth a plan to end the war.
The resulting Arab Deterrent Force (ADF), composed largely of Syrian
troops, moved in at the invitation of the Lebanese government to separate the
combatants. Most fighting ended soon
thereafter but under-lying problems still remained. (16)
In mid-1978 and April 1981 clashes between the Christian Lebanese
militias and the ADF
erupted.
Christian militias, Muslim militias, Palestinian commandos and the ADF
controlled
various areas throughout the country. The Lebanese Government made several
attempts to restore the authority of the central government to all parts of the
country with little success. The
1975-76 civil war severely impaired the Lebanese Armed Forces’ (LAF) ability to
intervene and restore order. Many
officers and enlisted men left the LAF to join various Christian and Muslim
militias taking their weapons with them.
(17)
During 1981, Israel shot down two Syrian helicopters in Lebanon and
Syria deployed SAM batteries in the Bekaa Valley. There were also outbreaks of Israeli-Palestinian fighting. On 6 June, 1982, Israel mounted a major
offensive from Southern Lebanon into Beirut and
the Bekaa Valley. This led to the evacuation of Palestinian commandos from
Beirut. The US
Marines assisted in the evacuation (BLT 2/8)
as part of the Multinational Force (MNF).
Following the withdrawal of the MNF in September 1982, two events
occurred which led to their return. The
first event was the assassination of President Bashir Gemayel on 14 September
by persons alleged to have ties with Iran.
The second event was the massacre of Palestinians in the Sabra and
Shatila refugee camps on 16 September 1982.
The Israelis conducted an investigation which led to the dismissal of
the Defense Minister Ariel Sharon. (18)
When the 24th MAU deployed to Beirut negotiations between the US,
Israel, and Lebanon were in a stalemate.
Note that Syria, a major occupying power/force in Lebanon was excluded
from the negotiations. Lebanon’s government
was asking for complete foreign troop withdrawal from the country. The Israelis refused to pull-out until they
were satisfied that their northern border with Lebanon was secure from
guerrilla attack and that the Syrians and PLO guerrillas leave the country. US
envoy, Philip C. Habib was the chief negotiator for the US with the Lebanese
and Israelis.
B.
Military Presence in Lebanon (1983):
There were numerous armed groups and or militias operating in various
sectors throughout Lebanon. In addition
to these Lebanese factions, the foreign forces of Israel, Syria, the PLO, UN
Interim Force In Lebanon (UNIFIL) and
the MNF also occupied certain areas.
Starting in the north, centered around
Tripoli, is the Zgharta Front. The
Zgharta Front was led by former Maronite president Sulliman Franjiyah. It was a leftist Lebanese Christian militia
which numbers approximately 1500. It
broke ties with the Christian Phalange because of differences in ideology and
familial disputes. (19)
The Christian Phalange, centered in East
Beirut and north, is a rightist
Maronite militia/political party. It is
also known by the name Kataeb. It was
founded in 1936 and is led by Pierre Gemayel. Pierre Gemayel is the father
of the assassinated president Bashir
Gemayel and the 1983 president Amin Gemayel.
The Phalange participated in heavy fighting against leftist factions
during the 1975-76 civil war. Their
strength was estimated at about 10,000.
(20)
Syrian forces entered Lebanon
in response to a Lebanese government request during the civil war. The Syrian Army as the largest contributor
to the Arab Deterrent Force occupies positions in eastern and northern
Lebanon today. The Lebanese government did not renew the
ADF mandate on 14 July 1982, and asked
for the withdrawal of all foreign forces.
