The Eagle and the Javelin: Tactical Ballistic Missiles And The Future Of U. S. Power Projection CSC 1992 SUBJECT AREA National Military Strategy EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: The Eagle and the Javelin: Tactical Ballistic Missiles and the Future of U. S. Power Projection Author: Major G. P. Garrett, United States Marine Corps Thesis: The improved tactical ballistic missiles becoming available to regional powers will make fixed forward bases seriously vulnerable to neutralization, thus requiring significant changes in our current approach to power projection in response to regional crisis. Background: The sweeping political changes in the world political order have led to the development of a new national military strategy which replaces containment with a focus on response to regional crisis. This new strategy is heavily dependent on power projection capability, which in turn is increasingly dependent on airlift, sealift and preposition- ing. All of these depend on fixed forward bases. At the same time, Third world nations are gaining access to tactical ballistic missile and satellite technologies which, in combination, will substantially increase the threat to these critical forward bases. At present, there are no fully effective defenses against tactical ballistic missiles for land based power projection forces, nor will any be available for several years. Recommendation: U. S. force planners must minimize our vulnerability to the emerging threat by reducing dependence on the fixed bases which provide optimum targets for ballistic missiles. Possible steps include expanded use of VSTOL aircraft, expanded use of seabasing for aircraft and logistics, and the reallocation of some submarine launched ballistic missiles as counterforce weapons for regional conflict. OUTLINE Thesis Statement: The improved tactical ballistic missiles becoming available to regional powers will make fixed forward bases seriously vulnerable to neutralization, thus requiring significant changes in our current approach to power projection in response to regional crisis. I. The strategic context of force projection A. The changing international security order and the new national military strategy B. Force projection within the national military strategy C. Doctrinal dependence on fixed bases II. The impact of new technology A. The military technology "revolution" in the Third World 1. Tactical Ballistic Missiles 2. Satellite Access B. Military Significance of Enhanced Capabilities 1. Tactical Ballistic Missile Accuracy 2. Enhanced Warheads 3. Near Real Time Intelligence C. Threat to Fixed Bases III. Countering the Threat: Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missile Defense A. Offensive counteraction B. Active Defenses 1. Patriot 2. Follow on systems C. Passive Defenses 1. Hardening 2. Counter Locating Measures 3. Counter Targeting Measures IV. Solutions for Future Power Projection A. Expanded Use of VSTOL B. Seabasing C. Counterforce Ballistic Missiles THE DEADLY JAVELIN: IMPLICATIONS OF THE EMERGING TACTICAL BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT OF POWER PROJECTION Since the summer of 1989, the strategic context in which U. S. forces operate has changed drastically. With the reunification of Germany and the end of the Warsaw Pact, the Cold War has passed away, and with it has gone the rationale for the containment strategy followed over the last four decades. The collapse of the Soviet Union has left the United States as the lone superpower in the world, and the only state in the developed world capable of countering destabilizing actions by developing regional powers. Yet even before the Iraqis seized Kuwait, the sweeping changes then underway in the world's political and military order led the Bush administration to announce a new national security strategy, one which replaced the Cold War strategy of containment with a focus on regional defense(16:6). Forward presence and crisis response capabilities are fundamental components of this regionally oriented strategy (64:11). These, in turn, are founded upon the the strategic principles of maritime and aerospace superiority, strategic agility, power projection, technological superiority, and decisive-force (64:9-10), all of which capitalize on the key strengths of U. S. forces. As DESERT STORM revealed, however, revolutionary changes in firepower, sensors, and guidance technology are fundamentally changing the warfighting environment in which these forces must be prepared to operate. In particular, the improved tactical ballistic missiles (TBMs) becoming available to regional powers will make fixed forward bases seriously vulnerable to neutralization, thus requiring significant changes in our current approach to power projection in response to regional crisis. The linchpin of the new national military strategy is power projection capability. Without the ability to deploy forces from the continental United States to reinforce our forward presence elements, deterrring aggression against our vital interests and stabilizing regional crises become impossible tasks. This ability to project military power abroad resides in two principal categories of forces: forcible entry