17 December 2002
Defense Department Briefing Transcript
(2002 defense accomplishments, Afghanistan, Iraq, NATO, military
transformation, missile defense deployment, North Korea, covert
propaganda, Iraq/declaration, Iraq/military action, Iraq/defectors,
Afghan army) (7530)
Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld and Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Gen. Richard B. Myers briefed the media December 17 at
the Pentagon.
Following is the transcript:
(begin transcript)
United States Department of Defense
Presenter: Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld
Tuesday, December 17, 2002
DoD News Briefing -- Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers
(Also participating was Gen. Richard B. Myers, Chairman, Joint Chiefs
of Staff)
Rumsfeld: Good afternoon. As the end of the year approaches, the men
and women of the Department of Defense can look back with a great deal
of pride for a year of accomplishment.
In 2002, Operation Enduring Freedom finished driving the Taliban from
power in Afghanistan, has disrupted the al Qaeda network responsible
for the September 11th attacks. Terrorists remain a serious threat to
be sure, but they are under pressure and finding it more difficult to
plan, communicate and finance their schemes of destruction.
The Defense Department has been working with coalition members in
Afghanistan to dig wells, deliver food, build schools, repair
hospitals, and make roads. The new Afghanistan is led by a
representative government. In the future, it will be defended by an
Afghan national army that's currently being trained by coalition
forces, including the United States. We're working with our allies and
the Afghan government to try to help them lay the foundation for a
more stable and peaceful country.
This year also saw a turnaround regarding the situation in Iraq. For
over a decade, Saddam Hussein has pursued and developed weapons of
mass destruction, in defiance of some 16 U.N. resolutions. President
Bush took his case to Congress and then to the United Nations, and the
United Nations passed a unanimous resolution giving Iraq a final
opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations. U.N.
inspectors are back in the country for the first time in years. The
men and women of the armed forces can take pride in knowing that the
pressure they have put on the Iraqi regime has played a role in the
progress that's being made.
This year we strengthened the NATO alliance. At the summit in Prague
last month, NATO heads of state agreed to streamline the NATO command
structures and to establish a NATO Response Force, designed to allow
the alliance to deploy a capability in days or weeks. NATO also
invited seven former Cold War adversaries to become allies --
Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
The arrival of these liberated nations reminds us that although we
still face very serious challenges in the world, freedom is indeed
ascendant around the world.
This year the department fashioned a new defense strategy with a way
of sizing our forces and a new way of balancing risk. We initiated a
significant reorganization of the worldwide command structure, known
as the Unified Command Plan, including a new Northern Command, to
better defend the homeland; the Joint Forces Command, more focused on
transformation; and a new Strategic Command responsible for early
warning and defense against missile attack and long-range conventional
attacks.
The department focused its space capabilities and fashioned a new
concept of deterrence that increases security while reducing reliance
on strategic nuclear weapons, and we reorganized and revitalized the
missile defense research and testing program, free of constraints of
the old ABM Treaty. Dr. J.D. Crouch -- and Ron Kadish, I guess, is
going to be here, J.D.?
Crouch: (Off mike.)
Rumsfeld: -- later on will be available after we've left, to make some
comments on the missile defense situation and respond to questions.
Finally, after a year of heroic effort, the Pentagon workers and
construction crews have a repaired Pentagon. We celebrated the
resiliency of this great institution and the stout hearts of those
within. The new Pentagon is better and stronger than ever.
The men and women of the Defense Department made a great deal of
progress over the past year, and they have a lot to be proud of, and
certainly they have my admiration and respect, as well as my very best
wishes for the holiday season.
General Myers?
Myers: Thank you, Mr. Secretary, and good afternoon, everybody.
As we look over the past year, I would like to first and foremost
recognize the dedicated men and women of our armed forces, who are
serving their nation in Afghanistan, in the Philippines, in Georgia
and 150 other countries around the world, and here at home. My thanks
goes to the -- I think all of our thanks should go to the soldiers,
sailors, airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen and DOD civilians, who --
whose hard work and determination has protected our nation's freedom.
We are proud of the remarkable things these men and women have done --
heroes every one, in my opinion -- on this war on global terrorism.
I also want to recognize the sacrifices of our service families. They,
perhaps more than others, know the risk, and still they stand proudly
by their children -- as their children, their husbands and wives,
their siblings, often their parents go into harm's way. It takes great
courage to, of course, fight in a war, but maybe it takes more courage
to allow a loved one to go. So to the families, thank you for your
courage and for your patriotism.