The Syrian Army is centered in the Bekaa Valley and numbers
approximately 35,000. (21)
The Druze, a radical offshoot Islamic sect, was centered around the
area known as the Shouf. The Shouf is situated in the central part of Mount
Liban and is bounded in the north by the Damascus road, on the east by the
river Nahr Barouk and on the south by the river Nahr el Awali. Through the
Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) headed by Walid Jumblatt, the Druze sided
with the Palestinians during the Israeli invasion. The Druze also clashed periodically with their northern neighbors
the Phalange. The PSP was founded in
1949 to represent Socialism in Lebanese politics and its strength numbers
approximately 1500. (22)
The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) have been making periodic raids into
Lebanon in pursuit of PLO guerrillas for many years. The 6 June 1982 invasion, called Peace for Galilee, has resulted
in the occupation of Southern Lebanon by approximately 35,000 Israeli
troops. When the 24th MAU arrived in
Lebanon in May 1983, battle lines were drawn in the Bekaa Valley between the
opposing forces of Israel and Syria.
The IDF occupied the Beirut-Damascus highway to the Bekaa Valley and
south all the way to Northern Israel. (23)
Major Saad Haddad’s Free Lebanon Militia (FLM) was also located in the
South. The FLM was a pro-Israeli
militia led by renegade Lebanese Major Saad Haddad. This militia was made up of
Shia Muslims as well as Christians.
FLM strength has been estimated at 1500. Israel wants the FLM to remain in place to guard its northern border
and ensure protection against Palestinian guerilla attacks. The Lebanese government never agreed to this
proposal. Most of the FLM weapons are
of western make, some originated from the former elements of the LAF, but the
majority were supplied by the Israelis.
These include M50 Sherman Tanks, 155mm Howitzers, M113 APC’s, 120mm
mortars, as well as various types of infantry and anti-tank weapons. (24)
UNIFIL, United Nations International
Forces in Lebanon, also maintained a presence in
southern Lebanon. UNIFIL was made up of various battalions from Ireland, Norway,
Fiji, Ghana
and others.
The purpose of their introduction into Southern Lebanon was to act as a
buffer between PLO guerrillas and the IDF.
(25)
The Multinational Force, MNF, was composed of Italians, French, US
Marines, and British soldiers. The
entire MNF was centered in the Beirut area.
Their mission, was to establish
an environment which would enable the Lebanese Armed Forces to carry out their
responsibilities. Various contingents
were attacked periodically throughout the entire deployment. (26)
The Palestine Liberation
Organization was founded in 1964 and is still today headed by Yasir
Arafat. After all PLO activity was
eliminated in Jordan in 1971 its headquarters was moved to Lebanon. The PLO is an umbrella organization which
encompasses numerous groups or factions. Many of these splinter groups have
differing ideologies and have fought with each other as well as with Jordan, Syria,
Israel, and Lebanese Forces. The Israeli
invasion dealt a severe blow to PLO military operations in Lebanon. PLO activity had been severely limited at
the time of the 24th MAU’s deployment.
Most remaining PLO groups had either been evacuated to other countries
or moved to the Bekaa Valley region.
(27)
The Lebanese Armed Forces, LAF, was slowly being rebuilt into a viable
fighting force. The US began a military
assistance program headed by Colonel A.T. Fintel, USA. The goal was to train seven brigades for a
total of 30,000 men. The LAF began an
intense recruiting drive during the early part of the 24th MAU’s
deployment. The LAF wanted to secure
the Israeli-Lebanon border after completion of the US led military assistance
program. (28)
Two other militias warrant mention, AMAL
and MURABITOUN. Murabitoun is a leftist
Independent Nasserite Movement which played a
major role in civil war clashes of 1975-76.
Murabitoun militia members were usually
called AL MURABITOUN or the Vigilants.
AMAL
or hope is a Shia Muslim political/military
faction whose primary goal was and still is to secure
government assistance for the Shias. Many Shias had been displaced by the
fighting between the
PLO guerrillas and Israel in southern
Lebanon. The Amal movement was centered
in Baalbek, 47 miles Northeast of Beirut.
Approximately 900 Iranian revolutionary guards, sent by Ayatollah Kholmeni, were also in the
Baalbek area. Both Amal and the Iranians are Shia Muslims. Hussein Musawi, leader of Amal (1983),
stated publicly that our brothers from the Revolutionary Guards are here to
help us in our social, political and humanitarian work. (29)
Finally, in late spring 1983, an obscure but dangerous terrorist
organization emerged in Beirut. It was and still is known as the Islamic
Struggle Organization or the Muslim Holy War.
