Improving The Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Intelligence Group (SRIG) AUTHOR Major Richard B. Pellish, USMC CSC 1991 SUBJECT AREA - Manpower EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: IMPROVING THE SURVEILLANCE, RECONNAISSANCE, INTELLIGENCE GROUP (SRIG) Introduction: The Marine Corps needs to understand the complex nature of joint/combined operations when analyzing surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence operations. Especially, when considering the support that will be received or the support that will be requested to enhance the Marine Air-Ground Task Force's (MAGTF) warfighting capability. This support will come from the Joint Task Force (JTF), national, theater assets or in the case of Desert Shield/ Desert Storm in Southwest Asia (SWA) the Commander in Chief of Central Command (CINCCENTCOM). Part One: For the first time, in the recent history of the Fleet Marine Force, the Marine Corps committed one of the newest organizations to combat, the Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Intelligence Group (SRIG). The SRIG had a very challenging situation in SWA due to the recent establishment of the organization and lack of training as a command responsible for providing the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Commander with a tailored intelligence product. Part Two: The SRIG is the focus point for the tactical exploitation of national capabilities (TENCAP) in the MEF. However, this capability is exploited through the chain of command on a priority bases. This highlights the fact the MAGTF must use its organic collection assets to its fullest capability when trying to satisfy the informational requirements of the MEF and its subordinate elements. The SRIG relies primarily on its internal organization to accomplish its mission. It includes a Radio Battalion, Remotely Piloted Vehicle Company, Force Reconnaissance Company, and Intelligence Company. Numerous lessons have been learned in the employment of these organizations in combat. In addition, plenty of equipment limitations will need to be improved for future battlefields. Part Three: Other organizations in the MAGTF are required to satisfy the collection requirements of the MAGTF Command Element, established by the Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center (SARC). The Aviation Combat Element (ACE) is the principle subordinate element that has to provide aerial reconnaissance and surveillance support. For the SRIG and the MAGTF, as a whole, to be successful in combat. Summary: The Marine Corps must continue to improve its overall surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence functions across the spectrum of the MAGTF. The SRIG being its lead organization with primary responsibility in this area. All Marines must continue to identify deficiencies in functional areas. Then appropriate commands and authority will be able to improve the capability of this warfighting organization. IMPROVING THE SURVEILLANCE, RECONNAISSANCE, INTELLIGENCE GROUP (SRIG) Thesis statement: The Marine Corps should capitalize on its unique Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group (SRIG) and realize the SRIG will have to continue to improve its capabilities for future battlefields. I. Prior to any conventional war involving the United States the U.S. Intelligence Community should explore all possible options to stop armed conflict and recommend those options to National Command Authorities. A. All national intelligence agencies have representation at the unified command level. B. Theater and national assets are tasked to support operational level commanders when their organic assets cannot efficiently collect in their area of interest. C. Operational commanders definitely have to control their area of influence with a very aggressive tactical intelligence collection plan, in order to survive on the modern battlefield. II. The Commandant of the Marine Corps stated that intelligence drives operations. A. Presently employed in Saudi Arabia is one of the newest organizations the Fleet Marine Force has established in recent years: the Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group. B. The following is a listing of requirements that the SRIG would have to address for 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) to be successful in combat operations. 1. Will Iraqi units conduct espionage, sabotage, subversion, or terrorist operations against Marine forces in Saudi Arabia? If so where, when and in what strength? 2. Will Iraqi forces attack Saudi Arabia? If so where, when, how and in what strength? 3. How, where and in what strength will Iraqi forces defend Kuwait? 4. Where, when and what type of mines, barriers and obstacles will Iraqi forces employ? 5. Will the Iraqi forces employ chemical munitions? 6. What targets will cause the greatest amount of damage to Iraqi forces in Kuwait? III. U.S. armed forces conducted a strategic bombing phase in the campaign plan, however Marine forces were contemplating the issues of conducting offensive ground operations. This presented the SRIG with very challenging issuses. A. Tactical exploitation of national intelligence capabilities must be tasked by military commanders to satisfy information requirements deemed necessary to achieve success on the battlefield. The U.S. intelligence community has considerable capability, however their primary mission is to support National Command Authorities. B. The organic collection assets of the SRIG will have to provide specific information to satisfy standing intelligence requirements of the 1st MEF. This was not be an easy task when considering what the MEF commander was authorized to do in a joint/combined operation. 1. The Radio Battalion had to play a major role in electronic warfare operations specifically in regards to electronic support measures (ESM) for the MEF commander to be successful on the battlefield. 