I've had a chance to visit over the last year many of our troops
around the world, as the secretary has. My report would be that
they're in some very challenging circumstances, but they rarely
complain about those circumstances. Most often what you hear is that
they're willing to serve and are looking for other opportunities to
help protect this great nation of ours. We are certainly proud of
their service and their sacrifice.
There's no doubt they'd enjoy being home over the holidays,
particularly this year, since so many of them have been gone from home
for some time now. But they also realize that they're making the world
a safer place for all of us.
You also know that we've had, over the past year, over 130,000
reservists activated since September 11th -- actually, it's a little
bit longer than a year -- September 11th of 2001. And today some
50,000 are still on active duty. And for service members everywhere,
active duty or reserve, there's been lots of -- lots of long hours,
weekends and holiday duty to get the job done.
In short, it's not been an easy time for troops and their families,
but what they're doing is so important to the nation and our friends
and allies around the world that we certainly appreciate it.
In the past year, I've also traveled to over two dozen nations, where
I've met with senior military representatives of those countries. We
talk about their support to the war on terrorism. In fact, as we
prosecute this war, over 30 nations have deployed more than 16,000
troops to help in this effort. These achievements are indeed
significant, and the international support is central, absolutely
essential to this fight for freedom. Whether from the United States or
any of the other 90 nations supporting our efforts, this war on
terrorism will require innovation and sacrifice on all our parts over
the next several years.
This past year I've also spoken about what I refer two as three
primary priorities -- the global war on terrorism; the pursuit of
improved, truly integrated joint warfighting; and, as the secretary
mentioned, transformation. And while carrying out this global war on
terrorism, we must not lose sight of the need to transform to meet the
security challenges of the 21st century. Our stated end-state is an
agile, decision-superior force. It means integrated joint warfighting,
not merely deconflicting our joint forces on the battlefield. We are
continuously engaged in our pursuit of transformation, with joint
military exercises and experiments and with continued modernization
efforts.
And finally, while we are always evolving, always striving to meet
future needs, let me reiterate that as the military, we understand we
have a long way to go on this war on terrorism; yet, regardless of how
long it takes, I'm confident that our military personnel stand ready
to answer whatever call they're given.
And let me end as well by wishing everyone Happy Holidays, since this
is likely our last press conference.
And with that, we'll take your --
Q: Of this year. (Laughter.)
Myers: -- take your questions.
Rumsfeld: That could be blissful thinking. (Laughter.)
Myers: I know! I almost didn't say it. And I normally don't say things
like that. That probably means we're going to have one --
Rumsfeld: I have a feeling we'll be back.
Yes, Jack?
Q: Mr. Secretary, the president announced today that the United States
intends to deploy an initial missile defense -- operational missile
defense by 2004, apparently in Greely, aboard ships at sea, and
elsewhere. And I'm wondering what gives you confidence that this will
work, six days after the -- I guess the third failure in eight tries
in the midcourse phase of the missile defense.
Could you comment a bit on the initial deployment and what gives you
confidence it would work, sir?
Rumsfeld: Sure. I'd be happy to comment on both. First, I have not
gone back to look at the records of other advanced development testing
programs, but if one goes back and looks at things like Polaris and
various others, the early days of the NRO, where there were failure
after failure after failure, I think that anyone who thinks about it
understands that when you're at the leading edge of technology, you
expect that there are going to be -- you're going to learn and gain
knowledge both by your successes and also by your failures. It's just
something that's a reality in research and development and in science
and technological programs. So this, as I understand it, the most
recent one, J.D., was a separation issue.
Crouch: Right.
Rumsfeld: And J.D. will be happy to get into the details of that, if
that would be helpful.
Let me just take a minute to set the scene for J.D. on missile defense
in response to your question. There's lots of words that the Pentagon
uses that have a meaning, like "capability," or "initial capability"
or "deployment." And I think that rather than use those words that
have strict meanings, it's better to describe what I see as our
current missile defense approach, and it is this: It is to recognize
that there is a threat of ballistic missiles to this country and to
our friends and allies, and that our interest and the president's
interest had been to be able to do a broad-gauged research and
development program in missile defense, unconstrained by the ABM
Treaty, which he now has been able to do for a period of some months
-- six months, I think, is all.
