DATE: 15 SEP 98

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND

 

OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT (ORD) II

 

AFSPC 002-93-II

 

FOR

 

THE EVOLVED EXPENDABLE LAUNCH VEHICLE (EELV) SYSTEM

 

 

 

 

 

\\SIGNED\\

RICHARD B. MEYERS

General, USAF

Commander

 

 

 

 

ACAT Level I

 

 

OPR: AFSPC/DRSV

PHONE: (719) 554-2577

DSN: 692-2577

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

 

SECTION PAGE

1. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY 1

1.1 Mission Area Description 1

1.1.1 Spacelift Mission.. 1

1.1.2 Expendable Spacelift Requirements Background 1

1.1.3 Key Performance Parameters. 3

1.2 Mission Need 3

1.2.1 Assured Access to Space. 3

1.2.2 Competition and Achieving Access to Space 3

1.2.3 Spacelift Mission Needs Statement (MNS) (AFSPC 002-93). 3

2. THREAT 5

2.1 Threat Overview. 5

2.2 Other Threats Identified for Spacelift Systems. 5

2.2.1 Espionage: 5

2.2.2 Sabotage: 5

2.2.3 Electronic Warfare: 5

2.2.4 Nuclear Forces: 5

2.2.5 Economic Threats: 5

3. SHORTCOMINGS OF EXISTING SYSTEMS 6

4. CAPABILITIES REQUIRED 7

4.1 Performance 7

4.1.1 Mass to Orbit. 8

4.1.2 Vehicle Design Reliability 9

4.1.3 Mission Reliability 9

4.1.4 Standardization 9

4.1.5 Infrastructure 10

4.1.6 Payload Interfaces 10

4.1.7 Cost 11

4.1.8 Timeliness (Schedule Dependability) 11

4.1.9 Responsiveness (Call-up) 11

4.1.10 Launch Rate (Basic) 11

4.2 Logistics and Readiness 12

4.2.1 Supportability/Maintainability 12

4.2.2 Technical Data 13

4.2.3 System Data 13

4.2.4 Range Interfaces. 13

4.2.5 Personnel and Training 13

4.3 Other System Characteristics 14

4.3.1 Safety Requirements 14

4.3.2 System Security 14

4.3.3 Orbital Debris 14

4.3.4 Environmental Constraints 15

4.3.5 Transition Operations 15

5. PROGRAM SUPPORT 16

5.1 Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) 16

5.2 Support Equipment 16

5.2.1 Practices. 16

5.3 Computer Resources 16

5.4 Other Logistics Considerations 16

5.4.1 Supply Support. 16

5.4.2 Technical Data 16

5.5 Infrastructure Support and Interoperability 17

5.5.1 Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence 17

5.6 Basing and Mobility 17

5.6.1 Basing. 17

5.6.2 Mobility 17

5.7 Standardization, Interoperability, and Commonality 17

5.7.1 Standardization 17

5.7.2 Interoperability 17

5.7.3 Commonality 17

5.8 Geospatial Information and Services (GI&S) Support 18

5.9 (Environmental) Weather Support 18

5.10 Joint Services and Multinational Applicability 18

6. FORCE STRUCTURE 19

6.1 Launch Services 19

6.2 Personnel 19

7. SCHEDULE CONSIDERATIONS 20

7.1 Spacelift Mission Schedule 20

7.1.1 Test Flights 20

7.2 Initial Operational Capability (IOC) 20

7.2.1 IOC Events 20

7.2.2 Medium Vehicle IOC 20

7.2.3 Heavy Vehicle IOC 20

7.3 Full Operational Capability (FOC) 20

DEFINITION OF TERMS 21

ACRONYMS and ABBREVIATIONS 234

 

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE PAGE

Table 1. Government Portion Reference Missions 7

TablE 2. Consolidated Government Portion Reference Missions 8

Table 3. REQUIREMENTS D-2

TablE 4. LAUNCH RATES D-11

 

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE PAGE

FIGURE 1. PAYLOAD INTERFACE 10

FIGURE 2. TOTAL MASS PERFORMANCE RELATIONSHIPS D-3 FIGURE 3. GOVERNMENT ORBITS D-4 FIGURE 4. MISSION DESIGN RELIABILITY METHODOLOGY D-5 FIGURE 5. RELIABILITY GOAL D-6 FIGURE 6. STANDARDIZATION GOAL D-7 FIGURE 7. SATELLITE GROUND PROCESSING TIMES D-9 FIGURE 8. RESPONSIVENESS TIMELINES D-10

