Let's All Get On Board With CAS CSC 1993 SUBJECT AREA - General EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Let's All Get On Board With CAS Author: Major E. E. Shoults, United States Marine Corps Marine Corps Command and Staff College Thesis: The reoccurring technical and tactical problems associated with CAS can be corrected through a joint effort encompassing historical analysis and a cooperative effort. Background: The history of CAS since World War I has been marked by tragedy--lives lost, unduly protracted conflict, and victory deferred--because both air and ground officers have too often failed to benefit as they might from history. (1:535) Past conflicts validate the demand for CAS. The mission will always be complex because of competing technologies used in defense and offense, along with the demand for night and bad weather capability. Unfortunately, the historical record suggests forces, staffs, and equipment will not be ready in the future. It indicates a failure to develop the necessary doctrines of CAS properly to pass on the tactics and techniques, the procedures, and indeed the attitudes found essential to support ground forces by Navy, USMC, and USAF aviation. This lack of readiness has, and will, result in the needless loss of lives owing to fratricide and/or the inability of aircraft to get bombs "on target, on time." Recommendation: It is time for a doctrinal focus shift by the air power enthusiasts. Doctrine is the key to maintaining our warfighting edge over our opponents. To be understood, doctrine must be kept active by a regular and repetitious training program. Doctrine rests on experience, but there is always the danger of viewing experience too narrowly and drawing the wrong inferences from it. (1:548) Once a rational appraisal has been done of the decisive impact that CAS has on the total war effort, then the many problems with training, terminal control, and technology associated with CAS execution will be quickly identified and corrected through a joint effort. OUTLINE Thesis: The reoccurring technical and tactical problems associated with CAS can be corrected through a joint effort encompassing historical analysis and a cooperative effort. I. Historical Perspectives on CAS A. Early Military Experiences and Conclusions B. World War 1 Experiences and Conclusions C. World War 2 Experiences and Conclusions D. Korea Experiences and Conclusions E. Vietnam Experiences and Conclusions F. Desert Storm Experiences and Conclusions II. Changes Required for Proper Air Power Focus A. Develop Flexible Joint Doctrine B. Re-evaluate Training Priorities C. Train Terminal Control Specialists D. Solve Technology Problems with Joint Effort LET'S ALL GET ON BOARD WITH CAS In the military it is commonplace that interallied and interservice operations pose serious difficulties in execution. Differences in equipment, in doctrine, in attitude and outlook stemming from contrasting past experiences all inhibit harmonious interaction. In no area of interservice operations has this problem been more pronounced than in the matter of Close Air Support(CAS). The reoccurring technical and tactical problems associated with CAS can be corrected through a joint effort encompassing historical analysis and a cooperative effort. Prior to addressing the execution deficiencies in CAS, the basic doctrinal premises must be altered by the air power advocates. Then the problems associated with joint air doctrine, joint training, terminal control, and interoperable equipment will receive proper attention and priority. The historical record shows that forces fail to accomplish missions and Servicemen die because of lack of cooperation and doctrinal regard. (4:84) With each new conflict, campaign planners determine the employment and allocation of available air assets. Without the luxury of an unlimited supply of aircraft, mission planners must, and do, prioritize the available sorties. Historically and doctrinally, strategic interdiction takes precedence over CAS. As the result of the Key West Agreement of 1943, and reiterated in FM 100-20(Command and Employment of Air Power), the first priority is to gain the necessary degree of air superiority. The second mission is to interdict hostile movement into theater. The last task is to participate in the battle area to the immediate front of the ground forces. This precedence immediately relegates direct aviation support to the ground forces to the tertiary, peripheral position in the air component commander's overall planning scheme. The USAF, the primary aviation service, holds to the conviction that the strategic deep mission is the only viable use of air power. Massive strikes against the center of gravity and lines of communication of the enemy are the decisive events of the conflict. CAS will always be unwanted by the USAF. The job will not be given to the Army lest it create a rival air arm; and it will not be embraced because it relinquishes the central control of air power. (2:35) During peacetime, this narrow focus results in the channeling of resources, equipment, and training to support the strategic mission. Each conflict highlights the fact that the services are not prepared to conduct CAS. Prior to 1914 military leaders were chiefly interested in air power because of the enhanced possibilities it offered in observation and reconnaissance. Well before the outbreak of WW I, both military and civilian leaders spoke of a combat role for the airplane. In 1893 Count Zeppelin