The War On Drugs: Unending LIC Or Attainable Security? CSC 1993 SUBJECT AREA - History EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: The War On Drugs: Unending LIC or Attainable Security? Author: Major Phillip B. Gleason, United States Marine Corps Thesis: Legislation is needed to provide an expanded role for the military in the nation's war on drugs. Background: The war on drugs has seen the introduction of the military as a supplemental measure to assist law enforcement agencies at all levels of our government. As a component of the national strategy to reduce the supply side of the drug problem, the military has played an increased role in interdiction operations at source, transit and border locations of the ongoing conflict. The legal restrictions of the "Posse Comitatus" Act of 1878 limit the degree of military assistance allowable in civil law participation. But the overwhelming concerns that the extensive drug problem causes this nation have extended far beyond the issue of identifying it as merely a civil law concern. The proliferation of illicit drugs has been identified as a National Security issue with a call for reform of domestic laws to combat the problem. The limitations that restrict operational deployment of the military greatly reduce the potential for interdiction that is readily available. There are many sound reasons that support the need to increase the authority of the military in this matter which far exceed any misgivings regarding such action. The war on drugs has the potential to remain an unending LIC if amending legislation is not adopted which would enable full employment of sound strategic principles. Recommendation: For those military units which are assigned specific missions of drug interdiction, controlled authority to apprehend, search, seize and arrest suspected drug smugglers should be granted in order to supplement civilian law enforcement agencies and thereby enhance overall effectiveness of the nation's war on drugs. THE WAR ON DRUGS: UNENDING LIC OR ATTAINABLE SECURITY? Outline Thesis: Legislation should be enacted which will provide for a greater role for the military in the nation's war on drugs. The effects of such an expanded role would be an increase in interdiction through seizures and arrests, thereby reducing the availability of drugs in our society. I. Threats posed by Drug Problem A. National Security B. Economic C. Medical II. Current Strategy Focus A. National Drug Control Strategy Report B. Supply Reduction 1. Limited Military Role 2. Law Enforcement Overextension C. Complementary Demand Reduction III. Ongoing Issues A. Legalities of Posse Comitatus Act B. Defense Authorization Act of 1989 C. Public Support IV. Objections to Proposal A. Military Resistance B. Individual Freedom C. National Sovereignty D. Required Specialized Training V. Principles that Support Adoption A. Goldwater Nichols Defense Reorganization Act B. Weinberger Doctrine C. End of Cold War VI. Results of Adopting Proposal A. Contribute to National Security B. Enhance National Drug Control Strategy C. Support of Law Enforcement Agencies VII. Results of Not Adopting Proposal A. National Security Decline B. Drug Problem Continuation C. Flawed Strategy for LIC The War on Drugs: Unending LIC or Attainable Security? As first proclaimed by President Reagan in 1981, the declared "War on Drugs" has been an ongoing conflict which has consumed enormous amounts of resources. But it has produced little in return for such an immense expenditure. Although usage levels have somewhat stabilized in the last two years, the overall supply and availability of illegal drugs has continued to remain relatively constant. (7:23), (10:198) The debate over the optimum strategy to be employed in order to rid our country of this plague has ranged from proposals to completely seal off our borders to calls for outright legalization. Obviously, something between these two extremes must be done if we are to reverse the trend of growing, widespread drug abuse in our nation. The overall cost to our country due to the use of illicit drugs is well-documented by many sources. One estimate is that there is a 150 billion dollar annual drain on the US economy due to drugs, with an additional 60 to 80 billion dollar cost associated with absenteeism, medical expenses, inefficiency, etc. (1:70) And so, it is due to the ever-expanding direct and indirect national costs associated with our drug abuse problem that billions of dollars are spent to combat this plague. And despite some isolated, but vocal calls that point out the benefits of legalization, there is overwhelming evidence to refute this collection of baseless assumptions. (8:55), (5:57) The annual "National Drug Control Strategy" (NDCS) report, first published in 1989, identifies numerous measures which support the two cornerstones of our nation's counternarcotics strategy: "Supply Reduction" and "Demand Reduction". This document is the unifying reference which establishes policies to direct, coordinate and unite all efforts at controlling drug abuse in our nation. It is the result of extensive evaluations of previous studies and its focus is to produce strategic guidance based on successful and promising methods by which our nation can reverse its threatening level of widespread illicit drug use. The concept of "Demand Reduction" entails