How Will The Marine Corps Fulfill The Forward Presence Mission In The Future? CSC 1993 SUBJECT AREA - Strategic Issues EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: How will the Marine Corps Fulfill the Forward Presence Mission in the Future? Author: Major Edward M. Hatcher Jr., United States Marine Corps Thesis: The forward deployed Marine Air Ground Task Forces' (MAGTFs) current organization does not support the wide spectrum of missions the MAGTF must conduct in the future. The Marine Corps must identify the weaknesses and use the assets of the Marine Corps and CINCs to ensure the MAGTFs can fulfill the forward presence missions in the future. Background: The need for our military forces to provide a forward presence will continue into the 21st century. The reduction in permanently deployed forces will increase the need for expeditionary forces to fulfill the forward presence missions. These forces must be able to respond to a wide spectrum of forward presence missions: crisis response, humanitarian, peacekeeping, noncombatant evacuations, low intensity and the build-up to major conflicts. These forces must build a small expeditionary force into a Joint Task Force (JTF). The Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) should be the force to provide the nation with this capability. The MEU's organization should enhance the build-up of a MEU into a JTF. Recommendation: Organize the MEU with a JTF liaison team. A small JTF liaison team would deploy with each MEU. This team would coordinate their service assets and bring specialized capabilities to the MEU. The JTF liaison teak and a greater emphasis on joint operations training, would enhance the MEU's ability to expand into a task organized JTF. The MEU with a JTF liaison team is a more effective forward presence force than the United States has today. OUTLINE Thesis: The forward deployed Marine Air Ground Task Forces' (MAGTF) current organization does not support the wide spectrum of missions the MAGTF must conduct in the future. The Marine Corps must identify the weaknesses and use the assets of the Marine Corps and CINCs to ensure the MAGTFs can fulfill the forward presence missions in the future. I. An expeditionary force for forward presence A. Navy and Marine Corps team provide the expeditionary force B. Expeditionary force is a MAGTF 1. Must support a wide spectrum of missions 2. Should be joint II. MAGTFs current weaknesses A. Command and control 1. As an enabling force for a JTF 2. As a JTF headquarters 3. As part of a JTF B. Communications 1. Joint 2. Embassies 3. Training C. Intelligence 1. Collection and dissemination 2. Special operations D. Liaison teams 1. Public affairs 2. Army and Air Force 3. United Nations III. Solutions to the MAGTFs weaknesses A. Organize the MEU as a JTF B. Support the MEU from external cells C. Organize the MEU with a JTF liaison team HOW WILL THE MARINE CORPS FULFILL THE FORWARD PRESENCE MISSION IN THE FUTURE? The National Security Strategy of the United States needs an expeditionary force that can support its basic demands: forward presence with the ability to act in crisis response, power projection, humanitarian or peacekeeping missions. These missions are often characterized by high intensity, short duration conflict, with little time to plan. The United States needs a force that can quickly expand into a joint warfare or combined force to fulfill these missions, In September 1992, the United States Navy and Marine Corps released the White Paper From the Sea. The new direction of the Navy and Marine Corps team, both active and reserve, is to provide the nation with Naval Expeditionary Forces - Shaped for Joint Operations.(4:2) The Navy and Marine Corps sent a clear message to the nation: they would fulfill the forward presence missions with forward deployed MAGTFs (primarily the Marine Expeditionary Unit {MEU}). Unfortunately there is a problem. The forward deployed MAGTFs' current organization does not support the wide spectrum of missions the MAGTF must conduct in the future. The Marine Corps must identify the MAGTF's weaknesses and use the assets of the Marine Corps and CINCs to ensure the MAGTFs can fulfill the forward presence missions in the future. MAGTFs CURRENT WEAKNESSES COMMAND AND CONTROL As part of the forward presence mission, the Marine Corps must act as an enabling force for a Joint task force (JTF). An enabling force must quickly respond to a crisis and facilitate the movement and build-up of forces into a crisis area. The Marine Corps currently uses the MEU to fulfill this mission. The MEU can conduct many low-intensity missions, but it cannot face a large hostile military force without augmentation from a larger MAGTF or other United States military component forces. When these follow-on forces augment the MEU, they can quickly overwhelm the MEU's command element. The MEU's command element cannot effectively sustain command of a joint or combined task force without augmentation from a higher headquarters.