told the German Chief of Staff that his airship was capable of attacking fortifications and troop concentrations. The air-to-ground offensive potential of the airplane was tested in several small wars before WW I. Aerial bombing in support of ground operations was introduced during the Italo-Turkish war of 1911-1912. There was also bombing in the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913. In those wars such action was random, and often at the initiative of the individual aviator. The years before WW I saw practical efforts to make the airplane effective weapons as France, Britain, Germany, and Italy mounted bombs and machine-guns on aircraft. In the US, the Army's Signal Corps conducted flight tests to perfect a bombsight and to use machine-guns against ground targets. As a result of these and other experiments, by the time war came to Europe in 1914, the airplane had been demonstrated in the US as a valuable weapon. In the first part of WW I, military aviation's only officially recognized function was to serve as the eyes of the army. By October 1914, officials began to encourage the offensive use of aircraft. It was over the Western Front that air power reached its most sophisticated level of development. The early bombing plane served chiefly as an extension of artillery well behind the enemy front. Early command relationships between air and ground forces came largely from the need for air reconnaissance and artillery spotting. As air power developed and adapted itself to position warfare, its organization became more elaborate. More centralized control accorded well with the mobility of air units and facilitated rapid and massive concentration at critical times and points in a battle. The first attempts at liaison on the battlefield were plagued by a number of difficulties, most of them stemming from the ground troops' hesitation to use signaling devices. As early as April 1916, the French Army issued an unified set of instructions defining techniques of air-infantry cooperation. The British, and eventually the Americans, borrowed the French system. The most ambitious effort in CAS was the German Schlachtstaffeln of 1918. The German techniques of air concentration at decisive points contrasted markedly with the British small patrols roving freely in search of targets. The Schlachtstaffeln were controlled by infantry corps commanders, who were in the best position to decide their disposition. At the end of WW I, air support aircraft had 2 categories of targets: objectives along the enemy's frontal positions, and a whole range of targets extending 20 miles and more beyond the front. A considerable body of opinion held that the chief contribution of aircraft should be objectives beyond the front Enemy reinforcements moving up in column were more visible and vulnerable than were front line troops in fortifications. Additionally, objectives behind the front tended to be less defended. By the time of the Armistice, CAS yielded a number of lessons, many of which reappeared 20 years later. First of all, aircraft had a significant effect on the morale of troops in battle. Each soldier felt that enemy aircraft attacked him personally. The emphasis on psychological rather than physical damage to the enemy slowed the development of weapons especially suitable to ground attack. As time went on, the purely emotional reaction to aircraft over the battlefield tended to decline. Towards the end of the war, both sides had developed and used antiaircraft guns along the front. As a result of this changing nature of aerial warfare, CAS became more hazardous and less successful towards the end of the war. Experiments in centralized command encountered opposition in the ground forces. As a rule, air staffs tended to see the benefits of centralized control, while army staffs tended to focus on the shortcomings. This fundamental difference of opinion would remain one of the key problems to be resolved in the subsequent history of CAS. In the years between the World Wars, exchanges between air and ground leaders tended to be negative in tone. Such conflict was dramatized by the celebrated "Billy Mitchell Affair." This lack of harmony had a serious effect on the evolution of CAS. With no common interest in resolving the problems inherent in ground support, little effort was expended on joint exercises or on the formulation of doctrine. Another consideration that helps explain the lack of emphasis on tactical aviation is the preoccupation with strategic bombing. This rationale left aviation ill-prepared to support the ground forces at the outbreak of WW II. When the Second World War broke out in September 1939, the German Luftwaffe had the most effective CAS system of any of the great powers. Even so, their system was a recent creation based on very limited combat experience. For the other belligerents, even less prepared, the first campaigns posed enormous problems. The basic reason for these early problems is most air forces entered the conflict armed with doctrine, planes, and pilots untested in battle. The Luftwaffe's doctrinal manual, The Conduct of the Air War, showed a ready grasp of the political and strategic complexities of 20th century warfare. The document was explicit that the Luftwaffe should aid the Reich's ground forces. Most German officers seem to have felt that the lives of aircrew and ground troops, and the successful completion of military operations, was more important than the narrow concerns of their