1976-1980 Political Goals and Purposes of the U.S.S.R. in Space*
Part-1
INTERNATIONAL SETTING, 1976-80: DISINTEGRATION OF
DETENTE
CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
MULTIPOLARITY, THE MAJOR TREND
The Soviets pursued their political goals and purposes in space during 1976-80 within a structurally familiar but rapidly changing international order.
Multi-polarity had long supplanted the bipolar world that had been shaped by Soviet and American rivalry during the cold war years. The superpowers, with their awesome nuclear arsenals and virtually instantaneous delivery systems, still command center stage in world affairs; but the constraints and limitations on the use of that power, along with other factors, have diminished the political effect of their enormous military strength.
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, A NEW FACTOR
The spread of international terrorism, in some respects symbolized by Iran's seizure of the American hostages in the Teheran Embassy, introduced a new and perplexing element on the international scene, new in terms of its global dimension and impact, and perplexing because of the difficulties in coping with it. This act of violence dramatically revealed the limitations on the use of power in undertaking retaliatory actions. It revealed the impotence of superpowers under certain conditions beyond their control; for Iran showed the world that it could defy with impunity the most powerful nation in the world, abuse its diplomatic officials, humiliate its government and people—and, for a time at least get away with it without direct, prohibitive costs.
DIFFUSION OF POWER
The diffusion of power within the competing East-West blocs has continued to erode political control from the center. The effects have been to further weaken the power and authority of the superpowers as the principal actors in international affairs. No longer is it possible for them to maintain control and command the unquestioned loyalty of their
*Prepared by Joseph G. Whelan, Senior Specialist in International Affairs, Senior Specialists Division, CRS.
allies. The emergence of Euro-communism, the displays of unrelieved and open hostility between Peking and Moscow, and China's military invasion of the Vietnamese border- lands in February 1979, provide clear evidence of the deepening fissures within international communism and the extent to which national interest has supplanted ideology as a vital force in inter-Communist relations. Resistance by America's allies to any strong punitive action against Iran for seizing the American hostages and against the Soviet Union for invading Afghanistan (beyond the Olympic boycott) revealed the same tendency toward independence within the Western Alliance system. No longer do the superpowers have things entirely their own way.
TENDENCY TOWARD INTERDEPENDENCE
The spirit of nationalism has continued its forward surge in the Third World, regenerating the concept of the nation-state, globalizing its impact on the world system, sometimes stimulating a stronger tendency toward regionalism, and, in all, creating out of the Third World a formidable international force. The Third World can no longer be ignored by the great powers.
On the other hand, interdependence, a counter-trend, has become a clearly definable force in world affairs, diverting much attention away from East-West problems and redirecting it toward those between North and South. Problems of the international economy, pollution of the global environment, food distribution, limited resources and materials, access to ocean resources; problems arising from an exploding world population, international development, and to a lesser degree the management of outer space—all have been increasingly perceived as common problems requiring common solutions in the national interests of all. The emergence of the resource rich Third World and the impact of its political activism, using its newly acquired economic leverage (for example, oil), has quickened this awareness of interdependence and has added a new dimension to world politics as North-South problems compete for attention with those between East and West.
Though the Soviet Union has continued to view interdependence from its own distinctive conflictual world outlook, it, nonetheless, has become concerned about achieving its own particular interests. Discussions on global problems and interdependence have been undertaken by specialists within the academies and foreign affairs institutes, suggesting a Soviet awareness that they must take a serious look at global problems and prepare for the future as these problems impact upon the Soviet Union. Perhaps more important—since it determines world peace in which all nations have an interest—the Soviets negotiated and finally concluded the SALT II agreement with the United States, a major step to control the strategic arms race.
CONTINUING PROMINENCE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Another element in the changing international structure has been the continuing prominence of science and technology both as creators of international problems and as vital components in their solutions through diplomacy. Rapid scientific and technological change, often at an exponential rate, has had a profound impact upon the world scene, complicating still further the tasks of diplomacy and magnifying the problems of management and control over the international environment. Advances in weapons technology, for example, have outstripped the skill of diplomats in their efforts to achieve negotiated limitations of modern armaments, to bring some dependable stability to the strategic balance, and ultimately to increase the chances for world peace.
RISE OF THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT
Finally, the rise of the Islamic movement has added still another new, and unpredictable, element in an already complex international order. This development is significant because the Islamic countries, lying within the Soviet-designated "national liberation zone" and partly along the Soviet border, constitute a large segment of the Third World. (The Soviet Union, with its rapidly growing Muslim population of some 45 to 50 million, ranks among the leading Muslim countries in the world.) Rich in oil resources and commanding strategic waterways of world communications, Muslim countries, notably those in the Middle East, bestride the most geopolitically important region in the world. Their importance has been heightened by their instability which has grown rather than diminished in recent years. The most recent case of a dangerous instability has been that of Iran.