(16:22) The MEU requires assets from higher headquarters and other service components to help command these follow-on forces. In a joint warfare environment the MEU command element must often act as a Marine component (MARCOM) headquarters, MEU headquarters, and JTF/Combined headquarters simultaneously. The MEU command element cannot act as three headquarters without degrading its ability to command its own elements. During Operation Provide Comfort, the MEU operated as part of a JTF without a MARCOM headquarters. A Marine liaison cell attached to the JTF headquarters, (that subsequently became a Combined Task Force (CTF) headquarters) was located in Incirlik, Turkey as Operation Provide Comfort progressed. This cell was to provide administrative and logistic support to Marine Corps follow-on units, but was not assigned to support the 24th MEU. The 24th MEU continued to support itself, even while the liaison cell with the JTF headquarters continued to support follow-on Marine Corps units (administratively and logistically) as they entered the area of operations. Since the MEU represented itself and the liaison cell with the JTF headquarters represented the follow-on Marine Corps units, there was no central MARCOM command element that the JTF could contact for "Marine issues."(18) The MEU did not enhance the build-up of Marine forces into the Area of Responsibility (AOR), but merely acted as the first Marine Corps element in the AOR. The effect of not having a MARCOM as part of the JTF is summarized by the MCCLS report by Lieutenant Colonel Morgan, who observed: There appeared to be no plan or systematic approach to the deployment of additional forces or staffing the Joint Task Force (JTF) Headquarters (HQ) as the force and command and control requirements of the JTF grew.(3) Although the MEU did support the JTF, it did not support follow-on forces as an enabling force. There was no plan to use the MEU command element and augment it from higher headquarters to support the follow-on forces. COMMUNICATIONS The MEU must communicate with all service components, higher command authorities and U.S embassies. Acting as the forward element of a JTF, the MEU needs the capability to communicate with higher headquarters via satellite. The MEU should tie into the Defense Information Systems Network, as well as internal JTF communications links. Although the MEU can maintain most of these communications links afloat, once ashore their communications capabilities are not adequate. The MEU does not have the communications equipment needed to operate in the highly complex joint warfare environment. The MEU must obtain the means to communicate with United States embassies via secure voice communications. The embassies do not currently have this capability themselves. During Operation Eastern Exit, (in which U.S. Marines acting as part of a JTF had to evacuate the U.S. embassy in Mogadishu, Somalia) all communications between the Marines and the embassy were through an unsecured radio.(17:vi) The opportunity for a terrorist organization to intercept communications and sabotage the Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) is obvious. The MEU needs secure voice communications with U.S. embassies now! Communications with a different service component requires highly trained communications personnel, familiar with other services' communications formats and terminology. Although Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control Systems (JINTACCS) has reduced some of the confusion between services, MEU communications personnel are not familiar with other services terminology and communications formats. There has been little emphasis on joint communications training in the past at the MEU level. The MEU needs communications personnel that are experts in joint communications. Can the MEU identify its communications strengths and weaknesses as the forward element of a JTF? Each MEU operation in a joint warfare environment adds new lessons learned. A great deal is learned from these successful operations. However, the time to make mistakes and learn lessons is not during operations. There is not enough joint warfare training conducted to identify and prevent future operational mistakes. The MEU must exercise the force build-up from MEU to JTF, to determine the equipment and training needed to support various joint warfare missions. INTELLIGENCE One of the most important tasks a forward deployed MEU has in joint warfare, is the collection and dissemination of intelligence. This intelligence allows higher headquarters to make well informed policy decisions, thousands of miles from the crisis. The MEU has limited assets to accomplish this task. The MEU's current organization supports only its organic elements with intelligence at a very basic level. Its organization does not allow it to provide intelligence to follow-on forces or higher headquarters. The MEU does not have the equipment, personnel or training to utilize national military intelligence assets. The MEU intelligence section has not adapted itself to support the wide range of special operations the MEU can conduct. The MEU has no unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) to gather intelligence afloat or ashore. The MEU does not have an imagery dissemination system to receive or pass imagery. The MEU intelligence section cannot communicate with higher headquarters (JTF...) through a dedicated circuit to pass or receive information by voice or message. The MEU needs a dedicated circuit to quickly exchange information in the fluid environment of a crisis response. The MEU's intelligence section must improve its capabilities to allow the MEU to support JTF intelligence requirements. LIAISON TEAMS Marine forces are capable of global operations along the entire operational continuum from deterrence through crisis to war.