Ground/Space-Based Defense - Offering Security In An Unstable, Multipolar And Volatile World AUTHOR Major Mark S. Peecook, USMC CSC 1991 SUBJECT AREA - National Security EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TITLE: GROUND/SPACE-BASED DEFENSE - OFFERING SECURITY IN AN UNSTABLE, MULTIPOLAR AND VOLATILE WORLD I. Theme: To illustrate America's reliance on space-based assets in our everyday life, present Soviet/Third World threats to our national security and offer a realistic solution to protect our country while maintaining freedom for unobstructed use of space. II. Thesis: Failure to adequately fund, develop, and field an active ground/space-based defense leaves America openly exposed to Soviet and Third World ICBMs, hostile satellite targeting and electronic intelligence imaging. III. Discussion: The Soviet Union views space as a fundamental strategic operating medium providing opportunities for application of national power to achieve permanent advantage. In other words, they see space as the geopolitical high ground. The Soviets possess the world's only operational antisatellite (ASAT) weapon, as well as other weapons with an ASAT capability. These weapons have the capability to disrupt or destroy United States or allied military space systems. However, the United States and the Soviet Union no longer enjoy a monopoly on key strategic technologies. Ignored until recently, the military threat posed by non-superpower nations has caused military strategists to rethink issues such as nuclear proliferation and Third World ASATs. Presently, 18 nations have ballistic missiles and by the turn of the century, the number is expected to rise to 24. It is estimated that Germany and Japan will have nuclear weapons by the year 2000. Arab nations will also buy nuclear weapons unless the United States agrees to protect them. History shows us that once countries develop long range missiles with an inherent space launch capability, reconnaissance "spy" satellites for targeting purposes, become the next logical step. Targeting from imagery, electronic and radar reconnaissance satellites represents the most direct threat to the well being of the United States. IV. Summary: The United States relies heavily on unobstructed use of space. However, America lacks both the capability to protect its orbiting satellites and ability to quickly replace them should the Soviets elect to employ their ASAT weaponry. Equally important is America's vulnerability to an accidental missile launch, an intentional launch by a rogue commander from a country undergoing internal unrest, or a terrorist ICBM. V. Conclusion: The first responsibility of government is the defense of the governed. Due to the potential catastrophic effect of weapons of mass destruction attacking from the high ground of space, America can ill afford an "ostrich defense." The United States must adequately fund, develop and field an active ground/space-based defense. GROUND/SPACE-BASED DEFENSE - OFFERING SECURITY IN AN UNSTABLE, MULTIPOLAR AND VOLATILE WORLD Outline Thesis: Failure to adequately fund, develop, and field an active ground/ space-based defense leaves America openly exposed to Soviet and Third World ICBMs, hostile satellite targeting and electronic intelligence imaging. I. Reliance on Space A. Military use of space 1. Persian Gulf War 2. Present-day use B. Commercial use of space II. Soviet use of space A. Strategic operating medium B. Geopolitical high ground C. Aggressive launch pace D. Military use of space 1. Reconnaissance/targeting 2. Soviet ASAT 3. Mutiny/unrest III. Outside Threats A. Industrialized nations B. Third World countries C. Terrorism D. Strategic technology proliferation IV. Reformation of SDI A. "Star Wars" vs "GPALS" B. Arguments for and against V. Destabilizing Imbalance A. Vulnerabilities B. America's choices GROUND/SPACE-BASED DEFENSE - OFFERING SECURITY IN AN UNSTABLE, MULTIPOLAR AND VOLATILE WORLD Despite wishful thinking to the contrary, man is and promises to remain an aggressive, combative creature. We fear, we hate, we fight one another. Until we remove causes of fear and hatred and correct the conditions which prompt us to arm ourselves, we have no choice but to prepare to defend ourselves against attack... against aggression in space and from space. We cannot surrender the 'high ground' without contest. Jacob E. Smart, General, USAF 1974 The Soviet Union stunned the world with the first successful satellite launch of Sputnik in October 1957. The United States quickly answered the Soviet challenge with the launch of Explorer 1 in January 1958. Then, in December 1958 President Eisenhower provided a glimpse of America's future in space when he delivered his famous Christmas goodwill message to the world by satellite. Public understanding of space programs, whether that of Americans, Soviets, Asians or Europeans, is confined to events publicized in the media. Therefore, it is not surprising that most of the world has remained relatively unaware of the extensive efforts by many nations, especially those of the United States and the Soviet Union, to utilize space to ensure national security. National security is much more than a purely military concept. It also has equally important economic and political dimensions. It includes verification of disarmament, domestic priorities and, increasingly, the challenges of terrorism and weapons proliferation. Moveover, national security can be influenced by events outside our treaty area, as was demonstrated during the Persian Gu1f War. Reliance on Space American satellites, out of sight and largely out of mind, high above the Arabian peninsula may never have fired a shot in the latest Gulf War, but they undoubtedly played a vital role in the victory of the coalition forces over Iraq. Labelling it "the first space war," Mr. John Pike, a space policy analyst at the Federation of American-Scientists in Washington, D.C., explained: "It's the first time the full range of space systems has been used to support the military in a real-time operational combat situation."