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Washington File

09 April 2003

U.S. Missile Defense Program "On Track," Agency Director Says

(General Ronald Kadish testifies before Senate panel April 9) (9160)
The U.S. missile defense program "is on track" and "we have the
confidence to proceed with plans for an initial defense capability,"
says Lieutenant General Ronald Kadish, director of the Missile Defense
Agency.
In testimony April 9 before the Senate Appropriations Committee's
Defense Subcommittee, Kadish said the program has "faced significant
technical and management challenges, but through aggressive testing we
have proven that hit-to-kill technology works. We have demonstrated
system integration through complex system testing."
These tests, he said, combined with analysis of simulations and
exercises, "give us confidence ... that we can take the initial steps
we are proposing to bolster defenses against short- and medium-range
ballistic missiles and introduce a modest defensive capability to
defeat a limited long-range threat."
Kadish recalled that last December, President Bush directed the
Defense Department to field an initial set of missile defense
capabilities "in order to reduce the vulnerabilities of the United
States, our troops, and our allies and friends."
Given the successful testing accomplished to date, "I believe we are
ready for this," he said. "We plan to begin operating modest land- and
sea-defense capabilities in 2004 to provide limited protection of our
country as well as our troops and critical assets overseas."
He stressed, however, that this will be a limited system to address a
range of missile threats, and that "no fixed, long-term architecture"
yet exists. The U.S. capability will evolve and improve over time, he
said, "so that what we proposed to field initially in 2004 and 2005
may evolve to look very different a decade later. The number and type
of missile defense assets and their locations and basing arrangements
may be expected to change to make the system more integrated and
capable."
Saying "robust, realistic testing is absolutely critical" to
developing an effective missile defense system, Kadish noted that over
the past two years "we conducted a total of 55 flight tests and 60
ground tests. Seventeen of these tests were flight-intercept tests.
... Over the next two years we are planning another 68 flight tests,
58 ground tests, and maintaining the same pace of intercept tests as
before."
"Our intentions," he said, "are to test the complete system and to be
ready to respond to ballistic missile threats against the United
States, our deployed forces, and our friends and allies. We have
conducted the rigorous testing needed to give us the confidence that
we are far enough along to do operationally realistic testing in an
integrated way."
Following is the text of Kadish's prepared testimony, except for five
tables which were deleted as noted:
(begin text)
Lieutenant General Ronald T. Kadish, U.S. Air Force
Director, Missile Defense Agency
Missile Defense Program and Fiscal Year 2004 Budget
Before the Senate Appropriations Committee's Defense Subcommittee
April 9, 2003
Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee. It is an honor
to appear before you to present the Department of Defense's Fiscal
Year (FY) 2004 Missile Defense Program and budget.
In early 2001 we restructured the missile defense program to develop
the capability to defend the United States, our allies and friends,
and deployed forces against all ranges of missiles in all phases of
flight. With the support of Congress, we have made considerable
progress in demonstrating key ballistic missile defense (BMD)
technologies and system integration. Our testing and analysis give us
confidence that hit-to-kill technology works and that we can take the
initial steps we are proposing to bolster defenses against short- and
medium-range ballistic missiles and introduce a modest defensive
capability to defeat a limited long-range threat. Today I will review
our progress, discuss why we are confident in our approach, and
outline our plans and challenges ahead.
Over the past two years we have conducted several successful intercept
tests. We achieved four for five successful [i.e., four successes in
five attempts] long-range, Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD)
intercept flight tests, demonstrating the hit-to-kill technologies of
the Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle, critical sensor technologies, and
the integration of many geographically dispersed missile defense
assets. The failure of the most recent such test (Integrated Flight
Test-10) last December resulted from the non-separation of the
interceptor and the surrogate booster rocket. This was not a failure
of new missile defense technology, but a failure of our quality
control processes. We are increasing our already focused
quality-control efforts. We are taking steps to ensure this separation
problem is not repeated. Furthermore, future GMD tests will no longer
use the surrogate booster and instead will use one or both of the
boosters currently under development.
We are three for three [i.e., three tests, all successful] in our
ship-based exo-atmospheric intercept tests. Last year Aegis BMD
successfully completed its Aegis Lightweight Exo-Atmospheric
Projectile (LEAP) Intercept (ALI) project. Based on these results we
accelerated the insertion of the follow-on Aegis BMD capability into
the Test Bed. Our third intercept in November 2002 was the first-ever
intercept of a ballistic missile in the ascent phase of flight.
Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) has made significant strides.
Since January 2001, we have had five for seven successful [i.e., seven
attempts, five successful] intercepts of ballistic missile targets and
have begun fielding the first PAC-3 missiles. We also executed more
than a dozen successful test flights of the Airborne Laser (ABL)
aircraft, completed significant aircraft modifications, and
accomplished successful subsystem testing and full-up ground-tests of
the first laser module. While we are in the difficult phase of
integrating the components into the ABL, our progress to date has
increased our confidence that ABL can eventually be integrated into
the BMD system (BMDS).
Mr. Chairman, America's missile defense program is on track. The
Missile Defense Agency is doing what we told Congress it would do. We
listened to your concerns and have sought to address them in a
responsible manner. We have faced significant technical and management
challenges, but through aggressive testing we have proven that
hit-to-kill technology works. We have demonstrated system integration
through complex system testing. These tests, combined with analysis of
simulations and exercises, give us confidence that the system can take
the first steps toward initial defensive operations while performing
as a test bed for further realistic testing and continued spiral
development.
The President's FY 2004 budget will allow us to continue this
significant progress and is structured to incorporate the
recommendations of the Defense Science Board summer study of 2002.
