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Chapter 7

Passive Defense

This chapter describes TMD passive defense measures used by US forces to minimize casualties, preserve OPTEMPO, and restore combat power. Passive defense measures used by ARFOR include reducing force vulnerability, reducing the effectiveness of threat targeting, providing tactical warning to the force, and facilitating force recovery and reconstitution.


7-1. TMD passive defense consists of those measures initiated to reduce vulnerability and to minimize the effects of damage caused by TM attacks. Passive defense measures must be trained and implemented at all Army levels. Commanders employ four principal passive defense measures to improve TMD. These measures are:

  • Reducing force vulnerability.
  • Reducing the effectiveness of threat targeting.
  • Providing tactical warning to the force.
  • Facilitating force recovery and reconstitution.


7-2. TMD passive defense measures provide individual and collective protection of friendly forces, population centers, and critical assets. US forces must implement TMD passive defense measures whenever and wherever they face a TM threat. Planning for passive defense begins with a comprehensive TMD IPB. This IPB then provides a methodology to evaluate the impact of TM employment. Army TMD planners should formulate guidance to subordinate headquarters and allocate resources to support passive defense operations (see JP 3-01.5).


7-3. Reducing vulnerability involves all measures taken to ensure that friendly personnel and equipment survive a TM attack with minimal casualties and damage. This principle is accomplished through hardening, redundancy, robustness, dispersal, training civil authorities, and NBC protection (see Figure 7-1).

Figure 7-1. Reducing Vulnerability


7-4. Hardening reduces the effect of attack on systems, facilities, and organizations. Design, careful site selection, field fortification, and other field expedient methods can accomplish hardening. Hardening begins in peacetime and continues throughout operations.

7-5. Prior to deployment, staffs will plan for the need to build field fortifications and improve the NBC hardening characteristics of structures and systems. Most system NBC hardening will be accomplished prior to deployment as a part of system design or as an add-on capability. Other equipment improvements such as armor protection for vehicles and body armor for soldiers should be made prior to deployment too, while on-site fortification work may become part of early entry operations.

7-6. Field fortifications and NBC hardening of structures and systems are important during all operations, especially during early entry. NBC collective protection systems and field expedient methods are also available to improve the NBC protection of existing structures in the AO.

7-7. Engineer elements must establish measures to minimize the physical blast, thermal, and radiation effects caused by nuclear-capable TMs. Planning maximizes our ability to provide the desired level of protection. The integration of camouflage and concealment plans also adds to the overall effectiveness of hardening. The type of protection must be determined based on the enemy's WMD/WME capabilities and probable means of delivery. Also exposure, vulnerability to discovery, location, mobility, surrounding terrain, and ability to avoid detection must be considered when establishing engineer support priorities. Protection may include parapets, revetments, earth walls, or dug-in positions. Adding timber or steel-reinforced concrete can also enhance existing defensive positions.

Redundancy and Robustness

7-8. Redundancy and robustness preserve combat power by duplication of critical capabilities that are particularly vulnerable to TM attack and for which other passive measures may be less appropriate. Force commanders should strive to minimize single point failures in key operational systems. Soft targets such as C2 nodes, sensors, and fixed sites are of particular concern.


7-9. Dispersal reduces target vulnerability by decreasing concentration and making a target less lucrative. Combined with mobility and deception, dispersal increases enemy uncertainty as to whether a particular location is occupied. It forces the enemy to search more locations, requiring more resources and more time. It also minimizes the effect of TM use by forcing the enemy to use a limited resource against targets of much lesser value.

7-10. The force commander will plan to take maximum advantage of the significant improvements in C3 systems to spread out friendly assets. Dispersal will reduce force vulnerability to TM effects, especially their potential for producing mass casualties. This may be difficult to accomplish during entry operations, especially in the case of forced entry when the initial lodgment area is small. Dispersal will contribute to the unit survival during a TM attack, but makes it more vulnerable to ground attack. Commanders will need to make appropriate trade-offs.

Training Civil Authorities

7-11. The force commander may be required to train and equip civilian defense authorities for passive defense suject to applicable statute and regulation. Measures can include establishing air and missile defense warning systems, identifying protected areas to go to in case of attack, providing protective measures to be taken by civilians using self-help techniques, and specifying the use of individual protective equipment.

7-12. Civilian authorities should be trained to organize and instruct their populations on actions to take upon warning of missile attack. Means of distributing early warning should be rehearsed. Populations in areas at risk of TM attack should frequently rehearse the entire process, from early warning through occupation of protective shelters. This training will facilitate civil defense efforts and may reduce the political impact of missiles and engagement debris hitting civilian areas and facilities. Also, civilian populations will be less likely to panic when "missile alerts" have been rehearsed.

NBC Protection

7-13. NBC defense is critical whenever the enemy has the capability to employ WMD/WME. The elements of passive defense against NBC weapons are contamination avoidance, force protection, and decontamination.