(24:1,36) In November 1990, the successful placement of America's 16th Navstar satellite into orbit highlighted the Pentagon's decision to buy 100,000 Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers.(33:3,36) Navstar GPS deserves much of the credit for the surgically precise bombing and accurate navigation by both aircraft and ground forces across the featureless Arabian desert. GPS is a precision worldwide navigation system using a constellation of 13 satellites that transmit three-dimensioned triangularized locations anywhere on the earth's surface or atmosphere. (15:66) GPS also played a key role in helping fuel-guzzling aircraft, tanks and military units to rendezvous with their refuelers and resupply. Equally important, not only did GPS assist friendly artillery in quickly pinpointing Iraqi targets, it also permitted coalition artillery locations to be accurately determined allowing first-round destruction of Iraqi targets.(23:20) Naval versions of GPS were used for shipboard navigation, pinpointing the locations of mines, and as a self-correcting homing device for the Standoff Land Attack Missile (SLAM), launched from warplanes against Iraqi command-and-control installations. (23:20) Commercially, GPS receivers are used not only to identify and update the exact location of land sites or vehicles in transit, but also in cellular telephones and forwarding messages as well. "The largest domestic user is the trucking industry, which is expected to equip a total of 11,000 vehicles with satellite terminals by the end of the year." (28:20) Private and commercial aircraft use GPS receivers as do law enforcement agencies. GPS was only a small portion of the vast array of satellite systems contributing to the overwhelming coalition victory. As General Norman Schwarkzkopf, the coalition forces commander, described the battle strategy in the final hours of the ground war, the allies took advantage of Iraq's reliance on Cable News Network satellite-broadcast news and Iraq's lack of space systems to provide independent information of the war. News coverage of amphibious assault exercises by Marines in December 1990 and of ground troops making small incursions northward across the border from Saudi Arabia to Kuwait deceived Iraqi commanders as to the real intentions of allied forces. Although General Schwartzkopf did not mention the role of space systems, central to the campaign's success was the fact that coalition forces had intelligence satellites; the Iraqis did not. Thus blinded, the Iraqi forces were placed at a disadvantage that proved impossible to overcome. The versatility and responsiveness of satellite space systems is extremely valuable in the contingency environment in which we live today. Crises may occur with little warning or requisite experience and knowledge of the terrain is not always readily at hand. The Defense Mapping Agency shipped over 7.6 million maps to forces deployed in Operation DESERT SHIELD. Ironically, the agency was prepared with up-to-date maps of Iraq, but was caught off guard by the need for the latest maps of two allies--Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. (09:17) The first shipments of maps of those countries were missing infrastructure changes made after 1982. Demonstrating the flexibility of space systems, new maps containing the updates were shipped in five days. Other contributions by space assets in the Gulf were provided by meteorological, reconnaissance and signals intelligence satellites. Highly detailed weather information of impending sand storms and high sea states saved lives and equipment. If Iraq had resorted to chemical warfare, weather information would have been vital for tracking chemical clouds and forecasting when the chemicals would dissipate.(20:06) American reconnaissance imaging satellites passed over the Iraqi theater more than a dozen times daily, providing hundreds of images on each pass. Both raw and interpreted image data were provided at real or near-real time to coalition intelligence officers in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. (06:25) Lacrosse radar-imaging satellites provided detailed bomb damage assessment, exact enemy location, and most likely enemy intentions even at night or during poor weather or smoke conditions.