Evolutionary Approach to Missile Defense
The BMD system involves many sensors and interceptors that are
integrated and layered to enable engagements against hostile missiles
in the boost, midcourse, and terminal phases of flight. Layered
defenses can allow multiple shot opportunities across all of the
engagement segments and potentially within each one of those segments,
greatly enhancing our ability to handle countermeasures and destroy
in-flight missiles and their payloads.
As I have explained in past hearings, we are building the missile
defense system using an evolutionary acquisition approach, so that the
system's capability can be enhanced over time. Our plan continues to
be one of incrementally providing the decision makers the ability to
field militarily useful capabilities based on their technological
readiness, suitability for operational use and threat developments.
Last December the President directed the Department to field an
initial set of missile defense capabilities in order to reduce the
vulnerabilities of the United States, our troops, and our allies and
friends. Given our fielding approach, and given the successful testing
we have accomplished to date, I believe we are ready for this. The
proposed budget for FY 2004 and across the 2004-2009 Future Years
Defense Program (FYDP) supports Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation (RDT&E) activities to accomplish that goal. We plan to
begin operating modest land- and sea-defense capabilities in 2004 to
provide limited protection of our country as well as our troops and
critical assets overseas.
In missile defense, we deal routinely with revolutionary technologies
and unprecedented engineering requirements. The program we are
currently executing recognizes the unique challenges we face and sets
out a disciplined course to develop the BMD system in an evolutionary
way. Having spent the last couple of years looking at different
missile defense options, we are now narrowing our program activities
and focusing on development and fielding of the most promising
elements.
Consistent with the approach I have described in previous hearings, we
are building and fielding limited, militarily useful capabilities as
soon as they can be made available. This approach takes into account
known and projected threats and the present state of technology. With
a capability-based acquisition approach we put capability into the
field, test it, use it, get comfortable with it, and learn what works
well and what does not. We have structured Test Bed fielding
opportunities to occur in "blocks" every two years to improve what we
have fielded as needed. Block 2004 (initial defense capabilities)
represents 2004-2005, Block 2006 represents 2006-2007, and so on.
These blocks will deliver elements and components that are ready for
continued rigorous testing and full integration into the system.
With the President's decision, we now have a basic near-term
architecture for a limited system to address a range of missile
threats. I want to stress that we have no fixed, long-term
architecture. We will evolve and improve the capability of the Block
2004 system over time, so that what we propose to field initially in
2004 and 2005 may evolve to look very different a decade later. The
number and type of missile defense assets and their locations and
basing arrangements may be expected to change to make the system more
integrated and capable.
We have adopted this evolutionary approach because a single
acquisition cycle is not responsive to rapid changes in threat and
technology and is not structured to deal with surprise. We want to
avoid prematurely constraining system design by using the traditional
requirements process and waiting up to 20 years or more for a
defensive capability that would result from using traditional
acquisition rules. In a world marked by increasing ballistic missile
activity, our nation, forces, and allies cannot afford to wait that
long.
In using this evolutionary approach, we still have the ability to
incorporate the discipline and intent of the traditional acquisition
process. For example, the warfighting community has been heavily
involved from the beginning in the development of system elements and
components. We are successfully using a spiral development process to
put new technologies into play more quickly than if we were to use the
traditional approach. Spiral development requires regular dialogue and
active participation between user and developer for delivering a
militarily useful set of capabilities. Once we field the initial
capability, uniformed personnel will operate the system.
Despite the many uncertainties we face, this approach allows us to be
good stewards of the taxpayers' money. The President's recent
announcement stands as a good example of this. We are not making an
early commitment to large-volume serial production and very
large-scale investments. Our fielding commitment will be scaled over
time and rise with our confidence that we are on the right development
path for this complex, multifaceted system.
Aggressive Research, Development and Test Activities (RDT&E)
As we prepare to implement the President's directive, we plan to
continue the program's intensive testing activities up to and beyond
the 2004-2005 timeframe. We have a single, robust RDT&E program
dedicated to the development and demonstration of missile defense
technologies and integration concepts. In fact, consistent with our
investments over the past two years, the lion's share of the FY 2004
budget request of $7.7 billion ($7,700 million) for the Missile
Defense Agency, roughly $6 billion ($6,000 million), will support
RDT&E activities that are not directly tied to system fielding.
Significant development efforts in FY 2004 include continued work on
Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), ABL, and kinetic energy
boost-phase interceptors in the post-Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)
Treaty environment.
These aggressive RDT&E activities are the basis for proceeding as the
President has directed and for continuing development work to build a
multi-layered BMD system. We will continue our practice of assessing
these activities on a regular basis to see if they can be accelerated
or whether they must be truncated or modified in some manner. RDT&E
activities occurring in FY 2004 will contribute to Blocks 2004, 2006,
2008 and 2010.
We are still evaluating the impact of our withdrawal from the ABM
Treaty. The treaty successfully did what it was intended to do. It
severely restricted missile defense development and fielding options.
The President's action has made it possible to begin to develop and
test aggressively the full range of missile defense technologies and
pursue capabilities that make the most sense from the standpoints of
technology, operations, and cost.
For example, as a result of the treaty withdrawal, Aegis BMD, the
sea-based defense element, began its successful participation in GMD
integrated flight tests conducted last October and December. While
initially only collecting boost and ascent phase radar data, Aegis BMD
has begun engineering efforts to become a full participant in future
tests and will eventually provide fire control data to the BMD system.
Our intercept tests against long-range ballistic missiles are very
complex, yet since October 1999 we were forced to restrict ourselves
to the same intercept flight geometries because of artificial
constraints in our current Test Bed and our obligation to remain
compliant with the ABM Treaty. Today, in order to test our GMD
interceptors, we must launch targets from Vandenberg, AFB in
California and interceptors from Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific Ocean.
