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Appendix D

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace

This appendix covers intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB), the methodology used to analyze the threat and understand how the enemy commander will fight. It is tailored to the Patriot battalion and patterned after Chapter 2 of FM 2-01.3 (Conducting Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield) and Appendix A of FM 3-01 (Air Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield). Note: Battlespace is the term used to describe a three dimensional aspect that includes air, land, sea and space.


D-1. Air defense officers need to fully understand the plans, tactics, and drills prior to the exercise or operation beginning to ensure success—

  • Commanders and staffs need to expect quality products from the air defense S2, so that the enemy picture is not distorted and the commander's battlefield visualization is accurate.

  • Air defense officers must practice IPB and develop personal and staff IPB drills, in order to fight the enemy not the plan.

  • Air defense officers should understand the relationship of the enemy air and missile threat against the friendly maneuver commander prior to developing an IPB.

D-2. The IPB process is time-consuming. IPB is not just a portion of the military decision making process (MDMP) or a significant aspect of the staff planning drill. It is a personal and professional skill that the air defense officer and S2 must take the time and energy to develop. Commanders at all levels have the responsibility of not only ensuring that IPB is understood by all air defense officers, but that all air defense officers under their command have an expert understanding of enemy air and missile tactics. This implies that commanders must be experts themselves.


D-3. The intelligence preparation of the battlespace has four steps—

  • Define the battlespace's environment.

  • Describe the battlespace's effects.

  • Evaluate the threat.

  • Determine threat courses of actions (COAs).

D-4. Each step in IPB can be considered as a point in planning where the analysis of the enemy is manifested in graphic products (identified with an asterisk in Figure D-1). The IPB is largely the focus of the intelligence section at the Patriot battalion. The S2 has a responsibility to ensure these products are developed at certain steps of the MDMP.

Figure D-1. Air Defense MDMP Products

Figure D-1. Air Defense MDMP Products

D-5. The S2's analysis—manifested in these products—is critical to the commander's battlefield visualization and the development of the plan. In addition, each product is sequentially based upon the previous product; see Figure D-2 for the S2 product relationship. Analysis of the enemy is deduced and refined into an understanding of what the enemy commander can do, and what the enemy will do against certain friendly COAs.

Figure D-2. S2 Product Relationship

Figure D-2. S2 Product Relationship

D-6. Because the Patriot battalion's mission is air and missile defense, the S2 focuses on the enemy air, ASMs, CMs, UAVs, missiles, nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC), and special operations forces (SOF)/terrorist threat. The S2 must also keep abreast of the enemy maneuver or ground situation, as this aspect often affects the employment of an enemy's rocket or air force, as well as the introduction of NBC and its delivery means. Furthermore, Patriot FUs may be susceptible to enemy ground forces, such as corps Patriot FUs protecting a division rear, that is within range of enemy long-range artillery fires.


D-7. Defining the battlespace environment consists of six steps that lead to an understanding of where and under what conditions the enemy air, missile and SOF/terrorist forces (as well as the Patriot FUs), will fight. These steps are as follows:

  • Identify significant characteristics of the environment.

  • Identify the limits of the command's area of operations (AO) and battlespace.

  • Establish the limits of the area of interest (AI).

  • Identify the amount of detail required and feasible within the time available for IPB.

  • Evaluate existing databases and identify intelligence gaps.

  • Collect the material and intelligence required to conduct the remainder of IPB.

Identify Significant Characteristics of the Environment

D-8. Consideration must be given to the geographical, cultural, political, and economic factors of the area to identify characteristics that may influence the enemy or friendly commander's decision-making or COAs. In doing so, the S2 begins to focus, or look for, these special considerations throughout the process. Examples of significant characteristics include, but are not limited to—

  • Political relationship between host nation, multinational forces, and US (may affect deployment timelines, peacetime and wartime rules of engagement (ROE), etcetera.).

