Strategic Sealift: A Problem With A Solution CSC 1993 SUBJECT AREA - Strategic Issues EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: Strategic Sealift: A Problem with a Solution Author: Major K.D. Bolitho, United States Marine Corps Conference Group #7, Marine Corps Command and Staff College Thesis: In accordance with the new National Military Strategy, U.S. strategic sealift must be reevaluated in terms of its rapid response capabilities, sustainability and economic feasibility. Background: As a maritime nation, the U.S. must be able to deploy and sustain substantial forces in areas of the world where we do not have forward-positioned forces or equipment. However, it was made apparent during Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, that the U.S. military and Merchant Marine fleets were not capable of responding quickly to the massive sealift requirements necessary to fight a war overseas. The inability of U.S. sealift to respond quickly to crisis without reliance on foreign-flag shipping is a problem which must be solved. Our experience during Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm pointed out three strategic sealift areas which if enhanced will provide the rapid response capability needed and will significantly reduce U.S. dependence on foreign-flag shipping: Afloat Prepositioning Ships, Fast Sealift Ships, and the U.S.-flag fleet and Merchant Marines. Recommendation: The U.S. must reconsider its strategic sealift operations. The Afloat Prepositioned Ships program and the Fast Sealift Ships program must be expanded to insure rapid deployment and sustainability in the theater of operations. The U.S.-flag merchant fleet and Merchant Marines must be revitalized in order to provide adequate follow-on sealift capability during a crisis without reverting to a dependence on foreign-flag ships. STRATEGIC SEALIFT: A PROBLEM WITH A SOLUTION Thesis: In accordance with the new National Military Strategy, the U.S. strategic sealift must be reevaluated in terms of its rapid response capabilites, sustainability and economic feasibility. I. Reexamining the U.S.'s military capabilities A. Refocusing on major contingency operations B. Deploy and sustain substantial forces C. Lack of available strategic sealift D. Dependence on foreign-flag shipping II. Afloat Prepositioning Ships A. Best forward deployed rapid reinforcement capability B. Configured in complete force modules C. Primarily unique to the U.S.M.C D. Capability should be expanded to other services III. Fast Sealift Ships A. Second echelon of follow-on support B. CONUS deployed reinforcements C. Maintained in ready state for rapid deployment D. Expensive to maintain E. Alternatives: l. Expand the FSS fleet 2. Government built ships and chartered to merchant fleet IV. Ready Reserve Fleet A. Capability that is past its prime B. Expensive to maintain and reactivate C. Critical manpower shortages D. No longer econically useful E. Better use of resources elsewhere V. U.S.-flag and Merchant Marine fleet A. Critical lack of U.S.-flag ships B. Critical lack of U.S. Merchant Marines C. Resulting dependence on foreign-flag shipping D. Start a government subsidized ship-building program l. Charter ships to U.S.-flag merchants 2. Return on Investment to government E. Provide depth in U.S. follow-on strategic sealift echelons STRATEGIC SEALIFT: A PROBLEM WITH A SOLUTION On 2 August 1990, President Bush directed that a new national military strategy be undertaken. His main focus was on major contingency operations vice the threat of a European-centered global war against the USSR. One of the main considerations that had to be addressed was the rapid deployment of U.S. forces capable of prosecuting a wide range of contingency operations anywhere within the world. (16:64) The new strategy that has been developed places more emphasis on power projection than on the U.S. Cold War strategy which was based on deterrence through forward defense of Western Europe and Korea, rapid reinforcement forces and military alliances. Small, flexible, rapidly transportable general purpose forces provide the cornerstone of the new strategy. This new military strategy is based on deterrence, forward presence and enhanced power projection to offset the reduced forward positioning of U.S. Forces. The capability to rapidly reconstitute forces in the event of a reemerging Soviet threat is also essential to the strategy. General Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, emphasized this point in a statement made to the House Armed Services Committee on February 7, 1991: "Deterrence is only credible if we possess a robust means of