2. The Remotely Piloted Vehicle Company had to concern itself primarily with battlefield surveillance and target acquistion. 3. The Force Reconnaissance Company most likely was limited in performing its primary mission of deep reconnaissance prior to appropriate authorization to conduct clandestine intelligence gathering missions in denied areas of Kuwait and Iraq. 4. Counterintelligence Teams primarily concerned with counterespionage, countersabotage, countersubversion and counterterrorism operations will be limited in what they can do based on authorization from the CINC. 5. Interrogation Translation Teams are primarily concerned with the exploitation of refugees and prisoners of war in order to glean information that will be of importance to the MEF and subordinate commanders of the MAGTF. In addition to providing support to the Joint Interrogation Facility (JIF) and Joint Translation Facility (JTF). IV. Other organizations of the MAGTF will be required to become team players in satisfying the collection requirements established by the Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center (SARC) of the MEF Command Element. A. The Aviation Combat Element (ACE) will have to provide aerial visual reconnaissance and surveillance operations to fill the gap of remotely piloted vechicles (RPVs). B. The ACE will also have to provide appropriate airborne electronic warfare support to attack and assault elements but also to the MEF commander's intelligence collection effort. The United States Marine Corps' Fleet Marine Force is a force in readiness. It is prepared to go to war on a moments notice. Normally there is a threat/intelligence build-up prior to any conventional war involving the United States. This gives the United States intelligence community an opportunity to explore possible options to prevent or stop armed conflict and recommend those options to National Command Authorities. Recently, we experienced such a situation in the Middle East. However, when President Bush saw sanctions would not cause Saddam Hussain to leave Kuwait, he was left with only the military option. At this point the U.S. intelligence community had to assume the responsibility of supporting the Commander in Chief of Central Command (CINCCENTCOM) General Norman Schwarzkopt. All national intelligence agencies are represented at the unified command level. This includes the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency (NSA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA). The entire world is aware of the difficulty the U.S. had in targeting Iraqi mobile SCUD missiles in Iraq and Kuwait. This intelligence limitation not only impacted on General Schwarzkopt but on every component commander in theater to include General Boomer, Commanding General, 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Commander. Marine officers must understand the tasking of national theater, and joint intelligence/operational collection platforms to support Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs). They need to have an appreciation of the capabilities and limitations of these platforms so they are not surprised with their results in time of war. Theater and national assets are tasked to support operational level commanders when their organic assets cannot efficiently collect in their "area of interest." Doctrinal guidance in OH 3-20, Commander's Guide to Intelligence states: Intelligence assets and collection capabilities at the national and theater levels may enhance organic MAGTF collection means. The national intelligence structure orients on satisfying strategic intelligence requirements in support of national objectives. However, much of the intelligence collected and produced at this level is of value to tactical units.... The Joint Service Tactical Exploitation of National Systems manual contains valuable information on these systems. Theater intelligence architecture plans provide specific information on how the systems would tie together for a particular theater. (16:para 2006A) Why should a Marine officer care about understanding intelligence, reconnaissance, or surveillance. First, understanding the scope of the battlefield will enable the officer to shape the battlefield efficiently. As defined in the Tri- MEF SOP for Field Intelligence Operations, the "area of interest" is the area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and have us extending into enemy territory to the objective of current or planned operations. The MEF area of interest will normally extend 96 hours ahead and 310 miles (500 km) or more from the MEF center of mass.(18:par 01005) Apply this formula to the Gulf War, the MEF's area of interest extended to all of Kuwait and southern portions of Iraq including Al Basrah, the home of the elite "Republican Guards." While closely monitoring the enemy situation within the area of influence/interest of major subordinate elements, the MEF Command Element Intelligence Section normally concentrates its assets and attention on the enemy forces and activities that could affect the operation up to 96 hours in the future. Operational commanders have to control their "area of influence" with a very aggressive tactical intelligence collection plan, in order to survive on the modern battlefield. As stated in the Tri-MEF SOP for Field Intelligence Operations, the "area of influence" is a geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of infuencing operations by the maneuver and employment of fire support systems normally under his command or control. In terms of time and space the MEF area of influence normally extends 72 hours in advance and 200 miles (320 km) from the MEF center of mass.