and benign entry. Forcible entry is the process of projecting forces into regions not under friendly control (97:2-8). By doctrine this is normally accomplished by either airborne assault or amphibious assault or a combination of both. Benign entry is the process by which forces are introduced into areas which are under friendly control, and doctrinally is accomplished using the so-called strategic mobility "triad" consisting of intertheater airlift, sealift, and prepositioned equipment and supplies. Both of these methods of projecting U. S. combat power abroad are dependent upon the establishment of forward air bases for success. The amphibious assault and for airborne assault require the establishment of a forward air base within range of the objective, since tactical aviation provides the preponderence of fire support at the time of the initial landings. In amphibious doctrine, landing force aviation is to be established ashore "at the earliest possible moment" (98:124), with expeditionary airfields used for the initial move ashore augmented by permanent airfields seized or uncovered as operations progress inland (98:144). In airborne assault operations, doctrine requires either the seizure of an airfield through which to receive supplies and reinforcements, or an early linkup with ground forces operating nearby. In either case, a fixed (non-mobile) base is considered essential. Benign entry forces are are equally dependent upon fixed forward bases. The critical distinction is that these bases must be secure from the outset; they must be in place and functional before benign entry begins: Within the context of strategic mobility, secure facilities are essential to airlift for enroute and secure landing; they are also necessary for administrative introduction of sealift forces and material, as well as, marry-up of prepositioned equipment and stacks with airlifted units. (97:2-7) The airlift element of the strategic mobility triad consists of U.S. Air Force C-5, C-141, and C-1O aircraft augmented by the commercial airliners and cargo aircraft of the Civil Reserve Airfleet (CRAF). CRAF contributes fully a quarter of the available strategic cargo lift and ninety-five percent of the passenger lift, but it can only operate out of airfields with runways of commercial length (generally, 8,800 feet or longer). The remainder of the strategic airlift force currently consists of C-5s and C-141s, both of which require runways of 5,000 feet or more (81:13-15). Because the C-5 requires extensive taxiway space and ramp space in addition to a 5,000 foot runway, it is limited to less than sixty airfields in Europe, fifty-three in the Pacific Region, and perhaps a dozen in the Middle East (59:337-338). The aerial tankers required to support extended range airlift operations are even more restricted, requiring runways in excess of 9,900 feet in most areas of the world (20:93). These runway limitations are significant at the operational levels of crisis response, because they greatly narrow the numbers of runways an opponent must target if he seeks to disrupt this most vital element of the crisis response apparatus. The arrival of the C-17 as a replacement for the C-141 commencing in 1996 will materially increase the numbers of bases available for use in airlift operations. With its ability to operate routinely from 3000 foot runways and much more restricted ramp space, the C-17 will give the strategic airlift force access to an additional 6399 airfields worldwide, triple the number now available to C-141s (59:24). Nevertheless, it will not solve the basic problem of the dependency of strategic airlift on a fixed airfield which can be targeted by TBMs. Strategic sealift requires port facilities to offload supplies and equipment. In the case of containerized material, these facilities must include specialized cranes to achieve the quickest possible offoad and turnaround. Although in some situations it may be possible to offload sealift using "logisitics over the shore" (LOTS) techniques, these are generally much slower than normal offloading operations, as well as being very dependent on weather conditions. In a crisis response scenario, speed of-arrival is critical, and sealift must have access to developed port facilities. Prepositioning permits a volume of materiel equivalent to that provided by sealift to arrive in a crisis area at the speed of air travel. Ultimately, it is reliant on effective airlift (58:368), and has the same dependence on fixed bases as both airlift and sealift. THE IMPACT OF NEW TECHNOLOGY At the same time that the world is experiencing a profound political upheaval with the collapse of the Soviet Union, it is also witnessing revolutionary changes in the distribution of military technology and the military capabilities of Third World countries. These changes affect not only the immediate battlefield threats faced by U.S. forces responding to regional crises, but the operational and strategic levels of crisis response as well. As the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, the Honorable Stephen J. Hadley, noted in Congressional testimony last year: We are witnessing a military technological revolution that is changing the