(12:11) Intelligence satellites intercepted Iraqi communications and assisted in the early warning of SCUD missile launches. The logistic chain supplying forces in the Gulf was more immense and extended than in any conflict the world has ever seen, yet it operated with speed and efficiency. Every mode of transportation, from aircraft to camels, was employed in the coalition buildup. Assisting in that effort were two small, lightweight, relatively inexpensive satellites called Lightsats. "Up to 50 pages of logistics requests for naval aviation spare parts and support material were forwarded daily back to [Marine Corps] headquarters in Cherry Point, NC; Rota, Spain and points east."(26:01) The update of maps for the Persian Gulf area was performed primarily by civilian Landsat and SPOT remote-sensing satellites. With resolution as fine as six inches, the exchange of information between the Defense Department and civilian sector permits civilian governmental agencies to benefit as well. For example, the Drug Enforcement Administration has used satellite imagery to identify illegal drug crops, manufacturing facilities, boats, aircraft and landing strips.(22:16) Due to its affordability, advanced technology from defense satellites has spurred many industrial and commercial applications. Commercial fishing, crop forecasts, cartography, oil and mineral prospecting, land-use planning, pollution surveys and all types of high load communications are but a few of the many civilian benefits of unobstructed daily satellite use.(40:190-196) Soviet Use of Space No matter what happens in the Soviet Union, no matter how many walls fall down, no matter how many elections are held, or who the President may be, the Soviet Union will remain a military superpower--a nuclear military superpower with the ability, if not the intention, to destroy our way of life in 3O minutes. General Co1in L. Powell Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff(27:17) It is interesting to note the sharply contrasting ways in which the two superpowers envisage the military potential of space. The United States views space as a sanctuary free of military conflict and as a medium for communicating or transporting items from one point to another. In contrast, the Soviets view space as a fundamental strategic operating medium providing opportunities for application of national power to achieve permanent advantage. In other words, they see space as the geopolitical high ground. (03:85) Soviet space assets conduct a variety of missions similar to those of the United States. Among these are targeting; imagery, electronic and radar reconnaissance; command, control and communications; launch detection and attack warning; ocean surveillance; arms control verification; and meteorological and navigational support. Targeting from imagery, electronic and radar reconnaissance satellites represents the most direct threat to the well-being of the United States. In an unusually open discussion of Soviet spy satellite capabilities, Colonel General Alexander Maksimov stated in the newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star): Space reconnaissance makes it possible to obtain a clear image in the visible spectrum with resolution down to .2 - .3 meters. This means that from orbit, it is possible to see every player on a soccer pitch, or to determine whether a B-1 bomber is equipped with missiles. Radio technical reconnaissance makes it possible to locate radiation in practically all bands and to determine the source of this radiation... Space reconnaissance [also] makes it possible to intercept radio conversations. With the help of retransmitter satellites, all this information can be obtained in close to real-time.(31:12) The Soviets are maintaining an aggressive launch pace that will continue to increase their future capabilities. During 1989, the Soviets averaged a launch every five days. Seventeen times during that year, space missions were launched less than 24 hours apart. Twice, the Soviets launched three missions in less than 12 hours. Once, four missions using four different types of launch vehicles were successfully placed in orbit. (07:44-45) By way of comparison, the United States launches an average of less than 30 missions per year. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the vast differences between numbers of Soviet and United States satellite space launches. Click here to view image The Soviets possess the world's only operational antisatellite (ASAT) weapon, as well as other weapons with an ASAT capability. These weapons have the capability to disrupt or destroy United States or allied military space systems. Recognizing the importance of space-based support to military forces, "...the Soviets long ago established a doctrinal objective of denying the use of space to other countries."(53:55) The USSR began intensive research and development of an ASAT intercepter in the 1960s; it became operational in 1971. Although since 1983, the Soviets have often claimed a unilateral moratorium on the launching of ASAT system, in actuality the Soviets routinely conduct tests of ASAT elements and procedures on the ground. Furthermore, their "coorbital intercept remains in readiness at its launch site at the Tyuratam cosmodrome, where two launch pads and storage space for many interceptors and launch vehicles exist."