Deployment, Employment And Management Of Marine Corps Aviation Logistics Support CSC 1993 SUBJECT AREA - Aviation EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Deployment, Employment and Management of Marine Corps Aviation Logistics Support Author: Major Mark Fracassa, United States Marine Corps FORWARD Although some accounts have been written concerning U.S. Marine Corps Maritime Preposition Ships (MPS) and the sorted logistical requisites associated with that program, little has been focused specifically on the Aviation Logistics Support Ship (T-AVB). Such peripheral accounting of T-AVB employment and capability problems result from insufficient or lack of peacetime training, when this asset should be periodically utilized as it would be during a crisis response. Consequently, much of the T-AVB "problem" information discussed herein was in necessity based upon "lessons learned" from the 1990-1991 Gulf crisis. The time to "learn" is not during crisis response, when the lives of Marines and personnel from the other Services or friendly countries hang in the balance. Rather, mistakes should be made, difficulties and problem areas identified and the "learning curve" overcome in a benign training environment where we have ample opportunity to "work out the kinks" with relative impunity. Unfortunately, although such is the norm for most Marine Corps activities and capabilities, such has not been the case with the T-AVB. Major Mark Fracassa, USMC Aircraft Maintenance Officer EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Thesis: The MALS (Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron) cannot be expected to be properly deployed or employed in times of war if it is not realistically managed, prepared and trained on a recurring basis in peacetime to deal with the type of environment and potential hostilities expected during conflict resolution. The only means by which to acquire such capability and experience is for the MALS to "train like it will fight." Background: Since the mid-1980's, the Navy and Marine Corps have developed and refined the Maritime Prepositioning Ships/Force (MPS/MPF) concept. During Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, this forward-thinking innovation proved its worth, as Marine forces were able to both deploy to the Gulf region and be prepared to fight almost instantly, as their required equipment was either previously embarked aboard MPF shipping or accompanied the forces en route. However, there were numerous shortcomings discovered within the Aviation Combat Element (ACE) lift ship, the T-AVB, which are of great concern to aviation maintenance and supply officers, and logisticians within the MALS. The crux of most problems discovered was a lack of knowledge and expertise within MALS with respect to deployment, employment and management of the Aviation Logistics Support Ship (T-AVB). The rudimentary and underlying cause for such limitations can be traced to lack of opportunity, funding, timing or desire (in some cases) to aggressively seek out and obtain access to the T-AVB for indepth MALS training. Recommendation: The T-AVB program should be recognized as the necessary combination of logistics and operations for the ACE commander in a deployed environment and sufficient peacetime training opportunity and funding should be afforded MALS to become both proficient and effective in its employment. DEPLOYMENT, EMPLOYMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF MARINE CORPS AVIATION LOGISTICS SUPPORT OUTLINE Thesis: The MALS (Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron) cannot be expected to be properly deployed or employed in times of war if it is not realistically managed, prepared and trained on a recurring basis in peacetime to deal with the type of environment and potential hostilities expected during conflict resolution. The only means by which to acquire such capability and experience is for the MALS to "train like it will fight." I. USMC Roles and Missions A. Maintaining USMC Effectiveness B. The Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 1. Mission and Employment 2. Operational Procedures II. MPS and MAGTF Support A. MAGTF Theater Employment B. MPS Concept of Operation C. The T-AVB D. MPS/MPF Training and Operations 1. Gulf War Employment 2. Lack of MPF Knowledge and Training III. MALS, T-AVB and Deployment Readiness A. MALS Operations During Crisis Response B. MALS and T-AVB Utilization 1. Gulf War Problems Encountered 2. Lack of MALS/T-AVB Training C. T-AVB Readiness Shortfalls 1. Delayed Activation and Arrival in Theater 2. Lack of Personnel T-AVB Knowledge and Training D. West Coast T-AVB 1. Attempts to Acquire Training 2. Somalia T-AVB Use Request Denied IV. T-AVB Quandary and the "Fix" A. Need Yearly T-AVB Training For