nature of warfare and will further challenge our future national security policy and military strategy for regional conflicts. Sophisticated military capabilities -once thought to be the exclusive preserve of the "superpowers" - are now available to regional military powers (91:855) At present, more than twenty "Third world" nations now have some type of TBM capability either in operation or under development (35:464). While most of these nations originally received missiles from one or the other of the superpowers, at least nine of these states now have their own domestic sources for missile technology, and one-- China --appears to be actively developing an export trade of missiles to the Middle East (46:438). The proliferation of these weapons has reached such an extent that Marine air ground task forces (MAGTFs) could find themselves within range of TBMs in any expeditionary operation conducted along the African littoral between the Straits of Gibraltar and the Horn of Africa, as well as anywhere along the periphery of the Eurasian landmass. Already, North Korean missiles appear to be capable of reaching U. S. bases in South Korea, and Indian "Agni" intermediate range ballistic missile can reach the U.S. base at Diego Garcia (35:466). Generally defined as a ballistic missile with a range of less the 1,000 kilometers, the TBM's principal operating characteristic is its ability to cover great distances in short flight times with a very low probability of being intercepted. Its primary benefit in a military sense has always been that it can threaten targets similar to those traditionally attacked by aircraft, but without risking an airplane or crew(68:3). Historically, TBMs have been considered a very inefficient way to deliver conventional explosives. More expensive to produce than an equivalent payload of artillery projectile or aircraft ordnance, TBMs are much less accurate than aircraft delivered munitions, and are useable for only a single strike. The TBM is typically no more than half as cost-efficient as a strike aircraft for an equivalent weight of ordnance delivered to the same range (76:526). This changes, however, in cases where aircraft attrition rates are abnormally high (35% or more) (26:9). For developing nations facing surface-to-air missiles such as the Patriot or HAWK (both with relatively high kill probabilities), TBMs may be an attractive alternative to air attacks against area targets deep in enemy rear areas. Indeed, TBMs may well be the weapon of choice in future conflicts, since as was proved in DESERT STORM, TBMs can continue to strike a vital enemy installation regardless of air superiority (56:247). Iraq's mobile launchers were apparently left undamaged by the initial Coalition air attacks, and despite nearly 2,500 sorties dedicated to their destruction, they remained ready for a massive strike right up to the last hours of the war (78:36). TBMs may also compensate for poorly trained or equipped air forces, or for the absence of air forces in countries unwilling or unable to invest in the expensive and complex infrastructure required to support aviation (40:14). Lastly, "missiles do not defect" (26:11). At present, the regional powers possessing TBMs are limited in their targeting strategies by a lack of real time long range reconnaissance as well as limited range, accuracy, payload and available numbers of missiles in their forces (35:469). Nevertheless, "Third World ballistic missiles are seen as a way of discouraging superpower intervention in regional conflicts. Failing that, some Third World leaders have announced a willingness (technical capabilities permitting) to strike offshore US military bases or US cities in retribution for US military actions. This intention appears to be irrespectve of the overall correlation of forces."(35:470) Thus, regional powers may perceive a powerful incentive to use their missiles preemptively, striking lucrative targets concentrated at known locations before opponents can destroy the missiles in their storage areas or the launchers in their firing sites. Air bases, ports, staging areas, POL storage areas and possibly even regional political centers may well be seen as choice targets during the early phases of a U. S. crisis response operation (49:20). Indeed, the example of what it cost Hussein to leave the airlift and MPS off loads of DESERT SHIELD unmolested may be the most powerful argument for such an approach. From a military standpoint, the TBM's two principal limitations are its inaccuracy and its dependence on real time target intelligence for use against any targets other than large, immobile area targets such as cities. It is for these reasons that the "threat" associated with TBMs has traditionally been a function of the availability of nuclear, chemical or biological warheads. Without such "weapons of mass destruction" or other advanced munitions to compensate for its inaccuracy, the TBM has been regarded by the military superpowers as more of a psychological threat than a military one. Indeed, it was the lack of "mass destruction" warheads in the Third World that made the original distribution of TBMs acceptable for the superpowers. Recently, however, the Third