Space

DATE=08/26/03

TYPE=CORRESPONDENT REPORT

TITLE=SHUTTLE REPORT (L)

NUMBER=2-306870

BYLINE=DAVID McALARY

DATELINE=WASHINGTON

CONTENT=

VOICED AT:

INTRO: Investigators have issued a scathing report on the causes of the U-S space shuttle Columbia disaster, which killed seven astronauts in February. As V-O-A's David McAlary reports, they find that the management of the space agency, NASA, is as much to blame for the accident as the immediate technical cause.

TEXT: The harsh report repeats the accident investigators' previous finding that Columbia was doomed upon landing by a piece of wayward hard foam insulation that had pierced the shuttle's left wing during launch.

It concludes that the shuttle is not inherently unsafe, but that NASA management is. That is, the agency does not have a strong culture of safety.

The report says that, under severe budget constraints, NASA developed practices detrimental to safety. Agency funding dropped 40-percent during the 1990s as the Clinton administration sought to reduce the huge U-S budget deficit. Panel member John Barry, an Air Force major general, says that in this fiscal atmosphere, NASA pitted safety against meeting shuttle flight schedules.

/// BARRY ACT ///

NASA had conflicting goals of cost, schedule, and safety. And unfortunately, safety lost out in a lot of areas to the mandates of operational requirements.

/// END ACT ///

The investigators say NASA relied heavily on the experiences of past successful missions as a substitute for sound engineering and testing. They find that the space agency threw up barriers to effective communication about critical safety information and stifled professional differences of opinion.

Panel member John Logsdon of Georgetown University's Space Policy Institute says that in its drive to get to orbit, NASA's shuttle program operated in uncertainty, stress, and tension.

/// LOGSDON ACT ///

It is hardly an environment for effective, safe operation of the program, the board concluded. We go into some detail in discussing the particular NASA human spaceflight culture and come to the conclusions that it must be modified for success in the future.

/// END ACT ///

Although the board of inquiry says the shuttle is not inherently unsafe, it makes recommendations to improve safety. They call for NASA to reduce debris that falls from the shuttle during launch, fortify the shuttle to withstand debris, get better imaging of launches and flights, develop a way to repair damage in orbit, improve inspections between missions, and enhance crew survivability.

NASA administrator Sean O'Keefe issued a statement saying his agency has already begun putting some of these recommendations into effect, since the board had issued many of them earlier. NASA has established a committee of outside experts to monitor its compliance and hopes to return shuttles to flight by March or April.

The chairman of the inquiry, retired admiral Harold Gehman [GAY-man], says his board calls for other longer-term organizational improvements that cannot be accomplished with short-term diligence.

/// GEHMAN ACT ///

Over a period of a year or two, the natural tendency of all bureaucracies, not just NASA, to migrate away from that diligent attitude is of great concern to the board because the history of NASA indicates that they have done it before.

/// END ACT ///

Admiral Gehman says the report should serve as the basis for a national debate about the future of the U-S space program. He cautioned against replacing the shuttle with an overly sophisticated spacecraft, but rather advised developing a human spaceflight program that is sturdy and within the limits of what the country wants to pay. (SIGNED)

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