7-14. NBC protection includes actions taken to physically counter the effects of the threat's WMD/WME TM delivery capability and maintain the health and morale of soldiers. Based on METT-TC, NBC protective measures should be implemented prior to force projection operations or at any point in an operation. The purpose of implementing NBC protective measures is to minimize WMD/WME impacts on the tempo and operations while protecting personnel and equipment. A warned force may be able to improve its protective posture by taking cover or donning protective gear. While these actions will provide force protection, this protection must be weighed against their potential for mission degradation. NBC protection is divided into three broad areas:

  • Force protection. Force protection involves actions taken to reduce the vulnerability of the force to WMD/WME attacks. Success depends largely on the operational employment of NBC detectors and sensors with organic capabilities and from specialized NBC reconnaissance assets.
  • Collective protection. Collective protection provides a contamination-free environment for selected portions of the force by applying special filtration systems to vehicles and shelters. Collective protection is especially valuable because it avoids the psychological and physiological burden of individual protection.
  • Individual protection. Individual protection is largely accomplished using individual chemical protective equipment and pre/post attack medical prophylaxis taken to reduce the body's susceptibility to specific classes of chemical or biological agents.


7-15. Commanders use OPSEC, deception, mobility, camouflage and concealment, and improved battle command measures to reduce the effectiveness of threat targeting against US interests. These measures are intended to make the enemy's targeting effectiveness of friendly assets as difficult as possible. Commanders will determine the extent of measures taken to reduce targeting effectiveness based on proximity to the enemy, assigned mission, and the enemy's capabilities to collect information on friendly operations (see Figure 7-2).

Figure 7-2. Reducing Targeting Effectiveness

Operations Security

7-16. OPSEC are measures taken to maintain security and achieve tactical surprise. It includes signal security, signature reduction, physical security, and information security. It also involves the identification and elimination or control of indicators, which can be exploited by hostile intelligence organizations.

7-17. Signal Security. Signal security is accomplished using a variety of techniques. These include minimizing transmission time, minimizing transmission power, using remote antennas, using directional antennas, using wire or fiber optic land lines, and using line of sight systems.

7-18. Signature Reduction. Signature reduction includes passive defense measures to deny targeting data to the enemy such as camouflage, noise reduction, heat reduction, electromagnetic signals reduction, radar absorbing camouflage, and concealment devices. Signature reduction also employs active signature masking measures including the use of smoke and obscurants. Appropriate EMCON procedures are used to control transmitting devices (radars, radios, data links, et cetera) that could possibly provide the enemy information as to location, type, and characteristics of friendly units and devices. SOE are control measures used particularly with radars to control time of transmission, type of transmission, and direction of transmission to prevent targeting by enemy assets.

7-19. Physical and Information Security. Physical security measures include safeguarding of personnel, military equipment and facilities, medical material, and arms and ammunition. Information security is the safeguarding of all media, access to which would allow the enemy to gain an advantage over friendly forces.


7-20. Deception is designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce the enemy to react in a manner prejudicial to his intentions. Successful deception in TMD requires a good deception plan that is executed correctly, monitored constantly, modified as necessary, and deceives the enemy completely. Deception in TMD is best categorized as being either ambiguous or misdirecting. Ambiguous deception will increase confusion in the enemy's IPB process and lower the probability of effectively targeting US forces by adding to the alternatives from which it must base targeting decisions. Misdirection reduces the uncertainty in the enemy's IPB process by convincing it of a particular falsehood, thereby influencing targeting decision(s) by having it commit TMs prematurely or ineffectively.


7-21. Mobility is the quality or capability of military forces, which permits them to move from place to place while retaining the ability to perform their primary mission. Mobility includes all those measures taken to ensure high-value elements of the force are never stationary long enough to provide an effective and lucrative TM target. Theater and operational level staffs will attempt to incorporate as much mobility as possible into all operations. Mobility increases the difficulty of the enemy's targeting process. Frequent displacement or continuous movement of key assets makes them less likely to be targeted.

Camouflage and Concealment

7-22. Camouflage and concealment are important parts of TMD during operations. They help counter the enemy's TM targeting effectiveness by making soldiers, units, vehicles, aircraft, weapons, tactical positions, and installations difficult to locate, strike, and destroy. Camouflage and concealment complicate the enemy's reconnaissance and target acquisition process for both visual observations and multi-spectral sensor systems. When coupled with deception, camouflage and concealment protect the force from TMs by manipulating the enemy's TM targeting decisions.

7-23. The purpose of camouflage and concealment in TMD is to avoid detection altogether. In some cases, it may succeed by merely preventing the enemy from clearly identifying a TM target. Camouflage discipline is critical to camouflage success. A comprehensive camouflage standard operating procedure (SOP) is a good tool for prescribing and enforcing standards that promote camouflage discipline. Concealment is protection from observation and surveillance. There are four methods of concealment: hiding, blending, disrupting, and disguising. They are most effective when used together. Visual concealment is seldom enough. Concealment must consider the enemy's ability to conduct multi-spectral reconnaissance. Smoke and obscurants can augment concealment and may be used with the following concealment methods; hiding with small screens, blending with large area visual screens and heat-signature screens, and employing smoke as a disguise with deceptive measures using high-fidelity decoys. SIGINT can eliminate or reduce the effectiveness of the enemy's TM target acquisition systems.