  • Economics of the area provides clues to the development of road networks and the movement abilities of TM and Patriot forces.

  • Sanitation and medical aspects related to soldier health.

  • Communication services such as phone, computer, and satellite capabilities.

  • Host nation's capability to support Patriot operations.

Identify the Limits of the Command's Area of Operations (AO) and Battlespace

D-9. The AO is the geographical area where the commander has the authority and the responsibility to conduct operations. Because Patriot forces don't "own" ground as much as they are assigned to protect it (or the asset on it), the Patriot AO has a third dimension. The air area of operations not only extends to what assets (whether maneuver or static) it may defend, but also to the maximum altitude of the Patriot system. Thus, the AO for Patriot battalions has depth, width, and height. As the plan is developed, external factors such as airspace control measures (missile engagement zones [MEZs], fire support coordination lines [FSCLs], and restricted operations zones [ROZs]) can impact upon the commander's AO.

D-10. The battlespace is defined by the Patriot battalion's maximum capability to acquire targets and physically dominate the enemy. Battlespace can extend beyond the battalion's AO and can expand or contract based upon the capabilities and activities of the enemy and friendly forces. Battlespace should not be considered the same as the AO; in fact, the battlespace normally extends beyond it.

Establish the Limits of the Area of Interest

D-11. The area of interest (AI) is the geographical area from which information and intelligence are required to permit planning or successful conduct of the battalion's mission. Because the battalion is concerned with enemy activities, the air area of interest extends vertically to include aircraft ceilings and TBM trajectories. This also includes activities on the ground (such as airbases, TBM forward operating bases (FOBs), and transload points) that may affect or result in affecting friendly forces or the protected assets. This information should also contain analysis of the enemy maneuver forces, and any threat they pose to the Patriot battalion.

D-12. When considering UAVs, ASMs, CMs and TBM ranges and launch points, the AI will normally be tremendously large. A technique that can reduce the size of the AI, as well as reduce the area under scrutiny, is to—

  • Know the type of missile and its maximum range under optimal conditions (without consideration to battlefield effects).

  • Assume the worst case and draw range arcs from the outermost point of the enemy's border or line of departure/line of contact (LD/LC). The result should show a series of range arcs for different missiles and the friendly territory that it is most vulnerable.

  • Identify potential targets within the threat arc, as well as the defended assets (see DAL).

  • Draw or reverse the missile arcs back into threat territory for each asset and each type of missile from each potential target or assigned/defended asset.

  • Erase overlapping lines.

  • Ending results are range arcs that indicate where TBM forces generally could deploy and launch missiles under optimal conditions, without consideration to battlespace effects. This is the initial representation of the TBM AI.

Identify the Amount of Detail Required and Feasible Within the Time Available for IPB

D-13. Once the AO, AI, and battlespace has been identified and graphically portrayed, the S2 must consider how much detail is required and necessary based upon the battalion's planning timeline (refer to Chapter 3). Because the commander relies significantly on the S2 to portray the enemy, the S2 must ensure that he has the necessary time built into the timeline in order to successfully analyze the enemy.

Evaluate Existing Databases and Identify Intelligence Gaps

D-14. The battalion S2 quickly reviews previous and current databases and threat models that were used to develop OPLANs, previous operations, and etcetera, in order to determine gaps in the ongoing analysis and set priorities for answering those gaps (such as TBM, CM and ASM launch points). Acting on these gaps, the S2 should determine what gaps are intelligence requirements that must be prioritized. If the gaps cannot be answered before mission analysis, the S2 should make reasonable assumptions and brief these to the commander and staff.

Collect the Material and Intelligence Required to Conduct the Remainder of IPB

D-15. The battalion S2 initiates request for information and collects intelligence from the sources available to him. As information becomes available, the S2 must review all assumptions made to eliminate those now known as fact, and to test the remaining assumptions for validity. Any gaps not identified previously must be determined if they need to be added to the priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) of the commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs). PIRs should be judiciously chosen in order to avoid information overload, frustration, and complacency.

