Naval Surface Fire Support: How Can We Get There From Here? CSC 1993 SUBJECT AREA - Warfighting EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Naval Surface Fire Support: How Can We Get There From Here ? Author: LCDR Clarence Todd Morgan, United States Navy Thesis: The United States Navy does not have the capability to effectively conduct the NSFS mission with its current force structure. However, the new littoral battlespace and the emerging doctrine in ... From the Sea requires a flexible and lethal naval weapon system that can successfully conduct sustained NSFS missions. Background: U.S. Navy surface combatants are unable to conduct effective NSFS to influence events ashore. This NSFS deficiency significantly hinders the successful completion of expeditionary missions. Current 5"/54 and 76-mm guns lack adequate range, penetration capability, or accuracy. Near-term solutions to correct NSFS deficiencies include: improved 5-inch ammunition, a new 8-inch gun with improved ammunition, a missile delivery system for guided submunition payloads, and limited battleship re-activation. Interim period solutions include: 5- and 8-inch extended range projectiles that deliver guided submunitions, a re- designed 8-inch gun, and adaptation of the Army's MLRS and TACMS systems. Long-term NSFS corrective actions will examine advanced technology 5- and 8-inch guns as well as additional missile delivery systems. The Navy-Marine Corps team's expeditionary response and power projection capabilities are severely degraded by the fleet's inadequate NSFS capabilities. To support the National Military Strategy, combat effective NSFS platforms are absolutely crucial to successfully conduct maneuver warfare from the sea. Recommendations: The United States Navy must develop and procure an effective and lethal NSFS capability for surface combatants. OUTLINE Thesis: The United States Navy does not have the capability to effectively conduct the NSFS mission with its current force structure. However, the new littoral battlespace and the emerging doctrine in ... From the Sea requires a flexible and lethal naval weapon system that can successfully conduct sustained NSFS missions. I. Surface combatants unable to influence events ashore A. Adaptive force package replaces CVBG B. Maritime Action Group provides support to MEU II. Effective NSFS critical to expeditionary force A. Deficient NSFS inhibits troop maneuvers B. Poor NSFS forces reliance on other fire support III. Lethal NSFS performs significant role in expeditionary mission A. 24 hour on-call capability B. Amphibious assault support IV. NSFS in battlefield interdiction role A. Greater ordnance on target in 24 hours B. Adjunct to air power C. Requirements 1. Range 2. Penetration 3. Accuracy V. Current NSFS systems A. 5"/54 B. 76-mm VI. NSFS solutions in the near-term A. 5"/54 Deadeye ammunition B. 8"/55 MK 71 gun C. SMASHR missile delivery system B. Battleship VII. NSFS solutions in the interim period A. ANSR 5- and 8-inch projectiles B. 8"/60 MK 71 gun C. Army MLRS and TACMS systems VIII. NSFS solutions in the long-term A. LP and ETC gun B. Sea Bear NAVAL SURFACE FIRE SUPPORT: HOW CAN WE GET THERE FROM HERE ? ... From the Sea articulates the United States Navy's future vision of its role in an extremely dynamic world. As America engages the post-Cold War world's new international realities, two elements are clear: fewer resources are available in military budgets and emerging threats are diverse as well as unpredictable. These guidelines will dictate tomorrow's force structure and operational doctrine. As a result, joint and combined operations are becoming routine with the Navy-Marine Corps team concentrating on expeditionary missions. The National Security Strategy's emphasis on regional threats demands flexible and effective Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS), previously known as Naval Gunfire Support (NGFS), for these increasingly important expeditionary missions. NSFS encompasses all weapon systems capable of delivering supporting fire ashore such as guns, missiles, and rockets.1 Today's fleet faces a dilemma of grave proportions. The United States Navy does not have the capability to effectively conduct the NSFS mission with its current force structure. However, the new littoral battlespace and the emerging doctrine in ... From the Sea requires a flexible and lethal naval weapon system that can successfully conduct sustained NSFS missions. During a future regional crisis, the inability of surface combatants to directly influence events ashore will inhibit the on-scene Joint Task Force (JTF) Commander in the completion of his mission. As the number of carrier battlegroups (CVBG) is reduced, innovative force