Find a Security Clearance Job!

Military

An Analysis Of Gulf War Psyops And Their Applicability To Future Operations
CSC 1993
SUBJECT AREA - Operations
                        EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE:   AN  ANALYSIS  OF  GULF WAR  PSYOPS  AND  THEIR APPLI-
         CABILITY TO FUTURE OPERATIONS
AUTHOR:  Major Peter A. Whitenack, United States Marine Corps
THESIS:  The  many-faceted  PSYOP  contribution  to victory in
the  Persian  Gulf  War  should  be examined in more detail to
determine  how  its  lessons  may  be  better  integrated into
preparations  for  dealing  with  conflicts  in the lean times
ahead.
BACKGROUND:   U.S.   military   planners   were   pivotal  in
developing   and   executing   a  coordinated,  multi-national
combined  arms  theater  campaign  that succeeded in defeating
Iraq.    Time  for  planning  and  coordination was a decisive
determinant  of this success, and this type of opportunity may
not  be  afforded  us  to  prepare similarly for future opera-
tions.    PSYOPS  in the Persian Gulf War actively spanned the
conflict  and  supported all elements of the theater campaign.
While  integration of PSYOPS into operational planning was not
conducted   according   to   doctrine,   it  was  nevertheless
effective  in  all mediums, significantly contributing to mass
capitulation  of  Iraqi forces and an overwhelming victory for
the  Coalition.    While  PSYOPS  efforts successfully comple-
mented  operations  in  the field, planning was initiated from
the bottom up for approval.
RECOMMENDATION:   That  psychological  warfare  operations  in
the  Persian  Gulf War be thoroughly studied for establishment
of  future  doctrinal  concepts  in  order to realize the full
potential of this effective force multiplier.
             AN ANALYSIS OF GULF WAR PSYOPS AND THEIR
                APPLICABILITY TO FUTURE OPERATIONS
                            OUTLINE
THESIS:    The  many-faceted    PSYOP contribution  to victory
in  the  Persian Gulf War should be examined in more detail to
determine  how  its  lessons  may  be  better  integrated into
preparations  for  dealing  with  conflicts  in the lean times
ahead.
  I.  Foundation for Analysis
      A.  Time as a determinant for success
      B.  Concern with force reduction
          1.   PSYOPS to facilitate objectives
          2.   Offset degradation of force potential
      C.  Basis of Gulf War PSYOP analysis
 II.  Historical Overview of Gulf War PSYOPS
      A.  Genesis of command
      B.  Operational establishment
III.  PSYOPS Planning
      A.  Campaign description
      B.  Tying operations to the mission
      C.  Regional sensitivities, the Coalition
IV.   Propaganda Development
      A.  Traditional forms
      B.  New campaign initiatives
V.    Product Application
      A.  Pre-air war dissemination
      B.  Pre-ground assault dissemination
      C.  Delivery systems discussion
VI.   Impact and Potential
      A.  Results and interpretations
      B.  Views to the future
           AN ANALYSIS OF GULF WAR PSYOPS AND THEIR
              APPLICABILITY TO FUTURE OPERATIONS
    U.S.  military  planners  were  pivotal  in developing and
executing  a coordinated, multi-national combined arms theater
campaign  that  succeeded  in  defeating  Iraq.   The U.S.-led
Coalition built a multi-national armed force capable of offen-
sive  operations,  and executed massive logistics preparations
in  order  to  support  and  sustain  it.    Inasmuch  as  the
Coalition  had  sufficient  time  to  plan and prepare for the
offensive,  forces  exploited  the time available to reach the
highest  possible  levels  of unit proficiency.  Time, in this
case,  as a decisive determinant of success, was a significant
advantage  that  may not be available in future crises.  This,
coupled  with  the  new  politics  of  the  defense budget and
ongoing  force  restructuring,  is  forcing  us to think about
ways to fight more efficiently.
