THE SCOTT REPORT
The essence of the Scott Inquiry was to establish whether all
parts of Government followed agreed Government policy on defence
exports to Iraq, and to report on related prosecution decisions.
The Government cooperated fully with the Inquiry. All Ministers
and civil servants provided evidence conscientiously and
thoroughly.
No arms sold to Iraq
The Report confirms that Britain supplied no lethal weapons to
Iraq. On non-lethal defence equipment, (such as radio systems
or hovercraft spares) and on possible dual-purpose equipment
(such as machine tools) the Government carefully balanced British
export interests alongside wider foreign policy consideration.
No conspiracy to send innocent men to gaol
The Report makes clear that the charge that Ministers were
prepared to sign Public Interest Immunity (PII) Certificates to
send men to prison is unfounded. They signed the certificates
so that the judge could decide whether material should be
released in court, as was required by the law.
Guidelines for Export of Defence Equipment
The Government's policy was to remain neutral in the Iran-Iraq
war. The report recognises that no lethal weapons were sold to
either side.
The Government also took measures to prevent the export of non-
lethal goods which could nevertheless have exacerbated the
conflict. A set of guidelines was introduced to assist in the
application of this policy. The policy was stricter than that
of our main international competitors.
The guidelines were applied restrictively but in a way which took
account of changing circumstances over the period. These changes
included the cease-fire in 1988, the Iranian fatwah in 1989, and
the execution in Iraq of Farzad Bazoft in 1990.
No Deliberate Misleading of Parliament
Ministers did not change the guidelines, which were designed to
be operated flexibly in the light of prevailing circumstances.
The Report accepts that Ministers believed the guidelines
remained unchanged. The Report takes the view that there was a
change of policy towards non-lethal goods following the cease-
fire and that therefore, a number of letters and Parliamentary
Answers were inaccurate. It also recognises that Ministers
honestly believed they were only applying existing guidelines in
the light of changed circumstances. There is no basis therefore
for the accusation that they deliberately misled Parliament.
Export Control Legislation
The Report criticises the continuing use of the 1939 Export
Control Act by Governments of both parties. However the Lord
Chief Justice found in May 1995 that Orders made under the Act
were, as the Government has argued, lawful. The Government will
consider this issue further in the light of the Scott Report.
Law on Public Interest Immunity
The Report takes issue with the Attorney General's advice that
(i) Ministers had a duty to sign PII Certificates; and that (ii)
it was proper to use such Certificates in criminal prosecutions.
But the Attorney General's view on both these points simply
reflects well established case law. It is supported by
authoritative decisions in Court by a number of Law Lords. The
Government is satisfied that the Attorney General's advice was
correct. PII law, which is judge-made, has moved on since the
Matrix Churchill and Ordtec cases.
Diversion of goods
The Report considered whether goods ostensibly bound elsewhere
were diverted to Iraq. The Government took steps to counter this
in the case of British exports. No British arms were found in
Iraq at the end of the Gulf war and the report finds no evidence
to the contrary.
Distribution of Intelligence Material
The Report finds failings with the distribution of intelligence
material relating to exports in the 1980s. The Government
accepts this, but has made substantial improvements to procedures
since then. The Report recognises these improvements.
Matrix Churchill Prosecution
The Report finds no evidence of impropriety in the conduct of the
Matrix Churchill prosecution, and in particular no deliberate
withholding of material which might have helped the defence.
Ministerial Accountability
The Report criticises the Government for what is seen as a lack
of openness. The Government has advanced the case of openness
beyond the position of any of its predecessors. It agrees these
issues should be debated further but some degree of
confidentiality will continue to be necessary in the interest in
areas such as international diplomacy, commercial operations and
national security.
Conclusion
The Report makes a number of recommendations, all of which will
be very carefully considered by the Government. Some have
already been accepted.
There are valuable lessons to be learned from the Report. On the
central charges that concerned the public and led to the setting
up of the Inquiry - that Ministers had conspired secretly to arm
Saddam Hussein in breach of declared policy and that Ministers
had attempted to gag the courts and send innocent men to gaol -
the Report clears the Government. The Government welcomes this
clearing of its good name.
