The Strategic Defense Initiative: "Star Wars" Becoming A Reality
CSC 1992
SUBJECT AREA Strategic Issues
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: The Strategic Defense Initiative: "Star Wars" Becoming A Reality
Author: LCDR Michael P. Kompanik
Thesis: The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) will provide the
United States with a viable means to defend itself, its allies,
and its forces overseas from limited ballistic missile attack.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a historical
analysis of SDI from its inception to the present, discussing its
origins, political perspectives, conceptual changes, system
architecture, and projected capabilities.
Background: By 1997 the United States will be in a position to
deploy the world's first truly effective ballistic missile
defense (BMD) system. Dubbed "Star Wars" by the media, SDI
represents an entirely new approach to strategic defense that is
more rational and tangible than the policy of deterrence and
adherence to mutual assured destruction.
Much has changed since SDI was first envisioned.
Technological advances have helped turn fantasy into reality.
Improvements in electronics, computers, and miniaturization have
helped make SDI more rapidly achievable at a cost far less than
first projected. The major technological breakthrough of
Brilliant Pebbles paved the way for affordable protection by the
end of this decade. This system, coupled with various
satellites, ground tracking and surveillance assets, and ground-
based interceptors comprises the deployable SDI system.
The world has also changed dramatically since the
Strategic Defense Initiative first began. The collapse of the
Soviet Union has virtually eliminated the threat of global
nuclear war. Political instability and ballistic missile arms
proliferation represent the new threat environment. Therefore,
in 1991, President Bush refocused the SDI effort to GPALS -
Global Protection Against Limited Strikes. GPALS' mission is to
provide protection against the deliberate, accidental, or
unauthorized attack from a limited number of ballistic missiles.
Regardless of how effective it is against the ballistic
missile threat, GPALS, however, cannot provide protection against
terrorists who may not rely on ballistic missiles to unleash
their destruction upon society. Until an effective strategy is
developed against such threats, we will never be completely
protected from weapons of mass destruction.
THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE: "STAR WARS-
BECOMING A REALITY
OUTLINE
Thesis Statement: SDI/GPALS will have the ability to defend the
United States, its allies, and its armed forces from limited ballistic missile attack.
I. Introduction
A. Scenerio demonstrating the need for SDI
B. President Reagan's speech challenges the nation and charts a new course for strategic defense
C. Skepticism against "Star Wars"
D. SDI provides an alternative to the prevailing doctrine of deterrence and reliance on mutual assured destruction
II. Origins
A. Findings of the Defensive Technologies Study
B. Establishment of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO)
C. Mission statement of SDIO
III. Controversy
A. Conflict between SDI and the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) Treaty
1. "Broad" interpretation of Treaty permits SDI research and development
2. Analysis of the role of the 1972 ABM Treaty in SALT TALKS
3. Recent developments negate importance of Treaty
B. SDI and our allies
1. Lack of initial support
2. Fear of destabilizing effect
3. Improved relations through mutual cooperation and joint research
C. High cost of SDI
IV. Refocus to GPALS
A. Arms proliferaton among the third world nations
1. Persian Gulf War
2. Libya and other threats
B. Collapse of Communism, Warsaw Pact, and dissolution of the Soviet Union
1. Threat of global nuclear war diminishes
2. Instability heightens concern over security of nuclear weapons
C. President Bush refocuses SDI to GPALS
1. GPALS-new mission statement for SDI
2. Differnces between SDI Phase I and GPALS
3. Cost savings due to technological advances and refocus to GPALS
V. System Design
A. Early conceptual views versus GPALS
B. Phased concept of development and deployment
C. BMD functions and system elements
D. Layered defense system concept - advantages and disadvantages of each
1. Boost/Post-Boost layer
2. Midcourse layer
3. Terminal layer
E. GPALS Architecture
1. Theater level missile defense
2. Brilliant Pebbles space-based interceptors
3. Brilliant Eyes satellites
4. Phased Ground-Based Radar Terminals (GBRT)
5. Exo-endoatmospheric Interceptors (E2I)
6. Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI)
7. Optional Ground Surveillance and Tracking System (GSTS)
8. GPALS command center
VI. Conclusion
A. GPALS brings militarization to space
B. SDIO's mission must continue
C. SDI/GPALS follow-on systems
1. Directed Energy Weapons (DEW) and High Velocity Weapons
2. Simplified command and control requirements
D. Transition from R & D to command and control is required
E. SDI/GPALS will protect against NBC threat from ballistic missiles but will not protect against terrorists or other
Stateless organizations.
F. True defensive protection will not be achieved until all NBC threats (non-missile) are effectively negated.
THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE:
"STAR WARS" BECOMING A REALITY
INTRODUCTION
Three Chinese made CSS-1B ballistic missiles, each equipped
with a 15 KT thermonuclear warhead, lift off from a military
facility hidden in the mountains near Tabas, Iran. Fired by an
extremist Iranian government, the missiles streak skyward at
17,000 m.p.h. Their targets - 1) a U.S. Naval carrier task force
in the Indian Ocean 115 miles from Iranian coast; 2) Basra Iraq,
the last stronghold of Saddam Hussein - retaliation against his
inhumane Scud C missile attacks delivering nerve agents which
killed thousands of Iranian troops along the Iraqi border; 3) the
massive U.S. military base in Dhahran, used to project U.S.
military power into the region and prop up a weak Saudi
government, besieged by Islamic fundamentalist revolutionaries
backed by Iran.