MALS B. Funding Required For Training C. Full Scale Work-Ups DEPLOYMENT, EMPLOYMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF MARINE CORPS AVIATION LOGISTICS SUPPORT by Major Mark Fracassa, United States Marine Corps Much has been written and discussed in reference to roles and missions of the Marine Corps and the direction it should take in the future. There is great concern for ensuring preservation of the Corps as a potent fighting force in a time when both Congress and the President appear to be swinging the saber of force drawdowns and reduced military spending with almost reckless abandon. This has forced the Corps to carefully scrutinize the ways it conducts business and as a result, significant effort is being expended to determine if there are capabilities or activities which can be consolidated without losing the Corps' effectiveness or efficiency. Whatever the future holds for the Corps, Marines must realize that its ultimate destiny will depend in large measure on the degree of efficiency in which the Corps operates and is managed in the eyes of Congress and the American people. This requires a demonstrated capacity of bringing missions to closure as expediently as possible with the least amount of personnel and equipment loss, and as cost effectively as possible. Presently, the Corps holds high marks in the afterglow of the Gulf War in each of these categories. But resting on previous performance will not provide the impetus required to ensure the Corps maintains and improves its capabilities for the future. One way all Marines can assist in this effort is by examining daily operating procedures and unit employment and management practices to ensure that all facets of Marine Corps life are conducted with maximum proficiency. The recurring issue which seems to haunt the Corps is failure to "train like we intend to fight," and few organizations appear innocent of violating this basic principle. With mandated cuts in military budgets and personnel reductions, it is a foregone conclusion that we must conduct our business "smarter." Consistently training in the same manner as we intend to fight will best serve the Corps' interests in terms of combat readiness and force employment effectiveness to foster continued belief in, and respect for, Marine Corps capabilities. THE MARINE AVIATION LOGISTICS SQUADRON One such organization which needs to be afforded increased opportunity to train like it is expected to fight is the Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron (MALS) of the Marine Aircraft Group (MAG). MALS is the Intermediate Maintenance Activity (IMA) which maintains and repairs aircraft components, and performs required manufacture, fabrication and support of items critical to the flying squadrons of the MAG. Utilizing the same approach in which the Aviation Combat Element (ACE) of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) is task-organized, MALS can be "tailored" to support an aircraft mix relative to the mission, providing the MAGTF Commander with desired flexibility in a functioning MALS (or MALS detachment) in support of his ACE. Since MALS is the major supporting activity for the Group's aircraft, it must achieve and maintain optimum readiness if it will be expected to perform its mission under the pressures of combat, especially if it will deploy in total and be forward based. MALS therefore cannot be expected to be properly deployed or employed in times of war if it is not realistically managed, prepared and trained on a recurring basis in peacetime to deal with the type of environment and potential hostilities expected during conflict resolution. The only means by which to acquire such capability and experience is for the MALS to "train like it will fight." MARITIME PREPOSITIONED SHIPS AND MAGTF SUPPORT In order to accomplish its missions and assigned taskings, the MAGTF must rapidly arrive in the theater of operations, be prepared to conduct forcible entry, and expeditiously exploit its successes. However, the ability to quickly move the MAGTF and project its power ashore (let alone sustain it once in theater), was heretofore the "long pole in the tent" and the subject of intensive study and doctrinal overhaul; enter the Military Prepositioned Ships (MPS) Program. The MPS concept links up air deployable MAGTF equipment and personnel with prepositioned supplies and equipment embarked aboard MPF ships that are continuously forward deployed. MPS Squadrons (MPSRON) each contain 30 days worth of supplies and equipment to sustain a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) of approximately 16,500 Marines. When married up with the necessary 249 C-141 sorties that round out MEB equipment requirements, the MAGTF becomes a credible fighting force. The enormous lift