A second principle that I have held is that it's -- I like the
feeling, the idea, of beginning, and putting something in the ground,
or in the air or at sea and getting comfortable with it, and using it,
and testing it and learning from that. A lot of things just don't
arrive fully developed, full-blown -- and there it is. So, by avoiding
those words, I think we maybe come to a better understanding as to
what's going to happen. I think the way to think about the missile
defense program is that it will be an evolutionary program, it will
evolve over a period of time. Any capability -- with a small "c"; I'm
not talking about initial capability, initial IOCs or any of that --
but capability with a small "c" will probably, one would hope, improve
as you go along. And it will -- when we're -- when it finishes some
day out there in the years ahead, it very likely will look quite
different than it begins. And it very likely will have layers. And it
very likely will involve a variety of different locations. And it will
very likely involve the participation of a number of countries.
So what the president was announcing was that -- and let me say one
other thing. Think of the Predator. The Predator was still in the
development and testing stage, and we've been using it in Afghanistan.
We've been using it in a few other places. Now, had it hit its -- gone
through all the checks and all the hurdles and was ready to go? No.
But we used it. Could we use the missile defense capability -- small
"c" -- in the event there were a need to use it, after some pieces of
it get put in place? Answer: Yes. Does that mean it would have been --
it would have been finished in any way? No. It would be a very
preliminary, modest capability, and you would be learning -- it would
be in a testing and learning mode. But also, in the event it were
needed, it would be able to provide you some limited capability to
deal with a limited number of ballistic missiles.
Now, is that -- that answers your question, I hope.
Q: Mr. Secretary, a related question, if I may. Some months ago, I
asked you, when you were on the podium, if the United States would
consider a preemptive strike against North Korea, if that country
threatened the United States. And your answer to me at that time was,
quote, "You got to be kidding," unquote. Things have changed, and
North Korea now has nukes that it admits to, and that we admit to.
Intelligence sources say it will have ICBMs --
Rumsfeld: I bet you didn't ask that question quite that way, and I bet
you I didn't answer it quite that way, did I?
Q: I think so, sir. But close.
Rumsfeld: Maybe you had to be there to appreciate it.
Q: Close. Close. Anyway, let me rephrase it.
We have a situation now where North Korea is clearly moving toward
being a threat to the United States, with nuclear weapons, with
ballistic missiles capable reaching the West Coast by the year 2004,
we're told. We have the possibility of a new presidential policy about
preemptive strikes.
I'm wondering if your feeling had changed at all, if North Korea
should develop its weapons to the point where they would indeed
threaten the U.S., would the United States consider a preemptive
strike?
Rumsfeld: Let me say a couple of things. Number one, when I was
chairing the Ballistic Missile Threat Commission, we reported on the
threat that North Korea poses to the United States, and that was back
four years ago. So I'm very sensitive and aware of what you're talking
about. Those capabilities have evolved and developed since then, and
the threat is more immediate and of a greater capability.
I would also add that -- and I don't believe there's anything secret
about this -- but as a former secretary of Defense, I was invited into
the Pentagon back in the early '90s, early to mid-'90s by the
secretary of Defense along with a number of my colleagues and briefed
on the fact that the United States was exceedingly concerned about the
evolving North Korean nuclear capability. And there were discussions
then about what one might do about it.
So full stop, this administration has, obviously, been working with
our friends and allies, in South Korea and Japan particularly, but
more recently with Russia and China, on the subject. And the president
is determined to find ways, through working with other friends and
allies around the world, to put the kind of pressure on North Korea
that its behavior conceivably might be moderated.
Q: A follow-up if I may, sir. All of that is all well and good, and it
may work. But if it does not, what would you recommend, and what would
the president do perhaps to remove the threat?
Rumsfeld: Well, as you know, I can't speak for what the president
might do. And what I recommend tends to be private to the president.
Q: Mr. Secretary, do you agree with Secretary Powell that the Iraq
weapons declaration is problematic? And if so, are the problems those
of omission or actual misstatements or lies?
Rumsfeld: I apologize. I have been out of the country for a number of
days and have not looked at the declaration or engaged the people who
are doing the analytical work. I heard what Colin said this morning.
He has been in town, and he has been attentive. So I have no reason to
not agree with it. I just don't have any first- hand knowledge about
it.
Yes.
