Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

HM CUSTOMS & EXCISE C&E S2/96 15 February 1996 THE PROSECUTION OF HENDERSON, ABRAHAM AND ALLEN (MATRIX CHURCHILL) BACKGROUND 1. Matrix Churchill was a long established Midlands based machine tool manufacturer which was purchased in 1987 by an Iraqi controlled company, TMG Engineering Ltd, which was in turn controlled by another Iraqi controlled company, Technology and Development Group Ltd (TDG). 2. The prosecution related to two contracts placed with the company. The first was placed by Industrias Cardoen of Chile and was for supply to Iraq of machine tools for manufacture of fuses for shells. The second was placed direct by NASSR Establishment for Mechanical Industries in Iraq and was for the supply of machine tools for a project, code named "ABA", to manufacture parts for multi launcher rocket systems. These contracts are referred to as the "Cardoen" and "ABA" contracts respectively. Export licences had been applied for in relation to these contracts and granted on the basis that civil end use was stated. 3. See "Prosecution Procedures" note for a description of the way in which Customs cases are handled. INITIAL ENQUIRIES BY CUSTOMS 4. Following receipt of intelligence from the West German authori- ties in March and May 1990 that Matrix Churchill machine tools were being (illicitly) diverted to Iraq for military use, Customs planned low key enquiries at Matrix Churchill premises for June 1990. Prior to the visits, the DTI were made aware of Customs plans. This was brought to the attention of Ministers. Customs undertook to keep DTI informed of progress. 5. Enquiries at Matrix Churchill in June 1990 found indications in company records of potential export breaches in relation to Cardoen exports. DTI officials were advised of Customs suspicion and other departments at inter-departmental meetings (known as Restricted Enforcement Unit meetings). Liaison between Customs and DTI officials resulted in a meeting on 11 October 1990. Both had taken legal advice on Customs' findings and the investigators advised DTI of interviews of Matrix Churchill individuals planned for the following week. These interviews were carried out but no charges were brought at the time. Further enquiries were conducted during October 1990. 6. Investigators' early contact with the intelligence agencies (just before the first visit to the company) established that there was a source in Matrix Churchill. After the arrest of Henderson and his fellow directors it was revealed that the source was Mr Henderson. In October 1989 he had provided a bundle of blueprints to the intelligence agency. In March 1990 he provided his contact with information on the ABA project. The connection between the drawings he had provided and Project ABA was not made. Furthermore at no time did he give information about Matrix Churchill's involvement in the supply of goods for the Cardoen and ABA contracts. In particular he had given no hint that these contracts concerned the supply by Matrix Churchill to Iraq of equipment specifically for military production. Against this background, Customs obtained an explicit view from the intelligence agency that his involvement with them was not a reason for not prosecuting him. Acting as an informant does not confer any individual special immunity against prosecution for criminal activity. 7. At a meeting of senior Customs and DTI officials on 29 October 1990, Customs alerted DTI to the potential line of defence that Ministers had encouraged machine tool manufacturers to "cloud the truth" about machine tool exports. DTI outlined concerns about exposing Ministers to unnecessary examination and protecting intelligence sources. The potential significance of the January 1988 meeting between Mr Alan Clark and the Machine Tools Trade Association (MTTA) was recognised and a DTI official (who had also been at that meeting) effectively rebutted that line of defence by stating that any guidance given was on the basis of dual-use machines being supplied in good faith for civil production. A witness statement was taken from the DTI official to this effect. DTI officials agreed that the evidence should be put to Counsel for advice on whether offences had been committed. In a further meeting between Customs and DTI officials on 20 November 1990, it was agreed that Customs investigators would examine all information held by DTI, including "sensitive source" material, so that decisions on prosecution would be informed by the results. 8. In early December 1990 a Sunday Times article alleging that Alan Clark had helped firms to circumvent export licensing requirements was discussed both by Customs and other departments and within Customs. Mr Clark strenuously denied these allegations and on 3 December he caused a statement to be made in the House stressing the inaccuracy of the article. 9. Initial enquiries, including contact with other parts of government, had therefore found no public interest or evidential reason to prevent a criminal prosecution. Customs investigators therefore sought the assessment of lawyers on the adequacy of the evidence for criminal proceedings. INSTITUTION OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 10. Recognising obvious sensitivities which could affect criminal proceedings, in December 1990 Customs sought the advice of Counsel at what was a relatively early stage in the case. Counsel, Mr Calvert-Smith, was given briefing - which included Mr Henderson's role as an intelligence source and the meetings between Ministers and the MTTA - and advised that, taken as a whole, there was a "respectable" case for prosecution. 