Latent revolutionary Islamic forces erupted in Iran and by early 1979 had toppled the ruling Shah from his throne. Seizure of the American hostages later in the year, amid the disintegration of the country's political order and in open defiance of international law and diplomatic custom, sharpened the growing conflict between the Islamic leaders and the West and quickened the tempo of the revival of Islamic fundamentalism. The Soviet invasion of Muslim Afghanistan in December 1979 catalyzed still further the Islamic movement, unifying the Islamic countries in a common purpose; namely, to protest and condemn the Soviet invasion.
An Islamic revival of this dimension and with this impact was unexpected; its implications have yet to be fully understood; it is an unpredictable and potentially powerful force in international life today.
Such were some of the major elements in the structure of international relations during the last 5 years.
SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS: TRENDS AND CHARACTERISTICS
MAIN THRUST OF RELATIONSHIP: TO MAINTAIN DETENTE
During the period under review, Soviet-American relations seemed to be directed along one main line: To maintain detente—that is, until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. Since the invasion, detente has been tested as never before since its inception in 1972, with the signing of SALT I. With the passage of time Afghanistan seems more and more to have taken on the appearance of a watershed in Soviet-American relations, though this judgment must remain an open question. Nonetheless, despite Afghanistan both nations seem to have tried at least to keep the SALT process alive and to maintain a tolerable level of diplomatic civility. In a climate of fear, suspicion and tension—and on the American side, of a feeling of having been deceived—this has been no small accomplishment. (1)
But the course of detente has never really run very smoothly. Deep political and ideological differences have always lain at the base of this relationship. Tensions had been eased visibly but momentarily in the twilight of the Nixon administration. Successive Brezhnev-Nixon summit conferences provided a somewhat artificial stimulus to the expectation of an emerging new form of peaceful coexistence. The same was true in the early months of the Ford administration. The Vladivostok agreement, concluded in November 1974 and proclaimed a "breakthrough," established the framework for reaching a SALT II agreement. Nonetheless, the relationship remained adversarial and the strength of accommodation tenuous as disrupting actions by both sides buffeted the relationship.
Virtually by common consent SALT II had become the center-piece of detente. Whatever measure of success or failure had been achieved in these negotiations, the results were inevitably reflected in detente. Disagreement over the Backfire bomber/cruise missile issue prevented success within the negotiating framework agreed upon at Vladivostok. Pressure on the Ford administration from the so-called "right wing" of the Republican Party during the primary election campaign in the spring of 1975, along with the adverse effects on detente of Soviet involvement in Angola, moved that administration to abandon the public use of the term "detente" and to mark time on SALT II negotiations. (The Soviets dropped the word "irreversible" in describing detente.)
Prospects of a SALT II agreement declined precipitously with deepening Soviet involvement in Angola during 1975 and 1976. It continued to decline during the first 6 months of 1977 when the newly inaugurated Carter administration proposed to set aside the Vladivostok formula and press for deep cuts in the nuclear arsenals of the Soviet Union and the United States. At the same time the administration initiated an aggressive human rights policy that was directed initially at the Soviet Union. The Soviet reaction was hostile: It rejected the shift on the Vladivostok accord; it protested what it termed to be U.S. interference in Soviet internal affairs.
Toward the end of 1977, however, negotiations were resumed as relations improved, at least superficially. SALT I, scheduled to be terminated in October according to treaty stipulations, was extended by common agreement. A new agreement on SALT was expected in 1978.
But agreement was not reached. Deadlock on numerous arms control issues continued as tension increased over Soviet military involvement in the Ethiopian-Somali war and as anxiety over the general Soviet military buildup and its consequences for the U.S. strategic position was aroused to new heights. This growing concern among some respected national security specialists elevated the problem to the level of a major national issue. Not until June 18, 1979 was the deadlock finally broken and the SALT II treaty signed. But doubts on the wisdom of the treaty persisted as a lively debate took shape within the ratification proceedings.
What hopes there had been for Senate passage of the treaty were dashed with the emergence of the Soviet brigade issue in September. Old anxieties over the danger of Soviet penetration of Cuba, lingering within the Nation's conscience since the missile crisis of 1962, surfaced in the country with reports of Soviet combat forces in Cuba. Linkage of this issue with passage of SALT placed the treaty in jeopardy.
But the final blow came in December with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Deeply alarmed by the implications of this bold military aggression, the United States reacted quickly and vigorously. It shelved the pending treaty, undertook peaceful sanctions against the Soviet Union, and set into motion defense policies that would strengthen the U.S. military presence in the Middle East and Persian Gulf region and enable it to respond to any further Soviet aggression in this vital strategic area.