Q: A question, and for General Myers also, on space-based systems that
would be crucial to any kind of missile defense program. General
Myers, if you could put your old space command hat back on. You've had
-- you have trouble now with both the SBIRS-high [space-based infrared
system] and SBIRS- low programs, those eyes in the sky that would pick
up enemy missiles being launched at the U.S. And Mr. Secretary, you've
been briefed on problems with the new spy satellite system, the FIA
program. To what extent do problems and delays with those three
programs complicate your effort to have even initial capability over
the next two years, given that those would be the eyes in space that
would let you know a launch has taken place and give you locations in
space where these missiles were coming from?
Rumsfeld: Go ahead.
Myers: I think the best that we can tell that the space-borne assets
that would warn of missile launch will continue with the current
systems we have up there, and then eventually be replaced with
SBIRS-high, as you said. And that the delays in SBIRS-high program
aren't going to affect that capability, it will be fielded in time to
make sure that is there.
As to the rest of the architecture, that's still being decided. And
one of the good things that happened when -- one of the many good
things that happened when the ABM Treaty went away was that we could
expand our horizons in terms of how we might put this architecture
together.
And so, some of those things are still being decided -- probably
better to ask General Kadish a specific architecture question like
that. But -- and it's also, I think, it's totally unrelated to -- you
were also talking about FIA, the Future Imagery Architecture; it's
unrelated to that particular system.
Q: Mr. Secretary, you talked to George Tenet a couple of weeks ago on
that program -- the spy satellite program. Can you give us the terms
of your concerns there? What cost and schedule, given how crucial that
is to transforming the military, anyway?
Rumsfeld: Well, first of all, you're connecting things that I don't
think -- in my mind I don't connect. A, you're certainly right. There
are some problems in a number of our satellite programs. And problems
-- I shouldn't say problems!
Q: (Off mike.)
Rumsfeld: Challenges -- good for you, Charlie! (Laughter.) Yeah, thank
you.
One of the things is some years back, for whatever reason, they
stopped taking out a margin of reserve. Yeah, what -- 30 percent or
something like that -- that they normally had for complicated new
problems. Well, they take that out, and then all of a sudden, for
decades you needed it, and you find you need it. So there --
obviously, what now you would say is a problem is an overrun of some
kind. But you always had them. But before, you had a reserve because
you knew you would have them because you're dealing with the unknown.
So, we're dealing with those kinds of problems. I've met with George
Tenet on this, I think, three times now, and we're close to getting a
way forward. So I think that's good.
Yes?
Q: Mr. Secretary, when you worked on the Ballistic Missile Commission,
one of the things you discovered was that many Americans assumed or
thought there was some basis on which the United States could defend
itself. A false sense of security, I believe the commission suggested
to Congress.
Now many Americans might see two items in the newspaper -- this rising
North Korea nuclear threat, and this initial deployment at Fort
Greely. What can you tell them about how effective the 10 initial
interceptors, if they do come on line in 2004, could be in dealing
with that threat, or is there -- should no security be gained from the
idea that that's going to be in there in two years, would something
else larger and more diplomatic be necessary to defuse the nuclear
threat, or will this be in some way helpful? Can you tell the American
people about that?
Rumsfeld: You're correct, we do not have a missile defense capability.
The United States cannot defend itself, currently, against ballistic
missiles coming from anywhere -- from the sea or from another
continent -- wherever. And for whatever reason, a lot of people
believed all along that we did have that capability. We don't.
The initial capability, when it's there with the first 10, and then a
following 10 set of interceptors -- (to staff) -- in how many years?
One year?
Staff: Ten in '04, 10 in '05.
Rumsfeld: Ten in '05 -- one year later -- would give us a limited
capability to deal with a relatively small number of incoming
ballistic missiles, which is better than nothing. And it's a start.
And these capabilities will evolve over time, in terms -- both in
terms of the sensors, as well as the interceptors, and as well as the
locations. And some may be afloat, and some may be on land.
Q: Mr. Secretary?
Q: If I could, Mr. Secretary. Should Americans feel marginally safer,
as they think about North Korea and that particular threat, which you
and others have identified, with these interceptors in place, or no?
Rumsfeld: The -- at the moment, when one looks out there, I think the
answer is yes. I think that it is certainly better to have that
capability than to not have it. That's why we're doing it. I wouldn't
want to overplay it. I wouldn't want to oversell it. I wouldn't want
to suggest that it has a depth or breadth or capability; that it will
take some time to evolve. But certainly the answer is yes.