own service. (1:104) However, the impression created by this doctrine was that CAS is subsidiary to missions such as interdiction, air superiority, and strategic bombing. CAS did not necessarily represent the best employment of air power, but it was a mission that could render significant help to the ground forces. In the years before the US entered WW II, the major mission of Army Air Corps(AAC) was the support of ground forces. However, in the 1930s, the AAC became preoccupied with strategic bombing. By 1941, the US was committed to strategic bombing. The plan for conducting the air war, Air War Plans Division Plan Number 1(AWPD-1), emphasized strategic bombing of the German homeland to achieve victory. In virtually all the joint air-to-ground maneuvers during 1940, the AAC seemed incapable of undertaking ground support missions. By the end of 1941, it had become clear that the AAC conducted operations according to its own concept of air power, without regard for the needs of ground forces. It remained the doctrine to not attack targets within the range of friendly artillery. After the Tunisian Campaign, FM 100-20, Command and Employment of Air Power, was published in 1943. This manual set the priority for air employment: air superiority, interdiction, followed by CAS. The manual shaped the way the AAC employed its tactical air forces for the remainder of the war. This manual was the product of personalities and experiences gained in Tunisia and the Western Desert by the Allied air forces. By the spring of 1944 in the Italian campaign, allied CAS had matured to the point where command and control, ground FACs, aircraft and armament, and air-land doctrine required only refinement. The most significant change was the change made in the air control process. At its heart was a well-defined procedure for command and control, which was governed by a requirement for extensive air-to-ground cooperation at all levels. As the tactical air command and control was regularized, FAC techniques became routine. The most widely known technique, Rover, was developed at this time. Additionally, during this period an optimum aircraft arrived in Europe for CAS, the P47D Thunderbolt. The CAS system advanced in the area of air-land doctrine as well. Land forces requested air strikes on specific targets, but air commanders controlled the aircraft. The noteworthy aspect of air operations in the Mediterranean was that the air forces in this theater pioneered tactical operations, establishing methods and principles that were of value in all the theaters of war. (1:225) The campaign in France presented CAS aviation with the challenge of performing a variety of operations. The mixed record of CAS in the early weeks of the campaign raised questions of how effective the training program had been before D-Day. There were not many large scale regimental or divisional exercises with aircraft. General Bradley claims in his memoirs that the US Army and the AAC assaulted Normandy unprepared for effective CAS because of this lack of training. Operation Dragoon, the US and French landing in the south of France in 1944, introduced the Mediterranean system of CAS into the European theater. CAS helped maintain the momentum of the Allied advance. Almost all officers interviewed after the war agreed that visible CAS raised the morale of the troops. CAS also contributed greatly to the reduction of enemy artillery fire. German sources also provide a useful evaluation of CAS. The preponderance of the German evidence points to the damaging effects of Allied CAS on their operations. On December 7, 1941, when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, the AAC in the Pacific had no experience with CAS. In fact, the term CAS had no official existence. CAS was not to be defined completely until after the war ended. The infant AAC accepted the tactical task of winning air superiority without question. Once accomplished, however, AAC leaders argued that interdiction of supplies, reinforcements, and LOCs should take priority over CAS. The most important factor affecting AAC's disregard of and distaste for CAS was the development of the doctrine of strategic bombing. Influenced by Douhet, Trenchard, and Mitchell, many AAC officers became convinced that strategic bombing would become the decisive element of the war. The War Department was convinced that the AAC officers opposed CAS primarily because they feared that it would bring about control of air units by ground commanders. Luzon, January 1945, would see the most extensive CAS in the Pacific. For the landing, no fewer than 18 escort carriers were assigned to support 2 corps of infantry. In addition, 13 fast carriers provided indirect support against enemy airfields. Plans for CAS following the amphibious phase were elaborate. Approximately 85 percent of the sorties flown over Luzon supported ground forces. The use of FACs to direct CAS was very common during the campaign. Certain conclusions emerge from the Pacific experience with CAS operations. Air superiority was an absolute requirement. The attitude of the air commander was a major factor in determining how much CAS the ground forces would receive. (1:331) Target identification was a major problem in the 1940s. There was no single complete solution to this target identification problem. Marking targets with smoke was overall the most effective means. By 1944 FACs began to talk aircraft onto targets. Air power doctrine never gave operational control of