Describe the Battlespace's Effects

D-16. Describing the battlespace's points to the effect the environment will have—in terms of advantages and disadvantages—on enemy and friendly capabilities. It is divided into two steps—

  • Analyze the battlespace's environment.

  • Describe the battlespace's effects on enemy and friendly capabilities, as well as broad COAs.

D-17. The analysis of the battlespace will vary depending upon what portion, or aspect of the battlespace is being analyzed. For example, the area around which Patriot forces may deploy must be analyzed in detail with respect to the terrain, especially when considering trafficability and route acceptability needed for FU's. Weather has different variations as well as different meanings of significance for different portions of the battlefield. For example:

on a given day there may be fog at certain enemy airbases (which may reduce sorties rates), it could be heavily raining in the vicinity of a templated enemy missile brigade (which may restrict TEL movement), and it could be clear and sunny in the friendly AOR (which may provide excellent flying conditions for friendly DCA operations while providing excellent observation of Patriot FUs by enemy SOF or terrorists).

Analyze the Battlespace's Environment

D-18. There are two components of this step: terrain and weather. The Patriot battalion S2 must analyze terrain and weather to point out the effects to the enemy threat as well as to the Patriot battalion. The battalion S2 must make use of graphical representations and programs. Map drops, along with computerized programs such as arc digitized raster graphics (ADRG), digital terrain elevation data (DTED), and terrain base, should be used to visualize the battlespace. Terrain and weather analysis includes an examination of the ground in relation to both ground and air units. IPB in relation to air defense operations does not just focus on the impact to enemy air operations; rather, it includes an impact on TBM, SOF, NBC and Patriot forces as well. The S2 must recognize that he does not have enough time to analyze the SOF/terrorist threat for each battery site; rather, he should analyze the area in which the battalion will operate and provide the necessary information that the battery commander requires for the development of his counter-reconnaissance plan.


D-19. Observation, Cover and Concealment, Obstacles, Key Terrain, and Avenues of Approach, (OCOKA), is used to evaluate the military aspects of terrain.

D-20. Observation—directly relates to target acquisition, SOF observation, and the best areas for TBM launch. Examples include, but are not limited to—

  • Aircraft, CMs, and UAVs— potential engagement areas.

  • TBM— TEL launch areas.

  • SOF— potential ambush points (kill zones) along routes, main supply routes (MSRs), and sites.

  • Patriot— potential areas that afford radar field of view (FOV) or minimized radar clutter.

D-21. Cover and concealment—cover is protection from observation. Concealment is protection from the effects of direct and indirect fires. Examples include, but are not limited to—

  • Aircraft, CMs, and UAVs— terrain that permits reverse slope loitering/denies Patriot target acquisition.

  • TBM— TEL hide sites.

  • SOF— cache point, patrol base, or insurgent base camp/safe house.

  • Patriot— site terrain that provides protection from direct fires.

D-22. Obstacles—any natural or manmade terrain feature that stops, impedes, or diverts military movement. Examples include, but are not limited to—

  • Aircraft, CMs, and UAVs— terrain that denies nap of the earth/contour flight, or restricts lateral movement.

  • TBM— surface drainage and slope configuration that impedes TEL cross-country movement.

  • SOF— unnatural vegetation or terrain (such as forested areas in a desert or unusual architecture in urban terrain), which is conspicuous to the common observer.

  • Patriot— (observation) mountains or terrain that prevent or reduce line-of-sight (LOS) and observation of UHF/VHF communications.

D-23. Key terrain—any locality or area that when seized, retained, or controlled, affords a marked advantage to either combatant. Key terrain is consistent with areas that give good observation over AAs and objectives, permit an obstacle to be covered by fire (or an attack orbit for FW, and loitering for RW), or are important road junctions/communication centers. Assets can also be considered key terrain when they are known to be likely threat objectives. Examples include, but are not limited to—

  • Aircraft, CMs, and UAVs— potential airfields', landing zones, drops zones, or terrain that can be used as navigational aids.