We are changing that. The Test Bed we are building will introduce
flexibility into our test approach and help overcome some basic
geographic and geometric limitations by allowing us to test weapons
and sensors against ballistic missiles of all ranges along different
azimuths and using different trajectories. For test purposes we will
introduce variable target launch and impact points and engagement
areas.
Robust, realistic testing is absolutely critical to developing an
effective missile defense system. Over the past two years we conducted
a total of 55 flight tests and 60 ground tests. Seventeen of these
tests were flight-intercept tests. Each test builds our confidence in
the BMD system. From our flight-testing, we know that the hit-to-kill
approach works. We know our sensors can successfully detect and track
the target and that our software algorithms can discriminate between
re-entry vehicles and basic decoys and debris. We know our battle
management system can generate orders that put a kill vehicle in a
position to achieve intercept. We will continue to refine and improve
the system's performance in all areas. Our test program continues to
add to our confidence that the basic technologies are sound and that
they will work together to provide the nation an effective BMD system.
Our program and budget will continue to maintain a high tempo of
increasingly complex ground- and flight-testing. Over the next two
years we are planning another 68 flight tests, 58 ground tests, and
maintaining the same pace of intercept tests as before. We do system
testing to give us confidence that we have the ability to integrate
geographically dispersed missile defense elements and components into
an effective system. This does not include the many experiments we
conduct routinely, the modeling and simulation activity, and the war
game exercises. Our computer predictions are very valuable in this
process and give us a great deal of confidence that we are on the
right paths.
We remain committed to our aggressive testing approach, where we
mature midcourse, boost, and terminal missile defense components and
elements through rigorous testing under increasingly realistic and
challenging conditions. When we have adequately demonstrated
technologies, decisions can then be made concerning their integration
into blocks for fielding. Testing activities remain central to what we
do and are well supported within our funding request.
Initial Defense Capabilities
The Congress has already funded plans to put five midcourse
interceptors into the test bed in silos at Fort Greely in Alaska,
develop Aegis BMD, and test the SM-3 interceptor at the Pacific
Missile Range Facility in Hawaii. Other activities are currently
underway to improve the missile defense Test Bed by upgrading or
developing launch sites (including Vandenberg, AFB), radar sensors,
battle management and command and control components, communications
terminals and networks, and associated test infrastructure in the
United States and the Marshall Islands (including airborne, sea-based,
and ground-based data collection assets).
Today we are asking the Congress to appropriate funds that will allow
us to add to this Test Bed and make it operational by 2004. These
initial defense capabilities, fielded over a two-year period, will
include ground-based interceptors to counter long-range threats,
sea-based interceptors to defeat short- and medium-range threats,
additional PAC-3 units, and early warning and tracking sensors based
on land, at sea, in the air, and in space.
Before the President's decision, the FY 2004 President's Budget would
have reflected the development of a set of Test Bed capabilities that
could have been made operational. Instead of building a Test Bed that
might be used operationally, we are fielding an initial defensive
capability that we will continue to test. All RDT&E activities will
support the initial defense capability, and the system elements and
components we field will continue to support RDT&E. Because of the
relationship between initial defense capabilities and testing, we are
asking that all funding associated with both efforts be under
Defense-wide appropriations RDT&E. With the December announcement we
have quickened the pace at which we are moving forward, but we have
not changed the direction in which we are moving.
We are proposing to do in FY 2004 what we said we were going to do in
previous hearings, that is, field tested missile defenses a little at
a time using a step approach. The missile defense operations we are
proposing are unprecedented, and there still is much to learn. I
believe there is tremendous benefit in putting this unprecedented
technology into the field, in manageable increments, to provide some
defense, to learn more about it, gain experience with it, and improve
it over time.
The Israeli Arrow program stands out as an example of how fielding
militarily useful capability in block increments and in a timely
manner can work and how successful it can be. With only four
successful intercept flight tests, Israeli officials declared their
first Arrow battery operational on October 17, 2000, and fielded that
country's first capability to defeat incoming ballistic missiles
launched from nearby states. The Israeli system has been operational
for more than two years now, and during that time it has conducted
additional intercept and flight tests to enhance the system's
performance. Plans are moving forward to augment it even further.
Surrounded by states having an active interest in ballistic missiles,
Israel found a way to field a limited defensive capability on an
accelerated timeline and at a time when it could not afford to wait
for system testing to be completed.
We in the United States, of course, are not strangers to fielding an
unprecedented military capability on an accelerated schedule. Our
leadership struggled in the early stages of deploying the first
reconnaissance satellites and land- and sea-based ballistic missiles.
Urgent national security requirements pressed us to deploy capability
soon, and through trial and error we did. Despite test failures, the
country persevered and made militarily useful capabilities
operational. Since that time, we have dramatically improved the
capabilities of those first-generation systems. The parallels between
these pioneering programs and the missile defense program are clear.
I believe, Mr. Chairman, that we are ready to take this next step in
missile defense. Our fielding approach will not only help rationalize
the force structure we deploy from the technological and threat
standpoints, but also from the standpoint of cost. We do not now have
adequate understanding to submit a bill of many tens of billions
[thousands of millions] of dollars for a huge, long-term fixed
architecture. We are able, however, to purchase, produce, and field
capabilities in small numbers. This approach will allow us to control
costs. With a modest investment and increase by the Department of a
total of $1.5 billion [$1,500 million] spread over the FY 2004 and
2005 budgets, we will provide this country with militarily useful
capabilities where none exists today.
In short, this $1.5 billion [$1,500 million] primarily will add a
small number of ground-based interceptors as well as more SM-3
interceptors to the test bed capability we are already building.
Future fielding decisions, as we have said all along, will be made in
the outlying years based on the progress of technology and the
evolution of the threat, subject to the annual congressional
appropriations process.