aircraft to the ground commanders. CAS procedures used in WW II never threatened the integrity of AAC command. When the Air Force(USAF) became an independent service in 1947, the principles and procedures of FM 31-35 were the basis for tactical air support to the Army. A series of disappointing joint tactical air exercises in 1947-1950 caused both USAF and Army leaders to call for a revision of this manual. The major defects came from the performance of the air control system. The doctrinal effort to correct these deficiencies was published in 1950 as the Joint Training Directive for Air-Ground Operations. However, neither the USAF nor the Army accepted it as service policy. The USAF felt the guidance endangered its control of mission priorities. The Army thought the directive failed to give ground commanders any real power over tactical air support. With the outbreak of the Korean War, the Army did not expect integrated CAS, and the USAF did not intend to deliver it except under certain controlled conditions. (1:351) At the beginning of the Korean War, there was confusion, frustration, and inefficiency amongst the aviation services. Three American air organizations flew tactical offensive air operations for United Nations Command(UNC) forces in Korea: the USAFs Far East Air Forces(FEAF), the 1st Marine Air Wing(MAW), and the USN Seventh Fleet Task Force 77(TF 77). These aviation forces had differing views on the relative contribution to ground operations of interdiction strikes and CAS missions. These differences were based in doctrine, organization, training, equipment, and tactical techniques. The interservice disputes sometimes obscured the overall contributions of UNC air operations to the conduct of the war. It took 6 months for the UNC air operations to show a good degree of coordination. These first 6 months also focused attention upon the differences in USAF and USMC CAS operations, and sparked a serious interservice controversy. The Navy-Marine Corps system for both air requests and air direction stressed rapid response and decentralized management of CAS sorties. This system did not involve extensive participation of intervening headquarters. The USAF had analyzed this system during the roles and missions controversy of the 1940s. The USAF argued that the Navy system was appropriate for the assault phase of amphibious operations, but that CAS should not substitute for heavy artillery. In 1951 1st MAW came under control of the USAF Joint Operation Center(JOC). The USAF's precedence of interdiction over CAS caused heated debates between Marine and USAF leaders. Throughout 1951, ground commanders voiced strong criticism over the lack of responsive provided by the USAF JOC system. Delay times for CAS strikes averaged nearly 2 hours. By the time of the Inchon landing, US Army leaders were vocal and unrestrained champions of Marine CAS. The USAF system was openly criticized by General MacArthur's staff. The Army Chief of Staff filed a formal criticism of CAS operations with the USAF Chief of Staff. After inquiries, it was determined that the doctrine in FM 31-35 was sound. The basic problem was that the USAF and Army had not yet provided trained staffs, control agencies, and communications systems necessary to make the doctrine work. The 1st Marine Division withdrawal from the Chosin Reservoir tested the Marine CAS system and found it fully justified in the most demanding of extended ground operations. (1:373) Until the end of the war the weight of the air effort remained interdiction operations. During 1952 only 13 percent of the USAF sorties were CAS. This number reflected the doubts that the USAF had of the effectiveness of CAS against the Communists' heavily fortified front with strong antiaircraft concentrations. By the time the war ended in Korea, the organizations and procedures developed to provide CAS, while still less than ideal, nonetheless achieved a high degree of effectiveness. UNC's air success stemmed from the characteristics of the opposing air and ground forces. The UNC established air superiority early in the war. The North Korean Air Force had fewer than 200 combat aircraft. Moreover, the mechanized/motorized divisions of the North Korean Army made excellent targets for air attack. LOCs provided relatively defenseless targets. UNC ground forces' weaknesses in artillery forced air units to concentrate on CAS. After the armistice of July 27, 1953, the major participants in UNC's CAS operations sent representatives to USAF headquarters in Seoul to examine the lessons of the war. This Air-Ground Operations Conference discussed all aspects of CAS, from training to equipment. Army, Navy, and USMC representatives proposed changes to the air request and air control system. The air request system had to be decentralized and simplified, especially for emergency missions. The USAF, while admitting the analysis was accurate, refused to endorse any deviation from existing doctrine. At the heart of USAF opposition to any change remained its commitment to interdiction as the principal instrument of air war. The conference concluded with no joint doctrine for air-ground operations. The USAF in Korea clung to its traditional concepts, directing most of its resources to an often costly strategic bombing campaign against an enemy that presented precious few appropriate targets. (13:13) The Korean War might have afforded the USAF some useful hints for future limited wars. For example, interdiction failed because the