  • TBM— transload points or FOBs.

  • SOF— terrain that controls one or more route chokepoints.

  • Patriot— terrain that provides coverage for more than one asset, or allows the sluing to one or more secondary target lines (STLs).

D-24. Avenues of approach— air or ground route of an attacking force leading to its objective or to key terrain in its path. Examples include, but are not limited to—

  • Aircraft, CMs, and UAVs— air avenues of approach.

  • TBM— TEL withdrawal routes from launch points to post-launch hide sites.

  • SOF— approach routes to ambush/attack points.


D-25. Weather— when analyzing the weather, the following aspects are considered:

  • Wind.

  • Precipitation.

  • Cloud cover.

  • Temperature and humidity.

  • Visibility.

  • Barometric pressure.

D-26. Winds— the effects of wind include blowing sand, smoke, dust, rain, or the force of the wind itself. Examples include, but are not limited to—

  • Aircraft, CMs, and UAVs— fuel and payload impacts on aircraft attempting to ingress or egress near their standard combat radius.

  • TBM— trajectory precision and circular error probability (CEP) based upon winds located at the launch point.

  • SOF— effect on insertion operations from the air.

  • Patriot— effect on communications, particularly UHF and VHF antennas and resultant degree of control on the air battle.

D-27. Precipitation— precipitation not only affects the soil conditions, but in heavy amounts, it can significantly affect personnel and equipment. Examples include, but are not limited to—

  • Aircraft, CMs, and UAVs— degree of icing on airframe prior or during flight.

  • TBM— degradation effect on chemical and biological munitions.

  • SOF— effect on supplies and health.

  • Patriot— effect on potential missile storage areas in low ground or enclosed by berms.

D-28. Cloud cover— influences aircraft and SOF operations, while having a negligible or favorable effect on TBM and Patriot operations. Examples include, but are not limited to—

  • Aircraft, CMs, and UAVs— low cloud ceiling may force aircraft to use unfavorable attack profile in relation to munition used.

  • TBM— heavy cloud cover denies visual surveillance of TBM field activities (transload operations, movement, etcetera).

  • SOF— allows movement of units in higher elevations due to degradation of visual and heat surveillance systems.

  • Patriot— heavy cloud cover masks movement of FUs from enemy air visual surveillance.

D-29. Temperature and humidity— the extremes have negative effects on personnel and equipment capabilities, particularly in hot and wet climates. As temperature and humidity increase, the air density decreases, thus reducing airframe payloads. Examples include, but are not limited to:

  • Aircraft, CMs, and UAVs— reduction in airframe payload, ordnance, and combat radius.

  • TBM— unexpected high/low temperatures can decrease crew performance and increase maintenance requirements.

  • SOF— effect on aerial resupply as well as personnel endurance.

  • Patriot— unexpected high/low temperatures can decrease crew performance and increase maintenance requirements.

D-30. Visibility— incorporates the effects of all aspects of weather and is not just concerned with illumination. The S2 must know beginning morning nautical twilight/end evening nautical twilight (BMNT/EENT), sunrise/sunset, and moonrise/moonset. Examples include, but are not limited to—

  • Aircraft, CMs, and UAVs— fog around airbases may lower sortie generation.

  • TBM— lack of cloud cover allows better aerial and ground surveillance of TBM force movement.

  • SOF— storm weather that reduces visibility may conceal movement from friendly forces and populations.

  • Patriot— higher moon illumination allows Patriot security elements to surveil against SOF/terrorist night attacks.