World has begun to acquire technology which substantially changes the potential effectiveness of their missile forces. In addition to TBMs, regional powers are gaining access to sensor and warhead technologies which were once the exclusive preserve of the superpowers. No longer is access to satellite imagery or cluster munitions a function of superpower support to a regional proxy. High resolution photo imagery, available in near real time, is increasingly available to developing nations via systems such as LANDSAT, SPOT, and EOSAT. As the former Soviet republics market satellite resources in return for hard currency, this access will grow even further. Already China, Brazil, South Africa, and Thailand have direct access to LANDSAT imagery via ground stations (27:110). Several other states are actively seeking such access, limited only by available funding. India is actively pursuing its own satellite launch program (63:43). In addition to being able to purchase LANDSAT and SPOT imagery on the open market. Planned improvements in the sensor resolution of the various civilian satellites, originally intended to increase their commercial and scientific utility, will also provide "access to imagery good enough to see aircraft, identify large ships and detect a variety of military maneuvers and operations"(27:112). The fact that these satellites are used jointly by several nations at a time limits U. S. options for use of anti-satellite weapons to blind them. Although the downlink connections in the target country might be targeted, the wide availability of mobile satellite receivers suggests that a complete cutoff of imagery sources might prove extremely difficult. Thus in future regional conflicts, the U. S. may discover itself unable to repeat the feat of blinding the Iraqis to the critical approach march leading to the "Hail Mary" maneuver. In addition to real time satellite imagery, Third World nations can now obtain access to the extremely precise navigational signals provided by the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS) satellite array and its Soviet counterpart (GLONASS). Originally, GPS was intended to provide two different signals positioning and velocity information signals: one purposely distorted to permit navigational accuracy only to 100 meters for general civilian use, and one permitting 10 meter accuracy for military use. The latter would be obtained only via coded signal using specially configured receivers. A shortage of these receivers in the early days of Operation Desert Shield led the Department of Defense to stop coding the signal, to permit deployed forces to use the widely available commercial receivers to 10 meter accuracy. As of late 1991, the signal coding had not been restored, apparently due to continuing reliability problems with the special receivers and pressure from civilian aviation interests, who argue that GLONASS's availability makes coding the military signal pointless. Moreover, a French owned firm has begun marketing a receiver which it claims can achieve accuracy "within centimeters" using even the distorted signal (11:4). The combination of real time targeting information provided by LANDSAT-type systems with the navigational accuracy provided by GPS/GLONASS will permit regional powers to employ TBMs with nearly as much accuracy as the most advanced U.S. systems. In the opinion of one expert on missile technology: "A thousand kilometer range missile with accuracy of about 50 meters is well within the capability of at least some Third World countries" (14:38). This advance in accuracy is perhaps the most ominous development of the military revolution taking place in the Third World, for at a stroke it mulitplies the value of previously obsolete ballistic missiles already in the possession of regional powers, and gives regional powers strategic and operational leverage on a par with the United States. Accuracy is one of two key components of missile lethality, the other being warhead effectiveness against the chosen target (89:139). The product of the quality of targeting information plus the precision of the missile's guidance hardware, accuracy is often compared by reference to "circular error probable" (CEP), which is defined as the radius around an aimpoint within which at least 50% of the missiles fired will impact. This figure, which is proportional to range, is derived from an extrapolation of test data, and is normally stated for the maximum range of the missile. Because of the number of factors influencing a missile's flight path during testing, including the specific climate and gravitational effects for the test range itself, it may be in error by as much as 50% (53:50). Thus, the stated CEP of a given missile may be considerably different from its actual accuracy, depending upon the testing conditions and the accuracy of the test data itself. Using strictly inertial guidance systems, a CEP of perhaps 200 meters at intercontinental ranges may be possible to achieve, given state of the art engineering expertise and technology (89:121). However, using guidance update methods, such as GPS, which permit corrections to the accumulated inertial errors prior to the terminal phase of