Yes?
Q: Mr. Secretary?
Q: Well, just to follow that --
Rumsfeld: You've got J.D. and Kadish coming down here at --
Q: You're the boss, and so we like to try you on this.
Rumsfeld: Yeah, come on now. I lost my voice last week a little bit,
so you're -- the general can answer this one.
Q: You're both doing very well.
All right. So the system is two years behind schedule. You were
talking about in earlier -- other weapons systems, you always --
Rumsfeld: Let's hold right there. I don't think we are behind
schedule.
Q: You're not behind schedule?
Rumsfeld: No. When I came in two years ago -- less than two years ago,
alone for the first six months -- (chuckles) -- I should say, we
didn't have a schedule. We said, "Let's stop and look at this." And we
did. And we said, "Wait. Let's get rid of the ABM Treaty. Let's see if
we can't go ahead and look at a range of things that were prohibited
by the treaty." And so we didn't have a schedule as such.
And I think it would be -- we may be off someone else's schedule, but
certainly not any schedule that you could characterize as ours.
Q: Well, there was a schedule set when this administration came in.
And at this time, the United States is about two years behind that
schedule. So maybe you have a different schedule.
Rumsfeld: How could we have set a schedule two years ago -- less than
two years ago?
Q: The previous administration -- (inaudible) -- they were trying to
hit certain milestones.
Rumsfeld: Oh, the previous administration. Fair enough. Okay.
Q: And you know, whether you adhere to that schedule or not, you
mentioned that earlier weapons systems had many failures, and most
weapons systems that have had many failures are not being deployed at
the time that they are having many failures. Predator is an
interesting exception to that.
Rumsfeld: Mm-hmm. JSTARS -- another example.
Q: The radar system that you want to rely on to eventually use with
this system has not yet been built. There are old radar systems that
you're trying to modify, and yet you're putting this on the ground.
Your critics say this is driven by politics. Can you address -- is it
driven by politics, or is it driven by what you feel is an acute
national need?
Rumsfeld: It is driven by acute rationality. There isn't anything
we're doing in this department that it would be accurate to suggest is
rooted in politics. That's just false. I don't know who our critics
are who say that, but the -- this department is -- has taken a fresh
look at missile defense. We took a serious look at it, and we have had
serious people attempting to see what is the best way to deal with
this very clear problem and capability that exists in the world and is
growing in the world, and which increasingly, if one looks around, our
allies and friends around the world are asking us to assist them with.
The -- we are doing this in a very appropriate, methodical way, and we
are putting things out there that we will then learn from.
I think it is very clear that there have been any number of systems
that have been put in place before they were fully developed. Indeed,
part of what we're talking about in our whole acquisition process is
spiral development, where you don't wait till something's completely
done for 20 years; you begin the process, you put some capability out
there, and then you improve that capability in successive blocks. I
think it is a -- it is not -- it is, walking away, the best way to
approach this problem.
Q: Mr. Secretary, could we go back to Iraq just for a moment?
Rumsfeld: Sure.
Q: We keep hearing --
Rumsfeld: Were we there?
Myers: (Inaudible.)
Q: (Chuckles.)
Q: If your rundown of opening items, you mentioned Iraq.
Rumsfeld: Oh.
Q: We keep hearing from some military analysts, military experts that
war with Iraq might be a cakewalk, that in fact they might
-- the Iraqi forces might fold very quickly. How does that square with
your assessment of how war with Iraq might go?
Rumsfeld: Well, Dick Myers and I have both responded from this podium
that that's, in our view, not the way to look at this situation. First
of all, any war is a dangerous thing, and it puts people's lives at
risk.
And second, I think that it is very difficult to have good knowledge
as to exactly how Iraqi forces will behave. A part of it will depend
on a whole series of things, in the event they were to evolve and
occur, that could affect their behavior favorably or unfavorably. And
since those things we can't predict -- first of all, we don't know
what the president will decide or what anyone else will decide, if
there will be a use of force. But if there were to be such a decision,
it's not knowable in what the context might be. And that would affect,
one would think, how Iraqi forces would behave.
