NASA: Status of Achieving Key Outcomes and Addressing Major
Management Challenges (31-JUL-01, GAO-01-868).
GAO reviewed the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's
(NASA) fiscal year 2000 performance report to assess the agency's
progress in achieving selected key outcomes identified as
important mission areas for NASA. The selected key outcomes are
to (1) expand scientific knowledge of the Earth system, (2)
expand the commercial development of space, and (3) deploy and
operate the International Space Station safely and cost
effectively. NASA reported mixed progress in achieving its key
outcomes. In general, NASA's strategies for achieving unmet
performance targets for theses outcomes are clear and reasonable.
NASA achieved most targets related to expanding knowledge of the
Earth system. However, its progress in other areas was more
limited. NASA has made improvements in its fiscal year 2000
performance report in comparison to its fiscal year 1999
performance report. Specifically, NASA is describing its
verification and validation efforts and disclosing its data
sources for each performance target, providing greater confidence
that the performance results are credible. NASA's report
partially addressed the governmentwide high-risk area of
strategic human capital management but not the area of
information security. GAO has previously found that NASA lacks an
effective agencywide security program. In its report, NASA only
addressed two of the three critical management challenges: (1)
correcting weaknesses in contract management and (2) effectively
implementing the faster, better, cheaper approach to space
exploration projects. However, it did not address the challenge
of controlling space station costs.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-01-868
ACCNO: A01698
TITLE: NASA: Status of Achieving Key Outcomes and Addressing
Major Management Challenges
DATE: 07/31/2001
SUBJECT: Aerospace research
Agency missions
Computer security
Information systems
Internal controls
Performance measures
Program evaluation
Space exploration
Strategic planning
Government Performance and Results Act
(GPRA)
NASA Space Launch Initiative
NASA Space Station Service Module
NASA X-33 Program
NASA X-34 Program
******************************************************************
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GAO-01-868
Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.
S. Senate
United States General Accounting Office
GAO
July 2001 NASA Status of Achieving Key Outcomes and Addressing Major
Management Challenges
GAO- 01- 868
Page i GAO- 01- 868 NASA's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes Letter 1
Results in Brief 2 Background 4 Assessment of NASA?s Progress and Strategies
in Accomplishing
Selected Key Outcomes 5 Comparison of NASA?s Fiscal Year 2000 Performance
Report With
the Prior Year Report 10 NASA?s Efforts to Address its Major Management
Challenges
Identified by GAO 12 Scope and Methodology 12 Agency Comments 13
Appendix I Observations on NASA?s Efforts to Address Its Major Management
Challenges 15
Appendix II Comments From the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
23
Tables
Table 1: Major Management Challenges 16 Contents
Page 1 GAO- 01- 868 NASA's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes
July 31, 2001 The Honorable Fred Thompson Ranking Minority Member Committee
on Governmental Affairs United States Senate
Dear Senator Thompson: As you requested, we reviewed the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration?s (NASA) fiscal year 2000 performance
report required by the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA)
to assess the agency?s progress in achieving selected key outcomes that you
identified as important mission areas for NASA. 1 We did not review NASA?s
fiscal year 2002 performance plan because it had not been issued by the time
we completed our work. NASA was in the process of making substantive changes
to the plan based on comments from the Office of Management and Budget and
the NASA Advisory Council. Thus, we are unable to discuss NASA?s fiscal year
2002 goals and strategies for the selected outcomes. Also, we could not
compare NASA?s fiscal year 2002 performance plan with its fiscal year 2001
performance plan for the selected outcomes. These are the same outcomes we
addressed in our June 2000 review of the agency?s fiscal year 1999
performance report and fiscal year 2001 performance plan to provide a
baseline by which to measure the agency?s performance from year- to- year. 2
These selected key outcomes are to
expand scientific knowledge of the Earth system,
expand the commercial development of space, and
deploy and operate the International Space Station safely and cost
effectively.
1 This report is one of a series of reports on the 24 Chief Financial
Officers (CFO) Act agencies? fiscal year 2000 performance reports and fiscal
year 2002 performance plans. 2 Observations on the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration?s Fiscal Year 1999 Performance Report and Fiscal Year
2001 Performance Plan (GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 192R, June 30, 2000).
United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO- 01- 868 NASA's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes
As agreed, using the selected key outcomes for NASA as a framework, we (1)
assessed the progress NASA has made in achieving these outcomes and the
strategies the agency has in place to achieve unmet performance goals; and
(2) compared NASA?s fiscal year 2000 performance report with the agency?s
prior year performance report for these outcomes. Additionally, we agreed to
analyze how NASA addressed its major management challenges, including the
governmentwide high- risk areas of strategic human capital management and
information security, that we and NASA?s Office of Inspector General
identified. Appendix I provides detailed information on how NASA addressed
these challenges. (App. II contains NASA?s comments on a draft of our
report.)
NASA reported mixed progress in achieving its key outcomes. In general,
NASA?s strategies for achieving unmet performance targets for these outcomes
are clear and reasonable. As described below, NASA reported that it achieved
most targets related to expanding knowledge of the Earth system. However,
its progress in other areas was more limited.
Planned outcome: Expanding scientific knowledge of the Earth system.
NASA?s performance report indicated that NASA made progress toward achieving
this outcome. NASA reported meeting nearly all of its planned performance
targets, which included developing models to use time- varying gravity
observations for the first time in space and completing an initiative to
reduce the size and weight of certain aircraft instruments. NASA?s planned
actions and time frames for achieving its unmet targets were clear and
reasonable. The NASA Advisory Council, which independently evaluated the
performance report, also generally found that good progress had been made
with this outcome.
Planned outcome: Expanding the commercial development of space. NASA?s
performance report indicated limited progress toward achieving this outcome.
Over half of the performance targets that we assessed for this outcome were
reported as having been met. But a number of targets were not achieved,
including two that were associated with NASA?s X- 33 and X- 34 programs.
These programs, designed to develop and demonstrate technologies needed for
future reusable spacecraft, were not competitively selected for additional
funding. The NASA Advisory Council expressed concern that program efforts
related to NASA?s new Space Launch Initiative were elusive. NASA provided
clear and reasonable explanations for targets that were not met. But it did
not provide strategies and time frames for achieving its unmet target of
pursuing the commercial marketing of space shuttle Results in Brief
Page 3 GAO- 01- 868 NASA's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes
payloads, even though it stated in the report that the target remained
feasible.
Planned outcome: Deploying and operating the International Space Station
safely and cost- effectively. NASA?s performance report showed that NASA
made limited progress toward achieving this outcome. Most performance
targets related to the space station effort were tied into a specific
launch, which did not take place as planned in fiscal year 2000. NASA
provided clear explanations for missing these targets, noting that delays
were caused by Russian Proton failures and Service Module launch schedule
slips. It also provided reasonable strategies and time frames for achieving
them. NASA did not directly address the problem of continuing space station
cost growth, despite the fact that this has been a long- standing problem.