combinations, known as adaptive force packages, will fill the void of the traditionally forward deployed CVBG. The newest force structure developed for this role is the Maritime Action Group (MAG), which has 2 to 4 units consisting of cruiser, destroyer, frigate, submarine, and land- based long-range naval patrol aviation assets.2 With no carrier airwing or Air Force tactical air support available, the vital importance of a sustainable and lethal NSFS capability on surface ships in a MAG cannot be ignored. In the future, an urgent embassy evacuation or other humanitarian operation could require a Marine Expeditionary Unit and its Amphibious Ready Group to conduct this operation under hostile fire with a MAG for support and no fixed-wing air cover. In such a scenario, only the NSFS capabilities inherent in the MAG provide the JTF Commander deep on-call fire support. Effective NSFS capabilities on Navy vessels are crucial to fully realize an expeditionary force's combat potential when reacting to regional crises in support of our National Military Strategy. Inadequate NSFS places constraints upon troops operating ashore. Enemy defenses that could have been suppressed or destroyed by effective NSFS will inhibit the troops' freedom to maneuver. Without the necessary NSFS capabilities, troops ashore become even more dependant upon close air support, heavy armor, and artillery for fire support. Marine units or Army airborne forces reacting to a crisis will not have these types of equipment in sufficient numbers for some days or weeks placing them at great risk. With the Navy-Marine Corps focus on the expeditionary mission, some small-scale conflicts would not require Army heavy forces to be moved from the continental United States. In this situation, adequate fire support becomes even more critical with effective NSFS filling the firepower void rather than relying solely on carrier air power. A lethal NSFS weapon system can significantly assist the successful prosecution of the expeditionary mission. A ship's inherent mobility and sustainability provides a unique NSFS weapon platform capability to the commander operating in the littoral battlespace. NSFS supplies on-call fire support in bad weather and around the clock against enemy forces or strong points. Shore bombardment prepares the amphibious objective area for assault and assists advancing ground forces along a coastline. The ground force commander must have this capability readily available, particularly during establishment of an amphibious lodgement when combat power buildup is slow and troops are most vulnerable. Unnecessary ground casualties or aircraft attrition can be avoided when NSFS provides afloat fire support. Operating independently, NSFS can play a substantial role in battlefield interdiction by targeting enemy units, installations, supplies, and communications in a littoral region. Currently, targets in the littoral area can only be effectively attacked by air strikes or Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles which are expensive and limited in number. These systems could concentrate on high-value deep targets if an effective and lethal NSFS weapon system with the ability to perform the interdiction or strike role within 100 NM of any coastline can be developed. NSFS is not a replacement for air power, but it can provide continuous on-station fire support placing a greater amount of ordnance on target compared to the number of air sorties available from a CVBG during a 24-hour time period. NSFS is viewed as an adjunct to air power: more suitable for some targets in dense air defense environments and invulnerable to attrition or capture. To accomplish battlefield interdiction missions, NSFS weaponry requires adequate range, penetration capability, and accuracy to be combat effective. A capable NSFS weapon system is a combined arms combat power multiplier. The current inventory of Navy NSFS weaponry lacks sufficient range, accuracy, or penetration capabilities to be effective in a fire support mission. The primary naval guns available for NSFS are the 5"/54 caliber MK 45 and MK 42 found in Spruance, Kidd, and Arleigh Burke class destroyers; Ticonderoga, California, Virginia, and Belknap class cruisers; and Tarawa class amphibious assault carriers. These 5"/54 guns are inadequate for effective NSFS. The maximum range for the 5-inch gun is 12 NM.3 Adequate sea room for safe navigation further reduces the inland reach of either gun. Such a short range fails to provide the required fire support for troops ashore and severely limits the littoral area that can be influenced. All 5-inch ammunition types are designed for blast effect and maximum fragmentation, which is ideal for soft targets or anti-aircraft