    In   searching   for  ways  to  maintain  future  mission
effectiveness  in the face of force drawdown, it would be wise
to  examine  the impact that psychological operations (PSYOPS)
had  in facilitating U.S. objectives in the Gulf War.  Accord-
ing  to  the  final  report  to  Congress by the Department of
Defense,  CONDUCT  OF  THE  PERSIAN GULF WAR, (3:87) the PYSOP
effort  was focused on breaking  the Iraqi will to resist, and
on increasing the fears of Iraqi soldiers.  On G-Day,
24 February 1991, the Commander-in-Chief, Central Command
remarked  that ".... .we  were  succeeding  beyond  our expecta-
tions...I  was  overwhelmed,"  (10:456) regarding his campaign
in  which  the  first  day of the ground offensive saw a shift
from  deliberate  attack  to  exploitation.    The  unexpected
degree  of  success  enjoyed  by the Coalition can be directly
attributed  to  the manner  in  which PSYOPS complemented the
overall  conduct of operations against the enemy in the Kuwait
Theater of Operations.
    As  traditional  "users  of propaganda against the enemy,"
PSYOP  units generated initiatives during the Persian Gulf War
which   employed  standard,  dedicated  communications  assets
(principally  broadcasting   and printing equipment) in support
of  combat  operations.    (8:25)    Across the theater, these
activities complemented Coalition operations and directly con-
tributed  to  the  unexpectedly  rapid  demise of Saddam's war
machine.    Psychological  warfare  operations  took  on  both
subtle  and  overt forms during the Gulf War.  In combination,
they  constituted  a  significant force multiplier in enabling
the  Coalition to inflict a crushing defeat upon Iraqi forces,
and  in  decisively concluding operations with minimal loss of
life.    The many-faceted PSYOP contribution to victory in the
Gulf  War  is  worth examining in more detail to determine how
its  lessons  may  be  better integrated into preparations for
dealing with conflicts in the lean times ahead.
    Before  Coalition  forces  fired  the  first  shots in the
Persian  Gulf  War, a different type of force had already been
assembled  for months, and was engaged in a pitched battle for
dominance  over  Iraqi  forces.    Far away from headlines and
newscasts,  PSYOPS initiatives were bombarding Saddam's empire
in  the   form of wave upon wave of leaflet and radio assaults.
Planing   for  psychological operations began immediately after
the  invasion  of  Kuwait.    In  early  August  1990, a PSYOP
planning  group  consisting of military and civilian personnel
from  CENTCOM,  SOCOM,  and  the  4th Psychological Operations
Group  (POG)  from  Fort  Bragg  was  formed  at  HQ, CENTCOM,
MacDill  Air  Force  Base,  Florida.    This  group became the
nucleus   of  the  PSYOP  command  and  control  element  that
deployed  to Saudi Arabia in late August.  The 4th POG command
element  was  followed  shortly thereafter in September by its
subordinate  8th PSYOP Battalion, task-organized with elements
of  the  PSYOP  Dissemination Battalion (PDB), to form the 8th
Psychological  Operations  Task  Force.  The POTF's deployment
began  what was to become a highly successful use of PSYOPS in
support  of  combat  operations  in  Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and
Iraq.
    Persian  Gulf  War  strategic  and  tactical  field  level
psychological  operations  supported  the goals and conditions
set  forth  by President Bush and other Coalition leaders upon
an  international  scale.    The field level implementation of
those  international goals and conditions were, as a matter of
course,  effected  through  theater level military operations.
Integral  to  those  campaign executions were a series of well
established,  time-tested  precepts,  judiciously  applied  by
CENTCOM  psychological  warfare  operators.   The Persian Gulf
War  PSYOP  campaign  basically mirrored the missions of CINC,
US  CENTCOM, and alternately the Saudi Armed Forces Commander,
Lieutenant  General  Kahlid  Bin Sultan.  Upon deployment, the
4th  PSYOP  began  a  comprehensive  analysis of both of these
commanders'  missions,  as  well  as  the combined missions of
units  subordinate to their command, and developed a guideline
of probable PSYOP-based mission objectives.
    During  the  initial  stages  of  Operation DESERT SHIELD,
CENTCOM's  principal  goal  was  the  defense of Saudi Arabia.