power projection and the mobility to deploy and sustain our forces." (7:19) The U.S. is a maritime nation and when it goes to war it goes overseas with 95% of all its military cargo delivered by ships. (1:41) Therefore, the U.S. must be able to deploy and sustain substantial forces in areas of the world where we do not have forward positioned forces or equipment. Maintaining a strong U.S. sealift capability is severely handicapped by the ever-constricting federal budget cuts; the age, condition and maintenance costs of our Ready Reserve Forces ships; our shrinking Merchant Marine force; and the cost of building new ships equipped to handle both military and civilian transportation. These handicaps have resulted in a shocking lack of available U.S. strategic sealift, effecting a dependence on foreign-flag shipping to move U.S. equipment during times of crisis. Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm (hereafter referred to as ODS) made clear the shortfalls of the U.S. military and Merchant Marine fleets when they were incapable of responding quickly to the massive sealift requirement necessary to fight a major conflict overseas. The new national strategy requires the U.S. military to move personnel and materiel to distant areas at a rate and in numbers sufficient to rapidly field an efficient force. These new demands require a strong U.S. sealift capability, supported by a solid shipyard industrial base. It also calls for a ready pool of qualified and licensed merchant seamen to man these ships in a minimal warning situation. None of these capabilities exist today. (1:42) The following pages set forth those areas which need to be addressed in order to meet these challenges. In terms of rapid response, the Afloat Prepositioning Ships (APS), consisting of 13 Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) carrying U.S. Marine Corps equipment and 12 other ships carrying Army and Air Force equipment and supplies, is the U.S.'s best forward deployed rapid reinforcement capability. (18:30) These ships were designed to support the Nation's forward defense strategy and enable Rapid Reinforcement Forces (RRF) to be inserted within days of the initial assault forces. The MPS provide mobile, long-term storage of military equipment and supplies at sea near areas of potential trouble. In ODS, the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) was faced with a staggering sealift effort. The first ships deployed were the 13 MPS. One point currently under consideration by the USTRANSCOM is an idea brought out by ODS. "If rapid deployment prevented Saddam Hussein from moving troops into Saudi Arabia, then mobility itself must be seen as a deterrent to military aggression." (7:19) A point which once again suggests the importance of enhancing our MPS capabilities. Unlike the Marine Corps' MPS, the l2 other APS do not contain all the combat equipment and supplies necessary to rapidly reinforce assault forces. Consequently, during ODS, the first Army and Air Force RRF's were intially dependent on rationed strategic airlift for support and sustainment. But not the Marine Corps' MPS. The MPS are configured in complete force modules and each MPS squadron of 4 ships carries a balanced mix of unit equipment and supplies to support an entire Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) of over 16,000 Marines and sustain them for 30 days. In ODS, the 2 MPS squadrons that were employed along with their combat-ready Marines provided the main deterrent between the Iraqi troops and Saudi Arabia for the first 30 days of the war. In fact, only 8 days after being ordered to action on 7 August, the first of the MPS was disembarking essential equipment to marry up with the U.S. Marines in Saudi Arabia. (3:22) MPS is clearly the most responsive arm of U.S. strategic sealift. However, currently, the MPS is mostly unique to the Marine Corps, This is a problem with a solution. MPS should be expanded to meet the needs of the other services, more specifically, the Army RRF's. The Army has turned to rapid deployment with the deactivation of foreign-based combat units and currently has a proposal which requires the Navy to buy 20 new high-speed cargo ships. These ships would allow the Army to store equipment for a forward deployed, 120-tank brigade. The fleet, which would be located at a base somewhere between Guam and Diego Garcia, will be able to respond and reach a crisis within 15 days. However, with all the cut-backs in the defense budgets, this initiative is in jeopardy and may not be high on the Navy's list. (21:23) Military analyst Jeffrey Record praised the Marine Corps when he