fire. Another naval gun, the OTO Melara 76-mm MK 75, is mounted in Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates and Pegasus class hydrofoils and is capable of conducting NSFS as a secondary mission. The 76-mm gun's range is 9 NM, and its ammunition is similarly designed for blast and fragmentation rather then penetration.4 None of these guns can successfully engage hardened emplacements such as block houses, pill boxes, and deep dug-in positions. With the possible exception of a mobility kill, current naval guns would not be effective against main battle tanks or other armor. Additionally, existing guns with available unguided ammunition have a circular error of probability (CEP) of 300 meters, which necessitates large quantities of ammunition be expended to hit even area targets.5 Current NSFS weaponry is inadequate to support expeditionary missions contemplated in the littoral battlespace. Recent events provide an illustration of current NSFS capabilities. During the Persian Gulf engagements in April 1988, over one thousand 5"/54 rounds were fired to destroy an oil platform.6 Such an inordinate expenditure on one small undefended target proves the unsuitability of today's 5-inch gun weapon system for NSFS. Considering the finite capacity of ammunition magazines, large ammunition expenditures against a few targets is unacceptable. By contrast, the battleship's 16-inch guns have the capability to penetrate 27 feet of reinforced concrete or 16 inches of armor plate.7 The 16-inch gun's range is 20.8 NM and extended range ammunition, already designed, increased its range to approximately 40 NM.8 USS Missouri and USS Wisconsin demonstrated their highly effective NSFS capabilities during sustained fire support missions conducted in Desert Storm. The comparison of 5"/54 and 16-inch gun performance underlines the inadequacy of current NSFS weaponry in the fleet with the withdrawal of the battleships from active service. A combination of near- and long-term solutions is required to correct the Navy's NSFS deficiencies. While combat effectiveness must be the primary consideration in addressing the NSFS problem; sustainability, flexibility, cost-effectiveness, maximum use of existing technology, as well as hardware should be the driving criteria in guiding NSFS weapon system procurement decisions. In the near-term (3 to 5 years) the focus of corrective effort must concentrate upon making existing NSFS weapon systems more effective. Interim (6 to 9 years) and longer term (10 to 12 years) solutions must examine new technologies and adaptation of other services' weaponry for use in the NSFS mission. The Navy's goal must be a comprehensive, long-term, multi-faceted plan to address current surface ship NSFS deficiencies, and to provide NSFS systems with enhanced capabilities as new ships enter the fleet. In order to achieve maximum improvement in fleet NSFS capability, any near-term solutions to the NSFS problem must minimize technological risk and cost. Improving the capabilities of the 5-inch gun weapon system would be an outstanding initial step. The 5"/54 guns are in more than one hundred active ships or ships under construction. Any significant improvements in range, accuracy, or penetration capabilities will pay high dividends in increased NSFS effectiveness and flexibility. Specifically, 5-inch ammunition requires the development of extended range projectiles with hard-target penetration capability and precision guided accuracy. Such ammunition has already been developed. The 5-inch semi-active laser guided projectile (SALGP), named Deadeye, successfully completed operational testing at sea and was approved for fleet use in 1982.9 The round has a combination high explosive/conical shape charge warhead allowing it to penetrate approximately 27 inches of rolled homogeneous armor or the equivalent of a T54-type tank; and it is highly accurate with laser designation giving the round a 2 meter CEP.10 Deadeye is a rocket assisted projectile (RAP), which increases 5-inch gun range to 15 NM.11 The 5-inch SALGP round was designed using an earlier 5-inch infra-red guided projectile body that optimized flight in an anti-air warfare role. However, if the 5-inch SALGP body is redesigned to aerodynamically optimize surface to surface flight, the range can be increased to 30 NM, and the addition of Global Positioning System (GPS) guidance would yield a 16 meter CEP independent of laser designation.12 The Deadeye fell victim to budgetary cuts in FY 1989, and was not funded for production.13 Re-introduction of the Deadeye program and its redesign would be the most rapid route to give the fleet a highly accurate shipboard hard-target kill capability. A second near-term solution