18 November 2002
Transcript: NATO Summit Document to Address Missile Defense Threats
(Bolton: time for lamenting end of ABM Treaty "has passed") (2330)
A key State Department official says the final declaration of the NATO
Summit in Prague November 21-22 is expected to express "the need to
examine options to protect allied forces, territory, and population
centers against the full range of missile threats."
Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security
John Bolton told the Royal United Services Institute conference on
missile defense November 18 that the final declaration will establish
"the framework within which NATO allies can work cooperatively toward
fielding the required capabilities."
Speaking in London, Bolton said the time to lament the passing of the
1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and question whether
ballistic missile defense is an appropriate response to the spread of
weapons of mass destruction and missile proliferation "has passed."
The treaty's demise "has not brought about the dire consequences
predicted by many," he said. Instead, it has liberated the United
States to explore the full range of technologies and architectures
available. It has also been liberating "in terms of our broader
relationship with Russia," Bolton added.
Earlier in November, the U.S.-Russian working group on missile defense
met to continue work on transparency issues and further cooperation,
Bolton told conference participants. The United States has invited
Russia to observe the next Missile Defense Agency mid-course
interceptor flight test (IFT-10) tentatively scheduled for December,
he said, as well as to attend an advanced Patriot system exhibit at
Fort Bliss, Texas, followed by a visit to missile defense facilities
at Fort Greeley, Alaska.
The United States and the NATO alliance are engaged with Russia on the
subject of missile defense cooperation "under the auspices of the new
NATO-Russia Council," Bolton said. He called that "a positive and
practical first step in developing a future joint NATO-Russia missile
defense capability to protect deployed forces and critical assets."
Later on, NATO "will evaluate next steps and the potential for deeper
cooperation with Russia in this area," he said.
U.S missile defense cooperation is operating on a two-track approach,
he said. The first is the NATO track and the second is a bilateral one
in which the U.S. will work with individual European and Asian allies
and friends to develop missile defense capabilities.
Following is the text of Bolton's remarks, as delivered:
(begin transcript)
Missile Defense in a New Strategic Environment:
Policy, Architecture, and International Industrial Cooperation after
the ABM Treaty
John R. Bolton
Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security
Remarks to the Fourth RUSI Missile Defense Conference
London, England
November 18, 2002
I'm very pleased to be here this morning to deliver the keynote
address to the Royal United Services Institute's [RUSI] conference on
missile defense. I know that RUSI's program of lectures, conferences,
and seminars provides a valuable forum for the discussion of a wide
range of topics related to national and international defense and
security with a very broad audience. I hope that I can contribute
today to the dialogue on what I believe is a very important issue.
The debate about missile defense is certainly not a new one.
Nevertheless, the terms of the debate, as it has played out over the
last decade, certainly have changed. As the reference to "a new
strategic environment" in the title of this conference suggests, there
have been a number of watershed events since October of last year that
have radically altered the environment in which we are now discussing
questions of missile defense policy, architecture, and international
cooperation. The most significant of those events, of course, are the
United States withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, which became effective
on June 13 of this year, and the not coincidental, simultaneous
development of a new strategic relationship between the United States
and Russia. Several major building blocks of this relationship were
put in place at the May Summit meeting between Presidents Bush and
Putin in Moscow, namely the Moscow Treaty and the Joint Declaration on
the New Strategic Relationship Between the United State of America and
the Russian Federation.
In the context of our new strategic relationship with Russia, the
demise of the ABM Treaty has not brought about the dire consequences
predicted by many pundits; quite the contrary. The Treaty's demise
instead has been liberating. It has freed us to explore the full range
of technologies and architectures to defend against an increasing
ballistic missile threat. For example, the successful October 14
missile intercept test conducted by the Missile Defense Agency
involved for the first time a U.S. Navy Aegis destroyer using its
SPY-1 radar system to track the flight of the target missile. The
participation of a sea-based, mobile radar tracking a strategic
ballistic missile in this test would have been banned under the ABM
Treaty.