FIGURE 9. LAUNCH RATE RELATIONSHIPS D-10

FIGURE 10. EELV REQUIREMENTS DERIVED FROM NSRP FUNCTIONAL NEEDS D-13

 

APPENDICES

PAGE

Appendix A: Requirements Correlation Matrix - Part I A-1

Appendix B: Requirements Correlation Matrix - Part II B-1

Appendix C: Requirements Correlation Matrix - Part III C-1

Appendix D: Requirements Methodology D-1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT (ORD)

AFSPC 002-93-II

FOR

THE EVOLVED EXPENDABLE LAUNCH VEHICLE (EELV) SYSTEM

 

1. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY

EELV Objective

As a nation, we are going to invest with industry to significantly reduce the cost of launch. We want to launch the payloads manifested in the National Mission Model (NMM) safely and effectively. We want to develop a family of vehicles that is technically achievable and costs 25% less (threshold) than current systems with an objective of 50% reduction in the cost of spacelift. We want to partner with industry to develop a standard payload interface, standard launch pads, and infrastructure to launch all the configurations of EELV. The system must launch responsively in accordance with long range, deliberative, and reactive planning. These are the basic requirements for EELV.

Mission Area Description

1.1.1 Spacelift Mission.

The mission of spacelift is to deliver payloads to the desired orbit with high reliability. The spacelift system must provide quality system performance to the required orbit while at the same time meeting designated thresholds and striving to meet the stated objectives.

1.1.2 Expendable Spacelift Requirements Background.

Space is becoming more critical in an information-dominated world. The United States Government needs the assured capability to routinely deploy payloads and replenish expiring satellites on-orbit to meet peace and wartime requirements in a very predictable timeframe. Without this capability on a day-to-day basis, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Space Command (CINCSPACE) cannot assure the combatant commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) will be supported in crisis or war with space based assets. At the same time, the nation needs to lower the annual cost of spacelift to make it more affordable within a declining federal budget environment and to enhance the U.S. industry's competitive position in the face of growing international competition. Consistent with the trend to streamline and reform acquisition, Department of Defense (DoD) is looking for the EELV program to manage risk, apply process controls from other industries to spacelift, move to insight and reviews while replacing them with processes where quality is designed in, and finally to build a strong partnership with industry. The following chronology demonstrates the nation's commitment to making the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle a reality. In the fall of 1993, Congress directed the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) to develop a plan to address national space launch requirements as part of the FY94 budget deliberations. The SECDEF then designated the Air Force as lead on this study and identified the Vice Commander of Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) to perform the study. The study led to the Space Launch Modernization Plan (SLMP) which was completed in May 94. As a result, the Air Force began the budgeting process to fund Option 2 (see para 1.1.1.1) of the SLMP in the FY96 POM process. Concurrently, Congress directed funding of an evolved family of launch vehicles in the FY95 budget deliberations but required a report to Congress on program strategy before funds release. In August 1994, Presidential Decision Directive on the National Space Transportation Policy (PDD/NSTC-4) tasked the SECDEF to provide a policy implementation plan that includes improvements and evolution of the current U.S. Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV) fleet. The directive also tasked the Secretaries of Defense, Commerce (DoC), and Transportation (DoT), and the Administrator of NASA, in coordination with the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), to prepare reports on a set of common requirements and a coordinated technology plan for space launch. PBD-172 to the FY96 budget established the initial funding line for the EELV program. The DoD Implementation Plan was signed and transmitted to the Administration in Nov 94. Following this, the Acquisition Decision Memorandum (signed 15 May 95) established the acquisition strategy. As required, the report to Congress explaining program strategy was released 17 Jun 95. This led to four Low Cost Concept Validation contracts being awarded 24 Aug 95. In Aug 97, HQ AFSPC/DO conducted an EELV stakeholders meeting that led to an updated Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for the EELV system where the government will procure a launch service instead of a hardware approach to spacelift. The CONOPS was approved on 31 Oct 97 and endorsed by all EELV stakeholders. The CONOPS change and projected growth in the commercial market led to a change in acquisition strategy that was officially approved by DUSD(A&T) on 3 Nov 97. Another result of this process was the creation of an interagency panel that has become known as the National Spacelift Requirements Process (NSRP) working group. The common requirements developed from this national forum represents a national consensus and are incorporated in the National Spacelift Requirements Document. This ORD specifically addresses Government ELV requirements and represents an evolutionary approach to meeting the nations expendable spacelift needs.