7-24. Theater commanders are responsible for establishing reporting systems to acquire, process, and disseminate warning information to joint force components and population centers. They are also responsible for implementing the TMD architecture for local operations and intelligence networks. The CINC tactical warning requirements are supported by national and theater systems. Component commanders are responsible for providing warning to assigned forces. Tactical warnings initiate preplanned passive defense actions. Warnings are both general (that missile launches are imminent or have occurred) and specific (that specific units or areas are under attack) (see Figure 7-3).

Figure 7-3. Warning the Force


7-25. Following a TM attack, units will be restored to a desired level of combat effectiveness, commensurate with mission requirements and available resources. In instances of mass devastation, whole unit replacement may be necessary (see Figure 7-4).

Figure 7-4. Recovery and Reconstitution


7-26. Commanders at all echelons are responsible for planning and executing passive defense measures to protect their units, and component commanders are responsible for implementing effective procedures to provide warning to all assigned forces. Key players in the passive defense element of Army TMD operations must ensure that passive defense measures are integrated into joint systems and operations. Synchronization is essential to ensure the proper forces are warned and protected.

7-27. The ARFOR Commander has the responsibility of providing warning to assigned forces vulnerable to missile attack. Passive defense capabilities and operations must be coordinated with other services to ensure seamless and effective warning, protection, and response to the effects of a TM attack. Efforts to deal with the effects of WMD/WME TMs necessitate coordinated efforts for support such as NBC detection and decontamination.

7-28. Passive defense resources include NBC, engineer, medical, signal, intelligence, ADA, and CSS personnel and assets. In addition, every unit has passive defense capabilities that can be used to enhanced survivability.


7-29. NBC defense systems include reconnaissance, detection, decontamination, and information systems. Chemical Corps contributions are principally NBC defense and TMD passive defense staff planning and execution.


7-30. Engineer passive defense contributions include mobility (gap and obstacle breaching), survivability (field fortification, construction, and concealment), sustainment engineering (building and repairing lines of communication and facilities), and topographic engineering (terrain analysis products).


7-31. Medical passive defense contributions include biological defense, medical chemical defense, and combat casualty care. Biological defense goals include preventing casualties by the use of biological countermeasures, diagnosing biological warfare agent exposure quickly, and by using antibodies/antitoxins to prevent lethality and maximize return to duty capabilities. Medical chemical defense goals are preventing casualties by the use of chemical countermeasures, providing individual prevention and prophylaxis, and management of chemical casualties to maximize return to duty. Combat casualty care attempts to save lives as far forward in the battle area as possible.


7-32. Signal Corps contributions to passive defense lie mainly in the communications and position location area. Survivable, redundant communications that are not easily targeted or identified contribute to passive defene.


7-33. Intelligence assets include national and military resources. These types of agencies provide the theater commander intelligence concerning enemy intent, capabilities, and locations through the use of various sources of information.


7-34. Passive air defense improves survivability by reducing the likelihood of being detected and targeted from the air and by mitigating the potential effects of air surveillance and attack. It does not involve the employment of lethal weapons. Air defense actions include providing alert and early warning systems, reactive TMD protection and overwatch, comprehensive EMCON policy, and communications to sensor systems.


7-35. CSS is critical for the success of passive defense operations. CSS units perform the following functions: supply, maintenance, transportation, combat health support, personnel support, and field services. CSS planners must be involved in deception planning since CSS units may need to use deception means to lead the enemy to believe activities exist where there are none. For example, they may use logistics base decoy packages, set up fake supply routes to a dummy base, or use smoke to simulate activity or obscure a dummy base. The technique of mobility clearly depends to some extent on availability of transportation assets beyond a unit's internal capability. Camouflage/concealment has significant implications for CSS units. They may store supplies in factories, bunkers, tunnels, et cetera. They set up in unusual positions, use secondary routes, move randomly, set up activities in partially destroyed installations, and so on. In addition, resupply of appropriate materiel is a key component of camouflage as well as hardening activities.


7-36. National and in-theater systems have the capability to detect BM launch and predict where and when they will impact. In-theater systems also can detect CMs and ASMs. CM impact points are difficult to determine accurately. ASM impact points may be predicted, but reaction time will be minimal. The challenge of early warning is to process information obtained from these sensors and disseminate timely TM warnings to personnel within the area at risk. Ideally, personnel outside the area at risk continue to perform under normal conditions. Once an enemy TM launch is detected, friendly forces will have little time to disseminate early warning to those forces or assets threatened by the TM. Warning architectures must be designed to support rapid distribution of warning through multiple and redundant routes. It is the CINC's and the ARFOR Commander's responsibility to establish the C4I systems to support distribution of passive defense information throughout the theater.

7-37. The ability to warn friendly forces of enemy TM attack is conducted in two stages. The first stage is alert warning and the second is impact warning. Alert warning is a data broadcast in near real-time over TIBS or TDDS followed by a voice warning broadcast over theater voice networks. For example, "a TBM missile launch has been detected" voice and data TM early warning is broadcast over Army command, TM early warning nets, and Global Command and Control System (GCCS). This warning may also be used to update information on location predicted impact point.

7-38. Force warning is soldier intensive. Lower echelon units will require more time to disseminate a warning because many automated systems currently terminate at battalion level. For this reason, force-warning procedures must decrease the amount of time necessary to issue warnings at lower echelons. Commanders should use METT-TC to determine the force protection measures (for example, NBC) soldiers will take to enhance survivability and maintain OPTEMPO.