The  rapid  deployment  of  tens of thousands of U.S. and non-
Arab  foreign  forces  to what had for almost 600 years been a
"closed  kingdom",  set  the stage for complicating an already
extremely  tense  situation.    In  support  of  easing  these
tensions,  the  4th PSYOP augmented the commander's mission by
demonstrating  to the regional Arab population that the United
States  was  only  one  member  of  a broader coalition force.
Further,  through  a  portrayal  of  encompassed  unity  which
included  Arab  forces,  the goal of the United States govern-
ment  was  not  to  conquer  or  dominate the Arab world as an
imperialist  venture.   This task was principally accomplished
during the initial months of DESERT SHIELD through the distri-
bution  of  a videocassette message to Saudi Arabian and other
regional  television stations.  The regional broadcast of this
multinational-power videotape  was  "designed  to demonstrate
U.S.  resolve  and  encourage support for Coalition efforts in
the  region."    (12:7)    The format of the videocassette was
grafted  from international news cuts which featured prominent
Arab  and  other  international  speakers  at  United  Nations
councils  and various  Arab  regional  summits.    First,  it
demonstrated  the  political  and military  strength  of  the
combined  forces  which  were arrayed against Iraq.  Moreover,
the  tape  not  only  strengthened  America's  argument  as to
Coalition  partnership, but also assured in no uncertain terms
that   the  U.S.  was  there  to  do  good  things  and,  more
importantly,  that  the  Iraqis  were not.  As Coalition force
levels   in  Saudi  Arabia    increased and missions changed with
respect  to  the    changing  political  and military situation,
these  videocassette  supporting efforts similarly changed, by
phase,   to   reflect   offensive,  consolidation,  and  enemy
prisoner operations throughout Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq.
    With  closure  of  forces, the anticipation of hostilities
dictated  the  development of other, more traditional forms of
propaganda.    Several  specific  campaigns were orchestrated,
including   operations   dealing  with  the  individual  Iraqi
soldier,   elements  within  the  Iraqi  command  and  control
structure,  and  operations  which  exclusively  addressed the
Iraqi  civilian  population.    The campaign organized against
the  individual  Iraqi soldier was divided into specific time-
phased  campaigns  including  pre-air war and several post-air
war  segments.    These  distinct  campaigns began development
simultaneously  during  early  September,  and  were  executed
variously as opportunities became available, or as required.
    The  Persian  Gulf  War  PSYOPS  campaign  began  with the
utilization   of  standard,  doctrinal  psychological  warfare
processes.    (4:54)    The initial process of target analysis
allowed  for development of PSYOPS campaign objectives in line
with military  objectives,  as  determined  and delineated by
CENTCOM.     Probable  psychological  vulnerabilities  of  the
target  audience  were  analyzed  and  projected  over time to
determine  a systematic methodology for delivery.  An order of
relevant  priorities  was  then  established, which 4th PSYOPS
eventually  utilized  as a flexible baseline in the conduct of
its  campaign.    This  target analysis effort culminated in a
PSYOP  campaign  which  emphasized  continual  themes  of "the
futility  of  resistance;  inevitability of defeat; surrender;
desertion   and   defection;  abandonment  of  equipment;  and
blaming  the  war  on Saddam Hussein."  (1:16)  The considera-
tion  of  national  policy  guidelines  was also indoctrinated
within  that  process;  a process which, in essence, is not at
all  unlike a civilian advertising campaign, which attempts to
ascertain  audience  acceptance  and appeal to any given topic
through analytical research.
    Throughout  the  buildup period from September to December
1990,  the  majority of effort concentrated on target analysis
and  campaign  control efforts, with initial planning directed
toward  easily  coordinated and obtainable PSYOP dissemination
methods.    In addition to the videocassette operation already
discussed, PSYOP materials  were  disseminated  upon  their
distinctive  audiences through three basic methodologies.  The
first  method, and most effective, was aerial leaflet dissemi-
nation.    Scripted  field  level  radio  transmissions, and a
combination  of  both  ground  and  air loudspeaker broadcasts
provided  the  two  additional  techniques used throughout the
conflict.