Nonetheless, despite the shelving of SALT both sides have officially acknowledged degrees of adherence to the terms of the SALT agreements. The United States has been forthright in pledging adherence, so long as the Soviets did the same; the Soviets have been more ambiguous but still supportive in their policy declarations. Both sides apparently want to keep the SALT process alive. (2)
The future of SALT, and thus the future of detente, seemed for a time to hang on the issue of Afghanistan. Meanwhile, as of this writing the United States maintains only minor Afghan sanctions against Moscow, hoping in that way to show its displeasure and, with some support of other countries and sustained Afghani resistance, to pressure the Soviet leadership into withdrawing from Afghanistan. The Soviet Union has been proceeding with great difficulty to pacify the rebels and to reestablish the authority of the Socialist regime. By the end of 1980 neither the United States nor the Soviet Union has succeeded in their chosen courses of action: The Western response in support of the U.S. approach has been perhaps only marginally successful (though the Muslim nations, acting on their own, have vigorously protested the invasion); and according to recent estimates, the Soviets, despite an extensive commitment of military forces, have failed to suppress the rebels and have become "bogged down" in Afghanistan. A broad spectrum of foreign policy observers foresee a period of prolonged tension in Soviet-American relations. (3)
OBSTACLES TO A HARMONIOUS RELATIONSHIP
Distrust and fear: The roots of superpower rivalry
(1) From the Soviet perspective
Distrust and fear lay at the roots of the Soviet-American relationship. Perhaps more than any other element these psychological characteristics have been responsible for producing the discord that has plagued the relationship ever since the Bolshevik Revolution 63 years ago.
On the Soviet side, distrust and fear are parts of an inherited national trait of insecurity that since the emergence of Russia as a European state centuries ago has permeated the Russian outlook in foreign affairs. (4) This trait had its origins in the geography that established the natural limits and the unique physical characteristics of the country, in the evolving political institutions that governed its people, and in the history of its national experience.
Vulnerable in Europe as the result of easy access of hostile forces across the Polish plain, Russia has been the victim of many enemy invasions throughout its history, the most recent large-scale invasions being by France under Napoleon and by Germany under Kaiser Wilhelm and Adolf Hitler. Such traumatic national experiences made a permanent mark on the history of Russia and its people, creating within the nation's psyche a sensitivity to its security and an awareness of its geographic vulnerability.
Historically, Russia's political institutions, authoritarian and absolutist and thus lacking the sanction of popular approval, instilled in its leadership, whether Czarist or Soviet, a distrust of potential enemies from abroad and from their own people within. The multi-national character of the state, having been built upon the conquests of contiguous neighbors of different ethnic origins and cultures (a "prison house of nationalities," Russia has been called), added to this heritage of distrust and suspicion.
The effect of these different elements was to produce in Russia, and particularly within its political leadership, a profound sense of insecurity. In the course of history this feeling of insecurity was transformed into a fear and distrust of the foreign, be it of people, things, or ideas, and even a fear and distrust of their own people, and it became a central feature in the Russian outlook on world affairs.
In the Soviet period a new ingredient was added; namely, communism. Essentially adversarial in behavior and messianic in belief, communism presumed a hostile relationship with the rest of the non-Communist world and fostered a belief in its ultimate Communist triumph as a world system—a militant, aggressive "savior" of mankind, so to speak. The combination of these elements, reinforced by Soviet experience during and after the 1917 Revolution and World War II, was to create a caste of mind preoccupied with insecurity.
Subsequently expanding circles of conquest enlarged the security requirements of the Soviet state, placing new demands upon its people, resources, and political leadership and creating new anxieties for its security with each outward thrust. Russia's suspicions and fears were accordingly magnified by this process of expansion and growth of power.5 It is not out of character, therefore, that Moscow's officially declared justification for the military invasion of Afghanistan, as it had been for Hungary and Czechoslovakia, was security of the state.
(2) From the American perspective
On the American side, distrust and fear of Russia have been emotions experienced strictly in the Soviet period. By and large the United States maintained a friendly and stable relationship with the Russian Imperial Government before the Bolshevik Revolution. Americans of the 19th century were an isolated people, protected within the Atlantic community as a byproduct of British sea power and far removed from the troubles of Europe. Their favorable view of Russia did not arise from any hidden virtues that they might have seen in the country or its people. Rather it sprang from national interest as perceived by both sides, for Russian and American interests generally coincided in international affairs. Ironically, in moments of national peril the Russians were on the American side, as in their support for the Federal cause in the Civil War and their participation in World War I on the side of the Allies. Nevertheless, Americans had disdain for Russia's autocracy and frequently complained officially of its violations of human rights. And the Russian aristocracy had equal disdain for American democratic institutions, an attitude difficult for them to conceal. (6)
Not until the Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia and the proclamation of their universal program of Communist conquest over world capitalism, with the United States as the principal target, did distrust and fear govern the U.S. attitude toward the Soviet Union. The "Red Scare" of the early 1920's, during which the civil liberties of suspected subversive leftists were hardly respected, revealed America's exaggerated fear of communism.