The demise of the ABM Treaty has also been liberating in terms of our
broader relationship with Russia. The ABM Treaty codified a doctrine
of mutual assured destruction that no longer made sense given the
changed international security environment and the end of the Cold War
rivalry. On May 1 of last year, even before his first meeting with
President Putin, President Bush laid out his vision of a new strategic
framework with Russia. He declared that we should work together with
Russia to replace the ABM Treaty with a new cooperative relationship
that would leave behind the adversarial legacy of the Cold War. A year
and a half later, the elements of a new strategic relationship
outlined by the President have largely been put in place. And as the
U.S.-Russia relationship has broadened and deepened, the significance
of the ABM Treaty has diminished.
This was evident in President Putin's dispassionate response to the
U.S. withdrawal decision. Although Russia did not agree with our
decision to withdraw from the Treaty, President Putin stated quite
explicitly that the U.S. decision presented no threat to the national
security of the Russian Federation.
Our withdrawal has not spurred an arms race or undermined strategic
stability. (I like to say that, in foreign ministries and editorial
boards for many years, whenever anyone typed "the 1972 ABM Treaty"
there was a key that automatically added, "the cornerstone of
international strategic stability." That key no longer works.) It is
significant that President Putin used his December 13 response to the
U.S. withdrawal announcement to call for further, legally-binding
reductions in strategic offensive weapons to below the 2,200 level,
thus responding positively to President Bush s statement at the
Washington/Crawford Summit that the U.S. would reduce its
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to a level between
1,700-2,200 over the next decade. These reductions have now been
codified in the Moscow Treaty, which we hope will be approved by the
U.S. Senate and the Russian Duma without delay.
The Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship that was also
signed at the May Summit in Moscow put in place a number of building
blocks for cooperation between the U.S. and Russia on missile defense.
In the Declaration, the two sides agreed to implement a number of
steps aimed at strengthening confidence and increasing transparency in
the area of missile defense, including the exchange of information on
missile defense programs and tests, reciprocal visits to observe
missile defense tests, and visits to observe and familiarize each side
with the other's missile defense systems. We also agreed to study
possible areas of missile defense cooperation.
Earlier this month, the U.S.-Russian working group on missile defense
met to continue its work on both transparency and cooperation. The
U.S. has invited the Russians to observe the Missile Defense Agency's
next mid-course interceptor flight test (IFT-10), which is tentatively
scheduled for next month; and, on a voluntary and reciprocal basis, to
attend an exhibition of the Patriot PAC-3 system at Ft. Bliss, Texas
and to visit missile defense-related facilities at Ft. Greeley,
Alaska.
There are also a number of other prospective areas of cooperation with
Russia that have real potential.
-- The Joint Declaration reaffirmed the two presidents' determination
to overcome the remaining obstacles to bringing the Joint Data
Exchange Center into operation.
-- Both sides have now expressed a desire to conclude an
intergovernmental agreement on the implementation of the
Russian-American Observation Satellite (RAMOS) program.
-- There is general agreement on developing a joint modeling and
simulation capability to examine missile defense system scenarios of
mutual interest.
-- Similarly, there is general agreement on expanding the breadth and
sophistication of our ongoing bilateral TMD (Theater Missile Defense)
exercise program.
-- We also want to encourage American and Russian industries to
propose mutually beneficial joint projects in the area of missile
defense, and we have proposed to the Russian side a number of projects
for joint technology cooperation.
The United States, along with the rest of NATO, is also engaged with
Russia on missile defense cooperation under the auspices of the new
NATO-Russia Council. The working group that has been established will
focus initially on missile defense terminology, concepts, and system
capabilities in order to develop procedures that could facilitate
protection of forces in a joint, non-Article V crisis response
operation. This is a positive and practical first step in developing a
future joint NATO-Russia missile defense capability to protect
deployed forces and critical assets. As work progresses, the Alliance
will evaluate next steps and the potential for deeper cooperation with
Russia in this area.