D-31. Barometric Pressure— if the battalion does not have access to meteorological analysis, the intelligence section must pay close attention to barometric pressure readings over the past 16 hours, in 2-hour increments. In spite of current visual conditions (example "it's raining or its not raining), the intelligence section should maintain a barometer to indicate what future conditions will be like. If the air pressure falls, then the weather is deteriorating. If the air pressure is constant, then current conditions will remain the same. If the air pressure rises, then better weather is to be expected. The section should remember that air pressure is related to elevation. Movement or relocation to a different elevation will result in a different baseline reading.

Terrain and Weather Analysis

D-32. The results of weather and terrain analysis can be graphically represented in the modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO). Symbology not available should be depicted in a manner consistent with easy identification and understanding. If time permits, the MCOO should be created for TBM baskets, or areas where TBM battalions and brigades are determined to be operating from.

D-33. MCOO step 1—display cumulative effects of obstacles and terrain

  • Unrestricted terrain— allows wide maneuver by forces and unlimited travel supported by well-developed road networks. Vegetation is minimal.

  • Restricted terrain— hinders movement to some degree, requiring zigzagging, detours, reduced speeds, or changing movement formations. Road networks are generally secondary or poorly developed. Vegetation can be moderate or densely packed in small areas. Slopes are generally moderate. Soil conditions in some areas slow movement of heavy equipment. Green, diagonal lines mark-restricted terrain.

  • Severely restricted terrain— stops or slows movement to such a degree that engineer effort must be made in order to enhance mobility. Road networks are absent or seasonally poor. Vegetation can be thick, such as triple canopy forests. Slopes are generally steep. Soil conditions are susceptible to precipitation, making cross-country movement impossible. Green, crossed, diagonal lines mark severely restricted terrain. Other types of severely restricted terrain include minefields, urban areas, and seasonal lakebeds. In addition, simply identifying severely restricted terrain does not necessarily mean that a Patriot or TBM unit moving in column formation along a small road or firebreak can't traverse it. What it indicates is the general, relative effect on that particular force.

D-34. MCOO step 2—display ground and air avenues of approach as follows:

  • Identify mobility corridors. Use red for enemy air forces, and blue for friendly, if applicable.

  • Categorize mobility corridors. When considering air, include the differences between rotary wing and fixed wing (some RW and FW mobility corridors may become an air avenue of approach (AAA) that is used for both).

  • Group mobility corridors to form AAAs.

  • Evaluate AAAs. For AAAs, evaluate whether used by attack FW/RW, transport FW/RW, etcetera.

  • Prioritize AAAs. Evaluate each AAA in relation to the threat objectives or defended assets. Each AAA should be assigned a number convention.

  • Other considerations. For SOF forces, identify infiltration lanes and withdrawal lanes, as well as landing zone and drop zone (LZ and DZ) locations. If time permits, AAAs should indicate potential engagement areas and ordnance release lines (ORLs).

D-35. MCOO step 3—display key terrain as follows:

  • Natural and manmade key terrain is marked with a circled K (black or purple).

  • Ensure to display key terrain that is important along air and ground AAs.

  • Evaluate the other four aspects of military terrain, and graphically represent the analysis.


D-36. Using MCOO, the battalion S2 must now prepare to discuss the military aspects of terrain and weather and relate this analysis to aircraft, ASM, CM, UAV, TBM, SOF, and Patriot forces. The S2 will brief the commander during mission analysis, and discuss why certain aspects are important and the effect on broad enemy and friendly COAs.


D-37. Evaluation of the threat centers on the enemy's capabilities and the employment of doctrinal principles under optimal conditions are manifested in the doctrinal template. The doctrinal template is a threat model that demonstrates doctrinally and historically how aircraft, TMs, and SOF forces are employed. It can be in any format, but it must answer in a graphical and narrative nature how forces are doctrinally employed.

D-38. Prior to any operation, the battalion intelligence section should be consistently creating and updating threat databases and models. Time during an actual operation simply does not permit the S2 to start from scratch. Instead, the battalion S2 should only have to update existing threat models in terms of new capabilities or variations in the enemy order of battle. If the S2 has not previously developed threat models, the battalion will be hindered in its planning process.