Not surprisingly, it took 16 years before the United States would establish diplomatic relations with Moscow, and even then it insisted that a series of Soviet pledges of good behavior be included in the official documents of recognition. Suspicion of Soviet good faith in fulfilling the obligations of recognition was an underlying American assumption in the entire proceeding. Beneath this suspicion was fear for the vulnerability of American institutions against the onslaught of subversive communism.
Fighting as allies in World War II against a common enemy failed to dispel American distrust and fear of Soviet Russia. War-time negotiations were plagued by suspicion on both sides as each (the Americans late in the war) saw in the other motives of self- aggrandizement in the conduct of the war and in the diplomacy of the emerging
Post war world. (7)
The onset of the cold war generated perhaps the strongest feelings of distrust, a feeling that magnified with the advance of communism in the postwar period. The contest became global, as the cold war enveloped the world, dividing it into two hostile camps. The "Red Scare" of the 1920's was to be repeated with the rise of "McCarthyism" in the 1950's. And in Russia, Stalin initiated virtually a "reign of terror" that created within that nation a paralysis of fear and a siege mentality directed against "enemies" from within and abroad.
Armed with nuclear weapons and virtually instantaneous delivery systems, the superpowers, as they came to be called in the 1960's and 1970's, engaged in their global rivalry with undiminished intensity. Survival, the ultimate national interest of any nation, became in a very real sense the vital concern of both sides, for each possessed the power to destroy the other. Distrust and fear were the guiding spirit as each sought accommodation of its interests in negotiations, notably in the SALT process; for neither could trust the other and their mutual fears of destruction became a common characteristic of life in the nuclear age.
To expect such deep-seated primal emotions as fear and distrust to dissipate in Soviet-American relations is perhaps too great an expectation, too Utopian. Clearly, given the powerful forces at work in international relations today—political and historical, technological and psychological—the odds are against it.
Conflicting ideologies and political perspectives
(1) Soviet commitment to revolutionary change
(a) Ideological differences.—Equally formidable as an obstacle to establishing harmony in Soviet-American relations is the conflict in ideologies and political perspectives. Where this conflict is most discernible is in their differing views on political change in the world and on such vital matters as human rights.
Briefly, the Soviets have a doctrinaire view of the world, of where it is going, and of their place within it. At least as a matter of state ideology, they see it moving inexorably toward socialism and ultimately communism, with the Soviet Union in the vanguard leading the revolutionary forces. For them this movement is preordained by history, and its success assured, driven on toward this goal by a dynamic and unfailing dialectical process working within the forces of history. The Soviets look upon their doctrine as an infallible design for the salvation of mankind. Change is inevitable; it is revolutionary, though not necessarily resulting in war since allowances are made for peaceful acquiescence by adversaries.
Viewing world affairs from the democratic perspective, Americans acknowledge the inevitability of change, but perceive it more in the context of peaceful accommodation of interests than in one of inevitable revolution. Tolerant of differences and conflicting interests, this view, though preferring democracy, having been a product of 18th century rationalism and belief in the rights of man, nevertheless accepts political pluralism as a fact of international life, believing that man as a rational being can resolve his differences and establish an acceptable harmony of interests. Recent history suggests that the Soviet view is clearly Utopian; the American, overoptimistic.
Both principles and the perspectives they produce clash, and when the adversaries are powerful nation-states like the United States and the Soviet Union, the repercussions can be far-reaching, as indeed they have been. For political beliefs, combined with the realities of power and driven on by a dynamic spirit of messianism, are the stuff that conflicts are made of.
(b) Kennedy and Khrushchev: Conflicting perceptions of the balance of power concept.—Two examples illustrate the force of these conflicting world views, notably over the limits of change, and their impact on Soviet-American relations: One deals with the Berlin crisis of 1961; the other with Soviet support for revolution in the Third World.
In the negotiations at Vienna in June 1961 between President John F. Kennedy and Chairman Nikita S. Khrushchev, the President tried to persuade the Soviet leader to accept the world balance of power as it existed in the belief that with recognition by each side of the other's interests and with the conduct of relations on that basis, a durable and genuine peaceful coexistence might be established. The background of the conference was Khrushchev's threat to Western rights in Berlin. Acquiescence in his demands would have meant Western recognition of a shift in the European power balance, a shift the Western powers were clearly not willing to accept, for Western vital interests were deeply enmeshed in the existing equilibrium of power.