(52:60) Even with their reported unilateral moratorium on ASAT weapon launches, the Soviets presently have the capability to destroy low and medium earth orbit satellites. The annual Pentagon publication, Soviet Military Power - 1990, presents an even more negative outlook: The Soviets have additional potential ASAT capabilities: exoatmospheric ABM missiles, located around Moscow and at the Sary Shagan test range, that could be used against satellites in near-earth orbit; at least one ground-based laser, also at Sary Shagan, that may have sufficient power to damage some unprotected satellites in near-earth orbits; and electronic warfare assets that probably would be used against satellites at all altitudes. Research and development of technologies applicable to more advanced ASAT systems continue at a steady pace. Areas of investigation that appear to hold promise include high energy laser, particle beam, radio frequency, and kinetic energy technologies. Future ASAT developments could now include directed energy weapons or direct-ascent nonnuclear interceptors. (52:61) These are times of unprecedented flux in the Soviet Union. The once cherished principles of Marxist/Leninist doctrine, established as the doctrinal political foundation of the Soviet Communist state, are being denounced by the liberalizing initiatives of their leaders and the Soviet people. Although the possibility of conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union has diminished, internal instability in the Soviet Union resulting from economic collapse, ethnic dissent, and internal political strife remains a distressing prospect. Clearly, from this new world order, a new threat has emerged. The possibility of an unauthorized or accidental discharge of chemical or nuclear weapons due to heightened turmoil within the Soviet Union was a noted concern of Senator Sam Nunn (Democrat-GA), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, during a recent floor speech. (32:16) A mutiny at a Strategic Missile Forces (SMF) base in the Urals was barely avoided in October 1990 and illustrates the unrest within the USSR. According to the Soviet newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda, the troops had not eaten for one week due to command negligence. Hunger and despair caused crews to desert their positions, and Moscow was forced to send in top officials of the SMF to avert the mutiny. (34:16) Declining Threat? The United States and the Soviet Union no longer enjoy a monopoly on key strategic technologies. Ignored until recently, the military threat posed by non-superpower nations has caused military strategists to rethink issues such as nuclear proliferation and Third World ASAT's. According to Stephen J. Hadley, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, "Eighteen nations have ballistic missiles now and, by the turn of the century, the number is expected to rise to 24."(29:27) It is estimated that Germany and Japan will have nuclear weapons by the year 2OOO. Arab nations will also buy nuclear weapons unless the United States agrees to defend them. (46:18) Unfortunately, possessing nuclear capability provides underdog nations and terrorists with "the great equalizer." There is ample evidence that Iraq, before the Persian Gulf War, was very close to developing its own nuclear weapons. Among the scientists attending a conference on nuclear explosive detonation held in Portland, Oregon, in August 1990 were three experts from the Iraqi nuclear weapons laboratory. "Partly because of such access to American expertise and the sale to Baghdad of nuclear components by the West Germans and Swiss, intelligence officials now estimate that Iraq could develop a bomb in less than a year."(36:06) How many other unstable nations have superpower and industrialized nations assisted in advancing their nuclear biological and chemical weapon production? Space proliferation as a genuine threat has come of age. In December 1990 the debris from the launch of an Iraqi three-stage rocket was tracked over multiple orbits and confirmed by the Defense Intelligence Agency. Besides becoming the first Arab nation to attain space launch capability, Iraq sent a political signal to Israel which had successfully placed two satellites into orbit last year and is making final preparations to launch its first reconnaissance satellite. (18:13) This Israeli satellite will be used to spy on Arab neighbors and to provide targeting data. (17:06) Other recent spacefaring nations, or nations within two years of their own launches, include: India, Egypt, Brazil, Argentina, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. The Department of Defense's main concern about space proliferation is that high tech weapons start with ballistic missiles. Less than 24 months after President Bush's "Discriminate Deterrence" report, the Administration voiced concern over the growing threat from Third World missiles armed with nuclear or chemical warheads. What follows is what Military Space calls the historical process: Once countries develop long-range missiles with an inherent space launch capability, reconnaissance satellites become the next logical step. Just as the U.S. Atlas and Soviet R-7 ICBMs launched the Discoverer and Cosmos reconnaissance satellites, Third World countries could launch their own systems on ballistic missiles optimized for space launch. ... Then nations take advantage of advances in electronics to develop sophisticated reconnaissance payloads. While the U.S., USSR and China started out with recoverable photographic systems, new space powers could go straight to electronic imaging systems. Based on TV camera technology, these systems can downlink images in near-real time to ground stations in a military theatre.