This group has claimed responsibility for the 18 April, 1983 car bombing
of the US Embassy, and the 23 October, 1983 truck bombing of the US Marine BLT
headquarters building (and at the same time the truck bombing of the French MNF
headquarters). (30)
C. Deployment:
The 24th MAU deployed to Beirut, Lebanon in May 1983, made-up of a
typical MAGTF. There was nothing to
distinguish 1st Battalion, 8th Marines from any other Marine battalions that
were on deployment throughout the world. The normal T/O made up the core of BLT 1/8,
how-
ever, some extra strap-hangers such as ITT,
intelligence, engineer and medical personnel
augmented the BLT because of the uniqueness
of the mission.
Another component of the 24th MAU was Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron
(HMM) 162. HMM-162 was made up of 8 CH-46's, 2 AH-IT Cobra’s, 2 UH-IN Huey’s,
and 4 CH-53E’s.
The last major component of the 24th MAU was
MSSG-24, coming from the 2nd FSSG.
The Commander of the 24th MAU was Colonel Timothy Geraghty. His previous assignment was G-3, Operations
Officer, 2nd Marine Division. BLT 1/8
was commanded by LtCol Larry Gerlach.
HMM 162 was commanded by LtCol L.R. Medlin, and MSSG-24 was commanded by
Major D.C. Redlich. The 24th
MAU deployed to Lebanon as part of Amphibious Squadron 8, commanded by Captain
(Commodore) M.N. France. The five ships
that made up the Amphibious Squadron were the USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2),USS AUSTIN (LPD-4, Phibron flagship), USS
PORTLAND (LSD-37), USS HARLON COUNTY (LST-1196), and the USS EL PASO
(LKA-117). Depending on what source you
read the ships were designated Phibron 8 or MARG 2-83, in any case, they
arrivev in Lebanon on 28 May 1983. On that day I was sent ashore with a reinforced platoon to
provide external security for the American and British Embassy. The main body of the 24th MAU
debarked shipping and moved into positions in and around Beirut International
Airport on 29 May 1983. The relief in
place of the 22nd MAU was completed without problems.
Once in position, the 24th MAU immediately began mobile and
foot patrols and took up positions in and around the airport and the
American/British embassy. Like the
MAU’s before it, the 24th MAU set up its headquarters in the airport
fire fighter school. The BLT headquarters
and attached units established themselves in the four-story building that once
had housed the Government of Lebanon’s Aviation Administration Bureau. In picking its command post, the BLT sought
a site that provided security from
heavy hostile artillery, rocket, and sniper fire.
D. Chain of Command:
On September 20, 1982,
President Ronald Reagan directed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
provide a contingent from the United States Armed Forces to participate in a
multi-national peacekeeping force. In
compliance with the President’s decision, the JCS directed that the
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. European Command, provide a U.S. contingent for the
multinational peacekeeping mission.
(31)
Before looking at the Chain of
Command, I want to point out the
mission given to the 24th MAU:
To establish an environment which will permit
the Lebanese Armed Forces to carry out their responsibilities in the Beirut
area. When directed, USEUCOM (Commander-in-Chief, United States European
Command) will introduce US forces as a part of a multinational force presence
in the Beirut area to occupy and secure positions along a designated section of
the line south of the Beirut International Airport (BIA) to a position in the
vicinity of the presidential palace.
(32)
In addition to the basic mission, on October 28, 1982, President Reagan
signed National
Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 64, which
established a U.S. objective the
withdrawal
of all foreign forces (Israeli, Syrians, and
PLO) from Lebanon not later than the
end of calendar year 1982. However, the
NSDD also suggested that the multinational force might not be withdrawn until
the government of Lebanon could once again “control, administer, and defend its
sovereign territory”. (33) According to
analysis done by Dr. Jack Matthews, “this NSDD increased the scope of the basic
mission assigned to the U.S. peacekeepers.