Turning the page on the ABM Treaty has also been liberating in another
respect. The Treaty prohibited cooperation on defenses against
longer-range ballistic missile threats with third countries. Now that
we are no longer bound by the Treaty, we can identify opportunities
and options for increased cooperation with friends and allies. In
July, U.S. teams went to NATO headquarters and fanned out to European
capitals to begin a dialogue on issues associated with missile
defense. We have also begun missile defense dialogues with our allies
in Asia.
The United States has developed a dual-track approach with regard to
missile defense cooperation with friends and Allies. We see these
tracks as separate but reinforcing. The first track is the NATO or
collective track.
Over the past several years, NATO has made progress in responding to
theater missile threats to its deployed forces. The Alliance is
currently completing a Theater Missile Defense Feasibility Study which
is examining options for providing missile defenses to defend deployed
Alliance forces against missiles with ranges up to 3,000 kilometers.
Once NATO completes the study, we believe that Allies should move
forward and acquire these needed capabilities.
We must also, however, take into account the need to defend Alliance
territory and populations against missile threats of all ranges. In
their June 6, 2002, "Statement of Capabilities," NATO Defense
Ministers concluded that "Alliance territory and population centers
may also face an increasing missile threat. Therefore, the Alliance
needs to examine options for addressing this increasing threat in an
effective and efficient way through an appropriate mix of political
and defense efforts." Without the ability to protect Allied territory
and population centers from missile attack, NATO's vulnerability to
political coercion and blackmail will only increase. As a follow-on to
the Ministers statement, on November 13, the North Atlantic Council
directed the initiation of a new missile defense feasibility study to
examine options for protecting Alliance territory and population
centers against a full range of missile threats.
In just a few days, NATO Heads of State and government will hold a
summit in Prague. We expect that the summit's final declaration will
express the need to examine options to protect Allied forces,
territory, and population centers against the full range of missile
threats. This will establish the framework within which NATO allies
can work cooperatively toward fielding the required capabilities.
The second track is the bilateral track, in which the United States
can work with individual Allies and friends -- both in Europe and Asia
-- to develop missile defense capabilities. In this track, we have a
proposed framework for participation in the U.S. missile defense
program. This framework would allow individual nations and their
industries to participate at various levels depending on their
interest, resources, and overall contributions.
We have conducted our initial consultations with friends and allies
without a predetermined missile defense architecture in mind or
complete answers to all of the relevant questions. We understand that
friends and allies have different motivations in approaching the issue
of cooperation -- some are interested in the benefits of industrial
cooperation and technology transfer; some believe more strongly than
others in the merits of missile defense both politically and
militarily; others approach this from the perspective of building a
closer bilateral relationship with the United States. The
consultations have also raised a number of complex issues, including
the budgetary implications and where missile defense should fit as a
priority among other defense needs, as well as command and control of
a potential European missile defense system. These are all important
questions that need to be addressed.
These questions also lead me to the main point that I want to leave
with you. The time for lamenting the passing of the ABM Treaty and
questioning whether ballistic missile defense is an appropriate
response to the spread of weapons of mass destruction and missile
proliferation has passed. The administration's policy is to develop
and deploy missile defenses as soon as possible that are capable of
protecting the United States, our deployed forces, as well as friends
and allies against the growing missile threats we face. The Treaty no
longer impedes our ability to develop, test, and deploy the most
effective defenses against the full range of missile threats, and we
are moving forward with a broad-based development and testing program
designed to take advantage of new technologies and basing modes.
It is no longer a question of whether missile defenses will be
deployed. Rather the relevant questions are now "what," "how," and
"when." The train is about to pull out of the station. We invite our
friends, allies, and the Russian Federation to climb on board.
(end transcript)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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