The launches are detected immediately by two orbiting
surveillance satellites. In moments, the National Military
Command Center has alerted major subordinate commands along with
top military and civilian leadership. The U.S. Space Command
instantly goes into action using the recently deployed SDI/GPALS
system to locate the ballistic missiles and compute trajectories
and target information. Two hundred fifty miles above the earth,
the multi-sensor equipped Brilliant Pebbles space-based
interceptors automatically lock on to two of the missiles.
Tracking their targets from the infrared signatures during the
missiles' boost phase, the Brilliant Pebbles almost
instantaneously compute the trajectories of the missiles and plot
intercept courses.
Although no larger than a golf bag, these small, intelligent
interceptors spell certain doom for the massive 57,000 lb.
ballistic missiles. Two Brilliant Pebbles fire their rocket
motors and close their targets at speeds close to 8 miles per
second. The resultant collisions in space completely destroy the
ballistic missiles before they can discharge their lethal
payloads.
Meanwhile, high above the atmosphere, Brilliant Eyes
satellites observe the intercepts made by the two Brilliant
Pebbles and track the third missile. This missile's target, the
carrier task force, is closest to the launch point. The shorter
trajectory and the shorter boost phase of this missile renders it
unsuitable for interception by Brilliant Pebbles. Instead, a
ground-based terminal phased radar system, located near Dhahran
and data linked to the Brilliant Eyes satellites, provides
trajectory data to a battery of new Theater High Altitude Area-
Defense (THAAD) interceptors which have replaced the old Patriot
Missile System. Similarly, on board an Aegis Class cruiser
operating with the carrier task force, the new, improved Aegis II
missile system stands by to conduct an intercept mission.
As the CSS-IB ballistic missile achieves maximum trajectory
and begins to accelerate downward toward the task force, two
THAAD interceptors are launched from Dhahran. The interceptors
reach their target high in the upper layers of the atmosphere.
The closing impact of the interceptors and ballistic missile at
greater than 12 miles per second, utterly destroys this third and
final threat to the security of the United States and its armed
forces
The above scenario would have read like a science fiction
novel a mere decade ago. Today, thanks to the tremendous
technological advances in strategic defense research, the United
States stands on the verge of deploying the world's first truly
effective Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system. By 1997, the
Strategic Defense Initiative's Global Protection Against Limited
Strikes (SDI/GPALS) system will be fully operational and
available for deployment. As a completely integrated, multiple-
layered defensive system incorporating the latest technologies,
SDI/GPALS has the capability to defend the United States, its
allies, and its armed forces from limited ballistic missile
attack.
For more than a generation, the United States national
defense policy against nuclear ballistic missile attack rested
solely on the foundation of strategic deterrence. National
defense policy, however, took a bold, new direction in the early
1980's with the advent of the Strategic Defense Initiative. The
mandate for this new policy occurred on 23 March 1983 in a speech
by President Reagan. Just as President Kennedy challenged
American society and American technology to a goal of winning the
space race by putting a man on the moon within the decade,
President Reagan also challenged American science and technology:
I call upon the Scientific Community in our country,
those who gave us nuclear weapons, to turn their great
talents now to the cause of mankind and world peace, to
give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons
impotent and obsolete. (13: 24)
President Reagan echoed these words again at his Inaugural
address on 21 January 1985 as he stated:
I have approved a research program to find, if we can,
a security shield that will destroy nuclear missiles
before they reach their target. It wouldn't kill
people; it would destroy weapons. It wouldn't
militarize space; it would help demilitarize the
arsenals of the earth. (11: 18)
These two speeches were met with a mixture of inspiration,
ridicule, and concern. To many, the goal of a viable, strategic
defense against ballistic missiles seemed like a pipe dream, a
lofty aspiration whose actual achievement scarcely seemed
feasible.
Proponents of the policy of deterrence scoffed at the mere
notion of such an advanced, space-aged system, dubbing it "Star
Wars". This catchy appellation, eagerly embraced by the media,
also served, no doubt, to emphasize what some detractors felt was
the destabilizing effect of such a system. For years U.S
strategic defense policy was primarily based upon nuclear
deterrence supported by the doctrine of Mutual Assured
Destruction (MAD). Massive nuclear forces were considered vital
to this doctrine to ensure the U.S. retained enough nuclear
strike capability to retaliate with complete and utter
destruction against a Soviet first strike. Defensive systems
which could neutralize ballistic missiles could upset the entire
delicate balance between U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear
forces. Supporters of "Star Wars" saw, for the first time, the
opportunity for shedding the shackles of deterrence for a
defensive system that would truly provide for the defense of our
county. This glimmer of hope, sparked by the American people's
confidence in our technological capabilities and American
ingenuity, was eagerly embraced by the entire nation.
ORIGINS
President Reagan's speech on Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
was not mere rhetoric. Richard D. DeLauer, Undersecretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering revealed that:
Following his historic speech, the President directed
an intensive study to define the technologies necessary
for defending the United States and our allies from
ballistic missile attack. We collected over 50% of our
nation's top scientists and engineers and asked them to
assess the feasibility of achieving this goal and to
structure a research program to develop the
technologies that could provide an effective defense
against their missiles. (18: i)
The result of their effort was the Defense Technologies
Study (DTS), completed in April 1984. This study, headed by Dr.