(12:2) The MEU must cover a wide spectrum of missions as the Marine Corps' forward deployed unit. The MEU does not have the personnel to cover many of the missions it has faced and will face in the future. The MEU does not have an effective public affairs section. The MEU participates in high visibility operations, hat quickly effect public opinion at home and abroad. A recent article in the Marine Corps Gazette summed up the importance of using the media as a weapon: One important lesson from Southwest Asia that we must not overlook is the definitive role of media on the battlefield. We can no longer ignore the press, or simply tolerate reporters' annoying presence. The press is here to stay, and they can be counted on to attend any future war in staggering numbers. We must do more than simply accept the media - we must understand their strength and exploit that strength as a weapon.(5:30) The Marine Corps cannot ignore the media's influence on the battlefield. The media can have a direct influence on the perceived success of any MEU mission. This perception will often be more important than anything the MEU does in an operation. The media's ability to cover and immediately report MEU operations as they occur emphasizes the need for a public affairs section. Since the MEU is co-located and has a habitual relationship with the Navy, its primary need for liaison is with the Air Force and Army. Due to fiscal constraints and limited assets, the Marine Corps is becoming more dependent on other services for support. The MEU will need quick liaison with Army and Air Force units to conduct many of its operations. Without the benefit of Army and Air Force liaison teams, the MEU must plan for the use of other services' units without detailed knowledge of their capabilities. In the execution phase of an operation the need for liaison teams is even more important to overcome problems as they occur. During Operation Eastern Exit, United States Air Force AC-130s were unable to provide Marine forces with scheduled overhead cover against suspected enemy artillery. This lack of support was due to poor communications between Marine Corps and Air Force units. The lack of air cover could have resulted in numerous casaulties.(17:44) This problem could have been avoided if the Air Force had a liaison team co-located with the supported Marine forces. The MEU must be capable of closely coordinating operations with United Nations' forces. The MEU's peace-keeping missions will undoubtedly lead to the MEU acting as an enabling force for United Nations' forces. This may occur without the formulation of a JTF. The requirement for a MEU liaison team to work directly with United Nations' forces will cause additional unforseen problems. The MEU must identify how it will make liaison with the United Nations' forces, and how it can support these forces in a humanitarian or peacekeeping environment. SOLUTION TO THE MAGTFs WEAKNESSES The Marine Corps must make the MEU more responsive to the forward presence-joint warfare missions, without degrading its effectiveness as a fighting force. Additional equipment and personnel must augment the MEU to enhance its capabilities. The MEU must add the new capabilities without greatly increasing the size of the MEU. The balance between increased capabilities, while maintaining the current effectiveness of the MEU is delicate. The Marine Corps must solve this delicate problem now. Then it can effectively conduct the forward presence missions of the future. There are three possible solutions to this problem: 1. Organize and train the MEU as a JTF. Assign the necessary equipment and personnel needed to the MEU permanently. 2. Support the MEU from external cells to increase capabilities. Identify the personnel and equipment needed in these cells. Train these cells with the MEU. 3. Organize the MEU with a JTF liaison team. Augment the MEU with external cells to increase the capabilities. Identify the personnel and equipment needed in these cells by working closely with all services through the CINCs. Train these cells with the MEU. ORGANIZE THE MEU AS A JTF The first alternative, organizing the MEU as a JTF, would make the MEU capable of fulfilling a wide spectrum of joint warfare missions a CINC would assign. The MEU would become a floating JTF, primarily manned by Marines, but also augmented by other service personnel. The MEU would maintain its own command structure, while forming a JTF headquarters to command the MEU and other service assets. The Marines manning the JTF headquarters would come from Marine Forces Pacific (MarForPac) or Marine Forces Atlantic (MarForLant). MarForPac/Lant would coordinate the augmentation of the JTF headquarters with the appropriate CINCs and MEUs. This would ensure the MEU had the support of a JTF and MARCOM headquarters. The MEU can solve its need for communications