In fact, NASA now projects cost overruns to exceed $4 billion.
NASA has made improvements in its fiscal year 2000 performance report in
comparison to its fiscal year 1999 performance report. Specifically, NASA is
describing its verification and validation efforts and disclosing its data
sources for each performance target, providing greater confidence that the
performance results are credible. Also, it has added discussions on why
performance results are meaningful, and it is explaining why changes in
performance targets are needed. However, NASA can still be more specific in
addressing the outcome of deploying and operating the space station safely
and cost- effectively and it needs to identify performance measures that
directly address cost growth. NASA can also improve its discussions on data
verification and validation by (1) more clearly identifying validation
methods used for some targets, (2) highlighting data limitations, and (3)
communicating these discussions in a less technical manner. Lastly, as we
noted in our review of the fiscal year 1999 report, NASA still relies
heavily on output measures. NASA?s explanations of why performance results
are meaningful help to better understand the linkage between the performance
targets and results. However, we believe that continued use of output
measures burdens NASA by requiring it to continuously demonstrate the
linkages between program efforts and results and to make improvements to
strengthen such linkages.
In assessing how NASA addressed major management challenges, we found that
NASA?s report partially addressed the governmentwide highrisk area of
strategic human capital management but not the other area of information
security. Addressing this issue is important since we have previously found
that NASA lacks an effective agencywide security
Page 4 GAO- 01- 868 NASA's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes
program. We also identified three other challenges facing NASA. We found
that NASA?s report addressed two of these critical management challenges:
(1) correcting weaknesses in contract management and (2) effectively
implementing the faster, better, cheaper approach to space exploration
projects. However, as mentioned above, it did not address the challenge of
controlling space station costs.
In commenting on a draft of our report, NASA said that it had no issues with
the report.
GPRA is intended to shift the focus of government decisionmaking,
management, and accountability from activities and processes to the results
and outcomes achieved by federal programs. New and valuable information on
the plans, goals, and strategies of federal agencies has been provided since
federal agencies began implementing GPRA. Under GPRA, annual performance
plans are to clearly inform the Congress and the public of (1) the annual
performance goals for agencies? major programs and activities, (2) the
measures that will be used to gauge performance, (3) the strategies and
resources required to achieve the performance goals, and (4) the procedures
that will be used to verify and validate performance information. These
annual plans, issued soon after transmittal of the President?s budget,
provide a direct linkage between an agency?s longer- term goals and mission
and day- to- day activities. 3 Annual performance reports are to
subsequently report on the degree to which performance goals were met. The
issuance of the agencies? performance reports, due by March 31, represents a
new and potentially more substantive phase in the implementation of GPRA-
the opportunity to assess federal agencies? actual performance for the prior
fiscal year and to consider what steps are needed to improve performance,
and reduce costs in the future. 4
NASA?s mission encompasses human exploration and development of space, the
advancement and communication of scientific knowledge, and research and
development of aeronautics and space technologies. Its activities span a
broad range of complex and technical endeavors- from investigating the
composition, evaluation, and resources of Mars; to working with its
international partners to complete and operate the
3 The fiscal year 2002 performance plan is the fourth of these annual plans
under GPRA. 4 The fiscal year 2000 performance report is the second of these
annual reports under GPRA. Background
Page 5 GAO- 01- 868 NASA's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes
International Space Station; to providing satellite and aircraft
observations of earth for scientific and weather forecasting purposes; to
developing new technologies designed to improve air flight safety.
This section discusses our analysis of NASA?s performance in achieving its
selected key outcomes and the strategies the agency has in place to achieve
unmet performance goals and measures in the future. In discussing these
outcomes, we have also provided information drawn from our prior work on the
extent to which the agency provided assurance that the performance
information it is reporting is credible.
The performance report indicated that NASA made progress toward achieving
its key outcome of expanding the scientific knowledge of the Earth system.
NASA reported that all performance targets for this outcome were met, except
two. However, NASA provided reasonable explanations for not meeting them in
fiscal year 2000. For example, NASA reported that a lack of science quality
spectroradiometer ocean color data prevented one of the targets from being
fully achieved, 5 and difficulties with an international partner prevented
the other target, ?Launch the NASA- National Center for Space Studies Jason-
1 mission,? from being achieved.
The NASA Advisory Council provided an independent evaluation of NASA?s
fiscal year 2000 performance and the evaluation was included in the
performance report. Its evaluation of performance related to this outcome
was positive, indicating the failure to launch the Jason- 1 spacecraft as
the most significant shortfall. However, the Council concluded that many of
the performance targets across all of NASA?s Enterprises were too vague and
did not sufficiently relate to the actual programs being implemented. The
Council did not identify which targets it viewed as vague in its report, but
it recommended that the targets be better written and that NASA communicate
to the public the reason the metric or program is important. In response to
the Council?s
5 That target stated that ?Sensor Intercomparison and Merger for Biological
and Interdisciplinary Oceanic Studies (SIMBIOS) will merge Moderate
Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS) ocean color data into global
ocean color time series, which began with Ocean Color Temperature Sensor and
Sea- viewing Wide Field- of- view Sensor (SeaWiFs).? Assessment of NASA?s
Progress and Strategies in Accomplishing Selected Key Outcomes
Scientific Knowledge of the Earth System
Page 6 GAO- 01- 868 NASA's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes
recommendation, NASA added statements to performance targets that explain
why the performance results are meaningful.
Regarding data credibility, NASA disclosed the methods used for verifying
and validating the data and the data sources for each performance target
associated with this outcome in the fiscal year 2000 report. This is an
important step toward providing confidence that performance results are
credible. However, for many performance targets, NASA did not discuss
limitations in the data and steps it would take to correct them. A recent
NASA Office of Inspector General (OIG) report states that beginning with the
fiscal year 2002 final performance plan, NASA will discuss anticipated data
limitations. 6 Also, in some cases, NASA did not clearly address how the
data was validated. For example, the verification and validation narrative
for the performance target, ?Continue the ocean color time with 60 percent
global coverage every four days- a 35 percent improvement over fiscal year
1999,? reads as follows.
?The two- day coverage is required to account for the losses due to the tilt
maneuver of the sensor and interorbit gaps. When clouds are taken into
consideration, the coverage is reduced to 50- 60 percent. The Sea- viewing
Wide Field- of- view Sensor Project has increased the Global Area Coverage
data beyond that expected by eight percent by collecting data to higher
latitudes than planned on all orbits. However, pole- to- pole coverage each
day is not possible since data at low Sun angles are not scientifically
useful for ocean color research. The Moderate Resolution Imaging
Spectroradiometer instrument aboard Terra is beginning to supply additional
data to meet to meet the ocean color requirement.?