(43:O3-O4) The increasing number of sophisticated space assets orbiting the earth at all altitudes complicates warfare, restricts the movement of our military forces, reduces surprise, and could permit a hostile nation to achieve first strike capability. Even without a Soviet threat, ASAT weapons are a small investment against any power employing satellites to target United States forces. As more unfriendly nations join the "ballistic missile club," they will similarly have the ability to place spy satellites into orbit. Transformation of SDI I have directed that the SDI program be refocused on providing protection from limited ballistic missile strikes, whatever their source. Let us pursue an SDI program that can deal with any future threat to the United States, to our forces overseas and to our friends and allies. (14:16) With these words, President George Bush announced a major redirection for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), commonly referred to as "Star Wars." The President disclosed the restructuring during his State of the Union Address to Congress and the American people on January 29, 1991. The scaling back of SDI to concentrate on defense against attack by shorter range enemy missiles and small volleys of long-range (ICBM) missiles, represents a major shift away from the "impenetrable shield" defense for full-scale nuclear war proposed by former President Ronald Reagan in 1983. The Defense Department has named the new mission Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS). GPALS will be less expensive than Star Wars and the technology to field such a system exists today. On January 28, 1991, the day before President Bush's State of the Union Address, an experimental endo/exoatmospheric ground based intercepter called Eris was launched from Kwajelein Atoll in the Pacific. Eris destroyed a mock incoming nuclear warhead launched 4,200 miles away from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. (13:11) This test is very significant for four reasons: 1. The target was destroyed with a nonnuclear device made from an expanding plastic mesh umbrella net. 2. The destruction took place 100 miles above the atmosphere where effects from destruction of chemical and biological agents would be harmless to humans. 3. The correct target was distinguished from among multiple "decoys" separated by less than 200 meters. 4. The equipment used in the test is available today. GPS satellites provided velocity and location data. The original SDI program planned for both ground- and space-based lasers that could destroy nearly all warheads aimed at the 48 contiguous states in a massive attack by more than a thousand missiles. The design goal now is to stop up to 200 warheads, extend protection to all United States territories, and accomplish destruction either inside or outside the earth's atmosphere at the most opportune point in the missiles' trajectory. Protection could even be provided to United States forces overseas, friends, and allies by basing the defensive weapons on aircraft, ships, ground mobile launchers and even in space.(01:28) According to SDI "Brilliant Pebbles" Task Force Director Colonel R. Worrell, interception of enemy biological or chemical missiles by space- or aircraft-based assets could also enable destruction to occur over enemy territory "with fallout going over their heads."(10:31) This in itself would add to deterrence. Why Ground/Space Defense Makes Sense You can not sit there and watch the SCUDS fly at Tel Aviv and Riyadh and not be concerned that we develop and field the capacity to deal with ballistic missiles. Technology is the key to keeping casualties low. There is a direct link to the number of lives we lose in combat and how much money we spend before the war starts on our capabilities and the quality of the equipment. (11:10) Dick Cheney Secretary of Defense Today, our country is completely vulnerable. We have little means of defending against ICBM-delivered biological, chemical or nuclear warheads. Even the missiles of Brazil could reach Florida. Presently the best we can hope for is to deter or avenge the attack. Opponents to a ground- or space-based defense system usually offer at least one of the following arguments against further development or employment: it won't work; it costs too much money; it won't be 100 percent effective; it could encourage the Soviets to attack us; and, lastly, it would create another arms race. It Won't Work No evidence exists today to indicate that the system can't be made to work. On the contrary, the successful destruction of a "dummy" warhead launched from 4,200 miles away is clear proof that the basic technology exists today. The critics' foremost challenges of "decoys" and using non-nuclear means for warhead destruction have been overcome. Nuclear Physicist Edward Teller played a key role in the Manhattan Project of World War II and in the later development of the hydrogen bomb. In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee in April 1983, Dr. Teller explained that "SDI was not a fantasy. President Reagan's proposal to develop an anti-ballistic missile system was scientifically sound in theory and principle."