7-39. The tactical warning system should have the following attributes:

  • Automated process. The warning process should minimize human intervention once a TM launch is detected and reported. Ability for manual override should be retained.
  • Timely response. The warning system must rapidly process and distribute notification of missile launch and impact data to the lowest echelon possible, ideally company level and below. The time from detection of launch to notification of the lowest echelon should be as short as possible to provide maximum reaction time.
  • Reliable communication links. The transmission of TMD-related data must be highly reliable. All suitable communication means should be used for TMD warning data to assure continuous transmission of information.
  • Accurate reporting. High accuracy is desired in reporting launch and impact information. Accurate PGIP/T will allow commanders outside the hazard zone to recall their forces from alert status and return to mission essential activities quicker and with less impact on OPTEMPO.
  • Notification. General warning includes the fact a TM launch has occurred, the time of launch, and the anticipated impact area. This type of information is unclassified and should be routed through the fastest communication links available. As sensors provide more data, specific warnings should be provided to units in affected areas of the battlefield. Note: Certain information such as the identification and types of friendly units in the area may be classified. Proper communications security (COMSEC) procedures should be used in this case.
  • Standardization. Message formats and grid coordinate systems must be standardized and automated whenever feasible to facilitate clear, accurate, and timely TM early warning. Manual reformatting, plotting, and coordinate conversion is not acceptable. Interoperable communications and common hardware and software should be used throughout the warning system.


7-40. Theater commanders establish TM warning release criteria. Reaction time is the critical aspect of warning. In defending against immediate TM effects, warning time should be balanced by the degree of accuracy of the predicted impact point. The initial warning (data) for an incoming TM would come from JTAGS or another member of TES over TIBS or TDDS. CMs and ASMs are normally detected by theater sensors and reported over theater networks. As the estimated impact point data is refined, warnings would be provided only to affected units, passive defense organizations, and active defense units. Such procedures would maximize passive defense, active defense, and attack capabilities while reducing the number of units and personnel unnecessarily warned because they are outside the affected area. The staff must base its recommendation on an analysis of likely COAs and to support all phases of the operation. In general, the criteria should establish whether the TMD warning will maximize unit and individual response time at the risk of excessive tempo degradation or maximize the selectiveness of the warning by allowing sensors more time to refine the accuracy of the impact point prediction. Due to these trade-offs (time vs. accuracy), the force commander must decide the warning criteria during deployment planning. The force commander must also decide appropriate response to warning. If IPB indicates a strong possibility of inbound WMD/WME, then a heightened mission-oriented protection posture (MOPP) level may be the appropriate response. Otherwise, the targeted force may simply take cover for five to ten minutes depending on missile flight time.


7-41. The following paragraphs describe sensors used to provide information on the TM threat, launch, and impact points. These sensors are extremely accurate and provide detailed information for countering TM threats.

Tactical Ballistic Missiles Sensors

7-42. The DSP satellites are national sensors for detecting and tracking TBMs. In the future, the follow-on to the DSP national sensor system, Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS), will also be able to detect and track TBMs. The Army has the Patriot, THAAD, and to a limited extent, Firefinder radars. Other service radars include the Air Force AN/TPS-75 radar, Expert Missile Tracker, and Cobra Ball IR sensor; the Marine Corps AN/TPS-59 radar; and the Navy AN/SPY-1 radar. National sensors are geared toward longer range TBMs while theater sensors are optimized toward SRBMs. (When fielded, the THAAD radar will contribute to MRBM detection.) These systems are either fielded, being modernized, or under development for fielding in the near future.

Cruise Missiles Sensors

7-43. Theater sensors are the primary sources of CM detection and tracking. Army sensors include Patriot and Sentinel radars. Air Force sensors include the E-3B Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), AN/TPS-43, and AN/TPS-75 radars. The Marine Corps sensor is the AN/TPS-59 radar, and the Navy's sensors include the AN/SPY-1 radar and E-2C Hawkeye. The AWACS and the Hawkeye have the advantage of being aerial platforms and may be able to detect CMs at longer ranges than surface-based sensors.

Air-to-Surface Missile Sensors

7-44. Army sensors are primary sources of ASM detection and tracking. ADA radars detect ASMs at significant ranges. Other service sensors such as the AN/TPS-59 can also detect and track ASMs.


7-45. The AAMDC in theater receives TM warning from national, Army, or other joint sensors. The AAMDC then provides TM early warning to ground-based forces according to the JFC's/Land Component Commander's (LCC's) TM warning guidance. ADA brigades and Patriot battalions also receive TM warning from national and joint sensors through the joint air defense C2 structure. All units with a Commander's Tactical Terminal (CTT) or Joint Tactical Terminal (JTT) receive the TM warning simultaneously.

7-46. When DSP sensors detect a TBM launch, the raw data is downlinked to JTAGS and other TES ground stations. They process the information and disseminate a warning in accordance with release criteria established by the JFC. JTAGS disseminates the PGIP/T and provides refinements at regular intervals. Updates are continuous as long as sensors are able to track the TBM.