For some targets, NASA?s discussions were simply too technical to provide a
good understanding of the approach used to verify and validate the data. For
example, the verification and validation narrative for the performance
target, ?Develop remote- sensing instrument/ technique for ocean surface
salinity measurements from aircraft? is articulated as:
?Salinities in the ocean are typically 33- 32 PSU. In 1998, they got +/- 1
PSU, so the target for a 10x improvement would be 0.1 PSU. Due to pointing
error on the plane L- Band, radiometer accuracy is adversely affected. From
a satellite sensor this error is much reduced. The airborne results coupled
with theoretical studies now show that a monthly average of sea surface
salinity, at a resolution of 1degree latitude x 1 degree longitude can be
produced with an accuracy of <0. 1- 0. 2 PSU, which will meet the target.
Important to this
6 Validation And Verification Of Selected NASA FY 2000 Performance Data
Related To The Government Performance And Results Act (GPRA), (IG- 01- 020,
Mar. 30, 2001).
Page 7 GAO- 01- 868 NASA's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes
analysis is getting the sea surface temperature right, and also getting sea
surface roughness from scatterometers. The monthly data product is suitable
for ocean circulation studies. It will also be possible to produce a weekly
data product, more for meteorological use.?
Regarding its plans for achieving the two unmet targets for this outcome,
NASA established reasonable strategies and time frames. It reported that
progress was significant in one of the performance targets (footnote 5) and
that full achievement of that target, anticipated in fiscal year 2001, is
dependent on the ?availability of valid moderate resolution imaging
spectroradiometer data.? The report noted that the planned delivery of new
processing software in November 2000 was expected to improve data quality to
a level sufficient for an initial merging of SeaWiFs and MODIS oceans
products. Achievement of the other target, ?Launch the NASANational Center
for Space Studies Jason- 1 mission,? is also anticipated in fiscal year
2001.
Lastly, NASA credits the contribution of the other agencies for the
successful achievement of performance targets related to this outcome. For
example, for the achieved target, ?Demonstrate the utility of spaceborne
data for flood plain mapping with the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA),? the report credits FEMA, the Army Corps of Engineers, and NASA for
conducting cooperative demonstration projects to evaluate NASA and
commercially provided digital topographic and image- based information
products to re- map flood plains.
The performance report indicated that the agency made some progress toward
achieving its key outcome of expanding the commercial development of space.
Over half of the performance targets that we assessed for this outcome were
reported as having been met. For example, NASA reported that it achieved its
targets to (1) promote privatization and commercialization of space shuttle
payload operations through the transition of payload management functions by
fiscal year 2000 and (2) establish up to two new commercial space centers.
NASA provided clear and reasonable explanations for targets that were not
met. For example, NASA reported that its performance target to promote
privatization of space shuttle operations and reduce civil service
requirements for operations by 20 percent in fiscal 2000 was not met
following the agency?s decision to hire additional staff to ensure that
safety would not be compromised for space shuttle missions. In August 2000,
we reported that several internal NASA studies had shown that the agency?s
space shuttle Commercial Development
of Space
Page 8 GAO- 01- 868 NASA's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes
program?s workforce had been affected negatively by NASA?s downsizing, much
of which occurred after 1995. 7
NASA reported that its performance target to complete small payload focused
technologies and select concepts for flight demonstration of a reusable
first stage was not met because the agency decided to terminate this
activity once it was clear that the cost objectives could not be met.
Furthermore, the performance targets for the X- 33 and X- 34 programs- which
sought to develop and demonstrate technologies needed for future reusable
spacecraft in partnership with private industry- were not met since they
were not competitively selected for additional funding.
The NASA Advisory Council had concerns about this outcome. In particular,
the Council noted that efforts planned under the new Space Launch Initiative
appear to be elusive, at best. The Council also stated that this highlights
the time- lapse between definition and evaluation of specific (and critical)
performance targets, but the Council did not provide further elaboration.
NASA did not provide strategies and time frames for achieving the unmet
target of pursuing the commercial marketing of space shuttle payloads by
working to allow the space flight operations contractor to target two
reimbursable flights, one in fiscal year 2001 and one in fiscal year 2002.
NASA stated the target remains feasible, but no reimbursable flights in
fiscal 2001 and fiscal year 2002 are planned due to policy limitations
impeding the marketing process. Regarding strategic human capital
management, NASA set one related target to promote privatization of space
shuttle operations and reduce civil service resource requirements for
operations by 20 percent (from the fiscal year 1996 full- time equivalent
levels) in fiscal year 2000. However, this target was not met since NASA had
decided to end its downsizing efforts.
The performance report indicated that NASA?s progress toward achieving the
key outcome of deploying and operating the space station safely and cost-
effectively was limited with respect to achievement of the agency?s planned
performance targets. Since the key outcome is not included in the report as
a specific goal or objective, we based our assessment of it on a
7 Space Shuttle: Human Capital and Safety Upgrade Challenges Require
Continued Attention (GAO/ NSIAD/ GGD- 00- 186, Aug. 15, 2000). International
Space Station
Deployment, Operation, and Cost
Page 9 GAO- 01- 868 NASA's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes
related objective in the report. The related objective is to deploy and
operate the space station to advance scientific, exploration, engineering,
and commercial objectives. All of the performance targets for this objective
are associated with a NASA launch, except one, and none was achieved as
planned for fiscal year 2000. The explanations for not achieving these
targets were reasonable. For the launch- dependent targets, NASA reported
that a schedule slip caused by Russian Proton failures and Service Module
launch delays slowed down the entire space station assembly sequence. This,
in turn, prevented NASA from achieving the launch- dependent targets in
fiscal year 2000. NASA also reported that nonachievement for the one
remaining target, ?Complete the production of the X- 38 first space flight
test article in preparation for a Shuttle test flight in 2001,? was due to
budget reductions. 8 The NASA Advisory Council?s report indicated that the
ISS program had a ?productive year? after the schedule slip caused by the
Russian Proton rocket failures, but it did not provide further elaboration.
In the fiscal year 2000 performance report, NASA identified reports that we
and NASA?s OIG issued in fiscal year 2000 that addressed space station cost
overruns and other issues. From the reports, NASA briefly summarized some of
the concerns and corrective actions it agreed to take in relation to these
issues, including space station cost growth. However, the agency did not set
performance measures that more directly address cost growth, despite drastic
increases in space station costs over the past several years and recent
agency projections of potential cost overruns in excess of $4 billion.