D-39. Threat models should answer how the enemy air and missile threat will employ during offensive and defensive operations. To speed the process, these threat models may even follow the format of a generic situational template and narrative for basic COAs (see Step 4, Determine Threat COAs). Threat models should answer the following criteria:

  • Enemy air, TBM, and SOF's order of battle.

  • Aircraft type, number, and units/formations/organization (to include munitions).

  • SOF units/formations/organization.

  • Aircraft operating bases with aircraft distribution.

  • TBM dispersal hide sites and or FOBs.

  • Enemy employment of UAVs, ASMs and cruise missiles.

  • Enemy equipment characteristics (to include munition characteristics such as ranges, ORLs, and CEPs).

  • Enemy air, TBM, and SOF strategic, operational, and tactical objectives.

  • Enemy air, TBM, and SOF strategic, operational, and tactical doctrinal procedures (to include use of NBC and release authority).

  • TBM types, numbers, and units/formations/organization.

Enemy Employment and Warfighting History

D-40. This criteria also assists the staff in preparing the commander's CCIRs, especially the PIRs ("What I want to know about the enemy") and EEFIs, ("What I don't want the enemy to know about myself").

D-41. Once the enemy's capabilities are known, battalion S2 must analyze the threat in order to understand how these capabilities are used. The S2 must answer—

  • Enemy capability to synchronize air and missile attacks.

  • Enemy proficiency (example pilot training, TBM individual soldier training, SOF training and motivation).

  • Enemy maintenance capability (to include availability of spare parts)

  • Potential of nondoctrinal and unconventional use of forces.

D-42. The S2 then develops the high value target (HVT) list. An HVT is an asset that the threat commander requires for the successful completion of a specific COA. The S2 identifies the HVTs based upon an evaluation of the database, the doctrinal template, and tactical judgment. Thus, the S2 has generally war-gamed enemy actions, and has identified what the enemy HVTs are in terms of the enemy air and missile threat. Because of the ability of Patriot and the nature of air defense operations, when identifying and prioritizing HVTs, the S2 should consider—

  • The TBM battalion organization and the importance of specialized equipment such as reload cranes, meteorological radars, and repair equipment.

  • ECM capabilities of aircraft, to include jamming aircraft.

  • Anti-radiation missiles (ARMs) and their carriers.

  • Command, control, communications (C3) systems that would improve the capability to conduct simultaneous air and missile attack.

D-43. The Patriot battalion does not have organic assets to attack these HVTs; however, the commander and staff must be aware of the enemy commander's capability. In addition, the HVTs identified by the battalion S2 must be forwarded to higher echelon intelligence and operational sections. Higher headquarters such as AAMDC and corps assets have the roles related to attack operations. HVTs are later refined after the development of situational templates/narratives.


D-44. The development of enemy COAs requires specific products to be made. Because it incorporates the effects of the battlefield, the result of this step provides the Patriot commander with visualization of how the enemy commander will fight his air and missile forces. There are five steps to determining threat COAs—

  • Identify the threat's likely objectives and desired end state.

  • Identify the full set of COAs available to the threat.

  • Evaluate and prioritize each COA.

  • Develop each COA for detail time allows.

  • Identify initial collection requirements.

Identify the Threat's Likely Objectives and Desired End State

D-45. The battalion S2 must start at the strategic level of enemy command, then work his way down, in terms of threat air, missile, and surveillance forces. The S2 must identify the strategic, operational, and tactical objectives—from the highest level of enemy command down to the aircraft sorties by AAA, the TBM firing battalions, and the small SOF teams operating in the friendly rear areas. The S2 then reviews the tactical and operational objectives to ensure they fulfill the parent command's desired end state.

Identify the Full Set of COAs Available to the Threat

D-46. The S2 must consider a complete set of COAs available to the enemy. At a minimum, the S2 must consider—

  • COAs in which enemy doctrine applies to the current situation.