Confidence in Initial Defensive Operations
In assessing our level of confidence with the planned initial missile
defense capabilities, we have to strike a balance between our desire
for perfection in the missile defenses we deploy and our desire to
have as soon as possible a defensive capability where none exists
today.
Adequate testing is the key to achieving that balance. And while this
testing may not fit the mold of classical operational testing that
would traditionally take place prior to full-rate production, we do
follow a testing discipline that I believe can give us the confidence
to say that what we deploy will work as we have said it would under
threat circumstances that we believe we might have to face.
I believe that to strike the right balance we must go through an
intense period of testing to demonstrate that the technologies on
which we are relying can work consistently under conditions that are
increasingly stressful and realistic. We have spent the past two years
demonstrating the technologies we propose to employ in the Block 2004
Test Bed. We have said all along that when we do field we will not
field a system that will fully meet our missile defense needs. We will
face limitations and have gaps, let there be no illusions there. The
system we are initially fielding will be limited operationally. But we
went down this road knowing that there would be gaps and with a
process that is specifically designed to fill those gaps and make up
for performance limitations as soon as practicable.
Among the limitations that should be included here is that of
operational experience. We need to build operational experience over
time with the system that will be guarding our nation and our troops.
There is no better way to do that than to put basic elements out into
the field and to begin working with those assets to develop the
doctrine and concepts of operation we will need and to train the
military personnel who will operate it.
We have spent significant amounts of money on testing the GMD and
Aegis BMD elements of system. All of the tests to date have been what
we have called "developmental tests." Regardless of the names we apply
to our testing, we must have assets and infrastructure in the field if
we are going to begin to test that system under operationally
realistic conditions. If we do not have the weapons and sensors
fielded at operationally useful locations, we cannot really do a good
job of hooking it all up to make sure it works.
The President's decision allows us to put this materiel out in the
field for testing, in locations that make sense from an operational
point of view. Given the recent events in the international security
environment, the President's decision reflects an urgent need to make
that test bed as operational as we possibly can. That decision also
recognizes that we will not be fielding the perfect system at the
outset.
What we are faced with today is a timing issue. Must we do what has
been traditionally called "operational testing" before we can say that
we have a capability we can use in an extreme security situation, or
can we do both? Can we continue to test the elements and components of
a system we also could use to defend ourselves if needed? I believe we
can.
Why do I believe that? Because we have shown that the "nuts and bolts"
of the missile defense capabilities we are planning to field in Block
2004 can work. We have had a significant degree of repeatability
represented in the tests we have conducted to date, and we are well
along in our goal of conducting these tests reliably. We are now to
the point where we need to assemble selected missile defense elements
into a test bed that will permit operationally realistic testing using
different azimuths and trajectories, different launch and target
points, and different arrangements in our sensors and weapons. That
test bed will allow us to test in different ways so that we can refine
our all-too-important battle management and command and control
infrastructure. The elements of the test bed also will have some
inherent defense capability. We can do operational development testing
while having the system on alert. We should take advantage of that.
Our intentions are to test the complete system and to be ready to
respond to ballistic missile threats against the United States, our
deployed forces, and our friends and allies. We have conducted the
rigorous testing needed to give us the confidence that we are far
enough along to do operationally realistic testing in an integrated
way. Testing will always be an important part of this system-always.
We will always be improving what we have in the field. The budget we
have submitted will support the testing required to ensure that the
elements of the Block 2004 system we would like to field will
adequately serve the defense needs of this nation.
Our RDT&E activities are extensive and are important part of our
acquisition approach. Below are three areas of special interest.
BMD System Radar Activity
The MDA's "Family of Radar" concept is continuous and flexible global
detection, tracking, discrimination, and hit assessment. Ideally, we
want to be able to watch missile payloads deploy and accomplish prompt
and early battle assessment. We are currently pursuing multiple sensor
technologies and identifying and developing sensors to give the BMD
system the "eyes" it will need. In order to identify the most
promising technologies and reduce risk, we are investigating, in
parallel, sensor alternatives on land-, sea-, air- and space-based
platforms to add robustness to the BMD system and improve
opportunities to collect multiple phenomenology on the threat missile
or target complex. Evaluations of different sensor and weapon
combinations and alternatives will help us assess their overall
benefit to an integrated, layered BMD system. An important element in
this effort is the mobile Sea-Based X-Band radar (SBX), which we plan
to build by September 2005 to greatly improve both testing and our
initial defense capability.
The BMDS Radar project, a new activity, is funded in the FY 2004
budget to expand the engagement battle space and assess missile
defense concepts of operation that we were not allowed to consider
under the ABM Treaty. We will validate the concept of forward-basing
and sensor layering and evaluate advanced algorithms using both MDA-
and non-MDA-owned sensors. Current plans call for the BMDS Radar to be
available for integration into the Test Bed in late 2006. We will
support continuous sensor research to improve capabilities and develop
advanced algorithms for Block 2008 and beyond.
BMD System Infrared Sensor Activities
The Department restructured the Space Based Infrared System-Low (SBIRS
Low) element in FY 2002, renaming it the Space Tracking and
Surveillance System (STSS). We will explore new technologies to
enhance missile detection, improve reporting on ballistic missile
launches regardless of range, azimuth, or launch point, and provide
critical midcourse tracking and discrimination data.
The Russian-American Observation Satellites (RAMOS) project is a
cooperative effort between the United States and the Russian
Federation to improve early warning technologies. RAMOS represents an
innovative space-based sensor R&D initiative. We are proceeding
towards a joint Preliminary Design Review this summer and expect to
conclude the design and development phase in early FY 2005. The United
States is actively striving to reach a bi-lateral agreement to conduct
activities beyond the design and development phase. If we are able to
move forward with this project, we would launch two satellites in late
FY 2008.