Furthermore, the issue of space station growth has been a long- standing
problem. Although the NASA Advisory Council did not comment on the issue of
cost- control measures for the space station in its evaluation of NASA?s
performance, we continue to believe- as we have reported in the past- that
NASA should develop performance measures that directly address space station
cost- control issues, including risk mitigation and contingency planning
activities. 9
8 The X- 38 is a prototype for a potential U. S. crew return capability from
the International Space Station in case of an emergency. 9 Major Management
Challenges and Program Risks: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(GAO- 01- 258, Jan. 2001)., Observations on the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration?s Fiscal Year 1999 Performance Report and Fiscal Year
2001 Performance Plan (GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 192R, Jun. 30, 2000).
Page 10 GAO- 01- 868 NASA's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes
NASA?s strategies and time frames for achieving the unmet targets were
reasonable. For example, as of April 2001, NASA had launched four of the
missions that were delayed in fiscal year 2000. The other two unachieved
missions are also anticipated for launch in 200l. For the one target that
was affected by budget reductions, ?Complete the production of the X- 38
first space flight test article in preparation for a Shuttle test flight in
2001,? the report stated that it would be achieved in fiscal year 2001. The
shuttle test flight that was planned for September 2001 was extended to mid-
2002.
For the selected key outcomes, this section describes major improvements or
remaining weaknesses in NASA?s fiscal year 2000 performance report in
comparison with its fiscal year 1999 report. It also discusses the degree to
which the agency?s fiscal year 2000 report addresses concerns and
recommendations by the Congress, GAO, NASA?s OIG, and others.
NASA?s portrayal of its verification and validation efforts applicable to
all outcomes is an improvement over the fiscal year 1999 report, and it
provides greater confidence that the performance results are credible. In
our review of NASA?s fiscal year 1999 report, we criticized NASA for not
describing procedures used to verify and validate performance information
and addressing data limitation issues in the data. Unlike the prior year
report, the fiscal year 2000 report provides a description of the methods
used for verifying and validating the data as well as the data sources for
each performance target. However, NASA can further improve the usefulness of
the performance information by highlighting the limitations in the data and
including steps it will take to correct them. This can be done by adding a
separate data limitations narrative for each performance target and by using
terminology such as ?none? where there are no limitations in the performance
data. Additionally, for a few performance targets, the reliability and
validity of the performance information would be strengthened if the related
verification and validation narratives were conveyed in a manner that would
more clearly (1) demonstrate actual validation of the performance and (2)
identify the validation methods. This is particularly true for the Earth
Science Enterprise. This can be done by writing the narratives in a more
convincing tone and in less technical language to enhance understanding of
the validation approach.
NASA?s OIG report commended NASA for a significant improvement in the
reporting of actual performance for fiscal year 2000. The OIG report found
Comparison of
NASA?s Fiscal Year 2000 Performance Report With the Prior Year Report
Comparison of Performance Reports for Fiscal Years 1999 and 2000
Page 11 GAO- 01- 868 NASA's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes
weaknesses in the accuracy and reliability of reported performance for 4 of
23 selected performance targets it reviewed in the fiscal year 2000
performance report. (NASA?s performance report includes a total of 211
performance targets). The OIG report indicated that based on OIG
recommendations, NASA management made the necessary corrections or
clarifications before issuing the fiscal year 2000 report.
For the most part, the performance targets continue to be output measures.
Explanations are added to the performance targets as to why the performance
results are meaningful. Generally, these explanations help to better
understand the linkage between the targets and results. In our review of
NASA?s fiscal year 1999 performance report, we noted that the continued use
of output measures burdens the agency by requiring it to continuously
demonstrate the linkages between program efforts and results and to make
improvements to strengthen such linkages. Moreover, in its evaluation of
NASA?s fiscal year 2000 performance, the NASA Advisory Council asked NASA to
portray its performance in a way that is more understandable to the public.
As previously mentioned, NASA?s fiscal year 2000 report adds explanations of
why the performance results are meaningful. NASA acknowledges that
developing annual outcomerelated performance metrics for multiyear research
and development programs is particularly challenging since these programs
may not be mature enough to deliver outcome results for several years. The
report notes that the stated objectives of programs within the agency are
longterm in character. However, NASA also states in the report that it would
continue to strive to meet the challenge of developing science and
technology metrics that are outcome- oriented and useful in demonstrating
how these outcomes benefit the public.
Lastly, in our review of the fiscal year 1999 report, we suggested that NASA
document in its performance plans and reports the rationale for newly
established performance targets to clarify the reasons for such targets. We
had noted that while many of NASA?s performance targets were new each year,
there was no stated basis for the changes. In its fiscal year 2000 report,
NASA provides the rationale that in many cases, new targets are developed in
response to program changes or as a result of experience gained in the
performance planning process. NASA also includes charts at the end of each
Enterprise and Crosscutting Process section that provide a trend assessment
when a fiscal year 2000 target has a corresponding fiscal year 1999 target.
Newly developed targets that have no corresponding fiscal year 1999 target
to facilitate an assessment are characterized as ?new target.?
Page 12 GAO- 01- 868 NASA's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes
GAO has identified two governmentwide high- risk areas: strategic human
capital management and information security. NASA?s performance report does
not fully explain NASA?s progress in resolving human capital challenges. The
report states that NASA has begun to focus on workforce renewal and
revitalization, but it does not elaborate on strategies for undertaking this
effort or address human capital challenges in other key areas. In addition,
the report does not address the challenge of information security. Doing so
is important for NASA. In 1999, we reported that the agency lacked an
effective agencywide security program and that tests we conducted at one of
NASA?s 10 field centers found that mission- critical information systems
were vulnerable to unauthorized access. 10
In addition, we have identified three major management challenges facing
NASA: (1) correcting contract management weaknesses, (2) controlling
International Space Station costs, and (3) effectively implementing the
faster- better- cheaper approach to space exploration projects. We found
that NASA?s report addresses the problems of contract management and
implementing the faster- better- cheaper approach. With respect to contract
management, it is important to note that until NASA?s Integrated Financial
Management System-- which is central to providing effective management and
oversight over its procurement dollars- is operational, performance
assessments relying on cost data may be incomplete, and full costing will be
only partially implemented.
As we discussed under outcomes, NASA did not address the challenge of
controlling space station costs. As we reported in January 2001, the
International Space Station program continues to face cost- control
challenges. As with contract management, until NASA?s Integrated Financial
Management System is operational, NASA may lack the cost information needed
to control space station costs.