7-47. Theater sensors detect a TBM launch and report the information through their C2 headquarters to the AAMDC or automatically inject the data into the joint air defense C2 architecture. Depending on sensor capabilities, a PGIP/T will be computed and disseminated. For active defense operations, ADA commanders and liaison teams at all levels will provide tactical warning to supported units using the same procedures for air defense early warning. The JFC must ensure all units in the theater, including coalition forces, receive timely tactical TM warning.

7-48. When theater sensors detect and track CMs and ASMs, the track data is provided to the air defense C2 structure and the AAMDC. PGIP/T data for CMs is not computed although the current heading and speed are used to predict the flight path for engagement by defense elements including combined arms for air defense (CAAD). The AAMDC initiates the force warning process. Simultaneously, ADA commanders and liaison teams at all levels will provide tactical warning to supported units using the same system used for air defense early warning.

7-49. Joint and Army echelons must deconflict and correlate TM warning data received from multiple sensors, so subordinate units are not inundated with duplicate reports. Automation is the key due to the short timelines available to warn the force.

7-50. Based on the JFC/LCC TM warning criteria, the AAMDC should provide TM early warning to forces in the LCC AOR. Subordinate headquarters are responsible for disseminating TM voice warning (as a back up) to their soldiers. The AAMDC also provides the LCC an intelligence assessment on the missile's possible effects (that is, high, low, or no WMD/WME threat) along with the warning. This transmission could be sent from the AAMDC over automated and manual communications systems such as Interim-PAWS (I-PAWS).


7-51. Communications are critical to effectively warn the force of a TM attack. Technologies available will influence warning methods; however, fundamentals will remain the same. The application of advanced communications, related automation, and the use of a common geographic grid system can significantly enhance TM warning dissemination. TM warning dissemination methods include cascading, broadcasting, and pinpointing.


7-52. The cascade method of warning the force involves higher echelons notifying subordinate elements of an impending attack (sequentially). This method provides maximum procedural control over TM warning dissemination by requiring each headquarters to provide TM voice warning each subordinate command echelon, but is the slowest method. Digitization of this process using Army Global Command and Control System (AGCCS) hardware and software will expedite passage of TM warning information while retaining control by the respective echelon commander.


7-53. The broadcast method of warning the force involves a higher echelon broadcasting warning directly to all subordinate echelons (simultaneously) through all means of communications available. This method provides the quickest distribution of time-sensitive information, but it is heavily dependent on operator training and has a tendency over warn or warn unaffected units.


7-54. Under the pinpoint method of warning the force in theater, the AAMDC transmits TM warnings directly to the specific elements affected by an attack (point to point). This is the preferred approach when available. This approach also lends itself to automated dissemination of digital messages.


7-55. The amount and type of communications available to support tactical warning will vary dependent upon assets available within the theater. Warning communications use a variety of service, joint, national, and multinational systems. Specific examples of current and developing communications systems anticipated to be used to disseminate tactical warning to the theater and civilian population centers include:

Joint Tactical Terminal

7-56. JTT is a secure UHF radio system developed to access Army and Air Force tactical intelligence information. JTTs directly receives TBM warnings by TES. This equipment provides warnings of DSP-detected TBM launches to corps, division brigade CPs, and to selected active defense and attack operation units.

Mobile Subscriber Equipment

7-57. Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) is the Army's tactical mobile area telecommunication system for corps level and below. MSE may be augmented using leased commercial lines and interfaces with the existing commercial telephone infrastructure to provide added redundancy and linkages with multinational units and civilian population centers.

Combat Net Radio

7-58. CNR frequency modulation (FM) and amplitude modulation (AM) radios provide an alternative means of voice warning at theater through brigade levels. FM radios will be used as a primary means to pass voice warning and transmit digital messages at battalion level and below.

Satellite Communications

7-59. Satellite communications (SATCOM) established to support theater, corps, and division commanders, are also used to provide tactical TM warnings. Coverage can be further extended using commercial off-the-shelf (COTS), nontactical SATCOM receivers.

Time Division Multiple Access Systems

7-60. JTIDS and Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS) radios are secure UHF digital data broadcast systems. Most units will have access to EPLRS, while only selected ADA units will have access to JTIDS. These systems provide direct access to TM information from multiple sensors.

Other Commercial and Developmental Systems

7-61. During Operations Desert Thunder and Desert Fox commercial pagers demonstrated the ability to provide immediate pinpoint warning and one-way text transmission from the AAMDC to selected units. Similarly, use of GPS satellite beacons and satellite-based paging systems to transmit text messages to small hand-held receivers in real-time is being explored. These and other innovative technologies may increase speed, reliability, and selectivity in the overall tactical warning architecture.


7-62. Response to warning should be tailored in accordance with METT-TC. Standardized responses should be outlined in unit SOPs. They should be keyed to posturing levels and other survivability actions at the time of tactical warning.


7-63. Cueing directs the employment of specialized passive defense assets. Cueing will need to continue after missile impact if WMD/WME are involved.


7-64. The key to protecting the force against NBC contamination is avoidance. Specific hazard areas must be located, identified, and marked. Resources available to do this include biological and chemical stand-off detectors, NBC reconnaissance system (NBCRS), point detectors such as Biological Integrated Detection System (BIDS), internal assets such as unit NBC equipment operators, and other NBC defense systems. NBCRS (FOX) assets may have to be moved to different areas on the battlefield to determine if a TM event was an NBC event. BIDS may need to be activated or repositioned along with standoff systems' downwind monitors.