James C. Fletcher, examined areas of surveillance, target
acquisition and tracking, directed energy weapons, conventional
weapons, battle management, communications, data processing,
system concepts, countermeasures, and tactics. The principal
finding of the DTS team was that, despite uncertainties, powerful
new technologies held great promise for developing a viable BMD
system.
Based upon the technical recommendations of this study,
President Reagan established the Strategic Defense Initiative
Organization (SDIO). As a focused research and technology
development program of the highest priority, SDIO was given the
mission to pursue the various technological paths leading to a
viable, comprehensive, BMD system. SDIO has vigorously pursued
this mission, examining a wide variety of technological avenues
for BMD systems, from ground-based interceptor systems to space-
based directed energy weapons. Even though the principle
architecture of the first phase of a deployable BMD system has
already been developed, SDIO continues to conduct research for
future, more capable systems and add-on components.
CONTROVERSY
SDI quickly became a subject of controversy among our
political leaders and allies. Concerns over the 1972 Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty, the possible destabilization effects of
SDI, and its enormous cost became major issues.
The 1972 ABM Treaty prohibited both the Soviet Union and the
United States from developing, testing, or deploying an ABM
system or components whether sea-based, air-based, space-based,
or mobile land-based. Each nation was limited to one BMD site
containing 100 interceptors, 100 interceptor launchers, and a
handful of radars. (11: 160)
President Reagan's instructions to SDIO explicitly required
compliance to this treaty. It was only, however, through
broadest interpretation of this treaty, which permitted research
and experimental work prior to development, that conflict was
avoided. U.S. chose to define "development" as a phase which
began with field testing of full scale ABM systems or components.
In essence, this broad interpretation permitted development and
testing, but not deployment.
Many defense analysts felt the ratification of the 1972 ABM
treaty was merely a ploy by the United States to slow down the
arms race and wanted to abrogate the treaty in its entirety.
This treaty successfully culminated the first round of the
Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT 1). At this time, the
Soviet Union had launched a massive expansion and upgrading of
its nuclear weapons inventory. Keeping up with the Soviets was
proving to be an insurmountable task. As Secretary of Defense
Harold Brown commiserated, "When we build, they build. When we
stop building, they build." (20: 206) The Soviets had developed
and deployed 3 new types of ICBM's and improved versions of
existing ICBM's, in addition to a new intercontinental strategic
bomber. The U.S. had no corresponding build up. The rapid
growth in U.S. strategic bombers and nuclear missiles during the
1960's had come to a screeching halt due to the enormous economic
drain of the Vietnam War.
BMD, however, was not an entirely new concept to the U.S.
defense establishment. In 1970, the United States deployed the
first BMD system, known as the Safeguard Strategic Defense
System. "Although this system did not work very well", James
Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense stated " it was vastly
better than anything the Soviets had at the time, and the Soviets
knew it." (14: 106) After the signing of the ABM Treaty, the
U.S. dismantled the Safeguard System. In return, the Soviets
signed the SALT 1 accords which reduced their nuclear stockpiles
and new weapons construction.
The Soviets strongly opposed U.S. involvement in the
Strategic Defense Initiative. Meanwhile, they continued to
upgrade their own ABM system outside Moscow and developed a large
phased-array radar facility near Krasnoyarsk, Siberia in direct
violation of the ABM Treaty.
The Soviet's negative reaction to SDI prompted many U.S.
officials to voice concerns over the potential destabilizing
effects of SDI. According to the tenants of deterrence and
mutual assured destruction, protection against massive nuclear
attack could only be maintained through mutual vulnerability.
The idea of an effective ABM system, many believed, would upset
the delicate strategic balance, and even encourage a devastating
pre-emptive strike prior to the deployment of an effective ABM
system. Recognizing the Soviet's fear of SDI, former Secretary
of Defense James Schlesinger and former National Security Advisor
Brent Scowcroft felt that SDI should be used strictly as a
powerful bargaining tool for major arms reductions. Others, such
as Robert McNamara and George Kennan, dismissed SDI as an issue
altogether, stating that the reality of such a system was so far
in the future that SDI would have no impact, whatsoever, in the
strategic arms situation.
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in late 1991, SDI's
compliance with the 1972 ABM Treaty and concerns over its
destabilizing affects became dead issues. In a remarkable
turnabout, the Soviet's successor state, the Commonwealth of
Independent States, has expressed strong interest in a joint
venture, strategic defense system with the United States. This
new era of cooperation between military super-powers reflects,
more than anything, the world's rapidly changing threat
environment.
Political support of SDI from allies has, likewise, done a
turnabout in recent times. The Strategic Defense Initiative came
as a rude surprise to many NATO allies who were angry and
dismayed that the United States had not conducted negotiations or
informed its allies prior to President Reagan's bold public
announcement. NATO allies were fearful of the potential
destabilizing effect SDI would have on the strategic balance
between the superpowers. With the rapid changes sweeping Europe
since 1989, overseas opposition to SDI has greatly diminished.
SDIO has received vastly strengthened allied support through its
expansion into foreign markets for technological research and
development. To date, the United States has bilateral SDI
research memoranda of understanding with the United Kingdom,
Germany, Israel, Italy, and Japan. France is currently
considering joining in SDI research with the United States and
its allies. Consultations with allies on SDI have broadened and
deepened during the past two years. The United States now
consults its allies immediately following each round of the
Defense and Space talks in Geneva. Furthermore, senior
government and industry personnel from several allied countries
routinely visit the United States for detailed technical
discussions and updates on the SDI program. The net result has
been extremely strong allied support for both the development and
deployment of the SDI system.