    Kuwait  Theater  of  Operations-generated PSYOPS materials
were  required  to  pass through several approval levels prior
to  achieving  final acceptance for target audience dissemina-
tion.   These various acceptance levels included, but were not
limited  to,  the  Commander,  4th PSYOPS, CENTCOM's J-3 staff
coordinator,   as  well  as  Headquarters  for  Saudi  Arabian
General  Khalid  and  General  Schwarzkopf.   Although General
Schwartzkopf  did  not  personally approve or disapprove every
product   type,   there   were  specific  instances  where  he
personally  did  become involved in the process.  Streamlining
measures  in  the  approval process were delegated to subordi-
nate  echelons.    Fail-safe  approval  mechanisms were estab-
lished  to  avoid  the  possible  devastating, negative impact
which  an  improper message  or  appeal  might  incur upon an
already  hostile   Iraqi  audience.   If leaflets, tapes, radio
scripts  or  any   other  PSYOP materials did not meet specific
cultural,  contextual  or  tactical criteria as defined by the
various  levels  of approval authority, they were returned for
modification,   resubmission   or   destruction,   as   deemed
appropriate.
    Leaflet  development  proved to be a very tedious process,
due  in  principle  to  the  many  layers of consideration and
acceptance  as  discussed,  as  well  as the physical distance
between  staffing  and  printing  facilities.   Actual leaflet
development   occurred   at  Riyadh,  with  digitized  imagery
transmission  to PDB printing facilities at Dhahran.  Although
leaflet   themes   were   being  continually  generated  since
September,  the  first  officially  acknowledged  instance  of
dissemination  did  not  occur until the 12th of January, when
Kuwait  City  was targeted with two distinct leaflet variants.
(6:45)
    Development  of the 29.1 million propaganda leaflets which
were  eventually  printed  for  dissemination  in  the  Kuwait
Theater   of   Operations   took  place   within  a  jointly-
coordinated,  combined propaganda cell in Riyadh.  (12.7)  The
combined  cell established functional control over the genera-
tion  of  all  leaflet,  radio,  script,  deceptive, and other
PSYOP  materials.    Available  within  the combined cell were
experienced  Saudi   and  Kuwaiti military PSYOP personnel, who
worked  both in the development of new propaganda concepts and
in  modifying  many  of  the  concepts  which had already been
developed.    Leaflet  development  was designed to foster and
expound  upon  key  action  points  or  "verbs"  determined in
target analysis  as enemy vulnerabilities.  (6:42)  These key
"verbs"  were  considered essential to successful execution of
the  PSYOP  campaign  as it related to the operational scheme.
For  example,  during  the pre-ground war campaign, key action
leaflet   verbs  were  developed  for  exploitation  such  as:
Saddam--Death--Hunger--Bombing--Family--Cease   Resistance--Be
Safe,  etc.    Key verbiage, multi- national expertise, PSYOP
themes  integrated with operational planning, and high quality
printing  control  resulted in a viable PSYOP medium which was
extensively used throughout the Kuwait Theater of Operations.
    While  efforts  for  popular support of Saddam's overthrow
were  being made  by  President  Bush and other Coalition and
world  leaders, PSYOP leaflet and radio broadcasting campaigns
disseminated  parallel  messages  upon  the Iraqi military and
civilian  populations.    The  principal  method  for  leaflet
dissemination  was  through  aerial delivery.  Prior to combat
operations,  leaflets  were  disseminated  by  C-130 aircraft;
they  were  dropped  from  high  altitudes  along the southern
Kuwaiti  border  and  followed  wind  patterns  to  cover  the
majority  of  front-line  Iraqi  units  in  Kuwait.  Specially
configured  M-129E1   leaflet   bombs   were  later  utilized
effectively  by  B-52, F-16 and F/A-18 aircraft throughout the
theater.