capability of a single MPSRON can be placed into perspective by realizing that to lift the equipment required by a MEB by air alone would require more than 4,500 C-141 equivalent sorties. (6:73) Due in part to the MPS program, the Navy-Marine Corps team enjoyed tremendous success in the Gulf War. (So successful in fact, that the U.S. Army has now embarked upon an MPS program of its own.) The MPS system provided our Naval forces with the ability to arrive in Southwest Asia (SWA) in an expedient manner and "set up shop" quickly, with all required items at hand. The MPS success story has written new chapters in the history of U.S. military power and has not gone unnoticed, as evidenced by General Colin Powell when he stated: "The amphibious capability of the Marines in tandem with the Navy gives us the capability to have a potential ground force presence wherever we have a Navy presence. And that is a great deterrent. Lying offshore, ready to act, the presence of ships and Marines sometimes means much more than just having airpower or ship's fire, when it comes to deterring a crisis. And the ships and Marines may not have to do anything but lie offshore. It is hard to lie offshore with a C-141 or C-130 full of airborne troops." (9) However, as documented through "lessons learned" submitted by Marines involved in MPS employment before, during and after the Gulf War, there remain several key issues which must be addressed to improve the overall program. Specifically, problems were noted which had the potential of hampering required readiness of the ACE due to inadequacies and/or difficulties experienced by aviation support personnel embarked aboard the Aviation Logistics Support Ships (T-AVB) of the MPSRON. THE AVIATION LOGISTICS SUPPORT SHIP (T-AVB) T-AVB' s were acquired as a result of a November 1983 analysis entitled "Feasibility Study of the Aviation Logistics Support Ship (T-AVB)." When not employed, T-AVB's are maintained in "RRF-5" (Ready Reserve Force) status, which requires five days preparation to ready the ship for sail. T-AVB's are commercial Roll On-Roll Off (RORO) container ships that have been modified for use by Marine Corps IMA aviation maintenance and supply organizations. When activated, these ships are operated by the Military Sealift Command (MSC) by civilian personnel. The primary mission of the T-AVB is to provide dedicated sealift for movement of a MALS in support of the rapid deployment of Marine aircraft units. In the event immediate off-load is not possible when the ship arrives at its point of debarkation, the ship's helicopter operating pad (capable of accommodating the CH-53E) facilitates the flow of aviation components and equipment assets to and from the ship for repair and subsequent return to units ashore. The secondary mission of the T-AVB is to provide resupply in a conventional RORO configuration if the IMA is not embarked aboard. MPS/MPF TRAINING AND OPERATIONS MPSRON's previously demonstrated their utility in several ways, although it took the Gulf War to make true believers out of skeptics or those who felt the entire program was too arduous. Inherent MPF flexibility makes it ideally suited for any type of mission, nearly anywhere in the world. However, it must be understood that the MPF program requires significant time, planning and forethought in order to be even remotely successful. The key requirement in the entire program is training that encompasses not only awareness of how the MPS concept operates, but more importantly, how to operate it. Such lack of awareness, understanding and operational capability was painfully obvious in the early weeks of the Gulf War. Because of shortcomings in unit training, many commanders had limited knowledge of what equipment was (or was not) embarked for them aboard MPF vessels. Consequently, many units did not sufficiently supplement their equipment or supply deficiencies through use of available follow-on airlift, and had to scramble to locate and secure basic necessities required to accomplish even the most elementary of missions. This was in sharp contrast to units which conducted rehearsals, local training and recent MPF training deployments in the months preceding actual deployment to the Gulf. Such units were already comfortable and familiar with the entire MPF operation, and off-load and distribution operations were therefore timely, efficient and effective. Units which conducted no prior MPS/T-AVB training were understandably in varied states of confusion throughout MPF operations. (1:41) MPF ability to rapidly deploy a unit and its equipment to the theater of operations has significantly enhanced Marine Corps capabilities. However, arrival and off-load of the MAGTF is but the beginning--serious attention and effort must also be directed toward