As agreed, our evaluation was generally based on the requirements of GPRA,
the Reports Consolidation Act of 2000, guidance to agencies from the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB) for developing performance plans and reports
(OMB Circular A- 11, Part 2), previous reports and evaluations by us and
others, our knowledge of NASA?s operations and programs, our identification
of best practices concerning performance planning and reporting, and our
observations on NASA?s other GPRA
10 Information Security: Many NASA Mission- Critical Systems Face Serious
Risks
(GAO/ AIMD- 99- 47, May 20, 1999). NASA?s Efforts to
Address its Major Management Challenges Identified by GAO
Scope and Methodology
Page 13 GAO- 01- 868 NASA's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes
related efforts. We also discussed our review with NASA officials and with
NASA?s OIG. The agency outcomes that were used as the basis for our review
were identified by the Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs as important mission areas for NASA and do not reflect
the outcomes for all of NASA?s programs or activities. The major management
challenges confronting NASA, including the governmentwide high- risk areas
of strategic human capital management and information security, were
identified in our January 2001 performance and accountability series and
high risk update, and by NASA?s OIG in December 2000. We did not
independently verify the information contained in the performance report,
although we did draw from other GAO work in assessing the validity,
reliability, and timeliness of NASA?s performance data. We conducted our
review from April 2001 through June 2001 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.
In written comments on a draft of our report, NASA said that it had no
issues with the report. NASA stated that as it develops its next performance
plan, it is looking into the decreased use of output metrics, so as to focus
more on outcomes. NASA also stated that it is reviewing its coverage of such
areas as the International Space Station and information security in the
performance plan. NASA?s comments are reproduced in appendix II.
As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after
the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies to appropriate
congressional committees; the NASA Administrator; and the Director, Office
of Management and Budget. Copies will also be made available to others on
request. Agency Comments
Page 14 GAO- 01- 868 NASA's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes
If you or your staff have any questions, please call me at (202) 512- 4841.
Key contributors to this report were Richard J. Herley, Shirley B. Johnson,
Charles W. Malphurs, Cristina T. Chaplain, John de Ferrari, Diane G.
Handley, and Fannie M. Bivins.
Sincerely yours, Allen Li Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management
Appendix I: Observations on NASA?s Efforts to Address Its Major Management
Challenges
Page 15 GAO- 01- 868 NASA's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes
The following table identifies the major management challenges confronting
NASA, including the governmentwide high- risk areas of strategic human
capital management and information security. The first column of the table
lists the management challenges that we and/ or NASA?s Office of Inspector
General (OIG) have identified. The second column discusses what progress, as
discussed in its fiscal year 2000 performance report, NASA made in resolving
its challenges. We found that NASA?s performance report discusses the
agency?s progress in resolving many of its challenges but does not discuss
progress in resolving the governmentwide challenge of information security.
In addition, the report does not address the major management challenge: The
Need to Control International Space Station Development and Support Costs.
Appendix I: Observations on NASA?s Efforts
to Address Its Major Management Challenges
Appendix I: Observations on NASA?s Efforts to Address Its Major Management
Challenges
Page 16 GAO- 01- 868 NASA's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes
Table 1: Major Management Challenges Major management challenge Progress in
resolving major management challenges as
discussed in the fiscal year 2000 performance report GAO- designated
governmentwide high risk
Strategic Human Capital Management: GAO has identified shortcomings at
multiple agencies involving key elements of modern human capital management,
including strategic human capital planning and organizational alignment;
leadership continuity and succession planning; acquiring and developing
staffs whose size, skills, and deployment meet agency needs; and creating
results- oriented organizational cultures.
In August 2000, we reported that several internal NASA studies had shown
that the agency?s space shuttle program?s workforce had been affected
negatively by NASA?s downsizing, much of which occurred after 1995. We also
reported that NASA had begun taking actions to address its shuttle workforce
problems. a
In January 2001, we also reported the need to implement a human capital
approach in NASA?s workforce management strategies as a major management
challenge. b
The report does not directly address agencywide key elements of modern human
capital management, including strategic human capital planning and
organizational alignment; leadership continuity and succession planning;
acquiring and developing staffs whose size, skills, and deployment meet
agency needs; and creating results- oriented organizational cultures.
The report states that NASA?s performance targets to (1) reduce the civil
service workforce level to below 18,200 and (2) promote privatization of
space shuttle operations and reduce civil service resource requirements for
operations by 20 percent (from the fiscal year 1996 full- time equivalent
levels) in fiscal year 2000 were overtaken by events. In December 1999, NASA
declared an end to downsizing, based on key indicators and recommendations
from the NASA Advisory Council that the agency had gone too far in
downsizing, particularly at the Office of Space Flight Centers. In January
2000, NASA began focusing on workforce renewal and revitalization. NASA?s
full- time equivalent budget ceiling was changed in the fiscal year 2001
congressional budget for fiscal year 2000 to 18, 622. Furthermore, the
report states that NASA achieved its performance target to maintain a
diverse NASA workforce throughout the downsizing efforts. Information
Security: Our January 2001 high- risk update noted that the agencies? and
governmentwide efforts to strengthen information security have gained
momentum and expanded. Nevertheless, recent audits continue to show federal
computer systems are riddled with weaknesses that make them highly
vulnerable to computer- based attacks and place a broad range of critical
operations and assets at risk of fraud, misuse, and disruption.
In 1999, we reported that NASA lacked an effective agencywide security
program that includes improvements in five areas: assessing risks and
evaluating needs, implementing policies and controls, monitoring compliance
with policy and effectiveness of controls, providing computer security
training, and coordinating responses to security incidents. The need for
such a framework was serious; tests we conducted at 1 of NASA?s 10 field
centers found that mission- critical information systems were vulnerable to
unauthorized access. We successfully penetrated several of these systems,
including one responsible for calculating detailed positioning data for
earth orbiting spacecraft and another that processes and distributes
scientific data received from these spacecraft.
The report provides no specifics to judge whether progress has been made in
improving information technology security.
GAO- designated major management challenges
The Need to Correct Weaknesses in NASA?s Contract Management: We have
reported that NASA?s contract management is a continuing area of high risk.
Implementation
The report states (1) NASA failed to meet its target to begin the
implementation of the Integrated Financial Management System at NASA
installations; and (2) extended system testing demonstrated
Appendix I: Observations on NASA?s Efforts to Address Its Major Management
Challenges
Page 17 GAO- 01- 868 NASA's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes
Major management challenge Progress in resolving major management challenges
as discussed in the fiscal year 2000 performance report
of the financial management system and its integration with full cost
accounting have been delayed. Until the Integrated Financial Management
System is operational, performance assessments relying on cost data may be
incomplete. We have also reported that NASA is continuing to rely on
undefinitized change orders- that is, contract changes initiating new work
before NASA and the contractor agree on a final estimated cost and fee- to
complete work on its largest space station contract. We stated that this is
a risky way of doing business because it increases the potential for
unforeseen cost increases and scheduling delays.
that the software was not ready for deployment and would not meet NASA?s
needs, so NASA terminated the contract. NASA then reformulated the program,
breaking implementation into individual software modules and recently
selected a contractor for the Core Financial System (CFS). The report states
NASA will begin the CFS Agency Design Phase in fiscal year 2001, complete
pilot center activities in fiscal year 2002, and implement the system at the
remaining centers in fiscal year 2003.