Chinese and Koreans were less dependent on their supply lines than Western armies, and were extremely clever in sustaining supply lines in spite of the bombing. USAF commitment to interdiction in Korea weakened the potential contribution of CAS. This aggressive policy of an USAF-controlled JOC and centralized control of air power permeated the doctrine, training, and leadership of the services prior to US involvement in Vietnam. The predominance of this thinking demonstrated that the USAF had missed the political-military lessons of the first limited war of the Cold War era. (13:13) In the aftermath of the Korean War, American strategists tailored the armed forces to meet an all-out nuclear exchange. During the era of "Massive Retaliation," the unbeatable combination of air power and nuclear weapons had, according to Commander of SAC General Curtis E. LeMay, "ended forever the era of protracted wars like Korea; in future wars, the decision would be reached in the first few days." (13:9) General LeMay was particularly vehement in opposing what he regarded as the artificial and dangerous division of US air power into tactical and strategic aviation. In particular, he objected to tying down a substantial portion of USAF aviation in support of surface forces. The USAF did little about tactical aviation until the early 1960s. The careful attention required to develop limited conventional warfare and counterinsurgency doctrine, especially with regard to CAS, lapsed in the all-encompassing strategy of nuclear deterrence. In the early 1960s, the Army and the USAF struggled to reach some accommodation concerning CAS. When US forces went into action in Southeast Asia, the USAF found itself once more unprepared to provide adequate CAS to the ground forces. It seemed as if a new generation of leaders with little knowledge of the past was going to fight over the same issues. An official USAF air warfare board clearly identified the difficulty as a failure to develop sound doctrine. On the eve of the US buildup in Vietnam, joint Army-USAF doctrine on CAS was nonexistent. The USAF and the NCA entered the Vietnam war confident in the belief that superior US military technology could solve any strategic problem. (13:13) The USAF fell victim to the unswerving commitment of its leadership to the doctrine of strategic bombing. In North Vietnam there were few strategic targets. North Vietnam was clearly neither WW II Germany nor Japan. In 1962, the Army set up a Tactical Mobility Requirements Board to examine aviation support issues. Among other things, the board recommended that commanders of field armies possess operational control over their air support. Within 1 month, the USAF created the Tactical Air Support Requirements Board to address the Army's findings. The USAF board advocated a joint concept wherein all aviation would remain under control of the USAF. Faced with differing views, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara ordered a joint Army-USAF examination of CAS. Despite some agreement on a few issues, the joint group could not reach an accord either on command and control issues or the type of aircraft used for CAS. The Army wanted decentralized control. The USAF insisted on centralized control of all aviation assets. Until the US ground troop buildup in 1965, problems continued to hamper the delivery of timely and effective CAS. One USAF study found that the response time for CAS requests prior to 1965 averaged 90 minutes, and that only one half of all requests were met. Weaknesses in CAS included cumbersome control procedures. Additionally, American aircraft were ill- suited to fight an extended conventional war. Few American strike aircraft could bomb in bad weather or at night. In April 1965, the Army and USAF Chiefs of Staff signed a Concept for Improved Joint Air-Ground Coordination. The Agreement formalized procedures for the apportionment and allocation of tactical air resources. The USAF agreed to assume responsibility for the required communications equipment and to provide FACs to Army battalions. By 1966, the Tactical Air Control system provided for planning, coordinating, directly, and controlling tactical air operations. In 1968, General Westmoreland implemented the USAF as the single manager of all air operations. The Army, Navy, and USMC all took exception to this new policy. The USAF felt that an air component commander should have the flexibility to adjust air resources among the tactical arena of counter air, interdiction, and CAS. This shift to the single air manager system caused controversy at the highest levels. At the heart of obtaining an effective CAS system in Vietnam was the FAC. The FAC advised the ground unit commanders on tactical air operations, had to be familiar with all required communication for CAS, and controlled air strikes near friendly positions. By 1970, more than 800 FACs were operating in Vietnam. The search for an aircraft for the FAC mission led inevitably to question the development of a specially designed FAC aircraft. The special conditions existing in Vietnam served to intensify the debate over developing an aircraft solely for CAS. Eventually the OV-10 Bronco proved ideally suited for the task. Some of the specific procedures and tactics associated with CAS operations helped change the conduct of the war in Vietnam. The development of the TAC system, evolution of the gunship, and the arming of the FAC aircraft accelerated the response time to air requests. In