(34)
The mission “re-stated” and passed down the chain of command was as
follows:
You
are part of the Multi-National Peacekeeping Force. Your mission is to assist the Government of Lebanon and the
Lebanese Armed Forces, to stabilize their country and to keep the peace. You are assisted in this mission by British,
French and Italian troops. (35)
As you can see, the mission is very vague and
broad. Nonetheless, before discussing
the chain
of command I felt a good look at the mission
will better help to understand just how confusing
and mixed up the situation became for the 24th
MAU. The conventional chain of reporting
and responsibility on site in Beirut was in fact augmented by additional,
overlapping, and sometimes redundant lines stretching back to Stuttgart, West
Germany and Washington, D.C., all made possible by the presence of “high-speed”
communications equipment which linked the headquarters to various remote
sites. An additional factor, which the
commanders had to deal with, and one which was to have predictable effects, was
the presence of the television media, with TV crews and direct satellite links
capable of sending live, instantaneous coverage of events back to the United
States and senior military offices as events unfolded. (36)
Dr. Matthews points out:
Television coverage amounted to
an unofficial backchannel of communication which circumvented all formal
command and control arrangements and,
given the highly political nature of
the mission, encouraged intervention in the command structure by high
placed officials. Because the U.S.
military mission to Beirut was unclear,
with a humanitarian-that is to say-rather than a strictly military objective,
the temptation for top officials to intervene in the mission in an attempt to
control the ‘image’ of the U.S.
military presence proved overwhelming.
In the absence of a clear military objective, ‘public relations’,
broadly defined emerged as a dominant although shifting purpose. (37)
During the peacekeeping mission to Lebanon,
four separate MAU commanders served as the
commander of the Marine force ashore:
Col J.M. Mead, 32 MAU,
16 Aug-10 Sep ‘82 and 29 Sep-01 Nov ‘82.
Col T.M. Stokes, 24th
MAU, 01 Nov ‘82-15 Feb ‘83, and
22nd MAU, 15 Feb-29 May ‘83.
Col T.J. Geraghty, 24th
MAU, 30 May-18 Nov ‘83.
B Gen J.R. Joy, 22nd
MAU, 19 Nov ‘83-09 April ‘84.
The Marine commanders above wore “six hats”,
or had six separate titles:
1-Commander Marine Amphibious Unit
2-Commander Task Force
3-Commander of the Landing Force
4-Commander U.S. Forces Ashore, Lebanon
5-Commander U.S. Multinational Force
6-Commander, Combined Multinational Forces for retrograde operations
During the deployment of the 24th MAU, Col Geraghty felt his
immediate “boss” was Commander 6th Fleet, Admiral Martin. Interestingly, Captain France, Commander of
Phibron 8, understood the command relationships to be that he was the senior
commander under the amphibious task force arrangement. However, Col Geraghty did in fact have a
direct line to 6th Fleet, as Commander of the U.S. Multinational
Force. Captain France also felt that as
commander of the Multinational Force, Col Geraghty was an “equivalent task
force commander.” As you can see, the chain of command was very confusing and
complex, and personality, event, and politically driven. Dr. Matthews devoted lengthy research into
the chain of command issue. His
analysis gives insight and clarity as to the numerous problems faced by the 24th
MAU. The dilemma’s presented to the
Marines in Beirut continued to escalate.
III. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT:
The Rules of Engagement (ROE) for
the 24thMAU Marines were politically
driven. The Peacekeeping mission in Beirut was a new beginning for the US Armed
Forces. Many senior military and
political leaders were well-intended, and very concerned about the image of the
Marine Corps and the United States.
This concern had a direct impact on the ROE, which in turn had a direct
impact on the conduct of the mission. I
am absolutely convinced that the militias who were in combat with the Marines knew
exactly what the ROE was, and actually used the ROE to their advantage. The following is precisely what the ROE was
for my Marines during our deployment to Lebanon (May-Dec ‘83):
(See Appendix I)
The ROE was never adjusted to accommodate the changing situation,
specifically after
the last week of August 1983 (after the
Israeli pull-out of Beirut). During
this time it was clear that US policy had changed from being neutral to
supporting the Christian controlled government. From late August to November, (departure of the 24th
MAU), Marines were engaged in nightly combat (not sporadic sniper fire,
as so many believe even to this day).