flight, CEPs of less than 100 meters at ranges of several thousand kilometers are possible (89:127). Thus, even the most primitive TBMs could begin to have guidance systems which would place them consistently within the effective radius of the large conventional high explosive warhead they normally carry. Even before this accuracy revolution comes to full maturity, however, the acquisition of cluster munition warheads for Third World TBMs has begun to change the calculation of their military potential. Originally developed for TBMs by the Soviets for use in the later models of their R-17 missile (better known today by its NATO codename "Scud")(42:302), these new munitions radically increase the destructive effects of a single missile. As an illustration of the comparison between cluster munitions and conventional high explosive, a single salvo of eighteen U. S. ATACMS missiles, each with a 150 kilogram cluster munition warhead, has the destructive effect of a salvo of thirty three battalions of 155mm artillery, or 792 high explosive projectiles (83:42). This potential for destruction, when married to the ability of a TBM to cover long distances very quickly with little chance of interception, in effect gives any nation which deploys such weapons the capacity. With greater accuracy and more lethal conventional warheads even obsolete missiles such as the Scud, become much more militarily significant. Currently the Scud has only a fifty percent chance of landing within 985 meters of its aiming point. An unmodified SCUD, with a CEP of 985 meters has a probability of .017 of hitting a 9,900 foot by 165 foot runway (72:139), Accordingly, it would take more than 40 missiles to obtain even a fifty percent probability of damaging the runway. However, studies conducted on the Soviet threat to NATO airbases in the mid-1980's concluded that 6 to 12 SS-23 TBMs, with CEPs of less than 100 meters and runway cratering munitions, had a 90% probability of temporarily closing an 8,000 foot runway (72:515-517). While a single hit on a runway with a conventional HE warhead might not damage the surface enough to put it 6ut of action for any significant period of time, a missile equipped with cluster munitions might well create sufficient surface spalling to prevent landings or take offs for a considerable duration. After an attack by Turkish aircraft in July 1974, which inflicted sixteen large (25 foot) craters, eighty smaller craters, and over 4,00 surface spalls (caused by strafing), the Nicosia International Airport was unable to operate a full length runway for nearly 5 weeks, despite the dedicated efforts of 130 engineers with repair materials readily at hand (18:18). This level of damage might easily be achieved by a mix of HE and cluster munition equipped TBMs launched in a salvo similar to the initial Iraqi missile barrage against Israel on 18 January 1991. Eight "large" craters would be created by either the HE warheads or the kinetic energy of the impacting cluster warheads casings alone, not counting the effects of the submunitions they contained. It is not difficult to imagine how different the course of the Gulf War might have been had even one such strike reached Dhahran, Jubail or King Abdul Aziz airfield during the critical early days of DESERT SHIELD. In addition to the potential for physical destruction, this enhanced threat reinforces the TBM's psychological impact as well, and in this regard it is important to consider that perceptions may be more important than actual capabilities(87:14). What if the first Scud fired in DESERT STORM had hit the barracks in Dhahran? What if it had hit the Israeli Parliament buildings, or the Dimona Reactor? What if Hussein had fired his first missiles as the MPS offload began, and the first salvo had landed squarely in the pierside areas of Jubail, unchallenged because the limited numbers of Patriots were covering Dhahran? With 99% of the containers being moved by non-U.S., civilian drivers would the offload have continued on schedule? There is little doubt that had any of these events occurred, the Gulf War would have been an entirely different psychological experience for the United States and its allies, and the Al-Hussein missile forces would have had a much greater, and possibly decisive impact on the course of the war. COUNTERING THE THREAT In seeking to counter the TBM threat, power projection forces have three basic options: offensive strikes to disrupt or prevent launch, active defenses to intercept missiles in flight, and passive defenses to complicate enemy targeting and reduce warhead effectiveness. (45:302) As the Allied experience in DESERT STORM revealed, offensive strikes to neutralize missiles prior to launch cannot by itself be considered a fully effective measure. As one commentator noted: ...it became clear in the Gulf War that Offensive Counter Air (OCA) is no substitute for effective missile defense. In the space of nearly six weeks the Coalition air forces were not able to eliminate the Iraqi missile threat--even though they had overwhelming air superiority and conducted massive bombardment, in spite of the sophistication of US air-reconnaissance assets, and even though Iraq's topography