15 February 1996
GOVERNMENT POLICY ON THE CONTROL OF EXPORTS TO
IRAN AND IRAQ 1980 TO 1990 - THE FACTS
1. When the Iran-Iraq war began in September 1980, the Government
adopted a policy of impartiality in the conflict and of doing
everything possible to see its earliest possible end. It supported
this policy by introducing a ban on the sale of lethal equipment to
either side. Non-lethal equipment was not at this stage restricted
because of the conflict, though exports of such equipment were
controlled for other purposes - eg non-proliferation agreements,
human rights reasons and foreign policy reasons. However, the
distinction between lethal and non-lethal defence equipment proved
difficult to define, and was in any case not thought to be
sufficiently robust as the conflict between the two countries
deepened. Guidelines on the export of defence equipment to the two
countries were therefore developed to reinforce the Government's
policy and to help in its day to day application. These were
implemented in December 1984. The Guidelines were as follows:
(i) We should maintain our consistent refusal to supply any lethal
equipment to either side;
(ii) Subject to that overriding consideration, we should attempt to
fulfil existing contracts and obligations;
(iii) We should not, in future, approve orders for any defence
equipment which, in our view, would significantly enhance the
capability of either side to prolong or exacerbate the
conflict;
(iv) In the line with this policy, we should continue to scrutinise
rigorously all applications for export licences for the supply
of defence equipment to Iran and Iraq.
2. These Guidelines, in particular Guideline (iii), required the
Government to reach a "view" on the effect of supplying defence
equipment to either side. Only lethal equipment exports were banned
outright. Exports of other items of defence equipment were only to be
denied an export licence because of the conflict if the Government
was of the view that they would significantly enhance capability to
prolong or exacerbate that conflict. A number of factors needed to be
taken into consideration in reaching this view, including:
- the capabilities of the equipment;
- the likely use to which the equipment would actually be put
(where it had civil as well as military uses);
- the usefulness of the equipment to the recipient country in
pursuing the conflict (sometimes different for the two sides);
and hence
- the state of the conflict itself.
3. Thus, when the conflict between the two countries escalated, the
Government responded by tightening the application of the Guidelines
accordingly. After the ceasefire had been agreed between the two
countries, only items which would enable or encourage either side to
breach the ceasefire could prolong or exacerbate the conflict. The
Government took the view - as it was entitled to under the Guidelines
- that only items of direct or offensive effect would do this.
4. As was noted in paragraph 1 above, exports to Iran and Iraq
could also be restricted in pursuit of policy objectives which did
not relate to the conflict. This remained the case throughout the
1980s. Items which might be used for internal repression were banned
to all destinations; restrictions on the export of chemicals which
could be used in chemical weapons manufacture became progressively
tighter as information on Iraq's development and use of these weapons
came to light; and tighter restrictions on defence exports were
imposed for foreign policy reasons on Iran following the Fatwah
against Salman Rushdie in February 1989, and on Iraq following the
execution of Farzad Bazoft in March 1990.
5. After the ceasefire between Iran and Iraq had been agreed in
August 1988, the Government considered its implications for the UK's
future relations with the two countries. Major trading opportunities
with both countries were anticipated in their post-war civil
reconstruction, and the Government naturally wished to see British
companies gaining as much as possible of this work. However, whilst
major opportunities for defence sales were also anticipated, the
Government decided that it should continue with its highly
restrictive policy in this area because of the continuing danger of
hostilities being resumed. The ban on sales of lethal equipment
remained in place, as did the restrictions on sales of other defence
related goods which might upset the fragile ceasefire. For goods
outside these two categories, the Government at all times had
discretion under the Howe Guidelines to allow licensable goods to be
exported, and it was anticipated that a continuing peace between the
two countries would enable the Government to apply this discretion to
a wider range of goods than had been possible when the conflict was
in progress.
6. Towards the end of 1988, a proposal was made by the then
Minister for Trade (Mr Clark) for the Guidelines themselves to be
revised. This proposal was discussed by the junior Ministers
concerned (Mr Clark - DTI, Mr Waldegrave - FCO and Lord Trefgarne -
MOD), and a revised form of words for Guideline (iii) was considered.
This read:
"we should not in the future approve orders for any defence
equipment which, in our view, would be of direct and significant
assistance to either country in the conduct of offensive
operations in breach of the ceasefire."
This wording was then used on a trial basis pending agreement by the
three Ministers on a final form of words, and the appoval of their
Secretaries of State and the Prime Minister.
7. The effect of this revision would not have been to extend the
range of goods which could have been exported under the Guidelines:
the original wording of Guideline (iii) already gave the Government
discretion to adjust the allowable range of goods to the prevailing
circumstances. The effect would have been to reduce the Government's
discretion to refuse export licences under the Guidelines for certain
kinds of goods, such as purely defensive items.
8. On 14 February, whilst the proposal to change the Guidelines was
still being considered by junior Ministers, the Iranian Government
declared the fatwah against Salman Rushdie. In response to this, the
Government decided to impose tighter restrictions on exports of
licensable goods to Iran. This decision did not sit easily with the
proposal to introduce new Guidelines reducing the Government's
discretion to refuse export licences. The proposal to change the
Guidelines was dropped, and the Government reverted to a more
restrictive application of Guideline (iii) in respect of Iran.
However, the Iranian fatwah had no bearing upon the kinds of goods
which could or could not be exported because of the conflict. In the
case of Iraq, officials therefore continued to interpret Guideline
(iii) in the light of the ceasefire, as they had been doing since the
beginning of the year.
9. Answers to Parliamentary questions and to letters from MPs and
members of the public accurately reflected this situation. The agreed
form of response, adopted with minor variations in such responses,
was:
"The Guidelines on the export of defence equipment to Iran and
Iraq are kept under constant review, and are applied in the
light of prevailing circumstances, including the ceasefire and
developments in the peace negotiations".
This form of words clearly indicated that the ceasefire and progress
in the peace negotiations were factors being taken into account when
applications for exports to Iran and Iraq were being considered, and
that other "prevailing circumstances" were similarly taken into
account (and Members of Parliament in 1989 would readily have
identified the fatwah as such a "prevailing circumstance"). The
answers given to Parliamentary Questions therefore gave an accurate
description of the Government's policy on exports to Iran and Iraq at
the time. There was no question of Parliament being deliberately
misled about this policy, or about the factors which influenced the
application of the policy.
10. Whilst Parliament was not given every detail about its defence
export policy for Iran and Iraq, the Government believes it was as
open with Parliament as it could be without risking significant harm
to British interests. The Government recently conducted a wide
ranging review of the question of openness and access to information.
Its conclusions were published in the White Paper on Open Government
(Cm 2290). We believe that this strikes the right balance on this
issue.