1.1.2.1 Space Launch Modernization Plan.

The basic tenets of Option 2 in the SLMP report were to: (1) fly out currently contracted ELVs; (2) consolidate medium/heavy launch families by evolving through modifications to the existing launch vehicle or application of major subsystems in order to meet payload block transition opportunities; and (3) maintain the Shuttle for human spaceflight.

1.1.2.2 DoD Implementation Plan for National Space Transportation Policy.

The Director, Strategic and Space Systems requested the Air Force to take the lead in producing an implementation plan in response to the President's National Space Transportation Policy. The DoD plan is the product of an interagency working group with representation from NASA, DoT, DoC, and the DCI. Consistent with the National Space Transportation Policy and Option 2 in the SLMP report, the implementation strategy calls for maintaining the current Medium Launch Vehicle (MLV) and Heavy Launch Vehicle (HLV) expendable vehicles and infrastructure of the U.S. ELV fleet until cost effective alternatives are available. The DoD strategy proposes to immediately begin a program to develop a cost effective alternative to current MLV and HLV spacelift vehicles that can meet payload transition opportunities in 2002 -2005 .

1.1.3 Key Performance Parameters.

The key performance parameters (KPP) are: seven consolidated DoD mass to orbit parameters; vehicle design reliability; standard launch pads; and standard payload interfaces. EELV must be able to launch the mass to orbit of the missions listed in the Government portion of the National Mission Model*(NMM). Vehicle design reliability is the component of mission reliability that includes the vehicle, staging events, and other elements; the threshold is 98%. Launch pads must be able to process and launch all configurations of EELV from that site and the system must provide a standard interface for each vehicle class.

* Note: The Government portion of the National Mission Model is made up of: the DoD portion which includes medium and heavy missions launched by Air Force Space Command to include missions identified for AFSPC, Air Force Material Command, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, Other DoD, and Support (National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)); and the Civil portion which includes medium missions launched for NASA and NOAA.

1.2 Mission Need.

1.2.1 Assured Access to Space.

Current National, DoD, and Air Force Space Command policies identify "assured access to space" as the need to assure the availability of critical space capabilities for executing space missions regardless of failures of single elements of the space force structure. This is a key concept supporting National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, and Air Force Doctrine. These policies indicate that assured mission capability for critical space systems can only be achieved through assured access to space, robust satellite control, on-orbit sparing, proliferation, and reconstitution. Currently, our assured access to space is expensive and costs are likely to increase. Therefore, the new operational need is to maintain a robust, modern space capability at a reasonable cost to launch satellites responsively to meet warfighter, National Command Authority, and other national security mission needs.

1.2.2 Competition and Achieving Access to Space.

During the Pre-Engineering and Manufacturing Development Phase, a reassessment of basic program assumptions suggested that sufficient commercial markets existed to support at least two expendable launch vehicle providers. Given this and other considerations, it was determined that a key aspect of ensuring access to space, was to support at least two launch service providers and leverage the competition in the commercial market to reduce costs.

1.2.3 Spacelift Mission Needs Statement (MNS) (AFSPC 002-93).

The present MNS for Spacelift forms the foundation for this requirements document. The Spacelift MNS identifies that without a modern and affordable spacelift capability, we will be unable to meet national security launch requirements and will be incapable of adequately supporting on-orbit forces. The basic tenets contained in the MNS include:

Capable of deploying a broad range of spacecraft, including multiple spacecraft (if required), to intended mission orbits.

Provide a spacelift design and an operations process that are supportable, maintainable, and able to meet schedule demands.

Successfully meet spacecraft mission assurance requirements and deliver spacecraft to intended mission orbits without inducing failures.

Operate at significantly lower per mission and life cycle costs than the current systems.

Provide the ability to quickly and dependably respond to changing missions. Responsiveness to support increased launch rates that may be needed to recover from spacecraft or launch vehicle failures, or to respond to increased on-orbit needs for crisis response or reconstitution, must be incorporated into baseline capabilities.

 

2. THREAT

2.1 Threat Overview.

No unique security or threat issues have been identified for EELV. The EELV is not envisioned to operate from other than secure areas within the continental United States (CONUS). There are, however, threats common to all spacelift systems: information warfare attacks that can disrupt or degrade launch activity; and physical threats to the launch vehicle and its support facilities during times of crisis, increased tension or war. A general overview of these threats can be found in the Space Systems Threat Environment Description (TED), National Air Intelligence Center (NAIC)-1574-0727-98, Nov 97; and Information Warfare Threat to Automated Information Systems TED NAIC-1574-0210-97, Apr 97. In addition, some EELV payloads may be viable military targets. Threats to these are addressed in the respective System Threat Assessment Report for the payload system.