We do know that in a matter of hours some 60[,000], 70[,000], 80,000
[Iraqis] -- not hours, maybe days; it was two or three days -- dropped
their weapons and surrendered very quickly in the Desert Storm. What
would happen this time is an entirely open question.
Q: Mr. Secretary --
Rumsfeld: Do you want to answer that?
Myers: I would just say there's nobody involved in the military
planning, to include the secretary or any of the senior leadership in
this building, I think, that you'll find, that would say that this
sort of endeavor, if we were asked to do it, would be a cakewalk. I
mean, it's just not how we characterize it.
Now we are postured, of course, to exploit -- if we were asked, again,
we -- you know, to exploit opportunities. So -- but that's a different
matter, and that's not presupposing the sort of situation we're going
to find in the battlespace.
Q: Mr. Secretary, as a former --
Q: Mr. Secretary, you have said that it was important to begin a start
with the missile defense program. I'm wondering if that also part of
the importance of the start of this is that it's symbolic and it sends
a signal to rogue nations.
Rumsfeld: There's nothing symbolic about our missile defense
activities, believe me. It is -- there's nothing symbolic at all. It
is -- the reason I think it's important to start is because you have
to put something in place and get knowledge about it and have
experience with it, and then add to it over time. I mean, there isn't
a single weapon system we have that hasn't gotten better successively
over a period of time that I can think of.
Q: I'm wondering if it -- but it does send a signal to nations like
North Korea, would you think?
Rumsfeld: It should.
Q: The start of it?
Rumsfeld: Sure. I mean, look, there are no secrets around here. This
capability will be what it is, and it will be fully understood by the
world. Other countries will know what we are capable of. To the extent
we have a capability, it will have a deterrent effect, you're quite
right. To the extent it has a limited capability, it will have a
deterrent effect only to that limit.
Q: Mr. Secretary, as a former political candidate yourself, do you
think the way you're prosecuting the war --
Rumsfeld: I haven't run for office since 1968.
Q: Well, you did run!
Rumsfeld: (Laughs.)
Q: (Laughs.) And you even thought of running for president.
Do you think that the way you're prosecuting the war and homeland
defense are legitimate political issues? Number one. And number two,
do you intend to involve yourself in any way in the presidential
campaign leading up to 2004?
Rumsfeld: I think that it is -- a national dialogue on important
public issues is a part of our process, and I accept that. Second, I
have not been involved in any aspect of politics since I came to the
department, and I don't intend to be as long as I'm here.
Q: Mr. Secretary?
Rumsfeld: Yes?
Q: On Iraq. Hans Blix has asked the Iraqis for a list of scientists to
give evidence. But there are those critics, including among former
inspectors, who say that you would have to exfiltrate very extended
family of the scientists to protect them. So, how do you think this is
possible? And what's your comment, basically, on this?
Rumsfeld: I think that the comment that you would have to be willing
to take their families out as well is not a critical comment, it's a
fact. I mean, you certainly wouldn't want to take a single person out
and expect he's going to tell you the truth if his family is still
back in Iraq. So I think that's well understood.
We know for a fact that the most important information that inspectors
have ever gotten on what's going on in Iraq have come from defectors
and from people who had personal knowledge inside the country as to
what was happening, and knew where things were and knew how things
were done, and knew what the denial and deceptive approaches and
practices were. And when we had that kind of expert opinion from
inside -- from people who had been inside the country, knew the
programs, that was when we were able to discover things. You're not
going to find that if you walk up to some fellow on the streets of
Baghdad and say, "Gee, why don't you give me all your sevens." It
won't work that way. You've got to get them out and you've got to get
their families out. And that was an important part of the U.N.
resolution.
Q: Yes. But, if I may. But what about those scientists who are
reluctant to talk and to go abroad?
Rumsfeld: That's life. Then you can't get them. That's the way it is.
If I were an Iraqi government official, I would be as worried about
that provision as any other provision, because that is the provision
-- if they refuse to allow people to get out with their families, they
will have violated that resolution.
Q: Sir?
Rumsfeld: Yes? For Dick Myers.
Q: President Bush has mentioned often that time is not on our side in
dealing with Saddam Hussein. On the other hand, patience and working
deliberately and through the United Nations offers you the opportunity
to develop more international support.
You've talked a lot about balancing risks. How do you assess the risks
of waiting versus the benefits of waiting?
