Space

DATE=08/26/03

TYPE=CORRESPONDENT REPORT

TITLE=SHUTTLE REPORT (L-UPDATE)

NUMBER=2-306878

BYLINE=DAVID McALARY

DATELINE=WASHINGTON

CONTENT=

VOICED AT:

/// EDS: ADDS PRESIDENT BUSH REACT AND ACT OF NASA ADMINISTRATOR O'KEEFE ///

INTRO: Investigators have issued a scathing report on the causes of the U-S space shuttle Columbia disaster, which killed seven astronauts in February. As V-O-A's David McAlary reports, they find that the management of the space agency, NASA, is as much to blame for the accident as the immediate technical cause.

TEXT: The harsh report repeats the accident investigators' previous finding that Columbia was doomed upon landing by a piece of wayward hard foam insulation that had pierced the shuttle's left wing during launch.

It concludes that the shuttle is not inherently unsafe, but that NASA management does not operate it safely.

The report says that, under severe budget constraints, NASA developed practices detrimental to safety. Panel member John Barry, an Air Force major general, says that NASA pitted safety against the need to meet flight schedules.

/// BARRY ACT ///

NASA had conflicting goals of cost, schedule, and safety. And unfortunately, safety lost out in a lot of areas to the mandates of operational requirements.

/// END ACT ///

The investigators say NASA relied heavily on the experiences of past successful missions as a substitute for sound engineering and testing. They find that the space agency threw up barriers to effective communication about critical safety information and stifled professional differences of opinion.

Panel member John Logsdon of Georgetown University's Space Policy Institute says that in its drive to get to orbit, NASA's shuttle program operated in uncertainty, stress, and tension.

/// LOGSDON ACT ///

It is hardly an environment for effective, safe operation of the program, the board concluded. We go into some detail in discussing the particular NASA human spaceflight culture and come to the conclusions that it must be modified for success in the future.

/// END ACT ///

The board of inquiry made several recommendations to improve shuttle safety. It calls for NASA to reduce debris that falls from the shuttle during launch, fortify the orbiter to withstand debris, get better pictures of launches and flights, develop a way to repair damage in orbit, and enhance crew survivability.

NASA administrator Sean O'Keefe says the space agency has already begun putting some of these recommendations into effect, since the board had issued many of them during its probe.

/// O'KEEFE ACT ///

We must choose wisely as we select options to comply with each of those recommendations. And we must continually improve and upgrade that plan to incorporate every aspect we find in addition to the board's findings in this long road to fixing the problem.

/// END ACT ///

NASA has established a committee of outside experts to monitor its compliance.

/// OPT /// The chairman of the inquiry, retired admiral Harold Gehman [GAY-man], says his board calls for other longer-term organizational improvements to NASA that cannot be accomplished in the short-term.

/// OPT GEHMAN ACT ///

Over a period of a year or two, the natural tendency of all bureaucracies, not just NASA, to migrate away from that diligent attitude is of great concern to the board because the history of NASA indicates that they have done it before.

/// END ACT ///

/// OPT /// Admiral Gehman says the report should serve as the basis for a national debate about the future of the U-S space program. He advised developing a human spaceflight program that is within the limits of what the country wants to pay. /// END OPT ///

The vacationing President Bush pledged that America's journey into space will go on and that the work of Columbia will continue. (SIGNED)

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