BMD System Interceptor Activity
Our longer-term goal is to develop low-cost enhanced interceptors for
integration with different platforms to defend against missiles in the
boost, midcourse, and exo-atmospheric terminal phases of flight. We
are consolidating all next-generation kinetic energy interceptor
(booster and kill vehicle) development efforts and placing them under
our BMDS Interceptor activity. Relying heavily on existing hardware
and proven technology, we will develop a hit-to-kill boost phase
capability by Block 2008 and deliver capability enhancements for Block
2010 and beyond.
In FY 2004 we will begin developing a space-based kinetic energy
interceptor Test Bed to explore the technological feasibility and
operational advantages of engagements from space. This plan is
consistent with the Defense Science Board's recommendation, released
last August, to establish a comprehensive development program for a
space-based kinetic system. Following up on last year's successful
experiments to understand key sensor technologies, we will conduct in
2004 a Near Field Infra-Red Experiment to observe from space a
boosting rocket. This data will assist in the selection of seeker and
sensor technologies for a ground-based boost interceptor and
development of interceptor guidance and homing algorithms.
Block Activities and Budget
We are working within the MDA and with the Department's operational
community to meet the President's objective to establish an initial
defense capability in 2004, which begins with Block 2004. The
following describes by block our planned fielding opportunities across
the FYDP.
Block 2004
This block continues development and integration of elements,
components, and facilities in the Test Bed. Block 2004 RDT&E funding
will deliver capabilities directed by the President for operational
use in FY 2004-2005. We plan to add different capabilities to
point-defense capabilities already provided by PAC-3 units. This
initial fielding will grow the RDT&E program and expand the physical
infrastructure of the Test Bed.
Funds in this block will enable us to conduct major target and
countermeasure development and capability demonstrations, integration
tests, and experiments. We are investing in a substantive system test
program to test system command, control, and battle management (C2BM)
and communications across the elements. The Block 2004 Master Test
Plan lays out the strategy for conducting a comprehensive set of
integrated and distributed ground- and flight-tests to verify
performance and characterize the capability of the system. This test
program will form the basis of operational and military utility
assessments of the Block 2004 initial defense capability.
We will have three major system integration flight tests, the first of
which is a large-scale integration event that tests C2BM and
communications during multiple element intercept tests. We plan to
demonstrate C2 capabilities and communications among C2 and battle
management nodes, weapons, and sensors and to continue work with the
Services, Combatant Commands, and the Office of the Secretary of
Defense to ensure BMD system interoperability with legacy and planned
Department systems and standards.
We are requesting $3.2 billion [$3,200 million] in FY 2004 to support
RDT&E for fielding Block 2004. Our estimated expenditure for Block
2004 activities across the FYDP is $6.2 billion [$6,200 million].
(TABLE DELETED)
Boost Elements. We are developing directed energy and kinetic energy
boost phase intercept capabilities to create a defense layer near the
hostile missile's launch point. We require quick reaction times, high
confidence decision-making, and redundant engagement capabilities to
counter ballistic missiles in this phase.
ABL is currently under development to acquire, track, and kill
ballistic missiles in boost phase using speed-of-light technology. ABL
integrates three major subsystems (Laser; Beam Control; and Battle
Management, Command, Control, Communications, Computers and
Intelligence (BM/C4I)) into a modified commercial Boeing 747-400F
aircraft. We will continue major subsystem integration and testing
activities. Block 2004 activities involve completion of
ground-testing, to include first light on the test bed aircraft, first
flight of the complete weapons system, and the successful track and
high-energy laser engagement of a missile-shaped target board dropped
from high-altitude. In FY 2005, we will deliver one aircraft for BMD
system integration and testing and demonstrate a missile shoot-down
against a boosting threat-representative target.
Midcourse Elements. Midcourse defense elements engage ballistic
missiles in space after booster burnout and before the warhead
re-enters the atmosphere. The GMD element defends against long-range
ballistic missile attacks, and Aegis BMD will counter from the sea
medium- and short-range ballistic missiles.
The Department's plans are to add by the end of FY 2004 one more
Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) at Fort Greely in Alaska for a total of
six GBIs at that site, and four interceptors at Vandenberg, Air Force
Base, for a total of up to 10 interceptors at both sites. The decision
to develop two interceptor sites is consistent with our layered
approach and operational concept and will allow us to work through
critical integration, battle management, and command and control
issues early on.
There are a number of other activities we need to undertake in FY
2005. We are asking for appropriations to produce up to 10 additional
GBIs for fielding at the Fort Greely site, for a total of 16
interceptors in Alaska and four in California. We also plan to produce
by the end of 2005 between 10 and 20 SM-3 missiles for deployment on
three Aegis ships converted to the missile defense mission. Because we
are starting from a base of zero, each interceptor we field between
now and 2005, up to the full complement of 20 ground-based and 20
sea-based interceptors, will increase significantly our overall
capability to defend this country, our troops, and friendly countries
against long- and medium-range threats.
Included in the Test Bed and as part of the initial missile defense
architecture are plans for integrating Early Warning Radars (EWR) at
Eareckson AS (the Cobra Dane radar at Shemya, Alaska) and Beale AFB
(Upgraded EWR). We will add to this infrastructure multiple fire
control nodes and improved lines of communications connecting sites in
Alaska and the continental United States using fiber optics and
satellites. As you know, the Administration is working to secure
allied approval to upgrade and integrate into the BMD system early
warning radars currently located in the United Kingdom and Thule,
Greenland to view threat missiles launched out of the Middle East. The
United Kingdom already has approved the use of the Fylingdales radar.
We also plan to build by September 30, 2005 a Sea-Based X-Band Radar
(SBX) to improve the testing regime and enhance initial missile
defense system performance.