11. Following Counsel's advice, further evidence was gathered during December 1990 and January 1991. Counsel saw DTI files relating to "Cardoen" licences and had a discussion with a legal representative of the Security Service about disclosure of documents. Customs investigators saw the SIS legal adviser. 12. With this knowledge, Counsel's written advice of 1 February 1991 and a further written advice on 13 February 1991 (after seeing material in the FCO), was that there was a "reasonable prospect for convictions" under the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 (CEMA) section 68 (2). Commencement of criminal proceedings was delayed to give FCO time to review their files and to consider the disclosure issue. On 15 February 1991 FCO stated that it had no objection to criminal proceedings (subject to there being the usual safeguard of claiming PII in respect of sensitive papers). On 18 February 1991 Customs advised other departments of a decision to prosecute and Henderson, Abraham and Allen were charged with export offences on 19 February 1991. FURTHER ENQUIRIES 13. On 29 April 1991 Customs Investigators interviewed Mr Clark about his meeting with the MTTA. He subsequently made a written statement, dated 12 July 1991, which stated that his remarks to the MTTA had referred to machine tools for general engineering and not to those for military use. On 17 July 1991 Lord Trefgarne, who had met twice with MTTA delegations, signed a written statement that it had never been suggested to him that the export applications concerned machine tools designed for military use and stated that he had never encouraged applicants to "cloud the truth". Written statements were also sought from DTI officials. 14. After consultation with lawyers, further criminal charges were laid. Other departments were advised of progress in the case. COMMITTAL PROCEEDINGS 15. At a pre-committal court hearing on 22 July 1991 it emerged that the defence would want Mr Clark, Lord Trefgarne and a Security Service officer to give oral evidence at the Committal proceedings. At a subsequent meeting, Prosecuting Counsel, Alan Moses QC (who had been appointed in October 1991), reviewed the case and placed a greater emphasis on the evidence of Mr Clark and Lord Trefgarne. He had advised on the importance of both being called as prosecution witnesses, at Committal and at trial. He further advised in writing the importance that DTI witnesses should be totally frank in their written statements as to their state of knowledge of possible military use of the goods at the time licences were granted. 16. Counsel's advice was communicated to other departments. Concern was expressed about the precedent of Ministers being called to give evidence in a criminal trial. In the event, the written statements of Mr Clark and Lord Trefgarne were not contested at the Committal by the defence who did not require the two witnesses to give oral evidence. The 3 defendants were committed on 26 November 1991 for Crown Court trial. Customs were made aware of advice from the then Attorney General, Sir Patrick Mayhew, to the Prime Minister that Alan Moses' advice about the two Ministers giving evidence should be respected. Ministers do not have any immunity from appearing as witnesses. 17. Mr Peter Lilley (Secretary of State for Trade and Industry) signed a PII certificate to protect sensitive information in DTI documents and Mr Kenneth Baker (Home Secretary) signed a PII certificate to protect sensitive information being disclosed by Security and Intelligence agency witnesses. These certificates were not in the event required. FURTHER PREPARATION FOR TRIAL 18. In December 1991 the indictment was lodged and in January 1992, witness summons were served. These included Mr Clark and Lord Trefgarne. In January 1992 Junior Counsel, Mr Calvert-Smith, returned the brief due to other pressures and was replaced by Mr Gibson Grenfell. Periodically, Customs updated other departments with progress in the case. 19. On 20 December 1991 Customs solicitors wrote to Irwin Mitchell and Co. inviting them to inspect unused material held by Customs. Their attention was also drawn to 'sensitive' material which would be subject to PII claims which were to be made. Ninety items of unused material consisting of several hundred pages were made available for inspection by the defence and copies were provided on request. 