As an historian and member of that generation much influenced by the consequences of appeasement in the 1930's, President Kennedy accepted the balance of power theory as a valid and realistic concept in international relations. His behavior during the crisis in Berlin, and later in the Cuban missile crisis, and his perception of the Soviet leadership and its policies was greatly influenced by this belief. Downgrading ideology, Kennedy tended to view international conflict more in national than in ideological terms. For him, national interest was the primary motivating force, not ideological abstractions. (8)
Thus, at Vienna, Kennedy tried hard to reach an accommodation with Khrushchev that would satisfy the vital national interests of each nation. The key element in his negotiating position was a mutual acceptance of the existing equilibrium of power and thus a common perception of the status quo—in brief, agreement on the limits of change that affected each nation. Kennedy accepted social change as part of the normal historical process, but essentially peaceful change and change that did not involve the prestige or commitments of the Soviet Union and the United States or upset the balance of world power. He recognized the status quo as acceptance of the existing balance of international force, but far from advocating a freeze on the social mold of the world, he believed in political and institutional change as both inevitable and desirable. What Kennedy hoped for was agreement on a process of change that would not entail the transfer of power from one bloc to the other and would not make either side feel threatened and therefore obliged to resist change by force.
Khrushchev rejected Kennedy's perception of the balance of power concept, arguing the thesis set forth in his January 6, 1961 speech; namely, that social revolution, as a global phenomenon, was preordained by history; that such revolutions, that is, "wars of national liberation," were "sacred"; and that the Soviet Union had an obligation to assist whenever possible. For Khrushchev, the status quo meant the unimpeded progress of the conquest of power by Communist revolution on a global scale. Kennedy's conception of a global standstill was in his view an attempt to alter the status quo, not support it; it was an attempt to arrest the revolutionary process.
Thus, the conflicting perceptions of the balance of power concept and its implications for the status quo became entangled in Soviet-American relations, dangerously so because it meant that Soviet support for global revolutions (for example, Castro's revolution in Cuba) and refusal to recognize an acceptable balance of power (for example, in Berlin and thus Europe) would expose the great powers to the very miscalculations and confrontations that Kennedy sought to avoid. Out of this essentially ideological conflict of world views emerged the dynamic forces that produced the crisis in Berlin during 1961, and 1 year later, the Cuban missile crisis.
(c) Soviet support for revolution in the Third World.—More recent is the example of Soviet intervention in Angola and the reaffirmation of its commitment to revolution in the Third World. What is revealed here is again the conflict over the limits of change. The United States had hoped that the Soviet commitment to detente would have placed restraints on their revolutionary activity in the Third World. But this was not the case. Like his predecessor, Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU, rejected what for him amounted to acceptance of a status quo in the Third World and thus a denial of the Soviet role in the dialectic of history. Furthermore, he rejected any notion that support of the revolutionary "national liberation movements" contradicted the principle of detente.
The Ford administration protested Soviet intervention in Angola, warning that detente could not take another Angola. The Soviet response was best expressed in Brezhnev's report to the 25th Congress of the CPSU in February 1976. Perceiving a further upsurge of the revolutionary spirit in the Third World and a "deepening of the crisis of capitalism"—and thus the opening up of new opportunities—Brezhnev reaffirmed Soviet policy of support for the national liberation movements. Soviet relations with the liberated or developing countries "have expanded and become more lasting," he said. The political content of "our ties has become richer." Despite difficulties, "profound progressive changes are taking place" within the Third World; "the class struggle is intensifying'; its influence in world affairs has increased "appreciably." The Soviet attitude toward "the complex processes" in the Third World was "clear cut and definite." Brezhnev explained:
The Soviet Union does not meddle in the domestic affairs of other countries and peoples. Respect for the sacred right of each people and each country to select their own road of development is a firm principle of Lenninist foreign policy. However, we do not hide our views. In the developing countries, as everywhere, we are on the side of the forces of progress, democracy and national independence, and we treat them as our friends and comrades-in-arms. Our party is rendering and will render support to peoples who are fighting for their freedom. The Soviet Union is not looking for any benefits for itself, is not hunting for concessions, is not trying to gain political supremacy and is not seeking any military bases. We are acting as our revolutionary conscience and our Communist convictions permit us.
Thus Brezhnev renewed the Soviet ideological commitment to revolutionary change.
"New horizons" were opening, especially in the Third World. And yet possible contradictions between this policy of support for revolution and the principle of detente were disallowed. "Détente does not in the slightest way abolish, and cannot abolish or change the laws of the class struggle," Brezhnev said, adding with a certain sleight-of-hand in his logic, "We do not conceal the fact that we see detente as a way to create more favorable conditions for peaceful Socialist and Communist construction. This merely confirms that socialism and peace are indivisible." (9)
That the Soviet commitment to—indeed active support of—revolutionary change in the Third World acts as a formidable obstacle to harmonious relations with the United States is evident by the repercussions of its military involvement in Angola, the Horn of Africa, and most recently Afghanistan.
Both illustrations—the conflicting Kennedy-Khrushchev perceptions of the balance of power concept and the Soviet commitment to revolutionary change in the Third World—point up, therefore, the irreconcilability between the Soviet and American view of political change in the world and clarify how the conflict in ideology and political perspectives can create formidable obstacles to a harmonious Soviet-American relationship.
