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Early Spring

The US Navy conducted investigation of ASAT capabilities with the initiation of the service’s “Early Spring” program. Pioneering military space author Paul B. Stares notes, “Early Spring became an umbrella name for a variety of programs that were put forward by the Navy between 1960 and 1964.” [Stares, The Militarization of Space, 110.] The Navy explored ship- and air-launched ASAT systems. In April and July 1962, the Navy conducted two tests of an air-launched ASAT missile which were similar to the Bold Orion test. The smaller ASAT missiles used in these tests were launched from F4Ds.

On 9 August 1961, Premier Nikita Khrushchev openly threatened the West with a new and terrifying weapon, the orbital H-bomb. "You do not have 50- or 100-megaton bombs, we have bombs more powerful than 100 megatons. We placed Gagarin and Titov in space, and we can replace them with other loads that can be directed to any place on Earth." Although the US had hypothesized orbital bombs and had developed countermissions for systems like SAINT, this was the first public indication that the Soviets were actively pursuing this course of action. Within a few months, however, analysis of the threat diminished its proportions. In the light of this analysis, the US cut back the SAINT program in December 1962 and then canceled it outright. Off-the-shelf hardware proved inadequate, and the resultant system reliability was questionable. DOD also doubted SAINT's usefulness against disguised weapons and decoys.

One idea behind many of the USN program variants was based on the concept of a Polaris submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) that could be inserted into the orbit of the intended satellite target, seek out the target through terminal guidance, and then disable it in orbit. In March 1961, the Navy presented to Congress an extremely advanced ASAT system, Early Spring. This ASAT, based on the Polaris missile, did not use a nuclear weapon as its kill mechanism. Early Spring proposed to mount a modified Sparrow air to air missile on a sub-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) which would climb to the target’s orbital altitude, wait until the target entered the engagement zone, and then destroy it by means of a proximity fuse and a conventional warhead.

Theoretically, a missile submarine parked itself under the path of the target satellite. The crew launched a missile that had a booster with just enough power to attain the desired altitude. Attached to a restartable upper stage, the payload would hover at the target altitude for up to 90 seconds waiting for the satellite to arrive. An optical scanning system, sensitive enough to see an object that the unaided eye would strain to see, first located the target with a wide field of view and then, once it had identified the target, tracked it with a narrow field for precise guidance.

The missile relayed data to the submarine for real-time control. Once it had identified the target, the vehicle maneuvered onto a collision course, and a proximity fuse detonated the warhead releasing thousands of steel pellets. The impact of even one pellet would destroy the satellite. A submarine could launch several missiles at one target. A major advantage of Early Spring was that the Polaris submarines could go almost anywhere to get at a satellite.

The Polaris SLBM was a non-nuclear option and afforded greater flexibility to target satellites at varying inclinations. R&D work continued into 1964 with researchers investigating several system configurations. Although the Navy successfully tested the optical tracker in the late 1960s, it canceled Early Spring because of funding difficulties and problems of real-time command and control at sea. One significant drawback was that the system did not allow for any inspection of the hostile satellite prior to its disablement. This perceived USN program weakness helped spur USAF research efforts in the direction of an on-orbit inspection capability.