SDI, like all defense programs, has been controversial to
many politicians, strictly on the basis of cost. Since 1985, SDI
funding has varied from $2.1 billion to $4.3 billion per year.
While these figures represent a massive investment in strategic
defense, SDI funding has amounted to only 10-15% of the overall
strategic forces (offensive and defensive) budget and less than
2% of the overall defense spending during these years (See
Figure 1).
Due to the innovative technologies of systems such as
Brilliant Pebbles, the SDI BMD system is now expected to cost
less than the continued development and modernization of existing
strategic nuclear weapons and delivery systems.
REFOCUS TO GPALS
Today's threat environment radically differs from the threat
of global nuclear war and the strategic nuclear arms race of a
mere decade ago. With the sudden collapse of communism in the
Eastern bloc, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and the
collapse of the Soviet Union, the "Evil Empire" no longer exists.
But arms proliferation among Third World nations, exposes a
new, ever expanding threat to world peace and stability. By the
year 2000, the CIA reports, 15-20 developing nations will be able
to launch ballistic missiles-six with ranges of at least 1,500
miles. For these and even more so for stateless 21st century
terrorists, the prospect of massive retaliation no longer offers
a sure-fire deterrent. (12: 124) Table 1 and Figure 2 clearly
illustrate the problem of Third World ballistic missile
proliferation.
As the Persian Gulf War has proven, these nations are more
than willing to use the missiles they possess. Saddam Hussein
launched over 68 SCUD missile attacks against U.S. forces and
targets in Saudi Arabia and Israel. Iraq's nuclear research
program was far more advanced than experts had originally
believed. They were, perhaps, only 2 to 3 years away from having
both a nuclear weapons capability and an effective ballistic
missile launch vehicle.
Iraq is not the only country pursuing nuclear weapons
technology. In April 1989, Libya's Muamar Qaddafi issued a call
for Arab Nations to accelerate development of nuclear missiles.
If he had owned such weapons when U.S. planes bombed Tripoli in
1986, Qaddafi noted, he would have retaliated by firing them at
New York City. (12: 121) North Korea also has an extensive
nuclear weapons technology program. Pakistan and Iran are also
investing heavily in technology which could lead to the
development of nuclear weapons. Lured by lucrative salaries,
many former Soviet nuclear scientists and engineers have further
compounded the problem by finding employment with several
aspiring nuclear powers, particularly in the Middle East.
The threat from Third World ballistic missile proliferation
is not limited to nuclear weapons but covers the entire nuclear,
biological, and chemical (NBC) spectrum. Libya and Iraq have
conducted extensive research in biological and chemical weaponry.
Iraq employed nerve gas agents against the Kurds and Iranians.
Libya maintains a chemical weapons plant deep within its borders
and continues to pursue development of these unconventional
weapons.
Meanwhile, the threat of global war with the Soviet Union
virtually disappeared with the sudden ousting of the Communist
Party in August 1991 and the dissolution of the country into
independent republics on 25 December 1991. Even before these
remarkable events, tensions had lessened dramatically as the
former Soviet Union, struggling to control its internal problems,
began to focus on domestic issues.
Today, there is a new spirit of cooperation with the Soviet
successor state, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
Dramatic cuts have been made in the nuclear arsenals of both the
United States and the former Soviet Union. Strategic nuclear
bombers have been taken off alert for the first time in a
generation. The "unofficial" Cold War has officially ended.
Plans have been made by both the United States, the CIS, and the
independent republics to conduct major reductions in conventional
forces, as well.
While a massive, nuclear strike from the former Soviet Union
is no longer considered a major threat, accidental launch and
loss of control of nuclear weapons by the former Soviet
Republics, are major defense concerns. The world held its breath
during the failed coup of August 1991 when Soviet communist
hardliners attempted to seize control of the government. The
former Soviet Union is still highly vulnerable to political
instability and nuclear weapons can be powerful tools to seize
and control power. The massive Soviet nuclear stockpile of over
30,000 tactical and strategic warheads is scattered among four
former Soviet republics who are far from achieving a concensus on
the ultimate disposition of these weapons. Serious concerns over
the security of these weapons exist as control of these weapons
transfers from former Soviet troops to the newly organized armed
forces of the new republics.
In January 1991, President Bush moved quickly to adjust the
national defense strategy of the U.S. to reflect the fundamental
changes in the world's nuclear and ballistic missile threat
environment. He directed the refocusing of the SDI program to
provide protection from limited, ballistic missile strikes,
whatever their source. This refocused program, which greatly
increased SDI's emphasis on Theater Missile Defense (TMD), was
named Global Protection Against Limited Strikes, or GPALS.
Unlike SDI Phase 1, which was the initial segment of SDI planned
for deployment, GPALS expands an umbrella of protection to our
forces, friends and allies, defending against both global and
regional ballistic missile threats. GPALS' mission is to provide
strategic defense, not only to the United States mainland, but
also to a greatly reduced, down-sized military, heavily involved
in overseas crisis response and forward presence roles.
SDI Phase 1 was designed to primarily deter a massive Soviet
first strike by destroying a significant portion of several
thousand attacking nuclear warheads. Focused mainly on the
Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), SDI Phase 1
concentrated on defense of the continental United States,
especially population centers and strategic forces facilities.