(2) Conflicting views on human rights
(a) Emphasis of Carter administration on human rights.—Equally important with the conflicting perceptions of change in world affairs is the differing Soviet and American views on human rights.
This issue is important because the Carter administration made human rights a cardinal principle of its foreign policy and, especially in its early years, had directed much of its criticism for violations at the Soviet Union. Consequently, much of the tension in Soviet-American relations, particularly since the inauguration of the Carter administration in January 1977, was caused by the human rights issue.
(b) International documents on human rights.—Human rights has been an issue in Soviet-American relations because each side views and acts upon the matter from conflicting ideological perspectives. Formally human rights as an international concern rests upon several documents, two of which are: The U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, and the Final Act of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe at Helsinki in 1975. Both documents are not legally binding but rather represent a statement of principles. Adherence by many of the world's nation-states, nonetheless, invests in them considerable moral force. Some of the relevant articles in the Declaration of Human Rights are as follows:
Article 1—All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.
Article 3—Everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of persons.
Article 9—No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.
Article 13— ... 2. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his
own, and to return to his country.
Article 18—Everyone has the right of freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.
Article 19—Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. (10)
The Helsinki Final Act reaffirmed the purposes and principles of this Declaration and the United Nations Charter in the field of fundamental human rights and freedom. Among the statements on human rights set forth in the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States are the following:
The participating States will respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.
They will promote and encourage the effective exercise of civil, political, economic, social, cultural and other rights and freedoms all of which derive from the inherent dignity of the human person and are essential for his free and full develop-ment. . . . The participating States recognize the universal significance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for which is an essential factor for the peace, justice and well-being necessary to ensure the development of friendly relations and co-operation among themselves as among all States.
(c) Conflicting interpretations: The American view.—Both the United States and the Soviet Union concurred in the adoption of these important international documents setting forth what appear to be common principles on human rights. However, the difficulty arises from the conflicting interpretations that each has given to these principles. In this case, "truth," like beauty, lies in the eyes of the beholder.
Soviet and American interpretations derive largely from contrasting ideological beliefs that shape their thinking, produce some antithetical goals, purposes, and national values, and ultimately place them far apart on the political spectrum.
American democratic ideology is rooted in the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the political philosophies of Locke, Jefferson, and Madison, and shaped by its unique historical experience. This ideology glorifies the rights of men as individuals within a genuinely democratic society with a modified free market economic system. It lays down the principle of individual human freedom as one of the highest attainable human values; it places man in the center of its political universe, endows him with a system of law to protect and preserve his rights and property and provides a system of government where power and authority flow from the governed.
(d) Conflicting interpretations: The Soviet view.—Soviet ideology is rooted in the thought of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, and shaped by the equally unique Russian and Soviet historical experience. A capitalist economic system in this view must inevitably violate the economic rights of most people. Extremes of wealth and poverty in the West are seen as clear evidence of this. Freedom is interpreted in a larger social and collective sense where the interests of society and state take precedence over those of the individual and where the limits of freedom are laid down by a small autocratic ruling elite. This elite, functioning within a tightly closed and rigidly organized totalitarian system, undertakes to act in the interests of all.
Political democracy is held in anathema, simply reflecting the needs of a capitalist ruling class, and according to the Marxist-Leninist laws of history, it is doomed to destruction. The party and the state, subsuming the individual man, are the center of the Soviet universe; law is the protector and preserver of the collective well-being, not of any inalienable rights of the Soviet citizen; and power and authority flow from the elite leadership, not from the governed.
(e) Inevitability of conflict.—Accordingly, Americans see the suppression of human rights in the Soviet Union as libertarians from an open democratic society understand them; namely, as the denial of fundamental and inalienable rights of men to act according to a free conscience and to exercise a maximum feasible freedom of choice.
The Soviet leaders perceive selective suppression as a "sacred duty" because internal dissent represents a threat to the doctrinal validity and integrity of the socialist system and the security of the party, the Soviet state and its people. They reject U.S. protests on grounds that it is interference in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union. Brezhnev gave this explanation in an address before the Soviet Trade Union Congress on March 21, 1977, which elucidates the Soviet perception of dissent:
In our country it is not forbidden to think differently from the majority. We regard the comrades who come out with well-founded criticism, who strive to help the cause, as critics in good faith, and we are grateful to them. Those who criticize erroneously we regard as erring people.
It is another matter when several persons who have broken away from our society actively come out against the socialist system, embark on the road of anti-Soviet activity, violate laws and, having no support inside the country, turn for support abroad, to imperialist subversive centers.
Our people demand that such so-called public figures be treated as opponents of socialism, as persons acting against their own motherland, as accomplices and sometimes agents of imperialism. Quite naturally we have taken and will take measures against them as envisaged by law.
And, in this matter, let no one take offense. To protect the rights, freedoms and security of 260 million Soviet people from the activities of such renegades is not only our right, but our sacred duty.