facilitates OCA against mobile missile systems. Active defenses against TBMs consist entirely of missile interceptors since the terminal velocity of TBMs approaching a target is several times too fast for a conventional gun system to intercept. The primary anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) is the Patriot. A radar guided computer controlled missile with a speed in excess of Mach 5, it is currently the only U.S. missile considered to be an ATBM, although the slower HAWK may have some capability against primitive TBMs when guided by the Patriot's radar (86:804). The Scud missiles upon which the Iraqi missile force is based have been described as "the dinosaurs of TBMs" (49:18) A close derivative of the German V-2 missile designs captured by the Soviets at the end of World War Two, the Scud is relatively slow in comparison with more modern designs and is thus less challenging to intercept. Even so, there is significant evidence now emerging that the Patriot system was far less successful than originally claimed in countering the 91 "Al-Hussein" modified Scuds fired by Iraq during DESERT STORM. Patriot batteries engaged 47 incoming Al-Husseins, firing 158 missiles in the process (72:126). In the system's programming for the automatic firing mode, two missiles were fired per salvo because the missile's single shot kifl probability was originally assumed to be only .5- .6 for a TBM target (.8 for an aircraft target)(2:50). A total of 39 Al-Husseins were not engaged because they were projected to miss any possible target or were outside of the Patriot's firing parameters (as was the case with the missile that struck the U.S. barracks in Dhahran.) The remaining five apparently broke up immediately after launch, and never reached their target areas (5:225). Although the Army and Raytheon Corporation have claimed that 45 of the 47 TBMs engaged were successfully intercepted, data compiled by the House Armed Services Committee and the Israeli Defense Forces indicates that between 24 and 39 of the engaged missile warheads actually penetrated to impact (72:126). Patriot's performance in DESERT STORM aside, it clearly has several inadequacies which must be corrected before it can be considered a truly effective system against the emerging TBM threat. First, it covers too small an area to be fully effective against multi-azimuth saturation attacks (2:50,52). Second, it does not intercept warheads high enough to prevent collateral damage, especially if the incoming missile is armed with a nuclear or chemical weapon. Third, it has less effectiveness as the range of TBMs increases, due to the proportionally higher reentry speed for longer range missiles (72, 86). Currently, the U. S. plans to expand its ATBM capabilities with deployment of the ERINT (Extended Range Interceptor) and "THAAD" (Theater High Altitude Air Defense) systems. ERINT is a very high speed missile designed to intercept incoming TBMs at significantly higher altitudes than Patriot is capable of(36:1365). Small enough so that a Patriot launcher unit can fire up to sixteen ERINTs--four times the number of Patriots--the system is intended to complement Patriot by providing an effective defense against TBMs with chemical or nuclear warheads and quadrupling its ability to deal with saturation attacks (67:10). THAAD is intended to be a ground based missile system which can provide high altitude air defense over a large area, intercepting warheads at ranges up to 200 kilometers and altitudes as high as 150 kilometers (36:1364). Capable of being deployed via C-130, it is intended as the first line of defense against TBMs until space-based defenses are developed and deployed. Conceived as being fast enough to permit two attempts at interceeption prior to handing a track off to ERINT/Patriot (29:12), it is designed to provide a much wider area of intercept capability than the point defense provided by PATRIOT, with an overall effectiveness up to ten times greater. Current plans project that ERINT and THAAD will be available for deployment by 1995, with both systems in full production and operation by 1998. Nevertheless, neither missile has yet progressed into full scale development, and given the difficulties experienced in the U.S.-Israeli ARROW ATBM project (38:156), it is not at all certain that these projected dates can be met. The shrinking fiscal resources available for defense spending, coupled with diminished Congressional concerns about overseas threats may also limit these programs. In any case, it seems likely that the Patriot, though only partiallly effective, will represent the "state of the art" in active defenses for some time to come. Passive defense measures against missiles consist of "hardening" facilities to make them more resistent to physical destruction, camouflage and deception to complicate enemy efforts to locate targets, and mobility and dispersion to counter the targeting process itself. Hardening technology is available which would make runways uncraterable, but it would do little to protect against cheinical attack or the effects of mine submunitions spread across the operating surface. In any case, hardening even a small percentage of the runways and port