An example of how flawed the ROE had become was that for Marines to use
indirect fire weapons systems, (artillery and or mortars), as of September ‘83,
all requests for fire had to be approved by the Secretary of Defense Casper
Weinberger. As you can see, by the time
the requests were approved approximately 30-45 minutes elapsed, which in many
cases the target(s) moved and it was no longer necessary to fire the
mission. So immediate requests, which
are most critical in combat, were non-existent.
The issue of a different set of ROE for the embassy and the airport was
due to the fact that on April 18, 1983 the US Embassy was destroyed by a car
bomb. This created the requirement for
an external security force at the new “makeshift” US embassy, additionally
requiring a higher level of security in order to prevent another terrorist
attack.
Due to the “fish-bowl” environment, it was essential that leaders at all
levels had to become
proactive in preventing
“accidental-discharges”. This led to a
series of ROE modifications, e.g. no magazines in weapons at certain “low-risk”
posts (low-risk was defined as rear area positions).
Ironically, one of the so called “low-risk”
posts was in and around the BLT headquarters.
IV. LESSONS
LEARNED:
The
experience in Lebanon, specifically the 24th MAU, became the genesis
of how the US
Armed Forces conducts Peacekeeping or
Operations Other Than War. Three
important lessons were derived from
the Beirut mission. Each one impacting
on one of the three levels of war (Strategic, Operational, and Tactical). First, at the strategic level, the mission and
consequently the introduction of US forces as a peacekeeping force violated the
basic essential
principle of a peacekeeping mission. This principle is that in order for a
peacekeeping force to be
effective,
all sides involved in the conflict must agree to have a peacekeeping
force, and that the
peacekeeping force must remain neutral in
action, deed, and intent. Any
perception by a faction
that the peacekeeping force is taking sides
can result in mission
breakdown. In Lebanon, the Multinational
peacekeeping force was viewed as taking the side of the Christian controlled
government. First, by training the LAF,
second by providing the LAF with naval
gunfire support from the USS New Jersey and USS Virginia, and finally by
attempting to negotiate a peaceful resolution of the conflict without all
parties/factions participating. All of
these issues eventually led to the Weinberger Doctrine named after Secretary of
Defense Casper Weinberger. The
Weinberger Doctrine basically spelled out
the conditions concerning the deployment and use of US forces.
(see Appendix II)
Since Lebanon, the Weinberger doctrine has been used as a guide by the
Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations for the deployment of US forces. Additionally, at the SecDef/JCS level,
mission statements coming from the National Command Authority (NCA) were
scrubbed for clarity and feasibility thus resulting in clearly understood
missions for US forces.
The second lesson learned is at the operational level of war and
concerns the Chain of Command (COC). As
described earlier, command relationships and the COC were unquestionably
confusing and often misunderstood. The
MAU commander wore six-hats, each one consisting of a unique COC along with
reporting procedures/information. The
command relationships were also confusing.
Depending on who you were talking to, each commander and level of
command had a different perception of who was answerable/responsible to
whom. This “maze” of command directly
impacted the Marines engaged in combat.
I strongly feel that it was criminal for off-site levels of command
(outside the operational realm) to require Marines in contact to clear fire
missions with them. Regardless of the
political sensitivities, force protection, as we see it today, is absolutely
critical to the success of a mission.
The problems faced by the 24th MAU led to the formation of
Commander in Chief’s (CINC), assigned as a warfighting commanders to specific
geographical regions throughout the world.
Today the most critical issue facing CINC’s as it relates to Joint
warfighting is command relationships.
The COC is the first issue
resolved in forming of a Joint Task
Force (JTF), and force protection is now treated as one of the essential
battlespace functions.
Finally, the third lesson learned is at the tactical level of war. This issue concerns the ROE.