We have made dramatic progress in recent months with the GMD element,
including in the areas of silo construction, development of a
nationwide communications network, and integrated flight-testing. We
have excavated six silos at Fort Greely, seven weeks ahead of
schedule, and we are in the process of constructing and establishing
appropriate security for multiple Test Bed facilities at Fort Greely
and Eareckson.
By the end of 2005, we will upgrade SPY-1 radars on 15 Aegis warships
for enhanced surveillance and track capability. Three prototype
surveillance and track Aegis destroyers will be available starting in
2003; we will modernize additional destroyers for surveillance and
track and BMD engagement capability. Two Aegis cruisers in addition to
the USS LAKE ERIE, our test cruiser, will receive BMD engagement
modifications.
The next SM-3 flight test, scheduled for later this year, will use a
re-engineered Monolithic Divert and Attitude Control System (MDACS)
for the first time in the interceptor's kinetic warhead. MDACS has
proved to be more reliable than the previous model, faster to build,
and less expensive. Five at-sea flight tests and numerous tracking
exercises, including participation in GMD integrated flight-tests, are
planned through 2005. Our cooperative research with Japan will
continue to enhance the capabilities of the SM-3 interceptor. The
focus of that research is on four components: sensor, advanced kinetic
warhead, second stage propulsion, and lightweight nosecone.
Terminal Elements. THAAD is designed to be rapidly deployable and
protect forward-deployed U.S. and friendly troops, broadly dispersed
assets, population centers, and sites in the United States by engaging
short- to medium-range ballistic missiles or their payloads at endo-
and exo-atmospheric altitudes. THAAD could have more than one
intercept opportunity against a target, a layering potential that
makes it more difficult for an adversary to employ countermeasures
effectively. This terminal defense capability will help mitigate the
effects of a WMD payload.
This year we will complete missile and launcher designs, initiate
manufacturing of missile and launcher ground test units, and begin
testing the first completed radar antenna. We will continue
fabrication of the second radar and building the battle manager and
launcher test beds. A total of four exo-atmospheric flight tests at
the White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico are planned for FY 2004-05.
PAC-3 provides terminal missile defense capability against short- and
medium-range ballistic missiles, anti-radiation missiles, and aircraft
with a low radar cross-section employing advanced countermeasures.
PAC-3 successfully completed initial operational testing last year,
intercepting ballistic missiles, aircraft, and cruise missiles. The
tests uncovered problems that we have since corrected in collaboration
with the Army. We have completed development of the PAC-3 missile and
made C2BM modifications to enable PAC-3's integration into the BMD
system. We will continue to conduct PAC-3 tests this year. Later in
Block 2004 we will demonstrate PAC-3's integration with other BMD
system elements.
With the support of Congress, the Department already has accelerated
PAC-3 missile production and currently has a plan to increase that
production rate to 20 missiles per month in 2005. Given current
production plans, by the end of 2005 the PAC-3 inventory will stand at
332 missiles.
The Department has transferred PAC-3 procurement and RDT&E funding to
the Army, which is reflected in the Army's FY 2004 budget request. The
MDA will retain responsibility for defining and testing BMD system
interoperability and continue to work with the Army on PAC-3
engineering, development, and testing. The Department realigned the
Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) program on March 31, 2003
to the Army.
The Arrow Weapon System, developed jointly by the United States and
Israel to counter short- to medium-range ballistic missiles, is
operational at two sites in Israel and interoperable with U.S. missile
defense elements. We worked with Israel to deploy its first two Arrow
batteries, and are currently assisting that country to procure a third
battery.
The Arrow System Improvement Program, a spiral development upgrade of
the current operational system, includes technical cooperation to
improve the performance of the Arrow system and test it at a U.S. test
range. The first flight test was conducted successfully on January 5,
2003. We continue to support additional Arrow flight-testing to assess
technology developments and overall system performance and to collect
data and conduct annual hardware-in-the-loop exercises with Israel to
enhance interoperability.
Block 2006
Block 2006 work continues to improve existing capabilities and provide
new sensors and interceptors for integration with fielded elements.
Our focus will be on evolving and integrating the capability to
achieve a more synergistic and layered BMD system. We will continue
rigorous system and element flight-test demonstration and validation
efforts and use war games to help develop concepts of operation and
operational procedures.
We are requesting $2.2 billion [$2,200 million] in FY 2004 to support
RDT&E for Block 2006. Our estimated expenditure for Block 2006
activities across the FYDP is $11.3 billion [$11,300 million].
(TABLE DELETED) 
Boost Elements. We will enhance and test the integration of the ABL
aircraft into the BMD system. Candidate enhancements include
improvements in BMC4I, interoperability, pointing and tracking, and
target engagement. We will continue evaluation of the ABL test
aircraft capability against a range of threats. This aircraft will be
available to provide an emergency operational capability except for a
maximum of six months during FY 2007 when it may undergo modifications
and enhancements.
Midcourse Elements. We plan to enhance defensive capability and
further develop the Test Bed by maturing hardware and software of all
GMD interceptor, sensor, and C2BM components. We will continue our
ground- and flight-testing to demonstrate improved weapon and
discrimination performance and critical interfaces with external
sensors. We also plan to complete the upgrade of the Thule EWR should
we get approval from Denmark.
Aegis BMD flight missions will incorporate remote engagements of
targets as well as demonstrations against intermediate-range ballistic
missile (IRBM) targets. We will continue development of Aegis BMD
sensor discrimination capability. Prototype BMD signal processors will
be tested aboard Aegis ships with SPY-1 radar modifications. SM-3
missile deliveries will begin in 2004. Our plans are to build an
inventory of up to thirty-five SM-3 interceptors by the end of 2006.
Also, if directed, we would prepare to field up to twenty additional
SM-3 interceptors in 2007. We will proceed with our cooperative BMD
research with Japan to enhance the SM-3. We have two joint flight
tests of the advanced nosecone planned in the FY 2005-2006 timeframe,
and we will continue to look at possibilities for co-development.