addition, the development of flare operations assisted in night CAS. However, these procedures, tactics, and doctrine for the employment of CAS fueled debate over the proper use of air power long after the Vietnam war was over. (1:445) The next major employment of air power was Desert Storm. The air campaign was planned by BGEN John Warden. He employed his concept of "concentric circles," first targeting the inner most circle: NCA, C3I capabilities, and air defense networks. Only later were the outer rings of the military forces in transit or at the front targeted by air power. US Central Command air component commander's plan for the air campaign in support of Desert Storm was remarkably similar to the concepts, objectives, and details articulated in AWPD-1. (4:86) A concentric ring theory of national structure, relative value of targets, national vulnerabilities, and vital centers of gravity was used to count, organize, and prioritize targets. BGEN Warden did depart from air power orthodoxy in his recognition that the air campaign can, and should, be tailored to the realities of the situation: the nature of the enemy, the political and military objectives at stake, and the capability of US forces. The USAF, with the preponderance of air assets in theater, assumed the role as the Joint Force Air Component Commander(JFACC). Joint aviation doctrine, which is a restatement of USAF doctrine, set the employment priority for all aviation assets in theater. This doctrine of centralized control and execution allows for maximum control but minimal flexibility. This lack of flexibility works to the detriment of responsive CAS. The USMC's approach of decentralized execution allows for quick and decisive employment of air power. The USMC's focus on air support in proximity to Marine ground forces engaged with the enemy, is what differentiates the Marine air power perspective from that of the USAF. (6:70) This doctrinal divergence between the services resulted in the USMC having to create workarounds during Desert Storm in order to provide CAS. During Desert Storm, a Joint Targeting Coordination Board(JTCB) coordinated component target requirements. Then a list of priority targets was developed for inclusion into the daily ATO. Without joint direction, the ground commanders soon felt voiceless in the overall targeting process, since from their perspective air operations were concentrated on strategic targets without an appropriate weight of effort against ground targets. The allocation of CAS resources was also an issue, as it has been since WW II. In Desert Storm, there was a general excess of sorties available. As a result the JFACC never had to address problems over priorities. However, priorities should be situation dependent, not doctrinally defined. To hold otherwise is to prematurely foreclose options that can accomplish the mission at a lower cost in ground forces. (4:87) Conflict arose between the JFACC and MARCENT as to how to manage airspace lying beyond the FSCL. JFACC and USAF doctrine view the FSCL as a restrictive control measure. All aircraft and ordnance used beyond the FSCL must be coordinated and approved by the JFACC. In contrast, the Army and the USMC both view activities beyond the FSCL as nonrestrictive. Resolution of this issue and standardization of joint air control procedures are critically important in maintaining the responsiveness of Marine air. (6:71) One of the most significant USMC criticisms of the JFACC in Desert Shield/Storm was that the JFACC was reluctant to shift phases of the war from strategic targeting to battlefield preparation. The effect of an interdiction strike is indirect, delayed, and long-range, and thus difficult to measure against the losses and frustrations of the ground commander. (1:538) Another JFACC issue that drew criticism was the unresponsive nature of the AT0 process that drove Coalition air operations. Because of the inability to change or add missions to the ATO, MARCENT ACE developed what came to be known as workarounds. Third MAW wrote generic strike packages into the schedule rather than target-specific packages, all in an attempt to retain flexibility. Fixed-wing CAS in the Persian Gulf took a lot of improvising in command, control, communications, tactics, and tasking to make it work. There were services differences and command, control, and communications difficulties that were never tested by a coherent, capable, determined enemy response. Those who design the air forces and concepts for the 21st century will succeed only to the extent that they understand that Desert Storm as paradigm could prove as intellectually pernicious as did Korea and Vietnam as anomalies. (13:19) Targeting and control were much improved by Joint STARS and ABCCC, but neither system was designed to provide precise control of CAS. (6:68) Acquiring targets from fast jets in combat was as much of a problem in Desert Storm as it had been in previous conflicts. In practice, it turned out that most societies, even Iraq, can withstand much greater punishment than the air power enthusiasts thought. One clear lesson of Desert Storm is that while air power provided the technical capability to bypass the castles, sooner or later you have to engage the enemy's army on the ground. (13:17) As a result of the deep interdiction campaign in Desert Storm, myopic air enthusiasts have even suggested that strategic air power alone is the dominant force in all wars. To allocate the limited aviation assets to press