(18:par 01003) Hypothetically, if this definition is applied to operation Desert Storm the MEF's center of mass was at the port of entry, Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia and its northern limit included Kuwait City, Kuwait. Its southern limit included the airfields located in Bahrain and Ad Dawhah, Qatar. The Commandant of the Marine Corps stated that intelligence drives operations. In fact intelligence- specifically combat intelligence- is a command responsibility. Commanders and staff officers who understand warfighting focus on the acquisition of strategic, tactical, and combat intelligence to complete successfully any assigned mission. Their search will normally encompass surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence operations across the spectrum of national, theater, and tactical collection assets. Those who do not understand the appropriate tasking procedures or do not have command emphasis will be doomed to providing an inadequate picture of the battlefield. One of the newest organizations in the Marine Corps being employed in Southwest Asia (SWA) is the Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group (SRIG). It was created by the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC)- convened Force Structure Study, conducted in January 1988. The intent of the SRIG was to rationalize the intelligence structure and consolidate most of the specialized intelligence and some other organizations resident in MEFs under one commander. The SRIG consists of an H&S Company, Radio Battalion, Communications Battalion, Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO), Force Reconnaissance Company, Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV) Company and Intelligence Company. The Intelligence Company consists of several specialized intelligence units, such as Counterintelligence Teams (CIT), Interrogator-Translator Platoon, Force Imagery Interpretation Unit (FIIU), Topographic (TOPO) Platoon, Marine Air Ground Task Force All-Source Fusion Center (MAFC), Sensor Control and Management Platoon (SCAMP) and the Tactical Deception (TAC-D) Platoon. The Marine Corps should capitalize on its unique Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group (SRIG) and realize the SRIG will have to continue to improve its capabilities for future battlefields. Recent lessons learned in SWA will have to be closely analyzed and addressed at the highest levels in the Marine Corps for this philosophy to be effective. For the reader's benefit a numerous amount of lessons learned have been extracted from the Marine Corps Lessons Learned System (MCLLS) which will be discussd in the remainder of the text. To put everything in context, in SWA, the SRIG would have to satisfy some basic essential elements of information (EEIs) to be effective. This is not an easy task, however it is one that had to be accomplished for efficient operational planning and execution of combat operations. The following is a listing of requirements that the SRIG should of address for I MEF to be successful in combat. 1. Will Iraqi units conduct espionage, sabotage, subversion, or terrorist operations against Marine forces in Saudi Arabia? If so where, when and in what strength? 2. Will Iraqi forces attack Saudi Arabia? If so where, when, how, and in what strength? 3. How, where and in what strength will Iraqi forces defend Kuwait? 4. Where, when and what type of mines, barriers and obstacles will Iraqi forces employ? 5. Will the Iraqi forces employ chemical munitions? 6. What targets will cause the greatest amount of damage to Iraqi forces in Kuwait? Operation Desert Storm included a strategic bombing phase to destroy the industrial infra-structure of Iraq's war production capability. This was followed by a theater bombing phase to weaken the Iraqi Army in the Kuwait Theater of Operation (KTO). During this portion of the campaign plan, I MEF was contemplating the issues of conducting offensive ground operations in the KTO. Realizing the importance of the stated intelligence requirements in the previous paragraph; the SRIG was faced with some very challenging issues. Tactical exploitation of national intelligence capabilities (TENCAP) must be tasked by military commanders to satisfy information requirements deemed necessary to achieve success on the battlefield. It is important to note, that the SRIG would be the focal point for this tasking in support of the entire MAGTF. The national intelligence community has considerable capability; however, Marines must realize their primary mission is to support National Command Authorities (NCA). Observations from representatives from Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1) in SWA stated the following: Many Marines seem to be unaware of the tactical exploitation capabilities of certain national assets. This hinders the Marine Corps from taking advantage of assets that may be available, especially when operating in a joint operation. Marines have an inherent distrust of anything that is not fielded and controlled by other Marines. This feeling is usually justified, based on historical evidence. However, this should not be allowed to become the de facto doctrinal approach to TENCAP. By not taking advantage of assets that are available, Marines are depriving themselves of valuable battlefield tools that can play a significant role in tactical success. Before these tools can be properly used, though, the Marines involved must be made aware of their existence, and trained on the tasking and employment of these assets. In too many circumstances, knowledge of these assets is assumed to be the exclusive domain of certain Military Occupational Specially (MOS) individuals, while in fact the knowledge of what these systems can provide should be part of all Marines' knowledge involved in planning combat operations. (12:1) Obviously, the corrective action for this problem is proper training at Marine Corps formal schools and in the Fleet Marine Force (FMF). In addition to national assets, the SRIG commander must advise the MAGTF commander on the availability of theater collection assets to aid in the satisfying of information requirements. These include systems like the Grumman E-8 Joint Surveillance Targeting Attack Radar System (JSTARS), the E-3A Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), the Lockheed TR-1 Theater Reconnaissance aircraft and the RC-135 Theater Communication Intelligence aircraft just too mention a few. It was reported that at least one of the two E-8s in theater is in the air "every night" and the information they are providing on Iraqi troop movements is valuable to allied planning.