26 June 2002
NATO'S Bell Discusses GPS and Galileo Security Issues
(Expresses concern about impact on NATO's military effectiveness)
(2200)
Robert G. Bell, NATO assistant secretary general for defense support,
told the European Satellites for Security Conference in Brussels on
June 19 that NATO had not taken a position for or against Galileo, the
European Union's planned satellite navigation system.
However, Bell said NATO wants to make sure that, if Galileo is
eventually deployed, it does not interfere with or impair NATO's
access to the significant military advantages afforded NATO forces by
the U.S. Global Positioning System, known as GPS.
Bell's remarks come as U.S. and European officials continue talks on a
proposed agreement on GPS-Galileo cooperation. While originally
intended for military applications, the U.S. government made GPS
available for civilian use in the 1980s. Today the system is being
used in cars, boats, planes, and even laptop computers. The Galileo
project calls for developing and launching a network of satellites
that would reduce Europe's dependency on the GPS system.
Bell said that potentially the most serious military issue related to
Galileo/GPS compatibility and interoperability is that the European
Commission is considering placing one of the four services proposed by
Galileo directly on top of -- or "overlaying" -- the "M-Code," the
encrypted future military GPS capability that will be used by U.S. and
NATO forces for crucial military operations.
If the Galileo signal directly overlays the GPS M-code signal, he
warned, "jamming one would also jam the other, resulting in a negative
impact on NATO's military effectiveness in the area of operations,
potentially risking fratricide on friendly forces and civil
populations."
"The stakes here are huge -- and I am not talking about dollars or
euros," Bell concluded. "I am talking about our nations' security and
the well-being of the men and women in uniform we send in harm's way.
Therefore, the sooner we can wrestle these technical issues to the
ground, the better."
Following is the text of Bell's remarks:
(begin text)
June 19, 2002
Robert G. Bell
NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defense
It is a pleasure to be with you today to discuss a range of issues
concerning the military dimension of the relationship between GPS and
Galileo. I appreciate that this conference has been addressing a much
broader range of space issues, so let me begin by noting that NATO has
been involved in space since 1976, with the launch of NATO III A, the
Alliance's first satellite communication system (SATCOM). In the 25
years since the first launch, NATO has placed five additional
satellites in orbit and is presently preparing to contract for its
next generation of SATCOM capabilities.
The reasons for using space based systems then are the same today -
modern military operations require increased mobility of forces, high
through-put of data, and wide area coverage for command, control and
consultation services for forces, headquarters and capitals. For
navigation, NATO land, sea and air forces need to have
three-dimensional position, accurate agreed time and properly measured
velocity. The degree to which these requirements are fulfilled will
directly influence the effectiveness of such forces and could well
affect the outcome of military operations.
As we all know, NATO forces are required to perform missions and tasks
in direct support of each other in NATO's Article 5 and non-Article 5
operations. Last fall, the Alliance for the first time in its history
invoked Article 5 in response to the horrific attacks in the U.S. of
September 11th. At present, NATO is continuing to lead three separate
non-Article 5 crisis response operations in the Balkans. And, today,
over a dozen NATO Allies are militarily engaged alongside the United
States in Afghanistan, either in the search for Al Qaida or in
bringing stability to Kabul as the new Afghan government is
established.
To accomplish these operations, it is essential that reliable
positioning, navigational and timing (PNT) services are available in
all foreseeable areas of operations, including training and exercises.
The advent of worldwide satellite based (PNT) systems has changed both
the scope of military operations and weapon systems, and the
supporting services required. Increased PNT performance (accuracy,
integrity, availability and continuity of service) will improve both
overall military capabilities and the accomplishment of individual
service missions. Communication networks, long-range sensors and
weapons, precise positioning for mine countermeasure operations,
precision delivery of weapons, forward artillery survey, automatic
data exchange, targeting, aircraft approach and landing and many other
military operations, including carrying out the high-priority missions
of NATO AWACS, require a high level of PNT performance.
In this context, the United States Global Positioning System, NAVSTAR
GPS, is - simply put - indispensable for NATO. Moreover, as recognized
in NATO's Strategic Plan for Navigation Systems, in the long-term
(2010-2015+), GPS, possibly in conjunction with inertial systems, will
become the primary navigational aid. NATO has therefore been following
with interest the plans of the European Union to develop, by 2008, the
Galileo global positioning satellite navigation system as a European
alternative to the U.S.-owned and operated GPS system - an alternative
that the European Commission has declared "must be an open, global
system fully compatible with GPS, but independent from it."
I want to emphasize that NATO has not taken a position either for or
against Galileo. The Alliance respects the right of the European Union
to decide, as it did at the March 15/16 Barcelona Summit, to go
forward with this program into its next, developmental phase.
That said, NATO does have a very clear interest in making sure that,
if Galileo is eventually deployed, it does not interfere with or
impair NATO's access to the significant military advantages afforded
NATO forces by GPS, and that NATO is able, if required, to deny a
potential adversary's access to the satellite positioning services
available from any other satellite navigation services during a
conflict.
In this regard, the most important and potentially serious military
issue related to Galileo/GPS compatibility and interoperability is
that the European Commission is considering placing one of the four
services proposed by GALILEO, the restricted and encrypted Public
Regulated Service (or "PRS"), intended for users such as EU national
law enforcement and internal security agencies, directly on top of -
or "overlaying" - the encrypted future military GPS capability, the
"M-Code". The M-Code will be used by U.S. and NATO forces for crucial
military operations, including navigation and precision-strike.
Although the Commission has emphatically stated that Galileo will not
be under EU military control, it has acknowledged that it cannot be
excluded that EU militaries will be able to use it in some respects.