Survivability of U.S. retaliatory strike capability was a major
objective of SDI in order to maintain the balance provided
through mutual assured destruction.
The objective of GPALS is to destroy all the warheads of a
limited ballistic missile strike, whether deliberate, accidental,
or unauthorized, from anywhere on the earth. Its main focus is
protection against the short and intermediate range ballistic
missiles, whether conventionally armed or equipped with NBC
warheads.
The President's goal was to develop and quickly deploy a
more limited, less expensive, strategic defense system that
adequately counters the new evolving threat from Third World
ballistic missiles and political instability in the post Cold War
era. In many respects, the refocusing decision was very timely.
Faced with a deepening recession and strong pressure to
drastically cut military spending, the President and the other
proponents of SDI realized the financial burden of the entire SDI
Phase 1 was, perhaps, more than the country was willing to bear,
especially given the reduced Soviet threat. They also realized,
however, that the policy of deterrence alone would no longer
suffice. Deterrence provides no defense against accidental or
unauthorized launch of nuclear weapons (by elements within the
former Soviet Union for example). Deterrence also does not work
against terrorists or third world countries who feel they have
nothing to lose. Therefore, GPALS was the logical solution to
the strategic defense dilemma presented by ballistic missile
proliferation and political instability.
GPALS utilizes most of the technologies developed for SDI
Phase 1 . In most respects, it is merely a less robust version of
SDI Phase 1, requiring fewer surveillance, tracking, and command
and control assets and far fewer space-based interceptors to deal
with the smaller numbers of missiles. GPALS will utilize more
theater level interceptors due to the shorter ranges of many of
today's ballistic missiles. In overall system design and
concept, however, it is nearly identical to SDI Phase 1.
Due to the technological breakthroughs of systems such as
Brilliant Pebbles, SDI/GPALS has not only become more achievable
in the near future, it has also become more affordable. The
estimated cost of SDI Phase 1 has fallen from $1.46 trillion in
June 1987 to $53 billion in November 1990. (17: 2-13) Current
cost estimates for the smaller GPALS system from initial research
and development to possible deployment in 1997 is $46 billion in
constant FY 91 dollars. Approximately 50% of this cost is
equally split between space-based interceptors (Brilliant
Pebbles) and ground based theater defense components. The
remaining 50% of the budget would support ground-based
interceptors and supporting sensors primarily for the defense of
the United States. Figure 3 illustrates SDI/GPALS funding
profiles from 1985 projected through the year 2005.
Funding will remain the critical path for the eventual
deployment of the SDI/GPALS system. Budget cuts by Congress in
recent years have caused delays in the production and field
testing of many components. Early in 1991, SDIO director Henry
F. Cooper reported that the earliest SDI/GPALS deployment date
had slipped from 1996 to late 1997 due to funding constraints.
SYSTEM DESIGN
SDI has undergone many conceptual changes since 1983 as new
and promising technologies have emerged. Early SDI concepts
envisioned directed energy weapons (DEW), utilizing various types
of lasers or neutral-particle beams and mirror systems to focus
intense, destructive rays on inbound ballistic missiles.
Although technological research continues into these areas,
significant difficulties must be overcome before any form of DEW
systems can be deployed. Therefore, SDIO has focused the
majority of its efforts on technologies suited for the near-term
deployment of GPALS. As a result, GPALS, the first generation
SDI system, will consist of more conventional kinetic energy
weapons systems, using ground-based and space-based interceptors
coordinated by a command and control system.
SDI was originally conceived as having a phased deployment.
GPALS has now superseded SDI Phase 1 as the initial phase of the
BMD system. All other phases are grouped together as follow-on
systems. These follow-on systems remain undefined at this time
because they are technology dependent. SDIO is conducting
research along multiple paths and only the most promising and
cost-effective technologies will be developed into deployable
follow-on systems. Early successive phases after phase 1 will
most likely consist of systems and components using similar or
enhanced technology of the initial GPALS architecture. More
diverse and advance weapons systems may be incorporated into
GPALS or may replace deployed systems which have become
antiquated.
Regardless of the defensive weapons systems and components
employed, both the DTS and SDIO agree on the functions and
systems elements required in any BMD system. According to Dr.
Robert S. Cooper of the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency
(DARPA):
The functions or tasks which any (BMD) system must
successfully perform are:
1. To unequivocally detect and broadcast the nature of a nuclear ballistic missile attack.
2. To locate, discriminate, track, and target booster rockets, MIRV buses, and individual reentry vehicles armed with nuclear weapons.
3. To assign weapons to attack and destroy each target.
4. To assess the effectiveness of each attack.
5. To retarget threatening objects and continue the attack throughout the entire flight regime until the desired result is assuredly achieved. (6: 161)
Continuing, he states .
The system elements which will be necessary to achieve these five functions might be characterized as follows:
1. Boost-phase surveillance and assessment system.
2. Target acquisition and discrimination system.
3. Target tracking and weapons assignment system.
4. Space and ground-based weapons system.
5. Kill assessment and retargeting system.
6. Communication system.
7. Command control system. (6: 161)
It is according to these functions or taskings, that all SDI
systems or components are designed. And all SDI components can
be categorized into one or more of these seven system elements.