facilities in crisis areas would be prohibitively expensive even if it were politically feasible to accomplish. Camouflage and deception may complicate enemy efforts to locate suitable TBM targets via their access to overhead sensors, but hiding a large scale airlift or MPS off-load would be extremely difficult. In the early stages of a crisis response, prior to actual hostilities, the U. S. may actuajly have an incentive not to hide such locations, since keeping the location of contingency forces secret might effectively ruin their potential deterrent effects. Dispersal of potential targets greatly reduces the probability that a single missile or salvo will cause catastrophic damage, but it also places a great strain upon logistics. Indeed, in some cases, dispersal may actually be the desired result of a missile targeting strategy. Certain maintenance elements, such as aircraft intermediate maintenance activities (IMA), become noneffective when dispersed too widely (31). The most effective passive defense measure is mobility. Targets which can "scamper away" when warned of attack are extremely difficult to destroy, as are targets which are able to move unpredictably over areas larger than a missile's lethal radius during its time of flight. Targets which can move more frequently than sensors can update information cannot be targeted at all, since basic target location data can never be obtained. SOLUTIONS FOR FUTURE POWER PROTECTION Clearly, 3,000 foot runways and MPS off-load ports cannot readily be made mobile. A mobility "effect" can be achieved, however, by substituting a series of alternate runway surfaces, including roadways, for any given airbase, multiplying the number of aimpoints required for an attacker to achieve a high probability of closing down flight operations (100:3). MPS off-load sites can also be more widely dispersed to reduce their vulnerability to a single missile or salvo. While such dispersion would greatly increase logistic inefficiencies and slow the pace of both airlift and MPS off-load operations, it would still permit the introduction of forces using those means. Dispersion also appears to be the most viable answer for preserving combat aircraft in the face of the TBM threat. Fighter and ground attack aircraft requiring a limited number of long, hard, smooth runways can be "pinned" by a steady barrage of TBMs fired at intervals, even if none of the airframes themselves are damaged. Since hardening of forward air bases is relatively difficult to achieve in the early stages of most crisis scenarios, the likelihood of aircraft escaping undamaged from a cluster munitions attack would seem rather remote. If such an attack is accompanied by a large-scale enemy air attack, the results could be catastrophic both to the aircraft and the operating surface itself, as noted in the previous account of the attack on Nicosia in 1974. Aircraft capable of operations independent of long, fixed runways would be able to maintain an air effort with much less interruption, being much more difficult to target even for an opponent equipped with near real time satellite imagery. The most readily achievable solution to the problem of making expeditionary air power independent of fixed bases is clearly the expanded use of VSTOL aircraft such as the Harrier. Two common concerns, however, are the perception that VSTOL aircraft are inherently less capable than conventional designs, and that expanded use of dispersed operating sites may overwhelm the ability of the logistics system to support the requisite levels of sorties needed for an effective air campaign. In fact, as a strike aircraft, the Harrier is superior in many respects to the F-16C (56:7-11). In the fighter role, the Harrier is extremely capable in visual range engagements, although its lack of a radar makes it ineffective in beyond visual range (BVR) combat (56:19,3:52). However, the Marine Corps will be acquiring a limited number of the AV-8"plus," which will be equipped with the same APG-65 radar that the Hornet carries, making it capable of firing the 40-plus mile range AMRAAM missile, and giving it a significant BVR capability (85:1347-8). Until substantial numbers of these models are available, a near term solution may lie in the on-going development of a truly expeditionary basing capability for existing conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) aircraft such as the F-15 Eagle, the F-16 Fighting Falcon and the F/A-18 Hornet. The Hornet is currently capable of operating from roadways as short as 3000 feet with full mission loads(31). With portable arresting gear, operating surfaces as short as 2000 feet are feasible (92:145). Work is also underway to give a similar capability to the F-15 (85:1345), while the F-16 is already being used in roadway operations by the Norwegian air force. Using the same logistics concepts that have been developed for Harrier operations from forward sites, bases using available roadways can be established which would permit high performance fighter cover of crisis response forces while minimizing vulnerability to TBMs. The problem of logistic support for dispersed operating sites ashore can be at least be partially resolved by the