the deep battle, at the expense of CAS, works well as long as the enemy keeps his forces and equipment massed in large concentrations. If he keeps his combat power operationally dispersed until arrival on the battlefront, deep interdiction will have minimal effect on the enemy's ability to bring formidable forces to the tactical arena. Moreover, if the opponent has no sophisticated C3 capability, then deep strikes will find few targets that merit the expense or effort. Korea and Vietnam are 2 examples of this lack of lucrative strategic targets. With historical reflection, all the services will realize that CAS is a viable, necessary, and cost-effective application of air power. To perform CAS requires centralized control and decentralized execution. The preferred method of control of air power is dependent upon the mission that is assigned to the aviation element. Once the fundamental importance of centralized control of air assets is understood by both air and ground officers, then the solution lies in perfecting the organization and procedures. The tragedy has been that each time the services have constructed a solution, the system has been abandoned and largely forgotten as soon as the conflict is over. (1:535) With a firm doctrinal understanding, the JFACC will realize that this flexible execution does not result in the loss of command and control over the theater air assets. Once air superiority is achieved, the strategic deep and close battle will receive equal shares of the total air campaign effort. Joint air power doctrine will encompass the historical reality of the necessity for CAS. Once the doctrinal focus is redirected, then the finer points of CAS execution will be solved in an atmosphere of cooperative effort. Corresponding to the de-emphasis on the necessity for CAS, comes the resultant lack of interest on training and equipment. The USMC devotes less than 5 percent of the fixed-wing training sorties to CAS. The other services devote even less of the available training time to this mission. It is a rare occurrence to have joint and/or combined CAS training. Even in peacetime, CAS is a challenging and demanding mission. Add in night and bad weather, and CAS can task saturate even the most experienced aviator. Only through constant training can a pilot be relied upon to perform effective CAS. This lack of training emphasis is somewhat unsettling for a ground commander who is trusting lives to the ability of the CAS aircraft to deliver ordnance in proximity to his position. A re-evaluation of aviation training priorities across the services will result in more emphasis on conducting joint CAS exercises. The USAF or USN can support Marines during Combined Arms Exercises. The Marines can provide CAS to a USAF, USN, or USA operation. More joint CAS training will result in more effective air power employment in the joint future. Joint air- to-air training has been conducted for years. It is time that air-to-ground training receives the same emphasis and priority. The Forward Air Controller(FAC), the terminal controller, is a vital link in the effectiveness of CAS. This FAC is an aviator with varying degrees of experience and expertise in the control of CAS aircraft. With the confusion of battle, the FAC has limited time to influence the impact and decisiveness of the hits on target. This coordination and timing takes repeated training between the target marking agency, the FAC, and the CAS aircraft. Too often CAS is ineffective due to a breakdown in communication, coordination, or proficiency. A Marine FAC knows little of the capabilities and requirements of other service aircraft to conduct joint CAS. Each service has its own training program to designate an individual as a FAC. This training is service and aircraft specific, with little joint interaction. A solution to this disparity is to establish a joint combined arms controller school. With equal emphasis on all DOD aircraft, as well as artillery and naval gunfire, this school will produce joint terminal controllers. Combining the individual service schools will save on training costs. Additionally, a joint school will ensure standardization in knowledge and tactical employment of fire power. This joint training program will ensure future FACs are capable of controlling all aircraft in the dynamic CAS mission. Presently, all the services take an aviator out of the cockpit for 1 to 2 years to perform as a FAC. This tasking includes both helicopter and jet pilots. After a short training program, with minimal actual CAS control, the aviator is designated a FAC. For a jet pilot trained to the CAS mission, this is usually a smooth transition. For the helicopter pilot, this new environment can be confusing and overwhelming. By the time he feels comfortable as a FAC, he is heading back to the cockpit. The rationale that only an aviator can be a FAC is based upon the premise that he is familiar with the mission. CAS is a demanding mission that takes proficiency from both the pilot and the FAC. A more viable system is to train non-aviators as a Joint Combined Arms Controller(JCAC). As a primary MOS, this JCAC would be able to devote all his time and energy to become a naval gunfire, artillery, and CAS terminal control expert. Remaining in the specialty will allow the JCAC to gain years of experience and expertise across the field of combined arms employment. This fire support controller would be a targeting expert, able to quickly assess what supporting fire