at the JTF level by attaching a JTF communications center, as part of the JTF headquarters with the MEU. This communications center would be the link between the CINCs and all subordinate units in the JTF (including the MEU). The MEU would not need additional communications equipment or personnel, since it could communicate directly with the co-located JTF headquarters. A Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) would be co-located with the JTF and MEU. The JIC would bring all the necessary intelligence equipment and personnel to work in a joint warfare environment. The MEU would not need any additional manpower or equipment. The MEU would get its intelligence through the JIC, and the JIC would maintain contact with national intelligence assets. The MEU can reduce its need for liaison teams when it deploys as a JTF. Army and Air Force liaison personnel would be part of the JTF headquarters. The JTF headquarters would work closely with the CINC to coordinate any operations with the United Nations. The CINCs representatives at the JTF headquarters would handle any public affairs requirements. In summary, the need for liaison teams would become the JTF headquarters' responsibility. Obviously the first alternative can operationally handle most of the problems the MEU would encounter in forward presence missions. Unfortunately, the large number of assets required to man a JTF headquarters are not readily available to a MEU. During a period of military draw-down, assigning a complete JTF headquarters to a MEU may not be the most feasible solution. It would cost too much to add the JTF headquarters. Adding the JTF headquarters could increase the size of the amphibious ready group (ARG). This would add additional costs also. Rear Admiral John B. LaPlante (Vice Director/Deputy Director for Mobilization, J-4, Joint Staff) clearly indicated his views on the size of future ARGs during a presentation at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College: "The MEU needs to get smaller, because ARGs are getting smaller-but missions are becoming more varied, complex-joint and combined."(11) Although the first alternative is viable, the commitment of a full JTF headquarters to a MEU is not the best solution. SUPPORT THE MEU FROM EXTERNAL CELLS The second alternative, using external cells to enhance MEU's capabilities for the wide spectrum of forward presence missions offers some definite advantages. By bringing cells in to augment the MEU, the MEU's size and basic structure does not change. The CINC would activate Fly-in cells that could quickly fly to the MEU and augment it in a crisis. These cells would come from the MEF, MarFor or CINC level headquarters (or their designated representatives). The command element of the MEU would request augmentation through operational channels as a situation developed. The MarFor would quickly establish a MARCOM headquarters element, that would facilitate the build-up of the JTF headquarters. These cells, previously identified and trained, would move to the vicinity of the MEU and establish their headquarters. The JTF headquarters would manage the build-up of the JTF, freeing the MEU to conduct operations as an element of the JTF. The immediate establishment of a JTF headquarters negates the need for additional communications, intelligence or liaison assets. The MARCOM is the forward element of this JTF headquarters. As the forward element, the MARCOM would receive assets from the CINC to facilitate the build-up f the JTF headquarters. This alternative solution definitely expedites the build- up of a JTF, but it requires all assets to fly-in to the crisis area. It does not take advantage of the MEU's forward deployed position to begin preparing the crisis area for the follow-on JTF. Although this solution enhances the MEU's current capabilities through external augmentation, it does not adequately utilize the MEU's capabilities to support the CINCs. ORGANIZE THE MEU WITH A JTF LIAISON TEAM The third alternative, organizes the MEU WITH a JTF liaison team and augments it with fly-in external cells from higher headquarters. It is a hybrid solution of the first two alternatives. It utilizes the strengths of a forward deployed JTF liaison team to begin the preparation of the crisis area for the JTF. The third alternative also maintains the flexibility of fly-in cells to adapt to a variety of missions, A small JTF liaison team would deploy with the MEU's command element. This liaison team would contain highly trained advisors from each of the services. Each would be capable of advising the JTF liaison commander on the capabilities of its service, The JTF liaison commander would work closely with the MEU commander during a crisis. During a crisis, the JTF liaison commander would decide (with the advice of the MEU commander) whether or not to establish an active JTF. The JTF liaison commander would also decide which external cells to use for the crisis. The JTF liaison commander would request the external cells from the appropriate CINC. While waiting for the fly-in cells, the JTF liaison team would work closely with the MEU and prepare initial estimates and plans for JTF operations. The MEU would improve its communications to support the JTF liaison commander. This would include the addition of satellite communications for secure telephone access ashore and autodin entry.