The Need to Control International Space Station (ISS) Development and
Support Costs: We have reported that the ISS program continues to face cost-
control challenges. c NASA?s OIG also reported that the ISS program
continued to experience cost overruns and scheduling delays.
The report does not directly address the ISS cost control issue and contain
performance measures that address ISS cost control issues. This challenge is
discussed in detail in the outcomes section of this report.
The Need to Effectively Implement the Faster- Better- Cheaper Approach to
Space Exploration Projects: We have reported that NASA faces significant
challenges as it attempts to create highly reliable missions and foster open
communications under the budget constraints of the agency?s faster- better-
cheaper space exploration strategy. In addition, real success will require a
comprehensive integration of lessons learned from failures on an agencywide
basis. Until NASA resolves these problems, its financial resources are
vulnerable to inefficient use.
This was designated as a new major management challenge in January 2001.
The report states NASA failed to achieve its performance target for the Mars
Climate Orbiter. The spacecraft was lost during orbit insertion in fiscal
year 1999. The report states NASA failed to achieve its performance target
to successfully land the Mars Polar Lander (MPL) on Mars in December 1999
and to operate its science instruments for the 80- day prime mission with at
least 75 percent of planned science data returned. However, related to this
management challenge, the report states (1) NASA achieved its performance
target to release an announcement of opportunity (AO) for the next Discovery
mission; (2) NASA?s Discovery program of lower- cost, highly focused
scientific spacecraft represents the implementation of NASA?s vision of
planetary missions that are ?faster, better, cheaper;? and (3) three highly
successful discovery spacecraft have completed their missions. The report
also states that NASA failed to achieve its performance target to capture a
set of ?best practices/ lessons learned? from each program. However, the
report states that NASA expects all programs will provide lessons learned in
fiscal year 2001.
OIG- designated major management challenges
Safety and Mission Assurance: NASA?s OIG has reported that safety and
mission assurance has become a serious challenge for NASA. Key
considerations to ensure safety in future NASA operations include (1)
ensuring an appropriate level of training for staff who conduct safety
reviews and evaluations; (2) maintaining adequate safety reporting systems;
(3) ensuring variances to standard safety procedures are appropriately
justified, reviewed, and approved; (4) maintaining an effective emergency
preparedness program; (5) ensuring NASA and contractor compliance with
safety standards and regulations; (6) ensuring product safety and
reliability; and (7) ensuring the space shuttle and the ISS maintain crew
safety.
The report discusses several safety- related targets. The report states that
NASA set a target for ontime successful space shuttle launches, but NASA
management concluded that the indicator might compromise safety; failed to
achieve its performance target to have in place an aggressive shuttle
program that ensures the availability of a safe and reliable shuttle system;
decided to hire additional staff to ensure that safety would not be
compromised for space shuttle missions; and did not achieve its performance
target to flight- demonstrate a conceptual aircraft flight deck integrated
with evolving ground- based runway incursion avoidance technologies
installed at a major airport. The report also states NASA achieved its
performance targets to (1) achieve seven or fewer flight anomalies on
average for missions flown and (2) (a) develop medical protocols and test
the capability of the Crew Health Care System; (b) evaluate and develop for
flight testing a minimum of three major research protocols intended to
protect bone, muscle, and physical work capacity and prepare a minimum of 10
biomedical research experiments to study human responses
Appendix I: Observations on NASA?s Efforts to Address Its Major Management
Challenges
Page 18 GAO- 01- 868 NASA's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes
Major management challenge Progress in resolving major management challenges
as discussed in the fiscal year 2000 performance report
to the gravitational environment; (c) complete the first phase of the
Advanced Life Support System Integration Test Bed facility; (d) provide
training to the appropriate NASA supervisors to prevent injury and illness
on- the- job, increase employee participation in the wellness program by at
least 25 percent over the fiscal year 1997 baseline and achieve a 10-
percent reduction in workers? compensation claims over the fiscal year 1998
baseline; and (e) reduce the number of lost workdays by 5 percent from the
fiscal year 1994- 96 3- year average. Furthermore, the NASA Advisory Council
states management needs to focus attention on the Shuttle Safety Upgrades
Program until it is properly defined and proper cost estimates are
developed. International Space Station: NASA?s OIG has reported that the ISS
is a significant management challenge due to significant problems related to
ISS cost, contingency planning, and the X38/ Crew Return Vehicle. Key
considerations for continued ISS assembly and operation are (1) managing the
political, financial, technical, and safety challenges presented by an
international partnership; (2) overcoming technical challenges inherent in
manufacturing, assembling, and testing complex hardware and software
components provided by different nations and integrated in space; (3) safely
maintaining, upgrading, and operating a structure as complicated as the
space station; and (4) maximizing the beneficial use of the space station
for scientific research and technology development.
NASA OIG?s description of the ISS major management challenge is more broadly
focused than our related management challenge. (See discussion under GAO-
designated major management challenge, the need to control ISS development
and support costs.) The report states that NASA made excellent progress on
its objective to deploy and operate the ISS to advance scientific,
exploration, engineering, and commercial objectives and that more than 90
percent of the prime contractor?s development work has been completed. The
report states several ongoing issues continued to constrain the ISS program
and prevent achievement of the fiscal year 2000 performance targets such as
deploying and activating the U. S. Laboratory Module to provide a permanent
on orbit laboratory capability, the Canadian- built space station remote
manipulator system, and the Airlock to provide an ISS- based extravehicle
activity capability. Others include (1) conducting operations with a three-
person human presence on the ISS; (2) delivering to orbit the first of three
Italian built multi- purpose logistics modules; (3) completing preparations
for the initial ISS research capability through the integration of the first
rack of the human research facility; and (4) completing the production of
the X- 38 first space flight test in preparation for a shuttle test flight
in 2001. The Russian Proton failures and Service Module launch schedule
delayed the entire assembly sequence into fiscal year 2001. The report
states: (1) outyear propulsion ISS contingency planning included plans to
augment Russian and logistics capabilities with the space shuttle and
development of a permanent U. S. propulsion module and (2) a new design
approach has been selected, and a formal decision to proceed will be
reviewed in the spring of 2001. The report briefly addresses concerns
related to space station cost overruns by listing GAO and NASA OIG reports
issued in fiscal year 2000. Information Technology: NASA?s OIG has reported
that information technology has become a serious challenge for NASA. Key
considerations for an effective information technology program include (1)
ensuring data security, integrity, and application controls; (2) protecting
operations and communications with spacecraft; and (3) monitoring and
evaluating the streamlining of operations through outsourcing information
technology operations for cost efficiencies, dependency on the vendor for
technological direction, vulnerability of strategic information to
outsiders, and
The report states that NASA met all agency IT customer satisfaction and cost
performance targets in fiscal year 2000 and improved performance of
agencywide IT support while maintaining customer ratings of ?satisfied? to
?very satisfied.?