Indeed, one recent publication by the Directorate General for Energy
and Transport claims that Galileo will "underpin" the CSFP by
providing the EU a "military capability". At the end of the day,
though, it is up to the Member States of the EU to decide whether
Galileo is to be "civil" or "military" and how to define those terms.
I understand that at the Summit, some EU States were quite emphatic
that Galileo must be strictly "civilian".
The co-existence of the GPS and GALILEO has been discussed at meetings
of the North Atlantic Council in recent months. These discussions
resulted in a tasking to the NC3 Board (which is in charge of the
Consultation, Command and Control issues in NATO and which I chair) to
examine the interrelationship between the GPS and GALILEO satellite
navigational systems "in the context of NATO military effectiveness".
The interrelationship between GPS and Galileo satellite navigation
systems obviously depends on the frequency bands that will be used.
Both will employ multiple frequencies for different types of services.
However, the focus in the NATO Council meetings has been on the issue
of a direct overlay of the PRS and the "M-Code". I want to be clear in
acknowledging that the EC has not selected a single frequency for the
PRS, but rather has continued to consider several "options" for this
service, including:
(1) A direct overlay of the M-Code frequency, using a wave form
modulation scheme (known in the business as a "Binary Offset Carrier"
or BOC) of 10,5;
(2) A "straddle" or "overlap" of the M-Code frequency through a BOC
(14,2) scheme, which would be centered on the M-Code frequency but
extended beyond the M-Code "sidelobes" in each direction;
(3) A "flexible BOC" approach, in which the PRS would directly overlay
the M-Code normally (i.e., with a BOC of 10.5) but could presumably be
"switched" to a different waveform modulation scheme (BOC) in times of
crisis; or
(4) A BOC different altogether from the GPS M-Code, e.g., a BOC (15,1)
or (5,1);
The Board is continuing to review these issues within its subordinate
structure, including with the assistance of experts from capitals, so
today I can only offer a preliminary estimate of where, subject to
confirmation later this summer, some of the technical judgments seem
to be headed.
First, it seems clear that if the Galileo PRS signal uses a BOC (10,5)
signal and therefore directly overlays the GPS M-code signal, jamming
one would also jam the other, resulting in a negative impact on NATO's
military effectiveness in the area of operations, potentially risking
fratricide on friendly forces and civil populations.
Second, modulation waveforms for the Galileo PRS such as BOC (14,2)
which are centered on but "straddle" or "overlap" the M-code would
apparently not permit selective jamming, as the Commission suggested
in one media article.
Third, if the Galileo PRS were to use a flexible BOC modulation that
would allow the PRS to change from BOC (10,5) to another BOC that does
not overlay the GPS M-code, it would be technically possible to jam
one signal without impacting the other if either the PRS or the M-code
were compromised. However, there would appear to be significant
technical and operational implications to NATO should a flexible BOC
signal structure be pursed by Galileo. For example, in times of
tension or conflict, NATO would have to ask the EU to change the
signal structure from BOC (10,5) to another BOC signal to be able to
deny an adversary access to a compromised PNT service.
As this audience is well aware, not all EU members are members of
NATO. If the request were denied or delayed, there could be a
significant impact on military effectiveness or timely combat
decision-making on the battlefield, thereby placing the lives of
NATO's military forces at risk. Some might argue that such concerns
are overdrawn - that NATO could always count on the EU to quickly say
"yes". But others, including myself, would argue that one of the basic
arguments for Galileo - that the EU could not trust the U.S. not to
turn off GPS - is itself overdrawn.
Lastly, if the EC selects modulation structures for the Galileo PRS
other than BOC (10,5), such as BOC (15,1) or (5,1), this may allow
selective jamming of these services thereby minimizing M-code
fratricide. This would also provide two redundant systems that could
provide a back up PNT capability for those NATO nations to choose to
use PRS for military purposes. However, such a PRS signal would not be
as "robust" as using BOC (10,5), and thus may hurt the "business case"
for the EC to market the PRS (and hence Galileo itself) to governments
and customers.
A second technical issue concerns the integrity of the proposed
encryption regime for the PRS. The EC hopes to persuade NATO and the
U.S. Government that they can be confident that the encrypted PRS
signal will not be compromised and exploited by an adversary, and
thereby persuade NATO and the U.S. that they do not need to threaten
to jam the PRS during hostilities. Others have argued that if one
believed the PRS access code had been compromised, it could simply be
changed. But such a change would be easier said than done. And how
would one know whether the code had been compromised? Here, the World
War II experience with ENIGMA comes to mind.
Removing the threat of jamming would facilitate the Commission's
efforts to persuade prospective PRS users (i.e., "customers") that the
PRS will provide a reliable and uninterrupted service. While EC
officials have stated in press accounts that they recognize that there
could be some "very serious crisis situation" in which NATO might
nonetheless need to jam Galileo, it hopes that such contingencies can
be restricted to the most extreme circumstances. Detailed discussion
on the crucial issues associated with high-confidence protection of an
encrypted Galileo PRS regime - including issues related to the control
and possible proliferation of user equipment, the robustness of
associated cryptography and distribution and control procedures for
the keys - have not been initiated or authorized between NATO and the
EC, but such discussions would obviously be crucial to any hope of
achieving mutual trust and confidence.
In closing, let me simply underscore the complexity of the technical
challenge before the two proud institutions if we are to get this
right. The stakes here are huge - and I am not talking about dollars
or euros. I am talking about our nations' security and the well being
of the men and women in uniform we send in harm's way. Therefore, the
sooner we can wrestle these technical issues to the ground, the
better.
Thank you.
(end text)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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