    Leaflet  delivery  supported  both  combat  and  deception
operations  across  the  entire  theater and had a significant
impact  in  contributing  to  degradation  of enemy morale and
will  to  fight.   The coordination of leaflet operations with
bombing   of   enemy  front-line  positions  was  particularly
effective.    Leaflet  deliveries warning of impending bombing
missions  on  specific  units and sites were actually followed
by  the   promised bombings, making the PSYOP campaign credible
among    Iraqi  soldiers,   and  producing  large  numbers  of
desertions   and  defections.     (11:9)  Leaflets  warning of
impending   amphibious  invasion  by U.S.  forces  were  given
credence  and  likewise   supported that deception and, even by
conservative  estimates,  helped  to divert at least two enemy
divisions  to  the  coast.   (1:18)  Leaflets overprinted with
VII   and  XVIII  Airborne Corps' unit insignia were intention-
ally   disseminated  along  avenues  of  approach  into  Iraqi
positions  where CENTCOM wanted the Iraqis to believe the main
U.S.  effort  would  be  concentrated.   Iraqi troop movements
were  subsequently monitored, confirming the credibility which
the leaflets had in eliciting such a response.
    Radio  and  loudspeaker  operations similarly complemented
combat  and deception operations.  Throughout the Persian Gulf
War,  many  hundreds  of  hours  of intrusive radio broadcasts
were  made  through  both  open  and  clandestine radio trans-
missions.    "Voice  of  the Gulf" and the "Radio Free Kuwait"
campaigns  are examples of such 4th PSYOP initiatives.  "Radio
Free  Kuwait,"  for  example,  communicated exclusively to the
Kuwaiti   resistance   movement   with  instructions  to  that
organization's   operations  in  support  of  the  Coalition's
invasion timetable.
    Other  PSYOP  radio  intrusions  into  Iraqi airspace were
physically  accomplished  by two methods.  The first method to
be  initiated  entailed ground based Special Forces teams dis-
persed  along  the  Saudi/Kuwaiti  border in early October and
November.      Utilizing  vehicular  mounted  low  power  (AM)
transmitters,  these  early broadcasts targeted Iraqi military
personnel  within  occupied  Kuwait.    The  second  4th PSYOP
broadcast  initiative  consisted  of  Voice  of the Gulf (VOG)
transmissions,  which  typically broadcast 18 hours per day on
multiple  AM and FM frequencies.  Radio scripts were developed
within  a  distinct  4th  PSYOP  combined cell in Riyadh, with
emphasis  that  VOG not be identified as a PSYOPS station.  In
that  regard,  the  station's  format  consisted  primarily of
regional  Arabic  music.   The abundance of music was designed
to  hold  Iraqi  and Kuwaiti target audiences' attention, with
only  periodic  interruption  with  selected  script read by a
native Kuwaiti broadcaster.
    A  deficiency  in  U.S. Army active duty field-level loud-
speaker  assets  early in Operation DESERT SHIELD necessitated
the  activation of reserve loudspeaker teams.  Drawn primarily
from  six  locations  in  the  U.S., they comprised a total of
sixty-six  three-man, vehicular-mounted teams with 4th PSYOPS,
and  were  attached  to  virtually  every brigade-level ground
maneuver  unit  within the Kuwait Theater of Operations.  Once
assigned,  loudspeaker  teams  were  tasked  with broadcasting
specific,  audience  taped  messages  upon the Iraqi military.