Appendix I: Observations on NASA?s Efforts to Address Its Major Management
Challenges
Page 19 GAO- 01- 868 NASA's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes
Major management challenge Progress in resolving major management challenges
as discussed in the fiscal year 2000 performance report
dependency on the viability of the vendor. NASA?s OIG reported that during
fiscal year 2000 NASA continued to have a fragmented information technology
(IT) security program without clear lines of authority, policies,
guidelines, or enforcement. The OIG reported that audits of several mission
critical information systems disclosed that NASA had not implemented
adequate basic controls in areas such as system access, protection of
critical files, system backup and restore procedures, privileged operations
controls, and system audit and monitoring capabilities.
(See discussion under governmentwide high- risk challenge: information
security for additional details.) Procurement: NASA?s OIG has reported that
procurement is an ongoing challenge for NASA. Key considerations for
effective procurement at NASA include (1) ensuring proper levels of staffing
to perform contracting requirements; (2) providing sufficient controls over
and monitoring both prime and subcontractors; (3) implementing or increasing
the use of innovative procurement procedures such as earned value management
and performance incentive fees; and (4) ensuring costs billed to NASA cost-
type contracts, due to the changing industry environment, are reasonable and
allowable.
The report states that NASA failed to meet its target to begin the
implementation of the Integrated Financial Management System at NASA
installations following the completion of system testing. The report states
that NASA achieved its performance targets of having funds available for
performance based contracts (PBC), maintaining PBC obligations at 80
percent; achieving at least the congressionally mandated 8- percent goal for
annual funding to small disadvantaged businesses; and competitively awarding
80 percent or more of the available research resources in these programs
based on peer review for selecting and funding/ conducting research and
analysis and core technology projects, the Space Science Enterprise, the
Earth Science Enterprise and the Life and Microgravity Science and
Applications program. However, the report does not directly address (1)
ensuring proper levels of staffing to perform contracting requirements; (2)
providing sufficient controls over and monitoring of both prime and
subcontractors; (3) implementing or increasing the use of innovative
procurement procedures such as earned value management and performance
incentive fees; and (4) ensuring costs billed to NASA cost- type contracts,
due to the changing industry environment, are reasonable and allowable.
However, the report lists and describes fiscal year 2000 GAO and NASA OIG
reports that identify ISS concerns related to prime contract changes and
contractor cost overruns and cost control. Furthermore, the report states
that NASA?s management is in general agreement with these reports. Fiscal
Management: NASA?s OIG has reported that fiscal management continues to be a
significant challenge for NASA. Key considerations to improved fiscal
management include: (1) monitoring contractor performance of financial
statement audits to ensure that the statements are properly prepared and
thoroughly reviewed; (2) ensuring adequate integration and testing of newly
developed automated accounting modules or capability; and (3) ensuring that
NASA continues to properly account for and record financial transactions as
new capability is implemented.
The report states that NASA achieved its performance target to cost 70
percent or more of available resources by using NASA?s Financial and
Contractual Status (FACS) reports. However, at the same time, NASA failed to
meet its target of implementing the Integrated Financial Management System
at NASA installations. This system is key to producing accurate and reliable
information for full- cost accounting. Until the system is operational,
performance assessments relying on cost data may be incomplete and full
costing will be only partially implemented. Measuring costs is key to
measuring performance in terms of efficiency and costeffectiveness. The lack
of relevant and reliable cost information affects NASA?s ability to make
economic choices, and to estimate and control cost increases.
Appendix I: Observations on NASA?s Efforts to Address Its Major Management
Challenges
Page 20 GAO- 01- 868 NASA's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes
Major management challenge Progress in resolving major management challenges
as discussed in the fiscal year 2000 performance report
Program and Project Management: NASA?s OIG has reported that NASA faces
significant challenges in program and project management. Key considerations
to effectively managing NASA programs include (1) improving planning to
enable NASA to accomplish its missions in the face of budget and human
capital issues; (2) eliminating duplication in programs and improving
coordination with other research and development organizations; (3) ensuring
that programs and projects accurately assess their progress and successfully
achieve their goals; and (4) effectively using technology developments to
increase NASA productivity.
The report states NASA failed to achieve its performance target to meet
schedule and cost commitments by keeping the development and upgrade of
major scientific facilities and capital assets within 110 percent of cost
and schedule estimates, on average, and capture a set of ?best practices/
lessons learned? from each program. This element materially affects the
improvement of NASA?s program/ project management. The report also states
that NASA achieved its performance target to dedicate the percentage of
NASA?s budget that is established in the fiscal year 1999 process to
commercial partnerships. The percentage of NASA?s research and development
budget dedicated to commercial partnerships affects integrated technology
planning and development with NASA partners. According to the report, NASA
achieved its performance target to increase the amount of leveraging of the
technology budget with activities of other organizations, relative to the
fiscal year 1999 baseline that is established during the process
development, and two of the three performance targets for objective 2 (Plan
and set priorities) of the Generate Knowledge Crosscutting Process. Launch
Vehicles: NASA?s OIG reported on challenges in (1) ensuring the availability
of small expendable launch vehicles to ensure schedule milestones and cost-
effectiveness of NASA missions; (2) evaluating whether NASA is providing the
majority of developmental funds and assigning technology rights to its
industry partners in the development of the new reusable launch vehicles in
the best interest of the government; and (3) ensuring that plans are in
place and are effectively implemented to address shuttle systems
obsolescence, logistics support, technical/ safety upgrades, and funding.