  • COAs that could significantly influence the battalion's mission (this includes "wildcard" COAs).

  • COAs that are possibly based upon recent events.

D-47. The S2 must eliminate any COA that the threat is incapable of performing. In addition, the enemy COAs must be weighed against the five criteria, or qualities of COAs: suitability, feasibility, acceptability, distinguishability, and completeness (see Chapter 3 for definitions).

Evaluate and Prioritize Each COA

D-48. The S2 must carefully evaluate each COA and determine which is most likely to be used against the enemy. This is necessary, as the staff will need a basis from which to develop friendly COAs. Once the S2 has determined the COAs in priority, he can categorize them as most likely (MLCOA), most dangerous (MDCOA), and less likely (LLCOA).

Develop Each COA in the Amount of Detail Time Allows

D-49. The enemy COAs must now be developed into situation templates (SIT TEMPs). SIT TEMPs are graphical representations of an enemy COA, and contain three parts: a template (or graphic), a narrative explaining the graphic, see Figure D-3 for illustration, and a listing of HVTs for that enemy COA. Like the friendly COA, they are normally snapshots in time that explain the decisive point in the air battle (refer to COA development, Chapter 3, for explanation on decisive points). SIT TEMPs are eventually used for war-gaming and later developed into event templates.

Figure D-3. SIT TEMP Narrative

Figure D-3. SIT TEMP Narrative

D-50. In order to properly synchronize the enemies COAs with the Patriot battalion's critical battle times, the S2 should discuss with the S3 the definition of H-hour. This will assist all staff members in developing and comparing friendly COAs with the enemy templates. Whenever possible, SIT TEMP graphics should be depicted on overlays and maps—

  • Begin with the threat model that represents the current operation.

  • Overlay the doctrinal template over the MCOO, or refer to a sketched doctrinal template and narrative.

  • Place another overlay over the MCOO. Adjust the threat model/doctrinal template in consideration of the battlespace's effects and tactical judgment.

  • Write a narrative using a matrix format or paragraph format. A technique is to write critical events over time using H-hour as a guide (events can occur prior to H-hour [H-___] and after H-hour [H+___].

  • Check to see if all enemy forces pertinent are accounted for (aircraft, TMs, SOFs, and ground forces that precipitate air/missile events).

  • Ensure that the SIT TEMP answers the air and TM attacks/threats of concern. This will also assist in the development of COFA (see Chapter 3).

D-51. S2s should keep in mind that enemy air forces might fly many sorties a day. However, the danger to Patriot operations is the most dangerous air threat per AAA each day. This should be annotated for every COA, to include MLCOA, MDCOA, and LLCOA. An example would be: "under the MLCOA, expect sorties of 2-4 Mig-25 mounted w/AS-11s will conduct deep strikes along AAA#2/day"

  • Review possible engagement areas by aircraft along AAAs (these will later develop into targeted areas of interest [TAIs]). These include points in space that begin aircraft attack profiles, to include ORLs.

  • If information about ORLs is not available, a technique to determine an enemy engagement point is to compare the maximum launch range of ordnance in relation to the battlespace effects (MCOO).

  • Graphically identify time phase lines (TPLs). TPLs are used to understand the movement of forces. In the case of aircraft, TPLs should depict the speed of attacking enemy sorties along each AAA. Working backwards from the engagement area, the S2 will sequentially draw lines (in terms of minutes) that depict the aircraft ingress and attack speeds in relation to the battlespace effects and AAA.

D-52. Unlike maneuver forces that draw TPLs in relation to the enemy maneuver force movement, the complex, frequent, and varied nature of attacking enemy aircraft requires the Patriot battalion S2 to explain TPLs in relation to the aircraft attack itself. However, the S2 must analyze and discuss when air and missile attacks will occur in the narrative.