In  addition to deceptive noises and sound effects, tapes were
used  in issuing vocal appeals and instructions to the Iraqis,
to  coerce  them into surrendering.  Limited PSYOP loudspeaker
support  missions  were also conducted by helicopter, but were
not   acknowledged  as  efficient  due  to  conflicting  rotor
noise.    A loudspeaker team from 9th POB, attached to the 1st
Marine  Division's  300-man  Task  Force  "TROY,"  contributed
significantly  to  that unit's deception mission.  Deployed to
mask  the  movement  of 2d Marine Division to its new assembly
area  prior  to the ground assault, the contribution of PSYOPS
loudspeakers  to  the  Task  Force's  success was evidenced in
captured  Iraqi  intelligence documents.  Three separate Iraqi
brigades  in  the  Wafrah  area  listed  Task  Force TROY as a
division-sized unit, mechanized, preparing to attack.  (7:77)
    Operational  and tactical considerations for theater-level
PSYOPS  objective  were,  for  the  most  part,  collected and
staffed  by  planners  and  liaison  officers  affiliated with
major  commands  within the Kuwait Theater of Operations.  One
prominent  staff  officer  and  participant  within the Riyadh
coordination  cell  indicated  that planning for PSYOP support
to  operations  was,  more  often than not, conducted from the
bottom  up  in  formulating objectives.  (1:20)  Procedurally,
this  deviates  from  established  doctrine  which states that
PSYOPS  must  be  coordinated  from theater to division level,
and  that the G-3 is responsible for integrating psychological
and  combat  operations.    (5:7-22,  23)    During Operations
DESERT  SHIELD  and   DESERT  STORM approval actually did occur
through   the  J-3.     More  aggressive,  doctrinally  correct
coordination  may  have produced even more successful results.
J-3   generation  of  PSYOP  requirements to enhance the opera-
tional  scheme  would  have  not  only  streamlined propaganda
production,  but could have ensured that maximum support would
be given during preassault, assault and consolidation phases.
    The  impact  of the basic doctrinal forms of psychological
operations  exercised against the Iraqi military in Kuwait was
complemented,  and  actually  made possible, by forces, opera-
tions,  and  events.    PSYOPS exploited the full potential of
these  factors  and  acted  as a force multiplier in regard to
establishing  Coalition  advantages which undoubtedly affected
the  decision   of  many Iraqis to surrender.  PSYOPS magnified
the  presence   of  the  Coalition in the eyes of the enemy and
amplified  its potential and advantages to the maximum extent,
particularly in the following areas:
    Sea Power
    Amphibious Capability
    Air Superiority
    Weapons and Equipment Terminology
    Night Operations Capability
    Force Presence
    Training State
    Sense of Purpose, Just Cause and Coalition
    NBC Defense
PSYOPS  further  contributed  to  the  enemy's rapid demise by
exploiting  the  following perceived weaknesses common to many
Iraqi ground units in Kuwait:
    Interrupted Command and Control
    Isolation
    Hunger
    Morality of Invasion ("19th Province", Unjust Cause)
    War Weariness
    National Pride
    Vulnerability of Tanks, Artillery, Equipment to Targeting
    Lack of Confidence in Command Structure
    Sleeplessness (Bombings and Repetitive Leafleting)
    Susceptibility to Promises of Fair Treatment
    Economic Homefront/Family
    Fear of Death
    Prior  to  military  offensive  operations,  PSYOP efforts
prompted   the   individual  Iraqi  soldier  to  question  the
validity  of why he was physically stationed in Kuwait.  In so
doing,  soldiers were automatically and implicitly questioning
the  judgment of their superiors in placing them there.  Later
widespread  lack  of confidence in leaders, dwindling supplies
and  a  feeling  of  helplessness  in  the face of a perceived
superior  foe,  attrition  and imminent threat of invasion all
contributed  to  incapacitate many units' combat effectiveness
with  bad  morale  and lack of cohesion.  PSYOPS supported the
operational  scheme  by enhancing the overriding atmosphere of
despair  which  had  been  made more acute through devastating
air attacks prior to commencement of the ground war.