Terminal Elements. The THAAD interceptor begins in the third quarter
FY 2006 a series of five flight tests that are scheduled to conclude
in first quarter FY 2008. We will improve THAAD's exo-atmospheric and
endo-atmospheric endgame discrimination capability against
increasingly complex targets.
Sensors. Current plans call for a new forward-based radar in late 2006
for positioning close to the threat at sea or on land. Enhanced
forward-based sensor capabilities and improved sensor netting will
enable the BMD system to handle threats posing a more difficult
discrimination challenge and provide a launch-on-remote capability. A
midcourse radar will be added as part of our layered approach.
Additional radar configurations will be procured as necessary to
satisfy Block 2006 objectives.
Current plans are to launch two low-earth orbit satellites in FY 2007
to validate space-based sensor concepts for target acquisition,
tracking, and discrimination and to provide a space node for the Test
Bed. STSS will improve in subsequent blocks to provide data fusion,
radar/sensor cueing over-the-horizon, and interceptor handover and
fire control. Production alternatives will be evaluated at least
annually based upon element performance and integrated BMD system
performance.
Block 2008
Block 2008 represents a major step in BMD system evolution. We plan to
complete multiple layers of weapons and sensors, based on fixed and
mobile platforms, to counter a range of ballistic missiles. This block
will include C2BM components that enable integrated control of all
system assets throughout the battle space. Primary development
projects include adding boost phase weapons to the Test Bed,
integrating space sensor platforms, and fusing multi-sensor
discrimination products. We will integrate capability-based targets
and payload suites (to include new and more complex countermeasures)
into our system testing to demonstrate effectiveness against evolving
threats.
We are requesting $572 million in FY 2004 to support RDT&E for Block
2008. Our estimated expenditure for Block 2008 activities across the
FYDP is $16.3 billion [$16,300 million].
(TABLE DELETED)
Boost Elements. ABL will integrate new technologies to improve
performance and lethality and enhance operational suitability. We will
continue development of promising technologies for insertion into
Block 2008 and beyond and design and develop a system-level
ground-test facility for ABL. We plan to test a second ABL aircraft in
the Test Bed during Block 2008.
Plans also are to develop and integrate a mobile ground-based boost
phase hit-to-kill capability into the Test Bed for flight-test
demonstration. We will initiate a space-based test bed development to
determine the feasibility of intercepting missiles from space. Initial
on-orbit testing would commence with three to five satellites in Block
2008.
Midcourse Elements. We will conduct up to three GMD flight-tests
annually to demonstrate advanced engineering and pre-planned equipment
improvements for the boosters, interceptors, early warning and fire
control radars, and C2BM and communications software builds. We plan
to enhance the Aegis Weapons System AN/SPY-1 radar to improve
discrimination for engaging both unitary and separating targets. We
will assess GMD integration with the BMDS Interceptor and also test
the interceptor on board an Aegis warship.
Terminal Elements. We will complete the development and testing of the
THAAD weapon system. We are planning up to eight developmental and
operational-type flight tests to stress interceptor, radar, and C2BM
performance in realistic scenarios that include advanced
countermeasures.
Sensors. Our work will build on the initial BMDS Radar configuration
and conduct sensor research to improve capabilities and develop
advanced algorithms. We will improve "Family of Radar" coverage,
performance, and flexibility and address vulnerability within the
context of the overall BMD system global sensor network. STSS
operations will continue to be integrated with other BMD elements in
the Test Bed and support enhanced C2BM development initiatives. STSS
will demonstrate the ability to acquire, track, and discriminate
midcourse objects with space-based infrared sensors.
Block 2010
Work in this block will continue spiral development projects for
weapon and sensor improvements and platform integration. C2BM and
communications improvements will enable highly resolved sensor data to
be exchanged with all BMD system elements.
We are requesting $24 million in FY 2004 to support RDT&E for Block
2010. Our estimated expenditure for Block 2010 activities across the
FYDP is $4.7 billion [$4,700 million].
(TABLE DELETED)
Boost Elements. Block 2010 activities will improve exo-atmospheric
BMDS Interceptor performance and enable greater basing mode
flexibility, to include possible adaptation to sea-based platforms. We
will develop and test an advanced space-based test bed to augment or
replace the Block 2008 space-based test bed.
Midcourse Elements. We will continue flight-testing improved weapon
and sensor components and work toward the integration of an advanced
BMDS Interceptor. Aegis BMD will incorporate prior block developments
into the Navy-developed next-generation, open architecture Combat
System.
Terminal Elements. THAAD will integrate proven technologies to enhance
its capability against longer range and faster ballistic missiles
without sacrificing existing mobility and performance. Fielding and
survivability upgrades also are planned to demonstrate a capability
against both IRBM and ICBM threats.
Sensors. New technologies will be inserted into subsequent STSS blocks
to provide precise threat tracking and improved discrimination. We
will develop and launch a satellite with improved sensors integrated
into the first common satellite bus, and develop and integrate
advanced ground station equipment and software. The Block 2010 STSS
will deliver a space-based capability to acquire, track and
discriminate ballistic missiles based on larger aperture track
sensors, increased vehicle lifetime, and increased, near-real-time
on-board data processing. The funding also includes launch services
for Block 2010 satellites. C2BM funding focuses on integrating STSS
data into the sensor net.
Mission Area Investments
Our Mission Area Investments are investments common to the entire BMD
system that enable us to implement over time our block fielding
approach. Mission Area Investments maintain core development and
testing infrastructure and facilitate the integration of future block
capabilities. The President's Budget requests $1.69 billion [$1,690
million] in FY 2004 for these investments. This program activity
accounts for about $11.3 billion [$11,300 million], or just over 20
percent of the total funding estimate across the FYDP.