7-65. Medical units may also require warning of potential mass casualties. Medical personnel must quickly identify chemical and biological agents to provide effective NBC casualty treatment. They assist commanders in determining combat effectiveness of units attacked by WMD/WME.


7-66. Logistics is the key to maintaining combat power. Logisticians must plan for increased expenditures of barrier materials and NBC supplies (for example, MOPP equipment, NBC alarms, decontamination equipment) in rear areas. They must also ensure there are sufficient quantities of these materials on hand at the beginning of conflict to equip deployed soldiers and units flowing into the theater.


7-67. All clear systems and processes are required to notify soldiers when hazards are no longer present. Standing down the force from protective measures as soon as possible is key to restoring full combat capabilities. Most all clear systems and processes will originate at unit level and will support decentralized actions in response to TM events to include NBC events. Units that were initially alerted as a result of over warning must be notified that they are not in a hazard area, and the threat from TMs is temporarily over and normal operations should resume. Units that are in the hazard area must be notified when the hazard has passed or when the threat from TMs has temporarily subsided long enough to relax their passive defense posture. In the event of an NBC hazard event, NBC unmasking procedures should be followed. Intelligence sources will indicate when the TM threat has temporarily declined. NBC and munitions sensors will indicate when the hazard area is clear from NBC contamination or munitions such as mines.


7-68. Passive defense measures begin in peacetime. Countering the proliferation of missile sales and containing the spread of TM technology are key, but other actions are also necessary. Readiness provides a trained, organized, and equipped TMD force to convince potential adversaries that the use of TMs against US forces would be unsuccessful and counter productive.


7-69. Most counter-proliferation actions will be executed at the strategic level and are proactive initiatives intended to reduce or eliminate the threat of TM from specific countries or theaters. These measures focus on countering the spread of missiles and warheads together with the materials and technologies needed to produce missiles or WMD/WME warheads. These efforts start before combat operations begin and rely heavily on treaties, international agreements, and strategic intelligence.


7-70. The US may consider conducting an overt demonstration of both the US force's capability and resolve to contend with a TM threat. This would be planned in advance, executed early, and may involve psychological operations (PSYOPS) and civilian media sources. Television and other communications media may be used in PSYOPS to undermine an enemy's will to employ TMs.

7-71. While deterrence through readiness remains a fundamental objective, an enemy's intent to use missiles may remain a viable threat. In these cases, the US force commander must assess the need and prepare to conduct preemptive strikes if required. Deterrence through readiness is most effective with a preemptive capability to destroy a potential enemy's aircraft, production facilities, storage facilities, missiles, warheads (especially WMD/WME), missile launchers, and other long-range delivery systems. The objective is to reduce enemy target acquisition and targeting capabilities, transportation assets, and C2 facilities. Conducting deterrence, while a key aspect of early planning, remains a valid requirement throughout TMD operations.


7-72. Joint CONPLANs should be reviewed to ensure TMD passive defense has been properly addressed. This review may identify the need for additional passive defense forces or tailoring forces according to passive defense requirements. The AAMDC ensures all information is provided to units to enable them to plan passive defense operations and to conduct training. The AAMDC will develop the air and missile defense annex for the force commander's CONPLAN/OPLAN. An example annex is provided at Appendix B.


7-73. Enhancing force survivability involves all those measures taken to ensure that friendly personnel and equipment survive a TM attack with minimal casualties and damage. The first step in enhancing survivability is to accomplish a vulnerability analysis for assessing strengths, weaknesses, and improvement options. The analysis should provide real-time vulnerability assessments and identify possible ways of reducing or eliminating vulnerability through:

  • Hardening,
  • Redundancy and robustness,
  • Dispersal,
  • Support of civil defense authorities, and
  • NBC protection.


7-74. Recommendations must be made on warning criteria based on COAs and the commander's guidance. Plans for ensuring that the correct warning system architecture, message protocols, and methodologies are in place must be completed and implemented.


7-75. Units develop and refine passive defense plans and procedures including OPSEC, deception, EW, camouflage and concealment, recovery and reconstitution. The appropriate mix of passive defense systems are placed high on the TPFDL to accomplish force protection based on METT-TC. Staffs will plan to build field fortifications and improve the NBC hardening characteristics of structures and systems.


7-76. The AAMDC will conduct vulnerability analysis, which should provide real-time vulnerability assessments and identify possible ways of reducing or eliminating vulnerability through hardening, redundancy and robustness, dispersal, supporting civilian defense authorities, and NBC protection. The AAMDC will establish the warning criteria and methodology. The AAMDC coordinates closely with units to ensure this criteria and methodology are incorporated in unit plans.


7-77. NBC protection requirements are determined and accomplished through continuous training, equipment outfitting, and medical pretreatment of the force to include vaccinations. The purpose of implementing NBC protective measures is to minimize the impact of WMD/WME on operations while protecting personnel and equipment. Hardening measures against conventional and NBC effects are reviewed for adequacy and improved as required. Most system NBC hardening will be accomplished prior to deployment as part of system design or as an add-on capability. The JFC will consider the need to train and equip civilian defense authorities and augment civil affairs units as necessary with chemical specialists.