The DTS of the early 1980's concluded that the most
effective strategic defensive systems would have multiple layers.
The GPALS system under current development embraces this
philosophy with a variety of ground and space-based assets and
various command and control systems, arrayed against the various
layers of the missile threat.
A layered defensive system provides for multiple engagement
opportunities against each missile, post-boost vehicle, and re-
entry vehicle (RV) warhead instead of a one-time hit or miss
interception. The layered defense approach also provides defense
opportunities against missiles of varying ranges and
trajectories.
Defensive systems have been designed for each layer of a
ballistic missiles flight. In the boost/post-boost phase, the
booster provides the thrust from lift off to maximum altitude and
the re-entry vehicles (RV's) and possible decoys are deployed.
The midcourse phase is the relatively long portion of a ballistic
missile's flight during which the RV's and decoys coast along
their ballistic trajectories in space. The terminal phase is the
final part of a ballistic missile's flight during which the RV's
re-enter the atmosphere near their designated targets.
Each layer of the ballistic missile trajectory has its own
unique advantages and challenges to the GPALS system. The
boost/post-boost layer offers the earliest opportunity for
interception. Successful interception within this layer prevents
missiles with multiple independent re-entry vehicles (MIRV's)
from deploying their individual warheads. In this manner, one
interceptor can effectively destroy ten or more warheads.
Failure to intercept during this phase requires separate
acquisition, discrimination, tracking, and interception of each
individual RV.
The midcourse layer provides a window to discern RV's from
decoys after they have been released by the post-boost vehicle
(PBV). Space-based sensors may allow early discrimination and
identification of RV's. Successful discrimination early in this
phase permits interception by either space or surface-based
systems.
In the terminal phase, the atmospheric drag on the heavier
RV's assists in the discrimination from decoys. Endoatmospheric
interceptors, however, must be highly maneuverable and able to
withstand high heat from atmospheric friction.
Utilizing this layered approach, the GPALS system currently
being developed for deployment, in 1997 consists of an improved
theater defense missile system, space-based Brilliant Pebbles
(BP) interceptors, and a ground-based tier consisting of
Brilliant Eyes (BE) satellites, radars, interceptors, tracking
systems, and various command and control systems.
The 1990 Persian Gulf War highlighted the strategic threat
to forward deployed U.S. and allied forces from theater ballistic
missiles such as the SCUD. To counter this threat, theater
missile defense (TMD) programs have been fully integrated into
the GPALS system architecture.
Many theater and tactical ballistic missiles utilize a
relatively short boost-phase with a low burn-out altitude making
space-based interception difficult or impossible. Research,
instead, has concentrated on upgrading existing TMD systems, such
as the Patriot Air Defense System, primarily through enhanced
sensors and tracking systems, improved guidance systems, and
increased interceptor ranges. Although there is some controversy
over the actual success of the Patriot Missile during the War in
the Persian Gulf, the basic concept of TMD has proven viable and
TMD will be a vital link in the overall strategic defense of the
United States and its forces deployed overseas.
SDIO is evaluating new defensive missile designs in addition
to the Patriot Missile System. These systems include the Israeli
long-range area-defense missile (ARROW) and the improved Arrow
Continuation Experiments (ACES), a "hit to kill" autonomous
missile referred to the Extended Range Interceptor (ERINT), a
U.S. Theater High Altitude Area-Defense (THAAD) Interception
System, and a complete replacement of the Hawk anti-aircraft
system.
Although fully integrated by SDIO into the overall GPALS
System, the theater ballistic missile threat is of such concern,
Congress directed the Pentagon to create a separate organization
to manage the Theater Missile Defense Initiative (TMDI). The
Army Strategic Defense Command (ASDC) has taken the lead on
developing the next generation theater missile defense systems,
incorporating the same layered approach as SDI - short range
systems such as the Patriot PACII and longer-range systems such
as ARROW and THAAD.
Cooperation and coordination between TMDI/ASDC and SDIO will
ensure that future theater-level defense is enhanced, once space-
based sensors are coupled to theater defense systems for early
warning and improved tracking. Service-unique missile systems,
like the Navy's Aegis missile system and the Patriot PACII will
one day be linked to a comprehensive, target acquisition,
tracking, and command and control system to improve overall
interceptor performance. Integration of theater-level and
strategic defense systems is also necessary because interdiction
of theater ballistic missiles with ranges in excess of 600 km may
be accomplished by space-based assets in addition to theater
level interceptors.
No element has been more instrumental in enabling the
deployment of the GPALS system prior to the end of this decade
than the space-based interceptor, Brilliant Pebbles (BP). The
brain child of high energy physicist Dr. Lowell Wood, BP is an
autonomous, low-orbiting, space-based kinetic energy interceptor
capable of operating against both strategic and long-range
theater ballistic missiles. BP carries its own optical senor or
camera to detect and track the bright rocket plume of a ballistic
missile as soon as it appears above the clouds after liftoff.
Each BP, moreover, has a tremendous organic computer capability
to process targeting data on its own, without the assistance of a
centralized command and control system.
Prior to BP, designing a BMD system that was affordable,
effective, and deployable within the near future seemed far out
of reach. Exotic lasers and other directed energy weapon systems
had potential only for long term future development. All other
conceivable space-based weapons required defensive shielding,
armament, electronic jamming, and/or decoys which made them too
big and too vulnerable to consider development. The challenge to
the designers was to develop an intelligent missile that could
operate on its own, but so small it would be difficult to detect,
and too inexpensive to shoot at.