sustainment of the force once it has arrived. Ensuring that we have the ability to both employ and sustain the associated elements of the MAGTF requires continuous, meaningful training with all the equipment and operational focus which would exist in a crisis scenario. It is in this arena of training that elements of the ACE tend to sell themselves short, particularly within the aircraft maintenance, supply and logistics realm spearheaded by the aviation logistics unit: MALS. MALS, T-AVB AND DEPLOYMENT READINESS The mission of MALS during a crisis situation is to deploy as an element of the MAGTF in support of either amphibious or land operations and provide aviation logistics support to aircraft within its purview. Accordingly, MALS must maintain currency and cognizance over identification of the type and amount of support which must be provided, be able to direct the prioritization of movement of that support, and possess the means to transport and embark its logistical support materiel. In order to accomplish such a broad mission, the Marine Aviation Logistics Support Program (MALSP) provides the framework within which aviation maintenance and supply support are fully integrated. It enables rapid task- organized aviation logistics support for combat operations predicated upon the mix of aircraft utilized. MALSP is designed to interface with MPF and T-AVB operations. MALSP Allowance Support Packages contain the prescribed allowances for spare parts, support equipment, mobile facilities, and support personnel required to sustain the ACE in combat. (7:1.15) MALS readiness and deployment preparation must therefore be a continuous process. Consequently, MALS must pay particular attention to its deployment plans, as it may be tasked with providing aviation logistical support for any combination of MAG deployments, ranging from training exercises to crisis action response into remote and/or hostile environments. In order to provide for such support, MALS conducts detailed predeployment preparations and planning in coordination with supported units to ensure sufficient support can and will be provided, based upon the theater situation. Generally speaking, MALS is not structured in a fashion that facilitates its full deployment except in a scenario such as the Gulf War. In most routine deployments, such configuration is not necessary, as requisite logistical support suffices with a limited number of maintenance and supply personnel and applicable stores of components and "common usage" materiel. Non-functional components are exchanged and retrograded to the parent MALS site, repaired and returned to this "rotable" pool system via opportune lift. However, a deployment of the majority (or sum total) of a MAG' s aircraft requires inordinate amounts and degree of IMA support, necessitating a compensatory "en masse" deployment of the supporting MALS. Simply considering the end result of the Gulf War, one would surmise that the MALS/T-AVB program is one of the most successful systems to come along in recent memory in the aviation community. Lift requirements were markedly reduced, the MALS was deployed expeditiously, and for the first time, aviation logistics was not a limiting factor in the operational scheme. (4:5) Although more successful than hoped, this evolution still experienced several difficulties before, during and after the Gulf War which detracted from its potential in several areas. It was apparent by the number and variety of after-action "lessons learned" from the Gulf War that MALS lacks the required training and practice to efficiently deploy under such pretenses as a unit. PROBLEMS WITH THE MALS/T-AVB PROGRAM The Gulf War was the Corps' first opportunity to actively employ the T-AVB in combat operations and it was readily apparent that failure to utilize the T-AVB would have had serious impact on ACE mission performance and completion. However, many problems were encountered with the activation and employment of the T-AVB's that could just as easily resulted in such undoing. Numerous "lessons learned" from the Gulf War indicated that the T-AVB and aviation logistics systems worked relatively well, but that several key areas needed attention to make them more effective. While some of these issues can be attributed to routine "growing pains", most can be traced to a specific, correctable shortcoming-- the lack of dedicated training with the T-AVB by those who would employ it during a crisis situation. As with any amphibious evolution, logistical support elements aboard the T-AVB must be properly embarked to provide maximized effectiveness and employability once the theater of operations has been accessed. During T-AVB MMF load plans and mount-out just prior to deployment to the Gulf, several "eleventh hour" additions and