has already been developed that can significantly improve current NSFS capabilities. The 8"/55 caliber MK 71 gun successfully completed its at sea operational evaluation in USS Hull (DD-945) in 1976, and was approved for fleet use in 1977.14 Program funding was subsequently canceled. The MK 71 gun was specifically designed for installation in Spruance class destroyers as its forward gun mount and could also be fitted in Ticonderoga cruisers and Arleigh Burke destroyers. Available 8-inch projectiles are either high capacity or high explosive; existing armor piercing rounds cannot be fired from the 8"/55 because of recoil system limitations.15 The current ammunition gives the 8"/55 a maximum range of 20 NM with each round having a 600 meter CEP.16 Although existing ammunition would return some enhanced area suppression capability to NSFS, improved 8-inch ammunition will significantly upgrade NSFS capability. Concurrent with the 8"/55 MK 71 development and testing, a 8-inch SALGP was also developed and successfully test fired at sea. With laser designation the 8-inch SALGP has a 2 meter CEP, a maximum range of 30 NM, and its combination conical shape charge/high explosive warhead can penetrate approximately 43 inches of rolled homogeneous armor or the equivalent of a T72- type tank making it comparable to the Hellfire missile's capability.17 Installation of the 8"/55 in new construction ships, a selective backfit program for existing cruisers and destroyers, and the production of the 8-inch SALGP would alleviate the current lack of effective NSFS in the fleet. Another near-term solution uses existing hardware and can be widely distributed among fleet combatants with STANDARD Missile capabilities. The STANDARD Missile Autonomous Strike Homing Round (SMASHR) would use SM-1 MK 56 motor assemblies with GPS midcourse guidance and deliver either 550 M46 dual purpose submunitions or a BULLPUP A warhead.18 The M46 submunition has a combination conical shape charge/high explosive warhead capable of defeating armor found on various armored personnel carriers such as a BMP.19 The SMASHR would have a 60 NM maximum range and a 16 meter CEP, which can be improved to 2 meters with the addition of a Low-Light-Level TV seeker for terminal guidance.20 Using the SM-2's MK 104 motor assembly, the SMASHR maximum range could be increased to 140 NM.21 SMASHR would be able to incorporate new guided payload advances, like Sense and Destroy Armor (SADARM) submunitions, to improve its anti-armor lethality. Although fewer missile rounds could be carried and each shot would be much more expensive than a gun projectile, the added range and accurate area coverage make SMASHR a very attractive NSFS weapon system. A final near-term solution is to recommission two Iowa class battleships, one per coast, for the sole mission of NSFS. Operating costs can be minimized by only deploying a battleship in case of a regional crisis and maintaining unit proficiency by operating in U.S. coastal areas. A different variation would place two of the battleships in the Naval Reserve with much lower manning levels. Manpower costs also could be minimized by either deactivating or removing the remaining six secondary 5"/38 gun mounts allowing additional room for other NSFS weaponry.22 Continued battleship operation would maintain a critical near-term capability and maintain an experienced personnel cadre in the event of a contingency requiring re-activation of the two remaining inactive battleships. The ongoing availability of a survivable battleship platform with its 16-inch guns would give NSFS a highly robust capability, which is now lacking. During the interim time frame, newer technological improvements to current systems must be examined. The Autonomous Naval Strike Round (ANSR) concept proposes improved ammunition for both the 5-inch and 8-inch naval guns. A 5-inch ANSR would use existing 5"/54 MK 45 MOD 1 gun mounts but achieve significant range improvement using RAP technology. The 5-inch ANSR carries 35 M46 submunitions to a maximum range of 50 NM or 56 M46s to 30 NM using a combination GPS/inertial navigation system (INS) guidance to maintain a 16 meter CEP.23 The 8-inch ANSR, using the 8"/55 MK 71 gun mount, delivers 133 M46s to a maximum range of 100 NM or 247 M46s to 60 NM and also achieves a 16 meter CEP.24 A 175 pound unitary warhead in a 8-inch ANSR could be fired to 100 NM and strike a point target with a 2 meter CEP if semi-active laser, infra-red, or other terminal guidance features were added.25 ANSR significantly extends the inland reach of Navy ships in littoral areas, greatly enhancing NSFS capability. An improved 8-inch gun design could be deployed in the interim period. The 8"/60 MK 71 gun would add