Inspired by Mr. Greg Canavan, an Advanced Weapons Specialist
from Los Alamos National Laboratory, Dr. Wood concentrated his
interceptor design utilizing stronger, smaller, simpler and more
reliable hardware. (4: 114) Mr. Ralph Kinney Bennet relates in
his article on Brilliant Pebbles, "The Pebble exploits such
advancing technologies as miniaturized electronics, light-weight,
high strength materials and ever faster computers .... The small
computer currently employed can make over 60 million calculations
per second." (3: 130)
As small as a golf bag, these incredible little machines
cost as little as half a million dollars each, and can
successfully locate and destroy strategic ballistic missiles all
on their own. Technological improvements in the field are being
generated so swiftly, the final design of Brilliant Pebbles has
not been frozen. Computers and sensors keep growing smaller,
faster, smarter, and more capable. Figure 4 illustrates the
current configuration envisioned for the BP interceptor.
Lt. Gen. James A. Abrahamson, former director of SDIO,
identifies the key features which make BP, without a doubt, the
most important element within the GPALS architecture. These key
features are:
1. large numbers of low-cost interceptors;
2. the capability of interceptors to operate
autonomously so that expensive support satellites
are not required;
3. individual interceptor clusters of sufficiently low
weight and small size that they can be launched on
small, low-cost booster rockets that are currently
available;
4. long-range interceptor optics that can "see"
boosters thousands of miles away;
5. highly capable computers that make internal
targeting decisions and calculations; and,
6. communications systems with two channels so that
commanders can control the interceptors at all
times. (1: 72)
BP performs the role of the boost and post-boost phase
interceptor, homing in on the infrared heat signature of the
booster rocket. Due to BP's unique and highly accurate homing
capabilities, it is also being studied as a potential midcourse
interceptor in limited attack situations envisioned in the GPALS
system. Approximately 1000 space-based BP1s are needed to
fulfill the GPALS requirement for the primary boost/post-boost
interceptor system. This quantity of interceptors would provide
continuous world-wide coverage against limited or accidental
ballistic missile strikes. Additional BP interceptors could
provide protection against more massive strikes.
The architecture for the ground-based portion of GPALS will
consist of Brilliant Eyes (BE) satellites accompanied by terminal
phase ground-based radars (GBRT's). A ground-based surveillance
and tracking system (GSTS) is currently an optional component in
the ground-based portion of GPALS that, if proven feasible, may
be deployed as part of the initial GPALS architecture or added as
a follow-on system. The offensive role within this tier will be
accomplished by a terminal phase endo-exoatmospheric interceptor
(E2I) and/or a midcourse phase exoatmospheric ground-based
interceptor (GBI).
The Brilliant Eyes satellites anchor the ground-based tier
of GPALS. Derived from an earlier design known as the Space-
Based Surveillance and Tracking System Satellites (SSTS), BE's
are, again, smaller, lighter, and more capable than their
predecessor. BE and its predecessor are illustrated in figure 5.
BE's mission is to provide post-boost and midcourse surveillance
of PBV's and RV's and provide targeting data to ground-based
interceptors. Approximately 60 BE satellites are required to
support the initial GPALS system deployment. An additional 200
BE satellites would be needed to support a full SDI Phase 1
deployment.
The GBRT's support intercepts during the terminal phase of a
ballistic missile's launch profile. GBRT's would perform the
same tracking and target discrimination functions for the
terminal phase that BE conducts in the post-boost and midcourse
phases. Like the BE, GBRT's would acquire, track, and
discriminate RV's from decoys and relay this information to the
E2I interceptor for target prosecution and destruction. GBRT's
evolved from a larger, less capable GBR system, both of which are
illustrated in Figure 6.
GBRT's orientation to the terminal layer of BMD defense
provides target acquisition and tracking of shorter-range
ballistic missiles and other short time-of-flight missiles such
as submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). GBRT research
is now pursuing the development of a family of radars related to
each other through common antenna modules and components in order
to meet each of the TMD, GPALS, and, if required, Phase 1 ground-
based radar requirements. Deployed in fixed assets in the United
States and mobile assets overseas, GBRT's may someday support
both strategic and theater level interceptors.
The E2I is a dual role derivative of the High
Endoatmospheric Defense Interceptor (HEDI). Again, technological
advances have greatly reduced the size and enhanced the
performance of this interceptor over its predecessor. The E2I is
a passive, multi-color infrared seeking, hypersonic, hit-to-kill
interceptor with great maneuverability. This inertially-guided
interceptor will receive sensor data from BE on late midcourse
(exoatmospheric) intercepts and from GBRT for terminal
(endoatmospheric) intercepts. During the terminal phase, the E2I
discriminates RV's from decoys using atmospheric slowdown to
identify the heavier RV's. For longer-range BM's, the E2I and
theater-level assets may provide the final opportunity for
destruction. For shorter range and submarine launched missiles,
they may be the only defense.
The GBI is an optional interceptor designed to operate
against missiles during the midcourse phase. As a midcourse
interceptor, the GBI would be inherently simpler than terminal
interceptors which must be able to withstand the heating and
mechanical stress caused by atmospheric friction. The GBI would
also have more time throughout the long midcourse portion of an
RV's flight trajectory to discriminate RV's from decoys and
perform its intercept mission. GBI's would receive target
tracking assistance and additional sensor data from BE satellites
or an optional GSTS system. GBI's may also prove valuable in
prosecuting SLBM's, interfacing with GBRT's to obtain the
necessary intercept data. Initial deployment of GPALS may
include both E2I and GBI systems if GBI proves able to
discriminate RV's within the midcourse environment.