In Lebanon, political and media concerns far
outweighed self-defense (force protection) of Marines. The ROE was constantly
being modified by off-site senior political and military leaders, thus
resulting in confusion which further resulted in an atmosphere of hesitancy by
Marines manning posts/positions, especially around the BLT and MAU
Headquarters. The single most feared event
by senior political/military leaders was an accidental discharge by a
Marine. To prevent an incident of this
nature from occurring, numerous ROE modifications were implemented. For example, on an almost daily basis, magazines were to be inserted (no round chambered) in the morning
and by the evening it would change to rounds inserted in chamber, then by
the next morning, the ROE would be
modified again to no magazine inserted in the weapon. This kind of “word-change” became routine for the 24th MAU Marines, resulting in a degradation of alertness, and
a sense of urgency. Today, standard
ROE’s are in place to prevent troop confusion, and interference by off-site
leaders. Today’s standard ROE’s are
closely reviewed in the force protection slice of the battlespace
functions. Standard ROE exists at the
CJCS and CINC level and are modified, as required, to fit
the mission.
A.CONCLUSION:
In my view, the mission to
Lebanon was a failure at every level (Strategic, Operational, and
Tactical). Regardless of the
outcome, the Marines performed
brilliantly given the conditions and restraints imposed on them. Nonetheless, despite the tragic events which
unfolded during the 24thMAU deployment, important lessons learned were derived
from this mission. Like most Marines, I
only wish that we did not have to pay such a high price to learn some “hard”
lessons.
It would be criminal of us if we were ever to
allow such tragedies to repeat itself again.
If the
sacrifice of the Marines in Lebanon saves
lives in the future then quite possibly some success did
indeed come out of the mission.
APPENDIX I
MISSION
YOU ARE PART OF THE MULTI-NATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE. YOUR MISSION IS TO ASSIST THE GOVERNMENT OF
LEBANON AND THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES,
TO STABILIZE THEIR COUNTRY AND TO KEEP THE PEACE. YOU ARE ASSISTED IN THIS MISSION BY BRITISH,
FRENCH AND ITALIAN TROOPS.
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
(DIRECT FIRE WEAPONS)
1. DIRECT
FIE WEAPONS INCLUDE INDIVIDUAL SMALL ARMS, MACHINE GUNS (ALL CALIBERS), LIGHT,
MEDIUM AND HEAVY GROUND LAUNCHED ANTI-TANK WEAPONS, AND TANK MAIN GUNS.
2. RIOT
CONTROL
a.
USE LAF
OR POLICE TO CONTROL IF POSSIBLE.
b.
RIOT
CONTROL FORMATIONS CAN BE USED.
c.
SHOW OF
FORCE CAN BE USED.
d.
WARNING
SHOTS -- LAST RESORT
ONLY SEC DEF CAN ARTHORIZE USE
OF RIOT CONTROL AGENT
3. ATTEMPTS
TO PENETRATE
a. DETER BUT CANNOT
DENY.
DENY MEANS STOP WITH ANY AND ALL MEANS
AVAILABLE.
DETER MEANS SLOWING OR PREVENTING BY USING
PASSIVE MEASURES
WARNINGS
FORMATIONS IN DEPTH
ROAD BLOCKS
SHOW OF FORCE
b. COMMON
SENSE MUT BE USED.
4. HOSTILE ACTS
a.
MUST POSE
ACTUAL DANGER TO FRIENDLY FORCES.
b.
RESPONSE
MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH THREAT OF ACT.
MINUMUM FORCE -- DISCONTINUED
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE --
RESTRAINT
C. GENERALLY
WILL NOT FIRE UNLESS FIRED UPON.
IMMINENT RIGHT TO SELF DEFENSE.
KEYS -- 1. RETURN FIRE
ONLY IF IN DANGER.
2. USE SAME KIND AND
NUMBER OF WEAPONS IF
POSSIBLE.
3. STOP WHEN INCOMING
STOPS.
5. TERRORIST ACTS
a.
SAME
RULES APPLY.
b. CONSTANT VIGILANCE IS BEST DEFENS