prevention through widespread education and treatment of current drug abusers. This area is recognized as having the greatest potential for ultimate success in alleviating our nation's drug ills. And although encouraging, it is emphasized that studies of the initial results concerning the effectiveness of new programs in the area of "demand reduction", are widely-held to be long-term investments that will require years to evaluate. (8:41) Although the military has an enviable record of reducing illegal drug use in its ranks by over 88 percent since 1980, it is better suited to support the NDCS by increasing its focus on the supply side of the national drug problem. (1:68), (3:111) Authority for overall administration of "Supply Reduction" efforts has traditionally been under the purview of a vast number of loosely-coordinated Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA's) that include virtually every Federal agency, as well as thousands of state and local LEA's. Enforcement efforts focus on interdiction operations aimed at reducing the supply of drugs at the source, while it is in transit and at our borders. It is designed as a multi-layered "defense in depth." (3:110) The desired result is to provide sufficient time in order to allow the promising social programs of "demand reduction" to become fully implemented. The strategy recognizes that the goal of "elimination of illegal drugs", as proposed by previous NDCS reports is unattainable. Hence, a more realistic focus of seeking an annual, measured amount of overall national "reduced usage" has become the current goal. (16:9) This will be accomplished by stepping up social efforts aimed at attempting to reduce demand, while at the same time continuing efforts to reduce supply. But, in spite of the collective efforts of many thousands of dedicated LEA employees, the flow of drugs across our borders seems to continue unabated. In attempting to combat this threat, the resources of the Department of Defense (DOD) have been mobilized to assist in reducing the supply side of the drug problem, albeit in a limited role, since 1981. These limitations on the degree of allowable military involvement have placed a needless restriction on the amount of support that can be rendered. Specifically, members of the armed services are prohibited from direct participation in any activity involving apprehension of civilians, including search, seizure and arrest outside of DOD property. This limitation, as codified by the "Posse Comitatus" Act of 1878, (Title 18, USC), reflects outdated post Civil War feelings of the fear of military involvement in civil affairs. Its purpose, that of prohibiting the use of the military in civil matters, was a continuation of the founding fathers desire to limit the power of a central, nationalized army and a reaffirmation of states rights to rely on and utilize their own national guard to maintain order. But times have changed. Today, we find ourselves overwhelmed by the ravages of widespread drug abuse supported by international smuggling. We must evolve in our thinking, realign our priorities and directly confront the reality that merely hoping the drug problem will go away is not going to cut it. If this is indeed a war that is being fought, now is the time to employ the third element of national power in an enhanced role. Legislation should be enacted which will provide a for a greater role for the military in the nation's war on drugs. The effects of such an expanded role would be an increase in interdiction through seizures and arrests, thereby reducing the availability of drugs in our society. The enormous amounts of resources that have been expended to produce a civilian LEA solution to the growing drug problem in our nation have yet to produce any tangible results of continued success. Amidst the ongoing debate of determining the level of DOD participation in this war, some of the restrictions of "Posse Comitatus" were amended in 1981, whereby military personnel and equipment could be loaned to civilian agencies to assist in an indirect, supporting role to LEA's. But even with unprecedented levels of annual Federal funding increases, the enormity of the drug problem continued to grow throughout the rest of the decade. (8:28) Against DOD's reluctance to willingly participate in this role, congressional legislation embodied in the "National Defense Authorization Act" (NDAA) of 1989 mandated three requirements for DOD in order to force its participation in the nation's war on drugs. This 1989 version of the NDAA required that DOD: (1) be the lead Federal agency in detecting and monitoring the illegal transit of drugs into the US; (2) be responsible for coordinating the total integration of all necessary C-3/I assets into an effective national network; (3) coordinate the expanded use of the National Guard to respond to any state governor's request for assistance in combatting drugs. In the three years that DOD's newly-assigned mission has been in effect, much has been learned at all levels in attempting to define and refine the manner in which DOD can best execute its assigned limited duties. Although its entry into the war on drugs brings with it tremendous potential, the current legislative limitations of DOD's involvement render its assistance far below what it could be. In our democratic form