7-78. If counter-proliferation and deterrence are not completely successful, the JFC must develop plans to ensure the force can withstand TM attacks with minimal casualties and damage while accomplishing the mission. This is accomplished through continuous planning and monitoring.


7-79. Counter-proliferation efforts will continue and should be part of a codified peace. The US may become key to counter-proliferation enforcement, especially during the early phase of an operation when US force vulnerability may be high and enemy intentions may be unknown.

Reduce Threat Targeting Effectiveness

7-80. The commander's TMD deception plan will mislead enemy decision makers by falsifying the indicators used by the enemy to discern friendly intentions, capabilities, or dispositions. It is effective when it causes the enemy to deplete TM resources by attacking false targets (decoys), missing intended targets, and by denying accurate BDA. It is also successful when it freezes the threat altogether, causing the threat to retain TM resources but miss attack opportunities. Successful deception in TMD is based on deception plans that are executed correctly, monitored constantly, and modified as necessary to trick the enemy completely. When coupled with deception, camouflage and concealment protect the force from TM attack by manipulating the enemy's TM targeting decisions.

7-81. Mobility includes all those measures taken to ensure high-value elements of the force are never in one spot long enough to provide an effective and lucrative TM target. Commanders and staffs should plan to capitalize on C4I capabilities to operate within the enemy's decision cycle.

Enhance Personnel and Equipment Survivability

7-82. The US force commander and subordinate commanders are responsible for planning and implementing specific measures to decrease the enemy's targeting capability. The first step in enhancing survivability is to accomplish a vulnerability analysis. The analysis will provide timely assessment and identify possible ways of reducing or eliminating vulnerability through active defense operations, attack operations, hardening, redundancy and robustness, dispersal, training civilian authorities, and NBC protection. The analysis must be done early and updated as necessary. Redundancy and robustness preserve combat power by duplication of critical capabilities that are particularly vulnerable to TM attack. Soft targets such as C2 nodes, sensors, and fixed sites are of particular concern.

7-83. Commanders and staffs should plan the levels of NBC protection, TM early warning, and force protection measures needed based on METT-TC. Plans should be designed to minimize the impact of WMD/WME on the OPTEMPO while protecting personnel and equipment.

Plan Recovery and Reconstitution

7-84. Although initial recovery and reconstitution planning would have occurred prior to deployment, continued planning will be required to adapt to changing situations and circumstances. Recovery and reconstitution involves those measures taken to restore the effectiveness of the force after having withstood a TM attack. The plan should consider the mass casualty potential of TMs with WMD/WME payloads and the decontamination requirements generated by WMD/WME impacts.

Warning the Force

7-85. Commanders and staffs should carefully plan appropriate tactics and techniques for warning the force. The AAMDC will establish protocols and architectures for alert and early warning for the ARFOR. Commanders and staffs of ARFOR units should carefully plan appropriate tactics and techniques for warning their forces within these established protocols and architectures.


7-86. Deployed and deploying units continue to develop IPB and continue vulnerability analyses. In addition, they implement OPSEC, mobility, deception, and camouflage and concealment measures. Field fortifications and WMD/WME hardening of structures and systems are continued; these are especially important during early entry operations. Operational and organizational decisions should include the need and method of accomplishing the mission even if primary resources are destroyed. Upon reaching assembly areas all units establish and test TM warning links and improve the fortifications of fixed sites. SOF units deployed early into theater can conduct UW or PSYOPS to prevent the enemy from using TM assets.

7-87. By dispersing during entry operations and throughout all operations, the US forces will be less vulnerable to TM effects, especially from the potential for mass casualties. This may be more difficult to accomplish during early entry operations, especially in case of forced entry. Dispersal will contribute to the survival of the force, but make it more vulnerable to ground attack. Appropriate trade-offs may have to be made.

7-88. NBC protective measures must be established. The force must be protected through employment of detectors and sensors with organic capabilities and from specialized NBC reconnaissance assets. Collective protection facilities and shelters must be established. MOPP guidance must be issued.

7-89. Following a TM attack, units should be restored to a desired level of combat effectiveness commensurate with mission requirements and available resources. In some instances of mass devastation, whole unit replacement may be necessary. Important elements of recovery include decontamination, replacing lost personnel and equipment, medical treatment of casualties, and conducting remedial training.

7-90. The extent and timing of decontamination will depend on the tactical situation, mission, degree and type of contamination, and resources available. The primary purposes of decontamination are to stop the erosion of combat power and reduce casualties that may result from inadvertent exposure or failure of protection. Timely, correct, and complete decontamination avoids problems, such as protective gear failure and heat stress. Decontamination is costly in terms of manpower, time, space, and materiel; so commanders must use resources wisely. The following principles apply: decontaminate as soon as possible to restore full combat potential, decontaminate only what is necessary, decontaminate as close to the site of contamination as possible to limit its spread, decontaminate the most important items first, and decontaminate in a manner to minimize recontamination through use.