proclaimed, "Desert Shield/Desert Storm has already affirmed the MPS program as one of the most prescient and imaginative U.S. conventional force improvements since World War II." (18:75) In the 1992 Annual Report to the President and the Congress, the Secretary of Defense stated, "Readiness and mobility must be among the highest priorities, especially for forces designated to respond to short warning crisis." (4:9) The Marine Corps has recognized these priorities of readiness and mobility. All Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) are required to be rapidly deployable by various means. These means include amphibious ships, strategic sealift, strategic airlift, or MPS. (9:9) Defense analyst David Silverstein has stated, "The Marine Corps is the best equipped and organized to deal with the sort of Third World crises America is likely to face." (17:26) Marine Corps planners agree that as the Navy's fleet of amphibious assault ships shrinks due to budget constraints and age, the Corps' 13 MPS will increase in importance. The Marine Corps would like to buy additional MPS to enable more equipment to be prespositioned at sea. However, any additional MPS must compete with other high priority funding requirements such as a replacement for the CH-46 helicopter and development of an advanced amphibious assault vehicle. (16:37) To date, MPS has proven to be the most effective solution to filling the gap between the initial assault forces and the follow-on contingency of Fast Sealift Ships (FSS). The FSS are Navy ships acquired from the U.S. merchant fleet for use in contingencies where fast sealift of heavy equipment is required. The FSS constitute the second echelon of follow-on support and must on-load all its cargo prior to sailing, unlike the MPS which are preloaded with equipment and staged for quick response. The FSS are held in a 96-hour reduced operating status with a nucleus of 18 crewmen. One FSS carries as much cargo as 230 huge C-5 transport planes. An activated ship requires a crew of 42 Merchant Marines who are employed by private companies under contract to the Military Sealift Command (MSC) and who are recalled during national need. The FSS have been configured as roll-on/roll-off ships (RO/RO), and therein lies one their problems. In ODS we had modern, deep-water ports to off-load RO/RO ships; however, we might not be so lucky in future crises. Clearly, in today's third-world crisis environment, adequate ports will not be available in the majority of cases. During ODS, all 8 of the Navy's FSS (SL-7s) were activated to move the Army's heavy equipment. The first FSS was sailing within 48 hours and the next 2 within 72 hours. In fact, the first FSS ship began unloading in Saudi Arabia on 27 August, only 20 days after President Bush's initial troop deployment order. The FSS made a total of 32 lifts, transporting more than 500 million pounds of dry cargo. (8:14) Although one of the FSS's suffered a major engineering casualty, the FSS's performed extremely well in ODS. "They averaged more cargo per voyage than any two U.S. or foreign-flag chartered vessels combined, having delivered 14 percent of all unit equipment by the end of the ground war." (8:16) Despite this impressive sealift effort, FSS, in concert with other strategic lift, took over 5 months to transport enough supplies to sustain U.S. forces prior to their initiating offensive actions. The major problem with the FSS lies not in its performance, but with the shortage of FSS. During ODS, the ship of choice for fast sealift was the RO/RO vessel. However, the U.S. was able to charter only 7 RO/ROs from the U.S.-flag fleet and 27 others had to be chartered from foreign-flag carriers. (5:67) Clearly, the solution to the shortage of FSS's is for Congress to curtail its massive expenditures on the aging Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF) and put the money into buying more FSS for the future. As Dr. Richard T. Ackley stated, on 24 January 1992 DOD provided the mobility requirements study to Congress. A portion of its unclassified summary called for the construction or major conversion of 20 large, medium-speed RO/RO ships. Eleven of these ships would be used for fast sealift, similar to the mission of the FSS in ODS. The other 9 would be assigned as prepositioned ships, similar to the MPS's mission in ODS. (1:45) The mobility requirements study is encouraging to those who believe that one of the keys to deterrence is a sealift capability that can get equipment into the theater of operations quickly, which FSS clearly demonstrated during ODS. Therefore, just as the mobility requirements suggest, the FSS