Soviet resentment against U.S. complaints of Soviet violations of human rights, as understood by Americans, has been bitter and strong. Here is what Brezhnev said to the assembled Soviet trade unionists:
Washington's claims to teach others how to live, I believe, cannot be accepted by any sovereign state, not to mention the fact that neither the situation in the United States itself nor United States actions and policies in the world at large give justification for such claims. I will repeat again: we will not tolerate interference in our internal affairs by anyone and under any pretext. A normal development of relations on such a basis is, of course, unthinkable.
(f) Impact of conflicting interpretations.—This mismatch in perceptions of human rights has inevitably increased discord in Soviet-American relations. President Carter's vigorous pursuit of his human rights policy in the first year of his administration provoked an equally vigorous response from the Soviet side. American protests of Soviet violations went unheeded as the Soviets proceeded to arrest, bring to trial, and imprison some of Russia's leading dissidents. As a result progress on SALT was delayed, and the relationship as a whole took a decided downward turn. Not until both sides backed off on this issue did progress in the negotiations resume and the relationship achieve a measure of stability.
Deepening differences; broadening misunderstanding
To sum up, the point to be made here is simply this: The depth of the differences between the Soviet Union and the United States in ideology and political perspectives—differences fundamental in such matters as political change in the world and human rights—when combined with the distrust and fear that have existed for so long on both sides, altogether create a formidable obstacle to establishing a harmonious relationship. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was to deepen these differences and broaden the void of misunderstanding, for it was a dramatic portrayal of these basic elements in conflict being acted out in a practical, real world setting.
AFGHANISTAN: A CONTINUING PROBLEM IN SOVIET-AMERICAN
RELATIONS 11
Radical change in American perceptions
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was called a "watershed event" in international politics. Whether or not this initial assessment is correct still remains an open question. Hostile criticism of the Soviet action through 1980 has tended to become muted with the passage of time and as doubt and uncertainty, stimulated by reappraisals of interests, have set in during the aftermath of the invasion. This tempering of international concern, combined with the growing Soviet difficulties in Afghanistan, tends to cast some doubt on the correctness of this assessment.
Initially, the invasion had an alarming effect on the United States. The administration, shocked by this bold Soviet military thrust, took vigorous retaliatory actions to punish the Russians: It shelved the SALT II treaty temporarily; halted the sale of high technology and strategic items to the Soviet Union; restricted cultural, economic and scientific exchanges; and refused to participate in the summer Olympics in Moscow. Other countries, including those in Western Europe and the majority of the Muslim states, denounced the invasion, but for a variety of reasons few have been willing to take strong a stand as the United States.
What seemed to be the most significant result of the invasion was the serious impact it had on the American perception of their relations with Russia and more broadly on their perception of what position the United States should maintain in world politics. The Afghanistan crisis shocked both the administration and the American people, producing a radical reappraisal of U.S. foreign and defense policies and a decided shift in American public opinion.
The initial thrust and tone of the American response was decidedly "hawkish." Public opinion, sharply critical of Soviet policy and reflecting disillusionment about the future course of relations, took a downward turn from its formerly favorable attitude toward relations with Russia. The Nation seemed to be swept up in a new spirit of bellicosity. It was generally agreed that the "Vietnam syndrome," meaning "never again" will the United States become involved in a foreign war over less than vital national interests, had been dissolved, and that the United States was once again moving toward a policy of qualified or selective globalism.
When Soviet-American relations will get back on the track of the pre-Afghan days remained problematical at the end of 1980. As noted above, action on SALT II would seem to be a major test of intentions for both sides. Hints of a possible return to negotiations and perhaps normalcy surfaced with preliminary proposals on the Euromissile issue suggesting that negotiations could proceed without ratification of SALT and with an exchange of reassuring signals by both sides during the fall of 1980. Nonetheless, Soviet "pacification" of Afghanistan goes ponderously forward, posing a clear and present danger to the vital interests of the United States and its allies if Afghanistan becomes a base for further expansion of Soviet arms and influence in the critically important oil-rich regions of the Persian Gulf. Qualified foreign policy observers foresee a period of prolonged tension in Soviet-American relations. Afghanistan, therefore, remains an important issue in determining the future course of the relationship. Furthermore, uncertainty about Soviet intervention in the unfolding Polish crisis during the closing months of 1980 contributed to tensions in the relationship.
Afghanistan: A new direction for Soviet policy?
The Afghanistan issue raised a series of basic questions that inevitably affect the course of Soviet-American relations. Does the invasion represent a new direction for Soviet policy, particularly in the Third World? Is it the opening of a new era of Russian expansionism in which Soviet military power will become the principal instrument of policy? Or is this an aberration, an overreaction by Russia to historic fears for its security, the implications of which are more regional than global, more local than geostrategic?