(8:19) The need for a more rapid tactical intelligence capability is among the early lessons learned from Desert Storm. Aviation Week and Space Technology reported that Lieutenant General Charles A. Horner, Central Command's air component commander stated: .... there is a "big BDA (bomb damage assessment) flap" within the defense community which "would indicate we may have been overly entranced with some forms of intelligence collection." This is an apparent reference to the decision to abandon such systems as the U.S. Air Force/Lockheed SR-71 and to rely instead on low- flying satellites. (8:18) These are just some of the issues that are being talked about in the defense community that will have an immediate impact on MAGTF operations in a joint/combined operation in the future. Realizing the MAGTF may or may not have the priority to satisfy its information requirements with national or theater intelligence collection assets the MAGTF must be prepared to satisfy MAGTF its requirements with organic collection assets of the SRIG and MAGTF. This will not be an easy task considering the range and limitations of organic collection assets. Combat intelligence is that knowledge of the enemy, weather, and geographic features required by the command in the planning and conduct of combat operations. The combat intelligence a commander receives greatly affects the degree of success he achieves. If the commander has sufficient combat intelligence, then it can be used to minimize uncertainty concerning effects of enemy, weather, and terrain on the accomplishment of the mission. However, conditions of combat change continually, and timeliness may require that decisions be based on incomplete combat intelligence. Select combat information may or may not modify combat intelligence. Combat intelligence contributes to the needs of the battle being planned to be fought in the future. It has little, if any, application to the battle in process. Many Marine officers do not have an appreciation of this. The Light Armored Battalion, specific aviation units VMO, VMAQ-2, and the VMFA squadrons which will be equipped with the Advanced Tactical Air Reconnaissance System (ATARS) must be included in the MAGTF tactical collection plan. MAGTF planners must understand all elements of the MAGTF must be active participants in the intelligence effort or valuable information necessary to make sound tactical decisions may not be entered into the information flow. The SRIG does not have operational control of all of the MAGTF's organic collection assets necessary to support the MAGTF commander for optimum results: specifically, the Aviation Combat Element's (ACE) aircraft and radars. Therefore, all subordinate elements of the MAGTF must the planning and conduct of combat operations. The combat intelligence a commander receives greatly affects the degree of success he achieves. If the commander has sufficient combat intelligence, then it can be used to minimize uncertainty concerning effects of enemy, weather, and terrain on the accomplishment of the mission. However, conditions of combat change continually, and timeliness may require that decisions be based on incomplete combat intelligence. Select combat information may or may not modify combat intelligence. Combat intelligence contributes to the needs of the battle being planned to be fought in the future. It has little, if any, application to the battle in process. Many Marine officers do not have an appreciation of this. The Light Armored Battalion, specific aviation units VMO, VMAQ-2, and the VMFA squadrons which will be equipped with the Advanced Tactical Air Reconnaissance System (ATARS) must be included in the MAGTF tactical collection plan. MAGTF planners must understand all elements of the MAGTF must be active participants in the intelligence effort or valuable information necessary to make sound tactical decisions may not be entered into the information flow. The SRIG does not have operational control of all of the MAGTF's organic collection assets necessary to support the MAGTF commander for optimum results: specifically, the Aviation Combat Element's (ACE) aircraft and radars. Therefore, all subordinate elements of the MAGTF must support the overall collection plan. Marines must comprehend the MAGTF has a tremendous capability to collect information of the battlefield in comparison to the majority of threat forces it will face. However, each MAGTF organization that has an intelligence collection mission functions differently and requires different considerations and concerns on the battlefield. One key organization the SRIG commander has under direct control to exploit the enemy's electromagnetic spectrum is the Radio Battalion. The mission of Radio Battalion as stated in FMFM 3-22, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Intelligence Group (SRIG) is as follows: The radio battalion is organized and equipped to conduct tactical signals intelligence (SIGINT), ground electronic warfare (EW), and communications security (COMSEC) monitoring/analysis in direct support of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) and other Marine Corps elements.