expanded use of seabases for these aircraft. Seabasing offers the mobility necessary to avoid the TBM threat with the sustainment potential needed for an effective air campaign. Although the limited numbers of large deck aircraft carriers will always constrain the numbers of conventional takeoff and landing aircraft which can be kept at sea in a crisis area, concepts such as The U.S. Navy's "Arapaho" system, developed in the late l97Os as a means for providing antisubmarine helicopter protection to convoys, have considerable potential as a means for expanding sea bases for aviation elements. Consisting of a kit of specialized containers and flatracks which can be installed atop the weather decks of several different designs of commerical shipping, the system provides an afloat air facility capable of operating either helicopters or VSTOL jets, conceivably including intermediate maintenance capabilities (59:103-105). As the Arapaho system is currently configured, each of these ships can operate 8-10 medium helicopters or up to 6 Harriers; certainly modifications could be pursued which would permit considerably more numbers of Harriers. Although they would not be capable of supporting CTOL aircraft, these vessels could serve to reduce the requirements for movement of logistic support ashore, as well as basing sufficient numbers of Harriers to provide the means for a significant air effort even without large bases ashore or the availability of several aircraft carriers. While they are not capable of sustaining battle damage on the scale of a carrier, Arapaho ships do offer a very cheap method of expanding the aircraft basing potential of a seabased crisis response force. In 1983 dollars, the cost of a single Arapaho was approximately $15-20 million per kit, excluding aircraft (68:118). Complementing both the Arapaho and air capable naval shipping would be the use of LCACs as highly mobile forward air refuelling points (FARPs) in support of road based CTOL aircraft. These air cushion craft are capable of 45 knot speeds with loads of up to 60 tons, and can cross up to 70 percent of the available coastline in the world. Capable of operating well inland, they could provide the means for a significant air effort by CTOL aircraft by bringing fuel, ordnance and even repair capabilities to whereever the roadway base happened to be. Facilities to support not only helicopters but Harriers and Hornets operating from roadways in the beachhead area. (48:104). Most importantly, they would be extremely difficult to target by ballistic missile. An alternative solution to the availability of CTOL aircraft in the face of the TBM threat is to place all CTOL aircraft aboard aircraft carriers and replace the numbers lost due to deck spaces with TBMs launched from ships. Vertical launch ATACMs, fired from cruisers, could be combined with conventional advanced munition missiles launched from ballistic missile submarines to provide an overwhelming deep strike capability. Our own ballistic missiles, combining with real time satellite sensors and the extremely advanced guidance technologies we have already employed in the Pershing and Trident systems would, in effect, turn the threat back on regional powers, restoring the spectacular fire supremacy which made a campaign such as DESERT STORM possible. Logistics bases for ground forces, like aircraft operating sites, cannot be widely dispersed without severe reductions in their ability to provide effective support. Thus, the only solution to minimizing their vulnerability to TBMs may well be to move them entirely to sea, using purpose built shipping such as the TAKs of the Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons as floating combat service support bases and supply warehouses. With modifications added to permit the rapid loading of LCACs and other landing craft offshore, these vessels could readily support the needs of units ashore. Using LCACs and helicopters to move supplies ashore would permit rapid resupply deep inland. The problem of providing the requisite amounts of bulk fuel might be solved by the use of large submarines, possibly retired ballistic missile boats, as tankers. These vessels would draw fuels from conventional tankers well offshore, then would move inshore to where they could remain submerged or resting on the bottom while offloading their cargo. This approach, in effect a submerged fuel farm, would greatly reduce the signature and vulnerability of bulk fuel storage sites while still permitting large amounts of POL products to be passed to forces ashore. SUMMARY In October, 1983, a large Mercedes truck loaded with the equivalent of a 12.000 pound bomb obliterated the headquarters of a Marine Battalion Landing Team deployed at the Beirut International Airport. Killing 241 U.S. servicemen and effectively destroying the U.S. position in Lebanon, the bombing sent shock waves throughout the entire military establishment, finally forcing a reassessment of the vulnerability of U. S. power projection forces in the face of a threat which had been evident for nearly two decades. In February, 1991, a single Al-Hussein missile obliterated another U. 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