of government, the military exists to defend the country from all enemies, both foreign and domestic. And the problems facing the nation today posed by drug abuse are certainly national and international in scope. Our military leadership is well-aware that we must remain above all else, subservient to our civilian policymakers who represent the elected will of the people. But, the negligible effects of over three years of limited military intervention have produced only isolated areas of success in our attempts to assist in the declared war on drugs. The results of DOD's initial participation in the war on drugs have served to demonstrate that the military is indeed quite capable of integrating itself into a non-traditional role of service to the nation. Previous fears and protests by civilian libertarians and most vocally, by our own military leaders (due to concerns of resultant lowered military preparedness issues), have proven to be totally unjustified. The degree to which the military has professionally adapted to its new mission, with a high level of universal praise from civilian LEA "coworkers" has been unanticipated and encouraging. (3:114) From the DOD-structured, strategy-driven planning cycle initiated and supervised by the Joint Chiefs, to the conduct of regional operations by all of the CINCS, to the dedication of participating service members, these initial results have demonstrated that America has nothing to fear from the military services in this new endeavor.(2) If we are to win this war, we must evaluate new and innovative means with which to conduct it. (17:18) The principles of civilian superior authority however, must prevail in any area in which we seek to improve our efforts to combat and reduce the supply of drugs. The area of apprehension, search, seizure and arrest by trained and constitutionally-empowered military authorities is one such area which should be amended in order to fully integrate the available resources of participating military units. One only needs to examine the adaptability and sophistication of drug smugglers in being able to successfully evade civilian LEAs to understand why it is imperative to do so. In FY 90, dedicated DOD assets detected a total of 6,729 potential drug trafficking aircraft. But of the 661 aircraft that LEAs attempted to interdict, only 49 of these attempts were successful. (19:24) The burden of relying only on civilian LEAs to accomplish direct interdiction duties is a scenario that all too often results in "essentially verified" drug traffickers maintaining their profit margins at only a mere modest increase in the cost of business due to US Military presence. Whenever an increased level of interdiction operations signals a heightened presence in one geographical area, smugglers easily change their mode or methods of transportation. (4:71) In addition to an infinite number of infiltration routes, containerized cargo presents just such an example of any number of low-risk, lucrative forms of alternative commercial and private transport. The fact that only three-percent of containerized cargo can be inspected by customs (due to manning and fiscal restraints), renders the much-publicized capture in 1991 of 1100 lbs of heroin worth over two billion dollars in Oakland, CA as no surprise to anyone on either side of the law. (7:200) For LEA's, it was a brief, elusive victory in one isolated case and for the traffickers, a minor setback that was quickly recouped, due to volume and the law of averages. It is estimated that less than ten percent of the illegal drugs entering this country are intercepted. And with a continuation of self-imposed limitations, this level of interdiction will remain low. As long as we accept such long-shot odds as the way it must be, we accept flawed, inappropriate strategy which robs us of our ability to fight this war on terms which could enhance our success in interdiction and lead to ultimate victory. The military has proven that it has the trust of the American people to perform any assigned mission in a dedicated and professional manner. The quality and commitment is there. This has been borne out by ongoing evaluations at all levels of government and in all the services. It was demonstrated recently in time of war and continues to this day. Our nation has an opportunity to demonstrate to the world that we are indeed serious about our dedication and resolve to vigorously pursue our war on drugs with an improved and more effective strategy. For years, many Latin American countries have viewed our attempts to mobilize their limited military resources in a war conducted outside US borders as "hypocritical" at best. (11:74) It is time to allow the military to participate in an expanded, yet specific and closely-monitored role in order to take the initiative away from the international traffickers. The experience and wisdom of the framers of our constitution were most evident, as demonstrated by the formation and adoption of a document for self-government which employed a system of checks and balances to maintain an equilibrium in the division of power. The passage of legislation for specific purposes with specific limitations is how this nation progressively governs itself in response to internal pressures calling for changes for the good of all. Our nation has assigned the military to take