deletions were made which, although deemed to be of necessity, caused significant impact on embark operations. In some instances, MMF' s appeared to have been selected not based upon their designed or intended purpose or function, but rather as a item matching a shipboard configuration requirement. Additions to the original load plan resulted in significant support equipment and maintenance related equipage shortages, while in other cases, unnecessary duplication (even triplication) of items embarked and transported to the Gulf. (11:19) According to their Required Operational Capabilities statement, T-AVB's are to be activated within 5 days of notification, with another 2-4 days allotted for MMF, equipment and personnel embarkation. In the case of the Gulf War, it was noted that although these ships are supposed to be maintained in such a relative state of readiness, the overall material condition of both ships (USNS Curtiss and USNS Wright) was less than expected and required. This led to problems during the deployment to and from the Gulf, as well as while the ships were in the theater of operation. (5:5) In addition to degraded material condition of the T-AVB's, neither ship was able to meet the required five day activation deadline. The USNS Wright was unable to do so, as it was undergoing major shipyard work when activated and consequently arrived several weeks late, while the USNS Curtiss required twice the allotted time, taking ten days to get underway. (13:13) In addition, after setting sail, Curtiss had to return to port twice to affect necessary repairs, resulting in a transit time to theater of 38 days. Although the degraded material condition and crew activation for the ships were major factors in delays getting to theater, another equally vital component was the lack of experience on the part of MALS in both loading and operating the T-AVB. (2:9) Lack of T-AVB use and operation during routine peacetime training is not only contrary to basic Marine Corps doctrine of maintaining unit readiness at peak potential to ensure mission accomplishment, it is also reprehensible. In the absence of such training, Marine lives during crisis (or humanitarian) missions are placed in jeopardy. Without the necessary logistical support for theater based-aircraft, medivac, reconnaissance, close air support, air defense, close-in fire support, and the numerous other missions of Marine Aviation are severely impacted. In the case of the USNS Curtiss, utilization of the Aviation Logistics Support Ship concept got off to a good start, but has not been maintained. The Curtiss was delivered to the Marine Corps and underwent its first sea trial/activation during August and September 1989. In a "real world" operating scenario, the ship was anchored in the vicinity of San Clemente Island off the coast of southern California and was operated as designed and intended--as a sea-based IMA in support of Marine aviation. (12:V) The exercise lasted a total of nine days and was considered a qualified success, as it effectively demonstrated the T-AVB concept and capability to embark and operate a functional IMA in a sea-based environment for an "extended" period of time. However, built-in and program artificialities, inadequate MMF configuration or quantities, and problems resulting from less than optimum consumable supply selection combined to reduce the Curtiss' effectiveness and capabilities. (12:27) Perhaps the most important lesson learned from the Curtiss "shakedown" cruise was the realization that talking and planning such an innovation as the T-AVB is much easier than actually putting it into practice. The complexity of T-AVB management, embarkation and employment all dictate that the ship be routinely worked into the various MALS (and MAG) training schedules, lest the knowledge and capability to effectively utilize it become obscured. Such realization was not lost on aviation maintenance and supply personnel of the MALS within the Third Marine Aircraft Wing (3rd MAW), as they have since attempted to incorporate the T-AVB into routine training. Requests were forwarded in attempt to ascertain the necessary funding and authorization to send appropriate IMA personnel to T-AVB schooling where students learn its proper employment and their responsibilities when embarked. Part of this instruction also included an actual tour of the Curtiss to familiarize Marines with the ship. Unfortunately, as is usually the case when funding is in short supply, cut backs in areas related to training occur and this was no exception, as this invaluable education and "hands-on" experience was canceled for lack of money to fund it. (10) A recent example demonstrating the impact of trying to do "more with less" and being forced to depend on the ingenuity of Marines to