20. In June 1992 Counsel for Mr Henderson requested "full discovery" of documents. Following a pre-trial review before Judge Smedley on 19 June 1992 Customs advised other departments about defence requests for disclosure and Counsel viewed DTI, FCO, SIS and MOD papers in July and August 1992. Following a further pre-trial review on 24 July 1992 Counsel further viewed papers in FCO, SIS and MOD and, after another pre-trial review on 4 September 1992, Counsel examined all documents made available by departments. During this process, Counsel considered whether and how individual documents were relevant to issues in the case. 21. During various enquiries in other Government departments to identify documents of potential relevance, some 10,000 pages of material were examined. Further documents were identified as potentially disclosable but of a type subject to PII claims. These, including documents resulting from extensive requests from the Defence for disclosure, were the subject of PII certificates signed by Mr Heseltine (DTI), Mr Garel-Jones (FCO), Mr Rifkind (MOD) and Mr Clarke (Home Secretary). Following the trial Judge's rulings on PII a further 634 pages were disclosed to the defence. 22. The Scott Inquiry has since drawn attention to a further 23 documents amongst the material submitted by the Departments to the Inquiry but which were not identified for potential disclosure. None of these documents are different in nature from those disclosed for the trial. Scott makes particular reference to one document - an Intelligence Report of 13 October 1989 - which related to the Matrix Churchill exports covered by the prosecution. This had been seen by Customs investigators in 1989 but its significance was not appreciated. It was routinely destroyed in May 1990 and its existence was not identified during the investigation and was not recalled when enquiries and the disclosure exercise were conducted. This highlighted deficiencies in the system for retrieval of historic intelligence material which have now been rectified. 23. A Sunday Telegraph article of 2 August 1992 alleged that Mr Alan Clark had helped UK companies to get round export licensing guidelines. A similar story appeared in the Independent on 6 August 1992. Prosecuting Counsel advised that he should be re-interviewed. He had by then left Government and proved difficult to contact. On 5 September 1992 the Attorney General minuted his officials, after considering concerns expressed by Mr Heseltine, that he should see the prosecution team to take an overview of the prosecution and assess the pros and cons. On the 7 September the Solicitor to Customs and Excise, quite independently, concluded that he should discuss with the Attorney General the problem relating to Mr Clark's evidence and wrote to the Attorney General's office that day. The meeting to discuss the case took place on 10 September 1992. Those attending were the Attorney General, the Solicitor General, Alan Moses and the Customs Solicitor. Mr Moses gave an assessment that the case was a fair and proper one to bring to trial and on that basis, and subject to a re-interview of Mr Clark, the Attorney was content for the prosecution to continue. 24. Mr Clark was eventually reached by telephone on 18 September 1992 and he confirmed that his written statement was correct. On the strength of that, Counsel advised that the case could continue. (Mr Clark saw the record of the telephone conversation shortly before he gave oral evidence and agreed it was accurate). THE TRIAL 25. The basis of the prosecution was that the contracts for machine tools, associated tooling and computer programs, which were the subject of the prosecution, were as a whole specially designed for military purposes (the so-called "package theory") but the prosecution also proceeded on the alternative basis that only computer programs and specified tooling were specially designed for military purposes. The specially designed tooling represented a considerable proportion by value of the items exported and, if the "package" argument failed, that alone was sufficiently serious to justify prosecution. 26. On 1 October 1992 the defence applied for disclosure of the documents covered by the PII certificates. Judge Smedley saw all the documents and expressly acknowledged that the PII claims had been properly made. Having balanced the competing public interests, he ordered on 5 October that all the category B (formulation of policy) documents should be disclosed but that the category A ("informant") documents should not. As to the category C (security and intelligence) documents he initially declined to order disclosure but, having heard the nature of Mr Henderson's defence, on 7 October ordered, with Mr Moses' agreement, that the documents be disclosed in an edited form which would protect the passages for which PII was claimed on a contents, as opposed to a class, basis. 27. The trial proper began on 12 October 1992. Mr Clark commenced his evidence on 4 November and, under examination by prosecuting counsel, was consistent with his witness statement. Under defence cross-examination he had, by 5 November, in effect accepted that the MTTA may well have inferred from their meeting in January 1988 that a truthful statement of the use to which the machines was to be put need not be given in export licence applications and that if they had stated military use in their application they would have been rejected by a "clerk". 28. Prosecuting Counsel considered that this evidence was wholly inconsistent with Mr Clark's previous written statement. Counsel advised that the proceedings should not continue and the Commissioners of Customs and Excise accepted this advice. The Judge directed the jury to acquit the Defendants on 9 November 1992 at Prosecuting Counsel's request.