numerous technological improvements, such as a monoblock gun barrel design, that enhance production and maintenance characteristics of the current 8"/55.26 The newer design upgrades the recoil system allowing growth in ammunition capabilities while increasing the gun's caliber.27 These improvements allow the use of current armor piercing rounds and increase the range of all existing projectiles by 10 percent to approximately 22 NM.28 The new 8-inch gun design would provide much improved NSFS firepower with a variety of ammunition; giving the JTF Commander the ability to influence events more than 75 NM inland. Several missile and rocket systems are possible alternatives in the interim time frame to fill the NSFS role. The Army's Multi-Launch Rocket System (MLRS) and Tactical Missile System (TACMS) are likely candidates. Each delivers a large payload of submunitions that are well-suited to attack large area soft targets. New guided submunitions with hard-target kill capability that are under development, such as SADARM, also are compatible. MLRS rounds can reach targets 16 NM away and saturate an area greater than four football fields using 12 rockets.29 Each MLRS rocket carries 644 M77 submunitions but is unguided.30 Improved MLRS rocket range and guidance would be necessary for NSFS use. TACMS can strike targets out to 80 NM with each rocket carrying approximately 1000 M74 submunitions and with GPS achieve a 16 meter CEP.31 Adaptation of missile or rocket systems can give tremendous area shock and suppression capabilities to NSFS but the cost per round and the number of available rounds on board ship raise sustainability questions. In the long-term, new evolving technologies must be investigated to correct NSFS deficiencies. Two new propellant types can substantially increase both the 5-inch and 8-inch gun range and performance. Liquid propellant (LP) and electro- thermal chemical (ETC) technologies combined with RAP can increase 5-inch gun ranges to 50 NM.32 The 8-inch LP or ETC gun would have a 100 NM range using RAP.33 Both the 5-inch and 8-inch ammunition would still carry M46 submunitions achieving a 16 meter CEP with GPS guidance. These advanced technology guns provide the required extended range critical for NSFS effectiveness in the littoral battlespace. Numerous missile systems can be examined in the long-term time frame for employment in a NSFS mission. However, cost, on-call capability, and sustainability are principal concerns with missile systems. One proposal, the Sea Bear concept, is a relatively low cost guided missile configured for launch from a Vertical Launch System canister or Harpoon launcher.34 Sea Bear would carry a 500 pound warhead or submunitions to 100 NM and achieve a 16 meter CEP with GPS/INS guidance, and if a fiberoptic guidance system is utilized a 2 meter CEP can be realized to a range of 20 NM.35 For a high priority target nearby or as an area suppression weapon Sea Bear could add a significant dimension to NSFS. To successfully achieve ... From the Sea's vision and conduct the expeditionary mission, the Navy requires a lethal NSFS weapon systems capable of sustained fire support against a diversity of targets. The battleship's decommissioning removed the Navy's only effective NSFS weapon. New construction programs continue installation of the 5"/54 despite the existence of off- the-shelf improvements and emerging technologies that promise highly capable NSFS systems in the near future. If the Navy is serious about littoral warfare, the deplorable state of NSFS must be addressed. Budgetary pressures are immense and funding will remain limited into the foreseeable future. An investment in NSFS capability is a great combat multiplier and highly cost effective. The Navy-Marine Corps team's expeditionary response and power projection capabilities are severely degraded by the fleet's inadequate NSFS capabilities. To support the National Military Strategy, combat effective NSFS platforms are absolutely crucial to successfully conduct maneuver warfare from the sea. ENDNOTES 1. Scott C. Truver and Norman Polmar, "Naval Surface Fire Support and the Iowas," Proceedings, Nov. 1985, p. 130. 2. Captain Robert O. Crawshaw, U.S. Navy, "What Is a Maritime Action Group?" Proceedings, Jan. 1993, p. 28. 3. Bernard Prezelin, ed., Combat Fleets of the World 1993, (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1993), p. 786. 4. Ibid. 5. J.G. Ferrebee, S.E. Anderson, and O.K. Blosser, "Naval Surface Fire Support Study," Report by Naval Surface Warfare Center (Dahlgren, Va.: Dahlgren Division, Jul. 1992), p. 31. 6. "U.S. Sinks or Cripples Six Iranian Warships," The Washington Post, 19 Apr. 1988, p. A22. 7. Prezelin, p. 786. 