    Psychological  operations  not  only  channelled  a common
emotional  commitment from Iraqi combatants and provided sound
reasonings  for  ceasing the struggle, but demonstrated proper
surrender  techniques so as to avoid needless death.  Explicit
PSYOP verbal  and visual direction was given to units of all
types  with  specific  direction as to method of surrender for
dismounted  or mechanized personnel when approaching Coalition
forces.    In only one instance did this instruction result in
treachery,  when  elements of the Iraqi 5th Mechanized Brigade
used  PSYOP  surrender  procedures  as  a  ruse  in  order  to
approach  Al  Khafji  unmolested.   (13:270)  By demonstrating
that   Iraqi   military   hardware,  and  not  the  combatants
themselves,  were  the  object  of Coalition targetings, Iraqi
soldiers  quickly  garnered  a  sincere  respect for Coalition
motives  and  thereby  found  it easier to show commitment and
eventually   engage  in wholesale surrender.  As a proven force
multiplier,  the  impact of PSYOPS on the Persian Gulf War was
perhaps  best  alluded  to  by  Lieutenant  General W. Boomer,
USMC,  COM  FOR MARCENT,  on  the  day  of  the  cease  fire:
"...Their  morale  being  extremely  low  in  this  case,  the
clean-up  didn't  turn  out  to  be  the  huge  fight  we  had
anticipated."  (2)
    The   effective   manipulation  of  the  enemy's  tactical
perception  of  the  battlefield  helped  create the degree of
security  and  cover  needed  to  execute  CENTCOM's  flanking
maneuver.    The  result  was  the  destruction of much of the
regular  Army,  significant  damage  to  the Republican Guard,
overall  mission  accomplishment  and  minimal  loss  of  life
through a supportive and complementary PSYOP campaign.
    The   Persian   Gulf  War  has  shown  that  psychological
operations  are  more than just a "minor appendage to military
operations."    (9:9)   Clausewitz saw war as "an act of force
to  compel our adversary to do our will; .. .to impose our will
upon  the  enemy is the object."  (14.3)  In a world where the
potential  for simultaneous involvement of U.S. forces in more
than  one  conflict is not unlikely, and at a time when we are
experiencing  a  seemingly  irreversible  reduction  in force,
perhaps  more  attention  to PSYOPS and its proper application
is  warranted.    Regardless  of  the environment and level of
conflict  intensity,  it  would  seem  prudent to explore this
possibility  further,  and  expand  the lessons of the Persian
Gulf  War  PSYOP  campaign  to  facilitate  future operations,
integrated with this proven force multiplier.
                         Bibliography
1.  Adolph, Maj. R. B., Jr., "PSYOP:  Gulf War Force
      Multiplier."  Army Magazine, December 1992.
2.  Boomer, LtGen. W. M.  "DESERT STORM:  The Ground Assault,"
      War in the Gulf Video Series, Video Ordnance, Inc.,
      1991.
3.  Final Report to Congress.  Conduct of the Persian Gulf
      War, Title V, U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash.,
      D.C., April 1992.
4.  FM 33-5, Psychological Operations Techniques and
      Procedures, Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1974.
5.  FM 100-5, Operations, Headquarters, Department of the
      Army, Wash., D.C., 1986.
6.  Johnson, R. D.  PSYOP:  The Gulf Paper War, Titusville,
      FL., 1992 (Pre-Publication, Permission of the Author).
7.  Liberators of Kuwait City.  First Marine Division.  Public
      Affairs Office, 1st MarDiv, May 1992.
8.  Linebarger, Paul M.  Psychological Warfare.  2d Edition.
      Combat Forces Press, Wash., D.C., 1954.
9.  McLauren, R. D.  Military Propaganda.  Psychological
      Warfare and Operations.  Praeger Publishers, N.Y., 1982.
10. Schwartzkopf, LtGen. H. Norman.  It Doesn't Take A Hero.
      The Autiobiography.  Bantam, October 1992.
11. Stankiewicz, LtCol. P. R.,  "PSYOP:  Winning Wars by
      Saving Lives."  Asia-Pacific Defense Forum, Winter
      1992-93.
12. Summe, Maj. J. N.  "PSYOP Support to Operations DESERT
      SHIELD/DESERT STORM."  Special Warfare Magazine, Vol. 5,
      No. 2, HQDA, October 1992.
13. U.S. News and World Report.  Triumph Without Victory, The
      Unreported History of the Persian Gulf War.  Random
      House, 1992.
14. Von Clausewitz, Karl.  On War.  Combat Forces Press,
      Wash., D.C., 1953.



NEWSLETTER
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list