(7) The Marine Corps also would request secure voice communications for Marine Security Guards (MSG) at each embassy. In a crisis the MSGs would activate their secure voice radios and monitor them to assist with NEOs and other operations as required. This action would take advantage of forward deployed Marines, without the knowledge of hostiles. The JTF liaison team would have an intelligence officer, and a small intelligence cell to support the MEU during the initial stage of an operation. This cell would have improved imagery capabilities, UAVs, and would communicate via a secure link with the CINC's JIC. This secure link would give the JTF intelligence cell access to national intelligence assets. The level of intelligence provided to the JTF liaison commander would be adequate for situational assessment and operational planning. Fly-in echelons would provide any additional intelligence needs. The JTF liaison team would reduce the need for many specialized liaison teams. The JTF liaison team would include an officer and a small cell trained in public affairs; host nation agreements, and legal matters. This cell would be versatile enough to plan and advise the JTF liaison team commander on problems in these areas. Again, fly-in echelons, provided with information from this cell, would normally handle the actual operations if possible. External/fly-in cells would also handle specialized requirements (such as the MEU acting as an enabling force for United Nations' forces). This would allow the MEU to maintain its limited size, while expanding its versatility CONCLUSION Although each of the solutions enhance the MEU's capability to fulfill the forward presence missions of the future, the third solution is the most effective. It overcomes the limits of the MEU's command element while using its organizational versatility. By providing a JTF liaison cell with the MEU, the MEU can conduct a variety of missions, while allowing the JTF liaison cell to plan for follow-on forces and special requirements. The JTF liaison cell supports the MEU's special needs, while giving the CINC the capability to establish a JTF with limited augmentation. The future of United States' military operations is clear, it will be joint! The forward deployed element of the United States should reflect the nature of that doctrine. The MEU will continue to provide the United States with a forward presence that is capable of quickly responding to any crisis. The time when operations could be planned well in advanced has passed. Future operations will be characterized by high intensity, short duration, night operations, joint and combined, with little or no planning time.(11) The nation needs a forward deployed, highly versatile, well trained and equipped military unit to respond to this future. The MEU, augmented by a JTF liaison team and fly-in augmentation, can quickly respond to the missions of the future. It is time for the MEU to become joint! BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Component Issue in Operation Provide Comfort Executive Level Lessons Learned submitted by LtCol. Morgan MCCLS Long Report, number 91054-84925 (04229). 2. Corps Establishes Component Commands, Marine Corps Gazette March 93: 7. 3. Force Offering and Staffing the JTF HQ Operation Provide Comfort, submitted by LtCol Morgan MCCLS Long Report, number 91055-06088 (04230). 4. From the Sea, Navy and Marine Corps White Paper, September 92: 2. 5. Haddock, Capt. Ellen K. "Media on the Battlefield: An Underestimated Weapon." Marine Corps Gazette October 92: 30-32. 6. Hoffman, Maj. F.G. USMCR, The New National Security Strategy, Marine Corps Gazette February 92: 49-57 7. Improving MEU Utility in Joint Operations, CG MCCDC Quantico VA draft MSG dtd 011930Z DEC 92. 8. Improving MEU Utility in Joint Operations, COMMARFORLANT MSG dtd 261626Z OCT 92. 9. Improving MEU Utility in Joint Operations, COMMARFORPAC MSG dtd 222024Z OCT 92. 10. Jenkins, MajGen Harry W., Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities: Report from the Director of Intelligence, Marine Corps Gazette September 92: 14-18. 11. LaPlante, RADM John B., Views of the Commander, Amphibious Task Force Briefing. Command and Staff College, 19 March 1993. 12. Marine Corps Capabilities Plan, Volume One, 26 June 92. 13. MEU as a Joint Task Force, submitted by LtCol Linn, MCCLS Long Report, number 80282-43168 (06598). 14. National Security Strategy of the United States, The White House, August 91. 15. Owens, Col. Mackubin T., USMCR, The Marine Corps and the New National Strategy, Amphibious Warfare Review, Summer 91: 84-89. 16. Rudd, LtCol. Gordon W., "The 24th MEU (SOC) and Operation Provide Comfort: A Second Look." Marine Corps Gazette, February 93: 20-22. 17. Siegel, Adam B., "Eastern Exit: The Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) From Mogadishu, Somalia in January 1991." Center for Naval Analysis. 18. Summary - Operation Provide Comfort Executive Level Lessons Learned, submitted by LtCol. Morgan, MCCLS Long Report, number 91054-29676 (04228). 19. The Role of the Marine Corps in the National Defense, 21 June 91.