(TABLE DELETED)
The significant Mission Area Investments are as follows:
System Engineering
The System Engineering activity defines, manages, and integrates the
layered BMD system. Capability-based acquisition requires continual
assessment of technical and operational alternatives at the component,
element, and system levels. Our system engineering process assesses
and determines system design and element contributions and the impact
of introducing new technologies and operational concepts to ensure
properly synthesized system blocks. These activities provide the
technical expertise, tools, and facilities to develop the BMD system
and maintain an intelligence and research capability to ensure that
the system evolves in a way that is responsive to known and
anticipated threats.
We are increasing our focus on risks related to producibility,
manufacturing, quality, cost, and schedule of the BMD system elements.
We dedicate resources to examine the applicability of technology to
system needs and transition readiness. Industrial and manufacturing
investment strategies for achieving system affordability and
facilitating insertion of successive new capabilities are increasingly
vital to the program.
Command and Control, Battle Management & Communications (C2BMC)
Our activities related to C2BMC create interoperability among a wide
variety of legacy systems and emerging elements over joint and
coalition networks. The C2BMC activity will continue development and
integration of the C2BM and communications functions for the BMD
system. By fielding software development spirals that improve system
synergism, integration capability, and interoperability with external
systems, this activity expands the inherent C2BM capabilities of
fielded terminal, midcourse, and boost defenses. Communications
funding will develop and improve BMD system-wide communication links
and sensor netting functions to enable enhanced early warning and
quicker interceptor response times. The Joint National Integration
Center (JNIC) provides a common environment for the BMD elements to
conduct experiments, demonstrations, and exercises and is a
key-operating C2BM component of the Test Bed.
BMD Tests & Targets
The missile defense program includes significant test and evaluation
infrastructure, test execution capabilities, and analytical tools for
program-wide use. The Agency conducts risk reduction, developmental,
and operational element and component testing as well as tests to
collect critical measurements, such as plume signatures. We also have
a rigorous measurements test program to collect data in support of
design, development, and engineering activities. Measurements from
dedicated test events and targets of opportunity enable us to design
components, characterize potential countermeasures, test algorithms,
undertake lethality and kill assessment, and validate our critical
models and simulations.
Investments providing ballistic missile targets, countermeasures, and
other payloads support our test objectives. Presentation of the
targets and payloads for flight test events involves designing,
prototyping, developing, procuring, certifying, and qualifying for
testing. In FY 2003 we will establish a single prime contractor to
further enhance system level management of targets and countermeasures
activities.
In FY 2004 we will continue to resource critical test facilities,
launch capabilities, instrumentation, telemetry, communications, and
safety systems underpinning our testing regime. With the enhanced
realism of the Test Bed, the increasing complexity of our tests, and
the escalating tempo of test activity, our investments in this area
will emphasize flexibility, standardization, and mobility.
International Programs
The President has underscored the importance of working with other
countries to develop missile defenses and provide protection against
ballistic missile threats. We are building defensive layers that could
potentially involve a variety of locations around the globe and
probably involve many other countries. Last summer interagency teams
briefed key allies on the international participation framework. Today
we are well along in our discussions with several governments
regarding their possible participation in the missile defense program
and improvements in our industrial relationships.
Advanced Concepts
We have several Science and Technology (S&T) initiatives to increase
BMD system firepower and sensor capability and extend the engagement
battle space of terminal elements. In FY 2004, we will continue to
focus on the Miniature Kill Vehicle (MKV) project, which could lead to
a flight-test in FY 2005. FY 2004 funding will support investigating
Early Detection and Tracking (ELDT) technology, Laser/LADAR
technologies for improved tracking, weapon guidance, and imaging, and
technologies for a space-based, high-power laser. While our S&T
activities are not on a critical path for insertion into the BMD
system, each one of them is being considered for their block
enhancement value.
Program Operations
Our Program Operations expenses are primarily for government personnel
performing management support activities, contractors that assist in
performing these activities, and O&M-like costs associated with
operations and maintenance at numerous facilities around the country,
supplies and equipment, communications and printing, travel and
training, and information technology management.
Management and Oversight
The missile defense program uses an acquisition approach tailored to
the unprecedented nature of the technology involved in missile
defense. We will continue to work very hard to ensure that the program
has adequate management and congressional oversight. There is an
improved process in place within the Department that preserves
management, technical, and financial oversight by cognizant
authorities on the Senior Executive Council and the Missile Defense
Support Group. Senior warfighters, including the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council, have reviewed missile defense objectives and will
continue to do so several times a year. Internally we have in place
configuration management procedures, and we produce on a regular basis
the necessary threat, system, and configuration control documentation
to ensure that our activities continue to support our development and
fielding objectives. As directed in the 2002 and 2003 Defense
Authorization Acts, we have identified cost, schedule, testing, and
performance goals and developmental baselines in the President's FY
2004 Budget justification materials and shown clear linkages between
the Agency's budget and key performance measures.
Closing
Mr. Chairman, we are on track with our missile defense program. We
know that the technology fundamental to the current generation of
missile defenses works. We have demonstrated many times over the past
two years that we can collide with a warhead and destroy it. We have
the confidence to proceed with plans for an initial defense
capability. A few years ago, I could not have said this to the
American people. Today I can. We will build confidence in the system
over time as we invest in the program.
We also recognize that we have much more work to do to improve the BMD
system. The architecture we have in 2004 and 2005 will probably be
very different a decade later, depending on how our RDT&E efforts
proceed. Our objective continues to be one of improving missile
defense capability over time. We have made considerable progress in
missile defense over the past three years. With the President's
direction, and with your approval of our budget request, we will take
another important step on that long road before us.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
(end text)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)



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