(30:99) Moreover, the fact that Moscow already possesses an in-depth, ground-based anti-ballistic missile system complete with detection and tracking radar, should dispel this rumor. Soviet awareness of the technological "can-do spirit" of Americans is the most likely reason the Soviet Union contests our decision towards full-scale development. It Costs Too Much A basic defensive system could be deployed in five years at a total cost of 69 billion dollars, much less money than Americans spend each year on alcohol.(50:28) The Apollo space program reached its pinnacle with the moon landing in 1969. The Apollo program cost four times the projected cost of a ground/space-based missile defense system. (37:09) Likewise, what would the cost of a single, "accidental" nuclear missile strike with only one rudimentary 500-kiloton warhead over the United States be in comparison to the cost of a basic defensive system? The Carnegie report estimates: 100 billion dollars--with the upper limit at about 10 billion dollars for relatively less-populated western states.... these cost estimates include damage to real estate, industrial production, financial and informational systems lost, and medical costs. The damage estimates do not include any value for lives lost, or income losses from injury, or pain and suffering.(30:71) Another factor concerning the cost equation is the benefit to the American economy and expected technological "spin-offs." Non-weapon advancements in areas such as miniaturization, computers, communications, lasers, kinetics and avionics would be achieved. Put another way, can we afford to be without a ground/space-based system? It Won't Be 100% Effective. And It Could Encourage The Soviets To Attack Us One of the most basic tenets of deterrence is mutually assured destruction, or "MAD doctrine" as it is commonly known as. If an enemy of the United States cannot be assured that its main targets will be destroyed, that most of its weapons would be intercepted and that the United States would be fully capable of retaliating, then the enemy would be very skeptical about attempting a first strike. Today, we do not have the ability to stop either an errant or an intentional launch. It Would Create Another Arms Race Recently, an article in the official publication of the Soviet general staff, Military Thought, stated "the Soviet Union should continue its work on strategic defense, regardless of what the United States decides to do."(21:22) As stated earlier, the USSR already has the only operational anti-ballistic missile defense system in the world. Treaties aimed at preventing the spread of biological, chemical and nuclear warhead technology, as well as anti-satellite and ballistic missile delivery systems, sound good in theory. Unfortunately, the United States does not have a "corner on the market" and controls can only slow, not stop, proliferation. Third World countries are developing indigenous competence in advanced technologies just by sending their future scientists and engineers to modern first world universities. The arms race in advance technologies will continue, even if the United States decides not to participate. The Destabilizing Imbalance Our lack of an ASAT capability is our single most vulnerable point if there were to be a conflict. (05:04) Frank C. Carlucci Former Secretary of Defense The United States relies heavily on unobstructed use of space. However, America lacks both the capability to protect its orbiting satellites and ability to quickly replace them should the Soviets elect to employ their ASAT weaponry. Equally important is America's vulnerability to an accidental missile launch, an intentional launch by a rogue commander from a country undergoing internal unrest, or a terrorist ICBM. The Soviets blamed the Chernobyl disaster on human error. Can we afford to be victims of Soviet human error ourselves? Would we permit an enemy to deploy "spy" reconnaissance satellites over both our nation and our armed forces for targeting purposes? Do we want to be held captive to some Islamic aggression? Failure to adequately fund, develop and field an active ground/space-based defense leaves America openly exposed to Soviet and Third World ICBMs, hostile satellite targeting, and electronic intelligence imaging. The surprise attack on Pearl Harbor notwithstanding, the relative geographic isolation of the United States in 1941 still afforded several years to mobilize industrial production and achieve combat preparedness. Unfortunately, today a satellite in low earth orbit travels 2,000 times faster than the ships that brought the Japanese task force to the Hawaiian Islands in 1941. Time and technology march on, regardless. It has been said that the first responsibility of government is the defense of the governed. Due to the potential catastrophic effect of weapons of mass destruction attacking from the high ground of space, America can ill afford an "ostrich defense." Should a hostile country or terrorist group attempt to use nuclear weapons for blackmail, we'd find ourselves in the uncomfortable position of asking, "What do you mean by - 'or else'?" 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