on a mission which it was initially somewhat skeptical about. In essence, the military has been assigned on a "trial basis" to allow observers at all levels to evaluate our coordination, approach, methodology and almost as important as success, our interaction with and reaction from the civilian population. As previously stated, the results have been encouraging from the standpoint of overall public support of our efforts thus far, but discouraging in terms of estimates of changes in the supply levels of drugs in our nation as a result of our limited role. A proposal as bold and one with such potential for controversy is bound to be met with widespread skepticism as well as with criticism by advocates of individual rights. But this proposal will merely enhance support of LEAs; it is not to be construed as a replacement or substitute of civilian law enforcement practices. It is readily apparent that the need exists for specific controls and limitations as to how and when the power of search, arrest and seizure should be granted to military support teams. Recent widespread debate in Congress on this topic is a matter of public record, but defeat of such proposals has generally centered on three objections: (1) perceptions of public concern for individual rights; (2) fear of foreign outcry of "Yankee Imperialism" at the prospect of increased interference with legitimate transport and sovereignty and (3) the necessity of proper, requisite legal training. The first objection has already been addressed. By and large, the American people have demonstrated that they have faith in the military to judiciously increase the pressure on international narcotics dealers. Fears of (mainly) Latin American charges of imperialism would become nonexistent with recognition that we have acted upon the need to more vigorously interdict our own borders as well. And most Latin and South American governments have finally realized that enhancements of neither their national infrastructures nor internal stability occur as a result of allowing the drug trade to flourish. (10:197) And, as for the final objection, it is widely acknowledged at all levels of LEAs and DOD that training could be provided for the military to the extent necessary to ensure that the rights of those apprehended while engaged in suspected illegal drug activity could be maintained intact until transferred to civilian LEAs. (18:32) Additional justification to provide impetus to enact such new legislation is provided by no less than three recent important occurrences which have dramatically impacted the military and our society. They are: (1) The implications of the "Goldwater-Nichols (GN) Defense Reorganization Act" of 1986; (2) The "Weinberger Doctrine" criteria for evaluating the contemplated use of force and (3) the end of the "Cold War". An analysis of each of these evolutions and how they apply to the proposal to expand the military's role in the war on drugs will show just how realistic and credible such a concept is. The impact of GN has been unprecedented and it affects all levels of our military. All exercises, operations and planning are now done with the concept of "Joint" service participation in mind, reflecting the new interdependence that all services must employ. Passage of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1989 with its emphasis on support of interdiction, further solidified the necessity to develop "joint" doctrine with its requirement to integrate all service C-3/I functions. The result of this portion of the legislation has been the requirement to optimize coordination between not only the military services, but also with most participating civilian LEAs as well. GN also empowered the CINCs with increased responsibility to plan for and conduct directed operations in their own AOR. As such, these CINCs are in a position to specify how their forces are to be employed and to identify what resources are needed to accomplish their missions. Clearly, a CINC with representation of all four services must strive to effectively integrate all his assets to conduct any operation, including the continuing war on drugs. Three of the five CINCs have opted to form autonomous Joint Task Forces (JTFs) with which to conduct this mission in their respective AORs, thereby further enhancing interservice and LEA efficiency and cooperation. It is thus easy to see that the passage of the GN Act, although unintended at the time, quite readily adapts itself to integrating the war on drugs between all the services and LEAs over a widespread geographic area with an overall unifying strategy. The "Weinberger Doctrine", named for the former Secretary of Defense, is a concept which was borne out of the tragic result of some of this nation's ill-fated military missions in the early eighties. Although not formally adopted as official policy, it is widely referred to as a set of six extraordinary and realistic principles by which the contemplated use of military force should be judged. The six criteria and a brief discussion for each as applicable is as follows: 1. Clear Objective. This is the basis of any sound strategy. There must be a unifying, clearly-stated objective which is realistically obtainable. The desired objective of reducing the supply of illegal drugs is an obtainable goal with enhanced interdiction as a focal point of this approach. (16:9) 2. Popular Support. As previously stated, Americans are fed up with drug abuse and all its associated malaise. Under controlled and specific circumstances, the vast majority would support this measure. (8:1) 3. Sufficient Combat Power. Although an increasing number of service members are participating now, this proposal would lift the restrictions of requiring continuous LEA personnel to accompany military interdiction operations. Civilian LEAs are currently undermanned and over extended, considering their wide range of duties and assigned AORs. Enhanced use of the military would greatly assist in reducing this disparity in extending coverage of areas currently left open to smugglers. 