7-91. There are three levels of decontamination. Immediate decontamination is the actions taken by a soldier to survive and continue to fight on the battlefield. Operational decontamination is accomplished using decontamination equipment organic to battalion-sized units and includes wash down and MOPP gear exchange. It allows the force to fight longer by reducing contamination. Thorough decontamination requires support of chemical units. When time permits, thorough decontamination restores almost all-combat power of the contaminated force.

7-92. Commanders must prepare their forces to handle large-scale medical treatment contingencies brought on by TM strikes. Commanders and staffs use IPB to accurately anticipate medical needs and quickly respond to TM attacks. Medical treatment attempts to return sick or wounded personnel to duty or restore them to the best health as quickly as possible.

7-93. In an NBC environment, medical treatments may be complex and diverse. Personnel may suffer from a variety of physiological and psychological "wounds" produced by the effects of TMs with payloads of WMD/WME. Conventional high explosive weapons can produce blast (overpressure) and fragmentation casualties. Nuclear weapons can produce flash blindness, thermal burns, prompt radiation effects, blast effects, and delayed radiation effects. Biological weapons can produce immediate and delayed casualties. Prompt treatment is very important. For some biological agents, treatment initiated before the signs and symptoms of disease appear is usually life saving, while delays until after symptoms appear may prove fatal. The decision on when to provide medical treatment is key to long-term consequences and must be balanced with short-term impacts. Chemical weapons have a variety of effects on the body including both respiratory and skin effects. Untreated chemical agent exposure can lead to death.


7-94. Passive defense is necessary to provide essential individual and collective protection of designated assets. Passive defense measures should be planned whenever US forces are threatened.


7-95. Planning for decisive operations is the same as the planning that occurs during deployment and entry stages for force projection operations. Plans and contingencies must be continuously updated and reevaluated throughout all phases of operations.


7-96. Execution during decisive operations is essentially the same as occurs during deployment and entry stages. NBC reconnaissance assets and sensors are positioned on the battlefield as appropriate per the latest intelligence information and implementation of passive defense measures such as OPSEC, hardening, decoys, and camouflage continue. Vulnerability analysis continues and recommendations to reduce vulnerability are provided.

7-97. When DSP or other sensors detect a TBM or CM launch and PGIP/T is determined, the warning message (data) is disseminated over theater or CINCSPACE-specified operational networks (TIBS, TDDS). Upon receipt by AAMDC, it may selectively transmit a warning to units and population centers within the targeted area. If more accurate PGIP/T information becomes available, a refined warning may be disseminated by the AAMDC. NBC reconnaissance assets and sensors may be cued toward probable impact points or targeted areas in preparation for the potential need to initiate downwind hazard warnings.

7-98. NBC reconnaissance is conducted. Units observing the impact or detonation and detecting chemical or biological agents submit NBC reports to higher echelons through the NBC Warning and Reporting System (NBCWRS). Medical treatment of casualties is then initiated and NBC decontamination is performed as required. If no NBC agents are suspected or detected, "all-clear" procedures are executed. As soon as it is determined there is no hazard, alerted units will reduce their protective posture.


7-99. Following decisive operations, units should be restored to a desired level of combat effectiveness commensurate with mission requirements and available resources. In some instances of mass devastation, whole unit replacement may be necessary.

7-100. Reconstitution includes the assignment of people and equipment and the reorganizing and training of units. Reorganization restores combat effectiveness by cross-leveling assets within a unit, forming smaller units, or by piecing together fragmentary elements into larger units. Regeneration rebuilds a unit in which the mission capability has been reduced or degraded. It will be accomplished through the replacement of personnel and equipment, re-establishment of effective C2, and will culminate in collective and individual training.


7-101. Passive defense operations continue as necessary. The necessity may arise from TM threats or from other threats such as terrorist dispersal of NBC munitions, civilian accidents, and discovery of chemical production facilities.

7-102. During post conflict, units may conduct peacekeeping, occupation, recovery, and redeployment operations. All of these operations require a moderate to high level of passive defense operations. This includes the need for a robust warning architecture in order to provide early warning to the forces in the event of an intentional or accidental release of chemical, biological, or radiological contamination or surprise TM attack. Commanders at all levels need to maintain the capability to employ these measures throughout the period of operations and only stand down these capabilities upon successful redeployment of the forces in theater.

7-103. Additionally, during this phase of operations, units and equipment exposed to NBC contamination will be required to completely decontaminate all traces of contamination prior to return of the equipment to home station. The verification process for the equipment is conducted by Army engineer elements.


7-104. Passive defense is the one operational element of Army TMD operations that all Army units perform. It supplements the effectiveness of active defense and attack operations. Passive defense is not a stand-alone element. It is fully integrated with both active defense and attack operations through the C4I system.

7-105. Every Army echelon in the theater has passive defense responsibilities and action to take. As with all other procedures, they must be individually and collectively trained and rehearsed. For example, the Army has always participated in efforts to deny potential enemies access to weapons, which could be used against US interests. Army units will attempt to reduce enemy target effectiveness through standard and innovative means. The Army has always developed procedures to warn the force of impending attack so that the force can take the necessary survival measures. Recovery and reconstitution are part of Army force projection operations.

7-106. Passive defense is the application of existing SOPs to an increasingly significant threat. Refinements of warning systems to alert forces in danger of TM attack in short periods of time is a significant change to previous doctrine.

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