get the job done while not giving them all the "tools" they require was relief and humanitarian operations in Somalia. Based on the mission of the T-AVB and the operational scenario, activation and use of the USNS Curtiss was more than justified and applicable; yet, its use was denied. The resulting lack of access to T-AVB lift and support forced 3rd MAW units to subsequently request strategic lift from the U.S. Air Force in an attempt to get all requisite aviation logistical support MMF's for aircraft in theater; this too, was denied. (10) The lack of capability or desire to field the T-AVB in such a scenario sends the wrong message to MALS, for if it was not considered "appropriate" for Somalia, it must therefore be "inaccessible" for vital peacetime training, so "don't even ask." Consequently, there was no IMA ashore or at sea, as the USS Tripoli, supporting 3rd MAW aircraft for the first 10 days, had to depart for other operations. Aviation support operations were then reduced to two capabilities: MALS-16 would have to make due with whatever supplies they brought with them, and, rely exclusively on logistical support airlift to ferry required supplies back and forth from southern California. Such parts shuttle runs averaged a turn around time in excess of 5 days, utilizing Air Force C-5 aircraft, which is prohibitively expensive to operate in such a fashion. (10) Had the T-AVB been activated, untold money would have no doubt been saved in transport costs alone, not to mention the measure of improvement in aircraft readiness that would have been realized. THE T-AVB QUANDARY AND THE "FIX" In order to retain the flexible response capabilities it has become noted for, the Marine Corps must continue to pursue and maintain a properly trained and equipped force to ensure its preparedness and effectiveness in the future. The Corps needs to follow through on initiatives that provide optimum benefit, especially in terms of power projection and readiness. Acquiring a potential such as the T-AVB of the MPSRON and not taking the time or effort to periodically incorporate the T-AVB into "hands-on" training as a routine (or not being able to do so due to funding shortfalls) serves only to reduce Marine aviation readiness and result in slower response time in the event of a crisis/reaction situation requirement. As applicably demonstrated by MPF/T-AVB operations during the Gulf War, efficient and effective employment of these capable and proven programs hinges on training and routine operational use: -- T-AVB's should be activated and thoroughly exercised at least annually. This will improve the material condition of the ships and reduce costs associated with activations/deactivations each year. (5:5) -- Regularly scheduled, meaningful training exercises using the T-AVB should be conducted by MALS to enhance loading and operating experience and help ensure that T-AVB (civilian) crews maintain proficiency. This would reduce activation and operating costs, ultimately reducing overall exercise costs. (3:2) -- Practice evolutions should mirror anticipated real world operations as much as possible to gain maximum benefit from "real world" lessons learned. (11:19) -- Utilize the T-AVB programmed biannual training provision for exercises (in addition to the current five year breakouts for engine checks). Presently, implementation of such valuable training is subject to the ever-vacillating availability (or lack) of funding and/or the option of the MAW in its scheduled training process. It is not surprising to find, therefore, that the Curtiss has not been employed for any realistic training since the end of the Gulf War. It is also not unreasonable to assume that the MALS are probably not optimally prepared or capable of efficient mission accomplish or maximized readiness in future T-AVB operations. Although both the Marine Corps and Fleet Commanders-In-Chief endorsed biannual T-AVB exercises as the most cost effective solution to ship, employment and procedural problems with the program as far back as 1989, the ships remain underutilized. (3: 2) -- Required funding should be programmed during the yearly budgetary process to assure T-AVB training is included. Post Gulf War lessons learned identified lack of T-AVB utilization during peacetime as a primary culprit in less-than-optimum theater aviation logistical readiness, recommending both adequate funding for the program and biannual exercises of the T-AVB for not less than 30 days to prevent similar future shortcomings. (3:2) It has been said that the "more you bleed in peace, the less you will bleed in war", and much the same can be said for the capability of aviation logistical support and the T-AVB concept. Purposeful training results in increased familiarity, confidence, effectiveness