(19:par 4002) Recent lessons learned in the MCLLS from SWA have stated that the Marine Corps does not have a High Frequency Direction Finding (HFDF) capability. HF radios are a primary means of communicating over the vast areas in the desert. The Marine Corps does not have a HFDF capability for either set frequency or hopping frequency HF transmitters. A tunable frequency HFDF system is available. It was recommended that an off-the-shelf system be procured and be sent to SWA for evaluation. Another observation from SWA stated that, the Radio Battalion Mobile Electronic Warfare Support System (MEWSS) Detachment has no mobile direction finding capabilities. This begins to defeat the purpose of mounting an electronic warfare platform on a Light Armored Vehicle (LAV). The MEWSS currently employs the PRD-10 Direction Finding (DF) unit, which requires 20-30 minutes to erect the ground mounted antenna. As a result, MEWSS has been operating solely with Light Armored Infantry Battalions (LAI Bns), which move fast and often. The MEWSS crews often do not have time to set up the PRD-10 antenna. A direction finding system, that remains vechicle mounted and can be used on the move, is necessary in order to increase the effectiveness of the MEWSS. It has been recommended that a system such as the OAR-3045 or the EB-100 be adapted to the MEWSS, which will give a mobile DF capability. During Alpine Warrior-89 and Cold-89, the Radio Reconnaissance Teams (RRTs) were inserted and extracted by the Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center (SARC), but all mission preparation and planning was done by the detachment, Radio Battalion (Det Rad Bn). It became apparent that despite their best intentions, Det Rad Bn did not have the time, resources or expertise to properly prepare their teams. The SARC is manned by Marines who are familiar with reconnaissance, counterintelligence, communications and would ensure adequate rehearsal, contingency planning and logistical support. Additionally, the information gathered by RRT does not need to be passed over the Special Intelligence (SI) nets, as it was in both exercises. The Reconnaissance Net is the logical net for RRTs. This also decreases response time to emergency situations, especially extracts. It is recommended that in future operations, the RRTs be under the operational control (OPCON) of the SARC and they utilize the Reconnaissance Net as their primary net. Additionally the SARC should be responsible for RRT mission planning and coordination. These are just a few of the improvements that need to be looked at in the Radio Battalion. Realizing that all organizations of the MAGTF that participate in the intelligence cycle and support the MAGTF commander's overall intelligence effort need to be evaluated for improvement. The next organization I would like to analyze in the SRIG is the Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV) Company. FMFM 3-22, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Intelligence Group (SRIG) states the mission of the RPV Company as follows: The mission of the RPV Company is to conduct day and night RPV operations in support of a MAGTF. Tasks included in the mission are to: 1. Detect, recognize, identify, and locate targets in support of the MAGTF. 2. Assist in the adjustment of indirect fire weapons. 3. Conduct real-time reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence collection. 4. Provide support for rear area security. 5. Assist in search and rescue helicopter route and landing zone reconnaissance, and bomb damage assessment (BDA). 6. Provide airborne radio-relay capability. 7. Identify follow-on requirements and develop RPV tactics and techiques.(19:par 7002) Initial reports from SWA have nothing but outstanding remarks in regard to the performance of RPVs in operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The U.S. deployed virtually all unmanned vehicles it owned -Pioneers and Pointers- to the Persian Gulf area. Aero Vironment Inc. developed Pointer, a hand-launched, 9 lb., battery powered UAV. The Army and Marine Corps each have two systems consisting of ground control and monitoring stations and an unspecified number of air vehicles. Pointer data links transmit imagery from a video camera. With a video link range of 5.6 km (3.5 mi.) Pointer's main value is to allow ground troops to look over a ridge.(14:24) Pioneer, developed in Israel and produced in the U.S. by AAI Corporation, is the other RPV deployed with U.S. forces. Both the Navy and Marine Corps have the RPV, whose missions include reconnaissance, surveillance, and target spotting in addition to battle damage assessment. The Navy has deployed Pioneer on the battleships Wisconsin and Missouri, where it could also be used for naval gunfire spotting.(14:24) A Pioneer system has similar components to Pointer, with the addition of launch and recovery systems. A typical Pioneer system includes about five RPVs. Sensors include television and Forward Looking Infra-Red (FLIR). Although the Pioneer's 5-hour endurance and 100 nautical mile data link range make it a better BDA platform than Pointer, the services need a longer-range RPV for that mission. This includes the Marine Corps and its SRIGs. The Joint Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) program office has defined a vehicle as the medium-range UAV. Officials have said it should have a 650 km (295 mi.) radius of action and speed of 550 knots, but the requirements for that vehicle are still being refined, Gary Dillion, director of the JPO, said.