Rumsfeld: Well, I fully support the president's decision. And he's
made a calculation that we should approach it through the -- first
through the Congress, then through the United Nations, and we should
take this declaration and examine it and see what it really is saying.
And then he can make judgments.
I think that the advantage of doing that are obvious, and there are
several of them. Obviously, as you point out, every day that you go
on, his capabilities are probably improving, although I suspect that
some of the pressure from the inspectors has slowed them down a little
bit.
Q: So do you feel some urgency or not?
Rumsfeld: I feel that the president made the right decision, and we --
he's played the hand and we'll play it out.
Q: Mr. Secretary, with regard to --
Q: Going back --
Rumsfeld: Go ahead.
Q: With regard to yesterday's New York Times story, can you confirm
that --
Rumsfeld: I haven't read the New York Times. I mean, what kind of a
story -- (laughter).
Q: Mr. Secretary --
Rumsfeld: The sport's page?
Q: -- there was a report in the New York Times that there are
discussions going on in the department about using covert propaganda
tactics in allied nations. Can you confirm that such discussions are
going on?
Rumsfeld: I can't. I was briefed on that story before I came down. I
have not gone over it. It's interesting -- let me try to put it in
context, and then I'll see if I can answer it. I have no idea what
it's about, other than what I was just briefed on five minutes before
I walked down here. And in fact, I'm told that the story said that --
that it's somewhere down here, not up here.
What's going on is that the world has moved into the 21st century; we
have a different security environment. We and our friends and allies
around the world have militaries that were organized and trained and
equipped to go after armies, navies and air forces that are owned and
operated by nations. In the 21st century, we are finding that there
are very few armies, navies or air forces that are owned and operated
by nations that are coming at us; quite the contrary, we have a whole
series of threats with the very lethal weapons in the hands of
individuals and networks. And we have a set of problems that are quite
different.
So, what Dick Myers and I, and Paul Wolfowitz and Pete Pace have done
is we've said to this institution, look, put your thinking caps on!
How in the world are we going to change this institution so that we
can help defend the American people? And people at various levels all
the way down in agencies and departments go off and they come up with
ideas as to how we might do that. Do I see a tenth of those?? No. Does
Dick? No. Why? Because we've asked people to screw their heads into
these things, discuss them, talk about them, and develop them and then
bring them forward.
Well, a lot of them, like any thinking, falls away. Any research
problems -- I don't know how many -- in pharmaceutical business, we've
probably had, you know, 10,000 experiments for every one that produced
a product. And -- but you don't get to that one that produces a
product unless you've done that kind of work.
Then what happens is some person in the press talks to somebody in the
hall, and he says, "Gee, I've got a piece of classified piece of
paper, why don't you write an article about this?" (Laughter.)
Q: Is that really how it works? (Laughter, commotion.)
Rumsfeld: I don't know how it works!
Q: We're in the wrong hallway! (Laughter.)
Myers: (Laughs.)
Rumsfeld: And so he goes out and writes an article, and the article
says, "Gee, this fellow's working on this project, and he thinks this
and he thinks that." Now, does that mean it's going to happen? No!
Does it mean I've ever heard about it? No! Does it mean I ever will
hear about it? If it's a bad idea, probably not. And if it's a good
idea, and I hope I will hear about it eventually, then we might do
something.
Now --
Q: Is it a good idea? (Laughter.)
Rumsfeld: See, I didn't read the article. But the way you phrased it,
the answer is no. What do I mean? Any idea that works its way up and
finally is going to get implemented -- now the problem is that all the
people who read the New York Times go out there thinking, "Gee, I saw
the headline. I saw that bullet. Those people are thinking about doing
something like that." The truth is, we're not.
And any idea that gets its way up from the 50th level, works its way
up finally, what is it going to have to do? For funding, it's going to
have to go to the Congress. For money -- for oversight, it will be in
the Congress. It's got to get up to us, and what do we do with it? We
look at it and we say, just like we did with the Military Commission,
when everyone said, "Oh, my goodness! The Military Commission! They're
going to do these terrible things to these people!" What did we do? We
impaneled a group of intelligent people, lawyers from -- Republicans
and Democrats and liberals and conservatives and said, "We want to do
this right. Why don't you help us? Give us some advice." And anything
that gets into an area that's new or involves civil liberties of any
kind, clearly, we would deal with it in a responsible way, just as
we've dealt with the commissions in a responsible way. And they have
to work their way through that process.