program should be expanded to increase the flexibility, balance and responsiveness of our present and future sealift systems. In terms of sustainability, the U.S.'s Achilles heel is the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) consisting of cargo ships and tankers which are supposedly maintained for breakout in 1 to 6 months in time of national need. The NDRF is made up of 2 groups of ships: 96 Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF) ships which are regularly maintained for breakout in less than 30 days and 116 older ships not regularly maintained. (1:42) However, as demonstrated during ODS, the RRF proved to be too old and out-of-date to be rapidly reactivated. The average age of a ship in our RRF fleet is 27 years and in addition to the obvious problems associated with an aging fleet, the RRF is comprised of out-of-date steam propulsion plants that require seamen trained in an outdated skill to operate them. (8:72) In ODS, 45 of the 96 RRF ships were reactivated and 42 were turned over to Military Sealift Command (MSC) for operational control. However, many of them were not ready for sea in the allotted time due to their poor propulsion and auxiliary machinery condition. Of the 45 reactivated, only l4 reached their loading port on schedule. (1:43) As well as being out-of-date, the 116 older NDRF ships are not cost effective to maintain or reactivate. For example, each year a ship is in an inactive status it amasses costs of over $12,000 just to dehumidify it. In 1985, a reactivation test of 2 of the older ships in the NDRF concluded that it would require about $2 million to make each ship seaworthy. The average cost to reactivate and run our RRF during ODS was $2.5 million per ship, according to Maritime Administrator Warren G. Leback. (1:43) As pointed out earlier, not only do our NDRF including the RRF ships have aging problems, but so do our U.S. merchant seamen who are trained in running the aged RRF ships. At this time, the average age of U.S. Merchant Marines is 50 years old. (8:72) According to the Maritime Administration, in 5 to 10 years there will be insufficient trained seamen to man the RRF in an emergency. This was graphically illustrated during ODS when one Merchant Marine engineer who was 83 years old was voluntarily recalled to active duty to provide the necessary expertise to operate an aged RRF propulsion plant. In the Department of the Navy's Fiscal Years 1992-1993 Report to the Congress regarding sealift during ODS, it was stated that " performance of our Ready Reserve Force was the greatest deficiency." As a result of the NDRF's age, costs and poor performance during ODS, the Maritime Administration has decided to sell all 116 of the older ships for scrap by the year 2000. (1:44) However, the DOD, in its mobility requirements study last January, reaffirmed its reliance on the RRF by increasing the RRF from 96 ships to 142. The additional ships are to be acquired used or through a build- and-charter program. (1:47) The final area which must be addressed is the continued decline of our U.S.-flag fleet and Merchant Marines to man the fleet. Since World War II, the U.S.-flag merchant fleet has declined from about 3,000 ships to 367 today. (1:44) In an article in Sea Power, August 1991, entitled "Navy League's 1991-1992 Resolutions," some maritime experts estimated that the U.S.-flag cargo fleet will decrease by an additional 85 percent by the year 2005 and ships capable of carrying the larger military cargo will decrease by about 70 percent. The combined loss may represent more than 200 ships. (24:21) Moreover, as the U.S.-flag merchant fleet has declined so have the numbers of U.S. Merchant Marines. At the end of World War II, there were thousands of U.S.- flag Merchant Marine ships. The Maritime Administration (MARAD) has predicted that the U.S. Merchant Marine fleet will continue to decline from the 168 militarily useful dry cargo ships available today to 35 by the year 2000. As the largest trading nation in the world, the U.S. carries less than 4 percent of that trade in U.S. ships compared to over 50 percent back in the 1950's. (7:19) The result of these declines is a critical lack of U.S.-flag merchant shipping and trained Merchant Marines ready for action in time of war. The decline in U.S.-flag merchant shipping is mainly a result of the commercial business concern which mandates that merchant ships must be profitable. American businesses have found it less expensive to buy foreign-built ships, hire foreign crews and register the ships under foreign flags than to use American products and crews. (1:47) One solution to this problem of revitalizing the U.S.