(14:24) It is important to remember the employment of any reconnaissance and surveillance assets in a denied area must be approved at the Commander in Chief (CINC) level prior to armed hostilities. The Force Reconnaissance Company most conceivably was limited in performing its primary mission of deep reconnaissance prior to appropriate authorization to conduct clandestine intelligence gathering missions in denied areas of Kuwait and Iraq. This most likely prohibited the SRIG in the early employment of one of its most capable assets in determining the enemy's locations and most probable courses of action. There is a general misunderstanding in the Marine Corps in the use of ground reconnaissance assets. Proper use of combat intelligence provided by ground reconnaissance assets, i.e., Force Reconnaissance Company, Reconnaissance Battalion, and the Light Armored Infantry, is key to any MAGTF planner in shaping the battlefield and making sound decisions. However, all too often in peacetime operations the planning and execution of reconnaissance and surveillance missions do not receive the appropriate amount of emphasis. MAGTF planners do not utilize these assets because they are all too familiar with the terrain at Camp Pendleton and 29 Palms. This all changes when faced with real-world operations as we faced in SWA. National and theater intelligence agencies, and the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) produce terrain analysis data in the form of GO/NO GO graphics on a 1:250,000 scale for operational planning. Nevertheless, they are not detailed enough for tactical MAGTF planners, and this is where extensive consideration must be given to ground reconnaissance, engineer reconnaissance and the topographic platoon of the MAGTF. The term reconnaissance is defined by the JCS Publication 1-02 as "a mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy; or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. "(19:par 8003A) Reconnaissance information is gathered by commanders at all echelons and is used to prevent surprise, permit the timely maneuver of ground forces, and to facilitate the prompt and effective use of supporting arms. At the platoon, company, and battalion levels, commanders use forward elements of their own force to perform "close reconnaissance" which is normally conducted in the area immediately forward of the line of contact or the forward edge of the battle area. At the regimental and division level, elements of the reconnaissance battalion perform "distant reconnaissance" which is usually conducted in the outermost edge of the commander's "area of influence" and is oriented toward the rearward elements of the opposing enemy forward committed units. At the highest level of a committed MAGTF, the Force Reconnaissance Company of the SRIG is employed to perform "deep reconnaissance" which is conducted in the commander's "area of interest" and is oriented toward determining the location, disposition, and movement of enemy reinforcements, combat support, and combat service support units. The Marines who serve with the reconnaissance battalions and the force reconnaissance companies of the Marine Corps perform an extremely specialized and challenging mission which is critical to the success of any operation. This was displayed many times in SWA. The first example was the battle for Khafiji, were force reconnaissance assets of 1st SRIG reported elements of a Iraqi armored force moving into the city. Subsequently, they engaged these units with supporting arms. Another example was the reconnoitering of barriers, obstacles, and minefields for the initial breaching efforts prior to the attacks of 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions into Kuwait. How do we capitalize on improving the capabilities of the Force Reconnaissance Company in the SRIG and other units in the MAGTF assigned with distant or deep reconnaissance missions. I would like to mention tactical satellite communications and the use of the global positioning system (GPS). The employment of Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Tactical Satellites (TACSAT) by the ground combat element (GCE) both as a station on the MEF net and as a link between the G-2 and reconnaissance elements has proven highly successful in 2nd Marine Division. The use of AN/PSC-3 terminals in support of the GCE during operations over extended distances greatly aids both the MEF and GCE commanders in communicating with widely separated elements, gathering intelligence, and in command and control. In some cases, this may be the only reliable means of communication. I submit the SRIGs employ UHF TACSAT more extensively. MAGELLAN I000M Global Positioning System (GPS) was effectively used as navigational aid for insertion of Force Reconnaissance during Team Spirit 1990. Force Reconnaissance used the handheld MAGELLAN I000M GPS to confirm the Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) Insert Point (IP) and the course from the IP to the Beach Landing Site (BLS). Because the insert time corresponded to GPS satellite windows, Force Reconnaissance was able to accurately navigate from IP to BLS. This capability is particularly important for Over-The- Horizon (OTH) inserts to unfamiliar beaches that have little or no coastal navigation aids, and in real-world contingencies, would allow insertion without risk of ITG requirements. The MAGELLAN I000M, handheld GPS is a highly capable navigational aid for Force Reconnaissance and Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Special Operations Capable (SOC) small boat operations. Increased emphasis must be placed on funding handheld GPS in order to improve MEU (SOC) small boat operations. These are just a few things to think about when contemplating improvements for the SRIG's ground reconnaissance units. Nevertheless, the primary tool for quality improvement is a challenging training program for the personnel who have already gone through a pipeline of military qualification training. Going back to the beginning of the paper, you will remember there was a listing of requirements. The first requirement dealt with the identification of Iraqi units that would conduct espionage, sabotage, subversion, or terriorist operations against Marine forces in Saudi Arabia. Resident in the Intelligence Company of the SRIG are Counterintelligence Teams (CITs). These teams have the primary mission of accomplishing this task, in coordination with other forces of the MAGTF. Counterintelligence Teams were limited in what they were authorized to do, based on official authorization from the CINC in SWA. Marine officers must understand that counterintelligence special operations are coordinated at the highest levels of the military command structure and with host nation cooperation. FMFM 3-22, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Intelligence