8. Ibid. 9. J.D. Hagan, "Naval Surface Fire Support Concepts," Report by Naval Surface Warfare Center (Dahlgren, Va.: Dahlgren Division, 1992), p. 6. 10. Interview with J.D. Hagan, Naval Surface Warfare Center G30 Guided Munitions, Dahlgren, Va., 18 Feb. 1993. 11. Interview with R.D. Cooper, Naval Surface Warfare Center G32 MK 45 5"/54 Improvements, Dahlgren, Va., 18 Feb. 1993. 12. Ibid. 13. Prezelin, p. 786. 14. Scott Gourley, "US Naval Surface Fire Support: The Gun Factor," Military Technology, Aug. 1992, p. 35. 15. "Preliminary Assessment of 8-Inch Gun Ammunition Availability and Development Status," Report by FMC Corporation (Minneapolis, Mn.: Naval Systems Division, 5 Jun. 1992), p. 7. 16. Ferrebee, p. 36. 17. Interview with J.D. Hagan. 18. Hagan, p. 13. 19. Ibid., p. 21. 20. Ibid., p. 19. 21. Ibid., p. 13. 22. Commander Robert W. Selle, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired), "The Best Kept Secret in Pentagon Room 4E-686," Proceedings, Nov. 1992, p. 103. 23. Hagan, p. 14. 24. Ibid., p. 13. 25. Ibid. 26. Interview with J.D. Hagan. 27. Ibid. 28. Ibid. 29. Truver and Polmar, pp. 130-131. 30. Ibid. 31. Hagan, p. 13. 32. Ferrebee, p. 33. 33. Interview with Tom Doran, Naval Surface Warfare Center G33 Electrothermal Gun Program Manager, Dahlgren, Va., 18 Feb. 1993. 34. Ferrebee, p. 22. 35. Ibid. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Crawshaw, Captain Robert O. U.S. Navy. "What Is a Maritime Action Group?" Proceedings, Jan. 1993, pp. 28-31. 2. Ferrebee, J.G., S.E. Anderson, and O.K. Blosser. "Naval Surface Fire Support Study." Report by Naval Surface Warfare Center. Dahlgren, Va.: Dahlgren Division, Jul. 1992. 3. Fickett, Richard K. "LCACs Can Support Shore Bombardment." Proceedings, Feb. 1993, pp. 88-89. 4. Gourley, Scott. "US Naval Surface Fire Support: The Gun Factor." Military Technology, Aug. 1992, p. 35. 5. Hagan, J.D. "Naval Surface Fire Support Concepts." Report by Naval Surface Warfare Center. Dahlgren, Va.: Dahlgren Division, 1992. 6. Herrmann, Second Lieutenant Fred K. U.S. Marine Corps. "Closing the Gun Gap." Proceedings, Nov. 1988, pp. 104-107. 7. Interview with Don Wilson, Naval Surface Warfare Center G30. Dahlgren, Va., 18 Feb. 1993. 8. Interview with J.D. Hagan, Naval Surface Warfare Center G30 Guided Munitions. Dahlgren, Va., 18 Feb. 1993. 9. Interview vith R.D. Cooper, Naval Surface Warfare Center G32 MK 45 5"/54 Improvements. Dahlgren, Va., 18 Feb. 1993. 10. Interview vith Tom Doran, Naval Surface Warfare Center G33 Electrothermal Gun Program Manager. Dahlgren, Va., 18 Feb. 1993. 11. "Preliminary Assessment of 8-Inch Gun Ammunition Availability and Development Status." Report by FMC Corporation. Minneapolis, Mn.: Naval Systems Division, 5 Jun. 1992. 12. Prezelin, Bernard, ed. Combat Fleets of the World 1993. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1993. 13. Selle, Commander Robert W. U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired). "The Best Kept Secret in Pentagon Room 41-686." Proceedings, Nov. 1992, pp. 102-105. 14. Truver, Scott C. and Norman Polmar. "Naval Surface Fire Support and the Iowas." Proceedings, Nov. 1985, pp. 130- 133. 15. "U.S. Sinks or Cripples Six Iranian Warships." The Washington Post, 19 Apr. 1988, p. A22. GUN AND AMMUNITION PROGRAMS GUN PROGRAMS: 1. PHALANX CIWS - POC PETER ADAMS, Program Manager, F1O7, x7587 Block Improvements: Adams Other Improvements: POC Tommy Harkins, G32, x8493 a. Enhanced Lethality Penetrator b. Extended Barrels c. RAD HAZ Primer - POC StanGriscavage, G32, x8868 2. Electrothermal Gun - POC Tom Doran, Program Manager, G33, x8318 a. 6Omm Gun - POC R.D. Coooper, G32, x7656 b. Guided Munition - POC John Fraysee, G33, x8318 c. Systems engineer - John Copley, G33, x8318 3. Advanced Minor Caliber Gun System - POC Jim McConkie, G32, X7861 4. MK 45 5"/54 Improvements - POC R.D. Cooper, G32, x7656 5. MK 71 8"/55 Major Caliber Lightweight Gun - POC R.D. Cooper, G32, x7656 6. Naval Surface Fire Support Study - POC Don Monn or Sam Burnley, G32, x8868 7. NATACMS - POC Larry Spangler, G33, X8318 AMMUNITION: 1. Guided Munitions- POC Dennis Hagan, G3O, x8141 a. Terminal Defense Round - Hagan b. Small Caliber Smart Munition - POC John Fraysee, G33, x8318 (This is a part of the 6Omm Electrothermal Gun Program.) c. Autonomous Naval Support Round (ANSR) - POC John Fraysee, G33, x8318 2. Cast Projectile - POC O.J. Huey, G32, x8493 3. Navy in-Service Ammunition Improvements - POC Bev Jablovskis, G32, x8493 (All Up Round Design Agent Program) ------------------------------------------------------------------- G31 - Light Weapons Branch - Head - Joe Monolo, x8891 G32 - Gun System Branch - Head - Don Monn, x8868 G33 - Smart Munitions Branch - Head Fred Perrine, x8318 Fire Support COEA - Gary Ferrebee, x8538