And I -- the only thing that bothers me about it is that I walk down
the streets some day and someone says, "Gee, why are you doing those
crazy thing?" And we're not doing those crazy things! They're not
being done, and they won't get done if they're crazy!
But, I think that what people ought to do is to keep that as a context
for what's going on, and think about it. And think about what the
impression is in the world of misinformation going out, not from the
department, but from the people who report on the department. If it's
put in a way that people think, "Gee, they're really doing that
stuff," and we aren't.
And we don't intend to do things that are in any way inconsistent with
the laws, or our Constitution, or the principles and values of our
country. And the people in this department understand that. And it's
going to -- any idea like that that comes up, it's going to get
pounded by -- at so many levels by so many people, and then it's got
to go to the Congress, anyway, for support and sustainment.
Q: Mr. Secretary, if you could be more specific, sir. If it were
suggested to you that the military or the Defense Department should
perhaps pay foreign journalists to -- covertly pay foreign journalists
to write good articles about the United States or pay people to have
pro-U.S. demonstrations; and that's something that the military or the
Defense Department should be involved in, as opposed to the -- and
General Myers is shaking his head no. I mean, would you support that
as a -- (laughter) --
Rumsfeld: Well, I'd shake my head too. No, no. No one's ever proposed
it. And if someone brought it up, I would suggest that that's not the
business of this department.
Q: General Myers, in the secretary's top 8-1/2 accomplishments for
2002, he mentioned the Afghan army in the future will be able to take
the entire responsibility for defense of that country. What's the
current timetable for that day, please, sir?
Myers: I don't know that we have a timetable. It's going to be
event-driven. We are still in the process of building that army, as
you know. The last couple of battalions, the recruitment there has
been better than the previous by wide margins -- over 700, I think, in
the 5th battalion. We now have them out in the field; we have one
battalion out in the field with our troops, which we think is a good
thing because they can see a professional army perform, and we think
that will be instructive.
It's going to take -- it's going to be more event-driven than it will
be timetable-driven. And so we have to work our way through it. It
also requires, as you know, the demobilization of some of the forces
that are out there with some of the regional leaders as well. So --
Q: I don't want to presume, when you say event-driven, it's only --
just sort of go back to the missile defense thing -- events that the
army proves itself successfully or the army stumbles and it has to --
the timetable has to be set back; that would be similar to the
learning process the secretary sort of talked about weapons defense.
But if --
Myers: Right. But I think there's a lot of -- I mean, it's the
relationship between the central government in Kabul and the various
major cities and regions, that that relationship has to mature as this
army is being built. There's still an issue of equipping this army and
paying them over the long term, making sure they have the right
facilities. So there are a lot of things to go that would be very hard
to put a date on it. But --
Rumsfeld: Plus, it would be a mistake -- if I could interrupt. It
would be a mistake to say that the answer to security in Afghanistan
is the army. That's just not true. It's the attitude of the people.
It's the pace at which reconstruction takes place. It's the pace at
which people begin to believe that they have a stake in that
government. And you could fill that country with security forces --
Afghan, foreign, ours, anybody else's -- and it still wouldn't have
security, unless and until the people of that country decide they have
a country, and they care about that country, and they want to see it
succeed, and they keep bad people out.
And then it's still going to be a question of what's your definition
of security? I read yesterday, I think, there were something like 666
murders in Chicago last year, in a city, not a country. Is that
security? Yes. I lived in Chicago and I think it's a great city. I
love it. And -- but we have things like that in our country going on.
So it is a lot bigger than the Afghan army, or any other army.
I'm told that we should go.
Q: Mr. Secretary, one more question. General Eberhart --
Rumsfeld: No, no. No, no. No, no. No, no. No, no. No, no. We really
have to go. We've run over 15 minutes, I think.
Q: If you don't come back, may we miss you -- wish you a Merry
Christmas?
Rumsfeld: No, I'm going to come back. I'm not going to leave you like
that. I wouldn't want you to --
Q: All right.
Myers: Thank you.
Q: Nice try, General! (Laughs.)
Rumsfeld: But J.D. is here and -- there's Ron Kadish too. Good. They
can --
Q: They can do this on the record, is that okay?
Rumsfeld: I don't know --
Q: I think you've blown their cover, sir.
Voice: We're going to talk about that right now. (Laughter.) I have no
idea.
(end transcript)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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