Group (SRIG) states the mission of Counterintelligence Teams as follows: Plan and recommend the implementation of measures designed to discover, neutralize, and/or destory the effectiveness of actual or potential hostile intelligence, sabotage, terrorism, and subersive activities. Additionally, Marine Corps counterintelligence recommends measures necessary for the protection of information against espionage, personnel against subversive activities and terriorism and material against sabotage. In addition to the above classical missions, Marine Corps counterintelligence maintains a human resources intelligence and technical collection capability to support the Marine Corps tactical mission, maintains a Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM) capability to support FMF tactical and garrison missions and provide resources in support of the overall DOD Human Resources Intelligence (HUMINT) program. (19:par 9008B) Generally speaking, the tactical concept of operations is for CITs to operate in depth. They are usually deployed to cover an area, but not necessarily a combat unit's area of operations. A CIT would continue to operate in an area even though tactical or support units have changed. This concept allows the CIT to focus on the enemy's intelligence organization and activities and not become restricted by tactical areas of responsibility. The area coverage concept also provides continuity of CI operations and allows CI personnel to become thoroughly familiar with the area, enemy intelligence organization and operations, and CI targets. CITs work very closely with interrogation-translator teams (ITT), military police, civil affairs, and pyschological operations units, and with tactical and service support units. A joint ITT/CI interrogation center is usually set up near a centralized prisoner of war compound and refugee control point. Interrogation-Translator Teams (ITT) are primarily concerned with the exploitation of refugees and prisoners of war in order to glean information that will be of importance to the MEF and subordinate commanders of the MAGTF. In addition to providing support to the Joint Interrogation Facility (JIF) and Document Exploitation Center (DEC). ITTs are normally retained under centralized control of the MAGTF SRI/SRI DET. This permits greater flexibility in their use. For example, if the MAGTF retains control of its assigned ITT, they can readily be sent forward to a regimental enemy prisoner of war (EPW) collection point to commence interrogation. If the SRIG had previously attached its ITT assets to subordinate units, this flexibility would have been lost. In the event that subordinate elements of the MAGTF are in widely separated areas, it may be advantageous to attach a subteam to those elements to facilitate timely interrogations. Other organizations of the MAGTF will be required to become team players in satisfying collection requirements established by the Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center (SARC) of the MAGTF Command Element. However, before moving outside of the SRIG, lets examine other functions and organizations of the SRIG. Solid Shield observations, mentioned the SARC was an integral agency within the MEF intelligence section and functioned under the Collections Unit of the Intelligence Operations Branch. The SARC must be manned 24 hours per day and must consist of the following elements: 1. Control Element 2. Force Reconnaissance Element 3. Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV) Element 4. Sensor Control and Management Platoon (SCAMP) Element 5. Radio Battalion Element 6. Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Element During Solid Shield 1989, only two elements were present in the SARC; RPV and Force Reconnaissance. Only because the Commanding Officer was designated the Officer in Charge of the SARC. The SARC could not be effectively manned 24 hours per day due to lack of personnel, and the requisite expertise to operate a SARC was not there. As outlined in the Tri-MEF Field Intelligence SOP, the Control Element is to perform eight functions; none of those were accomplished. Finally, a collection plan was never published, disseminated, nor employed throughout the operation. In future operations, the SARC must be staffed properly with organic personnel and representation from the other four agencies to be effective.(6:1) During three Combined Arms Operation (CAO-89) planning conferences, the concepts for employment of each MEF collection asset were formulated and discussed. Nevertheless, a MEF collection plan based on these concepts was not issued. This situation precluded completion of the necessary coordination of the MEF and GCE ground reconnaissance and surveillance efforts. The result was confusion over which assets were doing what, in which areas, and during which time periods. It has been recommended, based on the MEF and major subordinate element commander's requirements, the MEF G-2 must ensure coordinated development of a comprehensive collection plan and publish that plan in a timely fashion. (5:1) It is totally unsatisfactory that situations like this continue to be documented in the MCLLS. There are stacks and stacks of published doctrine that states the proper procedures to establish a SARC in addition to preparing and executing a proper collection plan. Again, I feel the lack of knowledge in regards to understanding surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence operations rests with the officer corps. Proper training and education would aid in correcting this deficiency. The ACE has to provide aerial reconnaissance and surveillance operations for the MAGTF to be successful on the modern battlefield. This will include armed reconnaissance, aerial imagery collection, and pre-planned on-call reconnaissance and surveillance missions. Until 1990, the function of tactical aerial reconnaissance was accomplished by the RF-4B. Since the loss of the RF-4B, there is