4. Vital National Interests. The prospective employment of military force should be contemplated only when the vital interests of the nation are threatened. The "National Security Strategy" of the US has, for a number of years now, continued to specify the threat posed by drug abuse to our national security. This document, from which all policy governing our strategy evolves, summarizes the goal of all US interdiction efforts: "To choke off supply, our principal strategic goal is to identify, disrupt, dismantle, and ultimately destroy the trafficking organizations that produce or smuggle illicit drugs for the US market." (17:18) In addition, the strategy calls for, "domestic and international legal reforms." Taking its lead from this guidance, the "US National Military Strategy" states, "The detection and significant reduction of the production and trafficking of illegal drugs is a high priority national security mission of our armed forces." (14:15) 5. Reassessment. Once committed, continuation of the employment of military forces must be subjected to scrutiny to ensure that any changes in either the objective or in the nature of the threat are considered. Growth in the level of the threat posed by international drug traffickers reinforces the validity of increasing the military's role. An assessment of the effectiveness of this new and supplemental employment of military forces could be conducted at an appropriate time after incorporation. 6. Last Resort. The fact that the military has been mobilized to confront such a widespread threat to our national well-being reinforces this prerequisite. Now employed, the potential for more effective interdiction of the incoming drug supply should be taken advantage of. Clearly, each of these principles is applicable to supporting the proposal to allow currently-deployed military forces the use of seizure and arrest, when required, in our fight against drugs. The end of the Cold War has brought many new challenges, but it has done little to alter the magnitude of the threat posed by drugs. In contrast, however is the unique opportunity presented here to utilize our redeploying military in efforts to drastically curb our drug supply problem. We can now look to more closely focus attention on one of those threats that were formerly displaced by preparation for the showdown in Europe. This is certainly an area in which the "peace dividend" could and should be invested in. This applies from a financial as well as manpower perspective, in view of the ongoing force drawdowns. A new mission (from bases mainly in CONUS) for formerly forward- deployed troops could be readily undertaken. An additional opportunity to be taken advantage of is the carryover of realistic training that enhanced border/periphery counternarcotics operations present. Many current military units can utilize real world interdiction missions to benefit from and enhance their readiness for a more traditional-type of military mission. (15:72) The proposal to authorize military units that are engaged in the war on drugs to make arrests and seizures is a logical step, given initial success levels and the realistic prospect that such action will significantly contribute to successful prosecution of NDCS objectives. Lifting of this current ban will, under specific, controlled and carefully-monitored circumstances, supplement and enhance LEA's efforts in this area. The value of utilizing military assets to assist in the execution of interdiction missions is widely acknowledged and is an integral part of the supply reduction portion of the nation's overall strategy to reduce drug abuse. (15:130) Combined with what is recognized as the need for full implementation of complementary strategies required to reduce demand, attainment of enhanced national security due to a diminished drug threat is feasible. LIC, the essence of the drug war, is unconventional warfare which the US has not proven to be particularly successful at. But attaining victory in a LIC environment is the result of carefully applying a tailored, effective strategy to address the underlying problem (demand) and the actions of insurgents who profit (supply). If we remain on our present course of responding to our national drug crisis by not utilizing all the resources available in waging this conflict, then the result will be a diminished national security posture for all to bear. The time has come to utilize readily-available assets to make a difference in this war. Bibliography 1. Bergantz, Colonel Joseph L. "Military Support of the National Drug Control Strategy." 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