  • Consider areas in time and space that determine certain enemy COAs. Examples include enemy aircraft that have chosen a specific AAA to fly (for example, a mountain pass that canalizes the aircraft's approach), or an enemy missile battalion conducting field operations (for example, a bridge that battalion K-51 cranes must cross in order to establish transload sites). These areas will develop into named areas of interest (NAIs). NAIs are points in space and time that confirm or deny a certain enemy COA.

  • Review/develop a list of HVTs for each COA.

D-53. In addition to the five qualities, the battalion S2 must review the SIT TEMPs to ensure each COA answers—

  • WHAT—the type of operation (related to the enemy maneuver force such as defense, offense, etcetera.).

  • WHEN—the time expressed in the narrative.

  • WHERE—the AAAs, TM NAIs, launch points, SOF ambush sites, and objectives that make up the COA.

  • HOW—enemy methods, such as TBM operational phases (dispersal sites, FOBs, transload operations, pre-launch hide sites, launch points, post-hide/reload sites, etcetera), and aircraft missions (deep strike, close air support, reconnaissance, ECM, bombing, combat air patrol, etcetera.).

  • WHY—the objective or end state the enemy wants to accomplish (usually related to the strategic or operational mission of the enemy maneuver force).

D-54. The battalion intelligence will be pressed for time; however, the section must recognize that the well-prepared enemy COAs contribute significantly to the commander's understanding of the battlefield, and provide the litmus test in which friendly COAs are measured against.

Identify Initial Collection Requirements

D-55. The battalion S2 must then identify collection requirements that will assist in identifying which COA the enemy will actually commit to. The battalion S2 must first identify NAIs.

D-56. Although the battalion S2 may send request for information (RFIs), (see Figure D-4 for worksheet), the observation and analysis of enemy activities over time at specific areas (NAIs) will reveal the enemy's chosen COA.

Figure D-4. RFI Worksheet and Event Template Matrix

Figure D-4. RFI Worksheet and Event Template Matrix

D-57. In order to identify and categorize NAIs, the battalion S2 develops an Event Template/Matrix see Figures D-4 for matrix illustration. The EVENT TEMP is the Patriot battalion's guide for intelligence collection. Each COA is evaluated to identify its associated NAIs. NAIs are then numbered in the matrix (that explains each NAI) and symbolized on a separate sheet of overlay. NAIs can be a specific point, route, or an area, whether on the ground or in the air. The battalion S2 must also refer to the higher headquarters order to check for NAIs listed by the brigade, AAMDC, or corps, and pay attention to ground NAIs that influence the air and missile battle. In addition, he should review HVTs and their relation or development towards NAIs when they are committed in each COA.

D-58. To avoid confusion, the battalion S2 may designate air NAIs as "ANAIs #___", and remaining ground NAIs as simply "NAI #__". However, any higher NAIs must retain their naming convention as assigned by higher headquarters.

D-59. Decision support template. As stated before, the enemy COAs are critical to the staff war-gaming process. As the friendly and enemy COAs are wargamed by the S3 and S2 respectively, the list of NAIs will be further refined and developed. An analysis of the EVENT TEMPs with the results of the DST as shown in Figure D-5, will assist the development of HVTs into high payoff targets (HPTs), which are targets whose loss to the enemy will contribute to the success of the friendly COA. In addition, decision points (a point or area in time and space that requires the friendly commander to make a decision) and TAIs (where one or more friendly air defense weapons are brought to bear on the enemy) are developed as a result of NAIs and a review of the enemy's engagement areas and ORLs.

Figure D-5. DST Example

Figure D-5. DST Example

D-60. Clearly, the key to the IPB process is the development of threat models, or doctrinal templates, prior to operation notification. The battalion S2 should constantly be developing these templates in relation to threat countries and capabilities. These threat models should be distributed and briefed to officers in the battalion on a regular bases, as they form the battlespace visualization that leads to OPLAN development, and as shown in this appendix, the subsequent defense design in real-world air and missile defense operations.

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