no other aircraft currently in the Marine Corps that has the capability to produce intelligence imagery that it provided. Its multisensor imagery capability-- photographic, infrared, and Side Looking and Ranging (SLAR) radar--made it unique in its performance. It allowed MAGTF planners to shape the battlefield and reduced the risk for the MAGTF. This remains the major issue facing the ACE, SRIG, and the MAGTF when discussing aerial reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities and limitations. The Advanced Tactical Air Reconnaissance System (ATARS) is to be the next generation Marine Corps system, as well as being the sensor suite for the medium-range UAV. ATARS is to replace cameras and film with three sensors-two using electro-otic charge coupled device (CCD) sensors in the visual spectrum, and one IR line scanner for night. Images are to be data linked to ground stations. The first ATARS is supposed to be installed in an F/A-18 for Marine Corps tests this summer. The ACE will also have to provide appropriate airborne electronic warfare support not only to attack and assault elements but also to the MAGTF commander's intelligence collection effort. The ACE is a key player in the overall reconnaissance and surveillance effort of the MAGTF and the efficiency of the SRIG. The responsiveness of the ACE to the SRIG, is as critical as the ACE to the GCE. In summary, it is crucial for all Marine officers to understand the complexity of surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence operations in a MAGTF. Realizing this paper mostly focused on the operations of a MEF, the principles and functions apply to Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) and Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) as well. The complexity of operations cross the spectrum of highly classified technical satellites to foot mobile light infantry conducting close reconnaissance operations. MAGTF Commanders rate having the best possible intelligence to enhance their operational combat power. It is the responsibility of the Marine Corps Intelligence Corps to educate and train as many Marines as possible in the types of operations that the SRIG conducts in combat. Furthermore, all Marines should continue to identify operational deficiencies in the surveillance, reconnaissance, intelligence capabilities of the MAGTF. It is to high a cost, to lose a Marine's life in combat due to faulty intelligence. Which could of been corrected by a hard working, conscientious group of Marines that believed it is better to identify problems and limitations to improve the MAGTF, instead of remaining quiet and looking good. The Marine Corps needs to move forward and capitalize on the SRIG. All Marine officers, of all military occupational specialty must contribute to the improvement of the Marine Corps' overall surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence capability across the spectrum of the MAGTF. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Bright, Capt, USMC. "Global Positioning System (GPS)." Pohang, South Korea. Report in Marine Corps Lessons Learned System of 22 March 1990. 2. CG, 2d MARDIV, "Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Tactical Satellite (TACSAT) Communications." Camp Lejeune, NC. Report in Marine Corps Lessons Learned System of 3 November 1988. 3. CG, MCCDC, "Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group Concept." Quantico, VA. Ltr 3900 over WF 10B of 10 Oct 1990. 4. CG, 4th MEB, "Employment of the Radio Reconnaissance Team (RRT)." Norfolk, VA. Report in Marine Corps Lessons Learned System of 15 June 1989. 5. CG, II MEF, "Intelligence Collection Planning and Coordination." Camp Lejeune, NC. Report in Marine Corps Lessons Learned System of 3 November 1988. 6. CO, 2d SRIG, "Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center (SARC) Manning Problems." Camp Lejuene, NC. Report in Marine Corps Lessons Learned System of 19 May 1989. 7. Covault, Craig. "Recon Satellites Lead Allied Intelligence Effort," Aviation Week and Space Technology, February 4, 1991, 25-26. 8. Fulghum, David A. "Desert Storm Highlights Need for Rapid Tactical Intelligence." Aviation Week and Space Technology, February 11, 1991, 18-19. 9. Hendrickson, Col, USMC. "High Frequency Direction Finding (HFDF)." Quantico, VA. Report in Marine Corps Lessons Learned System of 1 November 1990. 10. Hendrickson, Col, USMC. "Mobile Direction Finding System for Mobile Electronic Warfare System (MEWSS)." Quantico, VA. Report in Marine Corps Lessons Learned System of 1 November 1990. 11. McKinney, Franklin D., Capt, USMC. "Remotely Piloted Vehicles: One Marine's Perspective," U.S. Army Aviation Digest, July/August 1990, 56-59. 12. Moser, H.D., Capt, USMC. "National Asset Capabilities Awareness (TENCAP)." Quantico, VA. Report in Marine Corps Lessons Learned System of 2 August 1990. 13. Moser, H.D., Capt, USMC. "Rear Area Security and Terrorist Threat." Quantico, VA. Report in Marine Corps Lessons Learned System of 2 August 1990. 14. Nordwall, Bruce D. "U.S. Relies on Combination of Aircraft, Satellites, UAVs for Damage Assessment." Aviation Week and Space Technology, February 11, 1991, 25-26. 15. Ryan, Brendan, Maj, USMC. "MAGTF All-Source Fusion Center," Marine Corps Gazette, August 1990, 60-63. 16. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Commander's Guide to Intelligence, OH 3-20. Quantico, 1989. 17. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Fleet Marine Force Organization 1990, FMFRP 1-11. Quantico, 1990. 18. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Tri-MEF Standing Operating Procedures for Field Intelligence Operations, FMFRP 3-28. Quantico, 1989. 19. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Intelligence Group (SRIG), FMFM 3-22. Quantico, 1990. 20. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Development and Education Command. Intelligence, FMFM 2-1. Quantico, 1980.
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