Although we did not identify the X- 33 advanced technology demonstrator as a
major management challenge, we have reported and testified that the program
must overcome key technological challenges before the development of launch
vehicles. d
The report states that the X- 33 and X- 34 advanced technology demonstrators
are part of NASA?s ongoing efforts to pave the way for commercial
development of reusable launch vehicles that will dramatically reduce cost
and increase the reliability of space transportation. NASA states that it
failed to achieve its performance target to conduct the flight testing of
the X- 33 vehicle. The report acknowledges the X- 33 project experienced a
significant setback as a result of the X- 33 hydrogen tank failure in
November 1999. NASA did not achieve its performance target to complete
vehicle assembly and begin the flight test of the second X- 34 vehicle. NASA
does not explain how it determined how much funding and what data rights to
give to its industry partners in the X- 33 and X- 34 programs. Thus, it is
difficult to assess the extent cost- effectiveness was achieved. However,
the report states that NASA determined if additional government funds were
to be provided for the programs, these programs would be subject to a
competitive proposal process. The selection process did not result in either
program being selected for additional government funding. Technology
Development: NASA?s OIG has reported that technology development has become
a serious challenge for NASA. Key considerations to effective technology
development include (1) achieving a balance between scientific research and
technology development and demonstration projects; (2) continuing to refine
the technology transfer process to ensure that U. S. industry achieves the
maximum benefit from the new technologies identified; (3) determining if
NASA?s organizational structure effectively supports technology development
and transfer; (4) forming innovative partnership arrangements with U. S.
industry to share both the risk and costs of technology demonstration and
commercialization; (5) ensuring that NASA technology demonstrations do not
unfairly distort the marketplace; (6) ensuring that adequate controls exist
on cooperative technology development programs; and (7) ensuring adequate
protection of NASA- developed technology.
The report states NASA (1) met the three performance targets for the earth
science objective to develop and transfer advanced remote- sensing
technologies; (2) achieved its performance target to complete the
development and initiate the implementation of a comprehensive technology
investment strategy to support future human exploration; (3) did not achieve
its performance target for the objective to invest in enabling high-
leverage exploration technologies; (4) failed to achieve its performance
target to complete and deliver a technology development plan for the
Terrestrial Planet Finder mission by June 2000; (5) did not achieve two of
the three performance targets for the space science enterprise objective to
develop innovative technologies for enterprise missions and for external
customers; and (6) met or exceeded 8 of the 16 targets to measure progress
toward the 10 specific objectives of the aerospace technology enterprise.
Three targets were not fully accomplished, but they are projected to be
Appendix I: Observations on NASA?s Efforts to Address Its Major Management
Challenges
Page 21 GAO- 01- 868 NASA's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes
Major management challenge Progress in resolving major management challenges
as discussed in the fiscal year 2000 performance report
met during fiscal year 2001; the remaining five targets not achieved
involved recovery plans with projected completion beyond fiscal year 2001.
The report also states NASA (1) did not achieve the one performance target
for the objective to capture and preserve engineering and technological
process knowledge to continuously improve NASA?s program/ project
management; (2) achieved the two performance targets for the objective to
focus on integrated technology planning and development in cooperation with
commercial industry and other NASA partners and customers; and (3) achieved
its performance target to increase new opportunities to transfer technology
to private industry from 19, 600 to 19,800. International Agreements: NASA?s
OIG reported that international agreements are needed to ensure effective
and efficient programs. Key considerations include (1) program and project
vulnerability to schedule delays and cost overruns that require diplomatic
rather than contractual solutions; (2) security controls on technology that
impacts national security; (3) controls to assure the quality and timeliness
of the goods and services provided; (4) mechanisms to assure a balance
between program needs and national considerations; (5) plans with specific
critical paths and planned alternative courses of action to maintain
program/ project continuity; and (6) proper controls over access to NASA
facilities by foreign national visitors.
Although we did not identify this issue as a major management challenge, in
November 1999, we recommended measures to enhance NASA?s ability to oversee
and implement its export controls of ISS- related technologies. e
The report states (1) in fiscal year 2000, NASA and its international
partners passed a major test in the assembly of the ISS; (2) the STS- 99 was
the Shuttle Radar Topography Mission, which was part of an international
project spearheaded by the National Imagery and Mapping Agency and NASA,
with participation from the German Aerospace Center; (3) NASA Medical
Informatics and Technology Applications Consortium has established a
memorandum of understanding in telemedicine with MEDES, a French research
consortium, which has laid the groundwork for the development of an
international telemedicine program; (4) NASA and the Canadian Space Agency
signed an agreement for basic imaging coverage plus additional
interferometric mapping; (5) NASA supports both American and international
scientific teams that examine Earth and its environment and foster dialogs
among researchers that conduct sound scientific research and explore new
scientific frontiers; and (6) the Rosetta project delivered the electrical
qualification models for the four U. S.- provided instruments to the
European Space Agency in May 2000 for integration with the Rosetta Orbiter.
The report states NASA achieved other performance targets associated with
making significant contributions to international scientific assessments and
cooperation, including: providing the first global, regional, and country-
by- country forest cover inventory in support of national and international
needs of research, operational, and policy communities; and launching three
spacecraft and delivering two instruments for international launches within
10 percent of budget on average. However, NASA failed to achieve its target
of conducting the first regional international assessment in South Africa to
quantify the effects of climate variability and management practices on the
environment.
Appendix I: Observations on NASA?s Efforts to Address Its Major Management
Challenges
Page 22 GAO- 01- 868 NASA's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes
Major management challenge Progress in resolving major management challenges
as discussed in the fiscal year 2000 performance report
Environmental Management: NASA?s OIG reported that environmental management
is a significant management challenge. Key considerations include: (1)
prioritizing and addressing environmental obligations; (2) developing
consistent procedures under an agencywide policy; and (3) negotiating cost-
sharing agreements for environmental cleanup with previous government and
private sector tenants that are also responsible parties.
The report states that NASA significantly exceeded its performance target to
demonstrate, in a laboratory combustion experiment, an advanced turbine-
engine combustor concept that will achieve up to a 70- percent reduction of
oxides of nitrogen emissions based on the 1996 International Civil Aviation
Organization standard and achieved its performance target to validate the
technologies to reduce noise for large commercial transports by at least 7
decibels relative to 1992 production technology. However, the report does
not address three key management actions: (1) ranking and addressing
liabilities; (2) developing consistent procedures under NASA policy; and (3)
negotiating cost- sharing agreements for environmental cleanup with previous
government and private sector tenants that are also responsible parties. a
Space Shuttle: Human Capital and Safety Upgrade Challenges Require Continued
Attention
(GAO/ NSIAD/ GGD- 00- 186, Aug. 15, 2000). b Major Management Challenges and
Program Risks: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(GAO- 01- 258, Jan. 2001). c GAO- 01- 258, Jan. 2001.
d Space Transporation: Status of the X- 33 Reusable Launch Vehicle Program
(GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 176, Aug. 11, 1999); Space Transportation: Progress of the
X- 33 Reusable Launch Vehicle Program (GAO/ T- NSIAD- 99- 243, Sept. 29,
1999); and Space Transportation: Critical Areas NASA Needs to Address in
Managing Its Reusable Launch Vehicle Program (GAO- 01- 826T, Jun. 20, 2001).
e Export Controls: International Space Station Technology Transfers (GAO/
NSIAD- 00- 14, Nov. 3,
1999).
Appendix II: Comments From the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Page 23 GAO- 01- 868 NASA's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes
Appendix II: Comments From the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(120038)
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