Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

CABINET OFFICE (OPS) 5 February 1996 IMPROVEMENTS IN INTELLIGENCE HANDLING Today's Report by Sir Richard Scott comments that there were systemic failures in the handling of intelligence by Government Departments causing errors in the dissemination of some material. Steps have been taken in recent years to improve the handling and dissemination of intelligence material, as Sir Richard Scott recognises. These are set out below. The aim of the changes has been to ensure that the right intelligence material is sent on time to the right person in the right part of the Department concerned. The changes, in particular those that harness new technology, also make the retrieval, storage and analysis of material easier, quicker and more accurate. The changes are: Foreign and Commonwealth office - Following a major review completed in 1994 there are now regular meetings between specialist intelligence officials and FCO policy areas. - Since the early 1990s intelligence concerning arms exports has been copied both to the relevant geographical FCO Department (eg Middle East Department, South Asian Department) and the FCO Department with overall policy control. - Guidance on the internal handling of intelligence material is circulated to intelligence readers within the FCO every six months. - Since 1992 intelligence material falling under the following headings has always been submitted to the relevant Minister of State: * reports on developments in the area of non-proliferation which may change FCO practice or policy; * reports containing significant new information (eg, new proliferation programmes or UK firms' involvement in such programmes); * reports casting doubt on major UK exports. Department of Trade and Industry - The mechanism for the internal distribution of intelligence material changed in mid-1989. Before this time only Ministers, the Permanent Secretary and Deputy Secretaries were given by-hand deliveries. This has since mid-1989 been extended to include officials at all levels within the Department cleared to read such material. - In 1994, DTI reviewed and further strengthened its arrangements for handling intelligence within the Department. - DTI has recently begun trials of an IT system aimed at improving still further the speed and efficiency of Departmental facilities for handling and analysing intelligence reports. - DTI's Export Control Organisation would bring to Ministerial attention any significant intelligence bearing on major licensing issues. Customs and Excise - In September 1991 Customs Investigation Division formed an "intelligence cell" of officials within the operational team tasked with the investigation of breaches of export controls. All members of the "cell" have clearance in order to see intelligence material. This "cell" was expanded into a larger "intelligence team" in February 1993. - During early 1992 the "intelligence team" has used an IT support system able to cross-refer and retrieve historic intelligence material. Cabinet Office - In 1993 the Joint Intelligence organisation (JIO) in the Cabinet Office introduced a dedicated secure IT network in order to speed up the production of assessment of intelligence material. - JIO led the expansion of the secure IT network into other areas of the UK"s intelligence community in 1994. - Further enhancements to this technology are planned so as to enable desk-to-desk communications with SIS and GCHQ later in 1996. - Increased use of electronic distribution of intelligence material from Cabinet Office from January 1996. Ministry of Defence - Since 1987 there have been a number of changes and improvements in the structure of the Defence Intelligence Service (DIS). These have taken account of changing requirements within the Ministry of Defence (for example in reaction to the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact). A key structural reorganisation has provided more resources to proliferation-related areas (including the provision of advice on export licence applications in this area.) - IT has been improved and further studies have been commissioned. - There are now co-ordinated assessments by DIS on the threat of proliferation in particular regions and countries. - Communication has been improved and formalised between the DIS, decision makers on exports and the enforcement agencies. GCHQ - GCHQ now provides the names of individuals and organisations as appropriate in the intelligence material it disseminates to users. These details had previously been available only upon request to GCHQ. Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) - SIS has made a number of significant improvements to the system of intelligence distribution over recent years: * a strengthened dialogue with the recipients of intelligence has led to a wider customer base, more extensive consultations over intelligence priorities, and significantly greater availability of intelligence to Departments on whose interests or activities it impinges; * most intelligence reports are now issued telegraphically to key customer Departments to ensure swift transmission; * use of new information technology within SIS has also increased the speed of intelligence production and distribution; * new sections on requirements such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction have been established, concentrating expertise and intelligence production and improving the service to the relevant customer Departments.