2.2 Other Threats Identified for Spacelift Systems.

By 2020, a small threat to ballistic missiles in the boost phase may exist.

2.2.1 Espionage.

Information collection efforts targeting national security spacecraft, and/or spacelift technologies, manufacturing processes, logistical networks and operations.

2.2.2 Sabotage.

Physical threats to the launch vehicle, spacecraft and fuels to include threats against production, transportation, assembly/mate, checkout, software, command and control and launch facilities.

2.2.3 Electronic Warfare.

Potential threats to spacelift system communication links and relays including "command destruct" links, launch command and control nets, and world wide communication, telemetry collection and tracking networks.

2.2.4 Nuclear Forces.

The threat to spacelift from nuclear forces is very low and operational capability in a nuclear environment is not required.

2.2.5 Economic Threats.

Some foreign commercial launch providers are more heavily subsidized by their country's governments and are able to offer considerably lower prices than U.S. launch providers. Although some international launch trade agreements are in place, these providers are still able to underprice U.S companies and win competitive bids. These unfair pricing practices pose a threat to U.S. commercial space launch operators' ability to capture market share.

 

 

 

 

3. SHORTCOMINGS OF EXISTING SYSTEMS

The current fleet of launch vehicles will continue to operate beyond the turn of the century. However, continued production, operation, and maintenance of these vehicles are cost ineffective for two reasons: (1) escalating expenses associated with inefficient launch systems and their extensive infrastructure, and (2) outdated technologies, designs, and manufacturing techniques. Current launch systems operate with performance margins approaching zero. Additional performance capability is required to create a robust operable system. Current national spacelift facilities, processes, vehicles, procedures and supporting infrastructure are not standardized, making each mission a unique event. Planned replacement of the current fleet of launch vehicles must begin now if the necessary technologies and system concepts are to be available early in the next century to support the needed modernization and improvements to the nation's launch capabilities.

The inefficiencies listed above limit the capacity of United States commercial space launch providers in providing competitive services in the international commercial space launch market. Inability to compete effectively with foreign launch suppliers suggests that recurring costs will continue to rise. This is compounded by the "over-capacity" of existing U.S. stovepiped launch suppliers due to their reduced production and launch rates. All this strongly suggests that consolidation into a single family of medium to heavy lift vehicles per contractor is the right competitive and operational answer for the future.

4. CAPABILITIES REQUIRED

EELV shall meet the thresholds for key performance parameters (denoted by *) while striving to meet the thresholds and objectives for all other requirements.

4.1 Performance.

The mission masses and required orbits for the EELV portion of the NMM are shown in Table 1. The EELV system shall have the performance necessary to launch the government portion of the NMM. The complete NMM includes all Government and commercial launch missions and serves as the consolidated national forecast of spacelift requirements for the future based on documented customer (payload) needs. Methodology is presented in Appendix D.

 

 

 

 

DoD

PAYLOAD

ORBIT

CURRENT

LAUNCH

APOGEE

PERIGEE

INCLINATION

NOTES

PORTION

VEHICLE CLASS*

WT(LBS)***

(NM)

(NM)

(DEGREES)

AFSPC

ADV MILSATCOM

GTO

ATLAS IIAS

8500

19300

100

27

10

DMSP

POLAR

TITAN II

3300

458

-458

98.7

1

DSP

GEO

TITAN IV-IUS

5402

19323

19323

3

DSCS

GTO

ATLAS II

6300

19279

127

25.5

11

GPS IIF

SEMI SYNC

DELTA II 7925

4725

10998

100

55

2

SBIRLEO

LEO

DELTA II

8157

see note

see note

see note

3

SBIRGEO

GTO

ATLAS IIAS

8450

19324

90

27

OTHER DoD

TSX

POLAR

DELTA II 7925

6000

500

500

90

12

NPOESS

POLAR

DELTA II 7925

6840

450

450

98.2

SUPPORT

MISSION A

GTO

ATLAS IIAS

8500

19324

90

27

7

MISSION B

LEO

ATLAS IIAS

17000

100

100

63.4

4, 7

MISSION C

GEO

TITAN IV-CENT

13500

19323

19323

0

7

MISSION D

POLAR

TITAN IV-NUS

41000

100