and, most importantly, combat readiness within the Marine Corps. Training is a necessity--a reality of life whose importance seems to emerge only after the fact--after an aircraft mishap; after an avoidable accident in the workplace; after friendly fire incidents; after the death of a Marine or Sailor. Arguably, we must keep spending under control, but at what point do we say ENOUGH! and refuse to allow the further erosion of necessary training for our Marines? For the T-AVB, that time is now. T-AVB EXERCISE: MONETARY OUTLAY VERSUS BENEFIT By examining the USNS Curtiss activation exercise conducted by 3rd MAW in August of 1989, the expense incurred vis-a-vis benefit gained for such valuable training can be put into perspective. The overall cost of the nine day exercise came to approximately $1,400,000. Of this total, $1,200,000 came from Navy Exercise Funds which were utilized to activate, conduct the exercise, then deactivate the Curtiss, while the remaining $200,000 was required for temporary additional duty (TAD) expenses and was funded by the Marine Corps. (12:6) Based on these figures, it is estimated that a similar size and scope exercise conducted today would cost approximately $1,393,000 in Navy Exercise Funds and another $232,000 in Marine Corps TAD funds in current Fiscal Year (FY-93) dollars. (8:38) Consequently, for the two T-AVB's the Marine Corps (Navy) owns, a combined yearly training expenditure of approximately $3.5 million would be required to ensure MALS/IMA efficiency and effectiveness in employment of the Aviation Logistics Support Ship concept. Already proven in their invaluable worth to Marine Aviation during the Gulf War, the T-AVB potential needs to be exercised on a routine basis by MALS units to attain and maintain their decisive "edge" with respect to assuring aviation readiness for in-theater aircraft. Anything less than that is, at the very least, a dangerous disservice to the Marine on the ground. FUNDAMENTAL LESSONS ARE THE EASIEST TO LEARN The primary lesson that can be taken from T-AVB utilization in SWA is that unit training and education for the MALS are vital and fundamental foundations from which effective aviation support and resultant force projection emanates. The T-AVB program should be recognized as the necessary combination of logistics and operations for the ACE commander and allotted sufficient peacetime training opportunity. As with any other weapon support system, if the T-AVB concept is not given proper attention and appropriately exercised, MALS will be hard pressed to employ them to their potential during combat. After all, we are supposed to learn from "lessons learned" and pay attention to the experience of others. Proper peacetime training requirements to ensure maximized utilization of the T-AVB during a crisis situation is no exception. MALS therefore cannot be expected to be properly deployed or employed in times of war if it is not realistically managed, prepared and trained on a recurring basis in peacetime to deal with the type of environment and potential hostilities expected during conflict resolution. The only means by which to acquire such capability and experience is for the MALS to "train like it will fight." With the lives of our fellow Marines and overall mission accomplishment possibly in the balance, can we really afford to do anything else? BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Barna, Captain Tom D. , "MPF Off load: No Longer a Paper Tiger", Marine Corps Gazette, November 91. 2. Brewer, LTCOL, HQMC (LPO); Marine Corps Lessons Learned System, MCLLS Number 42652-10490 (03450). 3. Brewer, LTCOL, HQMC (LPO); Marine Corps Lessons Learned System, MCLLS Number 92718-73574 (01989). 4. Carswell, Col J.R., "The Marine Aviation Logistics Support Program", The Log, Oct 91. 5. Gerlaugh, MAJ, HQMC (POR-14); Marine Corps Lessons Learned System, MCLLS Number 42431-89765 (02890). 6. Hayes, Major Mark L. "Sealift: The Achilles' Heel of our National Strategy", Marine Corps Gazette, Nov 92. 7. "Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 36 Deployment Standing Operation Procedures", Chapter 1, 30 May 91. 8. "National Defense Budget Estimates For FY-93", Office of the Comptroller of the Department of Defense, March 1992. 9. Powell, General Colin L., USA; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Testimony before Congress, 14 Mar 1990. 10. Russell, Major Allen T., Aircraft Maintenance Officer, MALS-16, 3rd MAW, (interview), 26 Mar 1993. 11. Schweisthal, CWO-4, MALS-39; Marine Corps Lessons Learned System, MCLLS Number 42229-99030 (04931). 12. Sims, William H., Initial Activation of West Coast T-AVB, Center For Naval Analysis, Document CRM 90-3. 13. (Author not identified); Marine Corps Lessons Learned System, MCLLS Number 50852-22096 (03653).