- flag fleet and Merchant Marine is to start a government subsidized shipbuilding program, known as a build-and- charter program. By building and sailing more U.S. civilian-owned merchant ships, the infusion of capital into the industry would strengthen the U.S. shipyard industrial base, create jobs for merchant mariners and shipbuilders, and, most importantly, provide depth in our follow-on strategic sealift echelons. (1:45) Capt. Robert W. Kesteloot, U.S. Navy (Ret.), suggested that a common-design ship for both military and commercial use should be developed. He proposed that 4 different models of a single ship could be designed, which would encompass the basic commercial convertible container carrier, the combination break-bulk and containership, a Heavy-Lift model and a Heavy RO/RO design. By utilizing the same basic ship design, building costs could be saved and training costs of the crew could be cut. (15:38) According to Capt. Kesteloot, by chartering the commercial ships built with government financing, the U.S. Treasury would be able to recoup its investment and even make money. (15:39) But more importantly, the U.S. would have a trained Merchant Marine and U.S.-flag fleet ready to call on, drastically reducing our dependence on foreign-flag ships to transport our equipment during times of war. One problem that the Military Sealift Command (MSC) ran into during ODS was the lengthy amounts of time necessary for loading and discharging ammunition in breakbulk ships. The breakbulk ships were used predominantly to carry tens of thousands of tons of ammunition to the Persian Gulf. Loading and unloading ammunition on the breakbulk ships takes considerable more time than loading and unloading cargo on RO/RO's and container ships. The MSC is looking into speeding up the process for ammunition sustainment. The greatest proof yet of U.S. sealift capabilities and lack thereof came from the lessons learned from ODS. Although ODS has been hailed as a significant logistical success it was not a true test of our sealift capabilities. The U.S. had an allied country next door to the theater of operations where we could amass troops and equipment. The U.S. had modern, large, deep-water ports available, which were ideal for RO/RO ships such as those in our FSS. One of the systems that was not tested during ODS was the unloading of cargo "in the stream," and its transport to and over an undeveloped beach. The military has planned for and conducted exercises for such a contingency, but most of the industry, i.e., commercial ships and Merchant Marines, have not been involved or tested. (5:68) It has been suggested that the military should bring more of the industry into the planning stages in order to improve productivity when needed. A closer working environment during peacetime between the military and the commercial industry has been suggested as a source of future improvement in a crisis situation. During our next war or conflict, the U.S. may not have enough Allies willing to help with our sealift shortfalls. Our dependence on foreign-flag shipping during ODS proved that the U.S. must find a solution to the problem of our dwindling U.S.-flag merchant fleet. Lessons learned from ODS underscored the critical role our strategic sealift assets play in projecting our forces rapidly and in sufficient quantity to provide a credible, conventional deterrent to aggression. ODS did point out our need for continued support and enhancement of MPS shipping, since the MPS ships were the first to arrive and match up the Marines in theater with their equipment. The commander of the USTRANSCOM, Air Force General Hansford T. Johnson, in testimony before Congress (in a statement submitted to the House Armed Service Subcommittee on Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials, April 16, 1991), voiced his concerns regarding the disproportionate reliance on foreign-flag shipping during ODS, saying: Our ability to lift more than 10 million tons of material by sea in seven months of operations to the Persian Gulf region has.. depended heavily on the contributions of organic, allied and friendly shippers. In the future, however, we would find ourselves in a contingency that may require us to accomplish a deployment by relying principally on a mix of U.S. sealift resources. One of our greatest concerns, then, is the state of the U.S. maritime industry. (5:67) Maintaining a global sea-based forward presence by means of our MPS gives the U.S. the ability to respond wherever and whenever American interests are threatened worldwide. 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