needs to be employed on a particular target. The British practice in WW II of using Army officers, rather than pilots, as FACs was highly successful. Additionally, this system was successfully demonstrated with artillery officers as Aerial Observers in the OV-10 aircraft. With high regularity, command, control, and communications(C3) is the direct cause of the breakdown in the delivery of effective fire support. Emphasis on joint training, combined with JCAC expertise on the ground, will quickly identify and correct any shortfalls using a cost sharing cooperative effort. All the services will have a common interest in solving the joint fire support employment problem. Any joint employment communication deficiency will get priority in the DOD budget. The task of those who must prepare the nation for a future war is a matter of matching the characteristics of the planes selected for CAS to the environment by the prevailing level of technology in aircraft. (1:547) The battlefield grows in lethality, depth, and tempo. The attack jet aircraft characterized by speed, range, and flexibility has not seen its last CAS mission. (3:41) However, a CAS aircraft is expensive. A fixed-wing CAS aircraft that can cope with the threat, accomplish the mission with accuracy in adverse weather or darkness, and has the communications, navigation, and pilot workload-reducing sys- tems necessary to rapidly and flexibility integrate into the battle is the most expensive fighter one can buy. (3:35) As Alfred A. Cunningham stated, "The only excuse for aviation in any service is its usefulness in assisting troops on the ground to successfully carry out their operations." (6:66) No one would argue the top priority for aviation is to gain and maintain air superiority. This allows freedom of action for the ground commander, while impeding the enemy's actions. Deep interdiction is also important, if the enemy concentrates his forces and equipment in the rear area prior to battle. Joint operations will normally have an USAF JFACC to coordinate the overall employment of the air combat arm. Doctrinally, the USAF relegates CAS to the tertiary position in the competition for limited assets. This approach to air power employment has a direct and detrimental impact on training emphasis and equipment procurement. The history of CAS since World War I has been marked by tragedy--lives lost, unduly protracted conflict, and victory deferred--because both air and ground officers have too often failed to benefit as they might from history. (1:535) Past conflicts validate the demand for CAS. The mission will always be complex because of competing technologies used in defense and offense, along with the demand for night and bad weather capability. Unfortunately, the historical record suggests forces, staffs, and equipment will not be ready in the future. It indicates a failure to develop the necessary doctrines of CAS properly to pass on the tactics and techniques, the procedures, and indeed the attitudes found essential to support ground forces by Navy, USMC, and USAF aviation. This lack of readiness has, and will, result in the needless loss of lives owing to fratricide and/or the inability of aircraft to get bombs "on target, on time." It is time for a doctrinal focus shift by the air power enthusiasts. Doctrine is the key to maintaining our warfighting edge over our opponents. To be understood, doctrine must be kept active by a regular and repetitious training program. Doctrine rests on experience, but there is always the danger of viewing experience too narrowly and drawing the wrong inferences from it. (1:548) Once a rational appraisal has been done of the decisive impact that CAS has on the total war effort, then the many problems with training, terminal control, and technology associated with CAS execution will be quickly identified and corrected through a joint effort. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Cooling, Benjamin F., Editor, Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support, 0ffice of Air Force History, USAF, Washington, DC 1990. 2. Davis, Dale R., "CAS Revisited: Doctrine, Tactics, and Technology." Marine Corps Gazette October 90: 34-36. 3. Garrett, Thomas, "CAS: Which Way Do We Go?" Parameters December 90: 29-43. 4. Hastings, Eric E., Book Review, "Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support." Marine Corps Gazette March 92: 84- 87. 5. "Marine Air: There When Needed." Naval Institute Proceedings November 91: 63. 6. Motz, Dwight R., "JFACC: The Joint Air Control Cold War Continues." Marine Corps Gazette January 93: 65-71. 7. Schmidt, John W. and Williams, Charles L, "Disjointed or Joint Targeting?" Marine Corps Gazette September 92: 67-71. 8. Smith, Peter C., Cas, An Illustrated History, 1914 to the Present. Orion Books, New York, 1990. 9. "Strategic Air War in the Gulf: Conflicting Views." Aviation Week and Space Technology January 27, 92: 61-65. 10. Sweetman, Bill, "CAS, Fighters High, Helicopters Low." International Defense Review November 92: 1077-1081. 11. US Marine Corps, Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Letter: 3000/WF 12E, The joint Force Component Commander and Command and Control of Marine Air- Ground Task Force Aviation, Quantico, 1989. 12. Werrell, Kenneth P., "Air War Victorious: The Gulf War versus Vietnam." Parameters Summer 1992: 41-54. 13. Zienke, Caroline F., "Promises Fulfilled? The Prophets of Air Power and Desert Storm." Institute for Defense Analyses January 92: 1-19.