Opinion has been divided essentially between two schools of thought, the offensive and the defensive. The offensive view perceives the invasion as a "qualitative" change in Soviet foreign policy; asserts that it represents the opening of a new era of Russian expansionism and territorial conquest; and holds that it thus constitutes a direct threat to the vital interests of the United States in the Middle East.
The defensive school tends to argue that the invasion was a response to real or imagined threats to Soviet security along its sensitive southern border. This border divides Russia's Muslims from their kinsmen in the Middle East and South Asia. The upsurge of the militant Islamic movement in this area has no doubt heightened Soviet concerns for its internal security. Soviet motives were thus more regionally directed, and less a direct threat to U.S. and Western geostrategic interests. Tending to see many constraints on Soviet expansionism, notably the limitation on economic resources, this school tends to downgrade the degree of threat to the United States and its allies.
The cases for both sides have been forcefully argued. But by the end of 1980 one fact seemed clear, and it was that the Soviets were more deeply committed—even "bogged downs'—in Afghanistan and that this deepening problem, as a spoiler of the relationship, could not only adversely affect Soviet relations with the United States, but also temper Soviet expansionist ambitions, at least for the near future.
A SUMMING UP
Such was the international environment within which Soviet-American relations took place during the past 5 years. Multi-polarity dominated world politics as a surging nationalism, especially in the Third World, catalyzed the diffusion of power and the devolution of authority. Interdependence in a world of many competing parts, and science and technology with their ambiguous promise of progress and retrogression, offered some elements of stability m a world system that was buffeted by international terrorism and by the spectacle of the revival of an unpredictable, militant Islamic fundamentalism. Detente remained the declared objective of Soviet-American policy makers, but that hope was placed in jeopardy by their inability to repress the fear and distrust that lay at the roots of the superpower rivalry and to reconcile their conflicting ideologies and political perspectives. The Afghanistan issue, a classic case of ideologies and interests in conflict, deepened already profound differences and broadened the already expanding gap of misunderstanding in Soviet-American relations, so that both nations now face the 1980’s, a dangerous decade by all accounts, with the SALT process in suspension, diplomacy somewhat debased, and prospects for the future clouded.
References:
A. SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS: 1976-80, SUPPORTING VEHICLES AND LAUNCH VEHICLES, POLITICAL GOALS AND PURPOSES, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN SPACE, ADMINISTRATION, RE-SOURCE BURDEN, FUTURE OUTLOOK PREPARED AT THE REQUEST OF HON. BOB PACKWOOD, Chairman, COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, UNITED STATES SENATE, Part 1, Dec. 1982.
1. This section draws upon a number of chronologies prepared in the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division of CRS: Inglee, William B. Soviet-American Relations in 1976: A Chronological Summary and Brief Analysis. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, July 26, 1977, 135 pp.; Cooper, William H. Soviet-American Relations in 1977: A Chronological Summary and Brief Analysis. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Mar. 1, 1979, 192 pp.; and the Chronologies of Major Developments in Selected Areas of Foreign Affairs
published by the House Foreign Affairs Committee covering the years 1978, 1979, and Jan.-Mar. 1980.Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office.
2. Afghanistan: Soviet Invasion and U.S. Response. Issue Brief: IB80006. Afghanistan Task Force, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division. The Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Dec. 22, 1980, pp. 22-24. For a survey of recent Soviet-American relations, see, Simes, Dimitri K. The Death of Detente? International Security, vol. 5, Summer 1980: 3-25, and in the same issue, see Pierre, Andrew J. The Diplomacy of SALT, pp. 178-197, a review essay of Strobe Talbott's book, "Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II," with added commentary by the 'U.S. Congress. House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Soviet Policy and United States Response in the Third World. Report prepared by the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress. 97th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1981, pp. 84-116.
3. See text.
4. For an analysis of Russia and the problem of security, see, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behavior: Emerging New Context for U.S. Diplomacy. Prepared by Dr. Joseph G. Whelan, Senior Specialist in International Affairs, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979, pp. 517-519.
5. Ibid., pp. 518-519.
6. The attitude of Sergius Witte, the Russian negotiator at the Portsmouth Peace Conference ending the Russo-Japanese War, toward the United States is discussed in. House Foreign Affairs Committee, Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behavior, pp. 34-41. For a commentary on converging Russian-American interests in historical perspective, see pp. 539-540.
7. For examples of concerns on both sides, see. House Foreign Affairs Committee, Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behavior, chs. 4 and 5.
8. This section draws upon House Foreign Affairs Committee, Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behavior, pp. 329-330.
9. Ibid., pp. 431-434.
10. This section draws upon Whelan, Joseph G., Human Rights in Soviet-American Relations-Washington, Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, May 8, 1978 (Issue Brief IB77031-Archived).
11. This section draws from House Foreign Affairs Committee, Soviet Third World Policy and U.S. Response, pp.84-116.