Regardless of whether E2I or both E2I and GBI interceptors
are employed, GPALS will require at least 6 ground-based
interceptor sites, including sites in Alaska and Hawaii to effect
100% coverage of the United States against a limited ballistic
missile strike. A deployment of several hundred ground-based
interceptors per site would be necessary to protect against the
full range of potential threats. (17: 2-11) Additional sites
and more interceptors will be required to defend against a strong
SLBM threat, due to their shorter ranges.
The Ground Surveillance and Tracking System (GSTS) is an
optional, long wavelength, infrared (LWIR) sensor tracking system
intermediate between BE and GBRT. Boosted into suborbital flight
by a two-stage rocket, GSTS would support the GBI, performing RV
discrimination and tracking functions during the midcourse phase.
GSTS will only be employed if GBI's are integrated into the GPALS
architecture.
The final element in the GPALS architecture is the Command
Center which coordinates and controls the system's surveillance,
discrimination, and battle planning and engagement activities.
The Command Center consists of an integrated system of
facilities, equipment, software, communications, personnel and
procedures that supports centralized decision making (command)
and decentralized control and execution of GPALS while
maintaining human control. A Consolidated Command Center for
Ballistic Missile defense (CCC/BMD) may be augmented as necessary
by Mobile Operations Centers within or adjacent to given areas of
threat. The entire Command and Control System is designed in a
modular building block fashion that supports the anticipated
evolutionary growth of the SDI/GPALS System.
Figure 7 provides a depiction of the key elements of an
integrated GPALS System. Figure 8 depicts theater-level defenses
integrated into GPALS. Figures 9 through 11 illustrate the
relationship between the major GPALS elements arrayed against
different threats. Figure 9 illustrates GPALS protection against
ballistic missiles with ranges greater than 600 km. Figure 10
depicts the U.S. continental ground-based portion of GPALS and
Figure 11 illustrates the entire GPALS Operating System,
including defense against SLBM1s.
CONCLUSION
Deployment of the SDI/GPALS BMD System in late 1997 will
herald the beginning of a new era in U.S. strategic defense. To
make the world a safer place, space will become militarized. The
SDI/GPALS system is strictly a defensive system. The U.S. and
its allies, however, will have to maintain continuous pressure on
all technologically capable countries to keep offensive weapons
out of space. But, once the first weapons systems (whether
offensive or defensive) are deployed in space, other systems and
counter-systems are sure to follow. Therefore, the United States
must continue to conduct research and develop new technologies.
SDIO's mission will continue: to improve the GPALS system and
perhaps expand it; to find new technologies and develop follow-on
systems; to counter opposing systems; and to advance the science
of ballistic missile defense.
The follow-on phases of SDI/GPALS will undoubtedly consist
of more advanced systems employing some form of directed energy
or high speed weapons. Research is currently investigating the
long-term feasibility of space-based and ground-based lasers,
chemical and free electron lasers, neutral particle beams,
nuclear directed energy weapons, hypervelocity guns, and high-
speed light weight exoatmospheric projectiles (LEAP). The
technology to employ these weapons in the near future is
presently lacking, but studies indicate these weapons have
enormous long-range potential. One advantage of directed energy
weapons and high-speed projectiles is that they do not require
the sophisticated command and control and surveillance and
tracking components, because, when fired, these weapons have a
near instantaneous impact on their targets.
Meanwhile, as the U.S. moves from SDI/GPALS development to
deployment, the military establishment must transition from its
current research orientation to assume operational command and
control responsibilities. Command relationships must be resolved
in order to answer the questions that are being asked. Will SDIO
transition from a research organization into an operational
command element? Will GPALS be assigned to the subordinate Air
Force Space Command and be placed under the operational control
of the Unified U.S. Space Command? Will the Army's Strategic
Defense Command and the separate armed services retain control of
their theater ballistic missile defense systems?
Even after these questions are answered and SDI/GPALS is
firmly deployed in space, strategic defense concerns will not
end. In the post-Cold War era, SDI/GPALS will be able to
effectively counter the ballistic missile threat from other
nations. GPALS will provide protection against the deliberate,
accidental, or unauthorized limited strikes from these nations
and eliminate the dangers of nuclear, biological, and chemical
attack upon our country, our allies, and our forces overseas from
their missiles.
In these unstable times, however, GPALS cannot address the
threat of nuclear and unconventional arms proliferation among
stateless societies and terrorist organizations. These elements
do not require ballistic missiles to unleash their destruction
upon society. SDI/GPALS cannot defend against such threats.
Neither can deterrence nor the threat of massive retaliation
provide any protection against such threats. As the United
States continues to pursue the technical means to defend against
the more conventional threats to world peace, we must not forget
to assess all aspects of the current threat environment and
address it at each level. SDI/GPALS is the solution for
ballistic missile threats from an ever expanding host of nations
possessing the ability to threaten our homeland and forces
overseas with missile attack. But we must find effective
measures to counter other threats as well. Only then will our
society, our friends, and our armed forces be truly free from the
threat from weapons of mass destruction.
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